<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - West Africa</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 17:30:51 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>Demining on hold in Senegal’s Casamance Region</title><pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100850270000t.jpg" />]]>ZIGUINCHOR 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Demining has been halted in southern Senegal’s Casamance Region after 12 deminers were taken hostage by fighters with the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) on 3 May.</description><body><![CDATA[ZIGUINCHOR 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Demining has been halted in southern Senegal’s Casamance Region after 12 deminers were taken hostage by fighters with the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) on 3 May.

The hostages - all Senegalese members of private South African demining company Mechem - were seized in the village of Kaïlou, 20km west of the regional capital Ziguinchor, near the Guinea-Bissau border.

According to Seyni Diop, head of a division that helps mine victims at the government’s Anti-Mine Action Centre (CNAMS), demining has been temporarily suspended in Casamance. This comes just weeks after officials said Senegal was on track [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97907/Demining-speeds-up-in-Senegal-s-Casamance-region ] to meet the Ottawa convention with its commitment to ban anti-personnel landmines by 2015.

Mechem would not comment on the incident.

The rebels belong to the faction of César Atoute Badiaté, head of one of the three principal MFDC branches. The International Committee of the Red Cross has visited the hostages and, along with other agencies, including the UN Development Programme, local NGO Apran/SDP and the government of Senegal, is involved in trying to negotiate their release.

Fred Weyers, head of Mechem in Ziguinchor, said they were leaving the negotiations to the state of Senegal.

A meeting had been held two months ago in San Domingos, northern Guinea-Bissau, between rebels and the head of CNAMS, which leads the demining process in Casamance, to enable demining to proceed.

At the meeting, the rebels said they could not guarantee the security of deminers.

“The MFDC considers that CNAMS has reached a red line beyond which the security of deminers cannot be guaranteed. MFDC considers demining in Casmance to be dependent on the peace process.”

Meanwhile, over 1,000 people participated in a silent march through the streets of Ziguinchor on 22 May, organized by the Women’s Peace Platform, to push for the hostages to be freed. The group released a communiqué, stating: “We once again appeal to MFDC fighters and to César Atoute Badiate in person, for the well-being of the population of Casamance, for their mothers, aunts and sisters, who we are. We implore you to liberate these 12 people.”

CNAMS has been leading humanitarian demining in Senegal since 2008. For many years, NGO Handicap International led demining but late last year, two new operators came on board, Mechem and a Norwegian operator, NPA, to reinforce the effort.

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 ]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98094/Demining-on-hold-in-Senegal-s-Casamance-Region</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100850270000t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ZIGUINCHOR 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Demining has been halted in southern Senegal’s Casamance Region after 12 deminers were taken hostage by fighters with the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) on 3 May.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram</title><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005241211400801t.jpg" />]]>KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.</description><body><![CDATA[KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.

The attacks on BH camps in northern parts of Borno close to the borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroon followed the 14 May declaration of a state of emergency by Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. 

Musa Karimbe fled his village of Bulabute near Marte, BH's major stronghold in the area, on 17 May to Kusiri, 100km inside Cameroon where he is staying with a friend. "We are afraid of a repeat of Baga attacks on our homes," Karimbe said, referring to fighting on 16 and 17 April between troops from the Chad-Niger-Nigeria Joint Multi-National Task Force and BH members in which 187 residents from Baga town on the shores of Lake Chad were killed, and 2,128 homes burnt, according to Human Rights Watch [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria ].

People from villages around Abadam District, including Malamfatori, fled to Bosso in Niger’s Diffa Region, while others have taken refuge in the Cameroonian towns of Fotokol, Amchide, Darak and Kusiri, according to interviews with displaced Nigerians. Officials say 2,000 people have fled across borders, though several of the displaced told IRIN they thought the number was higher.  

The number of casualties from the fighting is not yet clear, though Nigeria defence spokesman Brig-Gen Chris Olukolade said on 17 May that there had been BH casualties, and that 100 BH members had been arrested.

An official with the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in the capital, Abuja, said they had not yet been able to establish contact with their teams to find out the details of the humanitarian situation, because telephone networks in Borno and Yobe states have been shut down since 16 May. “The areas where military operations are ongoing, are not accessible,” he told IRIN.

Residents of Gamboru Ngala in Borno State said military forces screened them thoroughly before allowing them to cross the border; others passed through the network of unofficial trade routes that criss-cross the region.

The military has placed a “food blockade” on northern Borno, refusing to allow trucks laden with household commodities from leaving Maiduguri (the state capital) to the northern part of the state, in case they end up in BH hands. As a result, prices have shot up, said Bukar Zanna, head of the Traders’ Association in Gamboru Ngala.

Since January 2013 BH has taken control of Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala-Balge and Gamboru Ngala local government areas in northern Borno, chasing out local government officials, taking over control of government buildings and imposing Sharia law.

This prompted President Goodluck Jonathan to declare last week that he would “take all necessary action... to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists,” including the arrest and detention of suspects, taking over BH hideouts, the lockdown of suspected BH enclaves, raids, and arresting anyone possessing illegal weapons.

The military crackdown came after several attempts at dialogue [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/Analysis-Hurdles-to-Nigerian-government-Boko-Haram-dialogue ] - the most recent on 17 April, when the president set up a 26-member Amnesty Committee (headed by Nigerian Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu) with a three-month mandate to try to convince BH to lay down its arms in exchange for a state pardon and social reintegration.

Dialogue soon broke down, and BH stepped up bombing attacks and assassinations in April and May in apparent defiance of the proposed amnesty. BH has repeatedly rejected peace talks, citing insincerity on the part of the Nigerian government following a series of failed mediated negotiations. 

On 8 and 9 May the Amnesty Committee met Nigerian security chiefs in Abuja and then BH members in detention in Kuje prison near Abuja to gather information on how to reach out to the BH leadership for talks. But on 9 May around 200 BH gunmen, armed with rocket launchers and rifles, launched coordinated attacks on security forces in the town of Bama in northern Borno, including a military barracks, a prison and police buildings, killing 42 people including soldiers, policemen, prison guards and civilians and freeing 105 inmates. Some 13 BH gunmen were killed in the attacks, according to the military.

In a 13 May video, BH leader Abubakar Shekau rejected the government’s amnesty overtures and vowed not to stop his group’s violent campaigns to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. 

Flip-flopping

The government’s flip-flop approach is evidence of its frustration with the deteriorating security situation. But the next steps are not clear. “Deployment of troops and the declaration of war on BH by the president have put a huge stumbling block on the path of the Amnesty Committee,” said Mohammed Kyari, a political science professor at Modibo Adama University of Science and Technology in neighbouring Adamawa State capital Yola, which is also affected by the emergency decree.

“It will now be difficult to win the confidence of BH which is crucial in bringing them to the negotiating table because you can’t talk of peace on one hand and be deploying troops on the other.” A leading rights activist in the north, Shehu Sani, who has participated in past negotiations with BH, agrees. 

But many say the government had no choice. Yahaya Mahmud, a prominent constitutional lawyer in Nigeria, told IRIN: “No government anywhere will allow a group to usurp part of territorial sovereignty. The declaration of a state of emergency was necessitated by the constitutional obligation to restore a portion of Nigeria’s territory taken over by an armed group which involves the suspension of constitutional provisions relating to civic rights.”

The fear now is that the more violent the crackdown, the greater the chance of radicalizing angry young men to join the rebel cause. Babagoni Kachalla, a resident of Wuljo, one of the areas taken over by BH in northern Borno, said BH has been going village-to-village since January in all-terrain vehicles fitted with loudspeakers to gather recruits and preach their ideology. In the days leading up to the military response, BH fighters stepped up their recruitment drive, said Borno State residents.

Political scientist Kyari worries, in response to the crackdown, that BH will just shift their bases. “BH can’t face Nigerian troops in conventional war; the troop deployment to northern Borno means they will move out to other towns and cities with less military presence and launch guerrilla war, which is deadlier.”

The deployment of troops to Maiduguri in June 2011 and military crackdowns pushed some BH members northwards within Borno, and others to northern Mali, which they fled during the French, Chadian and Malian intervention in the north.

Trust

Many analysts and politicians are pushing for dialogue as the only way out of the impasse, but trust between the government and BH is very low.

Conspiracy theories in the north abound, including that prominent politicians, including the president, are fanning some of the violence in the north since they would benefit from chaos continuing there in the run-up to 2015 presidential elections. 

While not endorsing the theories, Abdulkarim Mohammed, author of Paradox of Boko Haram, said they should be investigated if the government is serious about understanding the roots of BH’s insurgency. 

The Amnesty Committee stated yesterday it would meet BH leaders anywhere they chose, to negotiate a way out of the violence. 

If the government does not win the confidence of BH soon, to at least bring them to the negotiating table, we are going to be in this much longer than we thought,” said Kyari, adding: “and if it is not managed well, it will engulf neighbouring countries.”

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98076/Analysis-Nigerians-on-the-run-as-military-combat-Boko-Haram</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005241211400801t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Containing cholera in Niger</title><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203130651570194t.jpg" />]]>NIAMEY 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Cholera has struck 248 people in Ayorou in the Tillabéry Region of northwestern Niger, killing six, two of them Malian refugees.</description><body><![CDATA[NIAMEY 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Cholera has struck 248 people in Ayorou in the Tillabéry Region of northwestern Niger, killing six, two of them Malian refugees.

Among the sick are 31 Malian refugees who are living in Tabareybarey and Mangaize camps near the Mali border, according to the Tillabéry health services and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

In the camps and in surrounding villages, UNHCR has upped the supply of clean water to refugees, is distributing oral rehydration solution, soap, and disinfectant tabs to clean water, but more drugs are urgently needed, it said in a 21 May communiqué [ http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2013/05/un-refugee-agency-working-to-contain-cholera-epidemic-in-niger/ ]. NGO Médecins sans Frontières is treating those who have contracted cholera in camps.

UNHCR is worried that cholera could spread quickly due to the high concentration of refugees in the region.

Most of the cases were inhabitants of the town of Ayorou, which hosts a Sunday livestock market frequented by people from all across the region. The Ministry of Health is trying to temporarily shut down the market, which is just next to the River Niger, the suspected source of the contamination. The Health Ministry has also banned anyone from using, or drinking, water from the river, though this is very difficult to monitor.

The World Health Organization is supporting local health authorities to contain the disease’s spread.

Last year 5,785 people contracted cholera in Niger, and 110 of them died, according to UNHCR.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98078/Containing-cholera-in-Niger</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203130651570194t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NIAMEY 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Cholera has struck 248 people in Ayorou in the Tillabéry Region of northwestern Niger, killing six, two of them Malian refugees.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The changing face of land disputes in Liberia</title><pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305171420580095t.jpg" />]]>MONROVIA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Liberia Land Commission, which was set up in 2009 to help settle land disputes between returning refugees and their neighbours, is making significant headway, say land experts, but non-conflict related land disputes are increasing, most of them as a result of weak land laws.</description><body><![CDATA[MONROVIA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Liberia Land Commission, which was set up in 2009 to help settle land disputes between returning refugees and their neighbours, is making significant headway, say land experts, but non-conflict related land disputes are increasing, most of them as a result of weak land laws.

Tens of thousands of Liberians were displaced during the 1999-2003 civil war. Many returned to their villages to find their land had been sold on or taken over by neighbours. Disputes over land occurred all over the country, but were mainly concentrated in Nimba, Lofa and Bong counties, which had high levels of displacement [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/89149/LIBERIA-Land-rights-tensions-not-abating ].

Since 2009 many of the neighbour-neighbour disputes have been resolved without too much difficulty, given that the conflicting parties already had an established relationship, and thus a shared interest in negotiating. said Gregory Kitt, project manager with NGO Norwegian Refugee Council, which has helped resolve hundreds of land disputes over the past decade.

In recent years, such disputes have reduced slightly, said Kitt. "This is an indication of the progress Liberia has made to become more stable."

Land reform was identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Report [ http://trcofliberia.org/reports/final-report ] as one of the priorities for boosting long-term stability.

"We've made a lot of progress over the past three years. We've sorted out at least five dozen cases," Cecil Brandy, chairman of the Land Commission, told IRIN. But dozens of cases continue to come in each month, he added - many of them related not to displacement but to weak land ownership laws that insufficiently respect people's property rights and can lead to corrupt practices. "On a daily basis we are intervening in land fights across the country. Our files are filled with too many cases. Families are at loggerheads. It is hectic."

Parallel laws

Land ownership in Liberia is based on Common Law which requires an owner to have a title deed. But a parallel system of traditional law, based on verbal agreement, is also prevalent, creating widesperead confusion over who owns what. Landowners as a result, often sell to multiple buyers, opening up room for conflict.

During the civil war, fraud was rife with many illegitimate land-related documents registered. "This criminal practice must stop. They make fraudulent transactions without the involvement of the real landowners. Because of this, now as Liberians return from Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea, they are facing major problems with their land," said Brandy.

The Commission is trying to set up a better land registry system so citizens can more easily access land ownership documents, and at least know what their legal ownership status is. And it has submitted a criminal conveyance bill to the Liberian legislature to deal with suspected criminals involved in multiple land sales. Brandy hopes the bill will soon become law.

The Liberia Land Commission is an autonomous government body, with a staff of 25 civil servants, set up to shape land reform policy in Liberia [ http://www.lc.gov.lr/index.php ].

Ciapha George, 45, is currently battling another family for ownership of his plot of land in the capital, Monrovia: unbeknown to him, the land had been sold to someone else before he bought it.

The case went to court and the judge recently ordered him to demolish his house and turn it over to the former owner. "The seller misled me. Right now I am the loser. All my efforts have been in vain," he told IRIN. George's family is currently living in an abandoned building in the capital.

But the governance bodies set up to protect these laws remain weak, said Kitt, and until they are strengthened, civil society groups will continue to have to step in to try to resolve disputes before they end up in court.

The Land Commission must be more proactive in tackling this problem of multiple ownership, said Monrovia resident Prince King. "I have seen lives and properties destroyed because of land disputes. Liberia is just from war and we need to put these things behind us."

Some vulnerable families have never been given formal access to their land, said Brandy, who pointed out that one of the Commission's priorities is to make ownership more equitable by re-examining how deeds are distributed.

Communities versus investors

According to environmental NGOs, including Friends of the Earth Liberia, the local authorities and landowners have sold more than 1.5 million acres (607,028 hectares) of land to palm oil companies in Liberia over recent years, seriously threatening some communities' property rights [
http://www.irinnews.org/report/94882/LIBERIA-Land-grab-or-development-opportunity ].

"Over the past year and a half we've seen an increase in land conflicts between communities and investors trying to develop natural resources. It is clear that challenges are emerging," said Kitt.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98070/The-changing-face-of-land-disputes-in-Liberia</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305171420580095t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MONROVIA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Liberia Land Commission, which was set up in 2009 to help settle land disputes between returning refugees and their neighbours, is making significant headway, say land experts, but non-conflict related land disputes are increasing, most of them as a result of weak land laws.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Making WASH work in Burkina Faso’s cities</title><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305161656290386t.jpg" />]]>OUAGADOUGOU 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - Earlier this year Denis Ouedraogo, a tailor living in the Tampouy neighbourhood just north of Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou, connected his mud-walled home to the water network for the first time. “Even without electricity, having enough water can make you happy,” he said.</description><body><![CDATA[OUAGADOUGOU 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - Earlier this year Denis Ouedraogo, a tailor living in the Tampouy neighbourhood just north of Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou, connected his mud-walled home to the water network for the first time. “Even without electricity, having enough water can make you happy,” he said.

He is among 1.9 million people to have connected to the government water grid since 2001, thanks to major changes in how the National Office for Water and Sanitation (ONEA) delivers water to urban Burkinabés.

In 2001 just 73,000 Burkinabés could access clean water, according to research [ http://www.developmentprogress.org/sites/developmentprogress.org/files/burkina_water_progress.pdf ] by Peter Newborne at the Overseas Development Institute, which is trying to track and communicate examples of progress on development [ http://www.developmentprogress.org/ ].

In 2002 just half of Burkina Faso residents had access to clean water. In 2008 (the latest statistics available) this had risen to 76 percent - 95 percent in urban areas. The plan was to reach the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to double the number of those with access to clean water, in this case to 87 percent, by 2015. Those tracking water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) progress in Burkina Faso, say the goal will be surpassed [ http://www.unicef.org/sowc2012/pdfs/SOWC-2012-TABLE-3-HEALTH.pdf ].

How?

A number of factors made this possible: ONEA was nationalized and restructured in 1994 following a period in which it had become unprofitable and poorly functioning. The new national company ran along commercial lines, instilling a culture of performance and efficiency, said Newborne.

The second priority was to find a bulk water supply, in this case by building the Ziga dam 45km from the capital.

A mixture of government grant funds (from France and other European donors) and concessionary loans at low interest rates (predominantly from the World Bank), provided the required finances. This helped them bring costs down: for instance, connecting to the grid now costs a household US$61, down from on average $400 in the 1990s, according to ONEA’s chief operating officer, Moumouni Sawadogo.

Next came the work: building a network of pipes throughout Ouagadougou, including in the city’s unzoned [unplanned]  suburbs, which house one third of the capital’s residents and had hitherto been overlooked in terms of household water supply.

“Even in non-zoned areas, people can pay their water bills,'' said Halidou Kouanda, head of NGO Wateraid in Burkina Faso, citing a 2011 ONEA study noting that financial recovery rates in unzoned neighbourhoods were 95 percent.

Now, with a steady income and an 18 percent leakage rate, ONEA is one of the best-performing water utility companies in sub-Saharan Africa, according to the World Bank.

Targeting the poor

While targeting unzoned areas upped the percentage of urban dwellers who could access clean water (thus helping to meet the MDG), it did not ensure that water was affordable.

Now ONEA needs to try to target the poor, as it pledged to do in an initial equity strategy agreed with the Ministry of Water and Sanitation.

As part of its strategy, ONEA built 17,290 wells and standpipes for some areas without household-level connections. Water from a standpipe costs 60 CFA (11 US cents) for a 220 litre barrel (transported on wheels). But the very poor cannot afford such barrels, turning instead to water vendors who sell the same amount for 200-500 CFA (40-98 cents) depending on the season.

Thus paradoxically, the poorest families pay up to eight times more than others for their water.

ODI is discussing different pro-poor targeting methods that might work, including: subsidizing part of the water supply for certain households; targeting poor areas; allocation by housing type; means-testing; community-based targeting; or self-targeting.

At the moment, all households are charged the same connection tariff. “Is this equitable? We think not,” said Newborne. “You could means-test it; you could waive the connection charge for some; or charge the first X cubic metres at a different rate,” he suggested, adding that lower-income households could pay bills weekly or on a pay-as-you-go basis, to keep track of costs. “Think of how mobile phone companies have fixed their pricing plans to be accessible,” he said.

The concern is that households who experience running water for the first time may use more than they can afford, then falling behind  and drop off the grid, said WaterAid’s Kouanda. This happened to 6.8 percent of Ouagadougou’s ONEA customers in 2009.

Families must be made aware of this risk, said Kouanda. But many customers are so nervous of this happening, that they practice their own careful monitoring.

Ami Sidibé, who lives in Somgandé neighbourhood, which was connected to the water mains three months ago, said she continues to fill jerry cans - using tap water - to monitor her household’s use. “I’ll do anything to avoid returning to the situation before,” she told IRIN.

Reduced disease risk?

No studies have yet been published linking the spread of the water network with the incidence of disease, but some Somgandé residents who were recently connected to the grid said their children were falling sick less frequently. Water-borne illnesses are among the top five reasons for children’ health visits, according to the Health Ministry.

Future challenges will include how to extend such networks to rural areas, which are currently under-serviced in terms of clean water: 72 percent of rural Burkinabés access clean water, versus 95 percent of city residents.

The local authorities are responsible for rural water supply under Burkina Faso’s decentralized governance system.

According to a just-published report Progress on Sanitation and Drinking Water 2013 Update [ http://www.unicef.org/media/media_69091.html ] by UNICEF and the World Health Organization, striking disparities remain between rural and urban water access, with rural communities making up 83 percent of the global population without access to an improved water source.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98054/Making-WASH-work-in-Burkina-Faso-s-cities</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305161656290386t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">OUAGADOUGOU 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - Earlier this year Denis Ouedraogo, a tailor living in the Tampouy neighbourhood just north of Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou, connected his mud-walled home to the water network for the first time. “Even without electricity, having enough water can make you happy,” he said.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boko Haram attacks hit school attendance in Borno State</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg" />]]>KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</description><body><![CDATA[KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.

Most of the children are primary school students, according to the official. Thus far Boko Haram (BH) has burned or destroyed 50 of the state's 175 schools, he said. Teachers in the state confirmed the estimate.

Students are staying at home for fear of attack, or are being transferred to private Islamic schools, known in the north as Islamiyya. On 6 May state schools officially reopened following a six-week break, but many have stayed closed, as officials and teachers fear attack.

BH gunmen had initially targeted schools - most of them primary - at night, detonating grenades and home-made explosives or dousing classrooms with gasoline and setting them alight, according to military and education officials.

But on 18 March BH shifted tactics, attacking four schools in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State (population 4.17 million, according to the 2006 census), in broad daylight, killing four teachers and seriously injuring four students.

On 9 April suspected BH members killed two school teachers in their homes, and four officials of the Borno State Feeding Committee, which runs a primary and secondary school feeding programme, while they were on an inspection tour of schools in Dikwa town, Borno State.

The shift to direct attacks on educators and students has rattled teachers, leaving many too frightened to go to work.

"We have been asked to resume classes but we are too afraid to return to school despite the stationing of a military post outside the school,” said Hajara Modu, a school teacher at Customs primary school in Maiduguri.

Secondary school enrolment is only 28 percent in Borno State - the lowest in the country, according to a 2010 Nigeria Education Data Survey.

On 10 April BH leader Abubakar Shekau claimed ordering the attacks on schools in an Internet video post, citing Nigerian military raids on Islamic schools in Maiduguri as the impetus.

Adama Zannah, a father of four students attending Sanda Kyarimi secondary school, one of the four schools affected in the 18 March attacks, told IRIN: "I want my children to attend school but they can only do that if they are alive... I can't allow them to go to school in this atmosphere of fear when schools are burnt and gunmen open fire during classes."

Islamic school attendance up

Many parents see the safest option as Islamic schools, which have seen a sharp rise in enrolment rates over recent months. These are private religious schools which teach an Islamic education, though some include English and maths in the curriculum.

Given the demand, fees at some Islamic schools have also increased - by 300 percent since the beginning of the year in some cases, according to parent Muhammad Kolo. He used to pay US$1.90 per month to educate his two children but the fee is now $7.60.

Borno State information commissioner Inuwa Bwala said the state government will try to strengthen Islamic schools with more money and more materials, and standardize their curriculum to teach children the Koran alongside Western education. (BH literally means “Western education is a sin” in Hausa).

Militarized schools

The school districts worst-affected by the arson attacks include old Maiduguri city and four local government areas - Marte, Kala-Balge, Gamboru Ngala and Mabar - in the northern part of Borno on the border with Cameroon and Chad, where BH has a strong presence [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria ].

Many students from these areas have been taken to neighbouring Dikwa District to take their May and June exams, protected by a heavy military detail.

The government has deployed soldiers in at-risk schools across the state but some parents fear this puts their children in yet more danger.

"The presence of soldiers makes them more prone to attack by BH which considers the military as their main enemy," said Ahmad Kyari, a resident of Gwange Quarters in Maiduguri city where all the schools in the area have been burnt; his three children are at home.

Attacks on schools violate children's right to education, as well as a number of human rights. In situations of conflict, they may also violate international humanitarian law and criminal law, and may constitute war crimes [ http://www.protectingeducation.org/what-international-laws-are-violated ].

"I'm really afraid to go to school. The thought of gunmen storming the school and opening fire or throwing explosives gives me the shivers and this is a thought that fills the minds of many students like me," said Nura Babani, a student of Sanda Kyarimi secondary school which was attacked on18 March.

"It is too dangerous to go to school now, especially with the attacks on some schools in broad daylight during classes,” student Maryam Habib, told IRIN.

In some areas where the government was trying to renovate schools, BH had set them ablaze again. Gwange II primary school in the Gwange area of Maiduguri city, considered a major BH stronghold, was burnt four times by BH, each time after undergoing renovation.

The school-burnings "sabotage government's effort at improving on education in Borno State", Borno State information commissioner Bwala told IRIN.

"It is not possible to learn in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. How do you expect a teacher to put in his best and a child to learn effectively when they are always on edge, in anticipation of gun and bomb attacks. This is killing education here," said the Ministry of Education official.

The federal government is exploring ways to forge a dialogue with BH [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/Analysis-Hurdles-to-Nigerian-government-Boko-Haram-dialogue ] but thus far, there has been little progress, and in recent weeks the militants have been staging a fierce comeback in the northeast. Over 3,600 people have been killed in BH-related violence since 2009, including extrajudicial killings by Nigerian security forces, according to Human Rights Watch.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98032/Boko-Haram-attacks-hit-school-attendance-in-Borno-State</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Understanding the causes of violent extremism in West Africa</title><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281140270935t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Academics and government, military and civil society representatives gathered for a conference in the Senegalese capital this week to assess the interplay between development and violent extremism in West Africa, with some participants suggesting that underdevelopment, marginalization and weak governance create a breeding ground for militancy.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Academics and government, military and civil society representatives gathered for a conference in the Senegalese capital this week to assess the interplay between development and violent extremism in West Africa, with some participants suggesting that underdevelopment, marginalization and weak governance create a breeding ground for militancy. 

While local factors in West African and Sahel countries have contributed to extremist violence, the rise of global jihad in the wake of the US-led "war on terror" since 9/11 has also played a part in spreading radical militancy in the region. 

"In the Sahel, there is a combination of bad governance, poverty, insecurity as well as several internal and external factors [that contribute to extremist violence]," said Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, head of the Centre for Security Strategy in the Sahel and the Sahara, at the opening of the 6-10 May Dakar conference. 

"The Sahel has provided an ideal ground for extremist violence to take root and spread beyond national borders," he said. 

The region has a history of instability. Since the first post-independence coup in West Africa that toppled Togo's founding president in 1963, it has seen a string of coups, some of which have sparked civil wars. 

West Africa is also one of the world's most impoverished regions despite its natural resources. Seven West African countries occupy the bottom 10 places in the UN Human Development Index [ http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ ].

Poor political and resource governance have often led to explosions of violence by disgruntled segments of society, and a number of studies [ http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/west_africa.pdf ] have linked bad governance to insecurity in West Africa. 

For example, Mali's Tuareg have been fighting perceived marginalization by the central government and demanded an autonomous homeland in the country's north. Following the March 2012 coup in the capital Bamako, the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad seized towns from government troops in the north, but was soon driven out by militant Islamist groups. 

Nigeria's increasingly violent Boko Haram militia, which wants an Islamic state, should be seen as a reaction the government's entrenched corruption, abusive security forces, strife between the disaffected Muslim north and Christian south, and widening regional economic disparity, according to the Council on Foreign Relations [ http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739 ].

Some observers stress the local aspect. Militant Islam in Africa, while linked to broader ideological currents, is mainly driven by the local context, with Islamist groups emerging, evolving and reacting to immediate local concerns, University of Florida's Terje Ostebo, argued in a November 2012 paper [ http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AfricaBriefFinal_23.pdf ] published by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS). 

"The Malian government's failure to consistently invest [in] and maintain a strong state presence in the north. created an enabling environment for the expansion of Islamic militancy and the escalation of violence in this region," said Ostebo, an assistant professor at the university's Centre for African Studies (ACSS) and the Department of Religion. 

Marginalization 

"Poverty and underdevelopment and a sense of marginalization and exclusion that comes from lack of governance, particularly at the local level, are seen as drivers associated with violent extremism," Benjamin Nickels, an assistant professor with the ACSS, told IRIN. 

"Supporting development is a long-term approach to undermining drivers associated with violent extremism," he added. 

"You do have a number of underlying factors that make certain regions particularly vulnerable to violent extremism and extremist ideologies, and then you have a number of factors that trigger violence. Amongst these factors there is an underlying economic dimension that often gets missed," said Raymond Gilpin, the ACSS academic dean. 

Poverty, unemployment and socioeconomic deprivation partly explain the rise of Islamist movements - violent and non-violent - argued Ostebo.

"There are other factors of extremist violence. However, it is easier for militant groups to recruit unemployed youth who see no future for themselves, than those who are in employment. The more young people are able to be employed the less chances there are that they can be recruited by militant groups," said Gilles Yabi of the International Crisis Group.

"Development is part of the measures against extremist violence. But we are already in a situation [in West Africa] where underdevelopment is so deep that reversing it is very difficult," he told IRIN. 

Ould-Abdallah cited other factors such as West Africa's wide geographical area, weak public institutions and people's and governments' loyalty to tribe and clan rather than the nation state as also contributing to crime and extremist violence in the region. 

In a bid to end insurgencies, Nigeria and Mali have attempted negotiated settlements, but they have also resorted to the use of force, which is limited in resolving the fundamental causes of rebellion. Repression by governments or external forces can cause Islamist militants to fight for their very existence and at the same time deepen perceptions of state illegitimacy, Ostebo warned. 

Spillover 

The French-led intervention in Mali has dislodged the Islamist rebels from their strongholds, but triggered fears that the fleeing militants could destabilize [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97494/The-regional-threat-posed-by-Mali-s-militants ] countries in the region from where they hail, target foreign nationals in neighbouring countries and even win the sympathy of other extremist militia. 

The January attack on an Algerian gas plant is believed to have been in retaliation for the French military drive in Mali. Nigerian troops heading for Mali as part of an African intervention force came under attack by Boko Haram-linked militants in January. 

On 7 May, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb posted a video message calling for attacks on all French interests across the world for its intervention in Mali. 

Nigeria has teamed up with its neighbours to form a multi-national force to counter Boko Haram. 

"The priority for Sahel right now is to help resolve the Mali crisis. After Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, West Africa does not need another protracted crisis," said Ould-Abdallah. 

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98012/Understanding-the-causes-of-violent-extremism-in-West-Africa</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281140270935t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Academics and government, military and civil society representatives gathered for a conference in the Senegalese capital this week to assess the interplay between development and violent extremism in West Africa, with some participants suggesting that underdevelopment, marginalization and weak governance create a breeding ground for militancy.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Hunger projects stalled in Guinea-Bissau</title><pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208141544380935t.jpg" />]]>BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.</description><body><![CDATA[BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.

The organization needs US$7 million immediately to cover its food security and nutrition programme targeting 278,000 people for 2013; and a further $8 million to extend the project through 2014. The project involves school-feeding, preventing moderate and acute malnutrition, and boosting rice production, and was supposed to start in February this year.

WFP head of programmes Fatimata Sow-Sidibé told IRIN the money is lacking because traditional donors suspended all development cooperation following the April 2012 coup.

“We have some promises [from donors],” said Sow-Sidibé, “but the programme was supposed to start in February and we have no resources to buy the food we need.”

Traditional donors more or less stopped all development funding in Guinea-Bissau following the 12 April 2012 coup d’état, leaving infrastructure projects and basic services at a standstill across the country, but humanitarian funding was supposedly untouched. LINK The problem for WFP is that their project spans development and emergency activities and thus is not just eligible for humanitarian funding.

The African Development Bank also suspended its funding for rural agricultural development projects, following the coup. The cuts “are having a direct impact on food security in Guinea-Bissau, where we already have severe cereal deficits due to inadequate local production,” said a civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture who preferred anonymity.

Food insecurity in Guinea-Bissau is driven mainly by an inability of people to access food because prices are beyond their reach. Most Bissau Guineans rely on imported rice as they grow mainly cash crops (cashews) and not grains.

Food prices have risen year on year since 2008 (imported rice is currently U$1.20 per kg), and the most recent countryside hunger assessment (2011) cited high prices as the biggest barrier for vulnerable households to access food.

The coup put off a planned countrywide food security assessment in 2012 but a rapid assessment in the regions of Biombo, Oio and Quinara in June 2012 revealed one in five people were food insecure (regions in the east were not included in the survey). Some 65 percent of households at the time had under one month’s supply of food stocks and more people were resigned to further indebtedness, selling animals and producing wine from the cashew fruit, to get by.

Cashew crisis

People’s ability to buy food has been severely hampered by a crisis in the cashew industry: 80-95 percent of Bissau-Guineans depend on cashew sales to purchase food as well as meet other household expenses. Terms of trade for cashews have been deteriorating since 2011: In a good year 1kg of rice can be roughly exchanged for 1kg of cashews; this shifted to 1.5kg of cashews to buy 1kg of rice in 2012, and to 2kgs of cashews for 1kg of rice in 2013, according to Ministry of Agriculture and WFP research. “Everything here is linked to cashews,” said Sow-Sidibé.

The poor terms of trade are linked to a poor 2012 cashew crop, and plummeting cashew prices following the coup (from 80 US cents per kg in May 2012 to 50 US cents one month later), and also linked to low fixed prices on international markets.

Cashew farmers are further stymied by exorbitant petrol prices (US$1.50 per litre) which makes it increasingly expensive for them to get their crop to market.

Ongoing projects

WFP continues to run food assistance programmes where it can. In two districts in Gabu, eastern Guinea-Bissau (Mancadndje Dara, Madina Madinga), and in two districts of Bafata (Djabicunda and Sare Biro), the organization helps villagers improve their farming techniques to boost rice production, including giving them improved seeds and helping them rent animals to get their crops to market. It also helps villagers grow market gardens to improve their food diversity and boost household income.

Mutaro Indjai, head of the village committee of rice producers in Saucunda village in Gabu, told IRIN: “This project helped us improve our production to last through four months, whereas before we only produced enough for one month.”

If the project comes to an end, they will continue to use improved techniques of production, but they would lack the seeds needed to plant next year. “We won’t have access to improved seeds, nor to the animals we need to speed up planting and to help us transport our harvest to nearby villages,” he told IRIN.

Nutrition

Nutrition programmes have also been affected. WFP pushes food diversity, given that feeding practices are a key component of high chronic malnutrition levels in Guinea-Bissau.

The organization tries to push a more varied diet (than the starch-dominated fare given to most infants) including fish soup, peas, carrots, tomatoes, and millet-based cereal. They also support local NGOs to make regular visits to health centres and villages on vaccination days to talk about how to prepare nutrient-rich meals for infants made out of corn flour, peanut powder, bean powder, oil and sugar, among others. Programmes target children in their first 1,000 days of life.

Some 17 percent of children under-five are underweight, and 27 percent are stunted due to inadequate nutrition, according to a December 2012 UNICEF-Ministry of Health nutrition survey.

Hunger specialists fear chronic malnutrition levels will rise if prevention is not stepped up.

UNICEF supports the Ministry of Health to set up nutrition treatment centres; provides therapeutic food for severely malnourished children; and helped update the government’s strategy to manage acute malnutrition, in February 2013. “Lack of funding, very few partners in nutrition, and limited human resources trained in nutrition” are the major challenges facing UNICEF, said Victor Suhfube Ngongalah, head of child survival there. UNICEF needs US$750,000 to implement its projects in 2013 and 2014.

Guinea Bissau is ranked 176 out of 187 countries assessed in the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report. Political instability has also marred development. Since 1994 no elected president in Guinea-Bissau has finished his mandate.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98004/Hunger-projects-stalled-in-Guinea-Bissau</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208141544380935t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Sending the right message on mHealth</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208091451120607t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - We’ve read the stories: From bedridden patients sending text messages to their health workers, to young people receiving HIV prevention messages via SMS, the mobile phone seems to have morphed from communications device to essential life-saver. But is the evidence there yet that mHealth is an effective health delivery intervention for the developing world?</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - We’ve read the stories: From bedridden patients sending text messages to their health workers, to young people receiving HIV prevention messages via SMS, the mobile phone seems to have morphed from communications device to essential life-saver. But is the evidence there yet that mHealth is an effective health delivery intervention for the developing world?

IRIN, like others, has been reporting for years on mHealth’s potential: This communication technology could provide the answer to distant and under-resourced health services, in particular for Africa’s poor. Kenyan health workers have recounted [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88653/KENYA-R-U-OK-2day-SMS-check-up-takes-off ] how mobile phones have made it easier to track their patients’ progress; there have been anecdotal reports of lower maternal mortality rates as a result of Ghanaian mothers [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/87261/GHANA-Cell-phones-cut-maternal-deaths ] being able to call for ambulances during labour.

In Africa, with some 63 mobile phones per 100 inhabitants (compared to Asia and the Pacific’s 89 per 100 inhabitants), the cell in your pocket can become a direct channel [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91287/AFRICA-Mobile-phones-for-health ] for receiving public health messages, improving communication between patients and health providers, boosting data collection and, increasingly, assisting in diagnosis.

But a systematic review - published in January in PLOS Medicine [ http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001363 ] - into the effectiveness of mHealth technology in improving health delivery found mixed results from 42 trials of mHealth interventions. SMS appointment reminders, for example, were found to have modest programmatic benefits, while using phones to send digital images for diagnosis actually led to a drop in the correct analysis in two trials examined.

A 2012 study by the mHealth Alliance [ http://mhealthalliance.org/images/content/baseline_evaulation_report2013.pdf ], which advocates the use of mobile technologies in health care, found that sub-Saharan Africa had a higher number of mHealth projects compared to Asia and Latin America, with more than half of all mHealth projects related to communicable diseases such as HIV and malaria.

Insufficient evidence

Despite the rapid growth, "there is currently a gap in terms of evidence linking mHealth to improved health and operational benefits, and this is particularly true when it comes to studies in low- and middle-income countries," Patricia Mechael, executive director of the mHealth Alliance, told IRIN.

The PLOS review found that “none of the trials were of high quality - many had methodological problems likely to affect the accuracy of their findings - and nearly all were undertaken in high-income countries.”

Rajesh Vedanthan, an assistant professor at New York’s Mount Sinai Medical Centre who is currently working with AMPATH [ http://www.ampathkenya.org/ ], an academic health programme involved in research and health care in Kenya, told IRIN via email that some of the practical challenges with the use of mHealth technology included “optimizing the user interface, ensuring that users have an easy and error-free working experience with the mHealth device, not impeding the workflow of clinicians, issues related to network connectivity, access to a central server, coordination of individual devices with a central coordinating office, systems integration, etc…

“mHealth has the potential to assist with several aspects of the ‘supply chain’ of care for non-communicable diseases - including screening/diagnosis, linkage to care, treatment/decision support, retention and follow-up, systems coordination, etc.,” he added. “Whether mHealth will be effective in all of those arenas is still not robustly known, and rigorous research is still required.”

A need for standards

The mushrooming of mHealth pilot projects has caused concern around monitoring. Uganda has declared a moratorium on pilot mHealth initiatives as it seeks to bring them in line with national health policies.

“We first needed to study them [mHealth and mHealth initiatives]… Some of these people are duplicating what is already there,” Asuman Lukwago, the permanent secretary in Uganda’s Ministry of Health, told IRIN. “As a ministry, we only implement innovations that have been tested and approved. At the moment, we are suggesting reforms to put into practice for these new innovations.”

The mHealth Alliance recently released a review [ http://www.mhealthalliance.org/images/content/state_of_standards_report_2013.pdf ] of standards in the use of mHealth among low- and middle-income countries, which found that as mobile health systems “move towards scale, existing guidelines and strategies will need to be revised to reflect new demands on executive sponsorship; national leadership of eHealth programmes; eHealth standards adoption and implementation; development of eHealth capability and capacity; eHealth financing and performance management and eHealth planning and architecture maintenance”.

Scaling up mHealth

Mechael noted that mHealth could only meet its potential if it was fully integrated into general health programmes, becoming “so much a part of health systems that we no longer need to use ‘m’ as a designation”, something that cannot happen unless mHealth projects move beyond the pilot phase and really reach scale at a national or regional level.

Importantly, experts say, the use of mHealth and other humanitarian technology should be allowed to be driven by the communities who benefit from it.

“There has been a recognition - belatedly, in some cases - of the ways beneficiaries are using technology, voting with their wallets and their feet... We can see that the most innovative models of humanitarian technology are driven by communities themselves,” Imogen Wall, the coordinator of communications with affected communities for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, told IRIN.

She noted that humanitarian agencies would increasingly need to increase their engagement with the private sector as partners in preparedness and response, recognizing that the private sector is no longer merely a support system, but a humanitarian service provider as well.

OCHA recently released a report, Humanitarianism in the Network Age [ https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/WEB%20Humanitarianism%20in%20the%20Network%20Age%20vF%20single.pdf ], which stresses the importance of information and communication in humanitarian work and urges new ways of thinking that adapt to the changing realities of communities around the world.

“In order for humanitarian technology to meet its full potential, there must be a willingness - an openness - to innovate, to think outside the box, to test new ideas and to risk failure and success in both the processes and the deliverables - essentially, a willingness to accept change,” Wall said.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98001/Analysis-Sending-the-right-message-on-mHealth</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208091451120607t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - We’ve read the stories: From bedridden patients sending text messages to their health workers, to young people receiving HIV prevention messages via SMS, the mobile phone seems to have morphed from communications device to essential life-saver. But is the evidence there yet that mHealth is an effective health delivery intervention for the developing world?</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Displaced still homeless after clashes in Baga, Nigeria</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061639020892t.jpg" />]]>BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.

An estimated 2,275 homes were destroyed in fires, and a further 125 severely damaged, according to satellite images released by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in a 1 May statement [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-destruction-deaths-military-raid ].

“Our major worry now is finding where to stay and rebuild our homes before rain sets in. Many of us are now squatting with relations and friends here in Baga and in neighbouring towns and villages,” Ibrahim Buba told IRIN in the courtyard of his gutted four-bedroom mud house in the Pampon Gaja-Gaja neigbourhood.

Heavy fighting broke out in Baga, on the shores of Lake Chad, between MNJTF and Boko Haram (BH) on 16 April, causing fire to break out and sweep through the neighbourhoods of Pampon Gaja-Gaja, Fulatari and Budumari. The Nigerian Red Cross estimated 187 people died in the fire and fighting, but the military dispute these figures, insisting only 37 people, including 30 Islamists, six civilians and a soldier, were killed.

Many residents accused soldiers of burning their homes, while military forces disputed the accusations, blaming BH.

The area is a BH stronghold and military officials have accused Borno State residents of harbouring BH members. According to HRW, BH has killed numerous Borno State residents, creating a climate of fear in the area.

“I lost my all that I worked for in life including my house, two cars, two motorcycles, and a grinding machine which is my major source of income,” said 62-year-old Adamu Ciroma. “What preoccupies me is how to rebuild my house to shelter my family of 18.”

Maina Maaji Lawan, a Borno State senator, told IRIN there is not enough emergency shelter to house all the displaced. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has set up temporary shelter for just over 600 of the displaced, according to a recent statement.

Borno State governor Kashim Shettima has ordered that the destroyed houses be rebuilt, according to spokesperson Isa Umar Gusau.

Many still in hiding

Most Baga residents rely on fishing and farming for their income. “We don’t even have seeds to plant because the seeds we saved have been gobbled by fire,” local smallholder Ba’ana Sharif told IRIN, as he stood in the midst of his burnt granary. The rainy season begins in May and extends into September in Nigeria’s semi-arid northeastern region.

NEMA and the Red Cross arrived in Baga eight days after the fire because they had to wait for security clearance from the military which claimed the area was too dangerous for aid workers to enter, according to Nigerian Red Cross national coordinator Umar Mairiga.

Many residents are still in the bush having fled their burning homes: They fear a resumption of violence between BH and the military, residents and aid officials said.

"Many people are still in hiding. Part of our work there is to build confidence. We need to show people that what we have now in Baga is assistance, not any more attacks," said NEMA spokesman Manzo Ezekiel.

Resident Abdullahi Gumel told IRIN on 30 April that he found two residents in the bush suffering from burns and thirst. They both died within 24 hours.

Brig-Gen Austin Edokpayi, head of MNJTF, blamed the mass exodus of residents on “warnings from BH Islamists to leave the town, as the terrorists were planning reprisals against the military for the casualties they suffered at the hands of the multi-national troops.”

HRW called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to probe the events in Baga as part of a preliminary investigation the court launched in 2010 on the situation in Nigeria. The ICC has indicated that crimes committed by BH may constitute crimes against humanity.  
On 23 April, President Goodluck Jonathan ordered a full-scale investigation into the events in Baga.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061639020892t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: The plight of LGBTI asylum seekers, refugees</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305070711300235t.jpg" />]]>KATHMANDU 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Refugees and asylum seekers face a host of challenges when crossing borders, but the obstacles are particularly pronounced for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) persons, say experts.</description><body><![CDATA[KATHMANDU 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Refugees and asylum seekers face a host of challenges when crossing borders, but the obstacles are particularly pronounced for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) persons, say experts.

“LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees face a range of threats, risks and vulnerabilities throughout the displacement cycle,” Volker Türk, director of international protection at the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), told IRIN from Geneva.

“And while the world has come a long way since first recognizing asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity in the 1980s, residual factors ranging from criminalization to disbelief result in LGBTI people suffering at the hands of a variety of actors as they flee oppression and seek safety,” he said.

A new edition of the Forced Migration Review (FMR) released on 29 April [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/ ] highlights many of the remaining challenges for LGBTI migrants and asylum seekers.

According to UNHCR, targeting people based on real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity for persecution, discrimination, and harassment can stem from the belief that they are encouraging unwanted or unnatural social change [ http://www.unhcr.org/505c18af9.html ].

LGBTI people leave home for the same reasons as everyone else: to flee war, persecution, and oppression; to seek stability, education, employment, and freedom. In situations of upheaval or conflict, sexual and gender minorities have become targets for scapegoating [ http://www.hias.org/uploaded/file/Invisible-in-the-City_full-report.pdf ] or “moral cleansing” campaigns [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/01/11/nepal-police-sexual-cleansing-drive ], compounding the inherent vulnerability created by unrest, activists say.

LGBTI persecution

LGBTI people experience torture, violence, discrimination, and persecution in countries around the world, sometimes deliberately carried out by the state and often conducted with impunity.

Homosexual acts are punishable with the death penalty in five countries (Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen), as well as some parts of Nigeria and Somalia, the International Lesbian and Gay Association [ http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2012.pdf ], the oldest and only membership-based LGBTI organization in the world, reported in 2012.

According to research by Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/12/15/we-are-buried-generation ], gay Iranians [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/25296/IRAN-IRAN-Activists-condemn-execution-of-gay-teens ] are fleeing, frequently to Turkey, due to the state-sponsored persecution they face at home, while thousands of LGBTI people have sought international protection in Europe in recent years on the basis of their sexual orientation and gender identity [ http://www.rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf ].

And while few countries keep LGBTI-specific data, Norway and Belgium [ http://www.rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf ], which both track asylum decisions based on sexual orientation and gender identity, have shown a steady uptick in recent years.

From 2008-2010, LGBTI asylum decisions in Belgium increased from 226-522. During the same period in Norway they increased from 3-26.

But information about abuses against LGBTI people - called “Country of Origin Information” (COI) in the asylum process - can be scant in hostile countries, argued Christian Pangilinan, a Tanzania-based refugee lawyer cited in the Forced Migration Review [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/pangilinan ].

For transgender people, COI can mislead agencies, such as in Iran where authorities “allow transsexual surgery as a forced method of preventing homosexuality rather than supporting trans identities,” according to a gender expert’s FMR chapter [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/bach ].

Crossing borders of geography and identity

The multiple document checks migrants might encounter can be particularly difficult for transgender or gender-variant people. While international standards for travel documents officially recognize three genders - marked M, F, or X - [ http://www.icao.int/Security/mrtd/Pages/default.aspx ] only a handful of countries have incorporated the third category [ http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/eilr/26/26.1/Bochenek_Knight.pdf ], meaning that high-security travel environments, such as airports or emergency residential camps, can threaten humiliation or exclusion to people whose gender identity or expression is different from what is indicated by their documents [ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1926681 ] [ http://www.worldwewant2015.org/node/283239 ].

Sexuality and gender are nuanced personal matters. According to research by psychologists [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/shidlo-ahola ], some individuals may have had limited experience expressing or experiencing his or her deeply-felt sexual orientation or gender identity, and may outwardly appear very different than how he or she feels - to the extent of even being in a heterosexual relationship.

With the asylum process taking increasingly extended periods of time [ http://www.unhcr.org/4381c5832.pdf ], some may start the migration or asylum process with one identity, and change over time, complicating the matter both personally and administratively and exposing the individual to further discrimination or ill-treatment [ http://www.rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf ].

UNHCR’s guidelines for claims to refugee status based on sexual orientation and gender identity take the progressive step of acknowledging that “sexual orientation and gender identity are broad concepts which create space for self-identification” which may“continue to evolve across a person’s lifetime” [ http://www.refworld.org/docid/50348afc2.html ]. Nonetheless, according to UN Office of Drugs and Crime guidelines, discriminatory attitudes regarding sexual orientation and gender identity can mean the credibility of LGBTI people is dismissed by authorities [ http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Prisoners-with-special-needs.pdf ].

"That no one should be compelled to hide, change or renounce his or her identity in order to avoid persecution is a central tenet of refugee law, and this applies to sexual orientation and gender identity on equal footing with other claims,” UNHCR’s Türk told IRIN.

“There is no space for decision-makers determining refugee status to expect them to conceal who they are."

Safety and security

“There is harassment in the camp against us, sometimes beatings,”said Yoman Rai, a 19-year-old Bhutanese refugee living in a camp in Nepal. “We have a protection unit and complaint mechanism, but we are still facing problems,” he said, adding that just last month a transgender woman was beaten by other people in the camp.

Security in refugee camps is complicated and contingent on numerous, unpredictable factors. For members of the LGBTI community, vulnerabilities are exacerbated. Sexual abuse is common, but often goes unreported because the right questions are not being asked, and because survivors of sexual violence are reluctant to report [ http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=5006aa262 ] events that will “out” them to legal authorities.

Explained Rai: “Many Bhutanese are not `out’ to anyone except for the outreach workers because they still believe being LGBTI will put them in danger and negatively affect their resettlement process,” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91459/NEPAL-Resettlement-of-Bhutanese-refugees-gathers-momentum ] adding that the outreach educators’ network was operated by a Nepalese LGBTI rights NGO.

Emergency shelter settings -such as relief camps or refugee housing- pose specific challenges for transgender people. Access to male-female gender-segregated facilities, such as dormitories or bathrooms, can be perilous [ http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-55/making-disaster-risk-reduction-and-relief-programmes-lgbtiinclusive-examples-from-nepal ]. New research is exploring how immigration detention centres can respect and protect LGBTI residents, a US-based prisons expert explained in FMR [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/fialho ].

For LGBTI migrants who end up in urban areas, research has shown that cities can be unwelcoming and unfamiliar and access to basic social services limited by scant local resources, exclusion of foreigners, or limitations to access including finances, language, and cultural barriers. [ http://www.hias.org/uploaded/file/Invisible-in-the-City_full-report.pdf ]

“The single most threatening factor for these migrants is isolation,”said Neil Grungras, executive director of the Organization for Refugee Asylum and Migration (ORAM) [ http://www.oraminternational.org/ ], a leading advocacy group for refugees fleeing persecution due to sexual orientation or gender identity.

With UNHCR data showing the average major refugee situation lasting 17 years, these circumstances can impinge on a significant portion of an individual’s life [ http://www.unhcr.org/4444afcb0.pdf ].

Migrant populations are generally more at-risk for HIV due to disruption and displacement [ http://www.unhcr.org/4ef3056d9.html ], and according to UNAIDS are often overlooked in host-country HIV policies [ http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/briefingnote/2007/policy_brief_refugees.pdf ].

“It is critical that refugee organizations identify what the best ways of offering protection are, such as providing access to safe shelter, requesting expedited resettlement, and, if possible, working with the police and refugee communities to address specific threats of violence,” said Duncan Breen, a senior associate in the refugee protection programme at Human Rights First.

Evolving frameworks

Recent UN reports [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40743#.UX8oC7Xkvzw ] and statements [ http://www.iglhrc.org/content/un-ban-ki-moon-condemns-homophobic-laws ] demonstrate increased international attention to the human rights of LGBTI people.

On the programme level, agencies have begun to adjust to include considerations of sexual orientation and gender identity.

For example, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is implementing a “safe space” project for refugees at its four US Refugee Admissions Program Resettlement Support Centers.

Jennifer Rumbach, IOM resettlement support centre manager for South Asia, told IRIN the programme is designed to help LGBTI refugees at “every step along the way - whether during counselling, interviews, orientations, travel, or post-arrival…

“Disclosing sexual orientation and gender identity overseas works to the refugees’ benefit because it ensures we can provide appropriate and respectful services, ask questions that are critical to their resettlement experience, and try to get them any special help they need while they wait to be resettled,” she explained.

But ORAM’s Grungras warned:“We have to be extra careful to talk with refugees and migrants on their own terms - to understand them as they understand themselves, and not label them as“LGBTI” just because it fits our programmes.”

In spite of challenges such as a dearth of respectful terms used in some languages referring to sexual and gender minorities, IOM’s programmes also attempt to engage with local terminology.

“While it's important for staff to understand sexual orientation and gender identity terms used by the international community, we make special efforts to use relevant and respectful local terminology in our signs, handouts and interview and counselling scripts,” said Rumbach.

Supporting and protecting LGBTI people as they migrate requires nuance, sensitivity, and an appreciation of evolving identities, legal frameworks, and programmatic potential.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97989/Analysis-The-plight-of-LGBTI-asylum-seekers-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305070711300235t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KATHMANDU 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Refugees and asylum seekers face a host of challenges when crossing borders, but the obstacles are particularly pronounced for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) persons, say experts.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Little support, no justice for Mali rape survivors</title><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061358090140t.jpg" />]]>GAO/BAMAKO 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - During the rebel takeover of northern Mali in April 2012, many women said they were subjected to rape or sexual assault. Since then, little or no support has come through for these women, say aid workers.</description><body><![CDATA[GAO/BAMAKO 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - During the rebel takeover of northern Mali in April 2012, many women said they were subjected to rape or sexual assault. Since then, little or no support has come through for these women, say aid workers.

Aminata Touré* was on her way to her uncle’s house in the city of Gao in June 2012 when she was stopped by two men on a motorbike. “I had no choice. They were armed and threatened to kill me,” she said. While one of the men held her baby, the other took her to a nearby bush. “They took me and they did everything they could do, they raped me. Afterwards, they left me in the bush,” she told IRIN.

Since the insurgency began in the north soon after the March 2012 military coup, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has registered 2,785 cases of sexual and gender-based violence, though its Mali spokesperson, Eduardo Cue, says the real figure is much higher. Most of the cases involved rape; others included forced marriage and sex work.

When insurgents entered Gao they systematically went through each neighbourhood, stealing from some and assaulting others, said residents.

Local journalist and activist Ami Idrissa managed to stay safe by hiding in her house. Others were not so fortunate, she said. “Everyone has a sister or cousin who was raped. Daughters were assaulted in front of their fathers, women in front of their husbands. Many are still traumatized by what they saw or experienced that day,” Idrissa told IRIN.

Many residents told IRIN that members of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) were usually the perpetrators. MNLA spokespeople in France were unavailable for comment.

When Islamic militant groups arrived soon afterwards, they perpetrated different kinds of abuse, said Idrissa, who was forced to quit her job as a radio host by Islamists who would not tolerate a woman’s voice on the radio.

“MNLA raped women. MUJAO [the Islamist rebel Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa] instead forced women to marry them; in the end their marriages resulted in another system of rape when only one man married the woman and many men participated in the marriage,” she told IRIN.

Undocumented

The number of forced marriages among northerners and insurgents has not been fully documented. A UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) protection team found one case of forced marriage when questioning 105 displaced people in Mopti who hailed from Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. They also uncovered eight rapes, including that of a 13-year-old girl, and 44 cases of sexual abuse.

Gao resident Mouna Awata, whose daughter was arrested for not wearing the hijab, told IRIN: “Girls were arrested, brought to the mayor’s office and then transferred to the prison. That’s where they raped the women. They had mattresses there and everything.”

One father who withheld his name told IRIN his 15-year-old daughter called him from inside the prison in Gao. “She told me there was a naked man waiting for her on the roof. She escaped... that’s when she called me.”

Gao resident Miriam Cissé*, 18, was forced to marry a man twice her age in mid-2012. When she moved to her husband’s house she found out what she had feared all along - that he was part of MUJAO. “He forced me to sleep with him. When I refused he beat me,” she told IRIN. When she finally managed to escape she took a bus to Bamako. Afraid her husband will follow her to the capital she is hoping local NGO Sini Sanuman can help her to find a place to stay.

With little to no administration in the north [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97892/Plea-for-return-of-officials-to-northern-Mali ], there is insufficient support for women who have been abused. Local and international NGOs and UN agencies such as UNICEF, are helping women in the north and south, but resources are limited. UNICEF is supporting community-level child protection committees and is raising awareness of protection norms among social workers to try to avert further incidents of abuse.

Gao-based local NGO GREFFA has set up a clinic giving medical help to survivors of abuse, and help in preventing sexually transmitted diseases at the regional hospital. Survivors also receive medical attention in local clinics, said Gao midwife Mariam Maïga.

Meanwhile, women who fled south to Mopti and Bamako often face financial as well as medical problems. In Bamako Sini Sanuman provides medical and psychological help to survivors of abuse, but its director, Alpha Boubeye, said they could not help northerners who arrive in the capital with their food or rent requirements, "something that they desperately need".

The organization is struggling to keep up with the scale of need. In one Bamako neighbourhood Sini Sanuman identified over 300 cases of sexual assault among women who had arrived from the north since April 2012.

“Before the conflict no one was really tending to women who were victims of sexual abuse. We have had to set up a whole new strategy, training social workers and psychiatrists,” Boubeye told IRIN.

Stigma

Uncovering the extent of abuse continues to be very difficult in a country where rape is considered shameful.

“Many women do not dare to talk about being raped. They are afraid that their husbands will leave them and that they will be segregated from society,” journalist Idrissa told IRIN. “Before MNLA and MUJAO rape outside the house was not a problem in Mali. The rebels made it an issue.”

“Being raped is a very shameful thing in Mali and our social workers often visit the women many times before they open up," said Boubeye.

And pursuing justice is not even considered an option by many abuse survivors. Touré returned home to her husband in Gao, but she has not pursued a case against her attackers. “I want the men who raped me to go to jail, but I’m ashamed for everyone else to see me,” she told IRIN.

Her focus is to support her family in increasingly difficult humanitarian conditions, she added.

According to Daniel Tessogué, state prosecutor in Bamako, only one case of sexual assault linked to the 2012 conflict is being prepared to go to court.

*not their real names

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97983/Little-support-no-justice-for-Mali-rape-survivors</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061358090140t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GAO/BAMAKO 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - During the rebel takeover of northern Mali in April 2012, many women said they were subjected to rape or sexual assault. Since then, little or no support has come through for these women, say aid workers.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: A long road ahead for justice in Côte d’Ivoire</title><pubDate>Fri, 03 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031042070560t.jpg" />]]>ABIDJAN 03 May 2013 (IRIN) - Wary of a backlash, Côte d’Ivoire’s government has hesitated to charge its own supporters of crimes committed during the 2010-2011 poll violence, something that has raised doubts about its commitment to impartial justice, say analysts.</description><body><![CDATA[ABIDJAN 03 May 2013 (IRIN) - Wary of a backlash, Côte d’Ivoire’s government has hesitated to charge its own supporters of crimes committed during the 2010-2011 poll violence, something that has raised doubts about its commitment to impartial justice, say analysts.

The government’s National Commission of Inquiry into the conflict has accused both the Côte d’Ivoire Republican Forces (FRCI - now part of the army) and fighters loyal to deposed president Laurent Gbagbo, of crimes. It said FRCI was responsible for 727 deaths while Gbagbo’s forces killed 1,452 people.

In June 2011, two months after taking power, President Alassane Ouattara set up the Special Inquiry Unit - a special court - to try violence suspects. Prosecutors have charged more than 150 Gbagbo supporters but just a handful from FRCI. 

Analysts argue that this lack of even-handedness is due to Ouattara’s weak grip on the army which is largely made up of fighters who backed him during the poll chaos. Many of the fighters are also loyal to Guillaume Soro, a former rebel leader and now the National Assembly president.

Christophe Kouamé, head of the Ivoirian Civil Society Convention, said the slow pace of justice was because “social divisions are so deep that the president is certainly wary of rekindling conflict.”

“The one-sided approach to accountability is likely due in part to the president’s still tenuous hold over the entire military,” Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in an April report [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/03/cote-d-ivoire-unrealized-promises-impartial-justice ].

“Pursuing justice may prove to be deeply unpopular, including among segments of the population who believe that the forces loyal to President Ouattara who committed serious crimes were justified in doing so,” it added.

Only recently did the government go after its loyalists. In April, the trial of 33 FRCI troops - charged with crimes against the population, including premeditated murder, voluntary and involuntary homicide and theft - opened before a military court in the commercial capital Abidjan. Two soldiers were handed prison sentences [ http://news.abidjan.net/h/458597.html ] on 2 May.

Other moves against FRCI members seem likely following the April exhumation of bodies from 57 mass graves across Abidjan. Thirty-six of those graves, containing the bodies of people killed during the post-election violence, are in the city’s Yopougon District which was a Gbagbo stronghold.

FRCI has also been accused of atrocities in the west. In March, a judge tasked with investigating a July 2012 attack on a camp for the displaced in the west of the country visited the scene to identify mass graves. According to the International Human Rights Federation (FIDH), there are 13 mass graves in 12 different sites containing the bodies of people who were summarily executed during the attack.

HRW West Africa researcher Matt Wells said the trial of the soldiers was “an important step forward in Côte d’Ivoire’s fight against impunity. But the Ivoirian authorities need to also pursue the more sensitive cases involving FRCI for which victims have seen no justice, particularly the grave crimes committed during the post-election crisis.”

A good start?

Observers and rights groups have urged the government to be even-handed in pursuing justice, to avert the threat of unrest. However, achieving equitable justice in Côte d’Ivoire is a long and difficult process, warned Kouamé.

“We should be realistic. Côte d’Ivoire has a long way to go. We are not going to change things in one or two years,” he told IRIN.

“The fact that the government is taking responsibility for the killings committed by the forces that supported it is a good thing. This is a good start.”

To attain fair justice, the government should target foot soldiers and low-level commanders in both the Ouattara and Gbagbo camps, and then work its way through the chain of command, Florent Geel of FIDH’s Africa bureau, told IRIN.

Such an approach would help “build the confidence of the victims in the system and also develop the experience and the expertise of the local judicial authorities to be able to go up the chain of command,” said Param-Preet Singh, senior international justice counsel at HRW.

“We are not asking for perfect justice immediately. Impatience will not help. But there is need for political will to move things forward, as well as concrete and visible proof that things are moving forward,” said Geel, stressing that the government “must demonstrate that people who committed crimes must be made accountable”.

However, another analyst, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the government should instead go after senior commanders in both camps.

“You can’t try every Tom, Dick and Harry,” said the analyst. “The authorities should target top and middle-level people and focus on people that were in a position of command, [involved in] policy-making and financing.”

Transitional justice

More than a decade of violence and instability has heightened impunity and weakened the justice system in Côte d’Ivoire. “Impunity and lack of justice have led many people to conclude that there is no solution other than taking up arms,” said Geel.

Justice Minister Gnenema Coulibaly recently told reporters that the government inherited a dysfunctional justice system and announced a broad plan to reform the sector by 2015.

“A transitional justice process is vital for any country recovering from a situation like Côte d’Ivoire’s to ensure guarantee of non-repetition,” said Mohamed Suma, head of the International Centre for Transitional Justice office in Côte d’Ivoire.

“The risk of not doing anything is too much for the country," he told IRIN.

In the second half of 2012, Côte d’Ivoire was rocked by a series of attacks targeting army bases, police stations and other targets in Abidjan and elsewhere. The government blamed the deadly raids on Gbagbo supporters exiled in Ghana and Liberia, but they deny responsibility.

In March, at least 14 people were killed in a spate of attacks [ http://www.irinnews.org/Country/CI/Cote-dIvoire ] in the country’s volatile western region where long-standing land and ethnic disputes have repeatedly sparked violence.

Simone Gbagbo

Côte d’Ivoire handed over Gbagbo to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November 2011 for trial over crimes he allegedly committed during the post-election violence that claimed at least 3,000 lives, but it is yet to surrender Gbagbo’s wife, Simone, despite the court’s arrest warrant issued in November 2012. Simone Gbagbo is charged with crimes against humanity.

The government is concerned that Simone would be able to get in touch with former regime officials if she is out of its hands, a Western observer told IRIN on condition of anonymity.

“The authorities have two options: they can surrender Simone Gbagbo or challenge the admissibility of her case before the ICC. They have done neither,” said HRW’s Singh.

“It is okay to try her in Côte d’Ivoire if she can get a fair trial and if the ICC agrees that the national authorities have the ability to do so, but they have to respond.”

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97969/Analysis-A-long-road-ahead-for-justice-in-Côte-d-Ivoire</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031042070560t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ABIDJAN 03 May 2013 (IRIN) - Wary of a backlash, Côte d’Ivoire’s government has hesitated to charge its own supporters of crimes committed during the 2010-2011 poll violence, something that has raised doubts about its commitment to impartial justice, say analysts.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boko Haram threat chokes trade with Cameroon</title><pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304291759290784t.jpg" />]]>YAOUNDE 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Tighter security in Cameroon’s Far North Region due to the widening threat posed by Nigeria-based radical Islamist militia Boko Haram is stifling cross-border trade, hurting livelihoods and raising fear among civilians.</description><body><![CDATA[YAOUNDE 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Tighter security in Cameroon’s Far North Region due to the widening threat posed by Nigeria-based radical Islamist militia Boko Haram is stifling cross-border trade, hurting livelihoods and raising fear among civilians.

Cameroon has stepped up security over the Boko Haram (BH) threat. In November 2011, Nigeria shut its border with Cameroon, prompting Yaoundé to bolster security [ http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/briefings/Boko%20Haram%20in%20Cameroon.pdf ] in the largely Muslim Far North Region, close dozens of Koranic schools and hand over suspected BH members to Nigeria, which reopened the border in 2012.

Despite the intensified security, suspected BH militants on 19 February abducted [ http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/19/us-cameroon-kidnapping-idUSBRE93I0I820130419 ] seven French tourists, including four children, from a national park in the Far North Region, freeing them two months later. 

Cross-border trade sustains the local economy in the Far North Region which sells onions, rice, maize, livestock and other agricultural goods to Nigeria, and imports sugar, cement, textile and electronics.

“Tight border security and checks are making business impossible for some of us. This was worsened by the kidnapping of [the French] tourists. Today all the goods must be checked before entry, and taxes are so high,” said Doudou Yaouba, a trader in Maroua, the regional capital.

Yaouba, who exports groundnuts to Nigeria’s Borno State and returns with sugar and textiles, said he was thinking of starting another business due to the security restrictions.

The region also depends on inferior quality petrol locally known as `zua-zua’ which is smuggled in from Nigeria. Strict border controls have caused its price to rise.

“There are so many border checkpoints and it is very difficult for `zua-zua’ suppliers to get through. Petrol now sells at 600 [CFA] francs a litre compared to 400 francs before the crisis,” said Joel Alim, a petrol trader in Maroua.

Fertilizer imports have also ceased after the Nigerian authorities banned production and distribution over fears that BH was using fertilizer to make bombs, Mahamat Abakar, an official at Cameroon’s Ministry of External Relations, told IRIN. 

The cross-border cattle trade has also taken a hit owing to the tightened security. “More than 1,000 cattle are traded into Nigeria weekly from Cameroon but the movement of herds has been very slow and is even blocked at certain points by Nigerian security,” said Maroua cattle trader Ousmanou Mamadou.

“Less than half the normal cattle supply into Nigeria is possible, and only through very difficult terrain. Recently more than 800 cattle were blocked from crossing the Nigerian border in Kotokol,” he added.

Abakar said the government had to negotiate the reopening of the border following pleas by locals.

“People living near the border requested the Cameroon government to intervene in the decision by Nigeria to close the border because they were facing a very severe impact from the closure,” said Abakar.

“The border was reopened in February 2012 after negotiations with Nigeria. Cameroon assured Nigeria that its own side of the border is secure after 600 soldiers were deployed to the region.”

Cameroon wary

Cameroonian authorities are wary of BH’s infiltration into local communities and mosques. There are cultural and religious similarities between Cameroon’s Far North Region and neighbouring northeastern Nigeria. One of the worst explosions of religious violence [ https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/africa_today/v057/57.4.adesoji.html ] in northern Nigeria in the 1980s was triggered by a Cameroonian religious scholar, Mohammed Marwa, who led the “Maitatsine” movement.

Cameroon’s north and Nigeria’s north share similar deep-seated Muslim political grievances and BH’s ideology could trigger political problems in Cameroon, say some analysts. 

“Cameroon should worry about BH. We have a civilized Islamic practice in Cameroon. However, we are not sure that we won’t have radicals one day. BH’s fight is due to the economic and political context of northern Nigeria, with disputes over the equal sharing of national resources. Cameroon finds itself in a similar context and so measures must be taken,” said Alain Didier Olinga, political analyst and lecturer in international law at the International Relations Institute of Cameroon.

“The government’s strategy to dissuade BH is basically military, but governments must understand that the absence of true knowledge of what Islam is can only encourage Islamism,” Olinga said.

Despite the deployment of troops to the northern region, it is not easy to police the 1,690km border with Nigeria. 

“The borders are vast and to ensure full security along the whole territory is practically impossible. Checkpoints are mounted at cross-border routes and patrols are being enforced around the regions, most especially on Waza National Park where the French family was kidnapped,” a senior Defence Ministry official told IRIN on condition of anonymity.

Abakar from Cameroon’s External Relations Ministry said the government was also closely monitoring suspected BH militants, Koranic schools, preachers and sermons in mosques as well as collaborating with religious leaders.

Hayatou Muhamadou, head of Islamic studies at Yaoundé Central Mosque, said: “We don’t permit unidentified preachers in mosques and the Islamic community in Cameroon has been strongly warned against such practices… What we cannot guarantee is avoiding unknown worshippers in our local mosques. It is difficult to point out extremists in worship.”

For some residents of Cameroon’s Far North Region, the troop deployments and increased security measures seem to be causing more fear than BH: “This period is very difficult for us. Our fear is not exactly BH, but the soldiers’ presence. Everyone here is presumed to be suspect by the soldiers,” said a local resident who gave his name only as Yousouf, adding: “But we have been collaborating with the security forces by giving information and reporting suspected persons.”

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 ]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97942/Boko-Haram-threat-chokes-trade-with-Cameroon</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304291759290784t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">YAOUNDE 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Tighter security in Cameroon’s Far North Region due to the widening threat posed by Nigeria-based radical Islamist militia Boko Haram is stifling cross-border trade, hurting livelihoods and raising fear among civilians.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Calls for Côte d’Ivoire government to tackle unrest in west</title><pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208090925290524t.jpg" />]]>ABIDJAN 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - After recent attacks in Côte d’Ivoire’s volatile western region in which more than a dozen people were killed, the authorities announced new security measures, but observers say more than a military response is required.</description><body><![CDATA[ABIDJAN 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - After recent attacks in Côte d’Ivoire’s volatile western region in which more than a dozen people were killed, the authorities announced new security measures, but observers say more than a military response is required.

In the latest spate of armed raids in March, at least 14 civilians and soldiers were killed. The region saw some of the worst fighting [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96024/COTE-D-IVOIRE-We-should-stop-killing-each-other ] during the country’s 2010-2011 post-election conflict. In 2012, at least 10 civilians and seven UN peacekeepers were killed. Weeks later gunmen raided and torched the last remaining internally displaced persons (IDP) camp hosting some 5,000 people.

At the start of 2012 there were 186,000 IDPs [ http://ivorycoast.humanitarianresponse.info/Portals/0/Reports/Others%20reports/CIV%202013%20BESOINS%20HUMANITAIRES%20Final%20February%202013.pdf ] in Côte d’Ivoire, most of them in the country’s western region. An estimated 45,000 people remained displaced by the end of 2012.

Ethnic rivalries, and disputes over land that are worsened by political rivalry, have turned western Côte d’Ivoire into a tinderbox. Mistrust and enmity have often degenerated into violence. Greater efforts are needed to reconcile communities, restore confidence and address grievances, say observers. 

“The government must fully appreciate this problem and bring a lasting solution,” Francis Niangoran, a lecturer at Abidjan’s Sainte-Marie Teaching Institute, told IRIN. “Aid groups are faced with recurrent population displacements, organizing their return, distributing relief aid - it’s a vicious circle.”

While on a visit to the west following the attacks, Interior and Security Minister Hamed Bakayoko announced an emergency security plan to bolster troop numbers, set up attack brigades and equip them with modern radios as well as build an additional police station.

“When you travel across the region, you see ill-equipped soldiers. They don’t even have radios. The telephone network is also unreliable and they cannot use their mobile phones,” said Séraphin Zégnan, who fled the western Petit Guiglo area to the commercial capital Abidjan after an attack in the area in 2012.

Army chief Soumaila Bakayoko, also visiting after the attacks, said a permanent military base would be set up in the region. In 2012, the government formed a 600-strong force to secure the western region. The force is backed by both the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire and the UN mission in neighbouring Liberia.

“The government has the will to end the instability in the west - only it seems to lack the military capacity to achieve that. The western region is a difficult zone to secure and there is need for better trained and better equipped troops,” said Rodrigue Koné of the Centre for Research and Action for Peace (CERAP), an Ivoirian organization.

Others are also sceptical about the military efforts. 

“Moving from a security plan to an emergency security plan is to play with words rather than having a real will to resolve the problem. It is proof that the government is unable to contain the situation. It doesn’t know where and how to tackle the problem,” said Niangoran.

The Interior and the Defence Ministries declined to comment.

A matter of trust

Alexandre Neth Willy, secretary-general of the Ivoirian Human Rights League (LIDHO), told IRIN that the use of drones as recently requested by Côte d’Ivoire’s UN ambassador Bamba Youssoufou “will not be sufficient to solve the problem. The confrontations, recriminations and hatred are deeper [in the west] than in the rest of the country. 

“On the one hand there’s a need to build confidence among the people themselves and on the other between the people and the army.”

CERAP’s Koné said: “Today the majority of the people in the west consider the army as the government’s militia. They have not overcome the events of the post-election crisis and the army has not been able to gain their confidence.”

He argued that the government should work to forge an army with a national outlook following the deep divisions [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96574/COTE-D-IVOIRE-Facing-insecurity-with-unreformed-army ] caused by the post-election unrest.

Who are the gunmen?

Residents of the region - an area covering 73,000sqkm and home to nearly seven million people, or a third of the country’s population - say that apart from gunmen attacking from neighbouring Liberia, there are several armed groups operating inside the region with bases in the forests. 

These militias fought for current President Alassane Ouattara during the violent dispute with his erstwhile election opponent Laurent Gbagbo, they say.

“The most famous of these armed groups is headed by Amadé Ourémi, a Burkinabé, who with his 1,000 fighters, is extending his area of operations without the slightest response from the authorities,” said Fabien Dotonin, an administrator in the western Duékoué District.

“The authorities in Abidjan make threatening statements about dislodging him. But once they come to the west, they neatly avoid talking about the problems caused by Ourémi or even meeting him, yet this is a typical case which if resolved will help a great deal in easing the security crisis,” he added. 

Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan on 4 April said all those occupying government forests will be expelled by the army, but so far no action has been taken.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97920/Calls-for-Côte-d-Ivoire-government-to-tackle-unrest-in-west</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208090925290524t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ABIDJAN 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - After recent attacks in Côte d’Ivoire’s volatile western region in which more than a dozen people were killed, the authorities announced new security measures, but observers say more than a military response is required.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Demining speeds up in Senegal’s Casamance region</title><pubDate>Wed, 24 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100831480343t.jpg" />]]>ZIGUINCHOR 24 April 2013 (IRIN) - Over half of the mined land in Senegal’s southern Casamance region has been cleared, according to the government’s anti-mines action centre, CNAMS, which says it is on track to reach the 2015 goal of the Ottawa treaty to eliminate such weapons.</description><body><![CDATA[ZIGUINCHOR 24 April 2013 (IRIN) - Over half of the mined land in Senegal’s southern Casamance region has been cleared, according to the government’s anti-mines action centre, CNAMS, which says it is on track to reach the 1 March 2016 deadline of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty to eliminate such weapons.

According to CNAMS head Sény Diop, 630, 204 square metres have been demined, and the residents of more than 61 communities have been able to return home or access [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97127/SENEGAL-Casamance-recovers-more-land-lost-to-landmines ] their agricultural land.

Some 322 mines have been removed since demining began in 2008.

Diop said the Kassa region near the Guinea-Bissau border, an area east of the Casamance capital Ziguinchor, and north Sindian near the Gambian border are yet to be demined. These areas account for about half of the zones that were mined.

“We are very pleased with the progress of the operations,” said Diop. “In many areas socioeconomic activities have restarted.”

The pace of demining increased under Handicap International, which was responsible for demining from 2008-2012, as the organization completed assessments of at-risk zones and identified the right kind of equipment to detect all mines used.

In 2012, South African firm MECHEM took over and, according to Diop, the amount of land demined has doubled over the past year. MECHEM logistics coordinator Jean Michel Thiam said the accelerated pace was due to the experience CNAMS has gained over the years, MECHEM’s own experience, and the fact that unlike Handicap International it is a private firm with commercial interests that rely on productivity.

However, not all are as sanguine as Diop, given active fighting [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94895/SENEGAL-No-end-in-sight-to-Casamance-conflict ] in Casamance between the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and the Senegalese army, particularly in areas near the Gambian and Guinea-Bissau borders.

Thiam said it was impossible to determine whether demining will meet the Ottawa treaty goal as no surveys had been done in certain areas under rebel control.

“It’s not possible to determine the extent of work needed in these areas because we don’t have any information regarding the size or type of terrain that has been mined or littered with explosive remnants of war,” Thiam told IRIN.

MECHEM has extracted 146 mines and three items of unexploded ordnance in an area of 269, 251 square metres since it began demining, Thiam said.

In March, a 60-year-old man was hit by a mine in the village of Djirack, near the Guinea-Bissau border; while a woman and her son were killed in northern Sindian Province as they were travelling through the bush. CNAMS has not been able to work in either of these areas.

According to Handicap International in 2012, mines were still being planted in Sindian, 100km north of the capital, Ziguinchor.

MFDC fighters are often accused of laying mines, though they in turn accuse the Senegalese army. The rebels and the state of Senegal signed a peace accord in 2004 but sporadic violence has continued ever since.

Diop said it was impossible to tell if the recent mine deaths were due to pre-existing or newly-laid mines.

Dialogue efforts

CNAMS and international NGOs have tried to find ways to work with MFDC to come to an agreement to stop laying mines and enable all affected areas of Casamance to be demined.

At the end of March 2013, CNAMS and the military wing of an MFDC faction under the control of César Atoute Badiaté, met in San Domingos, northern Guinea-Bissau, to discuss demining. International mediator NGO Geneva Call, working with local NGOs APRAN/SDP, facilitated the talks.

In a statement after the talks MFDC said it understood the need to continue humanitarian demining, but it also considered CNAMS had reached a red line beyond which the security of operators could not be guaranteed. MFDC believes demining is dependent on a wider peace process. Geneva Call encouraged both sides to continue the dialogue.

In 2008 Badiaté had agreed to humanitarian demining taking place in Casamance while reserving the right to use mines in the case of attacks.

Senegal was one of the founding signatories of the 1999 Mine Ban Treaty.

As well as demining, CNAMS, alongside partners, runs mine awareness and prevention programmes, and helps ensure mine victims receive free hospital treatment, prosthetic limbs and wheelchairs, as well as livelihood support.

Some 800-1,000 people have been killed or injured by mines in Casamance since the 1980s, according to CNAMS, peaking at 221 incidents in 1997. This came down to just one incident in 2008. “Mine awareness is really paying off,” said Diop.

mad/aj/ob/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97907/Demining-speeds-up-in-Senegal-s-Casamance-region</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100831480343t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ZIGUINCHOR 24 April 2013 (IRIN) - Over half of the mined land in Senegal’s southern Casamance region has been cleared, according to the government’s anti-mines action centre, CNAMS, which says it is on track to reach the 2015 goal of the Ottawa treaty to eliminate such weapons.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Plea for return of officials to northern Mali</title><pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201210050938270763t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/GAO 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Residents in the northern Mali towns of Gao and Timbuktu are calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their towns, which they say are in a state of “complete chaos”.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/GAO 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Residents in the northern Mali towns of Gao and Timbuktu are calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their towns, which they say are in a state of “complete chaos”.

French, Chadian and Malian armies have ousted insurgent groups from most the main towns in the north, including Gao and Timbuktu, following a 10-month occupation. But despite an appeal from the federal government, only skeletal teams of administrators have returned to their posts.

In the absence of officials, town residents - including village elders, chiefs, women and youths - are working to operate basic services and clean up the damage as best they can.

Disarray

At the beginning of April, Gao’s governor and prefects returned, as did the director of the academy that oversees the region’s schools. In Timbuktu, the governor and two prefects are in place. Officials responsible for health, energy, education, planning and other programmes have yet to return.

For Kidal town, which is still under the control of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the government has named a governor and advisers, all of whom are still in Bamako, the capital, and the MNLA has nominated a governor of their own.

Almost all the regional services in Gao are in disarray, said Aliou Touré, a teacher from Gao town. “Health, agriculture, taxes, social development, police, civil protection, the treasury, the banks… all are in disarray… Officials must return to [put] their city back on track.”

The return of administrators would offer some reassurance of stability, and could deter any insurgents who remain at the outskirts of the town, he said.

Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal were all attacked in March and April by insurgents hidden in nearby villages.

The Minister of Internal Security, Gen Tiefing Konaté, promised last week that police would be re-deployed in Timbuktu before the end of April.

Oumar Sangaré, another teacher in Gao, is angry. “The administration has to return to sort things out. You can’t live like animals in a jungle, with no rules, no basic sanitation, no protection. Government and banking services must re-start immediately,” he said. "It's complete chaos here."

Government teachers must travel to Mopti, 500km away, to pick up their salaries, he said, due to the lack of banking services. “It’s ludicrous.”

While local and international aid groups are providing basic food, healthcare, water and sanitation and other essentials to many vulnerable people in northern regions, essential emergency programmes like large-scale fodder distributons and vaccination campaigns for livestock - critical as herders approach the lean season - require government oversight [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97799/Mounting-crisis-for-conflict-hit-northern-Mali-pastoralists ].

Self-organizing amid shortages

With so many civil servants displaced, the federal government has asked elders and village chiefs to set up management committees in Gao and Timbuktu to try to run things as best they can.

Touré, the teacher, said these committees were struggling: “They can’t continue their work because they don’t have the experience or the means.”

Women and youths formed a group in Gao to help clean up the town, said local journalist, Daouda Traoré.

People also organized themselves into a management committee in Kidal.

Water, electricity and fuel shortages still plague most of the north. Gao’s two major generators are currently not working, which means electricity is supplied from 6pm to 11:30pm only, according to an official with Mali’s energy company, EDM. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been providing fuel for the power stations in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu to make sure water is still available. It recently called for a further US$50 million to continue this service, and to distribute food to 420,000 people, supply farmers with seeds, and provide some animal fodder and vaccinations to pastoralists [ http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2013/04-10-mali-budget-extension.htm ].

Fuel supply is more consistent in Timbuktu, thanks partly to a wealthy trader who has stepped in to provide fuel.

The government has mapped out a $198 million reconstruction and rehabilitation plan for northern Mali, said Bassidy Coulibaly, director general of the Ministry for Territorial Administration in Bamako, but it remains just 12 percent funded.

Elections

The government is under international pressure to organize elections by July, though diplomats privately admit the deadline is ambitious, saying the end of the year is more feasible.

"If the government is serious about organizing elections for July, the administration has to return as soon as possible. If not, who will organize the elections in the regions?” said Oumar Touré, a retired civil servant in Timbuktu. He also worried displaced residents would be unable to return to vote.

“It’s inconceivable that people [displaced residents] can return - the governor, the prefects are working in complete anarchy,” he told IRIN.

Fear

Many Gao residents understand the reluctance of officials to return.

Daouda Diarra, a journalist in Gao, told IRIN, “I think they [civil servants] are right to be scared. Gao isn’t completely secure, and there’s nothing set up here: Everything has been looted, destroyed or attacked. Will they work under the trees? Will they live in the trees? The government has to at least assure the basics before forcing its citizens and administrative staff to return, otherwise they’ll just be sending them to the slaughter,” he told IRIN by telephone.

Moulaye Sayah, now in Timbuktu, was a doctor in Kidal before the events of 2012. “Work is important, but life is sacred. You have to keep yourself safe first and foremost,” he said.

“I understand the complaints of the people in the north who demand the return of the administration, but how and where would we work?” he said, adding that many black-skinned Malians are too afraid to return to MNLA-controlled Kidal.

Abdoul Karim Koné, sub-prefect of Toguérécoumbé town in Mali’s central region of Mopti, disagrees. He re-joined his post two weeks ago: “There is no such thing as zero risk anywhere in the world. If our hour strikes, whether it’s in Kidal, Gao or Bamako, it’s the end. People must accept this, and take up their positions accordingly.”

sd/aj/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97892/Plea-for-return-of-officials-to-northern-Mali</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201210050938270763t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/GAO 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Residents in the northern Mali towns of Gao and Timbuktu are calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their towns, which they say are in a state of “complete chaos”.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Negotiating aid delivery in Mali’s conflict zones</title><pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281209530967t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/MOPTI/DAKAR 18 April 2013 (IRIN) - Aid agencies managed to work in northern Mali throughout its occupation by Islamist militants in 2012 and the new complications triggered by the French-led military campaign earlier this year. No single template guided their engagement.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/MOPTI/DAKAR 18 April 2013 (IRIN) - Aid agencies managed to work in northern Mali throughout its occupation by Islamist militants in 2012 and the new complications triggered by the French-led military campaign earlier this year. No single template guided their engagement.

IRIN spoke to aid staff in Mali about how they navigated access challenges in a region facing critical nutritional and health needs over the course of 2012 and 2013.

What has humanitarian access looked like?

When rebel and Islamist groups first occupied northern Mali in April 2012 many international NGOs and UN agencies initially withdrew, often after having their offices, vehicles and aid supplies looted [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95233/MALI-Looting-halts-aid-work-in-chaotic-north ]. Some relocated staff to the central region of Mopti and sent international staff down to the capital, Bamako; others shifted their programmes further south to Mopti, Douentza and Ségou.

Many agencies experienced access problems that hampered their scale of operations. Most of them were involved in longer-term development projects. For the World Food Programme (WFP) and several others, access is still a problem: “One of our top concerns is for humanitarian access to be re-established,” WFP head Sally Haydock told IRIN in March of this year. “This would allow WFP to reopen its offices in order to assist a larger caseload and for our partners to operate fully.”

However, many NGOs continued to operate in northern Mali throughout the Islamist occupation, and several significantly increased their humanitarian reach because of the crisis conditions. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins du Monde (MDM), Action against Hunger (ACF), Solidarité Internationale and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) all worked across northern regions in 2012 and 2013, and heads of each organization said their access was not significantly affected. These organizations together provided nutrition support, healthcare, and water and sanitation services to a significant proportion of the remaining population.

After the French-led military intervention, which began in January 2013, things became more problematic as there were no clear authorities in place in many northern regions, said Frank Abeille, the Mali director of Solidarité Internationale. Civic administrations are for the most part still unstaffed, and the military chain of command is often unclear.

ICRC spokesperson Wolde Saugeron, in Geneva, told IRIN, “Paradoxically, things got more complicated with the intervention, as the interlocutors started to change.”

“Now it is much more complicated with a lack of authorities in place. We negotiate access with whoever we can find,” ACF head Franck Vannetelle told IRIN.

MDM said the same of the northeastern region of Kidal, where access has been confused by power struggles among the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) and other groups. “We don’t know who to address access-wise, who decides what. It is confusing for everyone, including the population,” MDM Belgium’s coordinator, Sebastien Lemaire, told IRIN.

The situation has eased in recent weeks, said Saugeron, who estimated that as of April 2013, ICRC’s access is back to pre-French-intervention levels.

What were some approaches used to secure access?

After the initial occupation, some organizations re-established access by working with local partners. WFP, for example, teamed up with ACTED in the area of Ménaka and Norwegian Church Aid in Kidal, both of which connected with local NGOs. According to WFP, its food aid reached up to 150,000 people in 2012 and 2013. ICRC also worked very closely with the Malian Red Cross.

On the other hand, many agencies negotiated access with whomever they needed to, including, in 2012, Islamic insurgent groups like the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and, in 2013, the Malian, French and Chadian armies, local authorities and the MNLA.
For example, in April 2012, MSF set up a large healthcare programme in Timbuktu Region and parts of Gao Region by negotiating with all the parties to the conflict - including armed groups and, more recently, the French and Malian militaries.

“All have to be approached. We worked out a way to keep our teams in the north last year and to keep them there this year - little by little we built up our humanitarian space,” said Johanne Sekkenes, MSF head in Mali. “This is part of our work as a humanitarian agency; it’s no secret. There is no guarantee of being accepted.”
According to ACF’s Vannetelle, MUJAO in Gao never refused access. “We had to confirm our movements 24 hours in advance, and they always cleared it. There was a direct chain of command, which gave us assurance.”

How has negotiation changed?

The use of negotiation to deliver aid in rebel-controlled areas has shifted over the past 20 years. In the 1990s, UN agencies often led negotiations over humanitarian access on behalf of much of the aid community – as in Operation Lifeline Sudan. Negotiation was considered integral to putting the humanitarian principles into practice.

This changed after the 9/11 attacks on the US, according to research by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). “Humanitarian organizations have long been pressured by states not to engage with [armed non-state actors], in part because they fear that doing so may lend them legitimacy,” said the ODI report Talking to the other side [ http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7711.pdf ]. But now these non-state actors “are often listed as terrorists in situations where humanitarian engagement is most necessary,” discouraging direct interaction.

This has marked a shift in the humanitarian culture, particularly for the UN, said one seasoned aid worker: “Now we’re more scared than we used to be… We’ve lost that culture of negotiating with rebels… It’s always been a high-risk job, but whenever we go now, we side with the government.”

For one senior UN official, who requested anonymity, the UN has no choice but to be more careful than other aid groups. “You must recognize the nature of groups like AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine - who have said the UN is among their top five targets… If you are a UN employee, you’re on their target list,” he said. “That’s why we work through partners.”

But some agencies, such as MDM, fear that working with local partners could jeopardize their operations’ impartiality because it is impossible to know exactly where partners’ personnel stand without strict monitoring.

Many interviewees said training is needed on negotiating access in conflict zones, a point also made in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 2011 report To Stay and Deliver [ http://www.dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/menschl_entw/FKP/Stay_and_Deliver_Feb_17_1_.pdf ].

Several organizations, such as ICRC, already do this. ICRC uses networking and awareness-raising to help negotiating parties gain confidence in its impartiality.

“This is something that has been developed over a long, long period of time - and it is directly related to the practical issue of having to work in conflict zones,” said Saugeron, who mentioned some agencies have approached ICRC for guidance in this area.

In Mali, rather than negotiating access directly with armed groups, many aid providers negotiated with village-level crisis committees, which included civilians and rebels, said the UN official. Access worked out through these committees largely worked, he said, in part because two of the groups in question - MUJAO and Ansar Dine - had no interest in diverting humanitarian aid. The advantage of these crisis committees is that they could work back and forth between southern and northern Mali, with multiple points of contact, he pointed out.

“What was done was the best that could have been in the circumstances,” he said.

What are the remaining security challenges?

Given tight military control following the French-led intervention, much of the north is again opening up to aid groups. But access is still limited by opportunistic banditry and criminality where there are no security forces, said a UN worker.

Banditry includes attacks on vehicles up and down the Niger river valley and along certain routes, such as the main road from Gao to Kidal. Threats also include improvised explosive devices and mines in parts of Gao. Illicit trafficking in cigarettes, drugs and other contraband are likely to pick up again.

“We have security, for the most part, in towns, and insecurity elsewhere - much like pre-conflict 2012,” noted the UN official. “We don’t want to return to how things were. We want to go beyond.”

The UN Security Council is reviewing a draft resolution to put a 12,600-strong peacekeeping mission in Mali by 1 July. If such an initiative attempts to integrate military, humanitarian and political operations, the neutrality of UN agencies could come into question.

“The nature of the mandate of DPKO [Department of Peacekeeping Operations] in Mali will be a determinant,” said Fernando Arroyo, head of OCHA in Mali. “There is wide consensus among humanitarians that it is imperative to keep humanitarian and political agendas separate, as a failure to do so could undermine the perceived impartiality that humanitarian organizations have gained so far in the north.”

On the other hand, said the UN official, integration could give humanitarians a voice at the table, which could result in better security for their programmes.

But for now, said Arroyo, aid agencies’ top priority is to getting the right people in place to restore basic services.

aj/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97870/Briefing-Negotiating-aid-delivery-in-Mali-s-conflict-zones</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281209530967t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/MOPTI/DAKAR 18 April 2013 (IRIN) - Aid agencies managed to work in northern Mali throughout its occupation by Islamist militants in 2012 and the new complications triggered by the French-led military campaign earlier this year. No single template guided their engagement.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Malian refugees face abject conditions, long displacement</title><pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207191122320739t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 17 April 2013 (IRIN) - Some 70,000 Malian refugees in Mauritania are facing enormous hardships and, as political and ethnic tensions persist back home, the prospect of a prolonged displacement.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 17 April 2013 (IRIN) - Some 70,000 Malian refugees in Mauritania are facing enormous hardships and, as political and ethnic tensions persist back home, the prospect of a prolonged displacement.

Medical aid group Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) called for long-term plans to improve the living conditions of the refugees at Mbéra camp [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95792/MAURITANIA-Beyond-big-refugee-camps ], near the Mauritania-Mali border. The camp is in the middle of the desert, where temperatures can soar up to 50 degrees Celsius.

The refugees receive only 11 litres of water per person per day, instead of the 20 litres considered adequate by humanitarian standards. There are few latrines in the camp, and some refugees still lack proper shelter, MSF said in a recent report [ http://www.msf.org/msf/articles/2013/04/mauritania-refugees-stranded-desert-no-hope-return.cfm.htm ].

Karl Nawezi, MSF’s Mauritania country director, said the rice, fortified flour and sugar given to the camp’s residents - mainly nomadic pastoralists - were not their staples, and that they were selling the food for milk and meat. The cereals are also insufficiently nutritious for children; admissions for malnutrition have more than tripled between January and the end of March.

“Admissions for severe malnutrition were about 38 children in January. At the end of March, we had more than 150 patients,” Nawezi told IRIN.

Ethnic Tuareg make up the majority of the refugees, who also include Arabs and other ethnic groups from northern Mali, said the MSF report. 

Militant Islamists seized swathes of northern Mali following the toppling of president Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012. Conflict, a harsh drought and tough Islamist rule forced civilians to flee to other parts of the country and to neighbouring countries.

A French-led military intervention, launched in January 2013, has dislodged the jihadists from much of northern Mali. However, rights groups have accused [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/21/mali-prosecute-soldiers-abuses ] the Malian army of targeting the Peuhl, Tuareg and Arab ethnic groups on charges that they helped the Islamists.

Throughout Mali, many blame [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97386/Killings-disappearances-in-Mali-s-climate-of-suspicion ] the Tuareg for helping the militants conquer the north. This hostility is preventing the return [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97585/The-returns-challenge-in-Mali ] of many refugees.

“We need to plan for the future because people will not go back home now,” said Nawezi over the phone from Mauritania.

jl/ob/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97867/Malian-refugees-face-abject-conditions-long-displacement</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207191122320739t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 17 April 2013 (IRIN) - Some 70,000 Malian refugees in Mauritania are facing enormous hardships and, as political and ethnic tensions persist back home, the prospect of a prolonged displacement.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Côte d’Ivoire awash in weapons</title><pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303211504560522t.jpg" />]]>ABIDJAN 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Côte d’Ivoire’s recent turbulence - including the ouster of president Henri Konan Bédié in 1999, a long-running insurgency and deadly poll unrest in 2011 - has left the country awash in arms, which have contributed to human rights abuses, widespread crime and persistent insecurity.</description><body><![CDATA[ABIDJAN 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Côte d’Ivoire’s recent turbulence - including the ouster of president Henri Konan Bédié in 1999, a long-running insurgency and deadly poll unrest in 2011 - has left the country awash in arms, which have contributed to human rights abuses, widespread crime and persistent insecurity.

Two years after coming to power in 2000, Laurent Gbagbo’s administration faced an army mutiny, which morphed into a full-scale rebellion. In response, the government underwent a “frenzied arms-acquisition programme”, Amnesty International said in a recent report [ http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/arms-proliferation-and-abuse-shatter-communities-c-te-divoire-2013-03-20 ].

Angola, China, Belarus, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Israel sold weapons to the Ivoirian government between 2002 and 2003, according to the report. A 2004 UN arms embargo did little to halt the flow of weapons into the country, according to Salvatore Sagues, Amnesty International’s West Africa researcher.

“Arms continued to be delivered to pro-Gbagbo forces during the 2011 post-election crisis,” Sagues told IRIN. “This shows that even a UN arms embargo is not enough to stop the illegal trade of weapons.”

Arms acquisition by the New Forces rebels, who controlled Côte d’Ivoire’s north between 2002 and 2009, is harder to trace, as most of their weapons are unregistered. Still, they are known to have used a range of Chinese, Polish and Russian assault rifles, Amnesty said.

It is unclear how many arms are in circulation in Côte d’Ivoire, said Désiré Adjoussou, the head of the National Commission to fight against the Proliferation and Illegal Circulation of Small Arms (ComNat).

“These weapons are held illegally. They are easy to disassemble, hide and transport around,” said Adjoussou.

Arms in the 2011 crisis

During the post-election conflict, in which some 3,000 people were killed, weapons were looted from police stations and army barracks, contributing to the wide circulation of arms in the country.

Since the crisis, the country has been rocked by several armed attacks, which President Alassane Ouattara’s administration blames on supporters of his election opponent, Gbagbo.

Military bases, police stations and other targets came under attack in late 2012, both in the commercial capital, Abidjan, and in other regions. Those attacks, purportedly by supporters of Gbagbo, led to a government crackdown and alleged human rights abuses [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96612/COTE-D-IVOIRE-Crackdown-sparks-rights-abuse-allegations ].

Côte d’Ivoire’s western region also remains a tinderbox of ethnic-driven political rivalry and intractable land disputes. In March, at least 14 people were killed in raids near the Liberian border over the long-standing land and ethnic conflict.

“Many people are armed in the west of the country, especially the dangerous dozos,” said Sagues, referring to a group of traditional hunters who fought alongside Ouattara’s forces during the post-election crisis.

“They have traditional arms and AK-47 supplied by the authorities, and they use them to make arbitrary arrest or extort money,” said Sagues. In a February report, Amnesty International described the dozos as “a militia supported by the state.”

“There is a huge trafficking of arms and munitions in towns, villages … which goes on at times with the complicity of some security forces members,” said a recent ComNat report, referring to western Côte d’Ivoire.

The ComNat report said that “during the post-election crisis, everybody sought to protect him or herself and so everyone was armed. Weapons are now easily available, and acquiring one is simple.”

In Abidjan a firearm can be bought for between 30,000 and 50,000 CFA francs (US$60-100). In the country’s restive western region, an automatic pistol costs 10,000 francs ($20) and an AK-47 goes for 20,000 francs ($40), according to ComNat.

“There is a climate of fear that is pushing some people to withhold their weapons in case they would need to defend themselves,” Rinaldo Depagne, West Africa researcher for the International Crisis Group (ICG), told IRIN.

Disarmament

A former pro-Gbagbo fighter, who gave his name only as Noël, told IRIN that many ex-combatants are not yet ready to give up their arms because they are wary of the government, which has made several demands for general weapons surrender.

“They doubt [the government]. Their weapons are what reassure them, and they prefer to keep them close,” said Noël, explaining that he has buried his four firearms somewhere near his house in Abidjan.

“Many [of Gbagbo’s former fighters] say that if they show up to hand over their weapons, something may happen to them,” he added.

Disarmament efforts since the poll violence have so far borne few results. Some 2,800 people have surrendered weapons, around 1,900 different types of firearms and 1,850 grenades have been collected, said ComNat’s Adjoussou.

In a renewed push in 2012, the government formed the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Authority (ADDR), replacing six different disarmament bodies.

Some 64,500 ex-fighters are set to be disarmed, according to Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan, but the head of opposition group Lider, Mamadou Koulibaly, puts the figure at around 100,000.

Duncan also recently announced that 30,000 ex-combatants will be demobilized this year, with the majority set to be integrated in the private sector and others hired in the customs department or as prison guards.

Adjoussou said that some people have turned to theft with their weapons to survive.

“Disarmament cannot work until unemployment is tackled,” he said. He also urged the lifting of the arms embargo to enable the government deal with the insecurity. “How can we ensure security of the people and property with bare hands?”

In a January report [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A-HRC-22-66_en.pdf ], Doudou Diene, a UN independent expert and human rights specialist, also argued that Côte d’Ivoire’s insecurity warranted the lifting of the arms embargo.

“The fact that the security situation is weakened by the rise of a culture of violence and by repeated attempts to destabilize state security is justification for lifting the embargo and providing technical reinforcement to state security agencies on an urgent basis,” he said in the report.

But ICG’s Depagne warned, “Côte d’Ivoire still has a weak arms control mechanism to regulate new imports of weapons.”

om/ob

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97854/Côte-d-Ivoire-awash-in-weapons</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303211504560522t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ABIDJAN 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Côte d’Ivoire’s recent turbulence - including the ouster of president Henri Konan Bédié in 1999, a long-running insurgency and deadly poll unrest in 2011 - has left the country awash in arms, which have contributed to human rights abuses, widespread crime and persistent insecurity.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Moussa Ibrahim, detained in Mali: “They accused me of supporting the Islamists”</title><pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121355200048t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Moussa Ibrahim is a 40-year-old ethnic Songhai restaurant owner in the Malian town of Timbuktu. He was arrested in February of this year on suspicion of supporting Islamist group Ansar Dine, which had taken over much of the region in 2012.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Moussa Ibrahim is a 40-year-old ethnic Songhai restaurant owner in the Malian town of Timbuktu. He was arrested in February of this year on suspicion of supporting Islamist group Ansar Dine, which had taken over much of the region in 2012.

In March, he spoke to IRIN in the gendarmerie in Gao, where he was being held: 

“The day the French arrived in Timbuktu, I went into the street to celebrate. Finally we were free.

“It was only a couple of weeks later that the problems started. One day, the [Malian] soldiers came to my house to look for arms. They accused me of supporting the Islamists. When they couldn’t find any weapons or other evidence of my affiliations with Ansar Dine, they left, only to return the next day. Again, they accused me of supporting the Islamists and brought me in the camp.

“The soldiers sat me on the floor, together with the other prisoners. There were at least 20 men in the camp. They were between 20 and 60 years old. There were Malians, of course, but also Algerians, a guy from Burkina Faso and even one man from Niger. Some of them looked like they needed medical attention.

“All the time, we were tied together with handcuffs or turbans. We were tied for so long my hands went numb. We were forced to sit up, and the soldiers took pictures of us with their cell phone cameras.

“After one week, maybe more, in the camp - I lost track of the days - we were finally moved to the gendarmerie, where they told us we would be transferred to Bamako. We stayed in the gendarmerie for at least another week. I was questioned and the officers explained I was detained on suspicion I was assisting the Islamists. 

“I have a small restaurant on the outskirts of Timbuktu. The Islamists often ate there. In fact, they were my only customers after many people had fled. That’s probably why the soldiers believed I was cooperating with them. But I never accepted any money and refused to perform any services they asked me to do. 

“My family lives in a small village a couple of kilometres away from Timbuktu. They don’t know I’m here. In fact, they don’t know I was arrested. I’m worried for them and the restaurant. As soon as they release me - because they have to, I’m innocent - I will return to Timbuktu.”

kh/aj/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97844/Moussa-Ibrahim-detained-in-Mali-They-accused-me-of-supporting-the-Islamists</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121355200048t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Moussa Ibrahim is a 40-year-old ethnic Songhai restaurant owner in the Malian town of Timbuktu. He was arrested in February of this year on suspicion of supporting Islamist group Ansar Dine, which had taken over much of the region in 2012.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Torture, beatings and death for detained Malians</title><pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121349370081t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of northern Malians - many of them ethnic Tuaregs - have been detained by the Malian army since the French military intervention to oust Islamist groups from northern Mali began in January 2013. Many of the detainees have complained they had no idea why they were captured and were not given access to lawyers; others alleged torture.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of northern Malians - many of them ethnic Tuaregs - have been detained by the Malian army since the French military intervention to oust Islamist groups from northern Mali began in January 2013. Many of the detainees have complained they had no idea why they were captured and were not given access to lawyers; others alleged torture.

The ill-treatment may also have proven fatal: Two ethnic Tuareg men, arrested in February and allegedly tortured by Malian soldiers in the town of Léré, in Timbuktu Region, died of their injuries at the Central Prison in the capital, Bamako, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in a communique on 11 April. 

IRIN spoke to human rights groups, detainees, gendarmes and military officers to find out the status of conflict-related detainees. 

Documented abuses 

According to HRW, which had been following the case of the two Tuareg men, they had received some medical attention when they were being held at Gendarme Camp 1 in Bamako, but were then transferred to the Central Prison in late March.

The two were transferred to Gendarme Camp 1 in Bamako, where they received some medical attention, and were transferred to the Central Prison in Bamako in late March. 

“The men were in very bad shape. One of the men was repeatedly abused, suffering severe hematoma and possibly a broken rib. While detained by the army, he had been injected with a caustic substance,” said Corinne Dufka, a senior West Africa researcher at HRW.

“They did not receive the treatment they needed, and the previous torture and ill-treatment clearly contributed to their deaths.”

HRW had interviewed and documented the torture inflicted on a total of seven men. The organization said most of the abuses they documented were committed while the prisoners were still in military custody but stopped when they were transferred to the gendarmerie. 

“Detainees described being beaten and kicked, burned, injected with a caustic substance, and threatened with death while in army custody,” said Dufka. “Detainees were only randomly questioned, and often while tortured. One man described a treatment similar to water-boarding while held by rank-and-file soldiers.”

The seven men were taken to Markala, in Gao Region, where they were photographed with assault rifles, ammunition and other alleged proof of their association with armed groups. Most of them denied any such association and said the arms and other items were not theirs, though some admitted they had either fought for or assisted the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) or Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), according to Dufka.

None of the detained had seen a lawyer or knew the full extent of the charges against them. 

Detainees have also been subjected to mock-executions, according to local and international human rights groups, among them HRW, Amnesty International and the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH). 

How many detained?

Following the start of the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013, the Malian army arrested dozens of men all over the country on suspicion of supporting the Islamist groups that took control of the north in 2012. Most of the men were taken in central and northern Mali as Malian and French forces advanced north. 

Kadidia Sangare Coulibaly, president of CNDH, told IRIN the arrests accounted for the disappearances of many members of ethnic minority groups during the first weeks of the French-led intervention. 

“It is likely that some of these people, of whom we still have no news, were arrested on suspicion of supporting the Islamists,” she said.

The police in Gao and Bamako, state prosecutors and lawyers in Bamako, and humanitarian organizations with access to the detainees are all unable to say how many were arrested since the intervention.

A gendarme official in Gao said that as far as he knew, 300 people were arrested in Gao, 70 of whom were later transferred to the state prison in Bamako. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) says the countrywide figure is 300. 

State prosecutor Mohamed Dicko, in Bamako, said he had received 109 cases from the Bamako gendarmerie of arrests for aiding the armed Islamists groups, a number likely to increase as more detainees are transferred to the capital. 

“So far, 200 people have been arrested and transferred to the central prison in Bamako. Among them, 27 have been released,” Dicko said, noting 26 men were arrested by the French army.  

Some 45 detainees are being held by the MNLA, which is in control of parts of Kidal Region, according to Wolde Gabriel Saugeron, the ICRC spokesperson in Geneva.

Six of the people detained across the country are children whose cases are currently being followed by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), according to Dicko.

Fear of reprisals

Alasane, a Tuareg pastoralist from a small village just outside the town of Timbuktu, told IRIN over the phone, “I’ve heard about innocent people who were arrested, killed and thrown down wells. The victims mainly belonged to minority groups, and I knew it was a risk for me coming to the market.”

He withheld his last name out of fear of reprisals from government troops.

In March, when he heard the French army was working with the Malians, he decided to bring his animals to the market in a town close to where troops were fighting. 

“I had no choice. I needed the money to survive. A cow goes for 100,000-200,000 CFA (US$200-400). If I sell a few of them, I can make enough to provide for my family,” he said.

Coming back from the market, he was stopped and interrogated by a group of soldiers. He was later put in a cell with another prisoner, Moussa Ibrahim [ http://www.irinnews.org/HOV/97844/Moussa-Ibrahim-detained-in-Mali-They-accused-me-of-supporting-the-Islamists ]. Rather than being swiftly transferred to the gendarmerie in Timbuktu, the men remained with their military captors. Alasane was later released. 

ICRC has been able to visit detainees in central Bamako, Kidal, Mopti and Sévaré to monitor their treatment and conditions of detention, and to pass on messages to their families.

Discipline

Human rights groups have urged the gendarmerie to be present during all major round-ups of suspects, and to provide legal representation for the prisoners, sound investigations into their charges, and the right to compensation for those abused or robbed and to the families of those who died while in custody.

Likewise, military officers should more closely monitor their soldiers’ behaviour, said HRW. “A clear military hierarchy to ensure discipline in low-ranking soldiers is needed. We do not believe the abuse is systematic. Many people were also arrested without being abused,” said Dufka.

A lieutenant colonel in the army, who asked to remain anonymous, told IRIN, “The army has been systematically marginalized by political leaders over the past 30 years. We have lost our cohesion, our sense of discipline - arguably the foundation of a good army - and our morale.” 

Some of the alleged abuses that soldiers carried out were undertaken by bandits pretending to be soldiers, he told IRIN, but he noted, “The last time most of these soldiers received training in international human rights was 10 years ago.”

He confirmed that a commission has been set up to investigate allegations of abuse.

Col Didier Dacko, in Gao, told IRIN that when accusations of prisoner mistreatment emerge, the suspected soldiers are immediately transferred to Bamako, where staff investigate the allegations and decide whether the soldiers should be prosecuted. 

Thus far, six soldiers have been transferred to Bamako, according to the Ministry of Justice in Bamako.

kh/aj/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97845/Torture-beatings-and-death-for-detained-Malians</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121349370081t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of northern Malians - many of them ethnic Tuaregs - have been detained by the Malian army since the French military intervention to oust Islamist groups from northern Mali began in January 2013. Many of the detainees have complained they had no idea why they were captured and were not given access to lawyers; others alleged torture.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Hunger at crisis levels in northern Mali</title><pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304111627480243t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/SÉVARÉ 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hunger in Mali has reached crisis levels in the northern Kidal Region and has reached critical levels in Gao and Timbuktu regions, according to food security agencies and the government’s early warning body.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/SÉVARÉ 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hunger in Mali has reached crisis levels in the northern Kidal Region and has reached critical levels in Gao and Timbuktu regions, according to food security agencies and the government’s early warning body.

One in five households in Gao and Timbuktu are facing severe food shortages, while in Kidal one in five households faces severe malnutrition and increasing mortality. 

The situation is likely to worsen over the coming months as the lean season progresses, part of the usual seasonal deterioration in food security across the Sahel. 

So far, 28 percent of the US$139 million appeal for food security and 17 percent of the $73 million appeal for nutrition have been committed by donors. 

“The problem is that people are starting [the lean season] from an already highly deteriorated position. Assistance is not yet meeting needs, and even if security improves dramatically tomorrow it will take a long time for households to rebuild their livelihoods,” Cedric Charpentier, West Africa market specialist for the World Food Programme (WFP), told IRIN.

In January, donors pledged $455 million to the African-lead international force in Mali, leaving some to fear the situation in northern Mali could be seen through a politico-military lens that overlooks the chronic vulnerability of ordinary Malians. 

“There is very strong political will to intervene in northern Mali,” said Frank Abeille, head of the NGO Solidarités Internationale in Mali, which is operating across the north. “What we need is to see a motivation that can also adapt to the reality on the ground: the real needs are humanitarian, not military.” 

Near-empty markets

Markets are still near-empty in Gao town and surrounding villages, and cereal prices are up by between 30 and 70 percent, according to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). The closed Algeria border and the flight of the majority of Arab and Tuareg traders in both Gao and Timbuktu have made products like pasta, oil, rice and sugar scarce.

While large cereal markets continue to function, smaller village-level markets have shut down, leaving rural communities and small traders - many of them women - destitute, according to Sally Haydock, Mali’s WFP head. The availability of staple grains, sorghum, millet and corn is better than in February but still far from healthy, according to food aid analysts. 

“We cannot say people are starving yet, but they are not eating as they should,” said Oumar Hama Sangho, a Gao resident who has just finished assessing food security in the area.

“You go to the market, there is no fruit, no vegetables, meat or fish… There is only rice, millet and corn - mainly donated by the government or internationals. Old and young are surviving on these cereals, but it is not enough.” 

Mahamane Touré, coordinator of the German NGO Agro Action in Timbuktu, told IRIN insecurity prevented many women from planting their market gardens this year, so they have little to fall back on. “I have met many families who eat just one meal - of cereals - a day,” he told IRIN. 

Banking systems in Gao and Timbuktu have also been largely shut down since mid-2012, making large-scale transactions impossible. This has led suppliers to refrain from large deals.

While security has improved in much of Gao and Timbuktu, widespread acts of criminality and banditry on transit roads and on the outskirts of towns are also disrupting food markets. 

In Kidal Region, both food and non-food items are largely unavailable in markets or are for sale at prices out of reach for the poorest people, said several NGOs. Kidal residents are highly dependent on markets, as they do not produce much of their own grain. 

“The region is already very fragile,” said Wolde Gabrielle Saugeron, spokesperson for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). “People lack seeds to plant this year, and planting will be even more difficult for the displaced, while for herders, the lack of livestock services will pose severe problems.” [  http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97799/Mounting-crisis-for-conflict-hit-northern-Mali-pastoralists ]

“The situation changes daily and remains unstable across the north,” he added.

ICRC is providing food to 30,000 people in Kidal - about one-third of them displaced - and is providing water to people in Kidal town. Doctors of the World (MDM) is providing healthcare and nutrition assistance. 

IDPs share rations

Many internally displaced people (IDPs) who spoke to IRIN in the central town of Sévaré said they were sending part of their monthly WFP food rations back home to family remaining in the north.

Ahmed Maiga, an IDP at the “La Maison des chauffeurs” makeshift camp in Sévaré, had recently returned from his home in Gao to check up on family members there. “I came back because life is too difficult there - the markets don’t exist. The shops are empty. Everything we had was looted… We send a large part of our monthly rations back home to the rest of our family,” he told IRIN.

WFP has delivered food to 90,000 Malians in the north so far this year, working through international NGO partners, and is looking to scale-up its deliveries, but access remains a concern. 

“One of our top concerns is for humanitarian access to be re-established. This would allow WFP to reopen its offices in order to assist a larger caseload and for our partners to operate fully,” said Haydock.

A number of NGOs - Médecins sans Frontières, MDM, Action against Hunger (ACF) and Solidarités - have been running nutrition and other programmes in the north since 2012. They say gaining humanitarian access through negotiations with non-state armed groups was not too difficult in 2012, but access is now more problematic because of the absence of administrative authorities and the lack of a clear military chain of command. 

ACF is helping moderately and severely malnourished children in Gao, Bourem and Ansongo, and plans to soon provide blanket feeding for up to 30,000 children under two years old. The agency is trying to figure out how to buy goods from local traders in order to support local businesses. 

Countrywide, the number of Malians at risk of critical hunger this year is estimated to be 2 million, and 660,000 children under age five are at risk of severe malnutrition, though this latter estimate is based on figures from a 2011 survey [ http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R32sum_A985___10_April_2013_(15_02).pdf ].

ACF head Franck Vannetelle told IRIN its caseload of malnourished children has gone up in recent days, but this could also be linked to the fact that its mobile teams are again running, enabling the organization to identify more at-risk children. 

WFP is scaling-up cash transfers for the south and is considering them for the north as well, but the pre-conditions - availability of food in markets, return of traders, re-opened trade routes, functional banks and better security - are not currently in place.

More detailed evaluations of food security in the north should take place soon. But obtaining information from health centres, families, market traders, officials, local NGOs, transporters and others and finding qualified staff who can undertake detailed, qualitative analyses of vulnerability and hunger remain challenging in the north.

aj/sd/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97834/Hunger-at-crisis-levels-in-northern-Mali</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304111627480243t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/SÉVARÉ 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hunger in Mali has reached crisis levels in the northern Kidal Region and has reached critical levels in Gao and Timbuktu regions, according to food security agencies and the government’s early warning body.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Regional insecurity adding to Chad&apos;s humanitarian needs</title><pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121513560373t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Chad is grappling with an influx of refugees and returnees into its south-eastern regions, mainly from neighbouring Sudan, and others from the Central African Republic (CAR) following a series of inter-ethnic clashes in Darfur and a recent coup in the CAR, respectively.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Chad is grappling with an influx of refugees and returnees into its south-eastern regions, mainly from neighbouring Sudan, and others from the Central African Republic (CAR) following a series of inter-ethnic clashes [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97434/Call-for-humanitarian-access-after-clashes-in-North-Darfur ] in Darfur and a recent coup [ http://www.irinnews.orgwww.irinnews.org/Report/97721/CAR-coup-amid-humanitarian-crisis ] in the CAR, respectively.

At least 74,000 people have fled into Chad from Darfur in the past two months, 50,000 of them in the past week alone, sparking the largest influx of refugees from Sudan into Chad since 2005, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) [ http://www.unhcr.org/5167e1366.html ].

Waves of refugees

In March, the first wave of 24,000 people fled from Darfur and arrived in Tissi, a remote area in Chad’s southeastern Sila Region; 8,000 were Sudanese and 16,000 Chadians. Most of them are women and children.

"Under every tree, there are women and children who are trying to protect themselves from sunshine," Abdellahi Ould El Bah, a UNHCR programme officer on mission in Tissi, told IRIN.

UNHCR staff on the ground say they “found women and children very scared, exhausted with haggard eyes”.

In Tissi, basic amenities are lacking.

“People lack everything and are living in very dire conditions. They need food, water and shelter. People are obliged to drink water from the river,” Aminata Gueye, the UNHCR representative in Chad, told IRIN. “Those who are wounded need healthcare, while health centres or clinics in Tissi [are] not functional.”

Access to Tissi by air is impossible, meaning aid workers have to spend eight hours by road, and they have to cross 21 wadis (seasonal rivers).

With insecurity rife, more refugees are expected. "We fear a new wave of refugees in the next few days, as there are reports of continuing violence on the side of Darfur," said Gueye.

Most recently, clashes have been recorded between the Misseriya and Salamat ethnic groups in Um Dukhum, Darfur, with dozens of deaths reported.

On 12 April, UNHCR started the relocation of at least 8,000 Sudanese refugees from Tissi, to the Goz Amir and Djabal refugee camps in Sila Region. The relocation is expected to help in the provision of assistance to the new arrivals and to improve their security.

Local authorities have provided some 100 ton of food for the new arrivals, with UNHCR and partners coordinating efforts to provide emergency assistance in Tissi.

Refugee population already large

The new refugee influx constitutes a huge challenge for UNHCR, which was already facing limited resources as it provided protection and assistance to the large numbers of refugees in Chad. Months earlier, UNHCR and the governments of Chad and Sudan had started discussions on the return of Sudanese refugees to Darfur.

Eastern Chad is already home to about 300,000 refugees from Darfur [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95863/SUDAN-CHAD-The-strains-of-long-term-displacement ] and thousands of others from CAR. Chad has, since December 2012, received at least 4,000 new refugees from CAR, in addition to some 65,000 already there, according to a 6 April update [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Central%20African%20Republic%20Humanitarian%20snapshot.pdf ] by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Besides the new refugees, Chad is also grappling with the returns of hundreds of Chadian migrants released from detention centres in Libya [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97617/Chadian-migrants-rue-Libyan-detention-ill-treatment-deportation ].

“It is with great concern that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is monitoring the multiple migration crises currently developing along the Chadian borders. IOM is already responding to the influx of 1,200 extremely vulnerable Chadian migrants returning to Chad after having been released from detention centres in Libya.

“At the same [time], IOM is in the process of providing life-saving assistance, including homeward transportation, to over 17,000 Chadian migrants, [that] are fleeing the intercommunity violence in Sudan, that are arriving in remote border towns in Chad without means to support themselves,” Qasim Sufi, IOM chief of mission in Chad, told IRIN.

Measles outbreak

Medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is treating the wounded in Tissi, with serious cases being referred to the towns of Goz Beida or Abéché.

At the same time, teams are trying to contend with an outbreak of measles in a nearby area: “In Saraf Bourgou only, our team has confirmed 35 cases of measles, which represents 25 percent of consultations,” said Alexandre Morhain, MSF’s head of mission in Chad [ http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=6719&cat=field-news ]. “The disease has already killed seven children, five of whom were under five years old.”

An emergency measles vaccination campaign is expected to be launched in Tissi, with severe acute malnutrition cases and paediatric emergencies also being treated.

According to MSF, the situation of the refugees there is precarious as the rains approach. “We need to act now, because within two months it will be impossible to access this area by road.”

aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97840/Regional-insecurity-adding-to-Chad-apos-s-humanitarian-needs</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121513560373t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Chad is grappling with an influx of refugees and returnees into its south-eastern regions, mainly from neighbouring Sudan, and others from the Central African Republic (CAR) following a series of inter-ethnic clashes in Darfur and a recent coup in the CAR, respectively.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Can Niger offer Mali lessons on the Tuareg?</title><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281140270935t.jpg" />]]>NIAMEY 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - The conflict that erupted in Mali in early 2012 brought to the surface a long history of rebellions and autonomy demands by the Tuareg. But the Tuareg in neighbouring Niger appear to have more stable ties with the government there. Does Niger’s experience hold any lessons for Bamako?</description><body><![CDATA[NIAMEY 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - The conflict that erupted in Mali in early 2012 brought to the surface a long history of rebellions and autonomy demands by the Tuareg. But the Tuareg in neighbouring Niger appear to have more stable ties with the government there. Does Niger’s experience hold any lessons for Bamako?

The Tuareg’s post-colonial history in both Mali and Niger is marked by a series of uprisings over perceived neglect and marginalization by the central government, as well as grievances over failures to fully implement peace agreements.

Three years after Mali’s 1960 independence from France, the Tuareg launched a rebellion that was crushed by the army, but more uprisings followed in the 1990s, and in 2006, 2008 and 2012, despite the signing of a key peace agreement in 1992. Mali’s latest crisis began with a coup executed by disgruntled troops who blamed the government for failing to handle a fresh Tuareg insurgency.

Niger was similarly rattled by Tuareg rebellions in the 1990s and in 2007. Niger signed a peace accord with the Tuareg in 1995.

But while the Tuareg demands for political and social inclusion and for physical and economic development are broadly similar in both Mali and Niger, the geographic, demographic and political circumstances are quite different.

Determined to keep peace

“The government in Niger is certainly making much more of an effort to at least appear conciliatory. You [also] have a more concerted effort by the northern Niger Tuareg to try to negotiate,” said Andrew Lebovich, Sahel consultant and researcher with the Dakar-based Open Society Initiative for West Africa.

Mohamed Ag Ewangaye, a director at Niger’s High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP), says that although the peace accords are far from being fully implemented and the conditions that fuelled past conflict still exist, the Tuareg in Niger are determined to achieve peace.

“The causes of the revolt remain. The enforcement of the peace agreements is far from successful,” Ewangaye, himself a Tuareg, told IRIN.

“If we were to always get into the details regarding the government’s attitude… if we were to always get involved in recriminations, there would be no peace. You must at one point stop to give peace a chance and reconstruct bit by bit because it is a long-term endeavour,” Ewangaye said.

Unlike the Tuareg in Mali, who are concentrated in the north, those in Niger are spread across the territory, a factor that has helped blunt irredentism.

“The Tuareg in Niger are not confined in a single region, so there can be no secessionist demands like in Mali,” said Ewangaye.

“Tuareg culture permeates more [of] the Nigerien society. Tuareg are spread out over most of Niger, which you don’t have in Mali. All of Niger is like northern Mali in the way the population is distributed,” noted Lebovich.

Tuareg rebellions in the 1990s also had very different effects: the rebellion in Mali pitted the Tuareg against other communities and complicated efforts to reach peace, while in Niger the conflict ended up fractionalizing the Tuareg, said Yvan Guichaoua, a lecturer at the University of East Anglia.

Peace agreements not implemented

Nonetheless, long-term stability among the Tuareg populations in both Mali and Niger has been undermined by the partial implementation of peace agreements and, recently, by the presence of radical Al Qaeda-linked groups in the region. (The presence of these groups has altered governments’ security policies and dealings with the Tuareg movements, some of which have been accused of ties with Al Qaeda, observers say.)

“The peace agreements were pretty similar in both Mali and Niger: economic development, military reforms, and integration and decentralization. But they didn't work well and there was a resumption of violence in 2007 in Niger and in 2006 in Mali,” said Guichaoua.

But Mali and Niger had different responses after these rebellions ended.

In northern Mali, a security programme called PSPSDN (Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement du Nord Mali) was launched in 2011, based on the idea that security would spur development. But because the army was loathed in the region, the programme simply stirred anger.

“Bamako has performed worse [than Niger] because it explicitly adopted a security agenda and forgot the [development] measures of Pacte National [the 1992 peace treaty],” said Guichaoua.

On the other hand, Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou has appointed members of the Tuareg community, such as politician Brigi Rafini, to key government positions in a bid to assuage feelings of neglect. “That is a short-term strategy. The long-term is to revive the three-pronged [peace agreement] policy,” he explained.

“In the two countries, the [peace] policies were not fully implemented, but in Mali it was pushed aside by a security agenda embodied in the PSPSDN, and in the case of Niger there were no structural changes either but a sort of savvier approach to the resolve the crisis,” Guichaoua told IRIN.

Changing method of struggle

Tuareg leaders in Mali and Niger have also had very different influences on their respective countries.

After agreeing to end hostilities in the late 2000s for instance, Malian Tuareg rebel commander Ibrahim Bahanga did not give up arms. But in Niger, Tuareg leaders more or less accepted the deals brokered by Libya’s then-leader, Muammar Gaddafi, which included disarmament, said Guichoua.

HACP’s Ewangaye said the struggle of the Nigerien Tuareg has continued but the means have changed.

“The armed struggle was one stage of protesting against the state of affairs. The peace accord is another step to begin a new national reconstruction. The reasons for the uprising still exist, but the method of struggle has changed,” he said.

ob/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97823/Can-Niger-offer-Mali-lessons-on-the-Tuareg</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281140270935t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NIAMEY 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - The conflict that erupted in Mali in early 2012 brought to the surface a long history of rebellions and autonomy demands by the Tuareg. But the Tuareg in neighbouring Niger appear to have more stable ties with the government there. Does Niger’s experience hold any lessons for Bamako?</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>