<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - DRC</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 01 Jun 2013 11:00:32 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>Analysis: AU prepares its shock troops</title><pubDate>Fri, 31 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305131245260795t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 31 May 2013 (IRIN) - A newly sanctioned African Union (AU) force for quick deployment in conflicts such as in Mali is being promoted as a stop-gap measure ahead of the planned formation of the “rapid deployment capability” (RDC) African Standby Force (ASF).</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 31 May 2013 (IRIN) - A newly sanctioned African Union (AU) force for rapid deployment in conflicts such as in Mali is being promoted as a stop-gap measure ahead of the planned formation of the “rapid deployment capability” (RDC) African Standby Force (ASF). 

Unlike the ASF, which will also have policing and civilian duties, the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (AICRC) force will have “a strictly military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergency situations upon political decisions to intervene in conflict situations within the continent,” Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, chairperson of the AU Commission, said in her recent report [ http://cpauc.au.int/en/content/report-chairperson-commission-operationalisation-rapid-deployment-capability-african-standby ] to the AU summit in Addis Ababa. 

While the AU’s failure to resolve crises in countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Mali has been a source of embarrassment to the continent-wide body, the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is widely regarded as a success, with the annual US$500 million running costs bankrolled by international partners [ http://www.irinnews.org/film/4786/Soldiers-Stories ].

AMISOM provides “pride” for the AU, according to analysts, as African forces at the cost of significant lives (some estimates say thousands), were able to achieve what a far better equipped US force failed to do in Somalia - bring about an opportunity for peace. 

Spurred into action 

Dlamini-Zuma said in her report Mali was a spur for the AICRC’s formation and it was “obvious” an African military force with an RDC would have meant the French military intervention would not have been “the only recourse”. 

Solomon Dersso, a senior researcher at the Addis Ababa office of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) [ http://www.issafrica.org/ ], a Pretoria-based think tank, told IRIN Mali interim president Dioncounda Traoré’s reaching out to former colonial power France for military assistance to counter the Islamist rebels “left a bad taste in the mouths of many people here [Addis Ababa and AU headquarters] and led to discussions at the highest level of the AU.”
 
According to Dlamini-Zuma, the AICRC will be drawn from a “reservoir of 5,000 troops, with operational modules in the form of tactical battle groups of 1,500 personnel that can be deployed rapidly… which must have a minimum initial self-sustainment period of 30 days”. 

The report said the AICRC would have three tactical battle groups, comprised of three infantry battalions of 850 troops each, an artillery support group and light armour elements, as well as an air wing of 400 troops, which would include strike aircraft and helicopters and logistical support, including strategic airlift capabilities. The unit would have a “10-day notice of movement”.
 
The force headquarters will have a nucleus of 50 staff and AICRC duties would range from “stabilization, peace enforcement and intervention missions; neutralization of terrorist groups, other cross-border criminal entities, armed rebellions; and emergency assistance to Member States within the framework of the principle of non-indifference for protection of civilians,” Dlamini-Zuma’s report said. 

Lamamra Ramtane, AU commissioner for peace and security, said in a statement [ http://summits.au.int/en/sites/default/files/21ST_AU_SUMMIT_-_PRESS_BRIEFING_OF_COMMISSIONER_PEACE_AND_SECURITY[1].pdf ] that troop contributions to the AICRC would be on a voluntary basis by member states and those countries participating would finance the AICRC so it could “act independently”. 

On the face of it, the AICRC looks like a prototype of the ASF, except there appear to be slight differences in the way the two forces can be deployed. Lamamra said: “Command and control [of the AICRC] will be ensured by the AU Peace and Security Council upon request of a Member State for intervention.” 

The ASF mandate under the Constitutive Act of the AU adopted in 2000, is a complete break from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, which adopted a philosophy of non-interference in member states. The Act gave the AU both the right to intervene in a crisis, and an obligation to do so “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.
 
Clayson Monyela, spokesperson for the South Africa foreign affairs department, told IRIN the AU remained committed to the ASF, and although any AICRC deployment was conditional on a government’s invitation, “there may be exceptional circumstances” where the force could intervene in the absence of such a request.
 
Ad hoc forces
 
Outside of AU and UN missions, African military operations have favoured ad hoc forces, such as the four-country force ranged against Joseph Kony’s Lord Resistance Army (LRA) [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95426/security-a-quick-reaction-force-moulded-by-africa-s-circumstances ].

The advantage of ad hoc forces, Sivuyile Bam, the AU Commission head of the Peace and Support Operations Division, told IRIN last year, was that it used the lead nation concept and was more direct, rather than dealing in the political intricacies of the ASF. “A country can go to the AU [with the ad hoc system] and say I have got a battalion. I will deploy it tomorrow.” 

Bam envisaged a “combined system for the next 5-10 years. The ASF system is maturing and taking time to develop and still relying on the lead nation [ad hoc] concept. So when there is a need for an operation - send out a note to the (AU) member states saying `I need soldiers, please help me out’.” 

The AICRC is framed as a “temporary arrangement”, the ISS’s Dersso said, but “once it gets a life it may take a different course altogether, depending on its success,” and may evolve from an ad hoc force into a “fully fledged unit” at the disposal of the AU.
 
Some analysts have argued that a functioning, efficient and well equipped ASF may still lack the capacity to simultaneously operate in places like South Sudan, the Sahel and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 

If and when the ASF eventually materializes, troop contributions to the five stand-by brigades will be based on Africa’s five regional economic blocs with each supplying about 5,000 troops, 720 police officers and 60 civilian members (e.g. human rights advisers, political affairs and public information officers) - and each regional bloc’s brigade will be placed on a six month rotational standby every two years to be available for rapid deployments. 

The ASF will fulfil a range of functions, for example, supplying troops for attachment to a regional military, political or UN mission; or it may deploy a regional peacekeeping force within a 30-day timeframe, or 14 days in “grave circumstances”, such as genocide.
 
Question marks over military capacity 

An urgent need for quick reaction forces was highlighted in a recent ISS report [ http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-future-of-intra-state-conflict-in-africa ] that said “the risk of instability and violence [in Africa] is likely to persist and even increase in some instances.” 

Drivers of conflict cited by the report included: the fact that “many states were trapped somewhere in between autocracy and democracy;” the “bad-neighbourhood” syndrome resulting in the effects of conflict spilling across borders; and post-conflict states lapsing back into “repeat violence”. 

The imminent deployment of a 3,000-strong “robust, highly mobile” intervention force - comprising troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania - under the masthead of SADCBrig (Southern African Development Community Brigade) to “neutralize” armed groups in the eastern DRC under UN Resolution 2098 has a stronger resemblance to the AICRC’s mandate rather than to the ASF’s, as it will comprise a combat force without any civilian or policing appendages [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97999/is-more-force-in-the-drc-more-of-the-same ].

However, deployment of the intervention force in DRC is being delayed by a combination of factors, including an increasing scarcity of available heavy air lift aircraft, and a paucity of landing strips capable of handling them, Helmoed-Romer Heitman, a senior correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, told IRIN. 

“How do you deploy quickly if you don’t have heavy airlift?” he asked. African militaries were chartering aircraft “as usual”, but relied on former Soviet logistical aircraft, such as Antonovs, which were becoming obsolete, he said.
 
South Africa ordered eight Airbus military A400m transport aircraft in 2005 at a cost of about US$1 billion, but later cancelled the order citing financial constraints and associated cost increases, and was reimbursed the $407 million down-payment in December 2011 by the European aircraft manufacturer. The transport aircraft were expected to enter service in 2013.
 
Heitman also questioned how the AU defined the concept of “quick reaction”, alluding to recent events in Bangui, the capital of the Central Africa Republic (CAR), that saw the botched deployment of South African troops in support of CAR President Francois Bozizé. Thirteen South African troops were killed and two others died from wounds on their return.
 
“A lot can happen in 48 hours. Putting a paratroop battalion on the ground in 24 hours is a quick reaction,” he said. 

go/cb 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98139/Analysis-AU-prepares-its-shock-troops</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305131245260795t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 31 May 2013 (IRIN) - A newly sanctioned African Union (AU) force for quick deployment in conflicts such as in Mali is being promoted as a stop-gap measure ahead of the planned formation of the “rapid deployment capability” (RDC) African Standby Force (ASF).</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>NGOs concerned about new DRC Intervention Brigade</title><pubDate>Fri, 31 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305300513560216t.jpg" />]]>GOMA 31 May 2013 (IRIN) - Nineteen international NGOs have sent a joint letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to express concern over the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and future military operations by a new UN Intervention Brigade.</description><body><![CDATA[GOMA 31 May 2013 (IRIN) - Nineteen international NGOs have sent a joint letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to express concern over the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and future military operations by a new UN Intervention Brigade.

The letter, dated 23 May and made public this week, asks the secretary-general to call on the 11 African states that signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) in Addis Ababa in February to implement the agreement, and to work with UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Mary Robinson.

The letter also recommends that the UN Security Council “should seriously consider suspension of the [UN Intervention] Brigade if it does not perform well or if the Congolese government does not make sufficient progress in implementing its commitments under the PSCF” agreement.

The brigade of 3,069 troops from Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi, which the UN peacekeeping department says should be operational by mid-July, has been given a more offensive mandate [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97999/is-more-force-in-the-drc-more-of-the-same ] than any previous contingent with a UN peacekeeping mission. UN Security Council Resolution 2098 empowers it to carry out “targeted and robust offensives… with a view to neutralizing and disarming armed groups”, whilst “taking into account the necessity to protect civilians and reduce risks”.

The NGOs’ letter asks Ban for his leadership “in ensuring that the operations of the Brigade… are clearly linked to the realization of the PSCF” and that it “is part of a broad, comprehensive approach to achieve long-term peace and stability”.

The NGOs also call on Ban to ensure that “planning and conduct of the Brigade’s operations prioritize mitigation of harm to civilians” and to urge “the Congolese government… to put in place a fully independent national oversight mechanism to oversee the implementation of its commitments outlined in the PSCF”.

Dialogue and DDR

Under this heading, the letter says “this should include local level dialogue to address the local causes of conflict and community grievances, as well as comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) options for combatants, irrespective of nationality.”

During his visit to the North Kivu provincial capital Goma on 23 May Ban made it clear that the UN does not see the Brigade as the sole solution to eastern DRC’s conflicts.

"The Intervention Brigade will address all this violence” he told local media, “and will try their best to protect human lives, human rights and human dignity - but you should also know that this is only one element of a much larger process. I think a peace deal must deliver a peace dividend, health, education, jobs and opportunity."

NGOs fear being linked with military action

One of the concerns that prompted NGOs to write the letter was the possible impact on their own work of future operations by the Brigade, said Frances Charles, advocacy manager for NGO World Vision (which sent the letter on behalf of the signatories).

“The issue of how the Brigade is related to the rest of the integrated mission and how independent humanitarian actors such as NGOs relate to MONUSCO is, I think, a very big issue.

“We have to preserve independent humanitarian access. MONUSCO needs to make clear to communities how all the different parts of the (UN) mission work together.

“One thing we are very concerned about, as World Vision, is being linked to any military action. We are independent and we want to make sure that our access to communities is maintained.”

Peacekeeping versus offensive action

Several observers have questioned whether MONUSCO’s existing role of protecting civilians, particularly in displaced peoples’ camps, will be possible in areas where the Brigade attacks armed groups, as this could result in retaliation against all UN military and civilian personnel as well as against other aid workers and civilians.

The interim head of MONUSCO’s office in Goma, Alex Queval, told journalists that all necessary precautions would be taken to ensure that peacekeepers continue all their existing work, but he did not go into details.

For its part the M23 rebel group [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97779/briefing-m23-one-year-on ] has suggested that the Brigade will need to work in different areas to the other peacekeepers.

"It’s a very complicated situation for us,” M23 spokesman Rene Abandi told IRIN this week. “Blue helmets come with an offensive mandate while others are deployed in the same areas with a peacekeepers' mandate. They have really to separate areas so that we can make the distinction."

Speaking to the UN News Centre on 29 May, the commander of the Intervention Brigade, Tanzanian Brig-Gen James Aloizi Mwakibolwa, acknowledged there are fears among some observers that the Brigade will exacerbate tensions.

“Perhaps they expect collateral damage to the extent that several people are not positive about the Brigade,” he said.

“It should be understood that our first concern should be the protection of civilians as we take on the armed groups,” he added. “A UN peacekeeper is a person who must protect UN staff and UN property but, above all, he must protect the civilians.”

The brigadier stressed that while he heads the brigade, he is not the head of the UN force in the country. “We are part of MONUSCO and our instructions come from the force commander of MONUSCO,” he said.

Goma groups support Brigade

Civil society groups in Goma are generally supportive of the Intervention Brigade and its offensive mandate.

“For the first time people feel they can look forward to a better future - because the new force has a mission to put an end to the armed groups,” said Goyon Milemba, team leader of the North Kivu civil society association’s working group on security issues, after the arrival of the Brigade’s headquarters staff in Goma last month.

“If people think you can protect civilians by stopping attacks on armed groups, they are wrong. We need a lasting peace and that peace will have to be imposed by striking hard against negative forces,” the president of the North Kivu civil society association, Thomas d’Aquin Muiti, told IRIN.

He acknowledged there would be collateral damage but said the situation for the people in displaced camps is intolerable.

“This does not mean MONUSCO should stop protecting displaced people,” he said. “Rather it should reinforce protection.”

He added that the government should recognize it will have an additional responsibility for protection as the Brigade starts offensive operations.

nl/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98140/NGOs-concerned-about-new-DRC-Intervention-Brigade</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305300513560216t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GOMA 31 May 2013 (IRIN) - Nineteen international NGOs have sent a joint letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to express concern over the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and future military operations by a new UN Intervention Brigade.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Beyond emergency needs in DRC</title><pubDate>Thu, 30 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201010210751260211t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 30 May 2013 (IRIN) - Humanitarian response in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) should broaden beyond emergency needs to encompass underlying dynamics of conflict, according to a report by the international refugee NGO Norwegian Refugee Council.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 30 May 2013 (IRIN) - Humanitarian response in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) should broaden beyond emergency needs to encompass underlying dynamics of conflict, according to a report [ http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9676206.pdf ] by the international refugee NGO Norwegian Refugee Council.

“The chronic and extreme violence in the eastern DRC poses a stark challenge to traditional humanitarian ‘urgent response mode’ approaches. The humanitarian service machinery has become a virtually permanent fixture in the region, serving victims of multiple displacements and repeating cycles of violence for two decades… Protection in this conflict cannot be achieved solely by providing services to victims,” says the report.

For instance, it argues that in the Kivus, which have borne the brunt of the conflict, every community is at constant risk of conflict and displacement “until military and armed-group violence against civilians is brought under control.”

“There are no ‘durable solutions’ here without a change in the level of peace and stability, and changes in the destructive behaviour of the armed parties towards civilians,” the report noted.

Many puzzle pieces

In an interview with IRIN, Kyung wa-Kang, the deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), called for a “clear commitment from both political leaders and the international community to improve governance” and help bring “security and help achieve human dignity in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the wider Great Lakes region.”

The Congolese government has been accused of only half-heartedly implementing peace agreements with rebel groups.

“Rather than effectively implementing the 23 March 2009 peace agreement signed by the government and the CNDP (National Council for the Defence of the People), the Congolese authorities have instead only feigned the integration of the CNDP into political institutions, and likewise the group appears to have only pretended to integrate into the Congolese army,” International Crisis Group,  global think-tank, said in an October briefing [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/b091-eastern-congo-why-stabilisation-failed.aspx ].

“The peace agreements that have been signed between the government and rebel groups provides for a real opportunity to push forward the agenda for lasting peace, but each party must be serious in ensuring it works and they do their part in making this fruitful,” Kang added.

In February, 11 leaders signed a UN-brokered peace accord aimed at ending the conflict in DRC and bringing peace to the wider Great Lakes region. “The agreement gives the people of eastern DRC their best chance in many years for peace, human rights and economic development,” UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said during his recent visit to the region [ http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=2846 ].

In March, the UN Security Council passed a resolution setting up the first-ever UN peacekeeping brigade, whose mandate would include battling rebel groups in DRC and monitoring an arms embargo along with a panel of UN experts. It will observe and report on the flows of military personnel, weapons and equipment across the border of eastern Congo, including by surveillance aided by unmanned aerial systems.

Kang noted to IRIN, “Bringing lasting peace in the DRC will involve deepening democracy” and engaging all sides “involved the conflict”, saying the recently proposed 3,000-strong UN-backed intervention brigade should be seen only as “a part of a wider puzzle.”

Protection needs

The long-running conflicts in eastern parts of DRC have forced more than two million people to flee their homes. Thousands more have become victims of violence and abuse. In the last six months, the number of those displaced inside DRC  increased by more than 150,000 people, with most of the displacements being in North Kivu Province. The insecurity has further compelled an estimated 90,000 to flee into Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda over the same period, according to OCHA [ http://www.unocha.org/drc/reports-media/situation-reports ].

The international community, the NRC report argues, “has invested significantly in initiatives aimed at documenting protection needs - information gathering and early warning systems,” something OCHA’s Kang says might be threatened by the increasing crises in places like Syria, which continue to “suck donor funding and receive greater humanitarian attention.”

ko/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98131/Beyond-emergency-needs-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201010210751260211t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 30 May 2013 (IRIN) - Humanitarian response in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) should broaden beyond emergency needs to encompass underlying dynamics of conflict, according to a report by the international refugee NGO Norwegian Refugee Council.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Digital jobs offer skills, promise to Africa&apos;s unemployed youth</title><pubDate>Tue, 28 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305281532240097t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG/NAIROBI 28 May 2013 (IRIN) - Although Africa’s economy has expanded rapidly in recent years, it has not kept pace with the growth of its youth population or their need for jobs.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG/NAIROBI 28 May 2013 (IRIN) - Although Africa’s economy has expanded rapidly in recent years, it has not kept pace with the growth of its youth population or their need for jobs. 

With almost 200 million people between 15 and 24 years old - a figure that is set to double by 2045, according to the African Economic Outlook’s (AEO) 2012 report [ http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/in-depth/youth_employment/ ] - the continent has the youngest population in the world. Yet despite the increasing percentage of Africa’s young people with secondary and tertiary educations, many find themselves unemployed or underemployed in the informal economy. Part of the problem, according to the AEO study, is a mismatch between the skills young jobs seekers have to offer and those that employers need. 

The world’s increasingly digitalized economy needs workers with the skills to capture and manage the vast amounts of data it generates. With appropriate training, such tasks can be performed anywhere in the world. Data generated by a high-tech company in Silicon Valley, for example, can be processed by youth with smartphones or tablets living in a slum in Nairobi, Kenya. This means that digital work could potentially alleviate the unemployment and poverty hampering development in many African countries.

Both the private and humanitarian sectors are starting to recognize this potential and find ways to harness it.

Skills for the future

The Rockefeller Foundation recently launched Digital Jobs Africa [ http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/current-work/digital-jobs-africa ], a seven-year, US$83 million initiative to improve the lives of one million people in six African countries through digital job opportunities and skills training. 

Eme Essien Lore, the foundation’s Nairobi-based senior associate director, explained that having identified youth unemployment as one of Africa’s most pressing problems, the organization was looking for ways to help young people on the continent gain sustainable, long-term job opportunities. 

“The reason digital employment really rose to the top for us was because we saw the skills they get from these kinds of jobs as a springboard to other types of employment,” she told IRIN. “We know young people take time to figure out what they want to do. Also, we don’t know what the future labour market is going to look like. So we thought this was a very important sector because it develops skills they can use whether they stay in the digital economy or move into other sectors.” 

The six focus countries - Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco and South Africa - share particularly high youth unemployment rates and have rapidly developing information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructures. Some, such as Nigeria and South Africa, have booming ICT sectors in need of labour, while others, such as Morocco, are well-placed to meet demand from Europe and the US, said Lore. 

Winnie Mwihaki, 24, is among 500 Kenyan youths from poor backgrounds recruited by one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s grantees - San Francisco-based non-profit Samasource. Globally, the company has connected an estimated 3,700 young people in nine countries to paying work and hopes to expand this number to 5,000 by the end of 2013. 

Samasource secures data- and content-processing jobs from its US-based clients, and then uses its specially developed software to break these large digital projects down into small computer-based tasks it calls “microwork”. This work is then distributed to local partners that are responsible for recruiting, training and managing employees. 

Unlike most companies in the business process outsourcing (BPO) and information technology outsourcing industry, Samasource only employs people living below the poverty line. Workers must also be between 18 and 30 years old, and preference is given to women, who are less likely to have access to formal employment. 

“Part of the criteria is that people need to be literate in English,” added Lauren Schulte, director of marketing and communications at Samasource. “They don’t have to have any computer skills. We can bring someone in with virtually no experience, and in a matter of weeks they can start doing small tasks on a computer.”

With her monthly salary of 13,000 shillings [$149], Mwihaki is able to assist her mother, who had been struggling to care for their family of six. “Because of the money I earn from here, I am now able to help my mother [and] to also be a breadwinner in the family,” Mwihaki told IRIN.

Mwihaki grew up in Korogocho, a sprawling slum in Nairobi, where crime is commonplace. She was unable to proceed to college after secondary school because her parents could not afford it.

“Now I will use part of what I earn from this job to sponsor myself through college,” she said. 

A new trajectory

Samasource is not the only company targeting disadvantaged people in low-income areas with digital employment. Another Rockefeller Foundation grantee, Digital Divide Data, operates on a similar principle and employs more than 1,000 people in Cambodia, Kenya and Laos. Both companies are considered pioneers of impact sourcing, which the Rockefeller Foundation defines as “the socially responsible arm of the BPO and information technology outsourcing industry”.

 A relative newcomer to the sector, and another Rockefeller Foundation grantee, is the Impact Sourcing Academy (ISA) in Johannesburg, South Africa. ISA combines a training and job placement programme with a fully functional call centre that gives its students the opportunity to obtain practical work experience while earning enough money to help support their families. 

“We’re not so much interested in just giving them a job as a call centre agent,” said ISA head Taddy Blecher. “We really want to make sure they’re doing part-time studies while they’re working, getting access to more knowledge and training so they can move into higher-level jobs.”

Once graduates are fully employed and earning a decent salary, they are encouraged to fund another student from a similar background. Using this model, the academy is already about 65 percent self-funded and aims to be completely self-funded in the future.

Blecher described the Rockefeller Foundation initiative as “a massive opportunity” for South Africa, given the need for skilled labour to work in its booming BPO sector and its 51 percent youth unemployment rate. “In a short period of time, you can bring a family out of poverty and put them on a whole new trajectory,” he told IRIN.

Opening doors

For now, evidence that impact sourcing really can lift families out of poverty is limited to the small studies the Rockefeller Foundation has conducted with Samasource and Digital Divide Data. “What we want to do next is really measure the impacts on a household level,” said Lore. “Anecdotally, we’re quite convinced, but we need to work on measuring over the next seven years.”

The Rockefeller Foundation does not stipulate a minimum wage that its grantees must pay, and the line between a living wage and an exploitatively low wage can be a fine one. “This is a sector where companies’ first priority is really around cost savings,” acknowledged Lore. “If you take the example of someone living in a slum, [a job like this] won’t get them into a nicer neighbourhood. But it might be able to buy food for the family and get younger siblings into school,” she said.

She added that the demand for young people with these skills is such that they are often poached by rival companies offering slightly higher salaries. “We’ve seen that when people move from these jobs, usually after about two years, they go on to better jobs. You rarely see people sitting in these types of jobs indefinitely.”

ks/ko/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98114/Digital-jobs-offer-skills-promise-to-Africa-apos-s-unemployed-youth</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305281532240097t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG/NAIROBI 28 May 2013 (IRIN) - Although Africa’s economy has expanded rapidly in recent years, it has not kept pace with the growth of its youth population or their need for jobs.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Malaria overstretching healthcare in DRC</title><pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201101050950250805t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - Gaps in the healthcare system in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are hampering the fight against malaria, a leading killer of children, say experts.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - Gaps in the healthcare system in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are hampering the fight against malaria, a leading killer of children, say experts.

Malaria accounts for about a third of outpatient consultations in DRC clinics, Leonard Kouadio, a UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) health specialist, told IRIN. He added, “It is the leading cause of death among children under five years and is responsible for a significant proportion of deaths among older children and adults.”

Kouadio continued: “Recent retrospective mortality surveys have revealed that in all regions of the country, the fever is associated with 40 percent of [deaths of] children under five.”

Malaria is also a leading cause of school absenteeism in DRC, and it may have other adverse effects. “In cases of severe malaria, children who survive face serious health problems such as epilepsy, impaired vision or speech,” he said.

According to UN World Health Organization (WHO) estimates [ http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs094/en/index.html ], out of about 660,000 malaria deaths globally in 2010, at least 40 percent occurred in DRC and Nigeria. 

In DRC, malaria accounts for about half of all hospital consultations and admissions in children younger than five, according to the government’s National Programme for the Fight against Malaria (NMCP). On average, Congolese children under five years old suffer six to 10 episodes of malaria per year, according to UNICEF’s Kouadio.

Other leading causes of death among under-five Congolese children include acute respiratory infections, diarrhoeal diseases and malnutrition, according to UNICEF’s 2013-2017 DRC Country Programme Document. 

A deficient health system 

“It is apparent that major deficiencies in the health system have contributed to the severity of recurrent outbreaks [of malaria],” Jan Peter Stellema, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) operational manager, told IRIN via email. 

“Mosquito nets are not being sent to vulnerable areas, and there are shortages of rapid diagnostic test [kits and] drugs and the equipment for carrying out blood transfusions vital for children suffering from anaemia caused by malaria.” 

Other problems include costly care and management challenges.

For example, the treatment of an uncomplicated bout of malaria ranges from about US$22 to $35, and treatment for severe cases can cost $75 to $100, according to NMCP. Such costs are prohibitive for a large number of people, many of whom live on about one dollar a day.

“In DRC, the absence of other healthcare providers and overstretched health systems leave people vulnerable to contracting malaria. Too many health centres lack the supplies necessary for coping with a new outbreak, and as a result children are dying because they did not receive care for malaria,” MSF’s Stellema said.

According to the DRC Country Programme Document, “Governance, management and coordination problems plague the [health] system at the national, provincial and local levels, thereby undermining political commitment, planning, budgetary expenditure, coordination and alignment of partnerships, the accountability and transparency of service providers, and the participation of the population in management of the services.” 

It adds, “Combined with extreme poverty, these factors create financial barriers hampering families’ access to nutrition and services, and weaken the social standards that are essential for keeping families together and maintaining a protective environment for children.”

Investment in healthcare needed

“The absence of government investment and the fragmentation of public assistance have eroded the capacity of civil society and of functional public facilities to maintain quality services,” adds the DRC Country Programme Document.

“The re-mergence and expansion of certain epidemics (polio [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91200/DRC-Polio-cases-on-the-rise ], measles [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94516/DRC-Measles-immunization-campaign-targets-1-7-million-children ] and cholera [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94028/DRC-Fighting-cholera ]) are proof of that. In addition, little has been done to modernize infrastructure. Essential supply systems, such as the cold chain, have not been put in place,” it states.

There is an urgent need to address the struggling health system to fight malaria, experts say.

“The fight against this scourge must remain a top priority of the country, despite the lack of financial resources,” said UNICEF’s Kouadio. “The government and its partners should increase the funding for the fight against malaria in the DRC, in particular, acquisition and universal distribution of mosquito nets to households, provision of essential drugs and rapid diagnostic test [kits], and dissemination of environmental sanitation measures.”

Malaria occurs almost year-round in DRC due its tropical climate and its river and lake system. The country has some 30 large rivers totalling at least 20,000km of shoreline, and 15 lakes totalling about 180,000km, which offer environments conducive to the proliferation of diseases and disease vectors, including the Anopheles mosquito, which spreads malaria. 

According to MSF’s Stellema, the DRC government and national and international health actors need to take rapid and sustainable measures to prevent and treat malaria in order to avoid unnecessary child deaths. In 2012, MSF treated half a million Congolese for malaria, many of them children under five.

“MSF's emergency response is saving lives in the short term. But in the longer term, the organization cannot address the [malaria] crisis alone,” said Stellema.

so/aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98069/Malaria-overstretching-healthcare-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201101050950250805t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - Gaps in the healthcare system in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are hampering the fight against malaria, a leading killer of children, say experts.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Towards internal solutions to the DRC crisis</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97999/Is-more-force-in-the-DRC-more-of-the-same ] will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there. 

The over-3,000-strong military force will work alongside the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) to carry out targeted offensives against militia groups, which have caused numerous civilian deaths and massive population displacements. 

While some welcome the forthcoming military intervention, many analysts are advocating for Kinshasa-led initiatives - such as reforming key institutions - as necessary, if not alternative, solutions. 

In this briefing, IRIN highlights some of the key issues that the DRC government needs to address to secure its restive east.  

How can the security sector be reformed? 

An effective security sector is key to resolving most of DRC’s problems, according to analysts. 

“The Congolese government’s inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else,” according to The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, a 2012 report by a group of Congolese and international civil society organizations [ http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/drc-ssr-report-20120416-1.pdf ]. 

“An effective security sector - organized, resourced, trained and vetted - is essential to solving problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals,” the report says. 

But little money is being directly spent on security sector reform (SSR), it notes.  For example, while official development assistance to DRC post-2006 has amounted to at least US$14 billion, just over one percent, or about $84.79 million, has gone to SSR. 

The report blamed the international community for being “politically incoherent and poorly coordinated” with regard to SSR. It also blamed the DRC government’s lack of political will to take on SSR, attributed to its endemic corruption.  

According to Naomi Kok, a research consultant with the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), “SSR is a long-term project for the DRC, and Kinshasa should take most of the responsibility for completing this successfully.” 

But DRC’s government needs to take charge first. “The problem of the DRC is a weak, and some may argue an illegitimate, government, unable to take full control and charge of its vast territory,” Nicholas Opiyo, a Kampala-based lawyer with the Akijul consultancy [ http://www.akijul.org/index.php ], told IRIN. 

He added:  “The weakness or division in the Congolese army is only... a manifestation of the broader breakdown in the governance infrastructure of the country. As a result, everyone finds resort in a patchy solution, taking control of the instruments of violence.” 

How can the army be reined in? 

Acts of violence against civilians in eastern DRC are rampant, with the DRC army (FARDC) and dozens of militia groups culpable. 

FARDC troops are accused of violating human rights around the town of Minova, in South Kivu Province, last year while retreating from North Kivu Province  after the city of Goma fell to the M23 militia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96833/DRC-Fall-of-Goma-puts-200-000-children-at-risk ], according to  a  May UN Joint Human Rights Office report [ http://monusco.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Pj7jOWjAxWo%3d&tabid=10662&language=en-US ]. 

“In this context, at least 102 women and 33 girls were victims of rape or other acts of sexual violence perpetrated by FARDC soldiers,” says the report, which noted the soldiers had arbitrarily executed at least two people, used forced labour and looted from villages. 

FARDC is often regarded as weak, with poorly organized, unmotivated troops. The M23 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] mutiny in eastern DRC in 2012 by ethnic Tutsi FARDC officers, for example, was in part fuelled by grievances over pay and living conditions. 

Training alone will not address FARDC’s problems, which are structural, say experts. 

“There is an overestimation about what training can achieve. Foreign partners (Belgium, USA, France, Angola, South African and China) have now been training the Congolese army since 2006, and the results are very poor,” Thierry Vircoulon, an International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst, told IRIN in an e-mail. 

“Training is only good when it can be applied but, given the state of the Congolese army, the trained soldiers are sent back to a dysfunctional organization without decent pay and working conditions. Training will not solve the structural problems of the Congolese army.” 

FARDC has also been plagued by ethnic divisions, with some troops still loyal to militia groups. 

“The so-called Congolese army is a patchwork of fighters with various backgrounds - former Mobutu military personnel, militiamen from the MLC [Mouvement de liberation du Congo] of Jean-Pierre Bemba, Mai Mai, AFDL [Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo] fighters, etc. And there was not a process to unite these groups, and some of them managed to stay in their territories of origin - CNDP [Congrès national pour la défense du people]/M23 in North Kivu,” noted Vircoulon. 

“Therefore, ethnic and past affiliations remain and are stronger than the military discipline and command. The Congolese army is not an institution; it is a patchwork of undisciplined and untrained groups of fighters.” 

What about demobilization? 

The process of integrating ex-combatants into the Congolese army, part of the government’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, is also mired in challenges. 

“Currently, the national military is in a shambles, and there are various armed groups that are in various stages of DDR. This situation is aggravated by domestic and regional political manipulation,” ISS’s Kok told IRIN.  

Another challenge is the failure to address the causes of armed rebellion, making disarmament often short-lived.  In 2009, for example, the DRC government signed a deal with members of the CNDP, but failure to fully implement the deal led to the 2012 mutiny that gave rise to M23. 

“[When] the M23 were integrated into the FARDC in 2009… their command and control structures [were] more or less intact. Thus, when the time came for them to defect and form a new rebellion, they were ready to do so,” explained Kok.   

The absence of a vetting process for ex-combatants is also a problem. 

“A strategy of integrating abusive warlords and their fighters into the Congolese army - in often short-lived deals with little or no vetting or training before former combatants are redeployed as Congolese army soldiers - have fuelled the cycles of violence and horrific human rights abuses in eastern Congo,” Ida Sawyer, a researcher and advocate with Human Rights Watch (HRW), told IRIN.  

Reforming the judiciary   

Inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms further enable impunity for abuses. 

Between 15 November and 2 December 2012, at least 58 cases of rape were reported during M23’s occupation of Goma, according to the May UN Joint Human Rights Office report. M23 also executed 11 civilians, recruited and used child soldiers, and engaged in forced labour and looting. 

Only a few DRC militia leaders have been arrested and convicted, among them Thomas Lubanga , who in, March 2012 was found guilty [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95073/DRC-Lubanga-verdict-a-first-step ] of conscripting child soldiers in the northeastern  Ituri  region by the International Criminal Court (ICC).  In March, former M23 commander Bosco Ntaganda surrendered to the ICC.   

Experts are calling for the establishment of specialized courts within DRC to try human rights crimes outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. 

“Together with Congolese civil society organizations, we have also called for the establishment of specialized mixed chambers or a specialized mixed court within the Congolese justice system, with the involvement of international prosecutors, judges and other personnel to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Congo since 1990,” said HRW’s Sawyer.  

“The need to hold to account those responsible for perpetuating grave crimes (government troops, rebels and militia) must not be short-changed for any short-term gains,” added  analyst Opiyo. 

According to ICG’s Vircoulon, “The blocking of justice reform is the reason why impunity is rife in the DRC.” 

What about negotiating local solutions? 

Peace talks  between M23 and the DRC government are ongoing in Kampala, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), an approach favoured by analysts sceptical of the military intervention force [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44523&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo ].   

“It all depends on the effectiveness of the UN intervention brigade, but from the point of the organization [ICGLR], we don’t believe the intervention brigade is the final solution to the conflict,” Stephen Mwachofi Singo, an ICGLR programme officer, told IRIN. 

“Already, through [the] ICGLR process, there is a political process ongoing in Kampala. Such a process should be supported to its logical conclusion,” added Singo. 

Tackling ethnic tensions is key to pacifying conflict areas. 

“DRC is a vast, multi-ethnic country, with some of the ethnic groups spanning the borders of neighbouring countries such as Angola and Rwanda. Unfortunately, past and the current DRC government[s] have used this multiplicity of ethnic groups against each other and for political connivance. This has brewed a sense of favour and disfavour,” said analyst Opiyo. 

“In order for the ethnic-based tensions to ease, there is need for not just a nationalistic army but a representative government. A centralized rather than devolved administration would provide a platform for a national, rather than an ethnic, outlook among the Congolese people.” 

According to Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, a political scientist at Makerere University, “Lasting peace in the DRC cannot come out of the deployment of aggressive foreign forces.” 

“The causes of violence in that country [DRC] are internal. The solution therefore lies in resolving the internal problems that fuel the fighting. Only [the] Congolese can solve their problems in a sustainable way. Foreigners will not do it for them.” 

so/aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98036/Briefing-Towards-internal-solutions-to-the-DRC-crisis</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Trading conflict for coffee in DRC</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081446130806t.jpg" />]]>GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.</description><body><![CDATA[GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.

"You should tell the population to grow coffee, as it's the best way for them to make money," he told a militia member during a recent visit to the town of Kalonge, where he and his fellow cooperative members have planted a nursery for coffee seedlings.

The Kivu Cooperative of Coffee Planters and Traders (CPNCK), which Makelele founded five years ago, has planted six of these nurseries in the Kalonge-Pinga-Mweso triangle, a hotbed of militia activity.

"If the young men in this area knew how much they could earn with coffee, they would not be interested in joining militias," Makelele told IRIN.

“A paradise for coffee”

Coffee, a traditional export crop, was virtually abandoned across much of North Kivu in the past 30 years. DRC’s production shrank from 110,000 metric tons in the late 1980s to about 50,000 metric tons in 2009, according to the DRC’s national coffee office.

CPNCK says it is giving away half a million arabica seedlings to help relaunch coffee’s cultivation.

Many people in the Kalonge area, including members of armed groups, appear to be interested in planting coffee. The militiaman told IRIN he would like to plant the crop on his ancestral land of more than 100 hectares, but that he would first have to raise US$1,000 to pay the land registry for title deeds.

Uncertainty about land titles and the involvement of Congolese and foreign armed groups are just some of the problems local farmers will face if they decide to take Makelele’s advice.  Planting coffee is a long-term investment, prices have been volatile and the market is not as reliable as that for food crops.

Nevertheless, the crop has paid off for neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda, which have increased their production in recent years. The crop is Uganda’s single most important export, and coffee and tea together account for nearly half of Rwanda’s exports.

The recent history of coffee prices could also deter would-be planters: The New York market price for mild arabica, currently slightly above the inflation-adjusted average for the past decade, has fluctuated by more than 300 percent since 2003, and has trended downwards since the late 1970s.

But coffee’s promoters argue that increasing demand in middle-income countries, plus the possibility that climate change could lead to the spread of diseases in coffee plants, point to higher prices in future - and bright prospects for Kivu coffee.

Additionally, the temperate climate in the Kivu region’s hills is thought to be protection against coffee rust, the most devastating disease affecting arabica. Partly for this reason, World Coffee Research describes the area as “a paradise for coffee”.

This optimism has helped to persuade several NGOs - including Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Oxfam, the Eastern Congo Initiative and the Fairtrade organization Twin - to launch coffee projects in the Kivu provinces.

Twin has helped a South Kivu co-operative, Sopacdi, replant coffee and improve yields, quality and post-harvest processing, enabling its 3,500 members to become the first producers in Kivu to achieve organic and Fairtrade certification.

Income potential

Sopacdi has publicized the job opportunities it has provided to ex-combatants. A number of them work at a mechanized washing centre - paid for by Twin and employing 161 people - where the coffee berries are depulped and dried.

One of the staff at the washing centre, former rebel Habamungu Engavashapa, told IRIN he was happy with civilian life because he was able to spend nights in a house rather than in the forest.

Another ex-combatant, Abdul Mahagi, said Sopacdi had trained him as a machinist and given him a contract; he said he was beginning to see a way to organize his life.

Other workers at the washing centre, however, complained that their salaries, about $60 a month, were barely enough to live on.

The main opportunities that coffee co-operatives are likely to provide for ex-combatants in the short term would be to clear land and plant seedlings.

CPNCK has been employing 50 ex-combatants on these tasks at a rate of $1 a day, much less than they would earn in artisanal mining, but not insignificant in most of the villages, says Jean-Baptiste Musbyimana, an agricultural journalist based in Goma.

The returns could be more enticing for ex-combatants and smallholder farmers who are able to grow coffee for themselves.

For information on the profitability of coffee versus that of alternative crops, IRIN consulted Franck Muke, an agronomist who has studied coffee production in DRC and in Brazil; Xavier Phemba, CRS’s agricultural project co-ordinator in Goma; and Sandra Kavira, an agronomist working for the International Fertilizer Development Centre.

Their data suggest returns from a hectare of 2,500 coffee trees could be two to three times as high as the returns from a hectare of maize or beans, assuming an absence of mineral fertilizers and only limited use of organic fertilizers.

Jean-Baptiste Musabyimana, of the Federation of Agricultural Producer Organizations of Congo (FOPAC), which does not promote coffee, said coffee is regarded as having several advantages over other crops, including the potential for intercropping with bananas, beans or legumes, which provide organic waste and additional profits from the same acreage.

Once the trees have been planted, coffee also requires less labour than annual crops and is less likely to be stolen.

"Armed groups won't cut off the berries and eat them," coffee plantation owner Eric Kulage told IRIN. "And the workers don't want the berries either, whereas when they are harvesting maize they always solicit some bags."

Coffee’s major disadvantage is the cost of planting and the fact that the trees cannot be harvested for the first three years and do not reach their full potential for five to eight years. Muke estimated costs of planting 2,500 trees per hectare, and pruning for three non-productive years, at $850 to $950. These costs, and the risks involved, limit the acreage farmers will be willing to devote to the crop.

Helping DRC compete

A significant limitation to DRC’s coffee industry is the lack of mechanized washing stations, which cut down on waste and help maintain product consistency. Washing stations are the norm in Uganda and Rwanda, but there are hardly any in Kivu, where producers depulp the berries by hand or sell the wet berries to merchants from Uganda and Rwanda.

Aid agencies are planning to install several washing stations at sites close to large population centres and to Lake Kivu. But Muke says this could be a mistake, as the lakeside areas have higher humidity, which is thought to promote coffee rust.

There could be social advantages to promoting a perennial crop in areas further from Lake Kivu, like Kalonge Pinga and Mweso, where many young men see joining an armed group as their most viable livelihood option.

“If they have a perennial crop to look after, they will want to settle down,” suggested CPNCK’s Makelele.

But a major obstacle to promoting agriculture in areas where militias recruit is, of course, insecurity. Although armed groups are unlikely to steal coffee berries, they might try to steal bulk loads of dried coffee from washing stations.

Plantation owner Kulage commented that, in his experience, armed groups had not succeeded in stealing and marketing large coffee harvests in recent years. He suggested that security forces might be deployed to protect washing stations during the limited periods when bulk loads of dried coffee are left there.

Oxfam’s co-ordinator for North Kivu, Tariq Riebl, doubted whether any donor would accept the risk of building a washing station in a place like Kalonge. He noted that 90,000 seedlings had recently been stolen from a CPNCK nursery near Kalonge.

“If you mention that to donors, they won’t want to hear anything more,” he said.

But Makelele argues that the theft was not a problem because the co-op was going to give the seedlings away anyway.

“I am very happy about it,” he told IRIN. “It shows that people want to plant coffee.”

nl/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97998/Trading-conflict-for-coffee-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081446130806t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Is more force in the DRC more of the same?</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081532470009t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters. 

The deployment of this “international brigade” made up of troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania will complement the existing UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and is designed to help quell M23 [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] and other rebel militias. 

When an intervention force was first mooted by the African Union (AU) last year, Sivuyile Bam, AU head of Peace and Support Operations Division (PSOD), told IRIN the plan was to “deal specifically with M23, and when M23 go away, they [the intervention force] go away”. That has since evolved into preventing the expansion of all armed groups, and neutralizing and disarming them by deploying an “offensive” military force, said a UN Security Council resolution [ http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10964.doc.htm ].

Pretoria-based think tank the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) [ http://issafrica.org/ ] estimates there are more than 33 armed groups currently operating in eastern DRC. They are variously involved in mineral extraction and self-defence through to acting as proxies for the strategic interests of neighbouring states. 

The intervention force, known as SADCBrig (Southern African Development Community Brigade), will “carry out targeted offensive operations… either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC [DRC national army], in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law,” says UN resolution 2098 [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098%282013%29 ].

It will consist “inter alia of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company with headquarters in Goma,” the UN resolution adds. 

Since the first deployment of “blue helmets” to the DRC in 1999, first as the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and then as MONUSCO, troop numbers have increased more than three-fold from the original 5,000-odd uniformed soldiers. There have been supplementary ad hoc military missions, such as the 2003 European Union (EU) military intervention in Bunia during the Ituri ethnic-based conflict dubbed Operation Artemis [ http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/book1/book%20vol1_part2_chapter12_operation%20artemis%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo_kees%20homan.pdf ], and the 2009 operations Umoja Wetu (Our Unity) and Kimia II, a joint military offensive of DRC and Rwandan security forces against the armed group Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération de Rwanda (FDLR). 

A military analyst serving with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), who declined to be identified, said the Security Council resolution was “a massive expansion of the task” first envisaged by the AU, but the mandate had to be “wider than M23” if the ambition was to protect civilians. 

Zuma doctrine 

The analyst told IRIN the intervention force was expected “to have initial capability by end of May and operational capability by end of June [2013]”. 

The deployment of South African troops in CAR and their participation in SADCBrig is being viewed by analysts as a departure from South Africa’s previous military ventures, with a more aggressive stance towards resolving the continent’s conflicts. It has been dubbed the [President Jacob] Zuma doctrine by analysts. 

South African Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane told a media briefing on 29 April 2013 her country was in favour of “preventative diplomacy, intervening when there are situations of strife. When we are called upon to do that, we will always be there, we will never say no.” 

In a statement adjoining the UN resolution, Rwanda’s Eugene-Richard Gasana hoped the force would tackle the “FDLR, which had sparked the 1994 [Rwandan] genocide”. Rwanda, which is suspected of supporting M23, sees it as a bulwark against the FDLR. 

The military analyst said MONUSCO had been “hesitant” to use force beyond self-defence - something for which the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation was roundly condemned when M23 walked into Goma unopposed, despite the presence of more than 1,500 armed peacekeepers in the town and nearly 6,000 in North Kivu Province. 

Ahead of the deployment of SADCBrig, and in the wake of 13 South African soldiers having been killed recently in the Central African Republic trying to prevent the rebel coup by the Séléka alliance, M23 taunted SANDF on social media saying it was “corrupt” and “old” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94597/Analysis-South-Africa-paper-tiger-of-African-peacekeeping-operations ].

Critiques 

Meanwhile, some doubt the new force can achieve its objective. 

“Armed (DRC) groups are seen as a military threat but most of them are not. The military option against the armed groups has failed repeatedly and some [armed groups] deserve a small dose of military pressure but [also] a lot of police work in order to be neutralized. The intervention brigade in particular and the UN [MONUSCO] in general are not equipped for this,” International Crisis Group (ICG) [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/ ] analyst Thierry Vircoulon told IRIN. 

He said SADCBrig deployment was “security by substitution”, and would delay reforms of the DRC national army (FARDC), which has been accused of being a serial human rights abuser by rights organizations. SADCBrig’s more offensive posture would lead to “retaliations against civilians [by armed groups] and worsening of the humanitarian situation”, unless stringent measures were put in place to protect civilians in the areas of operation. 

Liam Mahony, author of a recent report commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) entitled Non-military strategies for civilian protection in the DRC [ http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/fv-publications/Non-military_protection_in_the_DRC.pdf ], said: “The international community continues to believe that military protection of civilians in the DRC may succeed, if there are only enough soldiers or a sufficiently strong mandate. 

“However, there is little if any empirical evidence for this. Faith in military solutions is exaggerated by the mistaken belief that violence can only be met with more violence… 

“The humanitarian service machinery has become a virtually permanent fixture in the region, serving victims of multiple displacements and repeating cycles of violence for two decades, while efforts to change the underlying dynamics of conflict have been insufficient and ineffective.” 

He told IRIN the approach by policymakers to armed groups in the DRC was “one size fits all… People tend to oversimplify or choose extreme interpretations of armed groups… People assume they are unreasonable and not open to negotiation and communication… This is not specific to DRC. It is true everywhere.” 

“I would not categorically dismiss the possibility that there may be armed groups with whom such approaches would fail, and there may be armed groups who would be more deterred from human rights abuse by an effective military counter-force. It is conceivable, but it must be the result of a very specific detailed analysis, not a generic knee-jerk approach.” 

Operational difficulties 

Andre Roux, author of a recent ISS briefing [ http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1605 ] on SADCBrig’s deployment, said: “The realities of conducting operations in this remote and complex environment have been underestimated in the rush to put solutions on the table.” 

Roux said the capabilities of SADCBrig “to effectively conduct `war fighting’ operations in an integrated manner, are questionable. With different operational doctrines, a variety of tactical deployment techniques and military equipment that is often not interoperable, the battalions can fight as individual units, but questions arise about whether they can or must fight as a cohesive brigade.” 

SANDF is expected to transfer its troops serving with MONUSCO to SADCBrig, which is supposed to operate in conjunction with FARDC, though past experiences of cooperation between SANDF and FARDC appear to have been problematical. “Members of the local army [FARDC] did not share information and they would steal anything without blinking an eye,” said a June 2012 ISS report on relations between the two [ http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=31642 ].

Roux noted that apart from the challenges of integrating military “tactics and doctrines”, there was also the risk of “a protracted counter-insurgency-type scenario characterized by atrocities in which entire villages are wiped out by rebel forces in order to divert the attention of the brigade into a defensive mind-set focused on the difficult task of protecting civilians rather than neutralizing illegal armed groups… 

“Is this again a peacekeeping band-aid that will struggle to meet the high expectations that do not consider the difficult realities of the situation?” he asks. 

go/cb 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97999/Is-more-force-in-the-DRC-more-of-the-same</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081532470009t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Conflict cuts off civilians in DRC&apos;s Katanga</title><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201010210751260211t.jpg" />]]>KATANGA 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of displaced people in the Democratic Republic of Congo&apos;s (DRC) Katanga Province have received little or no humanitarian aid in the months since having fled ongoing conflict.</description><body><![CDATA[KATANGA 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of displaced people in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) Katanga Province have received little or no humanitarian aid in the months since having fled ongoing conflict.

In one territory, Malemba Nkulu, the number of displaced is estimated to have risen from 12,000 to 42,000 between December 2012 and January 2013, and no food distribution has yet been organized. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) says, "The global acute malnutrition rate is above 19 percent, and the severely malnourished need treatment.”

"Nineteen percent global acute malnutrition is nearly twice the emergency threshold level," Quoc Nguyen, head of operations for the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Katanga, told IRIN, adding that seven territories in Katanga have acute malnutrition rates above the 10 percent level.

UNICEF is assisting children and pregnant and lactating women suffering from acute malnutrition in several territories, including Pweto and Manono, where the rate is also above 19 percent; however this treatment is still not available in Malemba Nkulu. "There's no programme in Malemba Nkulu because of lack of funding, lack of access, insecurity and a lack of partners who can implement a programme," said Nguyen.

Malnutrition is a major contributor to the under-five mortality rate in the province, which UNICEF's latest survey put at 188 per 1,000. In its 16 April bulletin for DRC, OCHA said that in Malemba Nkulu "no humanitarian intervention has been implemented mainly because of difficulties of access and lack of funding".

Displaced people in the neighbouring territory of Manono - recently estimated to number 31,000 - have not had a food distribution since September, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) told IRIN this week, although a convoy of food trucks has just been sent there. WFP has distributed food in the past month at or near most of the other major population centres in Katanga where large numbers of displaced people have gathered.

But of 17,000 people who were displaced this year in the territories of Kalemie, Moba and Manono, most have not yet received any aid, nor have the 747 families living on the route from Mitwaba to Kisele, OCHA reported on 23 April.

Continued displacement

The total number of displaced in Katanga is estimated by the Commission on Population Movements (CMP) - an official body which collects data from aid workers - to have risen from 64,082 in December 2011 to 353,931 currently. 

"Needs are… enormous both among the displaced and the host population," OCHA said in a report published on April 10 [ http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo%E2%80%99s-neglected-%E2%80%9Ctriangle-death%E2%80%9D-challenges-protection ]. "Many IDPs have become more vulnerable due to repeated displacements, often across vast distances."

An upsurge in violence by Mai-Mai militia groups has been causing waves of displacement since late 2011. WFP's head of operations in Katanga, Amadou Samake, said the so-called 'triangle of death' between Mitwaba, Manono and Pweto had been emptied of most of its population - 75,000 households - by April 2012. By the end of last year, the displaced already numbered more than 300,000. 

The flow outwards from conflict zones has continued, and Mai-Mai violence has spread west and south, to Malemba Nkulu, Lubudi and Kambove territories.

On 17 February, a gang from the newly created Mai-Mai militia known as Kata Katanga (meaning 'cut off Katanga') killed three officials and drove out the population at Kinsevere, only 40km from Lubumbashi, the provincial capital. 

On 23 March, some 400 lightly armed Kata Katanga members marched from the bush to the centre of Lubumbashi, unopposed, before they were forced to surrender after a shootout with the elite Republican Guard. 

Amid the persistent insecurity, fewer than the 10 percent of the displaced have returned to their villages, Samake estimates. 

WFP assisted 250,000 people in Katanga last year, he said, but has not had the resources to guarantee the displaced three months of rations, the standard the agency aims for in North Kivu. Currently, he said, the agency has 5,915 tons in stock or en route and would need an additional 10,383 tons to feed 320,000 displaced people in Katanga through the second quarter of 2013.

If the displaced do not soon return to their villages, Samake added, another year of missed harvests will worsen food security across the province. 

UNICEF's Nguyen commented that much of Katanga was already in the grip of a food security crisis before the Mai-Mai’s resurgence in 2011. "There is a lack of basic services in every sector - health, water, nutrition and agriculture - and the conflict and displacement make an already bad situation much worse," he said.

Deteriorating security

OCHA reports the security situation worsened in April in Pweto, Manono and Mitwaba territories, with attacks by Mai-Mai groups on a dozen villages. 

The national army, FARDC, recently retook the town of Shamwana, at the centre of 'the triangle of death', but International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Thierry Vircoulon says the military seems to be having little success in suppressing the Mai-Mai. At the start of 2013, the army had only 1,000 men available in Katanga, but their number is now up to 2,500, UN sources told IRIN. 

Central Katanga has been unstable since Mai-Mai commander Gedeon Mtanga escaped from prison in September 2011. He and more than 1,000 of his followers were freed from Lubumbashi's central jail by eight armed men in broad daylight; there was speculation that the jail break was arranged by local power holders. Gedeon had led a Mai-Mai group known for its brutality and attacks on civilians from 2002 to 2007. Africa Confidential reported on 1 March that "his ambition is to root out the old order" and "his men have killed at least 15 traditional chiefs in Nord Mitwaba alone".

According to OCHA, the other main driver of instability in the province is Kata Katanga, which has also been fighting FARDC.

Like the brutal Mai-Mai group Morgan [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97314/Rainforest-riches-a-curse-for-civilians-in-northeast-DRC ], in DRC's Orientale Province, the Kata Katanga and Gedeon Mai-Mai seem to get much of their income from poaching, rather than minerals or agriculture. Therefore, they may not need much support from the local population.

There are no recent figures for the Mai-Mai in Katanga, but ICG estimated they might have numbered 5,000 to 8,000 in 2005 [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/103-katanga-the-congos-forgotten-crisis.aspx?alt_lang=fr ].

Following the bloody suppression of a Kata Katanga rally in Lubumbashi on 23 March, a report by local civil society activists accused senior members of the regime of providing the group with arms and funding. 

ICG's Vircoulon told IRIN he believes that several local “barons” are behind the Kata Katanga. 

The DRC's former police chief General John Numbi - a native of Malemba Nkulu who built his career as a political organizer among the Balubakat, President Joseph Kabila's ethnic group - may have held the key to security in the province. ICG reports that Numbi was supplying Gedeon with arms from 2002 to 2004. Later, he organized the manhunt that led to the Mai-Mai leader's capture. 

In 2010, Numbi was suspended as police chief following allegations that he was responsible for the murder of human rights defender Floribert Chebeya. 

Significantly, Gedeon and many of his followers were captured in 2007, after Kabila had won elections with support from a broad coalition in Katanga and elsewhere in the country. That coalition is now crumbling, allowing armed groups to be reactivated in many areas of eastern DRC. 

Protection needs

An April report [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Final%20version%20Protection%20Report%20Katanga%2011.04.pdf ] by OCHA in Katanga concludes: "Given the duration of the current conflict, humanitarian actors do not expect to see any improvements in terms of displacement numbers or humanitarian needs in the coming months."

The report highlights alleged abuses by the army as well the Mai-Mai, including allegations that 50 women and 20 girls were detained for two days and repeatedly raped by soldiers in February 2012. 

"Without an increased presence" of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), says OCHA, "such abuses will continue and may even increase, as will further displacements". 

Currently there are 450 blue helmets in Katanga, an area the size of France.

The report also calls for a political solution to the conflict in Katanga, for the government to reinitiate its programme to disarm, demobilize and re-integrate the Mai-Mai, and for humanitarian actors to establish contact with Mai-Mai groups so as to facilitate humanitarian access and sensitize the combatants on international humanitarian law.

nl/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97963/Conflict-cuts-off-civilians-in-DRC-apos-s-Katanga</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201010210751260211t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KATANGA 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of displaced people in the Democratic Republic of Congo&apos;s (DRC) Katanga Province have received little or no humanitarian aid in the months since having fled ongoing conflict.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Uganda pilots mobile courts for refugees</title><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203281125310596t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Uganda&apos;s government and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have launched a pilot mobile court system to improve access to justice for victims of crimes in Nakivale, the country&apos;s oldest and largest refugee settlement.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Uganda's government and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have launched a pilot mobile court [ http://www.unhcr.org/516d29359.html ] system to improve access to justice for victims of crimes in Nakivale, the country's oldest and largest refugee settlement.

The magistrate's court, whose first session began on 15 April, will hear cases of robbery, land disputes, child rape, sexual and gender-based violence, attempted murder, and murder. The project - a collaboration of the Uganda government, UNHCR, Makerere University's Refugee Law Project (RLP) and the Uganda Human Rights Council - aims to benefit some 68,000 refugees and 35,000 Ugandan nationals in the settlement.

“With the nearest law court currently 50km away in Kabingo, Isingiro, access to justice has been a real problem for refugees and locals alike. As a result many fail to report crimes and are forced to wait for long periods before their cases are heard in court,” said a UNHCR briefing on the programme.

The mobile court will hold three sessions a year. Each session will last 15 to 30 days and hear up to 30 cases. Officials hope to extend the project to other refugee settlements in Uganda to enable more refugees to access speedier justice.

"Most of the courts are far away from the settlements, and refugee complainants faced challenges of transportation for themselves and witnesses," Charity Ahumuza, programme manager for access to justice at RLP, told IRIN. "With the courts brought to them, the cost of seeking justice is reduced. The courts will also reduce the backlog of cases that exist of cases that arise in the settlements."

"Refugees have welcomed this initiative since it is about bringing justice closer to them," John Kilowok, UNHCR Protection Officer in Uganda, told IRIN.

Operational challenges

Experts say the project could face a number of operational challenges, including a need for funding and a shortage of trained court interpreters. Uganda has over 165,000 refugees from the Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia and South Sudan.

"The settlements are far away, and distance in accessing the court is likely to become a challenge. Language, too, will be a problem. The service providers through UNHCR are conducting training for interpreters to help in this issue," said RLP's Ahumuza. "The sustainability of the courts, I believe, will depend on availability of finances. However, the judiciary continues to face financial constraints."

Angelo Izama, a Ugandan fellow at the Open Society Institute, says the shortage of justice in the refugee settlements is a reflection of poor access to justice across the country, a situation that needs to be addressed.

"Improving the delivery of justice helps tremendously given that, ordinarily, the severe case backlog makes matters worse for nationals - let alone foreigners. The real crisis now is not providing refugees and nationals in western Ugandan fast relief but filling the many vacancies in the judiciary so that, nationally, justice is expedited," he said. "While justice processes improved on our side can help communities - both Ugandan and foreign - live better governed lives, the ultimate investment would be in improving governance across the border."

"There is need for a holistic approach to look at the refugee issues in Uganda. We have to look at policy, immigration and defence lawyers for fair trials. Will the suspects have access to defence lawyers, or will they be accorded with lawyers to defend them in court?" asked Nicholas Opiyo, a constitutional and human rights lawyer in Kampala, Uganda’s capital. "Sustainability is a very crucial element in this court... If they don't put good and proper systems to support this court, it will be a waste of time and money."

so/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97903/Uganda-pilots-mobile-courts-for-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203281125310596t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Uganda&apos;s government and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have launched a pilot mobile court system to improve access to justice for victims of crimes in Nakivale, the country&apos;s oldest and largest refugee settlement.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Uneven progress on child stunting in East and Central Africa</title><pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202150719060014t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Improvements in nutrition and stronger government policies have led to a decline in childhood stunting, according to a new report on child nutrition. However, the condition continues to affect some 165 million children under the age of five globally.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Improvements in nutrition and stronger government policies have led to a decline in childhood stunting, according to a new report on child nutrition [ http://www.unicef.org/media/files/nutrition_report_2013.pdf ] by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). However, the condition continues to affect some 165 million children under the age of five globally.

Stunting can lead to irreversible brain and body damage in children, making them more susceptible to illness and more likely to fall behind in school. Based on UNICEF’s report, IRIN has put together a round-up of the nutrition situations in six East and Central African countries that are among 24 countries with the largest burden and highest prevalence of stunting.

Burundi: Under-five mortality in this small central African country dropped from 183 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 139 per 1,000 live births in 2012. This is far short of the 63 deaths per 1,000 live births necessary for the country to achieve UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) [ http://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/child_mortality/en/ ] 4, which aims to reduce child mortality by two-thirds by 2015. An estimated 58 percent of children under age five are stunted, compared with 56 percent in 1987, according to demographic and health surveys from those years.

According to the UNICEF report, Burundi has made “no progress” on MDG 1 [ http://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/hunger/en/ ], which aims to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.

Central African Republic (CAR): An estimated 28 percent of under-five deaths in CAR occur within the first month of a child’s life; the biggest killers of children under five are malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia. The percentage of children under age five who are stunted has changed little since 1995, standing at 41 percent in 2010, as has the percentage of children who are underweight, which has remained at about 24 percent for the last 18 years.

There has, however, been significant progress in the number of mothers exclusively breastfeeding their infants. In 2010, 34 percent of infants under six months old were breastfed, compared to just 3 percent in 1995. According to UNICEF, infants who are not breastfed in the first six months of life are “more than 14 times more likely to die from all causes than an exclusively breastfed infant”.

Democratic Republic of Congo: Africa’s second-largest country bears 3 percent of the global stunting burden, with 43 percent of children under age five suffering from stunting and 24 percent being underweight. Stunting is significantly higher (47 percent) in rural areas than it is in urban areas (34 percent).

The percentage of children who are underweight dropped from 34 percent in 2001 to 24 percent in 2010. DRC’s progress towards MDG 1 is described as “insufficient”.

Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa nation, which bears 3 percent of the global stunting burden, has seen a steep drop in stunting levels, from an estimated 57 percent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2011. The percentage of underweight under-fives has also dropped significantly, from 42 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2011. Between 2000 and 2011, under-five mortality was cut from 139 deaths per 1,000 live births to 77 per 1,000 live births - within striking distance of its MDG 4 target of 66 per 1,000.

A national nutrition programme launched in 2008 has been key to reducing national food insecurity, a major cause of stunting. The country’s health service extension programme [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/72371/ETHIOPIA-New-programme-boosts-village-health-service-delivery ] has also played a role in bringing nutritional interventions to villages.

Rwanda: Community interventions - such as kitchen gardens and increasing the availability of livestock, as well as measures to boost healthy infant feeding practices like exclusive breastfeeding and the provision of nutritional supplements - saw the percentage of underweight under-fives in Rwanda drop from 20 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2010. Enhanced data collection and analysis has also enabled the government to improve its planning and monitoring of child malnutrition.

The report describes the country as “on track” to meet MDG 1.

Tanzania: Bearing 2 percent of the world’s stunting burden, Tanzania has made significant strides in improving child nutrition. An estimated 50 percent of infants under six months old were breastfed in 2010, compared to 23 percent in 1992. The country has also brought under-five stunting levels down from 50 percent in 1992 to 42 percent in 2010, but continues to suffer significantly higher stunting in rural children (45 percent) compared to urban children (39 percent).

Tanzania’s under-five mortality rate dropped from 158 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 68 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010, putting it close to its MDG 4 target of 53 deaths per 1,000 live births. UNICEF’s report says the country is “on track” to meet its MDG 1 targets.

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97853/Uneven-progress-on-child-stunting-in-East-and-Central-Africa</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202150719060014t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Improvements in nutrition and stronger government policies have led to a decline in childhood stunting, according to a new report on child nutrition. However, the condition continues to affect some 165 million children under the age of five globally.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: M23, one year on</title><pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303271154440060t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 03 April 2013 (IRIN) - The M23 rebellion, the latest of a string of armed insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province, has been active for one year now, during which hundreds of thousands have fled their homes and many have lost their lives.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 03 April 2013 (IRIN) - The M23 rebellion, the latest of a string of armed insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province, has been active for one year now, during which hundreds of thousands have fled their homes and many have lost their lives. 

The Mouvement du 23-Mars, or March 23 Movement [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ], came into existence in April 2012, when hundreds of mainly ethnic Tutsi soldiers of FARDC, the national army, mutinied over poor living conditions and poor pay. Most of the mutineers had been members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/76275/DRC-Nkunda-s-rebel-group-spells-out-demands ], another armed group that in 2009 signed a deal with the government, which the dissidents felt Kinshasa had not fully implemented. M23 is named after the date the agreement was signed.

In November 2012, M23 captured Goma, the provincial capital, but withdrew and subsequently entered into peace talks with the government. Neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda were accused of backing M23 by a UN Security Council Group of Experts report [ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/17/us-congo-democratic-rwanda-uganda-idUSBRE89F1RQ20121017 ], charges both countries strongly deny.

In this briefing, IRIN outlines the group’s impact on the province over the past year, its current position and avenues for peace in eastern DRC.

What is the humanitarian situation in North Kivu?

Although clashes between M23 and FARDC have subsided, “North Kivu remains highly insecure due to the proliferation of weapons, sporadic fighting between armed groups and the army, and inter-community tensions,” according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20-%20GOMA%20RESPONSE%20PLAN%20%28ENGLISH%29.pdf ] (OCHA).

OCHA notes that since the beginning of the M23 rebellion, more than half a million people have been driven from their homes in North Kivu. The figure accounts for more than half of the 914,000 displaced people in the province. Tens of thousands more fled to refugee camps [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97742/Congolese-refugee-camps-in-Rwanda-full ] in Rwanda and Uganda.

According to Amnesty International [ http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/drc-bosco-ntaganda-must-be-surrendered-icc-2013-03-19 ], M23 has been responsible for human rights abuses “including violations of the duty to care for the civilian population when launching attacks, forced recruitment of children who were either trained to take part in hostilities or forced to work to build military positions, unlawful killings, and acts of sexual violence”. The organization also blamed FARDC for widespread abuses against civilians. 

Where are M23’s leaders?

The movement’s leadership now looks significantly different than it did in April 2012. 

In February 2013, a rift was reported in M23’s leadership, with one of the founders, Bosco Ntaganda, and M23’s political leader, Jean-Marie Runiga, on one side and M23’s military chief, Sultani Makenga [ http://www.congoforum.be/upldocs/RVI%20Briefing%20-%20Usalama%20-%20Makenga%20Profile%20%E2%80%93%203%20December%202012.pdf ], on the other. The two factions clashed in North Kivu, and Makenga sacked Runiga, who was the group’s representative at the peace talks taking place with the DRC government in the Ugandan capital, Kampala. Following more fighting in March, Ntaganda’s faction surrendered. Both he and Runiga, along with several senior commanders and close to 700 fighters, fled to Rwanda.

On 18 March, Ntaganda surrendered himself to the US Embassy in the Rwandan capital, Kigali, and asked to be transferred to the International Criminal Court for trial over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. He made his first appearance in court on 26 March. According to a paper [ http://riftvalley.net/resources/file/RVI%20Usalama%20Project%20-%20Briefing%20-%20Ntaganda%20Profile.pdf ] by the Rift Valley Institute, Ntaganda had fallen out with fellow commanders early in the rebellion and had been effectively relegated to the sidelines. 

Experts have lauded Ntaganda’s arrest as a positive step in the fight against impunity in DRC, but warn that it does not mean an end to violence in the region.

Runiga has been placed under house arrest [ http://bigstory.ap.org/article/congo-m23-faction-leader-arrested-rwanda ] in Rwanda; the Rwandan government has disarmed [ http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-rebels-rwanda-moved-away-border?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ReliefwebUpdates+(ReliefWeb+-+Latest+Updates) ] the M23 troops who surrendered and moved them to a refugee camp more than 50km from the DRC-Rwanda border.

Various reports [ http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/27/democratic-republic-congo-sultani-makenga ] indicate that Makenga is now consolidating his fighters, thought to number about 1,500, and M23-held territory in North Kivu, but he may also be preparing for further negotiations with President Joseph Kabila’s government. According to Congo expert Jason Stearns [ http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2013/03/m23-split-and-join.html ], “The internal M23 split may have provided the break they [DRC representatives] needed to make the deal acceptable for the rebels.” 

Any deal is likely to involve the integration of Makenga’s fighters into FARDC, with lower cadre fighters automatically integrated and higher ranking officers considered for integration on a case-by-case basis. However, analysts say the re-integration method has not worked in the past and must be rethought.

“M23 integration in FARDC is feasible but is not suitable. The policy of repeated integration of armed groups in FARDC is [contributing] to the fragmentation and militarization of FARDC,” Marc-Andre Lagrange, DRC senior analyst for the International Crisis Group, told IRIN via email. “Since that approach has proven, with M23, to be a failure, the DRC government with MONUSCO and UNSC should look for another option.” 

According to a recent article in the newsletter Africa Confidential: “Experts broadly agree that some kind of agreement between Kinshasa and M23 is in the offing and will be signed soon, but reliable sources in North Kivu diverge on what the outcome will be. Some feel that Makenga will reintegrate his troops into the FARDC, while others suggest that Makenga and [new] M23 political leader Bertrand Bisimwa can stay independent of the army while not being seen as a ‘negative force’.” 

What is the fate of the peace talks?

The Kampala peace talks between M23 and the DRC government began in December 2012 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97075/Analysis-Seeking-civilian-and-military-solutions-in-the-DRC ], under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The talks have made little progress and have been put on hold due to the rebel group’s internal problems. Bisimwa has urged Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to revive the talks [ http://allafrica.com/stories/201304021191.html ].

On 24 February, a UN-brokered peace agreement [ http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/scanned-on-24022013-125543.pdf ] aimed at ending conflict in eastern DRC was signed in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, by 11 African countries - Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Dubbed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC, the deal’s goals include the reformation of the DRC’s army and an end to regional interference in the country. Among the decisions reached was the formation of a neutral intervention force aimed at fighting “negative forces” in eastern DRC - referring not only to M23 but other armed groups as well.

While the deal was lauded as a breakthrough by African countries, analysts are more sceptical, criticizing the agreement as being long on rhetoric and short on detail and solid action plans. A Foreign Policy Association blog post [ http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/28/regional-peace-to-settle-violence-in-the-drc-shows-progress-not-so-fast/ ] noted that since the 1990s, a number of similar regional agreements had failed to bring peace to DRC. It pointed out that the some key players were not mentioned or involved - including armed groups like Raia Mutomboki [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96899/DRC-Civilian-population-in-Masisi-at-risk ] (Swahili for “angry citizens”), Mai Mai Cheka and the Hutu-dominated FDLR, whose presence in eastern DRC is perceived as a threat by Rwanda.

“The primary aggressors present in the country for the last 10 years, the militia groups that patrol the eastern provinces, were not even included in the discussion,” said the author, Daniel Donovan. “By excluding these groups, they hold no commitment to such an agreement, which begs the question: How does this move signify a guarantee for peace?”

What is next for the region?

On 28 March, the UN Security Council authorized [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44523&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo ] an offensive “intervention brigade” to “address imminent threats to peace and security” as part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).

“The objectives of the new force - which will be based in North Kivu Province in eastern DRC and total 3,069 peacekeepers - are to neutralize armed groups, reduce the threat they posed to State authority and civilian security, and make space for stabilization activities,” according to the UN News Centre. It also aims to support the Addis accord.

Following the announcement, the DRC government said it supported the intervention brigade and warned M23 rebels to disband. M23’s Bisimwa has rejected [ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21993655 ] the UN’s decision to send the force, but said [ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YAzl8128kE ] the group would neither fight nor flee the UN forces. 

The International Federation of Human Rights [ http://www.fidh.org/DRC-An-intervention-brigade-within-MONUSCO-would-require-further-human-13106 ] has warned of a potential “escalation in military confrontations and increased risk of retaliatory attacks by armed groups against civilians” as a result of the force’s entry into the fray, and urged MONUSCO to “mitigate against the increased risks that communities will face”. 

Experts say reforms in eastern DRC must go beyond military solutions. “The intervention brigade… should not be seen as the only solution but one element of a comprehensive solution,” said ICG’s Lagrange.

“After last year’s fall of Goma and rise of the Mai Mai [rebel] threat, there is a serious need for a new approach against the armed groups. Such an approach should include the use of military force; a targeted policy of arrest on armed groups' leaders; a DDR [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] offer focusing on civilian reintegration; the investigation and neutralization of the logistical networks of the armed groups; and development work in the communities that generate armed groups,” he told IRIN. 

“Groups like M23 are not a cause but a symptom of what's going wrong in the DRC,” he added. “The Congolese government must commit to implement the security sector reforms, especially the reforms concerning the FARDC. It must also abandon its policy of peace prevailing over justice.” 

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97779/Briefing-M23-one-year-on</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303271154440060t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 03 April 2013 (IRIN) - The M23 rebellion, the latest of a string of armed insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province, has been active for one year now, during which hundreds of thousands have fled their homes and many have lost their lives.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boost for healthcare in DRC</title><pubDate>Sun, 31 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304020549030977t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 31 March 2013 (IRIN) - The British government has announced a major new programme aimed at providing essential healthcare to six million people in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The five-year, US$270.7 million project will focus on rebuilding health facilities, training health workers, and supplying drugs and equipment.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 31 March 2013 (IRIN) - The British government has announced a major new programme [ https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-british-boost-for-healthcare-in-drc ] aimed at providing essential healthcare to six million people in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The five-year, US$270.7 million project will focus on rebuilding health facilities, training health workers, and supplying drugs and equipment.

Civil war has destroyed much of the country’s health infrastructure, as well as the road networks and vital services such as electricity, meaning patients often have to travel long distances to health centres that may not be equipped to handle their complications.

IRIN has put together a list of five health issues in DRC that require urgent attention:

Maternal and Child Health - DRC’s maternal mortality ratio [ http://www.unfpa.org/sowmy/resources/docs/country_info/profile/en_DRC_SoWMy_Profile.pdf ] is 670 deaths per 100,000 live births, with an estimated 19,000 maternal deaths annually. The country has a severe shortage of health workers - less than one health professional is available per 1,000 people.

With 170 out of every 1,000 children dying before they reach the age of five and 10 percent of infants underweight, DRC has one of the worst child health indicators [ http://www.unicef.org/sowc2012/pdfs/SOWC%202012-Main%20Report_EN_13Mar2012.pdf ] in the world. It is one of five countries in the world in which about half of under-five deaths occur. Some of the biggest killers of children are diarrhoea, malaria, malnutrition and pneumonia.

Sexual violence - Several studies report high levels of sexual violence perpetrated against women, children and men in DRC, both by armed groups and within the home; one study [ http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=186342 ], conducted in the North and South Kivu and Ituri in 2010, found that 40 percent of women and 24 percent of men had experienced sexual violence.

Between the stigma of rape and the dearth of decent health services in DRC, sexual violence often leaves survivors injured, infected with sexually transmitted illnesses and severely traumatized. Some of the main requirements are first aid and trauma services, counselling, diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted infections, HIV post-exposure prophylaxis and access to contraception.

During a recent visit to eastern DRC, UK Foreign Secretary William Hague announced $312,110 in new funding [ http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/news/uk-announces-funds-to-help-survivors-of-rape-democratic-republic-of-congo.html ] to support the NGO Physicians for Human Rights, which works at Panzi Hospital in South Kivu Province, “to help efforts to develop local and national capacity to document and collect evidence of sexual violence”.

Diarrhoeal diseases - The consumption of unsafe water is one of the main causes of the diarrhoeal diseases - such as cholera - that infect and kill children and adults in DRC. A cholera epidemic that started in June 2011 has infected tens of thousands and killed more than 200 people. In the capital, Kinshasa [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95384/DRC-Poor-sanitation-systems-hinder-fight-against-cholera ], which has been hit by the epidemic, less than 40 percent of people have no access to piped water. According to the UN Children’s Fund, UNICEF [ http://www.unicef.org/media/media_68359.html ], 36 million people in DRC live without improved drinking water, and 50 million without improved sanitation.

Some of the measures to boost access to safe water and sanitation include hygiene awareness campaigns, rehabilitation of water supply and of sanitation facilities, disinfection of contaminated environments, chlorination of water, and distribution of soap.

Immunization - Despite the existence of an effective vaccine for measles at a cost of roughly $1 per vaccine, the disease is one of the leading killers of children in DRC. According to the Global Alliance for Vaccines [ http://www.gavialliance.org/library/news/gavi-features/2012/seth-berkley-visits-dr-congo-to-view-progress-on-immunisation/ ], 20-30 percent of children in DRC do not have access to immunization. Some challenges to universal vaccine coverage include the poor road network, the size of the country (DRC is Africa’s second largest country), unreliable electricity for vaccines that require refrigeration, and low awareness within the population.

HIV - More than one million people in DRC are living with HIV; 350,000 of these qualify for life-prolonging antiretroviral drugs, but only 44,000 - or 15 percent - are actually on treatment. Just 9 percent of the population knows of their HIV status, largely because of low awareness, but also because of a shortage of facilities - for instance, only one laboratory in the country is equipped to carry out polymerase chain reaction tests for early infant diagnosis.

Just 5.6 percent of HIV-positive pregnant Congolese women receive ARVs to prevent transmission of HIV to their babies; according to government figures, the mother-to-child transmission [ http://www.plusnews.org/Report/95346/DRC-End-of-mother-to-child-HIV-transmission-still-a-long-way-off ] rate is about 37 percent.

Humanitarian agencies have called on the government and donors to urgently boost funding [ http://www.plusnews.org/Report/95412/DRC-HIV-effort-needs-government-donor-commitment-to-succeed ] for HIV prevention, treatment and care.

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97761/Boost-for-healthcare-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304020549030977t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 31 March 2013 (IRIN) - The British government has announced a major new programme aimed at providing essential healthcare to six million people in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The five-year, US$270.7 million project will focus on rebuilding health facilities, training health workers, and supplying drugs and equipment.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Kony hunt still on after CAR coup</title><pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011051154390753t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 26 March 2013 (IRIN) - The search for the Ugandan rebel group the Lord&apos;s Resistance Army (LRA) in the rainforests of the Central African Republic (CAR) will continue despite the ouster of President François Bozizé by rebel group Séléka, officials say.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 26 March 2013 (IRIN) - The search for the Ugandan rebel group the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the rainforests of the Central African Republic (CAR) will continue despite the ouster of President François Bozizé by rebel group Séléka, officials say.

Séléka overran the capital, Bangui, on 24 March, putting Bozizé to flight. The rebels named their leader, Michel Djotodjia, the new head of state.

“I don’t think the overthrow of President Bozizé by Séléka will change our mission and position in the hunt down of LRA rebels. We are in CAR with the mandate from [the] AU [African Union] and UN [United Nations],” Uganda’s state minister for international relations, Henry Okello Oryem, told IRIN, adding that his country is committed to capturing LRA leader Joseph Kony.

Uganda has some 2,500 soldiers deployed around the border areas of CAR, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, where Kony and his fighters are thought to spend most of their time. The Ugandan troops are joined by 500 Congolese fighters, 500 South Sudanese and 350 CAR troops, all operating under the auspices of the AU. In late 2011, the US deployed 100 special forces to the region as military advisers to the effort.

Ploughing on

According to Thierry Vircoulon, Central Africa project director for the think tank International Crisis Group (ICG), “the fall of Bozizé will not change much the situation on the ground, except if the Séléka leaders insist on the departure of the foreign troops as stipulated in the Libreville agreement [a peace agreement brokered in January and breached by the latest fighting? but never successfully implemented].”

Potential problems

Some analysts say, however, that the AU’s decision to suspend CAR from the organization following the coup could have negative consequences for the hunt for the LRA.

“The AU’s suspension of CAR poses a great challenge and will slow down the hunt for Kony and his rebels. Uganda has to re-negotiate with Séléka rebels… in order for its troops to have the mandate to operate in their territory,” Ronald Ssekandi, a regional political analyst based in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, told IRIN.

Angelo Izama, a political affairs analyst at the US-based Open Society Foundation, said the hunt for Kony and the LRA would largely depend on Séléka’s control of the country.

“The deterioration of government in CAR is a significant complication for the hunt against Joseph Kony. The LRA's asymmetrical, low-tech survival strategy thrives in conditions of lawlessness and violence, especially in the hinterland,” he told IRIN.

“Already the geographical terrain, as well as the size of CAR, has been a practical constraint against the forces hunting Kony. If Séléka is unable to consolidate control, it would further the physical and tactical net within which LRA can seek opportunities to rebuild weapons caches,” he added. “The Séléka rebels do not have the capacity [to limit LRA activities]… In addition, Kony is not their problem; there are much more important emergencies to deal with.”

According to Lt Gen Edward Katumba Wamala, commander of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces’ (UPDF) Land Forces, Kony’s fighters currently number about 400, and they continue to roam around CAR, DRC, Sudan and South Sudan. He said some LRA defectors recently reported that Kony was in Sudan’s western region of Darfur, while his senior commanders, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo, are thought to be in CAR.

Kony, Odhiambo and Ongwen are wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) [ http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/Pages/situation%20index.aspx ] for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Uganda.

LRA still a threat

“The LRA no longer pose a big threat, but there are still [a] few pockets of LRA rebels operating in CAR under Odhiambo and Ongwen. They are a nuisance. They have continued to abduct, maim and kill unarmed people,” Katumba told IRIN.

“It is important to recall that, despite [the] relatively small number of remaining elements, the LRA continues to pose a serious threat to civilians, with dire humanitarian consequences, in the affected areas in CAR, DRC and South Sudan,” Abou Moussa, head of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), told IRIN via email.

In February, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported [ http://www.hdptcar.net/sites/www.hdptcar.net/files/Bulletin%20humanitaire%2001%20eng-1.pdf ] that in the country’s southeast, “there has been an increase in the LRA attacks against communities and hostages being taken.”

According to LRA Crisis Tracker [ http://www.lracrisistracker.com ], the LRA was responsible for 13 civilian deaths and 17 abductions in CAR February 2013. UNOCA says an estimated 443,000 people are currently displaced in LRA-affected areas, many of them depending on international assistance for food, shelter, health care, water and sanitation. This includes an estimated 347,000 people in Province Orientale’s Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé districts in DRC.

Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s chief prosecutor, recently sent a message [ http://www.icc-cpi.int/fr_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/statement-OTP-18-03-2013.aspx ] to the LRA, assuring them that, should they be arrested, they would not be “tortured or killed” and would receive a fair trial.

Commitment to the cause

Analysts say if the LRA threat is to be laid to rest once and for all, countries in the region must show more commitment to finding Kony.

“It requires committed governments to arrest Kony. The ICC can only base its optimism in this practical possibility. There is no government in CAR, soft states in South Sudan and Chad, and support for LRA from Sudan. It’s plausible that the situation above favours the LRA and not the ICC,” said Open Society Foundation’s Izama.

“Kony's continued existence, and that of his entire group, is part of a much larger problem in the Great Lakes region: failure by governments to resolve internal political problems and to work together in a concerted way to bring to an end cross-border insurgencies in the region,” said Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, a political scientist and senior research fellow at Makerere University’s Institute of Social Research. “Their proliferation points to the existence of problems or grievances that ought to be addressed - questions to do with citizenship and nationality, land ownership, access to services and opportunity.”

so/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97737/Kony-hunt-still-on-after-CAR-coup</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011051154390753t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 26 March 2013 (IRIN) - The search for the Ugandan rebel group the Lord&apos;s Resistance Army (LRA) in the rainforests of the Central African Republic (CAR) will continue despite the ouster of President François Bozizé by rebel group Séléka, officials say.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boosting support for IDPs outside DRC’s formal camps</title><pubDate>Thu, 21 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207101215300298t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 21 March 2013 (IRIN) - Humanitarian agencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province are working to increase their support for hundreds of thousands of displaced people living outside formal camps with little humanitarian support, often relying on the kindness of sometimes equally vulnerable host communities.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 21 March 2013 (IRIN) - Humanitarian agencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province are working to increase their support for hundreds of thousands of displaced people living outside formal camps with little humanitarian support, often relying on the kindness of sometimes equally vulnerable host communities.

Fighting in North Kivu in 2012 displaced some 590,000 people, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In total, some 914,000 people are displaced in the province. According to the NGO Refugees International (RI), some 802,000 of these are living outside formal camp settings.

“Only 112,000 North Kivu IDPs live in UNHCR-operated camps, while 230,000 are in spontaneous settlements, and the rest are living with host communities,” RI advocate Caelin Briggs [ http://refugeesinternational.org/content/back-field-drc ] told IRIN following a mission to the province.

“Across the board, we found extremely harsh conditions, particularly in the non-official camps - spontaneous settlements and people living with host families,” she added. “Food is the number one need mentioned. For instance, between July and December 2012, there was no food distribution in Masisi [territory]. They try to get day labour on nearby farms, but there is just not enough work to go around.”

Briggs noted that protection was another issue of concern. “In Goma, there is a big threat to women fetching firewood, especially as they now have to go deeper into the forest for it,” she said. “They are advised to go in groups, but this is not really helpful against a group of armed men.”

The DRC government has not yet ratified the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 2009 - also known as the Kampala Convention [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96984/IDPs-African-IDP-Convention-comes-into-force ] - the world’s first legally binding instrument aimed specifically at aiding people displaced within their own countries.

Harmonizing programmes

“Until recently, there was very little assistance and coordination of activities in spontaneous sites and for IDPs living in host families and other displacement situations,” Simplice Kpandji, the UN Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) public information officer in DRC, told IRIN. “Over the last few months, the humanitarian community has sought to create a new, more holistic coordination/assistance system which includes not only CCCM [camp coordination/camp management] camps but also other displacement situations.”

“Approaches to distribution, registration, security… etc. are being harmonized to ensure that all IDPs in various situations of displacement are treated equally,” he added.

RI is making the case for the “the activation of a national-level CCCM cluster to jointly address the needs of displaced persons living in CCCM camps as well as those living in spontaneous settlements and with host families” [ http://refugeesinternational.org/policy/letter/letter-deputy-special-representative-monusco ]. In some countries, humanitarian actors working within a particular field, such as shelter or health, coordinate their activities through “clusters” [ http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination ]. CCCM activities in the DRC are handled by a “working group” under the larger protection cluster.

Kpandji said that although the CCCM working group has been working “very much like a cluster”, it lacks access to funding mechanisms available to clusters, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund [ http://www.unocha.org/cerf/ ] and pooled funds.

In January, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) joined UNHCR in coordinating spontaneous sites in North Kivu.

“Little is done for IDPs outside the formal camps, which is why IOM has developed a strategy to care for IDPs in spontaneous sites and those living with host communities,” said Laurent de Boeck, chief of IOM’s mission in the DRC.

“IOM has a three-tier approach to IDPs outside the camps: understanding and registering the people displaced using a displacement tracking matrix; analyzing the pull-push factors leading to displacement, and assessing the ability of host families to cope with crisis; and, based on the needs, deliver the immediate needs of the IDPs [including] food and non-food items, and encourage other humanitarian actors to help as well.

“Finally, we aim to build the resilience of the IDPs, both where they are and in their places of origin - when and if return is safe. We aim to create durable solutions, whether this means insertion into host communities, return back to their places of origin or… formal re-localization,” he added.

Addressing the risks

De Boeck noted that displacement from one community to another could create tensions and make host communities vulnerable to possible insecurity.

He said access and identification of host families was particularly difficult. “Often both the displaced and the host families are vulnerable so there is a dilemma on who to focus on,” he said.

“One risk for UNHCR and partners is encouraging the creation of collective sites in areas with insufficient/inadequate conditions to provide effective protection and assistance,” said Kpandji.

“Contingency plans in the province should be updated regularly to ensure that suitable reception areas are identified in advance, and that the humanitarian community is prepared,” he added. “Close cooperation with authorities - who should identify land for displacement sites in advance - should be maintained.”

According to De Boeck, there is also a need for better harmonization between national humanitarian policy and regional implementation.

“In the overall approach, there is a misunderstanding between Kinshasa and the provincial level. Efforts are focused very much on North Kivu, with no systematic approach in other provinces,” he said. “There are good initiatives by the government, i.e., the ministerial and national policy on development as well as a new governmental decree giving the Ministry of Humanitarian Action a coordination role. This needs to be reflected at the provincial level.”

He added, “There is a need to dialogue with the population to better understand their needs and how to meet them.”

Kpandji also pointed out the need to develop the agencies’ ability to rapidly evaluate and respond to displacement, “in particular with regards to child protection and support to community-based protection mechanisms”.

Funding

“Funding is a major challenge. We are really advocating for increased funding for IOM and UNHCR, as well as for OCHA’s US$30.5 million [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA_Humanitarian%20Action%20in%20the%20DRC%2018%20January%202013%20_%20FINAL.pdf ] request to cover the basic needs of IDPs in North Kivu,” said Briggs.

“Our needs are $13 million over 12 months, and we will have $4 million before the end of the month, allowing us to work for six months… This is all for our work in North Kivu,” said de Boeck. “We will also be appealing for funds for our operations in Province Orientale and South Kivu.”

“Funding remains an issue. Sure, it is important, but equally as important - and arguably more important - is the end of fighting, an end to these sporadic bouts that prevent access and [hinder] aid organizations’ work,” said one aid worker, who preferred anonymity. “Money without access does not get us anywhere.”

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97702/Boosting-support-for-IDPs-outside-DRC-s-formal-camps</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207101215300298t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 21 March 2013 (IRIN) - Humanitarian agencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province are working to increase their support for hundreds of thousands of displaced people living outside formal camps with little humanitarian support, often relying on the kindness of sometimes equally vulnerable host communities.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Aid for Trade - does it help the poor?</title><pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/200705162t.jpg" />]]>LONDON 12 March 2013 (IRIN) - Since the World Trade Organization launched its Aid for Trade initiative in 2005, an estimated US$200 billion dollars of development funding has been mobilized for the programme. But some NGOs are asking whether Aid for Trade really helps reduce poverty.</description><body><![CDATA[LONDON 12 March 2013 (IRIN) - Since the World Trade Organization launched its Aid for Trade initiative in 2005, an estimated US$200 billion dollars of development funding [ http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl262_e.htm ] has been mobilized for the programme. But some NGOs are asking whether Aid for Trade really helps reduce poverty.

Two of those NGOs, Traidcraft and the Catholic Agency For Overseas Development, commissioned a study of British and European Aid for Trade assistance, looking at whether the donors have assessed the impacts of these projects on the poor. 

The study, carried out by Saana Consulting [ http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/Resources/Traidcraft/Documents/PDF/tx/Aid%20for%20Trade%20Report%202012.pdf.pdf ], points out that the majority of funding goes to middle-income countries rather than low-income countries, and finds little evidence to demonstrate what impact the programmes have had on poverty.

The study reveals most reviews are completed within the lifetime of a project or at the end - too soon to see any real impact. It adds that “by and large, causal linkages between what a project delivers and the impact on poverty are based on a series of assumptions, and in some cases a leap of faith.”

Little known about poverty effects

The assumption underlying Aid for Trade is that “a rising tide floats all boats,” that more trade brings greater national wealth, and that everyone - including the poor - will benefit. 

Liz Turner, one of the study’s authors, does not dispute this notion. She says that, generally speaking, trade is good. But, she says, “looking at the effects of Aid for Trade in the long term, we end up defaulting back to macro-economic analysis and this issue around the winners and losers from growth. Even if you know that the net effects of a project are going to be positive, wouldn’t it be wiser to find out if there are going to be any losers?” 

Aid for Trade supports all kinds of projects: road building and port upgrading, providing technical support for trade negotiations and regulatory frameworks, designing better border posts, and teaching Ugandan farmers how to produce dried fruit for the lucrative European breakfast cereal market. But only the latter kinds of projects are likely to get evaluated for their effects on poverty reduction.

Kerry Hamilton manages the UK’s Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund, which supports such projects. She told IRIN, “The whole idea is that by doing this, there will be a developmental impact on the farmers and workers involved in that trade. All our projects have a monitoring and evaluation framework, and we ask for baseline data and a set of indicators against which we can measure its success. 

“The difficulty is in the time scales. Projects included in our fourth round of funding have to be completed within 18 months, and by the end of that period, the impact on poverty is going to be minimal. Ideally we should go back in two years’ or five years’ time, but because of the way the funding works, once the project has finished we probably won’t.” 

Hidden losers

Asked by IRIN for an example in which trade support was shown to have an impact on poverty, the head of Aid for Trade at the UK Department for International Development (DFID), Adaeze Igboemeka, cited a project to speed border and customs procedures in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

“What it focused on was gender and the informal traders,” Igboemeka said. “We used methods like changing the actual structure of the border offices, adding glass panels. Officials working at the border were less likely to ask for bribes, and some of the sexual violence that affects women traders - we saw a very important decrease there. And just having clear procedures made it easier for poor, informal traders to trade.” 

But at a meeting to discuss the study at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London, ODI researcher Yurendra Basnett used border post projects as an example of aid that produces losers as well as winners, notably in the communities that spring up to provide services to people waiting at congested borders.

“I was involved in designing a project in South Sudan aimed at improving customs administration,” said Basnett. “Now, from improving customs capacity, how do you go to saying this will have a poverty impact? In the long term it may, and you can make these assumptions, but it is a massive leap of faith, and there are tensions… Now if, for example, you are working on a border post and reduce the transit time from three days to three hours, then a lot of informal traders lose their livelihoods.” 

The University of Manchester also found both winners and losers emerging from trade programmes [ http://www.capturingthegains.org/ ]. After trade sanctions on South Africa were lifted in the early 1990s, its fruit growers became major exporters and a lot of work was done to meet the standards demanded by European supermarkets. Growers were under pressure meet social standards, which had some positive effects for workers, including higher wages and the provision of clinics.

But the demand for cheaper produce also led growers to cut staff and use more temporary workers, often migrants from Zimbabwe or Mozambique, who are paid less and enjoy fewer benefits.

Not enough information

Donors admit that poverty impacts are very hard to track, especially for broader attempts to support trade.

William Hynes, of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), says most smaller donors don’t even attempt to evaluate these impacts. They only monitor that the money was spent on what it was intended for.

“Impact evaluations are costly. They are burdensome, lengthy, and not necessarily aligned with the project managers’ incentives. They do help get across this idea that we should prioritize learning over accountability. But getting at the poverty impacts of a project would probably involve a household survey. A baseline and final survey for 500 households would cost around $300,000, so for most activities that is simply off the table straight away.”

And Igboemeka concedes that, in most cases, the effects of Aid for Trade on the poor are difficult to nail down. “The poverty impact is indirect, and we are very clear about that. The assumption is - and there is a lot of evidence to support it - that if a country is able to trade more, it will grow, and that will create jobs and increase incomes and lead to poverty reduction. That’s a very long results chain, so we don’t try to make a direct attribution of the direct poverty reduction impact. We don’t have enough information to do that robustly.”

All this uncertainty worries campaigners like Gareth Siddorn of Traidcraft. “I know Aid for Trade is just one part of an aid portfolio,” he told IRIN, “but I was struck by the recognition, by colleagues from both DFID and OECD, that it might not be the most effective way of directly benefitting poor people. And from an NGO perspective, that isn’t just one indicator among many - it’s the primary purpose of aid and development policies.” 

eb/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97630/Aid-for-Trade-does-it-help-the-poor</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/200705162t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">LONDON 12 March 2013 (IRIN) - Since the World Trade Organization launched its Aid for Trade initiative in 2005, an estimated US$200 billion dollars of development funding has been mobilized for the programme. But some NGOs are asking whether Aid for Trade really helps reduce poverty.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Militias in Masisi</title><pubDate>Wed, 06 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303061047170615t.jpg" />]]>MASISI 06 March 2013 (IRIN) - The process of integrating armed groups into the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) army, FARDC, has stalled again amid heavy fighting at a base where hundreds of combatants had assembled.</description><body><![CDATA[MASISI 06 March 2013 (IRIN) - The process of integrating armed groups into the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) army, FARDC, has stalled again amid heavy fighting at a base where hundreds of combatants had assembled.

The clashes, which started in Kitchanga, North Kivu Province, could jeopardize community reconciliation across much of the province's Masisi territory, which saw outbreaks of ethnic violence in 2012.

In this briefing, IRIN looks at armed group integration and community pacification in eastern DRC and asks how these processes might develop in Masisi and elsewhere in the region.

What has happened in Kitchanga?

Heavy fighting broke out on 24 February between FARDC and the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) militia, and continued until 27 February. It broke out again on March 3; as of 5 March, at least 70 people had been killed and thousands displaced from their homes.

Between 500 and 700 APCLS combatants are believed to have been in Kitchanga, alongside a regiment of about 1,000 FARDC soldiers. The combatants had been sent by their commander, Janvier Bwingo Karairi, who was negotiating with the army over the possible integration of his forces.

UN Radio says discussions broke down over the murder of an APCLS officer and attempts by the APCLS to attack ethnic Tutsi living in a displacement camp, who they alleged were hiding weapons. A witness to the fighting, Samson Ndako, said many houses in Kitchanga were burned as the fighters targeted each other's communities. The APCLS are largely ethnic Hunde, and many soldiers in the town are Hutu or Tutsi.

Most of the town’s estimated 120,000 inhabitants have fled towards Tongo in the northwest.

Why are these latest clashes significant?

There is fighting between the FARDC and armed groups in many parts of DRC, but Masisi is a key area for political and strategic reasons. Tensions within this densely populated territory have repeatedly sparked or fuelled wars.

The area straddles an ethnic fault line between Banyarwanda people, who have Rwandan ancestry and include the Hutu and Tutsi, and other so-called “indigenous” communities, such as the Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo and Nande.

In 2012, the violence [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96392/DRC-Army-commander-seeks-solution-to-Masisi-crisis ] in Masisi was worse than at any time since the 1990s, contributing to the displacement of up to half a million people in North Kivu.

That violence died down in December, when Hutu, Hunde and other armed groups agreed to a ceasefire. There was even a plan for APCLS’s Janvier to take command of other armed groups and shepherd them into a mass integration into the army. That idea may now be shelved or abandoned.

Masisi is also at the frontline of the stand-off with the M23 rebels, who control most the neighbouring territory of Rutshuru.

What is the risk of a return to ethnic violence in Masisi?

The fighting in Kitchanga is not simply Hunde versus Hutu and Tutsi. Oxfam worker Eddy Mbuyi told IRIN that elements of the Rwandan, Hutu-dominated rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda(FDLR) have been siding with the APCLS, and other local Hutu militias appear to be neutral. Still, he said, there is virtually an ethnic war in Kitchanga, and it threatens to spread.

Yet progress towards reconciling Hutu, Hunde and other communities has been made in recent months. Since December 2012, at least three large pacification meetings have been held in the territory. The Jesuit Refugee Service described a meeting on 5 February at Masisi Centre as "historic" - it was the first time hundreds of Hunde and Hutu combatants had met at such a gathering.

The leaders of the APCLS and of the Hutu Force for the Defence of Human Rights (FDDH) militias were present at that meeting, and in an apparently strong gesture of solidarity, FDDH coordinator Emmanuel Munyariba said the FDDH would take orders from APCLS's Janvier.

However, that solidarity may have been conditional on good relations with the army (Munyamariba is also a local police chief), and the FDDH is not the only Hutu militia, nor is it united - three groups call themselves FDDH. In a recent Rift Valley Institute report [ http://rvi.asilialtd.com/download/file/fid/1121 ], Congo expert Jason Stearns [ http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/ ] referred to 15 mostly Hutu splinter militias in the neighbouring territory of Kalehe.

Reconciliation has a long way to go in the villages. The NGO Concern found some villages in Masisi still empty, and many formerly ethnically mixed villages are now inhabited by only one ethnic group. Forty-five percent of the villagers Concern interviewed said they had only just returned after fleeing the recent violence, and many remain displaced.

Notably absent from pacification meetings were representatives of the Tutsi community. The research head for the North Kivu Civil Society Association, Djento Maundu, said this was a major reason some community chiefs have not attended the meetings.

There is a serious risk of armed groups banding together against the Tutsi, who are widely blamed for the M23 rebellion [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] although many Tutsi have died fighting alongside the rebels. Most of the M23's senior officers are Tutsi, as are many generals in FARDC who were integrated into the army after fighting for Rwandan-backed rebel movements.

Some complain that past peace agreements have given the Tutsi too much power, and that they are using it to defend their large land holdings and dominant role in the economy.

Hunde elder and APCLS spokesman Kingi Mbayo told IRIN on March 4 that the APCLS is not against the Tutsi, and has some Tutsi in its ranks, including “Colonel” Philemon. He also said Tutsi ranches have not come under attack in the past year, which appears to be true.

But he added that many Tutsi who claim to be Congolese refugees, whose return to their land is one of the M23’s demands, are not genuine Congolese, and called for more pressure on the Congolese and Rwandan governments to address this issue.

APCLS spokesman Jannot Makale Kale told IRIN on 4 March that the group would not leave Kitchanga but was willing to coexist there with FARDC, which it still regards as its ally.

Where has this left the army integration process?

In 2012, the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) reported that there were at least 31 armed groups in eastern DRC. The only large militia to integrate into the army since 2009 was the Hutu Nyatura, a group of around 1,000 fighters, now known as the Tango Four regiment. MONUSCO has a list of 12 groups in North Kivu that have been in integration talks.

MONUSCO lists nine of the armed groups in North Kivu as pro-FARDC and only four as pro-M23. But the list considers APCLS a pro-FARDC group, so it may need updating. Even so, the APCLS's hostility to the Tutsi means an alliance with the M23 is unlikely.

The M23 is believed to include some 3,000 fighters, while the Congolese army may have deployed some 20,000 against them. The other armed groups in North Kivu cumulatively have several thousand fighters.

Without significant armed support, the M23 will have difficulty advancing far from the Rwandan border. The proposed deployment of drones [ http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/01/20131941818393957.html ] to monitor the border will put them under further pressure.

The M23 also has serious internal divisions. Two M23 factions, one led by Bosco Ntaganda and the other by Sultani Makenga, were fighting at the end of last month, allowing FARDC and allies to move into the M23 zone before withdrawing again on March 3.

The armed groups that MONUSCO lists as pro-M23 are generally smaller than the pro-FARDC groups, so the odds seemed to be stacked against the movement. By June, it could also be facing a possible reinforcement of MONUSCO – which has some 17,000 peacekeepers - by a South African Development Community-led neutral international force of up to 4,000 soldiers with a more robust mandate.

Where next for integration and pacification?

Spokesmen for armed groups like the APCLS, FDDH and Movement of Action for Change (MAC) have told IRIN that the reason they have not yet joined the army is because it has been infiltrated by the M23. There is widespread suspicion that Tutsi officers within FARDC are M23 sympathizers, and militia members will be reluctant to join the army if they think the senior ranks are dominated by a hostile community.

Meanwhile, government negotiations with the M23 have been ongoing since December. The government is trying to avoid reintegrating senior M23 officers; it has offered to reintegrate all ranks up to major and to treat colonels and above on a case-by-case basis, offering some of them “retirement packages”. MONUSCO supports this position.

If a deal is reached with the M23, the army might try to deal with the region’s other armed groups by force, with the help of MONUSCO. A military source said the SADC-led troops would probably conduct some operations against the FDLR, some of whose core leadership was involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

In a letter published on 12 February, 19 mostly international NGOs called for "non-military solutions to [the] conflict… based on the failure so far of military action to fully address the presence of non-state armed groups and the negative impact of such action on the civilian population".

But militia commanders' ambitions may not be limited to integration in the army. For instance, the territory of APCLS's Janvier's is rich in high-grade cassiterite, which has been largely unexploited.

Researcher Maundu suggests that a key to peace could be establishing which people are the real stakeholders in the mines, and then encouraging the mines’ exploitation by demobilized militias.

nl/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97602/Briefing-Militias-in-Masisi</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303061047170615t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MASISI 06 March 2013 (IRIN) - The process of integrating armed groups into the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) army, FARDC, has stalled again amid heavy fighting at a base where hundreds of combatants had assembled.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>African migrants pay high prices to send money home</title><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data [ http://sendmoneyafrica.worldbank.org/ ] from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world. 

While South Asians pay an average of US$6 for every $100 they send home, Africans often pay more than twice that - and in South Africa, which has the highest remittance costs on the continent, nearly 21 percent of money set aside for family members back home is spent on getting it there.

With an estimated 120 million Africans depending on remittances from family members abroad for their survival, health and education, the World Bank argues that high transaction costs are cutting into the impact remittances can have on poverty levels. 

To address this, the Bank is partnering with the African Union Commission and member states to establish the African Institute for Remittances [ http://sendmoneyafrica.worldbank.org/african-institute-remittances-air-project ], which will work towards lowering the transaction costs of remittances to and within Africa. It will also leverage the potential of remittances to influence economic and social development. 

“The World Bank’s approach supports regulatory and policy reforms that promote transparency and market competition and the creation of an enabling environment that promotes innovative payment and remittance products,” said Marco Nicoli, a finance analyst at the Bank who specializes in remittances.

Costly and difficult

Owen Maromo, a 33-year-old farmworker who lives in De Doorns, a grape-growing region in South Africa’s Western Cape Province, told IRIN that his family in Zimbabwe relies on the money he sends home every month. 

“I’ve got a house there and I need to pay rent. I’m also taking care of my youngest brother - since my mum died four years ago - and my wife’s family.

“Almost every Zimbabwean here is budgeting to send money back home,” he added. “If they could, they would send money home on a weekly basis.”

In a 2012 report by the Cape Town-based NGO People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP), interviews with 350 Zimbabwean migrants revealed some of the reasons sending money home from South Africa is both costly and difficult [ http://www.passop.co.za/news/featured/press-statement ].

A key impediment is the stringent regulatory framework that governs cross-border transfers from South Africa. Exchange control legislation, for example, requires money transfer operators (MTOs) to partner with a bank. According to PASSOP, this has had the effect of stifling competition that would likely reduce transaction costs.  

Legislation intending to counter money laundering and terrorist financing requires that customers provide proof of residence and proof of the source of their funds before they can access financial services. This effectively excludes the many migrants living in informal settlements and those who are paid in cash. 

PASSOP found that even among migrants who do have access to banks and MTOs like Western Union and MoneyGram, many lack the financial literacy to make use of them. 

“Some have just come from rural areas in Zimbabwe, so it takes time for them to know about such things,” said Maromo, adding that lack of documentation was another major obstacle. “If you’re undocumented, you can’t go through the banks.”

Three-quarters of the Zimbabwean migrants interviewed by PASSOP relied instead on “informal” remittance channels, such as giving money or goods to bus drivers, friends or agents to send home. This is often not much cheaper than using banks or MTOs, and it is significantly riskier. Of the respondents who used such methods, 84 percent reported negative experiences, including theft of their money, loss or destruction of their goods and long delays in remittances reaching intended recipients. 

Maromo relayed his own experience sending money home through an agent who charged a 15 percent commission to channel the money through his South African bank account before handing it over to Maromo’s relatives in Zimbabwe. “Some time ago, I nearly lost 2,000 rand ($225) because I deposited it in [the agent’s] account and he was saying he didn’t have it and giving excuses. In the end, we got the money, but it cost us nearly 1,000 rand ($113) in airtime calling Zimbabwe,” he said.

“Some are using bus drivers or those people who are going home, and you have to trust them because you’re desperate, but there can be a lot of problems,” he added. “There are a lot of people whose money just disappears. Almost on a daily basis, you hear those stories.”

Lowering transaction fees

Now, Maromo uses a UK-based online transfer service called Mukuru.com, which is popular with many Zimbabweans living overseas. The proof of residence and source of funds requirements are the same as for traditional MTOs, but the site charges 10 percent on transfers from South Africa to Zimbabwe - less than most banks. 

The South African Reserve Bank and the treasury have committed to bringing the cost of remittances down to 5 percent by relaxing regulations for smaller money transfers, negotiating with regulators in the Southern African Development Community on exchange control regulations, and removing the requirement that MTOs partner with banks.

However, at the time of writing, the Reserve Bank has not yet responded to questions from IRIN about how these changes will be implemented and within what timeframe.

Rob Burrell, director of Mukuru.com, said achieving the 5 percent target would be tough considering the numerous costs that MTOs have to cover, including fees paid to the companies that collect and pay out the money, the cost of supporting transactions through a call centre, and licensing and reporting requirements. “We would need everyone pulling together,” he said.

Burrell noted that less stringent laws governing MTOs in the UK mean more competition but much weaker anti-money laundering controls. To operate in South Africa, Mukuru.com has to comply with the regulation that they partner with a local banking license holder.

“In the UK, it’s easier to obtain your license. There are 4,000 [MTOs operating in the UK] compared to 12 in South Africa, but the downside is that it’s very difficult to police them all,” he told IRIN. “My last audit in the UK was four years ago because they can’t handle the volume of licenses.”

ks/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97557/African-migrants-pay-high-prices-to-send-money-home</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In Brief: Measles epidemic affects thousands in DRC</title><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201112211013110936t.jpg" />]]>KINSHASA 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - A measles epidemic has affected tens of thousands of children in northern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), overwhelming health facilities, says medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).</description><body><![CDATA[KINSHASA 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - A measles epidemic has affected tens of thousands of children in northern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), overwhelming health facilities, says medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

“Most health centres are either not functional, out of medical stocks or inaccessible for the majority of the population. Many children die in their villages because the health facilities cannot provide adequate care,” Anja De Weggheleire, MSF Medical Coordinator in DRC, told IRIN via email.

“The disease is extremely contagious and can spread quickly in countries like DRC, which have large gaps in their healthcare system,” MSF said in a statement.

Measles mostly affects children and can cause complications including pneumonia, malnutrition, severe dehydration, ear infections and eye infections that can lead to blindness. Despite the availability of a vaccine for the disease, measles remains one of the biggest killers of children.

According to MSF, measles can kill between one and 15 percent of unvaccinated children who contract the disease and up to 25 percent of malnourished or vulnerable groups with limited access to healthcare.

Since March 2012, MSF says it has treated more than 18,000 patients and vaccinated 440,000 children in DRC’s Equateur and Orientale provinces.

“This situation is only the latest development in an ongoing epidemic that has affected the entire country since 2010,” said Amaury Grégoire, MSF deputy head of mission.

MSF officials said they counted 35 dead children in one of the villages they visited. 

ko/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97559/In-Brief-Measles-epidemic-affects-thousands-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201112211013110936t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KINSHASA 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - A measles epidemic has affected tens of thousands of children in northern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), overwhelming health facilities, says medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Thousands flee army harassment in eastern DRC*</title><pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201302151557230505t.jpg" />]]>GOMA 15 February 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people have fled the town of Punia in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following threats to their ethnic community, according to UN sources.</description><body><![CDATA[GOMA 15 February 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people have fled the town of Punia in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following threats to their ethnic community, according to UN sources.

“Nearly a third of the population of Punia, a town of 53,000 inhabitants, has reportedly fled to the forest or to other areas around the town,” Sylvestre Ntumba, from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), told media in Goma on 13 February.

“They say there has been harassment by elements of the national army,” he said, saying this is the reason people have given for fleeing.

In a report released on 6 February, OCHA in DRC said: “Army elements have allegedly been threatening people in Punia on the basis of their ethnic identity.”

Humanitarian requirements

“Schools and businesses have been paralyzed… notably because of harassment by the security forces and various scare stories,” the report said.

“They all need food, healthcare, shelter and essential household items,” he said, adding that the roads are impassable to vehicles, though the area is accessible by air.

Fabienne Pompey, a spokesperson for the World Food Programme (WFP), told media that WFP has started airlifting supplies to Goma. Even so, supplying the town will be difficult, she said, as there are only two lorries available and traveling the 12km from the airstrip to the town takes three hours.

WFP flew 20 tons of food into Punia between 12 and 14 February, but Pompey says this is only enough to feed 8,000 people for five days. The agency is working with the Catholic charity Caritas to identify the most vulnerable of those displaced people from Punia; it is planning to conduct another airlift soon.

The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the NGO Merlin are present in Punia. Merlin coordinator Amy Beaumont told IRIN that the NGO is working with UNICEF to bring in more medical assistance, including mobile clinics and a vaccination campaign against measles.

Ntumba said many of the people who fled Punia were among the 40,000 who had already been displaced from villages in the area.

The security situation deteriorated in Punia following clashes between the army and insurgents in the area.

Mineral connection

OCHA reports that between 24 January and 1 February more than 26,000 people were forced to flee to the town as insurgents known as Raia Mutomboki, (“angry citizens”) approached.

The army then launched an offensive against the Raia Mutomboki, driving them back 70km from Punia, towards Kasese, a mining town.

According to the OCHA report, the flare-up of violence in the area is due to several factors including discontent over harassment by security services, “alleged extortion, forced work and other violence”. Violence is also attributed to the refusal by mining operators to comply with official requirements that minerals to transit through Kindu, the provincial capital, where taxes are collected.

The report says armed groups were used, likely by those with mineral interest, to take control of the airport at Kasese and fly out stocks of minerals.

The authorities in South Kivu and Katanga provinces are also encountering armed group resistance to their attempts to impose stricter controls on the minerals trade.

IRIN attempted to contact the army authorities for comment about the allegations of harassment. The chief of staff of the seventh military region, Col Kodja, based in Kindu, said that only the commanding officer in the region could comment. The officer in charge of military justice in Kindu, Col Kaninga, said he could neither confirm nor deny the allegations.

A police officer in Kindu, who preferred to remain anonymous, said an official delegation had been sent to Kindu to investigate.

nl/rz

*This article was amended on 17 February to correct a geographical reference in the 7th paragraph. WFP has started airlifting supplies to Punia, not Goma, as previously stated.

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97489/Thousands-flee-army-harassment-in-eastern-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201302151557230505t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GOMA 15 February 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people have fled the town of Punia in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following threats to their ethnic community, according to UN sources.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Girl child soldiers face new battles in civilian life</title><pubDate>Tue, 12 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201009271253370112t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 12 February 2013 (IRIN) - Girl child soldiers are often thought of only as “sex slaves”, a term that glosses over the complex roles many play within armed groups and in some national armies. This thinking contributes to their subsequent invisibility in the demobilization processes - in fact, girls are frequently the most challenging child soldiers to rehabilitate.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 12 February 2013 (IRIN) - Girl child soldiers are often thought of only as “sex slaves”, a term that glosses over the complex roles many play within armed groups and in some national armies. This thinking contributes to their subsequent invisibility in the demobilization processes - in fact, girls are frequently the most challenging child soldiers to rehabilitate. 

The broad categorization of girl soldiers as victims of sexual abuse obscures the fact that they are often highly valued militarily. While sexual abuse is believed to be widespread, girls’ vulnerability may vary, as attitudes toward women differ extensively across militias: In Colombia, the Marxist-leaning groups the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) treated female soldiers as equal to males, while right-wing paramilitary groups were known to embrace gender stereotypes. 

Some have argued that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR) are ill-equipped to address the needs of girls. DDR was designed for adult male combatants, and over the years has incorporated female combatants, followed by boy soldiers and then girls. 

A January 2013 World Bank briefing, Children in Emergency and Crisis Situations, says: “The use of girls [by armed forces] has been confirmed in Colombia, DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo], East Timor, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda and West Africa. There are some 12,500 in DRC. However, girls are generally less visible and up to now have hardly benefited from demobilization and reintegration programmes for child soldiers.” 

“No one knows what has happened after a DDR process to the large majority of girls associated with the armed groups,” the briefing said. 

About 40 percent of the hundreds of thousands of child soldiers scattered across the world’s conflicts today are thought to be girls, but the numbers of girls enrolling in child soldier DDR programmes dwindles to five percent or less. 

Girls often conceal their association with armed groups, Richard Clarke, director of Child Soldiers International [ http://www.child-soldiers.org ], told IRIN. In traditional societies, enrolling in DDR could confirm a past that imperils their future: “In contexts of entrenched gender discrimination, and in situations where a girl’s ‘value’ is defined in terms of her purity and marriageability, the stigma attached to involvement in sexual activity, whether real or imputed, can result in exclusion and acute impoverishment,” he said. 

Seeking gender equality 

Then there is the uncomfortable reality that some conflicts may actually fast-track gender emancipation. 

A 2012 report [ http://uit.no/Content/307291/Post_War_Processes_Report_Final.pdf ] by Tone Bleie of the University of Tromsø’s Centre for Peace Studies (CPS) explores this issue. During Nepal’s civil war, when Maoists conscripted “one member per house”, some parents offered their daughters to spare “sons whom they considered as their life insurance.” Of the Maoists’ 23,610 combatants at the cessation of hostilities, 5,033 were believed to be female, and of them 988 were girls. 

“Female combatants developed a new sense of pride and dignity due to personal sacrifices, military courage, feats in the battlefield and prospects of promotion in the ranks,” the report says. 

In the wake of Nepal’s 2006 ceasefire, during the cantonment of Maoists rebels and the subsequent reintegration process, girls and women were returned “to [the] very low position of women in traditional Nepalese feudal society,” Desmond Molloy, a panellist at the International Research Group on Reintegration at the CPS, told IRIN. 

“Inter-cast marriage, and marriage in general, was encouraged in the cantonment. This is taboo in Nepali society and proved a major obstacle for reintegration of young girls back into society, especially when they have children, as many do. Further there is in [Nepal’s] society a perception of a promiscuous environment in the cantonment. So many young girls were viewed with suspicion by their families, rejected by their new in-laws or ostracized by the community,” Molloy said. 

Abdul Hameed Omar, programme manager for the UN Development Programme’s Interagency Rehabilitation Programme, told IRIN that acceptance of inter-cast marriages was particularly problematic. “Children have been denied birth certificates, and women have been denied their citizenship certificates. When the community knows that a woman has been part of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army], these women sometimes face a stigma,” he said. 

He said attitudes of male Maoist ex-combatants “vary widely” but that “many voiced opinions that were not in line with their previous [gender equality] beliefs during the conflict. Other male ex-combatants who played traditionally female roles during the conflict, i.e., cooking or childcare, no longer feel that these are appropriate roles for men outside of the PLA.” 

Loss of power 

Many Colombian girl soldiers, who fought as equals to their male counterparts, struggled with the double standards of civilian life. 

“For some girls, belonging to an illegal armed group gives them a sense of power and control that they may not otherwise experience living in a relatively conservative, ‘machista’ [chauvinist] society,” said Overcoming Lost Childhoods, a Care International report about rehabilitating Colombian child soldiers [ http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000760.pdf ].

By the end of Eritrea’s 30-year-long liberation war, in 1991, females comprised between 25 and 30 percent of combatants. The gender-equality ideals espoused by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s (EPLF) had proved an attractive lure for female recruits, including some who were teenagers or younger. 

But “many Eritrean female ex-fighters experienced the years of war as preferable to the time that came afterwards… They had felt respected, equal and empowered, but this was all lost after the war when women were pushed towards traditional gender roles,” said the 2008 report Young Female Fighters in African Wars, Conflict and Its Consequences [ http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=3543 ].

Eritrea’s DDR programmes initially tailored economic opportunities for women to traditional gender roles - basket weaving, typing and embroidery - but this did not provide a sustainable livelihood. Training women in traditionally male trades also proved fruitless because society’s norms ultimately dictated who could get which jobs. 

“Furthermore, female ex-fighters had a hard time getting married after the war as men usually claimed that these women had lost their femininity during the war. Many male ex-fighters also divorced their fighter wives for this reason and married civilian women,” the report said. 

Duality 

Girl soldiers’ versatility - they serve as combatants, spies, domestics, porters and “bush wives” - makes them highly valued among armed groups, which can also increase their difficulty reintegrating into civilian life. 

Despite this, punishments for girls in northern Uganda, such as whipping or caning, were meted out for the smallest infractions, Linda Dale, director of Children/Youth as Peacebuilders (CAP) [ http://www.childrenyouthaspeacebuilders.ca/About%20Us/contact.html ], told IRIN. 

“There is a strong tendency to force a kind of passivity on girls while at the same time they are expected to be combatants. This duality, as well as the effect of sexual violence, makes their rehabilitation more complicated, in my view,” she said. 

The length of captivity also differed between the sexes; average internment period for girls in northern Uganda was six to seven years, while boys faced about three years, Dale said. “Because of that, the effects of the experience, and therefore the need for more assistance in re-integration, will be higher. For example, many girl returnees are illiterate because they have been out of school so long.” 

Shelly Whitman, executive director of the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative [ http://www.childsoldiers.org/ ], told IRIN that some girls can be seen as suffering from Stockholm syndrome, where captives develop a sympathetic association with their abusers. 

“Girls were raped but then given to or chosen by a commander to be a ‘wife’. They are confused about their experiences, their guilt, their families’ expectations and religious beliefs. Additionally, many have children fathered by their captors. They are often rejected when they return home and viewed as non-marriageable material, damaged goods. With this kind of a homecoming, it creates confusion about your identity and your self-worth,” she said. 

Invisibility 

The assumptions and expectations of people operating DDR programmes may also affect girls’ reintegration. 

Girl soldiers are often assumed to be “‘following along’, rather than girls who have been recruited and used, however informally, for military purposes… These assumptions have resulted in tens of thousands of girls being literally ‘invisible’ to DDR programmers, although the situation has improved somewhat in recent years,” said Clarke of Child Soldiers International. 

Phillip Lancaster, former head of the DDR programme for the UN Organization Mission in DRC, told IRIN, “Boys with guns are easier to see and easier to fear.” DDR programmes might “ignore girls on the assumption that they don't present the same threat.” 

“My own experience is that girls are often invisible to DDR programmes that draw narrow categories around the notion of combat,” he said. “It's tricky to avoid getting caught up in categories as soon as one starts trying to define parameters of qualification for DDR programmes, and most of the decisions tend to have a somewhat arbitrary flavour simply because of the complexity of the subject matter. 

“Most of the Congolese armed groups… draw on local community resources… The definition of girl child soldier in this setting could, in theory, extend over all the young females in a community who were supporting, supplying, informing or directly fighting with a relevant armed group.” 

go/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97463/Analysis-Girl-child-soldiers-face-new-battles-in-civilian-life</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201009271253370112t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 12 February 2013 (IRIN) - Girl child soldiers are often thought of only as “sex slaves”, a term that glosses over the complex roles many play within armed groups and in some national armies. This thinking contributes to their subsequent invisibility in the demobilization processes - in fact, girls are frequently the most challenging child soldiers to rehabilitate.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>DRC considers cholera vaccination</title><pubDate>Thu, 31 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/2008040724t.jpg" />]]>KINSHASA 31 January 2013 (IRIN) - Health experts, including those from the UN World Health Organization (WHO) and Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF), are considering introducing immunization campaigns as a way of dealing with cholera in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the disease is  endemic.</description><body><![CDATA[KINSHASA 31 January 2013 (IRIN) - Health experts,  including those from the UN World Health Organization (WHO) and Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF), are considering introducing immunization campaigns as a way of dealing with cholera [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95950/DRC-Concerns-over-cholera-mount-amid-clashes ] in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the disease is  endemic.

“Immunization against cholera opens up a new opportunity [for] treatment and [the] fight against the disease. We think that there is a new opportunity to use it in the DR Congo as a complementary measure to existing methods that that have been used in the past,” Marc le Pape, chief of the MSF bureau in the eastern town of Kalemei, told IRIN.

The parts of DRC most affected by the disease are characterized by poor hygiene, lack of awareness about how cholera is transmitted, limited access to protected and monitored water sources, and lack of sanitation infrastructure [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95384/DRC-Poor-sanitation-systems-hinder-fight-against-cholera ].

According to a cholera situation analysis [ http://www.afro.who.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=7815&Itemid=2593 ] released by WHO in September 2012, there were 22,792 reported cases of cholera in DRC between January and September 2012. There were 512 cholera-related deaths in the same period.

Sanitation focus

The government is considering a roll-out of the vaccine, but some government health officials have opposed calls for an immunization campaign, instead pushing for efforts to scale-up water and sanitation programmes.

“At the moment, we in South Kivu Province [think] immunization is not an emergency because a lot of work has been done to get clean water to reach more people there,” Jean-de-Dieu Mpuruta, an official from the Ministry of Health, told IRIN.

“We believe that if everyone has access to clean water and applies hygienic requirements - such as drinking boiled water, washing hands, eating warmed foods, having a clean toilet, keeping the surroundings/environment clean etc. - cholera disease can be defeated,” he added.

The provision of clean water and sanitation is critical to reducing the impact of cholera - a diarrhoeal disease that can kill within hours if left untreated - and other waterborne diseases.

Globally, there are an estimated 3–5 million cholera cases, resulting in 100,000–120,000 deaths, every year, according to WHO.

Plans underway

Health experts discussed these options at a conference held in the capital, Kinshasa, from 23 to 24 January. They also considered strengthening in-hospital care, using avail flexible financing, strengthening the epidemiological surveillance and communication system, and creating an emergency fund for cholera, as well as other measures.

Already, a five-year plan to combat cholera - especially in the eastern region, where a long-running conflict between the government and rebel forces has hampered prevention and treatment efforts - is being developed.

According to WHO, the vaccination against cholera will target mostly travellers, fishermen and farmers living along rivers.

In 2012, WHO convened a technical working group on the creation of a global cholera vaccine stockpile [ http://www.unicef.org/immunization/files/WHO_HSE_PED_2012_2_eng.pdf ].

A study [ http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22028938 ] carried out in Kolkata, India, on the effectiveness of the oral cholera vaccine revealed that the vaccine had a 67 percent  protection efficacy against clinically significant cholera for two years, and showed that the vaccinated population had a 66 percent protection efficacy against all forms of cholera for three years after vaccination.

There are currently two WHO pre-qualified oral cholera vaccines, Dukoral and Shanchol. Another five are still under development.

In 2012, a cholera outbreak in the eastern town of Kisangani spread quickly to Kinshasa and also affected many towns along the Congo River.

pc/ko/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97385/DRC-considers-cholera-vaccination</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/2008040724t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KINSHASA 31 January 2013 (IRIN) - Health experts, including those from the UN World Health Organization (WHO) and Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF), are considering introducing immunization campaigns as a way of dealing with cholera in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the disease is  endemic.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The poverty of the DRC&apos;s gold miners</title><pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301290903060729t.jpg" />]]>IGA-BARRIER 29 January 2013 (IRIN) - There is no refuge from the blistering heat at this artisanal gold mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Any trees that might have provided shade have been consumed by the mine, which covers an area the size of five or six football fields.</description><body><![CDATA[IGA-BARRIER 29 January 2013 (IRIN) - There is no refuge from the blistering heat at this artisanal gold mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Any trees that might have provided shade have been consumed by the mine, which covers an area the size of five or six football fields. 

About a thousand people - men, women and some children - swarm across the open-cast mine near Iga-Barrière, about 25km east of Bunia, the administrative town of the Ituri Region. 

The scene has all the trappings of a 19th century gold rush, apart from the hum of diesel generators powering pumps to drain water from the open shafts, while hawkers sell drinking water in translucent plastic bags. 

Mtsajme, 21, has worked as an artisanal gold miner for more than half his life. “I have grown up in the job,” he told IRIN. “I started as a child when I left school at eight. It is all that I have known.” 

When his stint at this mine finishes, Mtsajme will move to another. “There are too many [gold mines] to count [in Ituri]. One is born and one dies every day,” he said. 

Since the discovery of gold in 1903 along the banks of the Agola River, gold mining has been part of the territory’s economic lifeblood. It is more common to see people carrying mining tools - plastic basins and long-handled spades - than agricultural implements. Local NGOs put the numbers of artisanal gold miners in Ituri between 130,000 and 150,000. 

Nzembo Josue, 26, has just had his “best week” since starting as a gold miner six years ago. He made US$100, or the equivalent of two grams of gold. 

A way of life 

“Gold mining is the main activity of the majority of people in this area, people are not used to farming. There are so many hills here. When one gold mine is finished, we move onto another hill somewhere,” Josue told IRIN. 

Women, some with babies strapped to their backs, form human chains to pass plastic basins of mud from men excavating the shafts. They all work 13 hour days, six days a week. Some earn as little as US$0.21 a day. 

It can take up to three weeks to dig, by hand, an 8m-deep shaft to where the gold-bearing sands lie at Iga-Barrière. Narrower shafts requiring less work carry greater risks. 

Josue says that if cracks appear on a shaft’s wall, it must be dug wider to make it stable. “I have worked on gold mines where the shafts have collapsed and people have been killed.” 

A stake at the artisanal gold mine costs about $250, or five grams of gold, and is paid to the Société des Mines d'Or de Kilo Moto (SOKIMO), a public company, which was previously a parastatal. 

SOKIMO is a relic from Belgium, the former colonial power. Created in 1926, the company enjoyed boom years during the 1960s and 1970s, employing about 6,000 people and providing housing, clinics and schools for its employees. However, its nationalization in 1966 by then-Zaire’s President Mobuto Sese-Seko, who used the company to support his lavish lifestyle, eventually took a toll. 

By the late 1980s, the company’s only source of revenue was the taxing of artisanal and small-scale miners. Makuza Boniface, SOKIMO director at Iga-Barrière, told IRIN the company imposes a 30 percent tax on all gold produced at the site by the artisanal miners. 

After 15 years of gold mining, Lobho Faustin, 30, cannot afford his own claim. He is part of a group of eight diggers, earning a wage to support his three children. 

“It’s a job to live and survive on. How much money you make depends on how lucky you are. Sometimes I get $50 in a week and sometimes nothing. You can work for weeks and not get paid. I work for someone else. But it all depends. If we find gold then we get paid. There is nothing else to do,” he said. 

Gold smuggling 

The work of the artisanal gold miners in Ituri is not reflected in official production figures, and in recent years gold production has declined as the gold price has soared. 

Eric Yanba Kitene, of Bunia’s Centre for Evaluation d’Expertise et de Certification (CEEC), a government organization that provides technical assistance and determines gold purity, told IRIN that in the last six months of 2009, 83kg was officially produced in Ituri. In 2010, 115kg was produced. In 2011, this dropped to 58kg, and production up until November 2012 was 16kg. 

Meanwhile, gold is being smuggled across the borders by gold dealers exploiting a tax loophole, Kitene said, to maximise profits. 

In 2012, DRC reduced its gold tax for traders from 3.5 percent to 2 percent. Neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda have gold tax rates of between 0.5 percent and 1 percent, Kitene said. 

The percentage differential may appear small, but it was enough, Kitene said, to ensure that “maybe 5 to 10 tons of gold is smuggled annually,” across international borders, mainly to Rwanda and Uganda. 

The solution to prevent gold smuggling would be to introduce “uniform regional gold tax rates and allow gold traders to legally export gold,” he said. 

Toto Bosingaka, the chief of the Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement d’Artisanal (SAESSCAM), told IRIN gold traders have to be Congolese and pay an annual fee to government of $150. In Bunia, he said, there were about 30 to 35 registered gold traders, and about 800 in Ituri overall, excluding an unknown number of unlicensed dealers. 

Underfunded 

SAESSCAM was established in 2002 and tasked with providing assistance and training to the country’ artisanal mining sector, but it has been woefully underfunded by government. 

Bosingaka, who is responsible for four of Ituri’s five territories - Djugu, Irumu, Mahagi and Aru, but not Mambasa - said, “We have a problem of transport and equipment. We have no vehicle, no car, no motorbike and no bicycle.” 

They have a mandate to ensure adherence to the Mining Code for artisanal miners, and have 10 agents for the four territories, but Bosingaka said the organization was “not really in touch with miners. We work with the gold traders.” 

Artisanal miners face an array of occupational hazards, including: mercury inhalation while extracting gold from ore; tunnel and open-shaft mine collapses; women experiencing spontaneous abortions due to heavy labour; and the complete absence of water and sanitation facilities. 

“Health and safety is set down in the Mining Code, but most miners don’t seem to care. It is very difficult to prosecute people as most are not educated and many were in militias during the war,” Bosingaka said. 

Threat of conflict 

As elsewhere in the eastern DRC, Ituri encountered a succession of international and local conflicts, and a variety of militias and foreign national armies imposed their own taxation system on the artisanal gold miners. During the Second Congo War, for example, a conflict between the agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema emerged and lasted until 2007. 

Although Ituri has returned to relative peace, gaining access to Iga-Barrière requires passing through numerous roadblocks staffed by security forces and government officials, who impose random “road taxes” on vehicles and pedestrians alike. 

A November 2012 report, Conflict Gold to Criminal Gold, published by Southern Africa Resource Watch, said [ http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/congo_gold_webenglish.pdf ] that for artisanal miners, the peace dividend has not provided any respite from a culture of backhander payments. 

“And while the exploitation of artisanal and small-scale miners continues, the identity of those responsible has now changed. They are no longer warlords and militia leaders but government administrators, members of the government’s military and security organizations, and many regional traders,” the report said. 

Louis Bedidj Fuarwingo, coordinator of the artisanal miner organization the Association Exploit dans Mineur Artisnal pur le pacification et reconstruction Ituri (AEMAPRI), told IRIN, “Sometimes authorities harass miners and make them pay for small things to let them work. They can make people very angry and demand as much as $750. 

“They ask for non-existent certificates, like ‘scientific training’ and ‘expertise in mining’. They just create such lists to pick money from the miners. Police come to the mining camp and go to the mine boss and then all the miners have to contribute.” 

Ndele Tanzi, coordinator for the Bunia-based NGO Honesty and Peace told IRIN gold mining was a major threat to peace and stability. “The Ituri war was cast as an ethnic war, but if you look carefully it was about resources.” 

Gold is not the only mineral that the territory possesses. It also has, but has yet to commercially exploit, coltan, cobalt, wolframite and cassiterite among other minerals; a similar collection of valuable ores have encouraged and sustained conflict in DRC’s Kivu provinces. 

“Problems always exist on the mines,” Tanzi said, “and not all weapons were taken back after the war, and many of the miners used to be members of militias. There is anger [on the mines]. ” 

go/rz 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97356/The-poverty-of-the-DRC-apos-s-gold-miners</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301290903060729t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">IGA-BARRIER 29 January 2013 (IRIN) - There is no refuge from the blistering heat at this artisanal gold mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Any trees that might have provided shade have been consumed by the mine, which covers an area the size of five or six football fields.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Small steps to land reform in eastern DRC</title><pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301290839290013t.jpg" />]]>KINSATI 29 January 2013 (IRIN) - Shukuru Rudahunga keeps a wary eye on the steep slope above her as she weeds her patch of sorghum in the eastern province of North Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); she knows the risks are deadly.</description><body><![CDATA[KINSATI 29 January 2013 (IRIN) - Shukuru Rudahunga keeps a wary eye on the steep slope above her as she weeds her patch of sorghum in the eastern province of North Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); she knows the risks are deadly.

Landslides have killed several people in nearby Kinsati, 40km from the city of Goma.

"If it's been raining and I see the earth breaking up, I stop working and get off the hillside," she told IRIN.

Erosion also washes away seeds, plants and soil fertility. Villagers know that to protect against soil loss, they should fallow the steeper slopes after just a few seasons.

But “we don't do it because there isn’t enough land", Shukuru said.

The over-cultivation has also resulted in plummeting yields. Teacher Gabriel Hanyurwa remembers that, in the 1980s, farmers harvested 20 sacks of beans per hectare on land that now yields only six to eight sacks.

The land shortage results in part from population growth and in part from the expansion of cattle ranches.

"Since the ranchers brought their cattle here, we haven't had enough fields," Hanyurwa said.

"The ranchers prefer to put their cattle in the same places that we want to cultivate," another villager, Therese Tusali, said.

In a 2010 paper, ‘Land, Power and Identity: Roots of violent conflict in Eastern DRC’ [ http://www.internationalalert.org/resources/publications/land-power-and-identity ], author Chris Huggins noted that recent decades have seen “massive alienation of land held under custom” in the Kivus in favour of cattle ranchers.

Residents in Kinsati and elsewhere have had little say in this process.

Driving conflict

Land disputes are key drivers of conflict in eastern DRC, and they hinder development across the country. Some researchers [ http://www.africacanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Land_Citizenship_and_Conflict_in_the_Kivus_1.pdf ] argue that agrarian conflict, rooted in issues of land rights and citizenship, is the principal cause of the Kivu region's wars.

Population density, colonization and large-scale migration from Rwanda have all made access to land a critical issue in North and South Kivu. A corrupt judiciary and a flawed land law compound the problem.

In his 2007 book, From Genocide to Continental War, Gerard Prunier describes the extent of “land grabbing” during the presidency of Mobutu Sese Seko as “incredible”, citing the attempt by one businessman in 1980 to take control of 230,000 hectares; the average land holding was less than one hectare.

Land grabs, particularly from displaced communities, have continued amid the wars of the past two decades, and the prospect of an eventual land commission that might investigate these transfers has been a “sustaining factor in conflict”, Huggins has argued [ http://www.academia.edu/835635/Land_Conflict_and_Livelihoods_in_the_Great_Lakes_Region_Testing_Policies_to_the_Limit ].

Mediation initiatives

Through their work resettling displaced communities, aid agencies have become involved in mediating land disputes. UN Habitat runs the largest of these programmes. In 2012, its three mediation centres in the region identified 1,690 land conflicts and resolved 641 of them.

A conference in Belgium in September 2012 reviewed donors’ interventions in eastern DRC’s land problems; most of the spending had been on mediation. Koen Vlassenroot, who convened the meeting, says it was agreed that “mediation only seems to have an impact on conflicts between individual farmers; once larger players such as big landowners or army commanders are involved it’s very, very difficult”.

Conference participants were also concerned that mediation projects had “an acute lack of coherence, coordination”, and sustainability.

Vlassenroot noted that there are two other main interventions to help resolve land issues: assisting the registration of land claims - which has had “limited results” and involves “all sorts of problems” - and locally driven efforts by farmers’ organizations to work on a land reform process.

A report by International Alert [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/201209EndingDeadlockEasternDRC-EN.pdf.pdf ] highlights local efforts by the Forum of the Friends of the Earth (FAT) and the Federation of Congolese Agricultural Producers’ Organizations (FOPAC), whose success in lobbying for the integration of key issues in the new agricultural code offers “a grounded approach to peace-building”. These interventions have had much less support from donors.

Lobbying by FAT and FOPAC led to the inclusion in the agricultural code of a provision for the mediation of land disputes, as well provisions for identifying and reallocating unused concessions and greater representation of “peasants”, or agricultural workers, in local decision-making. However, the government has yet to agree on implementation measures for the new law.

Peasants take on land law

These organizations are currently advocating reform of the land law, which fails to define customary land rights. Chiefs were legally stripped of their traditional land allocation powers in 1975, but many continue to exercise them.

FAT and FOPAC have held consultations with farmers’ organizations in several provinces, including a forum in Goma, North Kivu Province, in October 2012. At the forum, many recommendations were put forward for improving the land law, such as ending land registry officials’ immunity from prosecution for “mistakes”, publicizing details of unjust land transfers and revealing the ownership of unused land concessions.

But none of these politically sensitive recommendations figured in the FOPAC newsletter, which recorded only that participants had called for customary chiefs to respect their predecessors’ land allocations, for taxes on title deeds to be reduced and for tenancy documents issued by chiefs to have legal status. No vote appeared to have been taken on these or the other recommendations.

Simplexe Malembe, coordinator of FAT, told IRIN that if the government is to give legal status to land allocations by chiefs, it should see that each chief is accompanied by an advisory committee representative of the community. “That principle is already in the constitution,” he said, “and we are trying to implement it through the agricultural law. But the government and the land registry don’t like it because it takes away a good part of their revenue.”

Participants at the forum agreed that the peasant associations need to strengthen their representation at the local level and their communications with smallholders.

The International Alert report recommends “bottom-up dialogue” to find local solutions and promote peace-building. Malembe agrees: “In the peasant movement, the dialogue needs to be from the base to the summit as well as from the summit to the base.”

Jean-Baptiste Musbayimana, who broadcasts for FOPAC, told IRIN he would like to include more phone-in programmes in his broadcasts, a “bottom-up” format popularized by the UN’s Radio Okapi in DRC, so that rural people can share their views on the problems in their communities; currently, the only two-way communication broadcast by FOPAC on the radio is about agricultural prices.

Government action

The good news, says Vlassenroot, is that the government appears willing to address land issues nationwide. At a workshop in Kinshasa in July, the government and UN Habitat worked out a “road map” for reform of the land law and land governance.

The deputy cabinet director at the land affairs ministry, Albert Paka, spoke to IRIN last month about the reform process. He agrees the government needs to hasten reform by taking the first step on the road map: appointing a steering committee to coordinate work on the process.

But determining who rightfully owns land, and even who is permitted to own land, will be a major hurdle. The new agricultural code, for example, limits foreigners’ share of DRC farmland investments to 49 percent; Paka confirmed that the government intends to revise this clause. Revision of the clause will likely be a precondition for new foreign investments in DRC agriculture.

Paka said DRC might go the way of other countries and buy up customary land, hinting that such land could be sold to foreign investors. Further research will be required before any decisions can be made, he said.

Consulting with the chiefs and understanding local customs will also be critical, he told IRIN.  “In some parts of the country, land belongs to the chiefs, whereas in other parts it belongs to the community, and they are merely arbiters of land rights.”

Huggins’s research suggests chiefs’ ownership claims tend to be strongest in the most densely populated areas, where land shortages are most acute. Government land purchases in these areas for resale to foreign investors could therefore be highly controversial.

“Recognition of customary chiefs will be the cornerstone of land governance,” Paka stressed.

Asked if there would be safeguards against unjust decisions by traditional chiefs, Paka said that if the chiefs were to be recognized as land custodians they would be part of the administration, and would be guided by its technical experts, whose capacity needs to be reinforced. He declined to speculate on how land administration might change if government at the chiefdom-level is democratized.

Paka indicated that government intervention will be necessary to help DRC reach its agricultural potential. Even though land shortages are a concern, he pointed out that a recent study showed 73 percent of agricultural land around Kinshasa is unused.

The National Confederation of Agricultural Producers in the Congo told IRIN that most of the land around Kinshasa is unused because it has been bought up by speculators in anticipation of biofuel investments.

nl/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97357/Analysis-Small-steps-to-land-reform-in-eastern-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301290839290013t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KINSATI 29 January 2013 (IRIN) - Shukuru Rudahunga keeps a wary eye on the steep slope above her as she weeds her patch of sorghum in the eastern province of North Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); she knows the risks are deadly.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Cash-strapped ICC takes on Mali</title><pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207301203450616t.jpg" />]]>LONDON 29 January 2013 (IRIN) - Concerns are being raised that the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into alleged war crimes in Mali is placing a serious strain on an already over-stretched and cash-strapped institution.</description><body><![CDATA[LONDON 29 January 2013 (IRIN) - Concerns are being raised that the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into alleged war crimes in Mali is placing a serious strain on an already over-stretched and cash-strapped institution.

Announcing her first formal investigation since taking office, prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on 16 January promised justice to victims of “brutality and destruction” in three northern regions of Mali. But with a shrinking team of investigators and a budget that has barely increased despite a doubling of the workload, some analysts are doubtful she can deliver.

“There are serious questions to be asked of the new prosecutor as to whether it is a drastic overstretch to have eight African countries being dealt with simultaneously with essentially the same level of staff and the same level of finance as her office was operating on before,” said Phil Clark, a lecturer in comparative and international politics at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies. “Is it really feasible for the office to be dealing with so many cases?”

The ICC intervenes in countries that cannot - or will not - prosecute perpetrators of mass atrocities. It is intended as a court of last resort in countries where prosecutions are unlikely to happen without its intervention.

Total court funding in 2013 is around US$144 million, with possible access to a contingency fund of up to $9.3 million, compared with $138 million in 2010. The prosecutor’s office, which carries out the investigations, was this year allocated $37 million. This represents an increase of just $1.3 million since 2010 despite the addition of Mali, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya to the docket - and these countries were themselves in addition to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Uganda and the Central African Republic (CAR).

“They are really at the edge of what they can do with their resources,” said Kevin Jon Heller, associate professor and reader at Melbourne Law School.

Investigating through intermediaries

The ICC is examining claims of murder, mutilation, torture, attacks on protected objects, executions, pillaging and rape since January 2012 when insurgent groups began their campaign to take over northern Mali. French troops and the Malian army have been reclaiming captured towns this month, but ongoing fighting means ICC investigators are unlikely to be gathering evidence on the ground.

“It isn’t like anyone from the ICC is going to Mali anytime soon,” said Heller.

Court investigators will instead speak to French troops, the Malian government and so-called intermediaries - usually local human rights groups who gather evidence and contact witnesses in areas the court cannot access.

Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Federation of Human Rights, among other groups, continue to actively investigate human rights abuses in Mali.

The use of intermediaries by ICC investigators has been controversial in previous cases, particularly during the trial of the DRC’s Thomas Lubanga. He was convicted [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95073/DRC-Lubanga-verdict-a-first-step ] of using children to fight in his Ituri rebel group but the intermediaries who helped prosecutors build the case were accused of bribing witnesses. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, who fought on the opposite side in the Ituri conflict, was late last year found not guilty [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97079/Reactions-from-the-DRC-to-ICC-acquittal-of-militia-leader ] of war crimes. The judges in that case were not convinced by the witnesses or the evidence.

Analysts hope the ICC will not repeat past investigative mistakes in Mali.

“Using intermediaries is unavoidable in those situations, because the intermediaries will know the field very well, be able to contact witnesses in a secure manner and arrange meetings in a way that can be done safely,” said Geraldine Mattioli-Zeltner, advocacy director in the international justice programme at Human Rights Watch.

“What needs to be improved is the way it is done; [there needs to be more] understanding [that] it is not the intermediaries who are conducting investigations but the investigators, and checking who your intermediaries are - whether they are credible and what kind of promises they have made to your witnesses.”

When possible, sending ICC investigators to the scene of the alleged crimes is the best way to investigate, she said. “It takes money to be able to deploy in the field which we believe is necessary in order to do good investigations.”

The Syria question

The ICC had asked for $157 million in 2013 to reflect its growing workload but major funders including the UK, France and Germany have resisted any increases. All three, however, signed a Swiss government letter to the UN Security Council earlier this month calling on it to refer Syria to ICC.

Russia, China and the USA - none of them ICC members - are unlikely to support such a referral.

Mattioli-Zeltner questions this pressure to add new cases to the already-crowded and unfinished docket.

“There is still more work to do in Darfur and DRC and now we are piling on new situations,” she said. “We don’t think the states parties have thought through what this means. It is very important that states commit to the justice process but also commit to an institution that has the means of doing its work properly.

“At this point we don’t think the ICC has the resources to do more situations, but we think there are a number of situations that deserve ICC intervention.”

Heller goes further: “I think if the Security Council should refer Syria and not give more money to the court, then Fatou [Bensouda] should refuse to investigate.”

But a UN request to intervene in Syria would be hard to resist for a young court that has yet to make its mark. Clark says the ICC wants to be seen as an active player in the conflict zones that matter most to the international community.

“The ICC is a new institution that is trying to build its own legitimacy,” he said. “It wants to be an option the Security Council can use in times of war, but this is leading the ICC to be too available even if they don't have the resources.”

The UN has already asked the ICC to investigate in Sudan and Libya. In Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya, the prosecutor’s office initiated the cases, while the governments of Mali, Uganda, DRC and CAR referred themselves to the court.

One-sided investigations

In Mali’s case the government asked the ICC to investigate in July 2012. Once a government asks ICC investigators to come into their country, investigators in theory, under their mandate, can pursue any case they find, which means they could end up charging government officials or members of the army. But to date, self-referrals have resulted only in cases against rebels.

Heller suggests that countries such as Uganda are using the ICC to “outsource their criminal justice problems” and should prosecute their own rebel groups. “Does the ICC need to spend all its time worrying about Joseph Kony and the LRA? Of course not,” he told IRIN. “If Uganda can get their hands on Kony, with international help they can give Kony a fair trial. Uganda has a very sophisticated legal system.”

The Uganda case faced sharp criticism when investigators failed to pursue evidence of widespread human rights abuses by the Ugandan army.

Likewise, instances of alleged extra-judicial killings carried out by the Malian armed forces this month and documented by human rights groups such as the International Federation of Human Rights, and Human Rights Watch, risk remaining untouched by the ICC.

One problem is that ICC investigators rely on governments to facilitate their visit to a country, which makes it difficult for them to pursue cases on all sides, even if it is within their mandate to do so, say observers. The ICC has no police force and thus relies on the goodwill of governments to make their investigations possible.

However, the ICC Prosecutor put up the pressure on the Malian authorities on 28 January, issuing the following statement: “My Office is aware of reports that Malian forces may have committed abuses in recent days… I remind all parties to the on-going conflict in Mali that my Office has jurisdiction over all serious crimes committed within the territory of Mali, from January 2012 onwards.” [ http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news%20and%20highlights/Pages/otpstatement280113.aspx ]

The prosecutor’s office did not respond to IRIN’s requests for an interview.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97359/Analysis-Cash-strapped-ICC-takes-on-Mali</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207301203450616t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">LONDON 29 January 2013 (IRIN) - Concerns are being raised that the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into alleged war crimes in Mali is placing a serious strain on an already over-stretched and cash-strapped institution.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>