<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Urban Risk</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 18 May 2013 07:33:58 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>The making of the Hyogo2 disaster prevention treaty</title><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301111208550461t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - A month after the Indian Ocean tsunami struck in December 2004, affecting millions, 168 countries signed on to a 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural hazards. Yet the plan, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015, focused primarily on “what to do to prevent disasters, but not enough on how to implement it,” says Neil McFarlane, chief coordinator and head of all regional programmes at the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR).</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - A month after the Indian Ocean tsunami struck in December 2004, affecting millions, 168 countries signed on to a 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural hazards. Yet the plan, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015, focused primarily on “what to do to prevent disasters, but not enough on how to implement it,” says Neil McFarlane, chief coordinator and head of all regional programmes at the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). 

Countries have since begun discussing [ http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=32535 ] what a follow-up action plan, the Hyogo Framework for Action 2 (HFA2), should look like. The results of these talks, a sketch of the HFA2, will be presented at the Fourth Session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, which begins in Geneva on 19 May [ http://www.preventionweb.net/globalplatform/2013/about ].

A draft will be finalized towards the end of 2014, for consideration and adoption at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Japan in 2015. 

The HFA2 will need to take on a number of emerging risks and concerns. While the HFA has helped countries reduce the loss of human lives, the economic consequences of natural disasters have continued to rise. For three consecutive years, natural hazards have cost the world more than US$100 billion a year, according to data from the Brussels-based Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) released in March 2013 [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97655/Tallying-natural-disaster-related-losses ].

Additionally, disaster risks are changing: The effects of the changing climate are expected to prompt more intense and frequent extreme natural events, including floods, droughts and cyclones. Urban populations are growing, as is demand for food, ratcheting up pressure on resources like land and water. 

Accountability 

In tackling the HFA2, experts are discussing how to improve accountability. "We have a framework with options to develop good disaster plans in the Hyogo, but how do we make governments, agencies… ensure it is implemented?" Tom Mitchell, head of the climate change programme at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), told IRIN. 

Mitchell says one of the major weaknesses of the HFA is its failure to ensure that "well-crafted" disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies were actually implemented. The agreement is voluntary, and there are no penalties for failing to put in place measures to protect citizens. 

"Because it [HFA] is voluntary, we have to ask how… effective it can be," remarked Frank Thomalla, senior research fellow with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) in Asia. 

Some question whether the world should consider a legal disaster-prevention treaty with a provision for penalties. 

The new plan’s timing is significant for the global community; 2015 also marks the end of the Millennium Development Goals and possibly the implementation of new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are still under discussion. A new agreement on addressing and adapting to climate change is also likely to be put into place around that time. Aid agencies and think tanks are all calling on the global community to consider the synergies among these policy-shaping developments. 

Many observers now question whether DRR policies should become a part of the legal climate deal, which might ensure their implementation. Countries’ DRR activities are increasingly considered part of their climate change adaptation plans, and are being funded as such. 

But there is no appetite for a legal treaty on DRR, says UNISDR's McFarlane. 

Harjeet Singh, ActionAid's international coordinator for DRR and climate change adaptation (CAA), says he is uncertain if a legal treaty “will bring about a dramatic change… After all, we have seen how [the UN’s] climate convention (UNFCCC) … failed to deliver in the last 20 years." 

Besides, the climate change deal will not consider geophysical events such as earthquakes and other triggers of potential disasters unrelated to climate, he added. 

That fact, plus the range of social and economic factors contributing to disaster risk, calls into question the rationale for viewing DRR, CCA and development from a purely climatological perspective, SEI's Thomalla told IRIN in an email. 

But the Cancun Adaptation Framework adopted by countries at the UNFCCC talks in Mexico in 2010 urges countries to implement the HFA, so it does make it a part of a stronger commitment linked to climate change says UNISDR's MacFarlane. 

Taking measurements 

Under the HFA, countries are required to report on how far they have complied with implementing DRR strategies and policies. But how "reliable is this data?" asked Thomalla. "How much opportunity is there for governments to 'manipulate' the information in order to be seen to be doing something?” 

For instance, a country might report to the HFA that it has established an early warning system to reduce hazard vulnerability. “But how can we be sure that the system works…? That people know how to respond to the warnings?” Thomalla said. 

There is no proper baseline at the start of HFA, nor are there specific targets for countries to follow, said Singh. 

"Targets and milestones for implementation should... be relevant and realistic for each country and agreed on through multi-stakeholder consultations," noted Mitchell in a briefing paper co-authored with colleague Emily Wilkinson [ http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/6663-disaster-risk-management-sustainable-development-policy-post2015 ].

McFarlane and Mitchell suggest the development of a peer-review mechanism, which is just taking off in some developed countries, could be an effective way to ensure countries comply. 

UNISDR Chief Margareta Wahlstrom said there has been a change in mindset since HFA: “The most visible signs of this change are summarized by the facts that 121 countries have enacted legislation aimed at reducing the potential impact of disasters, and 56 countries have national disaster-loss databases, which illustrates the growing recognition that you cannot manage risk management if you are not measuring your disaster losses." 

Mitchell’s ODI briefing paper also suggests "a human rights approach, in which countries fulfil obligations to respect, protect and fulfil basic human rights, including the 'right to safety' of vulnerable people exposed to hazards." 

This suggestion has support. Singh says, “Legislation to ensure safety and security of people is a good first step.” But it has to be implemented effectively all the way down to the community level, and must take into account the voices of the poor and women, he added. 

Thomalla says a rights-based approach would be a good way to address DRR "because many of the drivers of vulnerability result from inequality and marginalization, meaning certain regions and social groups are more vulnerable to hazards than others and are more strongly affected by the impacts.” 

But, again, creating global legislation could be problematic, he noted. "Monitoring and enforcement will also be difficult. Rich countries must come forward to provide resources and transfer skills to developing countries to reduce disaster risks." 

Resilience is key 

Most experts pin their hopes on the new-found interest in "building resilience". Resilience [ http://www.irinnews.org/In-Depth/97584/105/ ] is billed as a concept that will better link development, DRR and CCA by bringing the humanitarian aid community, which deals with disasters, closer together with development agencies. A focus on resilience might also help push for the implementation of DRR plans and promote funding. 

“The current separation of what is mainly [a] humanitarian response to disasters, through DRR and CCA, from business-as-usual development funding no longer makes sense," said Thomalla. 

In fact, disasters routinely reverse development gains. For example, floods in Thailand in 2012 cost three percent of the country’s annual GDP, affected education and caused the loss of vulnerable families’ household assets. 

“New development goals must factor in risk, whereby all goals, to the extent possible, are risk- informed,” said Antony Spalton, the DRR specialist with the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). "Given the significance of the risks posed by climate change, fragility and conflict, a post-2015 framework that better draws together DRR, climate change adaptation and conflict prevention/peace building under a goal or target for resilience could be considered.” 

UNISDR has already drafted a resilience-based disaster plan for the post-2015 development agenda, the Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience. It calls for an assurance that “DRR for resilience” is central to post-2015 development agreements and targets. It calls for timely, coordinated and high-quality assistance to countries where disaster losses pose a threat to development, and for making DRR a priority for UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies. 

Singh says countries "should develop a comprehensive resilience strategy rather than a piecemeal …strategy, when ‘pushed’ by donors.” 

Building resilience to a range of changes and risks does make sense, according to Thomalla. But we have a long way to go. 

"While we have made a lot of progress in thinking about resilience as a unifying concept, we need to strengthen our methods and tools to help… develop the institutions and governance structures that enhance resilience and enable them to measure and demonstrate success," he said. 

Ultimately, Singh says, "it all depends on the willingness of country governments to take concrete steps from local to national levels and enhance [the] resilience of poor and vulnerable communities." 

McFarlane says there are lots of ideas and suggestions on the table. Stay tuned. 

jk/rz 

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98058/The-making-of-the-Hyogo2-disaster-prevention-treaty</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301111208550461t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - A month after the Indian Ocean tsunami struck in December 2004, affecting millions, 168 countries signed on to a 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural hazards. Yet the plan, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015, focused primarily on “what to do to prevent disasters, but not enough on how to implement it,” says Neil McFarlane, chief coordinator and head of all regional programmes at the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR).</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The price of fear</title><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200801305t.jpg" />]]>RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In slums where killings, rape, kidnappings and other criminal violence are commonplace, say researchers, lives and livelihoods are hampered by a force that is tough to measure: Fear.</description><body><![CDATA[RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In slums where killings, rape, kidnappings and other criminal violence are commonplace, say researchers, lives and livelihoods are hampered by a force that is tough to measure: Fear.

“We talk about homicide rates and deaths. Fear is a huge part of the protection mandate, and we don’t measure it well,” said Ronak Patel, director of the urbanization and crises programme at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. He said surveys in recent years in slums in the Kenyan capital Nairobi - in a “non-crisis” peacetime setting - showed that 34 percent of people altered their daily activities for fear of violence and a quarter felt afraid in their own homes.

“This doesn’t get measured like mortality rates or rape incidence, but it has a huge impact that the humanitarian community needs to address.” For example this fear affects a woman’s ability to access a market, a prospective workplace or health care, he said.

Carlos Vilalta, professor and researcher at the Center for Economic Research and Education in Mexico City, at a recent conference [ http://hasow.org/Seminarios/Index/1 ] presented preliminary findings from research under way in Mexico.

Based on government survey data, he estimates that in 2010 it cost a family driven from home by fear of gang violence about US$611 to relocate, where the average monthly income was about $800. Very few studies into the fear of crime exist: it is an area that needs more attention, Vilalta said.

“Governments and particularly the police are obviously working very hard in fighting crime. However they seem to forget that fear of crime is also an issue for civil society and a matter of criminal policy.”

He said the premise that reducing crime will automatically reduce the sense of insecurity is false: “Mexico today has a lower crime rate than in the 1990s and, ironically, fear of crime is much higher.”

The European Commission’s humanitarian aid department, ECHO, says that in Central America, fear of organized violence is a constant.

“A frequent scenario is that people first escape inside the country, trying to seek refuge with family or friends, but are then localized by their aggressors and decide to leave the country,” ECHO said in its 2013 humanitarian implementation plan [ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2013/HIPs/central_america_en.pdf ] for the region.

A recent report [ http://www.cidehum.sitew.com/fs/Root/8svj6-Informe_CIDEHUM_Desplazados.pdf ] (Spanish) by the Costa Rica-based International Centre for the Human Rights of Migrants (CIDEHUM ) confirmed that organized crime is driving the displacement of populations in Central America.

Overlooked

The UN Refugee Agency, which commissioned the CIDEHUM study, three years ago issued guidance [ http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4bb21fa02 ] for assessing whether victims of gang violence may be eligible for international protection. For now in Central America the human impact is largely overlooked, UNHCR said.

“While organized crime is being dealt with from a security angle, such as crime prevention and response, little attention has so far been paid to the impact of this phenomenon from a humanitarian and protection perspective,” the agency said in a February 2013 paper [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/UNHCR_Overview_Americas.pdf ].

The 1951 Refugee Convention does, however, recognize the concept of fear: it defines refugees as individuals with a genuine fear of persecution, not people who have necessarily experienced persecution.

Still, Javier Rio Navarro, Médecins Sans Frontières operational adviser in Mexico and Central America, says emigrants from Mexico or Central America are generally regarded as economic migrants.

"This is no longer applicable to all of them. A significant number of them are survival migrants, or displaced, or as they would be called anywhere else in the world - refugees."

np/ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98039/The-price-of-fear</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200801305t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In slums where killings, rape, kidnappings and other criminal violence are commonplace, say researchers, lives and livelihoods are hampered by a force that is tough to measure: Fear.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Humanitarian intervention in violence-hit slums - from whether to how</title><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200801304t.jpg" />]]>RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In a move that experts say could open the door to a more robust aid response to chronic violence in urban areas, the European Commission’s humanitarian aid arm, ECHO, has approved 2 million euro in funding for interventions in cases of violence outside of conventional war in Central America and Mexico until the end of 2014. If large-scale aid work in so-called &apos;other situations of violence&apos; is the way of the future, there are certain things humanitarian workers will have to keep in mind.</description><body><![CDATA[RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In a move that experts say could open the door to a more robust aid response to chronic violence in urban areas, the European Commission’s humanitarian aid arm, ECHO, has approved two million euros in funding for violence-hit slums in Central America and Mexico until the end of 2014.

The world’s 10 most violent cities in 2012 were in Latin America, according to a study [ http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/sala-de-prensa/759-san-pedro-sula-otra-vez-la-ciudad-mas-violenta-del-mundo-acapulco-la-segunda ] (Spanish) by the Mexico-based Citizens’ Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice; and Latin America is considered the part of the world where slum residents are most heavily burdened by organized crime and violence not linked to traditional armed conflict. But as more and more cities see rapid and often haphazard urbanization, experts say other parts of the world could increasingly face similar challenges.

If large-scale aid work in so-called “other situations of violence” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97188/Urban-violence-new-territory-for-aid-workers ] is the way of the future, there are certain things humanitarian workers will have to keep in mind.

“It’s particularly true in situations of urban violence but it's true with urban issues in general - they are a real and significant challenge to the existing model of humanitarian action,” Paul Knox Clarke, head of research and communications at the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), told IRIN.

ALNAP is putting together a “lessons learned” paper drawing from the handful of cases where humanitarian agencies have intervened in slums hit by violence.

In the meantime, here are a few strategies:

Go beyond basic needs

As one of Rio de Janeiro’s notoriously violent slums prepared for the April opening of a visual arts centre, some people asked why a slum would possibly need such a thing.

“It’s wrong to see a favela as solely a bundle of scarcity,” says Jailson de Souza e Silva, associate professor at Universidade Federal Fluminense and head of Brazil’s Observatório de Favelas [ http://observatoriodefavelas.org.br/en/ ] (the Slums Observatory).

While many slum communities are poor, that does not define them.

“In these areas you have deprivation of basic rights, but you have a very active social fabric,” said Adriano Campolina, head of ActionAid in Brazil. Such communities can be seen as very weak and humanitarians might misguidedly focus only on the most basic of needs - shelter, food, emergency care, Campolina told IRIN on the sidelines of a conference in Rio [ http://hasow.org/Seminarios/Index/1 ].

“Depending on the way [a humanitarian agency intervenes], if you focus only on this and you don’t appreciate that the community’s struggle is for the full range of rights as a citizen, you risk undermining these people.”

Build on existing community responses

Humanitarian aid in already marginalized slum communities could further stigmatize residents, ActionAid’s Campolina said. “The people in these communities have over the years built their own ways of mobilizing, organizing, and negotiating. If you ignore that and you just dump humanitarian aid, you may actually further ostracize the people.”

Robert Muggah, professor at the Institute of International Relations at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and research director at Igarapé Institute, a Rio-based think tank [ http://pt.igarape.org.br/ ], says humanitarian actors with their “quick-in and quick-out mentalities” could undermine local forms of resilience and response.

He says city dwellers are dependent on services to ensure their livelihoods in ways the rural poor are not. “The rapid distribution of aid can unintentionally disrupt their networks and associations, often in dangerous ways. [Humanitarian action here] will require a high degree of sensitivity to local realities, willingness to work through community partnerships, and a considerable level of situation awareness.”

Understand local dynamics - even more so

At the conference, hosted by HASOW (Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War) [ http://hasow.org/ ], discussions about Brazil’s slums pointed out the importance of understanding what Harvard Humanitarian Initiative's Ronak Patel called slums’ “small-p politics”: power relationships among various groups; factors determining identity and status; and interplay among residents, authorities, and armed groups [ http://hhi.harvard.edu/programs-and-research/urbanization-and-humanitarian-emergencies ].

Aid experts say while an understanding of the local context is important in any humanitarian intervention, it is that much more critical - and complicated - in violence-hit slums.

“This is going to make the difference between a relevant and valid operation and something you're doing completely blindly,” said Vicente Raimundo, rapid response coordinator with ECHO’s office for Latin America & the Caribbean. “What is going on in El Salvador, for example, has little resemblance to what's going on in Honduras or in Guatemala. `Other situations of violence’ is a regional phenomenon that has a lot of local characteristics.”

But the complexity of the local context is no reason for humanitarian aid agencies to stay away, says Javier Rio Navarro, Médecins Sans Frontières operational adviser in Mexico and Central America.

“During any intervention, there is the need to understand the actors and the context to be responsible in the way you interact,” Navarro told IRIN. “Yes, working in urban settings is different from working in the bush. In the bush it's you and your patients. In these urban settings you've got a much wider range of actors - also a wider set of perpetrators of violence. This makes things more complicated, but does not fundamentally change our function and mission and should not turn violent urban settings into no-go areas for humanitarians.”

Be extra meticulous in targeting

The fairly narrow targeting typical of humanitarian interventions would not be suitable for most urban areas, particularly where violence has taken hold, says François Grünewald, executive director of the France-based research, training and evaluation group, Urgence, Réhabilitation et Développement (Groupe URD).

“In these urban societies where you have violence, people do not survive on their own,” he said. “They belong to networks - be they gangs, age groups, neighbourhood cliques. But if you get stigmatized because you’re targeted by a humanitarian agency, you’ve got to choose between being part of that targeted group or part of your network. And this is sometimes a choice between life and death.”

Stigmatization can be for reasons as simple as being “singled out” as a recipient of aid, in ways others in your network have not been.

Grünewald says he finds it “both fascinating and terrifying” how little interest there seems to be in the humanitarian aid and donor community for the kind of anthropological study required to understand these dynamics. He says getting to know the sociological and anthropological setting is a vital operational issue.

Be wary of your mandate - and your expertise

Many aid experts say the debate over intervening in such settings is shifting from whether to how. Still there are more questions than answers, including the applicability of international humanitarian law.

Some observers say such engagement by humanitarian agencies is mandate creep. For international affairs and political science professor Michael Barnett, author of Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, international humanitarian agencies should limit themselves to their terrain: emergencies. Even if international agencies could base their operations in violent cities in a legal framework, he said, it is better to fund local agencies - “those who know the terrain, not outsiders.” [ http://elliott.gwu.edu/research/books/books11.cfm#barnett ]

“What possible role could outsiders provide in terms of advancing the situation on the ground that locals couldn’t do? Perhaps there’s the neutrality aspect, but not operationally… I don’t think they [international NGOs] bring anything to the table. In urban settings - [there is a] clear role for humanitarians in assisting refugees or in natural disasters - beyond that, no.”

He acknowledged that the definition of humanitarianism has been stretched in recent decades. “But one of the things that has made humanitarian action effective is that it worked in emergency settings... Violence in urban settings is a classical human rights and development situation.”

Some agencies and donors, including ECHO, say uncertainty about the legal framework does not bar them from acting.

“We focus on the humanitarian consequences, on humanitarian needs, regardless of the causes,” ECHO’s Raimundo told IRIN. “If there are proven, unmet needs then there is a basis to act.”

For more, see IRIN’s piece on how fear of urban violence [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98039/The-price-of-fear ] is creating humanitarian need. 

np/ha/cb


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Does IHL apply? 

International humanitarian law (IHL), which gives civilians affected by conflict the right to humanitarian assistance, applies in situations deemed international or non-international armed conflicts. Traditionally, this has not been interpreted to include urban gang violence. But this may be beginning to change. 

Ronak Patel, director of urbanization and crises program, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative: 

“More and more, in these `other situations of violence’, we’ll move away from IHL because they won’t be international conflicts. Even to call them `non-international armed conflicts’ we have to meet the two criteria - organization and intensity. In many cases the intensity is clearly there; these are areas that look very much like war. Organization is much more difficult. No longer is it one or two large paramilitary forces fighting the state; it’s a multiplicity of actors - some very weak, others very organized. But attempting to call these `non-international armed conflicts’ so we can apply IHL and engage as humanitarians doesn’t work very well.

“Some have promoted a case-by-case approach; to me this seems very unwieldy but it might be all we have right now and this is an area that needs a lot of work; we’re lacking a legal framework for this kind of intervention.

“The diversity of armed actors makes application of some of the traditional methods of engaging them with IHL very difficult - e.g. teaching them about neutrality, teaching them to stockpile weapons, to minimize effects on citizens. Because they’re so many and so diverse, it’s difficult; even if leaders of many groups agree with these principles there’s no guarantee that this can be commanded all the way down the line.”

Robert Muggah, professor at the Institute of International Relations at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and research director at Igarapé Institute:

“From an international relations perspective, the question of whether or not to apply IHL or to intervene in a city like Rio is an extraordinarily sensitive one for governments. The declaration of war, the determination of armed conflict, or the introduction of IHL has dramatic implications for everything - from notions of sovereignty, notions of the right to intervene, all the way to credit ratings, to tourism and even national pride and prestige. Even so, it is interesting that for most cities HASOW covers - Rio, Medellin, Ciudad Juarez, and Port-au-Prince - most municipal public officials, elected or otherwise, have no such qualms. They readily describe their cities as at war - less conscious perhaps of the diplomatic connotations.”

Vicente Raimundo, rapid response coordinator, ECHO office for Latin America & the Caribbean:

“ECHO does have a legal basis that rules and regulates our actions. A 1996 piece of European Commission legislation [ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/humanitarian_aid/r10001_en.htm ] regulates humanitarian aid funded by the Commission.

“We operate guided by the so-called humanitarian principles. And nothing in them prevents us from funding OSV [“other situations of violence”]. In fact, it has been done always, virtually everywhere. We focus on the humanitarian consequences, on humanitarian needs, regardless of its causes. If there are proven, unmet needs, then there is a basis to act. 

“Finally, nowhere in our legislation is it defined that we have to operate only on IHL qualified situations. It is mentioned: `Whereas people in distress, victims of natural disasters, wars and outbreaks of fighting, or other comparable exceptional circumstances have a right to international humanitarian assistance where their own authorities prove unable to provide effective relief.’

“Therefore, acknowledging that we are not facing an officially-qualified armed conflict, we note as well that there are unmet humanitarian needs, that the victims do have the right to receive humanitarian assistance relevant and proportional to their needs from neutral aid actors, and that we believe that as a donor, ECHO has an added value justifying its intervention supported both by its legal mandate and previous experience.”

np/ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98038/Humanitarian-intervention-in-violence-hit-slums-from-whether-to-how</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200801304t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In a move that experts say could open the door to a more robust aid response to chronic violence in urban areas, the European Commission’s humanitarian aid arm, ECHO, has approved 2 million euro in funding for interventions in cases of violence outside of conventional war in Central America and Mexico until the end of 2014. If large-scale aid work in so-called &apos;other situations of violence&apos; is the way of the future, there are certain things humanitarian workers will have to keep in mind.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boko Haram attacks hit school attendance in Borno State</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg" />]]>KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</description><body><![CDATA[KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.

Most of the children are primary school students, according to the official. Thus far Boko Haram (BH) has burned or destroyed 50 of the state's 175 schools, he said. Teachers in the state confirmed the estimate.

Students are staying at home for fear of attack, or are being transferred to private Islamic schools, known in the north as Islamiyya. On 6 May state schools officially reopened following a six-week break, but many have stayed closed, as officials and teachers fear attack.

BH gunmen had initially targeted schools - most of them primary - at night, detonating grenades and home-made explosives or dousing classrooms with gasoline and setting them alight, according to military and education officials.

But on 18 March BH shifted tactics, attacking four schools in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State (population 4.17 million, according to the 2006 census), in broad daylight, killing four teachers and seriously injuring four students.

On 9 April suspected BH members killed two school teachers in their homes, and four officials of the Borno State Feeding Committee, which runs a primary and secondary school feeding programme, while they were on an inspection tour of schools in Dikwa town, Borno State.

The shift to direct attacks on educators and students has rattled teachers, leaving many too frightened to go to work.

"We have been asked to resume classes but we are too afraid to return to school despite the stationing of a military post outside the school,” said Hajara Modu, a school teacher at Customs primary school in Maiduguri.

Secondary school enrolment is only 28 percent in Borno State - the lowest in the country, according to a 2010 Nigeria Education Data Survey.

On 10 April BH leader Abubakar Shekau claimed ordering the attacks on schools in an Internet video post, citing Nigerian military raids on Islamic schools in Maiduguri as the impetus.

Adama Zannah, a father of four students attending Sanda Kyarimi secondary school, one of the four schools affected in the 18 March attacks, told IRIN: "I want my children to attend school but they can only do that if they are alive... I can't allow them to go to school in this atmosphere of fear when schools are burnt and gunmen open fire during classes."

Islamic school attendance up

Many parents see the safest option as Islamic schools, which have seen a sharp rise in enrolment rates over recent months. These are private religious schools which teach an Islamic education, though some include English and maths in the curriculum.

Given the demand, fees at some Islamic schools have also increased - by 300 percent since the beginning of the year in some cases, according to parent Muhammad Kolo. He used to pay US$1.90 per month to educate his two children but the fee is now $7.60.

Borno State information commissioner Inuwa Bwala said the state government will try to strengthen Islamic schools with more money and more materials, and standardize their curriculum to teach children the Koran alongside Western education. (BH literally means “Western education is a sin” in Hausa).

Militarized schools

The school districts worst-affected by the arson attacks include old Maiduguri city and four local government areas - Marte, Kala-Balge, Gamboru Ngala and Mabar - in the northern part of Borno on the border with Cameroon and Chad, where BH has a strong presence [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria ].

Many students from these areas have been taken to neighbouring Dikwa District to take their May and June exams, protected by a heavy military detail.

The government has deployed soldiers in at-risk schools across the state but some parents fear this puts their children in yet more danger.

"The presence of soldiers makes them more prone to attack by BH which considers the military as their main enemy," said Ahmad Kyari, a resident of Gwange Quarters in Maiduguri city where all the schools in the area have been burnt; his three children are at home.

Attacks on schools violate children's right to education, as well as a number of human rights. In situations of conflict, they may also violate international humanitarian law and criminal law, and may constitute war crimes [ http://www.protectingeducation.org/what-international-laws-are-violated ].

"I'm really afraid to go to school. The thought of gunmen storming the school and opening fire or throwing explosives gives me the shivers and this is a thought that fills the minds of many students like me," said Nura Babani, a student of Sanda Kyarimi secondary school which was attacked on18 March.

"It is too dangerous to go to school now, especially with the attacks on some schools in broad daylight during classes,” student Maryam Habib, told IRIN.

In some areas where the government was trying to renovate schools, BH had set them ablaze again. Gwange II primary school in the Gwange area of Maiduguri city, considered a major BH stronghold, was burnt four times by BH, each time after undergoing renovation.

The school-burnings "sabotage government's effort at improving on education in Borno State", Borno State information commissioner Bwala told IRIN.

"It is not possible to learn in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. How do you expect a teacher to put in his best and a child to learn effectively when they are always on edge, in anticipation of gun and bomb attacks. This is killing education here," said the Ministry of Education official.

The federal government is exploring ways to forge a dialogue with BH [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/Analysis-Hurdles-to-Nigerian-government-Boko-Haram-dialogue ] but thus far, there has been little progress, and in recent weeks the militants have been staging a fierce comeback in the northeast. Over 3,600 people have been killed in BH-related violence since 2009, including extrajudicial killings by Nigerian security forces, according to Human Rights Watch.

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98032/Boko-Haram-attacks-hit-school-attendance-in-Borno-State</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Quelling xenophobia in South Africa&apos;s townships</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141515080313t.jpg" />]]>PHILIPPI 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - This week marks five years since tensions between foreigners and South Africans living in impoverished communities across the country erupted in xenophobic violence, leaving more than 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced, their homes and businesses robbed and abandoned.</description><body><![CDATA[PHILIPPI 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - This week marks five years since tensions between foreigners and South Africans living in impoverished communities across the country erupted in xenophobic violence, leaving more than 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced, their homes and businesses robbed and abandoned [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/78386/SOUTH-AFRICA-Xenophobic-attacks-spreading ]. 

Since May 2008, various initiatives have been established to detect early warning signs of future xenophobic attacks and to improve responses. But while no further outbreaks have occurred on the scale of the violence five years ago, attacks on foreign nationals have continued [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96589/SOUTH-AFRICA-Foreigners-still-at-risk ]. On average, one person was killed every week in 2011, according to the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA).

The looting and victimization of foreigners has also remained a feature of the frequent service delivery protests that have rocked South African townships in recent years, as has the near impunity of perpetrators [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88052/SOUTH-AFRICA-Foreign-nationals-attacked-with-impunity ].

In a statement released on 13 May, CoRMSA concluded that “much more still needs to be done to promote peaceful communities”.

Tensions high

Philippi Township, 25km southeast of Cape Town, has been a hotspot for xenophobic violence in Western Cape Province post-2008. In an area where nearly 60 percent of residents are unemployed, according to census data, Ward Counsellor Thobile Gqola, estimated that foreign nationals run more than half of businesses.

“Generally, people are happy to live side-by-side; the problem starts when it comes to business,” he told IRIN. 

Most of the violence has been directed at Somali refugees who run many of the small grocery stores known as ‘spaza’ shops in the township [ http://www.irinnews.org/film/4903/Living-under-siege ]. Like many other Somali traders in Philippi, Abdullahi Wehliye, 28, opened a shop there after losing his shop in neighbouring Khayelitsha Township during the 2008 xenophobic violence.

“I lost everything; I had to start over,” he told IRIN as he served customers through a metal grill, a security precaution that has done little to protect him from crime. 

Wehliye said his shop had been robbed seven times since it opened in 2010. During one incident in 2012, his brother was shot and killed. Although he reported all of the robberies, no arrests have been made. Of 60 Somali shopkeepers in the area, who have formed an association that Wehliye chairs, all have had their shops robbed and the vast majority have experienced shootings, Wehliye said.

A 2012 study [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/ElusiveJustice_17October.pdf ] by Vanya Gastrow and Roni Amit, of the African Centre for Migration and Society at Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg, found that Somali-run shops suffered disproportionately from crime, including attacks orchestrated by competing South African traders. Their vulnerability to such attacks was found to be partly the result of their lack of access to informal justice mechanisms and community structures.

In township settings, noted the researchers, leaders of local street committees, most of which fall under the authority of the South African National Civic Association (SANCO), often play a more important role in responding to crime than the formal justice system. 

“People in townships still respect their ‘chiefs’,” said Charles Mutabazi, director of the Agency for Refugee Education, Skills, Training and Advocacy (ARESTA), a Cape Town-based NGO.

Peace monitoring, community building

ARESTA partnered with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to start a project in Philippi in 2012 that identified 20 community leaders in each of the townships’ five wards and trained them to be “peace monitors”. The three-day training included mediation and conflict-resolution skills as well as information about the rights of migrants and refugees. 

“There’s a lot of conflict here,” said Vra Mdledle, a SANCO member and secretary to a ward counsellor who went through the training last year. “When you’re in SANCO, they don’t give you training, they just nominate you. ARESTA gave us skills we could use in our communities.”

She gave the example of a Somali shopkeeper in her area who had recently experienced an arson attack. Following a similar attack last year, he alleged that local police had pressured him to drop the case. 

“I called all the peace monitors, and we decided to accompany him to the police station,” said Mdledle. “We asked to see the station commissioner and demanded that the previous case be reopened. I saw the police are not really doing their job.”

Although the focus of the project is to promote diversity and quell xenophobic tensions, the peace monitors do not limit themselves to advocating for foreign nationals. Locals also suffer as a result of police negligence, said Mdledle, and there are many situations that demand conflict-resolution skills in this densely populated township. 

Voyiseka Nzuzo, 24, who went through the ARESTA training in February, said peace monitors in her area had recently intervened after the family of a nine-year-old rape victim beat and stabbed a man they believed to be the perpetrator. “We found that the child had pointed out five different people. We went to the police station and tried to convince the case investigator they had the wrong suspect,” she told IRIN.

As the owner of a barber shop with foreign customers and the founder of a local business association that includes South Africans and migrants, Lefefe Mdunyelwa said he already had friends from other countries before he became a peace monitor, but that he still learned a lot from the training. “I learned that each and every person is just living for themselves; nobody’s trying to steal your business,” he told IRIN. 

Noticing that the foreign members of his association were often discriminated against when it came to the issuing of business permits and the charging of rent by municipal officials, he said his association is now advocating for equal treatment.

Although ARESTA has made efforts to include members of Philippi’s Somali community in the peace monitor training and quarterly peace marches, Mutabazi said participation had been disappointing. 

Wehliye, who is one of eight Somalis to have gone through the training, said language remained a barrier, and Gqola, the ward councillor, said foreign nationals often stayed away from meetings aimed at facilitating dialogue between local and foreign business owners because they felt intimidated.

Wehliye said he signed up for the training because “after we’d been robbed so many times, I wanted to know what rights I had. I learned I had the same rights [to justice] as local people. I feel empowered.”

Becoming a peace monitor has also brought him into contact with local leaders whom he works with to resolve conflicts. “I now feel like a member of the community,” he told IRIN.

Mutabazi said the success of the peace monitor project lay in its emphasis on changing the mindset of influential community leaders. Whether it will be rolled out in other townships will depend on funding, but Mutabazi is convinced that the value of the training has been tested. 

“It’s empowering [participants] to be better community leaders. If we’re leaving that kind of legacy behind, it’s very good for promoting social cohesion.”

ks/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98035/Quelling-xenophobia-in-South-Africa-apos-s-townships</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141515080313t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">PHILIPPI 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - This week marks five years since tensions between foreigners and South Africans living in impoverished communities across the country erupted in xenophobic violence, leaving more than 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced, their homes and businesses robbed and abandoned.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Marshalling smartphones, gravediggers to fight dengue in Pakistan</title><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091306350487t.jpg" />]]>LAHORE 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - On the frontline in the fight against dengue fever in Lahore, Pakistan’s second largest city, the authorities have a sharp eye for spare car tyres.</description><body><![CDATA[LAHORE 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - On the frontline in the fight against dengue fever in Lahore, Pakistan’s second largest city, the authorities have a sharp eye for spare car tyres.

“When the police show up, we will throw all these tyres into the basement,” said Rohil Ayub, 18, who runs a downtown repair shop.

“The police fine us a lot, thousands of rupees every time,” he said.

Every few days, police inspectors fine anyone who leaves tyres outside - a nuisance, complain the owners of the hundreds of repair shops in the area but essential, health experts say, for combating dengue, a potentially fatal haemorrhagic fever without a vaccine.

Response

In a four-month outbreak [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93793/PAKISTAN-Dengue-deaths-mount ] in 2011, the mosquito-borne virus infected 21,000 in Pakistan, 85 percent of them in Lahore, leading to 352 deaths.

At the time, a range of rapidly deployed measures, including using smartphone technology, fumigation and the tracing of larvae breeding grounds, were set in motion by the provincial government to help prevent a worse crisis and keep deaths in the hundreds.

“No one expected this kind of political commitment,” said Qutbuddin Kakar, who oversees programmes to combat malaria and dengue in Pakistan for the World Health Organization (WHO). “In this part of the world, at least, we had not seen this kind of response before.”

The anticipated 1,000-plus deaths did not occur, and since then, dengue fever cases have dropped - 200 in the province (Punjab) last year, without any reported deaths.

So, what was done right, and what do the authorities need to do to make sure solutions are long-term?

The tactics developed to prevent another dengue outbreak were first developed in 2011: information campaigns, data-sharing, and destroying mosquito larvae sites.

Hundreds of government entomologists regularly visit cemeteries, public parks, and gardens, testing for aedes mosquitoes and larvae in any sources of water.

The results they collect are processed on site by specially-designed Android based applications on their smartphones, and uploaded to a centralized dengue prevention centre.

There, analysts match the entomological data with reports from hospitals showing where dengue patients are being treated. Based on the findings, a team is sent to fumigate areas where aedes mosquitos seem to be breeding and infecting people, or to identify and remove sources of standing water.

The key season for infections comes with monsoon rains, when the aedes aegyptus and aedes albopictus mosquitoes, which can carry the virus, begin to appear.

Chronology of an outbreak

In August 2011 heavy monsoon rain dumped 13 inches in a week, leaving parts of Lahore with large bodies of standing water, and raising immediate concerns about disease.

By mid-October, the provincial government in Punjab reported that more than 11,000 dengue cases were recorded by the provincial government.

“It was an exponential increase in number, and it really frightened the government,” said Faran Naru, a consultant hired by the provincial government to tackle the problem. “And the issue was resonating in the media... so it created a panic in the public which had to be contained.”

Most people infected with dengue recovered on their own, said Naru, but once media outlets began reporting on the extent of the outbreak, thousands showed up at hospitals and laboratories to get tested.

An initial team of 70 entomologists conducted 12,000 spot-checks to track where aedes mosquitos were present. By mid-October, this data had been mapped, along with the locations of 11,000 reported dengue patients.

The results surprised the scientists. The worst affected areas were some of the wealthiest neighbourhoods of Lahore: Model Town, Race Course, Mozang, and Gulberg.

“I saw that in Model Town there is a big park, and in Race Course there are two of Lahore's biggest parks… and I believe lots of breeding was happening there and mosquitoes were leaving from there and infecting people,” said Naru.

The mosquitoes need fresh water to lay their eggs, and the large puddles in Lahore's biggest public parks proved to be ideal homes.

Another hotspot was the Mozang neighbourhood, home to one of Pakistan's largest graveyards. The 150-acre area was found to be a major breeding ground for mosquitos. Gravediggers had dug large pits to hold water, which they used to soften the dirt when digging.

“It's fresh water,” said Naur, “from the tap, and there were 70 pits, and all of those were infected, full of larvae.”

Back in the hospital, dengue patients were separated into special areas for treatment. The home of each dengue patient was fumigated, along with 12 surrounding houses, three in each direction.

Sanitation workers unclogged sewers and drains in an effort to clear areas of rainwater; and parks, gardens, and cemeteries were also sprayed. Thousands of Mosquitofish and Garden Carp - fish species known to attack mosquito larvae - were also released into ponds and ditch canals.

Within a few weeks, entomologists detected far fewer aedes mosquitoes, and the prevalence of dengue cases rapidly decreased.

A public awareness campaign also helped - with city residents encouraged to use mosquito repellent and bednets, and schoolchildren instructed to wear long-sleeved clothing, despite the monsoon heat.

Lessons learned?

There have only been two cases of dengue fever reported in the province so far this year, suggesting the anti-dengue measures have had an impact.

But the disease tends to come in 2-4 year cycles, and public health officials worry that if the lessons learned from the 2011 outbreak are not institutionalized, future governments might not handle subsequent outbreaks as well.

In March, an interim government took over in Pakistan to oversee national and provincial elections.

“We must see if the government is able to plan long-term for dengue. This was just a short-term response,” said Kakar from WHO.  He says the teams of entomologists and fumigators, and funding resources devoted to surveillance and data transmission, need to continue to work every season.

He also says Pakistan could devote the same kinds of resources to other mosquito-carried diseases like malaria.  

Pakistan sees more than 300,000 cases of malaria every year according to WHO, a figure that would inevitably drop with a successful long-term anti-mosquito campaign.

“So far,” he said, “a negligible amount is spent on malaria eradication in Pakistan. We should expect that all vector-borne diseases - malaria, dengue... should be brought together under one programme.”

Kakar says malaria is mostly restricted to rural parts of Pakistan, where healthcare facilities are so bad that it is difficult to even get an accurate count of how many people are dying from the disease.

He said if the government provided good sources of water, in both cities and rural areas, he would expect a major impact on mosquitoes, whether they carry malaria or dengue.

uf/jj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98010/Marshalling-smartphones-gravediggers-to-fight-dengue-in-Pakistan</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091306350487t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">LAHORE 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - On the frontline in the fight against dengue fever in Lahore, Pakistan’s second largest city, the authorities have a sharp eye for spare car tyres.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Hunger projects stalled in Guinea-Bissau</title><pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208141544380935t.jpg" />]]>BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.</description><body><![CDATA[BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.

The organization needs US$7 million immediately to cover its food security and nutrition programme targeting 278,000 people for 2013; and a further $8 million to extend the project through 2014. The project involves school-feeding, preventing moderate and acute malnutrition, and boosting rice production, and was supposed to start in February this year.

WFP head of programmes Fatimata Sow-Sidibé told IRIN the money is lacking because traditional donors suspended all development cooperation following the April 2012 coup.

“We have some promises [from donors],” said Sow-Sidibé, “but the programme was supposed to start in February and we have no resources to buy the food we need.”

Traditional donors more or less stopped all development funding in Guinea-Bissau following the 12 April 2012 coup d’état, leaving infrastructure projects and basic services at a standstill across the country, but humanitarian funding was supposedly untouched. LINK The problem for WFP is that their project spans development and emergency activities and thus is not just eligible for humanitarian funding.

The African Development Bank also suspended its funding for rural agricultural development projects, following the coup. The cuts “are having a direct impact on food security in Guinea-Bissau, where we already have severe cereal deficits due to inadequate local production,” said a civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture who preferred anonymity.

Food insecurity in Guinea-Bissau is driven mainly by an inability of people to access food because prices are beyond their reach. Most Bissau Guineans rely on imported rice as they grow mainly cash crops (cashews) and not grains.

Food prices have risen year on year since 2008 (imported rice is currently U$1.20 per kg), and the most recent countryside hunger assessment (2011) cited high prices as the biggest barrier for vulnerable households to access food.

The coup put off a planned countrywide food security assessment in 2012 but a rapid assessment in the regions of Biombo, Oio and Quinara in June 2012 revealed one in five people were food insecure (regions in the east were not included in the survey). Some 65 percent of households at the time had under one month’s supply of food stocks and more people were resigned to further indebtedness, selling animals and producing wine from the cashew fruit, to get by.

Cashew crisis

People’s ability to buy food has been severely hampered by a crisis in the cashew industry: 80-95 percent of Bissau-Guineans depend on cashew sales to purchase food as well as meet other household expenses. Terms of trade for cashews have been deteriorating since 2011: In a good year 1kg of rice can be roughly exchanged for 1kg of cashews; this shifted to 1.5kg of cashews to buy 1kg of rice in 2012, and to 2kgs of cashews for 1kg of rice in 2013, according to Ministry of Agriculture and WFP research. “Everything here is linked to cashews,” said Sow-Sidibé.

The poor terms of trade are linked to a poor 2012 cashew crop, and plummeting cashew prices following the coup (from 80 US cents per kg in May 2012 to 50 US cents one month later), and also linked to low fixed prices on international markets.

Cashew farmers are further stymied by exorbitant petrol prices (US$1.50 per litre) which makes it increasingly expensive for them to get their crop to market.

Ongoing projects

WFP continues to run food assistance programmes where it can. In two districts in Gabu, eastern Guinea-Bissau (Mancadndje Dara, Madina Madinga), and in two districts of Bafata (Djabicunda and Sare Biro), the organization helps villagers improve their farming techniques to boost rice production, including giving them improved seeds and helping them rent animals to get their crops to market. It also helps villagers grow market gardens to improve their food diversity and boost household income.

Mutaro Indjai, head of the village committee of rice producers in Saucunda village in Gabu, told IRIN: “This project helped us improve our production to last through four months, whereas before we only produced enough for one month.”

If the project comes to an end, they will continue to use improved techniques of production, but they would lack the seeds needed to plant next year. “We won’t have access to improved seeds, nor to the animals we need to speed up planting and to help us transport our harvest to nearby villages,” he told IRIN.

Nutrition

Nutrition programmes have also been affected. WFP pushes food diversity, given that feeding practices are a key component of high chronic malnutrition levels in Guinea-Bissau.

The organization tries to push a more varied diet (than the starch-dominated fare given to most infants) including fish soup, peas, carrots, tomatoes, and millet-based cereal. They also support local NGOs to make regular visits to health centres and villages on vaccination days to talk about how to prepare nutrient-rich meals for infants made out of corn flour, peanut powder, bean powder, oil and sugar, among others. Programmes target children in their first 1,000 days of life.

Some 17 percent of children under-five are underweight, and 27 percent are stunted due to inadequate nutrition, according to a December 2012 UNICEF-Ministry of Health nutrition survey.

Hunger specialists fear chronic malnutrition levels will rise if prevention is not stepped up.

UNICEF supports the Ministry of Health to set up nutrition treatment centres; provides therapeutic food for severely malnourished children; and helped update the government’s strategy to manage acute malnutrition, in February 2013. “Lack of funding, very few partners in nutrition, and limited human resources trained in nutrition” are the major challenges facing UNICEF, said Victor Suhfube Ngongalah, head of child survival there. UNICEF needs US$750,000 to implement its projects in 2013 and 2014.

Guinea Bissau is ranked 176 out of 187 countries assessed in the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report. Political instability has also marred development. Since 1994 no elected president in Guinea-Bissau has finished his mandate.

aj/dab/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98004/Hunger-projects-stalled-in-Guinea-Bissau</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208141544380935t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Displaced still homeless after clashes in Baga, Nigeria</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061639020892t.jpg" />]]>BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.

An estimated 2,275 homes were destroyed in fires, and a further 125 severely damaged, according to satellite images released by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in a 1 May statement [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-destruction-deaths-military-raid ].

“Our major worry now is finding where to stay and rebuild our homes before rain sets in. Many of us are now squatting with relations and friends here in Baga and in neighbouring towns and villages,” Ibrahim Buba told IRIN in the courtyard of his gutted four-bedroom mud house in the Pampon Gaja-Gaja neigbourhood.

Heavy fighting broke out in Baga, on the shores of Lake Chad, between MNJTF and Boko Haram (BH) on 16 April, causing fire to break out and sweep through the neighbourhoods of Pampon Gaja-Gaja, Fulatari and Budumari. The Nigerian Red Cross estimated 187 people died in the fire and fighting, but the military dispute these figures, insisting only 37 people, including 30 Islamists, six civilians and a soldier, were killed.

Many residents accused soldiers of burning their homes, while military forces disputed the accusations, blaming BH.

The area is a BH stronghold and military officials have accused Borno State residents of harbouring BH members. According to HRW, BH has killed numerous Borno State residents, creating a climate of fear in the area.

“I lost my all that I worked for in life including my house, two cars, two motorcycles, and a grinding machine which is my major source of income,” said 62-year-old Adamu Ciroma. “What preoccupies me is how to rebuild my house to shelter my family of 18.”

Maina Maaji Lawan, a Borno State senator, told IRIN there is not enough emergency shelter to house all the displaced. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has set up temporary shelter for just over 600 of the displaced, according to a recent statement.

Borno State governor Kashim Shettima has ordered that the destroyed houses be rebuilt, according to spokesperson Isa Umar Gusau.

Many still in hiding

Most Baga residents rely on fishing and farming for their income. “We don’t even have seeds to plant because the seeds we saved have been gobbled by fire,” local smallholder Ba’ana Sharif told IRIN, as he stood in the midst of his burnt granary. The rainy season begins in May and extends into September in Nigeria’s semi-arid northeastern region.

NEMA and the Red Cross arrived in Baga eight days after the fire because they had to wait for security clearance from the military which claimed the area was too dangerous for aid workers to enter, according to Nigerian Red Cross national coordinator Umar Mairiga.

Many residents are still in the bush having fled their burning homes: They fear a resumption of violence between BH and the military, residents and aid officials said.

"Many people are still in hiding. Part of our work there is to build confidence. We need to show people that what we have now in Baga is assistance, not any more attacks," said NEMA spokesman Manzo Ezekiel.

Resident Abdullahi Gumel told IRIN on 30 April that he found two residents in the bush suffering from burns and thirst. They both died within 24 hours.

Brig-Gen Austin Edokpayi, head of MNJTF, blamed the mass exodus of residents on “warnings from BH Islamists to leave the town, as the terrorists were planning reprisals against the military for the casualties they suffered at the hands of the multi-national troops.”

HRW called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to probe the events in Baga as part of a preliminary investigation the court launched in 2010 on the situation in Nigeria. The ICC has indicated that crimes committed by BH may constitute crimes against humanity.  
On 23 April, President Goodluck Jonathan ordered a full-scale investigation into the events in Baga.

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061639020892t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Countering the radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth</title><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031222150686t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya's youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.

Youth unemployment is extremely high, as are levels of political disenchantment. An estimated 75 percent of out-of-school youths are unemployed, according to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) [ http://kenya.usaid.gov/programs/education-and-youth/51 ]. 

"The unemployment crisis is a ticking bomb. Over 60 percent of the population is under 25. You cannot ignore that," said Yusuf Hassan, the Member of Parliament for Nairobi’s Kamukunji Constituency, which has a large Muslim population. "A huge and significant population is restless. And the gap between the rich and poor is getting wider."

"When access to resources is based on ethnic, cultural or religious characteristics or there is a growing divide between the 'haves' and 'have nots' in countries and communities, economic conditions further contribute to instability," says a new report by the Institute for Security Studies in Africa (ISS) [ http://www.issafrica.org/assessing-the-vulnerability-of-kenyan-youths-to-radicalisation-and-extremism ]. "Countries confronted by large differences between 'haves' and 'have nots' are additionally vulnerable to conflict, which may include resorting to acts of terrorism."

Marginalized and radicalized

A string of grenade attacks - some allegedly by Somali Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabab or their sympathizers - have occurred in the Kenyan towns of Garissa, Mombasa and the capital, Nairobi, since Kenya began its military incursion in Somalia in October 2011 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94018/KENYA-SOMALIA-A-risky-intervention ].

But Islamic radicalization is not new to Kenya. Kenyans were involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and the Tanzania city of Dar es Salaam; the coordinated attacks, which killed more than 220 people, were Africa's first suicide bombings by Al-Qaeda's East Africa cell. In a 2002 dual car-bomb and suicide attack on a hotel and plane in Mombasa, at least one of the suspects was Kenyan.

Muslims make up an estimated 11 percent [ http://www.knbs.or.ke/docs/PresentationbyMinisterforPlanningrevised.pdf ] of Kenya’s population; large Muslim communities can be found in the country’s northeast and in the coastal region. Traditionally, Kenya’s Muslims are moderate, with the community peacefully seeking participation in politics. But ISS pointed to the historical political marginalization of Muslims - right from negotiations for Kenya’s independence, in which ethnic Somalis, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, were not represented - as a contributor to the radicalization of young people. 

“Although Kenya is a secular state, it is essentially a Christian country because of the dominant Christian population… There is the perception that Islam is ‘alien’, despite the fact that it came to Kenya before Christianity,” the report notes.

The report also found that some young Kenyan Muslims have been influenced by radical preaching, which leads them to believe that wars being fought against Muslims abroad - for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq - are part of “a global campaign against Islam”.

According to a 2011 report [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 ] by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, non-Somali Kenyan nationals constituted the largest and most organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabab.

Taking advantage of vulnerable youth 

"We've already seen the rumblings of 'Pwani si Kenya' [Coast is not Kenya, the slogan of a separatist group in Kenya’s Coast Province] [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrs ] - radicalized, marginalized, poverty-stricken young people are saying, ‘we don't belong to Kenya’," said Hassan, who was seriously injured in a 2012 grenade attack in his constituency. 

The ISS report found that Islamist militants were exploiting sub-standard socioeconomic conditions, and the government's inability to provide basic services, by positioning themselves as providers of assistance. "Creating or infiltrating bona fide charity organizations... is a sure way to win the general support of ordinary people," the report said. 

The report points to the growing influence of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), a Kenyan group whose objectives include promoting community health and social welfare, but which also advocates "an extreme interpretation of Islam and prepares members to travel to Somalia for 'jihad' [holy war], thus attracting the attention of security agencies in Kenya and abroad." According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544 ], Al-Shabab announced a merger with MYC in 2012.

Hassan Sheikh, a cleric in the northeastern town of Garissa, said extremist groups have taken control of many mosques and Islamic schools, setup orphanages, and employed teachers and imams.

"North Kenya is a hub for mercenaries. You can easily get [attract] them - it’s out of poverty,” said Khalif Aabdulla, a civil rights activist from Wajir, also northeastern Kenya.
NGOs and government officials in Kenya acknowledge an urgent need to develop a counter-radicalization policy to prevent young people from turning to violent groups, and some say Kenya’s newly elected government may be an opportunity to tackle the issue. NGOs say the government must do more than promote economic empowerment among marginalized communities; it must also foster a sense of belonging.

"There are some efforts to use the Council of Imams or Islamic Preachers' Association to talk to the youths," said Mwalimu Mati, CEO of governance watchdog Mars Group Kenya. "The moderates are trying to assist the government, but I can't say it's a complete success." 

Counter-productive counter-terrorism

"The problem is exacerbated by counter-terrorism programmes by the Kenya police who carry out mass raids rather than targeted arrests. It keeps the youths feeling repressed generally. They then identify that as oppression based on religion," Mati said. He says the problem is primarily in North Eastern District, Eastleigh and Coast Province. 

The ISS report describes the current approach as "collective punishment based on perceptions".

"Most perceptions are completely wrong, especially that Somali nationals are responsible for attacks in Kenya or that Kenya is an innocent bystander when acts of terrorism are committed on its soil," it stated. 

Following attacks in Nairobi, ethnic Somalis - both Kenyan and foreign nationals - said they experienced xenophobia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94090/KENYA-Xenophobia-fear-follow-Nairobi-blasts ] and lived in constant fear of arrest.

Under the government of former president Mwai Kibaki, both the Ministry for Peace-building and Conflict Management and the Ministry for Education told IRIN that they had no programmes to address radicalization.

The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport said they ran "empowerment programmes" in conjunction with the formal education system. But as Leah Rotitch, a director in the education ministry, said, "The people Al-Shabab target are normally young people who are out of school."

The persecution felt by ethnic Somalis and other Muslim communities has only increased [ http://www.kenya-today.com/news/kenyan-muslims-fear-the-worst-over-proposals-to-boost-police-powers ] in recent years, with police allegedly engaging in extrajudicial use of force and even killings of terror suspects; the police deny these claims.

"Since the passing of the new anti-terror bill, we have seen a huge spike in extrajudicial killings. And terrorism has become an easy label," said Horn of Africa analyst Abdullahi Halakhe. "Such efforts only succeed in alienating the local population, who usually have critical human intelligence. They are turning the Islamic radicalization of young people into a matter of national security, making those young people their enemies, thus making it worse."

The ISS report calls for "introspection on the part of the police officer stopping and searching a person because he looks Somali".

Reaching the young

Tom Mboya, who established the Inuka Kenya Trust in response to the role young people played in perpetrating the post-election violence of 2007-2008, says now is an opportunity to engage the youth. "They're what should be the engine of this country," he told IRIN.

"Devolution is positive," he says, referring to the process of decentralizing power from Nairobi [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97726/Briefing-Devolution-to-transform-Kenya ], which was set in motion by Kenya's new constitution. Mboya believes this process will create opportunities for young people. But, he says, "in parts of the country more prone to violent extremism, there needs to be policy in place. The leadership will have to be more alive to that problem".

A focus on young people formed a key part of new President Uhuru Kenyatta's election campaign - his government will now have to work out an acceptable and effective approach in tackling the issue of violent extremism. 

Mars Group's Mati says using moderate imams to neutralize potentially radical youths does not work because young people no longer regard them as credible. "It's a generation gap - control over youths has somehow become difficult. In the old days, what an imam said went. The radical preachers are young," he said.

Hadley Muchela, programmes manager for Kenyan rights group Independent Medico-legal Unit, says targeting violent extremism will require sensitivity because, thanks to the way the issue has been handled in the past, it is often seen as an indictment against all of Islam. "You find very few Kenyans willing to go into it," he said. 

Abdikadir Sheikh, who works with the Sustainable Support and Advocacy Programme, a local NGO, said the group has set up a pilot project to dissuade youth in the northeastern towns of Dadaab and Garissa from joining extremist groups. 

"We are very careful or [we could] lose our lives; you can’t confront radicalization directly - you need different approaches," he told IRIN. "We have established a strong team of more than 600 youths… some have so far joined colleges. We plan to work with the county governments.” 
The ISS report warns that "there is no quick fix for the level of radicalization seen in Kenya".

"The biggest threat to stability in Kenya will be if extremists succeed in dividing Kenya between Muslim and non-Muslim," the report said. 

jh/na/kr/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97982/Countering-the-radicalization-of-Kenya-apos-s-youth</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031222150686t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Iraq 10 years on: the humanitarian impact</title><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041322550503t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - The humanitarian legacy

Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97895/Iraq-10-years-on-The-humanitarian-legacy ]

Water and Sanitation: Are the taps flowing? [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97894/Are-the-taps-flowing ]

Electricity: Blistering black-outs [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97896/Blistering-black-outs ]

The forgotten displacement crisis [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97905/The-forgotten-displacement-crisis ]

Economy grows, but how many benefit? [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97909/Economy-grows-but-how-many-benefit ]

Education: Schools try to play catch-up [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97928/Schools-try-to-play-catch-up ]

Human Security: More freedom but less security? [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97937/More-freedom-but-less-security ]

Aid work: From restrictions to access challenges [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97952/From-aid-restrictions-to-access-challenges ]

War leaves lasting impact on healthcare [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97964/War-leaves-lasting-impact-on-healthcare ]

Gender: Women yet to regain their place [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97976/Women-yet-to-regain-their-place ]

Food security: Less dependent on food rations [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97991/Less-dependent-on-food-rations ]

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-10-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041322550503t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Plea for return of officials to northern Mali</title><pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201210050938270763t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/GAO 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Residents in the northern Mali towns of Gao and Timbuktu are calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their towns, which they say are in a state of “complete chaos”.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/GAO 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Residents in the northern Mali towns of Gao and Timbuktu are calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their towns, which they say are in a state of “complete chaos”.

French, Chadian and Malian armies have ousted insurgent groups from most the main towns in the north, including Gao and Timbuktu, following a 10-month occupation. But despite an appeal from the federal government, only skeletal teams of administrators have returned to their posts.

In the absence of officials, town residents - including village elders, chiefs, women and youths - are working to operate basic services and clean up the damage as best they can.

Disarray

At the beginning of April, Gao’s governor and prefects returned, as did the director of the academy that oversees the region’s schools. In Timbuktu, the governor and two prefects are in place. Officials responsible for health, energy, education, planning and other programmes have yet to return.

For Kidal town, which is still under the control of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the government has named a governor and advisers, all of whom are still in Bamako, the capital, and the MNLA has nominated a governor of their own.

Almost all the regional services in Gao are in disarray, said Aliou Touré, a teacher from Gao town. “Health, agriculture, taxes, social development, police, civil protection, the treasury, the banks… all are in disarray… Officials must return to [put] their city back on track.”

The return of administrators would offer some reassurance of stability, and could deter any insurgents who remain at the outskirts of the town, he said.

Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal were all attacked in March and April by insurgents hidden in nearby villages.

The Minister of Internal Security, Gen Tiefing Konaté, promised last week that police would be re-deployed in Timbuktu before the end of April.

Oumar Sangaré, another teacher in Gao, is angry. “The administration has to return to sort things out. You can’t live like animals in a jungle, with no rules, no basic sanitation, no protection. Government and banking services must re-start immediately,” he said. "It's complete chaos here."

Government teachers must travel to Mopti, 500km away, to pick up their salaries, he said, due to the lack of banking services. “It’s ludicrous.”

While local and international aid groups are providing basic food, healthcare, water and sanitation and other essentials to many vulnerable people in northern regions, essential emergency programmes like large-scale fodder distributons and vaccination campaigns for livestock - critical as herders approach the lean season - require government oversight [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97799/Mounting-crisis-for-conflict-hit-northern-Mali-pastoralists ].

Self-organizing amid shortages

With so many civil servants displaced, the federal government has asked elders and village chiefs to set up management committees in Gao and Timbuktu to try to run things as best they can.

Touré, the teacher, said these committees were struggling: “They can’t continue their work because they don’t have the experience or the means.”

Women and youths formed a group in Gao to help clean up the town, said local journalist, Daouda Traoré.

People also organized themselves into a management committee in Kidal.

Water, electricity and fuel shortages still plague most of the north. Gao’s two major generators are currently not working, which means electricity is supplied from 6pm to 11:30pm only, according to an official with Mali’s energy company, EDM. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been providing fuel for the power stations in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu to make sure water is still available. It recently called for a further US$50 million to continue this service, and to distribute food to 420,000 people, supply farmers with seeds, and provide some animal fodder and vaccinations to pastoralists [ http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2013/04-10-mali-budget-extension.htm ].

Fuel supply is more consistent in Timbuktu, thanks partly to a wealthy trader who has stepped in to provide fuel.

The government has mapped out a $198 million reconstruction and rehabilitation plan for northern Mali, said Bassidy Coulibaly, director general of the Ministry for Territorial Administration in Bamako, but it remains just 12 percent funded.

Elections

The government is under international pressure to organize elections by July, though diplomats privately admit the deadline is ambitious, saying the end of the year is more feasible.

"If the government is serious about organizing elections for July, the administration has to return as soon as possible. If not, who will organize the elections in the regions?” said Oumar Touré, a retired civil servant in Timbuktu. He also worried displaced residents would be unable to return to vote.

“It’s inconceivable that people [displaced residents] can return - the governor, the prefects are working in complete anarchy,” he told IRIN.

Fear

Many Gao residents understand the reluctance of officials to return.

Daouda Diarra, a journalist in Gao, told IRIN, “I think they [civil servants] are right to be scared. Gao isn’t completely secure, and there’s nothing set up here: Everything has been looted, destroyed or attacked. Will they work under the trees? Will they live in the trees? The government has to at least assure the basics before forcing its citizens and administrative staff to return, otherwise they’ll just be sending them to the slaughter,” he told IRIN by telephone.

Moulaye Sayah, now in Timbuktu, was a doctor in Kidal before the events of 2012. “Work is important, but life is sacred. You have to keep yourself safe first and foremost,” he said.

“I understand the complaints of the people in the north who demand the return of the administration, but how and where would we work?” he said, adding that many black-skinned Malians are too afraid to return to MNLA-controlled Kidal.

Abdoul Karim Koné, sub-prefect of Toguérécoumbé town in Mali’s central region of Mopti, disagrees. He re-joined his post two weeks ago: “There is no such thing as zero risk anywhere in the world. If our hour strikes, whether it’s in Kidal, Gao or Bamako, it’s the end. People must accept this, and take up their positions accordingly.”

sd/aj/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97892/Plea-for-return-of-officials-to-northern-Mali</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201210050938270763t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/GAO 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Residents in the northern Mali towns of Gao and Timbuktu are calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their towns, which they say are in a state of “complete chaos”.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>For women, urbanization is a mixed bag</title><pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201105181441170873t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 17 April 2013 (IRIN) - Countries across Africa are experiencing unprecedented urban growth, presenting women with greater economic and social opportunities as well as greater risks to their safety and welfare.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 17 April 2013 (IRIN) - Countries across Africa are experiencing unprecedented urban growth, presenting women with greater economic and social opportunities as well as greater risks to their safety and welfare.

Unlike their rural counterparts, women in urban areas are thought to enjoy greater social, economic, political opportunities and freedoms.  In an editorial [ http://eau.sagepub.com/content/25/1/3.full.pdf+html ], the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) said that urban women are able to “engage in paid employment outside the family, better access to services, lower fertility rates, and some relaxation of the rigid social values and norms that define women as subordinated to their husbands and fathers and to men generally”.

Even so, these women are likely to continue experiencing forms of gender discrimination. According to UN-HABITAT, “notable gender gaps in labour and employment, decent work, pay, tenure rights, access to and accumulation of assets, personal security and safety, and representation in formal structures of urban governance show that women are often the last to benefit from the prosperity of cities.”

Inequalities, risks

UN-HABITAT estimates [ http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/getElectronicVersion.aspx?nr=3457&alt=1 ] 40 percent of Africa’s estimated one billion people now live in cities and towns. About 51 percent of these people live in slums. Many governments struggle to maintain services and infrastructure - and women and girls are the most affected by these shortcomings.

Expensive public transport systems also hinder women’s mobility, and many are forced to live in poor housing in the face of escalating living costs.

In her paper, Cities through a “gender lens”: a golden “urban age” for women in the global South? [ http://eau.sagepub.com/content/25/1/9.abstract ], Sylvia Chant of the London School of Economics said, “While women make significant contributions to their households, neighbourhoods and the city through their paid and unpaid labour, building and consolidating shelter and compensating for shortfalls in essential services and infrastructure, they face persistent inequalities in terms of access to decent work, physical and financial assets, mobility, personal safety and security, and representation in formal structures of urban governance.”

In an interview with IRIN, Cecilia Tacoli from IIED said, “The risks that women face with urbanization are related largely to inadequate infrastructure and services,” and the lack of personal safety and security.

Tacoli says women living in poor urban neighbourhoods have to compensate for a lack of services and infrastructure by working longer hours, “looking after children who are always ill as a result of inadequate water and sanitation” and making sure the “family is fed, while living in a home with very little space for cooking and storing food.”

Urban crime remains a serious problem for women. A 2011 study by Action Aid International [ http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/actionaid_2011_women_and_the_city.pdf ] noted that insecurity in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, “restricted women’s earnings, the sustainability of their small businesses, and thus their empowerment.”

According to Cathy Mcllwaine of the University of London, while urbanization could provide women with an opportunity to effectively cope with violence due to available institutional support and economic resources, often “social relations can be more fragmented, which can lead to greater incidence of violence, as can the pressures of urban living, such as poverty, engagement in certain types of occupation, poor-quality living conditions and the physical configuration of urban areas.”

And despite urban areas having better equipped health clinics and more doctors, the expense of such healthcare often puts it out of the reach of poor women [ http://www.unicef.org/sowc/files/SOWC_2012-Main_Report_EN_21Dec2011.pdf ].

Organizing

Still, many women in urban areas manage to organize themselves into community savings groups, which help them save money to ensure their priorities are addressed.

The authors of the paper Community savings that mobilize federations, build women’s leadership and support slum upgrading [ http://eau.sagepub.com/content/25/1/31.abstract ] say that “although the amount that each individual saves is modest, when aggregated in community savings funds, it is often large enough to attract external resources that allow support for larger-scale initiatives”.

The authors note: “Building on communities’ strengths rather than on their weaknesses helps develop a voice and identity, and these federations can negotiate with governments and other stakeholders to improve and upgrade their settlements.”

ko/rz
]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97868/For-women-urbanization-is-a-mixed-bag</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201105181441170873t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 17 April 2013 (IRIN) - Countries across Africa are experiencing unprecedented urban growth, presenting women with greater economic and social opportunities as well as greater risks to their safety and welfare.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Moussa Ibrahim, detained in Mali: “They accused me of supporting the Islamists”</title><pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121355200048t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Moussa Ibrahim is a 40-year-old ethnic Songhai restaurant owner in the Malian town of Timbuktu. He was arrested in February of this year on suspicion of supporting Islamist group Ansar Dine, which had taken over much of the region in 2012.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Moussa Ibrahim is a 40-year-old ethnic Songhai restaurant owner in the Malian town of Timbuktu. He was arrested in February of this year on suspicion of supporting Islamist group Ansar Dine, which had taken over much of the region in 2012.

In March, he spoke to IRIN in the gendarmerie in Gao, where he was being held: 

“The day the French arrived in Timbuktu, I went into the street to celebrate. Finally we were free.

“It was only a couple of weeks later that the problems started. One day, the [Malian] soldiers came to my house to look for arms. They accused me of supporting the Islamists. When they couldn’t find any weapons or other evidence of my affiliations with Ansar Dine, they left, only to return the next day. Again, they accused me of supporting the Islamists and brought me in the camp.

“The soldiers sat me on the floor, together with the other prisoners. There were at least 20 men in the camp. They were between 20 and 60 years old. There were Malians, of course, but also Algerians, a guy from Burkina Faso and even one man from Niger. Some of them looked like they needed medical attention.

“All the time, we were tied together with handcuffs or turbans. We were tied for so long my hands went numb. We were forced to sit up, and the soldiers took pictures of us with their cell phone cameras.

“After one week, maybe more, in the camp - I lost track of the days - we were finally moved to the gendarmerie, where they told us we would be transferred to Bamako. We stayed in the gendarmerie for at least another week. I was questioned and the officers explained I was detained on suspicion I was assisting the Islamists. 

“I have a small restaurant on the outskirts of Timbuktu. The Islamists often ate there. In fact, they were my only customers after many people had fled. That’s probably why the soldiers believed I was cooperating with them. But I never accepted any money and refused to perform any services they asked me to do. 

“My family lives in a small village a couple of kilometres away from Timbuktu. They don’t know I’m here. In fact, they don’t know I was arrested. I’m worried for them and the restaurant. As soon as they release me - because they have to, I’m innocent - I will return to Timbuktu.”

kh/aj/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97844/Moussa-Ibrahim-detained-in-Mali-They-accused-me-of-supporting-the-Islamists</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121355200048t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Moussa Ibrahim is a 40-year-old ethnic Songhai restaurant owner in the Malian town of Timbuktu. He was arrested in February of this year on suspicion of supporting Islamist group Ansar Dine, which had taken over much of the region in 2012.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Torture, beatings and death for detained Malians</title><pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121349370081t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of northern Malians - many of them ethnic Tuaregs - have been detained by the Malian army since the French military intervention to oust Islamist groups from northern Mali began in January 2013. Many of the detainees have complained they had no idea why they were captured and were not given access to lawyers; others alleged torture.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of northern Malians - many of them ethnic Tuaregs - have been detained by the Malian army since the French military intervention to oust Islamist groups from northern Mali began in January 2013. Many of the detainees have complained they had no idea why they were captured and were not given access to lawyers; others alleged torture.

The ill-treatment may also have proven fatal: Two ethnic Tuareg men, arrested in February and allegedly tortured by Malian soldiers in the town of Léré, in Timbuktu Region, died of their injuries at the Central Prison in the capital, Bamako, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in a communique on 11 April. 

IRIN spoke to human rights groups, detainees, gendarmes and military officers to find out the status of conflict-related detainees. 

Documented abuses 

According to HRW, which had been following the case of the two Tuareg men, they had received some medical attention when they were being held at Gendarme Camp 1 in Bamako, but were then transferred to the Central Prison in late March.

The two were transferred to Gendarme Camp 1 in Bamako, where they received some medical attention, and were transferred to the Central Prison in Bamako in late March. 

“The men were in very bad shape. One of the men was repeatedly abused, suffering severe hematoma and possibly a broken rib. While detained by the army, he had been injected with a caustic substance,” said Corinne Dufka, a senior West Africa researcher at HRW.

“They did not receive the treatment they needed, and the previous torture and ill-treatment clearly contributed to their deaths.”

HRW had interviewed and documented the torture inflicted on a total of seven men. The organization said most of the abuses they documented were committed while the prisoners were still in military custody but stopped when they were transferred to the gendarmerie. 

“Detainees described being beaten and kicked, burned, injected with a caustic substance, and threatened with death while in army custody,” said Dufka. “Detainees were only randomly questioned, and often while tortured. One man described a treatment similar to water-boarding while held by rank-and-file soldiers.”

The seven men were taken to Markala, in Gao Region, where they were photographed with assault rifles, ammunition and other alleged proof of their association with armed groups. Most of them denied any such association and said the arms and other items were not theirs, though some admitted they had either fought for or assisted the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) or Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), according to Dufka.

None of the detained had seen a lawyer or knew the full extent of the charges against them. 

Detainees have also been subjected to mock-executions, according to local and international human rights groups, among them HRW, Amnesty International and the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH). 

How many detained?

Following the start of the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013, the Malian army arrested dozens of men all over the country on suspicion of supporting the Islamist groups that took control of the north in 2012. Most of the men were taken in central and northern Mali as Malian and French forces advanced north. 

Kadidia Sangare Coulibaly, president of CNDH, told IRIN the arrests accounted for the disappearances of many members of ethnic minority groups during the first weeks of the French-led intervention. 

“It is likely that some of these people, of whom we still have no news, were arrested on suspicion of supporting the Islamists,” she said.

The police in Gao and Bamako, state prosecutors and lawyers in Bamako, and humanitarian organizations with access to the detainees are all unable to say how many were arrested since the intervention.

A gendarme official in Gao said that as far as he knew, 300 people were arrested in Gao, 70 of whom were later transferred to the state prison in Bamako. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) says the countrywide figure is 300. 

State prosecutor Mohamed Dicko, in Bamako, said he had received 109 cases from the Bamako gendarmerie of arrests for aiding the armed Islamists groups, a number likely to increase as more detainees are transferred to the capital. 

“So far, 200 people have been arrested and transferred to the central prison in Bamako. Among them, 27 have been released,” Dicko said, noting 26 men were arrested by the French army.  

Some 45 detainees are being held by the MNLA, which is in control of parts of Kidal Region, according to Wolde Gabriel Saugeron, the ICRC spokesperson in Geneva.

Six of the people detained across the country are children whose cases are currently being followed by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), according to Dicko.

Fear of reprisals

Alasane, a Tuareg pastoralist from a small village just outside the town of Timbuktu, told IRIN over the phone, “I’ve heard about innocent people who were arrested, killed and thrown down wells. The victims mainly belonged to minority groups, and I knew it was a risk for me coming to the market.”

He withheld his last name out of fear of reprisals from government troops.

In March, when he heard the French army was working with the Malians, he decided to bring his animals to the market in a town close to where troops were fighting. 

“I had no choice. I needed the money to survive. A cow goes for 100,000-200,000 CFA (US$200-400). If I sell a few of them, I can make enough to provide for my family,” he said.

Coming back from the market, he was stopped and interrogated by a group of soldiers. He was later put in a cell with another prisoner, Moussa Ibrahim [ http://www.irinnews.org/HOV/97844/Moussa-Ibrahim-detained-in-Mali-They-accused-me-of-supporting-the-Islamists ]. Rather than being swiftly transferred to the gendarmerie in Timbuktu, the men remained with their military captors. Alasane was later released. 

ICRC has been able to visit detainees in central Bamako, Kidal, Mopti and Sévaré to monitor their treatment and conditions of detention, and to pass on messages to their families.

Discipline

Human rights groups have urged the gendarmerie to be present during all major round-ups of suspects, and to provide legal representation for the prisoners, sound investigations into their charges, and the right to compensation for those abused or robbed and to the families of those who died while in custody.

Likewise, military officers should more closely monitor their soldiers’ behaviour, said HRW. “A clear military hierarchy to ensure discipline in low-ranking soldiers is needed. We do not believe the abuse is systematic. Many people were also arrested without being abused,” said Dufka.

A lieutenant colonel in the army, who asked to remain anonymous, told IRIN, “The army has been systematically marginalized by political leaders over the past 30 years. We have lost our cohesion, our sense of discipline - arguably the foundation of a good army - and our morale.” 

Some of the alleged abuses that soldiers carried out were undertaken by bandits pretending to be soldiers, he told IRIN, but he noted, “The last time most of these soldiers received training in international human rights was 10 years ago.”

He confirmed that a commission has been set up to investigate allegations of abuse.

Col Didier Dacko, in Gao, told IRIN that when accusations of prisoner mistreatment emerge, the suspected soldiers are immediately transferred to Bamako, where staff investigate the allegations and decide whether the soldiers should be prosecuted. 

Thus far, six soldiers have been transferred to Bamako, according to the Ministry of Justice in Bamako.

kh/aj/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97845/Torture-beatings-and-death-for-detained-Malians</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121349370081t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/GAO 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of northern Malians - many of them ethnic Tuaregs - have been detained by the Malian army since the French military intervention to oust Islamist groups from northern Mali began in January 2013. Many of the detainees have complained they had no idea why they were captured and were not given access to lawyers; others alleged torture.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Unwelcome side effects of mining in Mozambique</title><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201107261238340824t.jpg" />]]>TETE 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - It is 15.45 in the afternoon and two young women are already sitting outside the Night Clinic in Moatize, a small town in Mozambique&apos;s northern Tete Province, near one of the largest coal mines in the southern hemisphere, owned by Brazilian mining giant, Vale. The national 123 road cuts through the town, and the clinic lies just off it, intentionally located to bring its services as close as possible to its target patients: miners, truck drivers and sex workers.</description><body><![CDATA[TETE 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - It is 15.45 and two young women are already sitting outside the Night Clinic in Moatize, a small town in Mozambique's northern Tete Province, near one of the largest coal mines in the southern hemisphere, owned by Brazilian mining giant, Vale. The national 123 road cuts through the town, and the clinic lies just off it, intentionally located to bring its services as close as possible to its target patients: miners, truck drivers and sex workers. 

"When the big mining companies were established here, people started moving in from neighbouring countries: Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia. Tete became a window of hope, but when people don’t find the jobs they hoped to find, many of them end up involved in prostitution or criminality," said Oswaldo Inacio Jossiteala, a programme officer at the International Centre for Reproductive Health (ICRH). 

Every mining boom brings the fear of a rising HIV infection rate, particularly in a country like Mozambique, where the estimated prevalence is already 11.3 percent. 

Although the incidence of infection in Tete has been stable at 7 percent, officials are concerned that this could be changing. In an interview with Radio Mozambique, Domingos Viola, the coordinator of the provincial working group for the fight against HIV/AIDS, noted that in 2012, 35,000 cases of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) were registered in the area, 10,000 of them in Moatize, at the centre of the coal boom, which has just 40,000 residents. 

The recently opened Night Clinic is part of a project called the Improved Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Services for Most at Risk Populations (MARP) in Tete, set up with the goal of reducing STIs and HIV in Tete and Moatize. 

Most of the patients are between 16 and 35 years old, and 30 to 35 receive medical attention every evening. According to Jossiteala, "The target group are often stigmatized when they go to ordinary clinics - we believe they find it easier to come here, and that the new clinic will attract more patients." 

The project is a collaboration between Mozambican health authorities, the International Centre for Reproductive Health, USAID, and the Flemish International Cooperation Agency (FICA) [ http://www.icrh.org/projects/improved-sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights-services-for-most-at-risk-populations-in ]. Vale has contributed $200,000 for the infrastructure, while the local health authority is paying for staff and medicines. 

The Night Clinic has activists working in local communities, at trucks stops and guesthouses, trying to convince target groups to visit and make use of the services. They also lobby for the rights of sex workers in the province. 

"If a sex worker is beaten by a customer, or if a customer doesn’t pay, the women have the right to take the case to court. But since most of them are here illegally, that is very difficult. The women are afraid that the authorities will turn against them, but now we see small changes in the attitudes." 

The Mozambican media last year reported cases of policemen abusing foreign sex workers in Tete and soliciting bribes from them, but Jossiteala noted that since clinic staff began educating sex workers about their rights, this is slowly changing. 

As mining companies flourish in the province, residents are growing increasingly unhappy with the inadequate contribution of the firms to the wellbeing of surrounding communities. Most of the people working in the mines are men under 40 years old, many of them living alone. Américo Conceicão, acting Permanent Secretary of Tete Province, has urged the mining companies to do more. 

"They have internal HIV-programmes, but how their employees act affects the whole community, not just the mining company. They need to work together with the health authorities concerning these issues," he said. 

Carla Mosse, the provincial director of health in Tete, hopes that with the worrying rise in the incidence of STIs and HIV, mining companies will step up and play a bigger role. 

"We are too disorganized. We need to elaborate a provincial plan for social responsibility where we, together with the companies, have decided what they will contribute each year. Now, if we need something we send a letter asking for help, and the answer is always, ‘No, no, no’." 

awn/kn/he 

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97822/Unwelcome-side-effects-of-mining-in-Mozambique</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201107261238340824t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">TETE 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - It is 15.45 in the afternoon and two young women are already sitting outside the Night Clinic in Moatize, a small town in Mozambique&apos;s northern Tete Province, near one of the largest coal mines in the southern hemisphere, owned by Brazilian mining giant, Vale. The national 123 road cuts through the town, and the clinic lies just off it, intentionally located to bring its services as close as possible to its target patients: miners, truck drivers and sex workers.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Better urban planning needed to dodge disasters</title><pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208100944380963t.jpg" />]]>COLOMBO 09 April 2013 (IRIN) - With the world’s mega-cities growing even larger, policymakers - especially those in developing countries - need urban planning that will help these areas withstand the impacts of natural disasters.</description><body><![CDATA[COLOMBO 09 April 2013 (IRIN) - With the world’s mega-cities growing even larger, policymakers - especially those in developing countries - need urban planning that will help these areas withstand the impacts of natural disasters.

The urban population in developing countries is expected to double to four billion people by 2030, from two billion at the start of the century, according to a recent World Bank report [ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSDNET/Resources/Urbanization-Planning-Connecting-Financing-2013.pdf ] on urban planning.

The physical space of these cities is likely to triple in size to 600,000sqkm over the same period, the report revealed, noting that implementing the right planning policies will be “the key to resilient and sustainable development”.

Abhas K. Jha, a World Bank sector manager for urban and disaster risk management in East Asia and the Pacific, based in Washington, DC, told IRIN it is crucial for government officials to build cities’ “resilience” [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97584/Understanding-resilience ] to disaster.

Need risk assessment

“An assessment of the risk levels [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97379/Needs-assessment-fatigue-in-Bangladesh-less-is-more ], a cost-benefit analysis of available interventions, and an inventory of existing capacity and financial resources can guide decision-makers in cities or in national governments in the prioritization of concrete actions,” Jha said.

He added that the first step is to understand risks at the national, regional and city levels.

“We have seen that disasters can wipe out decades of progress [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97655/Tallying-natural-disaster-related-losses ], and that [these] impacts can be felt throughout the whole region and globally, too, through supply chains and trade patterns,” said the Bank expert.

O.P. Agrawal, an urban transport specialist and one of the co-authors of the World Bank report, said planning is paramount to avoid hefty disaster-related bills. “The sooner you get into planning cities, even those cities that are already large, the more cost-effective it will be.”

Having a lead agency helps, he said, “to get good urban planning off the ground” so city services know about one another’s plans, urban emergency services are handled more effectively and land use is regulated more easily.

Urban flooding

South Asia is home to some of the fastest-growing cities worldwide. Some of the main cities in the region include Dhaka, Bangladesh, which has a population of 13-15 million and is home to 37 percent of the country’s people [ http://cusdhaka.org/ ], and Colombo, Sri Lanka, which has a population of 753,000. Both are the main economic engines of their countries and are prone to natural disasters, with floods being a top threat.

“Looking at the economic impacts, urban flooding is becoming increasingly costly as low- and middle-income countries transition to largely urban societies,” Jha said.

Asia has nine of the 10 cities expected to be most prone to coastal flooding by 2070, according to a 2010 World Bank report [ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf ].

Jha told IRIN many cities around the world - including Chicago, New York and Seattle in the US; Enkoping in Sweden; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Manila, Philippines - have actively integrated flood protection into their planning policies.

After months of prolonged flooding in Thailand in late October 2011, experts told IRIN that key ways to prevent urban flooding [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94319/HOW-TO-Build-a-flood-resilient-city ] included developing - and keeping updated - an urban “master plan” that protects concentrations of economic and human capital; spreading out development projects so as to not overload any one city; boosting water resource management; involving the private sector in flood control management; and re-evaluating flood control systems.

India

India, with its exploding urban population - in the last decade, 90 million joined the national urban population - is increasingly taking note of these tips. In densely populated countries like China and India, even small disasters can leave millions affected.

“We have to keep these millions out of harm’s way,” said Asesh Maitra, former director at the School of Planning and Architecture in New Delhi.

The Indian National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) [ http://ndma.gov.in/ndma/index.html ], headed by the prime minister, creates national disaster-management policies. Chief ministers in each of India’s 28 states and officials at 640 district level committees tailor those policies through local laws.

“There are changes taking place. The earthquake and cyclone resistance codes applied to constructions is being changed so that they can withstand disasters. There is also a disaster management institute [ http://nidm.gov.in/default.asp ] that trains [public and private] personnel,” said Maitra.

Originally part of the NDMC, the institute now carries out independent training, research and documentation and provides policy advice and analysis.

But experts say India needs to be more proactive.

The World Bank report gave Mumbai’s urban density policies as an example: Mumbai preserves large zones of uniform, relatively low density - an effort to not overburden the city’s infrastructure - instead of applying caps based on street capacity and width, as is done in Manhattan, New York. The report concluded that India’s uniform-density approach promotes sprawl, whereas the rising land values that accompany increased densities could help fund better infrastructure.

Agrawal, the former Indian administrative official, said India needs to promote “compact cities” that concentrate facilities like housing, transport and public services where people are most likely to move or currently live.

Clustered services, along with good public transit, allow for better land use, make it easier to respond to emergencies, maintain drainage and water retention areas, keep waterways clear, and fight sprawl - which can spawn urban disasters, he explained [ http://www.irinnews.org/In-Depth/97199/102/ ].

Sri Lanka’s flash-flood response

City planners [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91093/SRI-LANKA-Better-planning-regs-needed-to-reduce-flash-flooding ] trying to save Colombo from frequent, and expensive, flash floods know precisely why the city goes underwater so often.

One reason is beyond their control: changing weather patterns have brought short but intense bursts of rains on the densely populated city. The other is preventable: waterways are clogged and water retention areas are insufficient.

“In the last 10 years we have lost 30 percent of our water-retention capacity [in Colombo],” said Rohan Seneviratne, additional secretary to the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development. The loss is due to land reclamation for illegal constructions, including in marshes and wetlands, the official said.

Flooding in May 2010, when over 500mm of rain was recorded in just 24 hours (about one-fourth the average annual rainfall), caused the city some $50 million in losses, according to an internal World Bank assessment.

The government is now digging six new lakes around the capital city in effort to boost rainwater storage. It is also setting up pumping stations at key outlets to the sea to more quickly flush out floodwaters during storms.

The artificial lakes and pumping stations are part of a $233 million project [ http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/02/27/000333038_20120227233002/Rendered/PDF/662580PAD0Box30official0use0only090.pdf ], primarily funded by the World Bank, launched in mid-2012.

The waterway expansion project is scheduled for completion in 2017.

ap/pt/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97814/Analysis-Better-urban-planning-needed-to-dodge-disasters</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208100944380963t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">COLOMBO 09 April 2013 (IRIN) - With the world’s mega-cities growing even larger, policymakers - especially those in developing countries - need urban planning that will help these areas withstand the impacts of natural disasters.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Thousands of Libyan families displaced in the Nafusa Mountains</title><pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304021435030371t.jpg" />]]>MIZDAH 02 April 2013 (IRIN) - Relations between ethnic groups in Libya’s northwestern Nafusa Mountains remain tense several weeks after renewed clashes in the town of Mizdah.</description><body><![CDATA[MIZDAH 02 April 2013 (IRIN) - Relations between ethnic groups in Libya’s northwestern Nafusa Mountains remain tense several weeks after renewed clashes in the town of Mizdah.

Around 1,500 families fled their homes in March when heavily armed fighters from the Qantrar and Meshashya communities clashed in early March. The fight lasted five days, killing nine people, according to the head of the town’s local council, Abdel Hakim Bedran.

Humanitarian agencies have been providing displaced persons, some of them still in Mizdah, with food, medical supplies and non-food packs, including blankets and cooking equipment.

“We had no water or electricity for two weeks,” Mizdah resident Mohamed Hussein said, collecting a piece of pipe perforated by a bullet. “Meshashya fired on the water pipes on purpose to vex our people and make them go away.”

Hussein is a member of the Qantrar, one of the two major communities that have lived together in the town for around a century. 

The National Mobile Force, a unit of the Libyan army, has taken control of the town, 180km south of Tripoli, to put a stop to the fighting, but residents told IRIN that they felt the situation was precarious and that around half the population had fled.

A divided town

The town centre has become a front in the ethnic conflict, in which around 400 homes from both sides have been looted and burned, according to Bedran.

Before the March clashes, the town was already split - Qantrar living in the south and west, and Meshashya families living in the neighbourhoods to the east and north.

“My parents and my brothers and sisters now live in our relatives’ place in Janzoor, in Tripoli,” Hussein told IRIN, looking at debris of his home, which is located exactly on the boundary line between Qantrar and Meshashya neighbourhoods.

In June 2012, the second floor of his house was hit by mortars during an earlier bout of interethnic fighting; in March’s fighting, the ground floor was completely destroyed.

“Today, two of my brothers and I are here just to watch the house and to prevent looting,” he said.

The town’s general hospital is located in a Meshashya area, making access difficult for Qantrar people. The building is frequently without water, and many of the doctors have fled.

“Before the revolution both tribes could receive assistance at the public hospital, but now the Qantrar cannot reach the place,” Aisha Ibrahim, a resident from the Meshashya clan, told IRIN.

The hospital cannot guarantee treatment despite receiving some supplies from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Wounded people have been transferred to the larger hospital facilities elsewhere in the region, according to Mohmmed Alsweii, head of the Libyan Humanitarian Relief Agency (LibAid).

Education has also taken a hit: “The schools are frequently stopped because it is dangerous to go around in the city,” said Aisha, who fled her home in June 2012.

While there are primary schools functioning in both communities’ neighbourhoods, secondary schools have been closed since June, and Aisha’s eldest daughter can no longer attend school. Her husband has also been unable to get to his office in a Qantrar part of town.

Delivering aid

Although the ICRC, LibAid, Mercy Corps, Libyan Red Crescent and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have delivered hundreds of food rations, blankets and other items in Mizdah and nearby villages, many of the displaced told IRIN that they had not received any assistance apart from that provided by host communities.

“The Red Cross distributed humanitarian aid only during the fighting,” Nasra Musbah told IRIN. She is a member of the Meshashya community and has lived in the nearby town of Shgiga since Qantrar militia destroyed her house in Mizdah in June.

She lives in a makeshift shelter with her husband and her 16-month old child. She is also pregnant and says she had no money to buy the medicine she needs.

“The distribution of aid is a delicate operation. It is not easy to reach all the people in need. We try to pay attention to people with special needs, such as widows and war invalids, who are not personally able to withdraw [from] aid,” Asma Awan Khalik of ICRC told IRIN.

But many of the displaced told IRIN they felt abandoned.

On 14 June 2012, Ramadan left Mizdah with his family, his parents and his sister’s family after their house was destroyed. “We spent a night in the desert, south of Mizdah. We went there because we had nowhere else to go.”

Ramadan now lives with his family in a compound on the outskirts of Tripoli, in the district of Gyps. The compound consists of 10 apartments, all inhabited by Qantrar families.

“So far, we have only received food aid from some good-hearted people. Obviously, I would not call it humanitarian aid.”

LibAid told IRIN that it was difficult reaching all the IDPs because they are not concentrated in one area.

A need for reconciliation

The tension between the two communities goes back far beyond the recent civil war.

Qantrar leaders say their presence in the mountains long pre-dates the arrival of the Meshashya, who some Qantrar leaders accuse of illegally occupying their land. “[Former Libyan leader Mummar] Gaddafi gave the land to Meshashya, known in Libya as his historical supporters,” said Hussein.

According to members of the Qantrar community, Meshashya were settled in the area by the Italian colonial authorities, and their status was reinforced during Gaddafi’s 42-year rule, as part of an attempt to undermine the influence of the Qantrar. 

For their part, Meshashya leaders say the Qantrar community wrongly accuses them of being Gaddafi supporters. They say the Qantrar have unfairly seized their land.

“We were with them to fight during the revolution. But now they want to get rid of us,” said Muna, from the Meshashya community. She has been living with relatives since her home was destroyed in clashes in June 2012.

Five elders from the National Reconciliation Committee, appointed from the city of Tobruk, which is seen as neutral, have been seeking to calm tensions in the Nafusa Mountains since July.

“We delayed our engagement in the Mizdah crisis, but since the recent clashes we have started enacting a series of proposals,” committee member Hussein Al Habbani told IRIN.

Following last month’s violence, the National Reconciliation Committee set up an arbitration committee made up of five retired judges with the power to help solve legal problems related to housing, land and property disputes - widely seen as the underlying causes of the ethnic tension.

Property rights are complex in Libya because of resettlements, nationalization and land redistribution policies from the colonial and Gaddafi eras, and also because the latter oversaw the public destruction of property records in 1986.

Al Habbani says they will try to resolve disputes amicably: “No one will be evicted by force. The first option is to compensate the legitimate owner and to let families live where they have been living in the last decades.”

But he said the recent violence was about more than property rights.

“If the crisis in Mizdah is related only to property issue, it will be very easy to be solved. But there are other elements.”

He said that pro-Gaddafi fighters were still active in the Meshashya community, and added that the reconciliation committee had reported the names of alleged fighters to the Ministry of Defence.

np/jj/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97772/Thousands-of-Libyan-families-displaced-in-the-Nafusa-Mountains</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304021435030371t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MIZDAH 02 April 2013 (IRIN) - Relations between ethnic groups in Libya’s northwestern Nafusa Mountains remain tense several weeks after renewed clashes in the town of Mizdah.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In Congo, thousands still homeless one year after munitions blasts</title><pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203230906150052t.jpg" />]]>BRAZZAVILLE 28 March 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people remain homeless in the Republic of Congo (ROC) one year after being displaced following a deadly munitions blast at an army barracks in the capital, Brazzaville. The 4 March 2012 blast, in the area of Mpila, east of the capital, left some 282 people dead and 2,300 others injured, according to officials.</description><body><![CDATA[BRAZZAVILLE 28 March 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people remain homeless in the Republic of Congo (ROC) one year after being displaced following a deadly munitions blast [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95143/CONGO-Thousands-still-homeless-after-munitions-blast ] at an army barracks in the capital, Brazzaville. The 4 March 2012 blast, in the area of Mpila, east of the capital, left some 282 people dead and 2,300 others injured, according to officials. 

“We have not relocated all those affected to date. We are relocating them gradually, as we are building houses on selected sites,” Emilienne Raoul, the ROC minister for humanitarian action, told IRIN. 

“For a long time, the disaster-affected have remained traumatized, especially the children. It’s difficult to forget this disaster,” Raoul continued. 

Thousands of people who were left homeless after the March 2012 blast - which was actually a series of explosions - sought refuge in several sites around the capital. 

Still waiting

At present, at least 1,400 people are still living in tents at site number 17, west of Brazzaville. 

In the surburb of Kintélé, 25km north of Brazzaville, the ROC government has built houses on 10 hectares of land. About 300 affected families have already been settled there. 

“Here, we have the bare minimum: water, electricity, modern toilets and sanitation,” Ago Ngoulou, 43, told IRIN. Ngoulou is living in Kintélé after losing all his property in the explosions. “But transport is a headache. The site is far from the city centre.”

Most of those affected by the blasts have returned to the area of Mpila, where 2,000 families have received tents for shelter. Conditions there are difficult. 

“We set up the tents between the sides of the walls of our destroyed hoses. We are at the mercy of the elements, insects and dangerous animals such as snakes,” complained army Sgt Jules Engambé.
In the vicinity, vegetation grown over the shells of burnt up military tanks and vehicles.

The ROC government has set aside some 60 billion CFA (US$120 million) to assist the affected households - about 50 people crippled in the blast will receive a monthly allowance of 140,000 francs ($280).

In September 2012, the ROC government and China signed a number of financial agreements totalling 970 million euros (about $1.2 billion), most of which will go towards reconstructing Mpila. Reconstruction work will start in 2013, in consultation with the land owners, according to the planning minister, Jean-Jacques Bouya.

The process of decontaminating the explosion site, which started days after the early 2012 blasts, is expected to end on 31 March, the proposed date for the start of the reconstruction work. 

“The munitions that were exploded were scattered over a 3km radius,” said Cpt Cyr Andsi, the mine clearance head, adding that quality controls had been carried out to ensure the safety of people in Mpila.

Inquest 

Members of an inquest into the cause of the 4 March 2012 explosions in Mpila initially suspected that the blasts had been due to an electric fault. But according to the ROC prosecutor Essamy Ngatsé, “This theory no longer holds.”

At least 30 people have so far been arrested and charged, among them 23 military officers who were said to have breached state security and committed arson. But their case files have, for a long time, been circulating between various offices of the judiciary, including the court of appeals and the supreme court.

“If the trial proceeds based on this cacophony that we have observed, it’s hard to believe that it will be a just and fair trial,” said Roche Euloge Nzobo of the Congolese Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH).

lmm/aw/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97751/In-Congo-thousands-still-homeless-one-year-after-munitions-blasts</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203230906150052t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BRAZZAVILLE 28 March 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people remain homeless in the Republic of Congo (ROC) one year after being displaced following a deadly munitions blast at an army barracks in the capital, Brazzaville. The 4 March 2012 blast, in the area of Mpila, east of the capital, left some 282 people dead and 2,300 others injured, according to officials.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The view from the ground: How drone strikes hamper aid</title><pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303191149230977t.jpg" />]]>AMMAN/DUBAI 20 March 2013 (IRIN) - Drone strikes have been the subject of much debate since their use in counter-terrorism operations spiked in 2009 and 2010. But in all the debate, one question has rarely been asked: How are drone strikes affecting humanitarian work on the ground?</description><body><![CDATA[AMMAN/DUBAI 20 March 2013 (IRIN) - In recent years, the legality and civilian casualties of the secretive American drone programme have increasingly been the subject of much discussion. But one question has gone largely unasked: What is the impact of drone warfare on humanitarian work?

“The public debate, rightly so, has focused on the transparency and targeting of drones, but for humanitarians, there are a whole set of much more specific concerns that we don’t necessarily have answers on and ought to be thinking about,” says Naz Modirzadeh, a senior fellow at Harvard Law School and a leading expert on the intersection between counterterrorism and humanitarian aid.

In places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, strikes by unmanned planes are increasingly affecting humanitarian operations, aid workers say, necessitating a greater discussion by humanitarians on how to deal with the impact and a greater focus by US policymakers on how to mitigate it.

The issue will be increasingly relevant in coming years, as drones, also used in Somalia, Yemen and Gaza, become an ever more popular weapon of choice in counter-terrorism operations.

The legal framework

One of the first questions of relevance for humanitarians is the legal framework under which the drone strikes operate and whether international humanitarian law (IHL), which protects humanitarian access and aid workers, applies.

Last month, NBC News made public a US Justice Department white paper [ http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf ] making the legal case for drone strikes “outside [an] area of active hostilities”, in which IHL traditionally applies. It argued the USA was engaged in a geographically boundless non-international armed conflict with non-state armed groups - essentially claiming that it is “at war everywhere all the time”, as one international lawyer put it.

In the white paper, the US argues its counter-terrorism programme will be “informed by” what it presents as four core principles of IHL - necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity.  But it is not clear whether this is a binding interpretation of the law or a flexible policy statement.  

Modirzadeh argues there are unanticipated costs of waging conflict in what she calls “fuzzy international legal terms”.

“A purported global non-international armed conflict, fought through weaponized unmanned vessels, whatever its status under international law, raises fundamental questions about how the humanitarian community will engage with states in order to ensure that lifesaving supplies reach the civilian population,” she told IRIN.

“If strikes target a particular region (such as in Yemen or Pakistan), what state, if any, has an obligation to ensure the population has access to relief operations? With whom do humanitarians interact to negotiate access? Can the territorial state reasonably be expected to offer meaningful and secure access? Does the targeting state have any obligations under IHL relevant to humanitarian assistance? Does human rights law [apply] as the dominant set of rules relevant to the basic needs of the population?”

In an attempt to answer some of these questions, the UN special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism in January launched [ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/130124_SRCTBenEmmersonQCStatement.pdf ] an inquiry into the civilian impact of the use of drones, focusing on the applicable legal framework. He will present findings and recommendations to the UN General Assembly later this year.

Perceptions of neutrality

In the meantime, aid workers are already feeling the impact on the ground.

Like other counter-terrorism methods, including other air strikes and night raids, drone strikes have in many cases created environments of suspicion and paranoia, even witch-hunts, with perceived collaborators hunted down and in some cases executed in front of video cameras [ http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/world/asia/drone-war-in-pakistan-spurs-militants-to-deadly-reprisals.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 ].

In this environment, how do you manage perceptions of humanitarians’ neutrality? To varying degrees, aid workers have been able to distance themselves from traditional military associations: checkpoints, troops, convoys. But how can you distance yourself from a drone strike?

Take the May 2008 US missile attack on al-Shabab leader Aden Hashi Ayro in Somalia as an indicator. According to NGO security officials there, attacks by armed groups on aid workers rose from one or two per month leading up to his assassination, to 6-11 per month for the rest of the year. Aid workers were abducted and two US NGOs working in the area of the strike shut down operations as a result.

“That was kind of a turning point in al-Shabab suspicion towards humanitarian actors,” said Jeremy Konyndyk, director of policy and advocacy at Mercy Corps, which was working in Somalia at the time. “The fact that foreign NGOs were operating in the same area where the strike had occurred was enough to put them at severe risk.”

Pakistan is a more recent case in point of how even the prospect of drone strikes can compound tensions.

In 2011, Pakistani investigators alleged that a doctor running a vaccination campaign in northeastern Pakistan was an undercover CIA agent trying to gather information on the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden.

“That did a tremendous amount of harm to the humanitarian community,” said Sarah Holewinski, executive director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict.

According to one volunteer who has worked with government vaccination teams in Khyber Agency, one of Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas: “Because of drones and the Dr. Shakil Afridi case, all health workers are looked on with suspicion.”

Citing the case, in June 2012, a local Taliban commander in North Waziristan Agency, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, distributed pamphlets in the town of Miramshah banning polio vaccinations [ http://tribune.com.pk/story/394714/no-polio-drives-in-n-waziristan-unless-drone-strikes-stop-hafiz-gul-bahadur/ ] until drone strikes stopped. He alleged the campaign was a cover for US spies. Until now, vaccinations have not resumed in many parts of North Waziristan.

The Pakistani volunteer, who requested anonymity, said hostility worsens after a drone strike. "In villages, we have been accused of being Western agents and [have had] jibes hurled at us,” he told IRIN. “My relatives warn me not to do this vaccination work as my life could be at risk.”

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Humanitarian Policy Group raised the issue in research with the Taliban last year.

“Fighters recalled retaliating against local aid workers present after drone attacks and airstrikes, assuming that they were responsible for passing on intelligence,” Ashley Jackson, an ODI research fellow, told IRIN. “Aid workers gathering information for programming or assessing needs - even basic information - become suspect for asking questions, and are often blamed [by] the Taliban in the aftermath of such strikes.”

Collecting information

Organizations working in rural areas of Afghanistan, who use GPS coordinates as a more reliable way of tracking the people they help in remote villages, say they have had more difficulty collecting beneficiary information in the last year and a half or so.

“If you are running around with maps, or even a large watch that could be mistaken for a GPS, people are very uncomfortable,” said one aid worker working with a USAID-funded programme in tribal areas of Afghanistan.

Third-party organizations doing monitoring and evaluation of NGO programmes have in some cases refused to offer the option of taking GPS coordinates because it has become too dangerous.

“It has made collecting information really difficult,” the aid worker said. Even where they are able to get the information, “now we are worried about where that information goes,” not only for privacy reasons, but also security reasons.

In addition, counter-terrorism legislation has required aid agencies to do more vetting than usual in areas where drone strikes occur, Modirzadeh points out. “If you are asking all sorts of questions of your partners and vendors and one week later there is a drone strike, who is going to be blamed?”

Protection of civilians

One of the main concerns humanitarians have is who to liaise with when things go wrong, to secure safe access and to advocate the protection of civilians.

“Who do you call when an intelligence agency is running strikes and there are no operations on the ground?” Modirzadeh asks.

While the protection of civilians eventually became an important pillar of the US counter-insurgency approach, because it contributed to “winning hearts and minds”, the shift to counter-terrorism has placed the well-being of civilian populations on the back-burner, Holewinski says.

“The CIA is not going to sit down with humanitarian organizations and explain their operations and discuss how they can protect each other’s space. It’s an inherently clandestine organization.”

In 2012, an aid worker with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) died [ http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/yemen-news-2012-06-20.htm] of shrapnel wounds after an air strike in southern Yemen.

“This is the cost of being vague about legal obligations,” Modirzadeh says.

Some say this is a new face to an old problem, but the remotely-controlled nature of the operations does add a unique challenge.  Many of those who have tried to dialogue with drone strike operations have hit a brick wall.

ODI’s Jackson was working with Oxfam in Afghanistan 2010 and 2011 when a drone strike caused civilian casualties near the eastern city of Jalalabad. She tried to determine who was responsible for the strike, but “it’s incredibly difficult to get to anyone,” she said.

The drones might fly out of the same airbase as the regular military but have a completely separate chain of command, leading to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US military special operations forces’ Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).  

Jackson’s colleagues in Washington tried to arrange meetings with US officials, but “humanitarians don’t formally interface with the CIA or certain parts of the Pentagon who control this.” In the end, she said, “we had zero success.”

But others feel they are getting somewhere. While the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)’s 2012 report on the protection of civilians tracked only five drone strikes which resulted in civilian deaths and injuries, it did share its concerns with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the view that there is close cooperation between ISAF and the CIA and that the commander of ISAF has purview over any weapons used on his battle space
[ http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=zYmVmJCwBe4%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US ].

“They are ultimately responsible from our point of view,” said James Rodehaver, deputy director of UNAMA’s human rights unit. “There is more than enough ability on the part of the forces here to track what sort of weapon is operating in their area and where the orders to order the strike came from,” he told IRIN.

Because of a “decent flow of information”, UNAMA does have a “direct line for advocacy and for messaging”, he said, with concerns shared with ISAF presumably reaching responsible authorities outside Afghanistan, for example US military’s Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. At times, the interaction works extremely well; at others, “it takes more effort”, including delays while ISAF determines what it can and cannot share publicly.

But ISAF often provides UNAMA with relevant information, which helps the Mission confirm whether air operations - including drone strikes - occurred in a specific place at a specific time. Advocacy with ISAF more broadly has been successful in getting international forces to change tactical directives, train its forces, and ensure Standard Operating Procedures are enforced so as to reduce civilian casualties. Rodehaver urges that practical directives issued for aerial operations also be applied to drones for clearer policy guidance so that advocacy on drone strikes specifically can have a similar impact on operations.

But humanitarians are more skeptical. “The military will tell you, ‘Those are not our guys. We don’t know what to tell you’,” one researcher said.

In places like Yemen, where there is no international military force on the ground, the challenges of finding an interlocutor are that much more acute.

One option for dealing with this challenge would be some kind of special operations interface, but logistically, this would be very difficult. Special Forces on the ground are “wearing beards and blending in”. Making their presence overt would open them up to attack and would expose the quiet consent of national governments who allow them to operate on their territory.

“But it’s an important function the US government has to have,” Holewinski says, “whether it is on the ground or somewhere else.”

When her organization, which recently wrote a report [ http://civiliansinconflict.org/resources/pub/the-civilian-impact-of-drones ] on the unexamined costs of drones, tried to lobby US senators and members of Congress for greater oversight of the drone programme, not a single one responded to requests for meetings.

The way forward

The American use of armed drones has risen considerably in recent years. According to UNAMA [ http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=zYmVmJCwBe4%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US ], the number of weapons released by drones in Afghanistan jumped from 294 in 2011 to 506 in 2012, a 72 percent increase. But from the limited information available, it appears civilian casualties have not followed the same curve.  

Several organizations, including The Bureau of Investigative Journalism [ http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/01/11/obama-2012-strikes/ ] and PakistanBodyCount.org [ http://pakistanbodycount.org/drone_attack ], have tried tracking civilian deaths caused by drone strikes, but researchers have questioned their methodologies [ http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/COLUMBIACountingDronesFinalNotEmbargo.pdf ], which are largely based on analyzing press reports. As such, Howlenski argues, “nobody really knows” the true number of civilians killed by drones.  

Still, the New America Foundation [ http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones ], which has among the most conservative estimates, says civilian casualties have accounted for about 14 percent of drone-related killings during Obama’s tenure - down from 46 percent during the Bush administration. In 2012, that percentage was down to 1.7, though another 9.3 percent of casualties’ identities were unknown, the Foundation said.

But concern over the use of drones has, if anything, increased. Researchers expect other countries to start using drones, if they have not already (Israel, for example, has reportedly used drone strikes in Gaza) [ http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/middleeast/israeli-drone-strike-kills-militants-in-gaza.html?_r=0 ]. With troops pulling out of Afghanistan in 2014, the trend is likely to continue.

“If you have fewer troops on the ground, and you have less transparency and [drones] is the way they increasingly fight the war, it will increasingly be an issue for civilians and as such for aid workers,” Jackson said.

And while the US government is under more and more pressure to address civilian casualties of drone strikes, observers say the impact of drones on humanitarian action is almost surely not on the radar screen.

“We are… concerned that there are consequences to covert drone strikes that policymakers and the public may underestimate or fail to recognize,” the Center for Civilians in Conflict wrote in its report.

It urged more disclosure on drone warfare in order to inform public debate and an inter-agency task force in the US that would evaluate, among other things, the strategic value and humanitarian impact of covert drone strikes compared to other counterterrorism approaches.

“A fundamental shift may be slowly, if haltingly, emerging,” Modirzadeh said. “It is very difficult to do things in secret anymore and we are likely to see a legal and political debate about this in the years to come.”

kh/ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97690/The-view-from-the-ground-How-drone-strikes-hamper-aid</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303191149230977t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">AMMAN/DUBAI 20 March 2013 (IRIN) - Drone strikes have been the subject of much debate since their use in counter-terrorism operations spiked in 2009 and 2010. But in all the debate, one question has rarely been asked: How are drone strikes affecting humanitarian work on the ground?</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Beyond the E-1 Israeli settlement</title><pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/200709115t.jpg" />]]>JERUSALEM 18 March 2013 (IRIN) - A controversial Israeli settlement plan, known as E-1, has garnered much attention in the media. But Israel has also been moving forward with equally controversial settlement plans under less scrutiny and with unusual speed. As US President Barack Obama prepares to visit the region this week, IRIN takes a look at some of the details that have been overlooked in the discussion.</description><body><![CDATA[JERUSALEM 18 March 2013 (IRIN) - Last month, an international fact-finding mission on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) commissioned by the UN Human Rights Council found [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A-HRC-22-63_en.pdf ] that settlements constituted a violation of international human rights and humanitarian law and called on Israel to stop all expansions immediately and withdraw from settlements. 

A controversial Israeli plan, known as E-1, to build thousands of housing units and hotel rooms near the Ma’ale Adummim settlement, has garnered much attention in the media because it would sever Palestinian East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. (See IRIN’s briefing on E-1 here.) [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97644/Briefing-Inside-the-E-1-Israeli-settlement ]

But at the same time, Israel has been moving forward with equally controversial settlement plans under less scrutiny and with unusual speed. 

As US President Barack Obama prepares to visit the region this week, IRIN takes a look at some of the details that have been overlooked in the discussion.

What’s the Giv’at HaMatos plan?

According to Israeli NGO Ir Amim (“City of Nations”), which works to preserve Jerusalem as a home for both Jews and Palestinians, one settlement plan of “critical importance” is Giv’at HaMatos. 

In a sense, Giv’at HaMatos does in the south what E-1 does in the east. The planned large housing and hotel complex at the southern perimeter of Jerusalem would further disrupt the contiguity of land between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank required for a future Palestinian state, seriously impeding a two-state solution, research and rights groups say [ http://peacenow.org.il/eng/GivatHamatosEng ]. It would also mark the first new settlement construction in Jerusalem since 1997. 

“All construction is problematic but there are several plans that are, in our view, more dangerous if implemented,” Hagit Ofran, director of the Settlement Watch project at the Israeli NGO Peace Now, told IRIN. “Giv’at HaMatos is the most dangerous plan that is now approved.”

Part of the plan - to build 2,612 units - was approved by the Jerusalem Regional Planning Committee on 19 December. 

Most of Giv’at HaMatos is currently uninhabited, but according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), which recently released a two-part report [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/134-extreme-makeover-i-israels-politics-of-land-and-faith-in-east-jerusalem.aspx ] on the future of East Jerusalem, its build-up would cut off Arab neighbourhoods in southern Jerusalem, like Beit Safafa and Sharafat, rendering them “Palestinian enclaves”. 

Giv’at HaMatos would connect the dots of several other planned or expanding settlements along southern Jerusalem - including Giv’at Yael in the southwest; and Har Homa and East Talpiyot in the southeast - forming “a long Jewish continuum severing Bethlehem’s urban continuum from Palestinian Jerusalem”, ICG said. Last year, the Israeli government also approved more than 2,000 new units in neighbouring Gilo.

This kind of attachment to Jewish expansions could make peace negotiations even harder. 

“From an Israeli public opinion perspective, Giv’at HaMatos is in the municipal border of Jerusalem,” Ofran said. “It’s considered a legitimate part of Israel.” 

Barak Cohen, the Jerusalem Municipality's adviser for foreign affairs and media, told IRIN Giv’at HaMatos is part of Jerusalem’s “natural and much-needed growth”, allowing both Arab and Jewish landowners to develop their properties.

Indeed, part of the Giv’at HaMatos plan, approved on 18 December, allows for the building of 549 units for Palestinians - though Betty Herschman, director of international relations and advocacy at Ir Amim, points out much of it retroactively legalizes building that has already been completed. The figures, she added, amount to just over one-fifth of the Jewish expansion. 

Still, Cohen insisted, the development would benefit Jerusalem as a whole: “Not planning and developing Jerusalem neighbourhoods ultimately harms all residents and landowners - Arabs and Jews alike.”

Last year, Israel also issued tenders for the construction of 606 new housing units north of East Jerusalem, in the Ramot settlement, just north of the Green Line marking the border between Israel and the West Bank, and approved another 1,500 units in the neighbouring settlement of Ramot Shlomo, according to Ir Amim. 

What other settlements are planned?

Beyond Jerusalem, there was movement on a number of other settlements projects [ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hagit-ofran/israel-west-bank-settlements_b_1616793.html ] in disputed areas, according to Settlement Watch.

In June 2012, the Israeli government announced it would build 851 new units in the West Bank, including more than 230 in the controversial settlements of Ariel and Efrat. Like Giv’at HaMatos, these two settlements make a contiguous Palestinian territory impossible, Settlement Watch says [ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hagit-ofran/israel-west-bank-settlements_b_1616793.html ].

Overall, settlements expanded much faster than usual last year.

In 2012 [ http://peacenow.org.il/eng/2012-summary ] the Israeli government approved the construction of 6,676 settler housing units in the West Bank, compared with 1,607 in 2011 and several hundred in 2010, according to Peace Now. 

For plans that were already approved, it issued more than 3,000 tenders to construction contractors - more than any other year in the last decade, Peace Now said [ http://www.peacenow.org.il/eng/sites/default/files/ConstructionAndTenders_forPublication.xls ]. Construction has actually begun on 1,747 homes [ http://peacenow.org/images/Summary%20of%20the%204%20years%20of%20Netanyahu%20Government.pdf ].

Regardless of the settlements, Palestinians, especially in Area C, are under immense pressure. Recent weeks have seen a considerable upswing in demolitions of Palestinian structures. According to the Displacement Working Group, a grouping of aid agencies helping displaced families, Israeli forces destroyed 139 Palestinian structures, including 59 homes, in January - almost triple 2012’s monthly average. The demolitions occurred in East Jerusalem and the West Bank - with a majority taking place in Area C - and left 251 Palestinians, including over 150 children, displaced. 

The office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the (Palestinian) Territories (COGAT) told IRIN there was no connection between the removal of unauthorized buildings and the construction of Israeli settlements. “All construction in the West Bank is subject to building codes and planning laws and unauthorized constructions are dealt with accordingly,” the office said in an email. 

What are the knock-on effects?

Settlements are often discussed through the lens of their illegality under international law or as obstacles to a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. But everything associated with the settlements - including Israeli-only infrastructure, the separation barrier, military checkpoints, restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement, suppression of freedom of expression and political life, and control of Palestinian natural resources - causes a ripple effect through Palestinian society, adversely impacting the people [ http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settlements_FactSheet_December_2012_english.pdf ].

The UN estimates there are now 520,000 Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, with 43 percent of the land there allocated to local and regional settlement councils. According to the UN Secretary-General, Israel has transferred roughly 8 percent of its citizens into OPT since the 1970s, altering the demographic composition of the territory and furthering the Palestinian people from their right to self-determination. 

Baker, of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, said a future Palestinian state should include a Jewish minority. “The assumption behind this… is that Jews have no right to live in the West Bank, an assumption that we reject. In fact we see ourselves as the true indigenous people of this land.”

But Israeli settlements have violated Palestinian rights to equality under the law, to religious freedom and to freedom of movement, according to the UN fact-finding mission. They have also eroded Palestinian access to water and to agricultural assets, and the ability to develop economically, it said. 

For example, Bedouins from the Palestinian village of Khan Al Ahmar, northeast of E-1, cannot sell their dairy products at their traditional Souq Al Ahmar market any more. Because of movement restrictions (they hold West Bank IDs and lack the proper permits to enter East Jerusalem), they cannot get there.

The UN secretary-general has said that Palestinians “have virtually no control” over the water resources in the West Bank, with 86 percent of the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea under the de facto jurisdiction of the settlement regional councils. 

There is a statistical correlation between Palestinians’ proximity to settlements and their rates of food insecurity, according to a UN and government survey [ http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/47d4e277b48d9d3685256ddc00612265/75cc20e011b5c5b985257a46004e6518?OpenDocument ], which found that one quarter of Palestinians who live in Area C, home to the largest number of settlements in the West Bank, are food insecure. In Areas A and B, the average rate of food insecurity is 17 percent. 

In addition, “all spheres of Palestinian life are being significantly affected by a minority of settlers who are engaged in violence and intimidation with the aim of forcing Palestinians off their land,” the mission said.

Operation Dove, an international organization working in the Palestinian village of At-Tuwani and the South Hebron Hills, reported that Palestinian children have a very hard time going to school due to settler attacks. 

The UN and rights groups say radical settlers use violence against Palestinians with impunity and their illegal outposts are often recognized and retroactively legalized by the government. 

Since the occupation began, Israel has detained hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, some of them without charge, and some of them children. Most of the minors are arrested “at friction points, such as a village near a settlement or a road used by the army or settlers”, the fact-finding mission said. 

Israel uses what they term “administrative detention” when it considers the detainee a threat to the security of the state.

Ir Amim’s Herschman says Israel is also attempting to create a “greater Jerusalem” through additional means, for example: the Israeli separation barrier, planned national parks, and the construction of highways dividing villages, dispossessing Palestinians of their land and making it harder for them to access services like schools and mosques. 

In recent weeks, residents of the Palestinian village of Beit Safafa have been protesting against the planned extension of the Begin Highway that would divide their village in order to connect major Israeli settlement blocks outside the city to Jerusalem.

The planned root of the separation barrier, in addition to a potential national park around the perimeter of the barrier would also close off nearby Palestinian village al-Wallajeh. 

The planned route of the barrier extends all the way around and far beyond Muale Adummim and in other areas south and north of Jerusalem. “These lines are a unilateral declaration of a much greater Jerusalem, a unilateral expanding of the boundaries, an exponential increase,” she told IRIN. 

Or as the ICG put it, “for many Arab East Jerusalemites, the battle for their city is all but lost.”

mg/ha/cb

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This is the second in a two-part series on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

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]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97676/Briefing-Beyond-the-E-1-Israeli-settlement</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/200709115t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JERUSALEM 18 March 2013 (IRIN) - A controversial Israeli settlement plan, known as E-1, has garnered much attention in the media. But Israel has also been moving forward with equally controversial settlement plans under less scrutiny and with unusual speed. As US President Barack Obama prepares to visit the region this week, IRIN takes a look at some of the details that have been overlooked in the discussion.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Security of Christian communities “precarious” in Libya - archbishop</title><pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303141431380034t.jpg" />]]>TRIPOLI 15 March 2013 (IRIN) - Various Christian communities in Libya, as well as some Muslim groups, have been feeling increasingly under pressure from hardline Islamist groups since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011.</description><body><![CDATA[TRIPOLI 15 March 2013 (IRIN) - Various Christian communities in Libya, as well as some Muslim groups, have been feeling increasingly under pressure from hardline Islamist groups since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011.

“The level of security remains precarious for all foreigners, especially for Christians, because of the presence of some fundamentalist Islamic groups,” Giovanni Martinelli, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Tripoli, told IRIN.

“It is a new phenomenon that emerged during elections last July,” he said.

Nearly all Libyans are Sunni Muslims; members of other religious groups tend to be foreign residents, though Christianity has maintained a presence since Roman times.

“I think the [recent] arrests of Egyptian Christians do certainly seem to highlight a mounting issue,” said Joe Stork, deputy director of Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division.

“There are different things going on and underlying this are two problems; firstly a problem of lawlessness and the absence of a well-functioning law-enforcement or justice system, and secondly I think there’s a real order problem with the militias.”

The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) issued a statement last week saying it deeply concerned by recent incidents, including violence against a Coptic Christian church and other religious buildings, as well as attacks on the media [ http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3561&ctl=Details&mid=8549&ItemID=1115583&language=en-US ].

“The universal values of tolerance, moderation, and respect for differences are deeply rooted in Libyan society’s religious and cultural heritage,” said Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Tarek Mitri.

“These values should be the foundation upon which the new Libya is built.”

During Gaddafi’s 41-year rule the government’s surveillance network kept a tight lid on religious extremism and thousands of radical Muslims were imprisoned, but many helped overthrow Gaddafi, forming armed militia groups across the country.

Since the end of the fighting, some Salafists, who favour a literalist interpretation of Islam, have carried out hundreds of attacks on the mosques, tombs and shrines of other sects of Islam, particularly Sufis.

In the centre of the Libyan capital Tripoli the Sha'ab ad-Dahman mosque was demolished in August along with around 50 Sufi graves, including the tombs of Libyan Muslim scholar Abdullah al-Sha'ab.

Social media footage shows Libyan security forces present during the destructions without intervening. The Libyan Herald news site reported that three journalists from the Al-Assema television station were detained by security forces as they tried to cover the destruction.

The Libyan interim interior minister Fawzi Abdelaei resigned after the incident and the President of Libyan National Congress Mohamed Magarief said “The people responsible for those attacks are unfortunately aligned The SSC was created at the end of the civil war in October 2011 by the National Transitional Council as a way to provide more centralized security in the capital Tripoli.

Most Libyan experts and media blame the coordinated destructions of mosques and shrines on the Libyan Salafi network Ansar al-Sharia.

In Salafi perspective, the destructions are necessary in order “to avoid idolatry”, prevent “religious corruption” and prohibit the spread of other religious deviations such as “black magic”.  

Insecurity is one of the key concerns of the new government, which is still in the process of setting up a modern police force and national army.

Spate of attacks on Christians

The last few weeks have seen a number of attacks on Christian communities including an incident in Tripoli when an armed man entered San Francesco Catholic Church in Dahara and opened fire on the priest.

“He wanted to kill him as he opened fire with an AK-47 some 2-3 metres away,” said Archbishop Martinelli, explaining that the incident is under investigation.

The church gates have now been reinforced, but churchgoers are not feeling very reassured. “I continue to hold tightly the cross on my chest. But I'm afraid,” said Sonia (she only gave one name), who originally comes from Aleppo in Syria but has lived in Libya for 35 years. “I am Armenian, one of the few dozen Armenians left in the country since the beginning of the revolution in Libya. We are very concerned about security.”

Eastern parts of the country appear to be the worst affected by threats against, and attacks on, Christians.

On 3 March, extremist group Ansar Al Sahri'a (allegedly involved in the attack on the US consulate on 11 September 2012) surrounded the Benghazi European School (BES), and accused the teachers of promoting pornography: Sex education materials given to the students were deemed unacceptable.

On 28 February a gunman attacked a Coptic Orthodox church in Benghazi, assaulting two priests, though they were not injured.

Around the same time, 50-100 Copts in the city (Egyptian workers in Libya) were detained on charges of “spreading Christianity”.  According to the authorities, they were in possession of bibles, Christian books and sacred images.

On 17 February (two-year anniversary of the revolution) four Christians - a Swedish-American, an Egyptian, a South African and a South Korean - were arrested by a “Preventive Security” unit on charges of proselytizing and distributing religious literature. The four missionaries are awaiting trial and could face the death penalty.

Salafist militias have a strong presence in the city, and Ansar Al Shari'a enjoys widespread support in the region, according to the spokesperson of Local Council in Benghazi, Osama Al Sherif.

The first attack on the Christian community in Libya since the revolution was in September 2012 in the western province of Misrata when four men broke into the Greek Orthodox Church of St. Giorgio Dafniya, burning three icons and Greek and Cypriot flags.

Three months later, on 29 December, grenades were thrown at the same church, killing two Egyptian Copts. The attack was carried out by an Egyptian fundamentalist group allegedly enraged by a controversial film about the Prophet.

Modus vivendi?

There are no official figures on religious communities in Libya. Of the estimated 1.5 million foreigners, about 100,000 are Christians, according to local Christian authorities - mainly Copts and Roman Catholics, with some Greek Orthodox, Anglicans and Protestants.

According to Bishop Timotheus Adla Bishara, head of the Orthodox Church in Tripoli, those Copts who fled during the nine months of fighting in 2011 have returned.

“We Copts live peacefully in Libya. After the attack on the Coptic church near Misrata, the local council and the government have given us full support and are committed to guaranteeing greater security to our community,” Bishop Adla Bishara told IRIN, adding: “The Copts are safer in Libya than in Egypt nowadays and the authorities are investigating the latest threats.”

Immediately after the end of February assault on Coptic orthodox priests in Benghazi, the Libyan foreign ministry condemned the aggression by what it called “irresponsible armed men”, and said the action went against the teachings of Islam and basic rights [ http://allafrica.com/stories/201303070570.html ].

“During the Gaddafi era, the authorities did not issue any restriction on religious minorities as there was a tacit agreement on the ban on proselytizing,” said Roman Catholic Reverend Vasihar Baskaran in a sermon following the arrest of four Catholics in Benghazi.

np/jj/cb


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Timeline: Attacks on mosques and Muslim shrines since the revolution

October 2011
The mosque at the town of Sidi Masri was vandalized and the remains of two historic Muslim scholars removed. In the same month, the cemetery in Gargaresh, in Tripoli, was ransacked.

November 2011

In Tripoli, Sidi Nasr mosque was desecrated.

January 2012

The cemetery of Sidi Ubaid in Benghazi was attacked and 31 corpses were stolen.

March 2012

The shrine of the fifteenth/sixteenth-century Sufi, Sidi Abdul-Salam Al-Asmar Al-Fituri, at Zliten in western Libya, was targeted by a large group of armed religious extremists, but defended by local residents.

July 2012

A bomb exploded at the Sahaba Mosque in Derna and the shrine of Zuhayr Ibn Qais Al-Balawi, companion of Prophet Muhammad and Muslim military leader, was demolished. In the same month in El-Tag near Kufra, Salafi activists removed the body of Sidi Muhammad Al-Mahdi Es-Senussi, a supreme sheikh of the Senussi Sufi order, from his mausoleum.

August 2012

On 25th August, in the centre of Tripoli, the Sha'ab ad-Dahman mosque was demolished along with around 50 Sufi graves, including the tombs of Libyan Muslim scholar Abdullah al-Sha'ab. The next day in Misrata, extremists removed the body of famous Muslim scholar Ahmad Zarruq and destroyed the Mosque with bulldozers.

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97653/Security-of-Christian-communities-precarious-in-Libya-archbishop</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303141431380034t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">TRIPOLI 15 March 2013 (IRIN) - Various Christian communities in Libya, as well as some Muslim groups, have been feeling increasingly under pressure from hardline Islamist groups since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Inside the E-1 Israeli settlement</title><pubDate>Thu, 14 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/20070612t.jpg" />]]>JERUSALEM 14 March 2013 (IRIN) - There was much fanfare over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement last year that Israel would move ahead with the controversial E-1 settlement plan. But what has happened since? How quickly could E-1 become reality? And what of the oft-overlooked humanitarian implications?</description><body><![CDATA[JERUSALEM 14 March 2013 (IRIN) - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu kicked up a storm in November when he vowed to push ahead with the controversial “E-1” plan to build an Israeli neighbourhood for some 20,000 people over 12sqkm that would separate Palestinian East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank.

Palestine, now upgraded to a non-member observer state at the UN General Assembly, recently threatened [ http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/01/201312454114299269.html ] to ask the International Criminal Court to investigate Israel if it moves forward with E-1 (Palestine would first have to sign onto the Rome Statute that created the Court).

There was much fanfare over Netanyahu’s announcement last year but what has happened since? How quickly could E-1 become reality? And what of the oft-overlooked humanitarian implications?

What’s the process?

The master plan for E-1 - including 3,500-4,000 housing units, 2,100 hotel rooms, an industrial area and a regional police headquarters west of the Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adummim - was first conceived in 1994, expedited in 1999 and approved in 2002 but has been frozen for years due to US resistance.

On 30 November 2012, one day after the UN General Assembly voted to recognize Palestine as an observer state, Netanyahu announced the plans would move ahead.

On 5 December, the West Bank Higher Planning Council of the Israeli Ministry of Defence’s Civil Administration arm approved two specific plans for a total of 3,426 housing units in E-1. But according to Israeli groups that monitor settlement expansion, the plans have not yet been formally deposited for public review.

Once that happens (usually a sign is publication of the plan in a local newspaper), the public will have 60 days to submit objections. The Planning Council would then hear the objections, and decide whether to approve the plan as is, reject it or send it back for amendments.

Once fully approved, there are two further steps. The municipality of Ma’ale Adummim, to which E-1 belongs, must approve building permits. The final step is for the Ministry of Housing to issue tenders for contractors to begin construction.

“No decision has been taken to allow construction in E-1,” David Baker, senior foreign press coordinator for the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, told IRIN. “We have allowed so far for preliminary planning and zoning work only.”

To what extent is politics relevant?

So when would bulldozers actually start breaking ground? The whole process could take as little as six months, more likely at least one year, if not two. But it depends on political will. The government can freeze the plans at any point in the process up until the tender stage.

Alternatively, “if there is willingness, it can happen fairly quickly,” said Yehezkel Lein, head of research at the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Jerusalem.

The political will depends on who ends up joining Netanyahu’s governing coalition. The union of his right-wing Likud Party with the centrist Hatnuah Party, led by Tzipi Livni, a long-time advocate of peace negotiations, is likely to slow the process. But to form the rest of his government, Netanyahu is still in negotiations with others, including the far-right Habayit Hayehudi (Jewish Home) Party, led by religious Zionist Naftali Bennett.

Still, to avoid a diplomatic incident, movement is unlikely in the lead-up to or immediately after US President Barack Obama’s visit to the region this month. In addition, “given the instability in the region right now, [moving forward on E-1] would be a very risky, ill-advised decision,” said Betty Herschman, director of international relations and advocacy at Israeli NGO Ir Amim (“City of Nations”), which works to preserve Jerusalem as a home for both Israelis and Palestinians.

The decision to move ahead with E-1, she pointed out, came as a “retaliatory gesture to the UN resolution” and in the lead-up to Israeli elections, when there was “a lot of political cachet to be gained” from such an announcement. Because of the ill-understood, multi-level process of planning and approvals, such an announcement could be made, and yet, “theoretically, [construction] might never happen.”

On the other hand, she and others said, Netanyahu could agree to freeze settlement expansion for one year, continue with the preparatory bureaucratic steps required, and begin construction of E-1 one year later without any delay in the process.

Much of the infrastructure for a settlement in E-1, including a major road, utilities, and levelling of ground as a preparation for the future neighborhood, was built in 2004 and 2005; as such “if construction gets going at the site, it will proceed far more rapidly [ http://peacenow.org/entries/post_69#.UMMI6YM3vJd ] than under normal circumstances,” Peace Now, an Israeli NGO, has said.

Regardless of whether construction starts, Hagit Ofran, director of the Settlement Watch project at Peace Now, told IRIN, the bureaucratic steps would bring any future government that much closer to implementation.

What are the implications of starting construction?

The Israeli government argues that the status of settlements will be determined in future peace talks. But many diplomats and rights groups have termed E-1 a “nail in the coffin of the two-state solution”, because it effectively puts a wedge between Palestinian East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, destroying the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state.

E-1 would also have more immediate consequences.

In the 1990s, when Ma’ale Adummim was first expanding, more than 200 Bedouin families were relocated - some forcibly - further south right next to a landfill near Al Ezariya town. According to OCHA, the move left 85 percent of them unable to practice their traditional herding livelihoods and exposed them to the health hazards posed by the garbage site.

“It was a very painful process,” Lein told IRIN.

Some 2,300 Palestinian Bedouins live in 20 communities [ http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_map_of_threat_of_displacemnt_jerusalem_periphery_october_2011_english.pdf ] in the hills to the east of Jerusalem, in and around the Ma’ale Adummim settlement, within the contours of the Israeli separation barrier. More than 80 percent of them are refugees from what is now Israel and over two-thirds are children, according to OCHA. Ir Amim says around 1,100 of them live within the area slated to become E-1.

Bedouin communities - not only in the area around Ma’ale Adummim, but even more so in the Jordan Valley and other parts of Israeli-controlled Area C - have had their homes demolished and are regularly displaced [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97158/OPT-A-precarious-existence-in-the-Jordan-Valley ] on the basis that they do not have legal building permits or are living in Israeli military zones.

The Israeli government has long planned to relocate Bedouin living in and around E-1, arguing they are living there without permits. It says their planned transfer (still under legal negotiations) is completely unrelated to the E-1 settlement plan. But observers say their transfer will likely be expedited if E-1 goes ahead. After many objections to the old site near the garbage dump, the Civil Administration has identified a new relocation site next to Jericho.

Forcible transfer of an occupied population is a violation of international humanitarian law. But aid workers fear the communities may “choose” to leave voluntarily, knowing they will soon be kicked out anyway, in order to settle on the best possible land in the new location.

“When you don’t have a meaningful option, even if you agree, it’s not legitimate consent,” Lein said.

An international fact-finding mission on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory recently found that the effects of settlements go much further, affecting nearly every aspect of Palestinian life [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A-HRC-22-63_en.pdf ].

mg/ha/cb


Read more:

Peace Now briefing on E-1
[ http://peacenow.org/entries/post_69#.UMMI6YM3vJd ]

Ir Amim briefing on E-1
[ http://www.irinnews.org/newsite/pdf/Ir_Amim_briefing_on_E-1.pdf ]

B’Tselem briefing on E-1
[ http://www.btselem.org/settlements/20121202_e1_human_rights_ramifications ]

OCHA Fact-sheet on Bedouin relocation
[ http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_map_of_threat_of_displacemnt_jerusalem_periphery_october_2011_english.pdf ]

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This is the first in a two-part series on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

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]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 14 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97644/Briefing-Inside-the-E-1-Israeli-settlement</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/20070612t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JERUSALEM 14 March 2013 (IRIN) - There was much fanfare over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement last year that Israel would move ahead with the controversial E-1 settlement plan. But what has happened since? How quickly could E-1 become reality? And what of the oft-overlooked humanitarian implications?</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Kenya’s waste management challenge*</title><pubDate>Wed, 13 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/2007103011t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 13 March 2013 (IRIN) - As the urban population in Nairobi and elsewhere in East Africa grows, so does the solid waste management burden - a situation worsened by poor funding for urban sanitation departments and a lack of enforcement of sanitation regulations.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 13 March 2013 (IRIN) - As the urban population in Nairobi and elsewhere in East Africa grows, so does the solid waste management burden - a situation worsened by poor funding for urban sanitation departments and a lack of enforcement of sanitation regulations. 

At least 100 million people in East Africa lack access to improved sanitation, according to UN sources [ http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/africasan.pdf ].

“Due to budgetary deficiencies, town authorities find it difficult to address solid waste management in a sustainable manner. In addition, insufficient public awareness and enforcement of legislation is also a hindrance,” Andre Dzikus, coordinator of the urban basic services section of the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), told IRIN.

In Nairobi, a large percentage of solid waste is managed by the private sector and NGOs due to public-private partnerships, says Dzikus.

The city council’s solid waste department, like those in Kampala and Dar es Salaam, is not well equipped, with transport vehicles few and often poorly serviced, despite increasing waste quantities due to rapid urbanization, he added. 

Understaffing and a lack of skilled staff in waste management is also a challenge. 

Without proper controls, solid waste is often dumped in abandoned quarries or similar sites. In Nairobi, for example, municipal waste is taken to the Dandora dumping site, a former quarry some 15km east.

Dandora slum residents who live close to the dumpsite are therefore exposed to environmental and disease risks, said Dzikus.

“Burning plastic produces very toxic fumes, such as furans and dioxins, which are very harmful to human beings and the environment. Most of the uncontrolled dumpsites are some of the major sources of greenhouse gases contributing to global climate change,” he added.

Although Nairobi has a sanitation policy, the Environmental Sanitation and Hygiene Policy 2007, which recognizes the role of NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs) and the Kenya Water and Sanitation Network (KEWASNET), often there is little collaboration in service delivery, according to a February report, Comparing urban sanitation and solid waste management in East African metropolises: The role of civil society organizations [ http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275112000595 ].

“Sanitation service delivery for the urban poor is a disconnected pluralism between government and NGOs/CBOs institutions,” it states.

Living with waste 

More often than not, the urban poor have to make do with living amid waste despite the health risks; child mortality in the slums is 2.5 times higher than in other areas of Nairobi, according to the UN World Health Organization (WHO) [ http://www.who.int/social_determinants/publications/urbanization/factfile/en/index.html ].

In the Mathare slums, for example, the sight of children playing among plastic bags full of human excrement, referred to as “flying toilets”, is common.

“We use plastic bags to relieve ourselves because the few toilets that are there are too expensive,” Mama Annah, a resident of Mathare, told IRIN. 

“If I have to choose between paying for the toilet and buying food, the choice is easily made.” 

The improper disposal of faecal matter within settled areas is a major public health problem. “We throw the plastic bags in the streets because there is no other alternative. Our children have no [other] place to play,” added Mama Annah.

Insecurity and a lack of hygiene awareness are other problems.

“I have built toilets and bathrooms several times, but every time it rains, or there is a conflict, they are destroyed. Because of the instability, I take my time before I build a new one,” Simon Macharia, a slum property owner, told IRIN.

“We also have to work together, because every time some of us try to keep clean, someone defecates in front of your door.” 

Health risk 

According to WHO, open defecation was the only sanitation practice available to 33 percent of the population in East Africa in 2006. Lack of access to proper sanitation, including clean water, is a major cause of diarrhoea, the second biggest killer of children in developing countries, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) [ http://www.unicef.org/media/files/Final_Diarrhoea_Report_October_2009_final.pdf ].

Many slum dwellers in East African cities pay five to seven times more per litre of water than the average North American, notes WHO.

And it is children and women who suffer the most due to poor sanitation, according to Akiba Mashinani Trust, an NGO focusing on the rights of slum dwellers in Nairobi. 

“One of the health risks women have is [with] reproductive health because they use public toilets that are not properly maintained. Some of them have suffered from urinary [tract] infections,” Edith Kalela, a communication officer at Akiba Mashinani Trust, told IRIN.

The biggest challenge to waste management in the slums is the lack of disposal space, added Kalela. “Since these people live in informal settlements, the government has failed to manage their solid waste.”

Lack of land tenure 

Slum residents often do not own the land they live on, risking eviction.

In the Huruma slum area, also in Nairobi, Akiba Mashinani Trust has helped residents obtain some land by negotiation with the government and the city council, for which a communal title deed was issued. “If you have land, you have more prospects to do developments,” said Kalela.

“We help these people build houses that are self-contained. Even if we build toilets, there are over 200,000 households, so how many toilets will we build for public use? A sustainable solution is to help them build a house that is self-contained.”

In the past, the government has attempted to improve living conditions in the slum areas under the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/89738/KENYA-Spanner-in-the-works-for-slum-upgrade ], but without much success. KENSUP has recently completed a sanitation project in the Kibera slum, handing over seven water sanitation facilities to community groups there, but there are concerns over the project’s sustainability.

lam/aw/rz

*This article was revised on 14 March to clarify UN-HABITAT’s comments on municipal waste management challenges

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 13 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97638/Kenya-s-waste-management-challenge</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/2007103011t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 13 March 2013 (IRIN) - As the urban population in Nairobi and elsewhere in East Africa grows, so does the solid waste management burden - a situation worsened by poor funding for urban sanitation departments and a lack of enforcement of sanitation regulations.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Zimbabwe&apos;s urban housing crisis</title><pubDate>Fri, 08 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303080930170792t.jpg" />]]>HARARE 08 March 2013 (IRIN) - With rural-to-urban migration increasing in Zimbabwe and urban squatter camps growing, the shortage of affordable public housing has become a contentious issue.</description><body><![CDATA[HARARE 08 March 2013 (IRIN) - With rural-to-urban migration increasing in Zimbabwe and urban squatter camps growing, the shortage of affordable public housing has become a contentious issue.

According to the Ministry of National Housing and Special Amenities, there are approximately 1.2 million people on the government's national housing waiting list, although the exact figure is not known because most local authorities do not collect the necessary data.

"With thousands of young people in the countryside completing their secondary education each year, the country has seen an upsurge in the number of people migrating from rural to urban areas, hoping to secure better employment opportunities. This has been a trend dating back to the days before the country gained its independence [in 1980]," said an official from the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency, which has estimated the waiting list number at closer to 1.25 million.

The government has had multiple plans to roll out public housing schemes around the country, including a national housing policy launched in 1999, but it has lacked the resources to keep up with rising demand.

Special Sibanda, director in the housing ministry, said the ministry invested over US$25 million in housing development in 2012 through joint ventures with land developers and local authorities. However, another senior official in the ministry, speaking on condition of anonymity, said $176.5 million was required annually to address Zimbabwe’s public housing backlog by 2015.

The government’s 2005 slum clearance programme, Operation Murambatsvina, made over 700,000 people homeless and worsened the country’s housing crisis. Promises to re-house those whose shacks had been bulldozed have gone unfulfilled. Thousands are still living in squatter camps [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/89360/ZIMBABWE-No-hope-yet-for-the-homeless ].

Unscrupulous cooperatives

Precious Shumba, director of the Harare Residents Trust, a local NGO that advocates for Harare residents to be represented in local governance issues, blamed the government’s reliance on unscrupulous housing cooperatives. According to the Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Cooperatives (ZINAHCO), these cooperatives are typically formed by a group of workers from a single company or industry, or by people from the same geographic location. Members pool their resources to ensure that they all benefit in improving their living conditions.

But according to Shumba, housing cooperatives acquire housing stands from corrupt city council officials at very low prices. They then build houses and sell them at inflated prices, which buyers pay off monthly over at least 14 years before being given title deeds.

"Local authorities and the government of Zimbabwe have not really invested in the provision of housing and accommodation to the citizenry, except to relinquish this responsibility to housing cooperatives, the majority of whom are siphoning off the little financial resources of low-paid workers," Shumba told IRIN.

He added that rapidly growing communities in Harare meant to accommodate low-income earners - such as Hopely Farm, Caledonia, Hatcliff and Whitecliff, all built by housing cooperatives - are lacking social infrastructure such as schools, health and recreational facilities, and shopping centres.

"The miserable condition of the emerging communities is attributed to poor planning and corruption by officials in the Housing and Community Services Department, as well as among councillors and officials in the urban planning and environmental management committees, where reports abound that corrupt housing cooperative leaders have been allocated land in some reserved open spaces where clinics, schools and shops were meant to be put," he said.

Meanwhile, in some of the squatter camps north of Harare, where many of the people made homeless by Operation Murambatsvina now live, politically connected housing cooperatives are reportedly duping individuals into paying thousands of dollars for housing stands the cooperatives do not have title deeds to. 

Marilyn Mutarara, a 44-year-old widow with six children, from Harare's Caledonia Farm squatter camp, said she bought her housing stand for $2,375 from a local housing cooperative four years ago, but has not yet received a title deed for it and, as a result, cannot get approval to build on the land. Local police have failed to take action because of the cooperatives’ political connections, she said.

Still waiting

Maurine Sambiri, a 48-year-old single mother from Mbare, Harare’s oldest low-income suburb, told IRIN she has lived as a tenant for 23 years. She pays $140 a month for the two rooms she occupies.

"I still don't have a place to call my own home. The government has not come to my rescue as a single mother, although I always hear there are government houses for the poor," she said, adding that she was placed on a government housing list several years ago.

According to the National Housing Policy, after registering with the government's public housing department, homes are allocated on a rent-to-buy basis determined by the individual's income. Twenty percent of government houses are reserved for civil servants who are required to pay a deposit of $3,600 for a house while non-government employees are required to pay a deposit of $10,000.

But with unemployment in Zimbabwe estimated at 60 percent, the Harare Residents Trust say very few can afford the deposits to buy government houses.

"It does not need a person from Mars to know that most Zimbabweans are self-employed and have no fixed monthly income. And personally, I doubt if some of us on the housing list will ever get the houses because, honestly, where will we get the $10,000 deposit?" said Terence Mugwadi, a tenant from Harare's Highfield low-income suburb.

Many residents who IRIN spoke to also alleged that the allocation of government housing was done by corrupt officials. They said they had failed to make it onto housing lists despite providing proof of their monthly income. 

"Often [they] demand bribes from us merely to place us on a housing list," said Richard Chiriga from Glenorah, a low-income suburb near Harare.

Glenorah is where Harare’s most recent batch of government houses was completed, following years of construction. But according to residents in the area, distribution of the houses has not been transparent.

In 2012, Harare City Council signed an agreement with the Central African Building Society (CABS) to build 3,102 more houses worth $15 million, a cost local authorities indicated they could afford annually for similar projects to meet the housing demand in the capital.

According to the agreement, the houses meant for low-income earners are to be built over a two-year period, with four-roomed houses costing approximately $12,000 each. 

But lifelong tenants like Eunice Chambati, a single mother from the city's Mabvuku-Tafara low-income suburb, say they have lost all hope of ever acquiring a government house.

"This is my life now,” said Chambati. “Living as a tenant for me is now very normal, and I have come to accept this." 

jm/ks/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 08 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97615/Zimbabwe-apos-s-urban-housing-crisis</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303080930170792t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">HARARE 08 March 2013 (IRIN) - With rural-to-urban migration increasing in Zimbabwe and urban squatter camps growing, the shortage of affordable public housing has become a contentious issue.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Somali government to relocate IDPs, welcome returning refugees</title><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202281303480107t.jpg" />]]>MOGADISHU/NAIROBI 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - The Somali government plans to relocate thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently living in Mogadishu to camps on the outskirts of the city, but there are concerns over inadequate government capacity as well as security and access to services in the proposed relocation areas.</description><body><![CDATA[MOGADISHU/NAIROBI 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - The Somali government plans to relocate thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently living in Mogadishu to camps on the outskirts of the city, but there are concerns over inadequate government capacity as well as security and access to services in the proposed relocation areas.

There are an estimated 369,000 IDPs or people living like IDPs in Mogadishu, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Of these, about 270,000 could be relocated to three camps on the outskirts of the capital, helping to decongest the city, according to Mohamed Ahmed Nur Tarsan, Mogadishu’s mayor.

“Honestly, no mayor in the world would tolerate IDPs form[ing] shanty shelters in the capital city. This issue touches [on] the security of the city and remains a threat to the sanitation of the city,” Tarsan said, adding that there are no security problems on the outskirts of Mogadishu.

“I am not saying that we should put these people in faraway isolated places, but what I am saying is that we should get better places for them since these people are currently living in appalling conditions.”

IDPs in Mogadishu live in difficult conditions [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96686/SOMALIA-Mogadishu-IDPs-suffer-extortion-eviction ], under threat of extortion and eviction. Providing aid to them has also been difficult in the past due to security constraints.

But in reaction to the relocation plan, IDPs expressed concerns about security and the availability of basic services.

“If we are provided with security and health services, we will obey the government plans. But if we do not feel safe, we will just wait [for] our God here,” Abdullahu Olow Dhere, an IDP in Mogadishu’s Darwish camp, located next to Somalia's parliament, told IRIN.

Another concern is the distance of the proposed relocation sites from livelihood opportunities.

Voluntary relocation key

Some of the IDPs may be unwilling to relocate from Mogadishu or to return to their original homes. Somalia has a relatively youthful population, meaning that, for some, Mogadishu is the only home they have known. “Those who may be unwilling to return to their previous locations should be relocated to camps on the outskirts of Mogadishu,” said Tarsan.

IDPs in Mogadishu grapple with insecurity, including rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, raising concerns that violence will be a problem in the proposed new locations as well. “If we just simply resettle people from one location to another, I don’t think we should expect any improvement in the security [or] protection of those people, especially the single-female [headed] households. Unless we put in place the conditions for success, success is not assured at all,” Justin Brady, the head of the OCHA office in Somalia, told Radio Ergo in a recent interview.

But according to Tarsan, “Rapists will be killed, as the President said, and we anticipate Mogadishu to [have] zero rape within the coming three months.”

He added, “We are providing security as well as the land, and it is the responsibility of aid organizations to provide services like health and water.”

Aid agencies are getting ready.

“What we are looking at is how the government plan can be assisted by the partners… to make this as ethical and humane a resettlement - and voluntary, that being the key part for the IDPs - going forward,” Brady told Radio Ergo.

“We need to review exactly what is required… It is not simply a shelter issue or a protection issue, but all of the service providers across the spectrum of clusters [ http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination ] need to be involved.”

According to Brady, the Somali government hopes much of the relocation will happen this year. “The government’s plan has a very ambitious timeline. They wish to see a good portion of it done by the 20th of August, which is obviously a very symbolic date in Somalia. We will be engaging with them to see… the key points where effort needs to be put in to ensure that the conditions are right for resettlement.”

On 20 August 2012, the mandate of Somalia's transitional government ended, paving way for a new parliament and the subsequent presidential election, the first in more than two decades. The successful election led to growing optimism about the future of Somalia, prompting thousands of people to return to Mogadishu [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95886/SOMALIA-Return-to-Mogadishu ].

Refugees returning

Some refugees are also returning from the Dadaab refugee complex [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95456/KENYA-SOMALIA-Life-on-the-margins-of-Dadaab ] in northeastern Kenya, which is home to close to half a million refugees.

The returns have been, in part, driven by growing pressure by the Kenyan government on Somali refugees to return to Somalia [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96116/KENYA-SOMALIA-Repatriating-Dadaab-refugees-unrealistic ].

“Almost 20,000 Somali refugees have voluntarily left Kenya since repatriation calls started,” states Hasty Repatriation: Kenya’s attempt to send Somali refugees home [ http://heritageinstitute.org/images/Hasty%20Repatriation%20Report.pdf ], a recent report by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, a Somali-based think-tank.

“Vacancy rates of houses and apartments in Eastleigh [a heavily Somali district in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi] have rocketed and, subsequently, rent rates have plummeted… Schools in the area have reported considerably reduced student numbers.”

Speaking at the launch of the report, the Somalia ambassador to Kenya, Mohamed Ali Nur,  said that while the Somali government is willing to welcome back the refugees, “and we want them to come back to help in rebuilding the country, we want the refugees to go back in a coordinated manner.”

According to the report, the Somali government is not prepared to accommodate the almost 600,000 Somali refugees living mainly in Kenya and Ethiopia. Still, “the Somali government is devising an ambitious plan to establish large camps inside Somalia, near the Kenyan border. It hopes to move hundreds of thousands of refugees to the new camps before the end of 2013. Not only is the implementation of this plan unrealistic, but it could also expose vulnerable refugees to dangerous conditions.”

The report’s author, Anab Nur, said, “To send such a large number of refugees back at this time, I think, will be destabilizing. They are already dealing with an IDP issue.”

The report recommends that Kenya and Somalia work closely through their Joint Cooperation Committee to find a satisfactory solution, and for the Somali government to “capitalize on recent security gains by establishing state institutions that can absorb the influx of refugees”.

“Key to this,” it states, “is addressing the emotive issue of land in Somalia. Unresolved land disputes will likely lead to a re-eruption of violence in southern Somalia. An orderly, well-timed return of refugees would, however, solidify recent gains made and lay the foundations for a stable Somalia.”

amd-aw/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97552/Somali-government-to-relocate-IDPs-welcome-returning-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202281303480107t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MOGADISHU/NAIROBI 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - The Somali government plans to relocate thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently living in Mogadishu to camps on the outskirts of the city, but there are concerns over inadequate government capacity as well as security and access to services in the proposed relocation areas.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>