<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Security</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/irin-fp.aspx</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 18:30:40 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>PAKISTAN: Water woes compounded by internal disputes</title><pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205150902590444t.jpg" />]]>KARACHI 16 May 2012 (IRIN) - The dead fish recently washed up on the shores of Lake Keenjhar, the largest fresh water lake in Pakistan, shocked nearby villagers in Thatta District in the southern province of Sindh.</description><body><![CDATA[KARACHI 16 May 2012 (IRIN) - The dead fish recently washed up on the shores of Lake Keenjhar, the largest fresh water lake in Pakistan, shocked nearby villagers in Thatta District in the southern province of Sindh.

“We saw the dead water life after a recent storm. It seems contaminated water came into the lake from a drain,” Zahir Ahmed, a villager said. “We have been trying to get water from other places, but it is hard work."

“The water flowing in from one drain is now dark and impure. It used to be crystal clear,” Jehangir Durrani, natural resources manager for the Worldwide Fund for Nature at Keenjhar, told IRIN.

An inquiry by Sindh Environment Protection Agency is under way, but has not yet produced definitive results. Concern is high since the Lake Keenjhar is the main source of water for Karachi, but is some 70km away.

“We are awaiting a detailed report so we know exactly what happened,” said Mir Hussain Ali, the Sindh environment secretary.

The Keenjhar episode is not the only case of water contamination in the country. Concern has in the past arisen over the pollution of other water bodies in Sindh, [ http://dawn.com/2011/06/09/polluted-manchar-lake-needs-help/ ] including the Lake Manchar.

The Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2011 [ http://www.unescap.org/stat/data/syb2011/escap-syb2011.pdf ] published by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in October 2011 says Pakistan is one of the nations of the world “facing major threats” of increasing water scarcity, high water utilization, deteriorating water quality and climate change risks. It was ranked among the “water hotspots” of the region.

For ordinary Pakistanis the situation is dire. "There used to be a water-well near our village," said Manni Bibi, who lives in Khuzdar District in Balochistan. "But it has dried up and now the other women and I have to walk nearly 6km to fetch water from a pond. Animals also drink from here and cleanliness is a concern, though we do boil the water,” she told IRIN.

Internal disputes

Internal disputes within the country add to the problems. The Water Apportionment Accord [ http://cms.waterinfo.net.pk/pdf/iwt.pdf ] between the four provinces of Pakistan was signed in 1991, but politicians, notably from Sindh which lies downstream of the Indus, say it has not been adhered to. Veteran Sindhi politician and activist Rasul Bux Palijo, who has also written extensively [ http://www.cpcs.org.pk/docs/bookshelf/Sindh-Punjab%20Water%20Dispute.pdf ] on the water distribution issue, said “enormous injustice” had been done to Sindh, with waterflow along the Indus dwindling. Canals and barrages built upstream on the river are a key factor in this, say Palijo and other Sindhi people.

“We live in perpetual crisis because not enough water flows down the Indus to water our crops. We barely have clean water to drink,” said Ghulam Bux, a farmer in Thatta District. He also complained that the dwindling Indus delta was leading to “land loss due to sea erosion”.

Indian connection

Problems linked to the division of water with India have also aggravated Pakistan's water shortage problem. On the acrimonious partition of the two nations in 1947, there was concern in Pakistan over the fact that almost all the key rivers providing water for agricultural and other purposes had sources in India or Indian-administered Kashmir.

The 1960 Indus Water Basin Treaty [ http://cms.waterinfo.net.pk/pdf/iwt.pdf ] signed between the two countries attempted to arrive at a water-sharing formula by allocating water from various rivers to each country. But as growing populations and dwindling water resources put pressure on both countries, more and more problems have arisen.

Environmental experts, such as Lahore-based lawyer and activist Rafay Alam told a seminar [ http://tribune.com.pk/story/274344/india-pakistan-issues-forget-kashmir-terrorism-worry-about-water/] last year on India-Pakistan water issues: “International concerns about the environment were in their infancy when the Indus waters treaty was negotiated. Now we need to engage communities living in the basin. The water resources of both countries were abundant at the time, now they are scare.”

Alam also called for the issue to be looked at scientifically, rather than politically, but this is easier said than done. In the National Assembly, a fierce debate is currently raging about five dams [ http://www.agrihunt.com/agri-news/50/2767.html ] India reportedly plans to construct on three western rivers. Pakistan’s minister for water and power believes this would violate the Indus Water Basin Treaty and further reduce water supplies to Pakistan. International arbitration is being sought.

“A lack of trust between the two countries holds up agreements on water discharge from rivers," Syed Jamaat Ali Shah, the Pakistan commissioner for the Indus Water Basin Treaty, told IRIN. Pakistan, he added, “needed at the least drinking water” from more rivers.

kh/eo/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95460</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205150902590444t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KARACHI 16 May 2012 (IRIN) - The dead fish recently washed up on the shores of Lake Keenjhar, the largest fresh water lake in Pakistan, shocked nearby villagers in Thatta District in the southern province of Sindh.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>DRC: North Kivu in turmoil again</title><pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205160807530682t.jpg" />]]>GISENYI (WESTERN RWANDA) 16 May 2012 (IRIN) - In the last few weeks fighting between government troops and “mutineers” has ended three years of relative peace in North Kivu Province, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and thousands of refugees have been streaming across the border to Rwanda.</description><body><![CDATA[GISENYI (WESTERN RWANDA) 16 May 2012 (IRIN) - In the last few weeks fighting between government troops and “mutineers” has ended three years of relative peace in North Kivu Province, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and thousands of refugees have been streaming across the border to Rwanda.

According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the clashes have displaced 40,600 people since April. For many of them this is the third time they have been forced to flee their homes since the mid-1990s. 

“It [war] is something they have seen and that they know,” Richard Ndaula, the UNHCR team leader at western Rwanda’s Nkamira transit camp, told IRIN. The camp has received at least 8,000 refugees since 27 April. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95413/DRC-Congolese-refugees-flee-fighting-into-Rwanda ]

Who are the “mutineers”?

Bosco Ntaganda was second in charge of the Tutsi rebel group Congrès national pour la défense du people (CNDP) until 2009, when he brokered a deal to integrate its troops into the national army and take over the North Kivu command. After integration, CNDP soldiers operated a parallel leadership structure, taking orders only from Ntaganda.

However, in early April, the former CNDP soldiers began to defect, citing unpaid salaries and poor living conditions, and said the government had failed to uphold the terms of the 2009 peace accord. Commentators said the “mutineers” were protecting Ntaganda from arrest, but they denied this, calling themselves M23 in reference to the 23 March 2009 accord.

Ntaganda, already indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), stands accused in the past week of continuing to recruit children as young as 12 into the ranks of his armed group.

On 15 May ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said he wanted to add charges of murder, ethnic persecution, rape and sexual slavery to the 2006 charge against Ntaganda of recruiting children.

Ntaganda was Thomas Lubanga’s successor in another militia, the Union des patriotes congolais. The ICC on 14 March found Lubanga guilty [http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95073/DRC-Lubanga-verdict-a-first-step] of conscripting child soldiers in the northeastern DRC region of Ituri. 

Anneke Van Woudenberg, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch (HRW) in Goma (eastern DRC), said: "There is evidence to suggest extensive recruitment of children and young men by the mutineers… Bosco Ntaganda is once again committing the very crimes against children for which the International Criminal Court has been demanding his arrest.”

Allegations of mistreatment

It took Jean-Pierre Iransi, a 20-year-old student from Burungu in Masisi, North Kivu, five days to reach Rwanda, a journey which normally takes one day. Iransi said he was detained 12 times by both government soldiers and rebels. At one point rebels forced him to carry equipment; when he refused, he said they threatened to kill him. "Many civilians were taken to become soldiers. Up to this moment we don't know where they are," he said.

HRW in a 16 May statement [http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/15/dr-congo-bosco-ntaganda-recruits-children-force 
] based on interviews with witnesses and victims, said: “Ntaganda’s troops - an estimated 300-600 soldiers who followed him in his mutiny - forcibly recruited at least 149 boys and young men around Kilolirwe, Kingi, Kabati, and other locations on the road to Kitchanga, in Masisi, North Kivu Province, between 19 April and 4 May… Those forcibly recruited were between 12 and 20 years old and were largely from the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups.” It said the actual level of recruitment during this period may have been significantly higher.

In an excerpt from the HRW statement, a woman said that in mid-April Ntaganda had personally come to her village and said: “Since you [villagers] have been with the government, you’ve got nothing. Why not join me?” The woman said: “[Ntaganda] asked us to give our children, our students, to him to fight. He came to our village himself, like [detained rebel leader Laurent] Nkunda used to do. But we refused and said our children should go to school.”

Later, Ntaganda’s fighters took children by force from schools, their homes and farms, or from the roadside as they tried to flee on foot or on motorbike taxis, said HRW. “A number of those forcibly recruited were given quick military training, but the majority were immediately forced to porter weapons and ammunition to frontline positions. Many were put in military uniforms or partial uniforms.”

According to Omar Katova, a spokesperson for a number of North Kivu civil society groups, the Congolese government should end the "new war" in North Kivu by disbanding armed groups and arresting “mutineer” defectors, amid increasing concern that other rebel groups, including the pro-Hutu Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), could take advantage of a security vacuum.

On 7 May FDLR attacked some government positions and abducted five women in neighbouring South Kivu Province.

At present, Ntaganda's location remains unknown, although according to the HRW statement, he could be in the Virunga National Park with a small group of fighters. His M23 “mutineers”, reportedly numbering 500-800 [ http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2012/05/weekend-of-talking-and-heavy-fighting.html ], have in large part left Masisi. After gathering at the border junction between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, they attempted a takeover of Bunagana town, along the DRC-Uganda border in early May.

The absence of Ntaganda’s CNDP troops in their Masisi stronghold, which is currently under the control of the Congolese army, is emerging as a threat to the remaining Tutsi population, with many of those who have fled to Rwanda speaking of ethnic intolerance.

"They [Congolese soldiers] beat us when they find us. They tell me I'm Rwandan. Every time, they say this is not your country. But I was born in Congo, I grew up in Congo," said a refugee.

Meanwhile, Congolese refugees arriving in Rwanda from their homes in Masisi, say they saw friends and family beaten and arrested on the way. Arsene Harnyurwa made it to Rwanda from Rubai but said soldiers took everything he had, down to his baby's milk. "The rebels and the government are the same. The people who made it here are the lucky ones," he said.

Voting with their feet

On 7 May Liz Ahua, deputy director of UNHCR's Africa Bureau, warned [ http://www.unhcr.org/4fa7e3126.html ] that "a new site will have to be found if more refugees continue to arrive on a daily basis.”

Rwanda is already hosting some 55,000 Congolese refugees in three crowded camps.

In neighboring Uganda, the challenge is different with an estimated 30,000-40,000 so-called Congolese "night commuters" at the Bunagana border point. They are refusing to seek asylum in Uganda, waiting for the situation back home to stabilize. The Ugandan government is encouraging them to seek refuge and get UNHCR assistance.

As to when they will return home, HRW’s Van Woudenberg said: "People will decide with their feet.”

jh/aw/am/cb]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95465</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205160807530682t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GISENYI (WESTERN RWANDA) 16 May 2012 (IRIN) - In the last few weeks fighting between government troops and “mutineers” has ended three years of relative peace in North Kivu Province, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and thousands of refugees have been streaming across the border to Rwanda.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Israeli government challenges the law to embrace illegal settler outposts</title><pubDate>Mon, 14 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205141111000222t.jpg" />]]>RAMALLAH/TEL AVIV 14 May 2012 (IRIN) - Israeli settlers east of the separation barrier in the central West Bank occupy the land most critical for any future final status agreement under a two-state solution. But instead of limiting settlement expansion, critics say the Israeli authorities are setting a dangerous precedent by legalizing new outposts and undermining the law.</description><body><![CDATA[RAMALLAH/TEL AVIV 14 May 2012 (IRIN) - Israeli settlers east of the separation barrier in the central West Bank occupy the land most critical for any future final status agreement under a two-state solution. But instead of limiting settlement expansion, critics say the Israeli authorities are setting a dangerous precedent by legalizing new outposts and undermining the law.

God gave us this land 3,000 years ago,” an Israeli bus driver said on the way from Jerusalem towards the Israeli settlement of Psagot. “This land is ours. It’s not for the Arabs,” he added, as the bus crossed from Jerusalem into the occupied West Bank, continuing its way through the rocky landscape east of Ramallah.

Psagot is home to about 1,600 Israeli settlers and the seat of the Mateh Binyamin Regional Council, which is one of six councils providing municipal services to more than 300,000 Israelis who live in 124 officially recognized settlements in the West Bank.

While all settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) are illegal under international law, more than 90 so-called outposts are illegal even under Israeli law. One such illegal settlement is Migron, where about 322 Israeli settlers live in caravans on 36 hectares of privately owned Palestinian land.

Migron is one of several cases where the Israeli government has tried to circumvent Supreme Court decisions on the evacuation of illegal structures, instead supporting settler interests. For the first time since 1996, the government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formally created new settlements this April by legalizing the three outposts of Rechalim, Sansana and Bruchin.

“There is a big change of policy happening,” Talia Sasson, a former Israeli chief-prosecutor who wrote the influential Sasson report [ http://www.mideastweb.org/sassonreport.htm  ] on government support for illegal outposts, told IRIN. “I believe that the price for removing an illegal outpost has become too high to pay, for the Israeli government.”

When Netanyahu formed a new unity government with the centrist Kadima party on 8 May, some analysts said this could bring along changes, while Palestinian officials immediately called upon the new government to freeze settlement activity. [ http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/palestinian-official-israel-s-new-unity-cabinet-must-freeze-all-settlement-activity-1.429019 ] But, many warned that settlers were only gaining in strength, holding onto occupied land at any price.

Now, say analysts, state support for settlements and illegal outposts has crossed a point of no return, undermining the rule of law and threatening Israeli democracy.

“What happened around Migron and other outposts is a total earthquake of Israeli constitutional balance,” Dror Etkes, an Israeli expert on land issues in oPt, told IRIN. “There is a major clash coming up between the government, the settlers and the Supreme Court. By legalizing the outpost, the government made clear that it neither cares about national, nor about international law.”

The government had asked the Supreme Court to delay Migron’s demolition for three years, which the court rejected, and tried to delay the implementation of another court decision on the demolition of the illegal Ulpana neighbourhood in the Beit El settlement. Efforts are reportedly under way to pass a bill to retroactively legalize Ulpana. This would force the Supreme Court to declare the law unconstitutional.

Experts say legalization of settlements endangers any future solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under the terms of a two-state solution.

“Nineteen years after Oslo and 13 years after a final settlement was supposed to be reached, prospects for a two-state solution are as dim as ever,” the International Crisis Group (ICG) said in a recent report [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/122-the-emperor-has-no-clothes-palestinians-and-the-end-of-the-peace-process.aspx ] which called for a new paradigm.

Migron “compromise”

The caravans of Migron stand high on a hill close to the Palestinian villages of Burqa and Ein Yabrud. Only 2km further down, bulldozers were digging into the rocky soil, building a new Migron for the outpost’s 50 families, where they will move on 1 August, according to an agreement reached between the settlers and the government after the Israeli Supreme Court had ruled that the illegal structures be removed.

Migron’s residents are confident old Migron will remain, alongside the new Migron that is being built for them.

“Today’s Migron should become an educational institution for soldiers, or we transform it into a farm,” Itai Hemo, a resident from Migron, told IRIN. “In any case, the evacuation will provoke a strong reaction from settler communities all around. We won’t be able to control that.”

The government’s “compromise” with the settlers effectively blocked the Supreme Court decision to demolish the illegal outpost. This only strengthened the settlers’ self-confidence.

“Netanyahu legalized the outposts and showed his clear intentions. It is a statement to all settlers and residents of illegal outposts that the government continues to support them,” Lior Amichai, who works for Peace Now’s Settlement Watch Project, told IRIN.

Observers say illegal outposts impact negatively on neighbouring Palestinian communities.

“This is the area of Migron in 1999,” Dror Etkes said, looking at a satellite image that shows huge planted fields that once belonged to nearby Palestinian villages. “And this is Migron today,” he continued, pointing out the built-up area of Migron on another satellite image. “Hundreds of dunams in agricultural land were taken away from the villages, severely affecting their livelihood. And a settler road closed off Palestinian access.”

“The heart of Israel”

Migron’s residents are national-religious settlers who make up about 80 percent of Israelis living east of the separation barrier, on land that would become part of a Palestinian state under any realistic final status agreement.

They are driven by the belief that settling the land is both a national and religious duty, and compared to secular and Ultra-Orthodox settlers, they are more unwilling to leave the land for compensation, past surveys have shown. [ http://www.haaretz.com/news/poll-25-of-settlers-east-of-fence-prepared-to-leave-homes-1.174523 ]

“Eighty percent of what happened in the Bible happened here. This is the heart of Israel, also geographically. If we don’t have [a] presence here, it would mean the end of Israel,” Miri Maoz Ovadia, liaison officer from the settlers’ umbrella organization, the Yesha Council, told IRIN.

Strategically located on a hill like most outposts, Migron’s residents have lived in illegal structures since 2002. The Israeli Ministry of Housing and Construction generously funded them with more than US$1 million, according to the so-called Sasson report.

“Coming here was not only an ideological decision. I simply love this place,” Itai Hemo said, while resting on the porch in front of his caravan, overlooking the picturesque landscape.

“When you look into the Bible, you will see many of the holy places that are actually here,” he added. “But the conflict about the land is a political one. Any researcher will tell you that Palestinians came from other Arab countries. But it doesn’t mean we have to expel them. Co-existence is possible.”

But the details of this “co-existence” are far from anything that could be acceptable to Palestinians.

“The West Bank is separated into area A, B and C. Israel would annex area C, where all of today’s settlers live, while offering citizenship to the Palestinians there. Area A and B would get some kind of autonomy,” Miri Maoz Ovadia said.

An estimated 150,000 Palestinians live in Israeli controlled area C, [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full%20Report_69.pdf ] which makes up over 60 percent of the West Bank. About 70 percent of it is off-limits for Palestinian construction.

Influencing the state

The Israeli settlers who live in illegal outposts and settlements east of the barrier appear to have effective channels of influence to the government, the military and state institutions.

“Before Gaza-settlements were evacuated in 2006, we organized demonstrations. But the evacuation of Gush Katif (Gaza settlements) broke the movement,” Miri Maoz Ovadia said. “We also understood that Gaza was emotionally not in the heart of Israel, but the West Bank is. We have other channels of influence today.”

Today, the regional councils and the Yesha Council increasingly focus on advocacy, bringing politicians to speak in illegal outposts and attracting Israelis through tourism and volunteering. “We want to bring the heart of Israel to Judea and Samaria (the West Bank),” Ovadia added.

Since the Israeli High Court ordered the evacuation of Migron, politicians have come to pay tribute, many from Netanyahu’s Likud party. “We had a lot of members of Knesset [parliament] here. At least 30,” Itai Hemo said.

One of them was Reuven Rivlin, speaker of the Israeli parliament. During a January visit to the outpost, Rivlin called on the government “to take responsibility” and not to relocate or evacuate Migron.

The influence of settler ideology on the Likud was further boosted by the rise of the national-religious politician Moshe Feiglin.

“That Feiglin got 25 percent of Likud’s votes, affects the whole party. It pushes all others who compete with him towards a more extreme position,” Talia Sasson said. Feiglin advocates a greater Israel and encourages all Palestinians to leave.

“Of Likud’s 130,000 party members, 9,000 are settlers. Because they always vote as a united bloc, they are very strong,” Dror Etkes said. Other analysts estimated that at least 20 percent of Likud’s members are settlers.

Another sphere of influence is the Israeli army, where settlers volunteer. In addition, the settler councils actively attract more and more Israelis to participate in pre-army volunteer programmes.

Asked whether a future confrontation between settlers and the army over Migron was possible, Miri Maoz Ovadia replied: “61 percent of the settlers from here volunteer in combat units. It would be a fight against ourselves.”

But their increasing influence on the army and politics could make future demolitions or evacuations more difficult to implement.

“From Gaza they evacuated some 8,000 people. But the West Bank is different. It is in the heart of the country; 350,000 settlers are impossible to evacuate,” she added.

Radicalization

While most settlers pursue their interests non-violently, radicalized settlers have also directed attacks against Palestinians, left-wing Israelis and the Israeli state.

The weekly average of such attacks by settlers resulting in Palestinian casualties and property damage increased by 144 percent in 2011 compared to 2009 [ http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_violence_map_april_2012_english.pdf ] An ideologically driven radicalized movement has grown in West Bank outposts over the years, following a strategy called “price-tag attacks”, meant to increase the price the government has to pay for demolishing illegal outposts.

"We are dealing here with two main ideological dimensions - both coming from Jewish religious teachings which place the conflict with the non-Jew at the centre of their teachings,” said Ofer Zalzberg, a senior analyst with the ICG.

“The first comes from the teachings of anti-statist religious leaders like Rabbi Ginzburg of the Yitzhar outpost. The second from Rabbi Meir Kahana’s teachings. The young activists who follow such political-theologies often come from broken and disaffected families," he added. The two Rabbi’s justified violence against Arabs and objected to partitioning the land.

Analysts also say radicalization among settler youth is linked to decreasing loyalty to the state, partly as a result of past government support for the Oslo agreements, which many national-religious settlers see as incompatible with the messianic reading of Jewish law.

Most national-religious settlers oppose the “price-tag movement”, but have one goal in common: pressuring the government to not to demolish outposts.

“The settlers are playing a dangerous game. They condemn the radicalization and violence, but at the same time, are using it silently to pressure the government not to demolish outposts,” Hagit Ofran, head of Peace Now’s settlement watch project, told IRIN.

Dror Etkes said most settlers are represented by the Yesha Council which seeks to influence the state through formal channels, while there is a more radical minority in outposts around Hebron and Nablus.

“The Council uses the radicals to tell the government: ‘If you don’t compromise our interests, you will have to deal with these radicals’,” he added. “There is a mutual interest.”

ah/eo/cb]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 14 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95445</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205141111000222t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">RAMALLAH/TEL AVIV 14 May 2012 (IRIN) - Israeli settlers east of the separation barrier in the central West Bank occupy the land most critical for any future final status agreement under a two-state solution. But instead of limiting settlement expansion, critics say the Israeli authorities are setting a dangerous precedent by legalizing new outposts and undermining the law.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>LIBYA: Uneasy calm in Sebha after clashes</title><pubDate>Mon, 14 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205141142260733t.jpg" />]]>SEBHA 14 May 2012 (IRIN) - A tenuous peace has taken hold in Libya’s southwestern city of Sebha more than a month after tribal clashes killed at least 70 people, with tensions still high between communities living here, many of whom have their own armed militias, according to local residents.</description><body><![CDATA[SEBHA 14 May 2012 (IRIN) - A tenuous peace has taken hold in Libya’s southwestern city of Sebha more than a month after tribal clashes killed at least 70 people, with tensions still high between communities living here, many of whom have their own armed militias, according to local residents.

“You see that place?” Adoum Abaka, a Tubu from Tayuri, a poor neighbourhood of Sebha inhabited mainly by Tubu and Tuareg families, told IRIN, pointing to a nearby building on a hill with gaping holes where the walls used to be. “That is where some of us hid when Tayuri was under attack by the Awlad Sulayman [tribe]. We were fighting with Kalashnikovs. One person was killed there.”

The latest clashes erupted in March between the Tubu ethnic group and the Arab Awlad Sulayman and Awlad Abu Seif tribes. The clashes are said to have begun after a man belonging to the Abu Seif family was killed allegedly by the Tubu. But other narratives suggest the conflict followed a dispute over several million dollars which the ruling Transitional National Council (TNC) was planning to spend in Sebha. The violence went on for six days until the TNC brought in forces from the north to quell it. [ http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f8550982.html ].

The same communities clashed in February in the oasis of Kufra.

TNC forces have brought some semblance of peace to Sebha, but most tribal groups still have their own militias. Wanees Abu Khamada, head of the Special Forces and military governor of southern Libya, told IRIN the military recently banned people from carrying weapons at night. However, no process has yet been established to take back the weapons.

When asked if the army lacked the ability to bring the region under control, he said: “We are still trying. The army is not weak, but it is restricted by law. The militias on the other hand can just go and attack a place on their own.”

Despite the presence of the military, residents of Sebha are apprehensive. Adam Ahmad of Tayuri said the ceasefire between the two groups was an “obligation”, and many were afraid of what would happen if the army pulled out.

“Fighting has ceased, but we don’t know for how long,” said Al-Zarooq from the local council.  

Outside the camp council of Tayuri, an assortment of weapons, including mortars, rockets, artillery and unexploded munitions lie scattered on the ground.

In nearby Al-Hijara, charred remains of abandoned houses and cars stand testimony to the destruction wrought on the neighbourhood. Ali Mohamed Boubacar Julwar, a teacher who fled Sebha for the southern town of al-Qatroun, came back to find his family gone and his house destroyed.

“I found my neighbours outside, no shelter, their property stolen," he said. "They said Awlad Sulayman did it, and some Sebha families.”

Identities and allegiances

The Tubu, an indigenous black African tribe, live in southern Libya, along the Tibesti mountain range, and in Chad and Niger. While some Tubu from Chad were encouraged to migrate north to work in the oil industry under former president Muammar Gaddafi, many indigenous to Libya experienced marginalization and exclusion by the same regime and took up arms on the rebel side during the 2011 uprising. Those living in Kufra in the southeast had their identity cards and passports withdrawn under a 2007 policy aimed at deterring more of them from entering Libya and authorities in the area were told to treat them as foreigners. [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/107%20-%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20V%20-%20Making%20Sense%20of%20Libya.pdf ]

“The nomadic nature of the Sahara desert tribes and the fact that they have extensions in neighbouring countries were reasons for the previous regime to deny them their rights,” Adam Ahmad, a Tubu leader and head of Tayuri camp council, told IRIN.

During recent clashes, local perceptions of the Tubu as outsiders fuelled the violence, as residents in Sebha unrelated to the initial disputes were urged to take up arms against them.

“The Awlad Sulayman told the people of Sebha that the Tubu want to control the city,” Omar, a resident of Sebha who preferred not to give his full name, told IRIN. “So the people of Sebha, who have always been prejudiced against the Tubu, attacked their areas.”

The discourse over who is truly Libyan and who is an outsider underlies multiple conflicting accounts of the Sebha clashes and larger identity politics in the region.

The city, home [ http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f8550982.html  ] to about 210,000 people, has long served as a hub and transit point for migrants entering the southern borders, often illegally, from Niger, Chad and other countries. As increasing numbers of Tubu arrived in Sebha to support their people during the clashes, the conflict escalated, and xenophobic fears of foreigners led to some cases of arbitrary arrests of African migrants from neighbouring countries like Chad.

“Not all the Tubu are Libyan. Libyans are welcome here, but outsiders are not,” said Mohamed Shahhat, a member of the local council in Sebha, from the Awlad Sulayman tribe. “There are rumours around that Tubu have their nation in the south of Libya. We are afraid of a situation similar to what is happening in Mali where the Tuareg are trying to establish their country. The Tubu are not just a tribe, they are a nation.”

While the Awlad Sulayman express fears of a Tubu takeover, the Qaddadfa and Awlad Sulayman are among the most prominent tribes in Sebha. [ http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f8550982.html ] Many of the latter were allied to the Gaddafi regime, while others fought on the rebel side during the uprising. In the four months after Sebha was liberated, residents of Sebha allege that Awlad Sulayman militias took control of the city and that crimes were committed.

Members of the Awlad Sulayman were reluctant to talk to IRIN about their involvement in the conflict or to give interviews with those whose relatives were killed.

Ayoub al-Zarooq said the Awlad Sulayman may have their own ambitions to assume control of the area around Sebha. “Many of the militias are from Awlad Sulayman. The street talk is that they want to control the city and perhaps even the south of Libya,” he said.

It is difficult to say who truly holds power here, according to Bill Lawrence, director of the North Africa Project of International Crisis Group (ICG). "Certain districts in and around Sebha are controlled more by one group or another, and certainly Awlad Sulayman have had the upper hand, but I would not say that one or another group truly holds power, especially after the revolution which made things murkier," he said.

Security south of the city

Both the Tubu and the Awlad Sulayman have lived side by side for decades and both inhabit regions that extend beyond Libya’s borders. It is in these border regions where migrants and smuggled goods make their way north that the conflict which spread to Sebha is said to have originated. “They say the fight started here in Sebha, but in fact, trafficking and smuggling routes are in control of these two groups,” said Omar. “And each one pays the other. This is where the fight actually began, on the border.”

Ahmad Naas Mohamed, a member of the local council from the Abu Seif tribe, denied these claims. “Awlad Sulayman are not controlling the border areas, they are just doing some commerce there," he said. "It is the Tubu who are in control.”

Adam Ahmad of Tayuri local council said much of the southern border region is controlled by the Tubu, but that the Awlad Sulayman may also have their own trafficking routes. Al-Zarooq said the borders presented the greatest security challenge to the southern region, and stability in Sebha would largely depend on securing these regions.

"Stability depends in part on dialogue between the communities and the ability of leaders to avert the worst," ICG's Lawrence said. "Eventually, the overall stability of Libya and these regions will depend on issues of legitimacy and governance and service delivery."

The government has said it will investigate the Sebha clashes, but military governor Abu Khamada said it will take time and facts are hard to gather.

Meanwhile, the residents of Al-Hijara are still waiting for justice. Yusuf Said, a young Tubu who said his mother was killed in the local hospital during the conflict, believes the Tubu must be ready to defend themselves again.

“We consider the war is not over,” he said.

zm/eo/cb]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 14 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95446</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205141142260733t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">SEBHA 14 May 2012 (IRIN) - A tenuous peace has taken hold in Libya’s southwestern city of Sebha more than a month after tribal clashes killed at least 70 people, with tensions still high between communities living here, many of whom have their own armed militias, according to local residents.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>PAKISTAN: Concern over attacks on aid workers</title><pubDate>Mon, 14 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201300958210387t.jpg" />]]>ISLAMABAD 14 May 2012 (IRIN) - Attacks on humanitarian workers in Pakistan have increased in the last four years, with five personnel abducted in the first two months of 2012, and three killed in separate incidents in Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab Provinces, the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF) has warned.</description><body><![CDATA[ISLAMABAD 14 May 2012 (IRIN) - Attacks on humanitarian workers in Pakistan have increased in the last four years, with five personnel abducted in the first two months of 2012, and three killed in separate incidents in Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab Provinces, the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF) has warned.

The escalating risk has forced the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to suspend operations in Pakistan, [ http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/pakistan-news-2012-05-10.htm ] particularly since the body of an ICRC health programme manager was found on the outskirts of Quetta on 29 April, with a note stating that he had been killed because “demands” had not been met. Khalil Rasjed Dale, 60, had been abducted four months ago. [ http://tribune.com.pk/story/377226/operations-review-red-cross-suspends-work-in-pakistan/ ]

The decision will have a ripple effect. "It is hard to give an exact figure, but we can say tens of thousands of people will be affected," Anastasia Isyuk, a spokesperson for the ICRC in Pakistan, told IRIN. Only a single ICRC-run rehabilitation project in Pakistan-administered Kashmir is still operating. "Our projects were mainly in the health, and also the in water and sanitation areas," Isyuk said. "No timeframe can be put on how long the ongoing review may take."

Other humanitarian organizations have also been affected by the ICRC decision. "Yes, we are also looking at security and reviewing measures, as are other organizations, but our work in the country is continuing," Aine Fey, Country Director of the UK-based charity, Concern Worldwide, told IRIN.

This is the first time the ICRC has suspended activities in Pakistan since it began working there in 1947. Offices in the port city of Karachi, and Peshawar, in the north, have been closed. International staff have been recalled to the capital, Islamabad, and national staff placed on paid leave. The Quetta office of the organization has been closed since Dale was kidnapped.

According to the PHF, the list of humanitarian aid staff who have been attacked in the past several years includes eight staff members of two organizations, who were shot in targeted attacks in 2009, and six who were killed in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province in 2010. Four more personnel were abducted and one murdered in an attack in Balochistan, and 14 were abducted in 2011.

Until now, none of the perpetrators have been captured or brought to justice, said the Forum, and seven humanitarian staff are still being held hostage since they were abducted in 2011 and 2012.

kh/eo/he]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 14 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95444</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201300958210387t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ISLAMABAD 14 May 2012 (IRIN) - Attacks on humanitarian workers in Pakistan have increased in the last four years, with five personnel abducted in the first two months of 2012, and three killed in separate incidents in Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab Provinces, the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF) has warned.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SECURITY: A quick reaction force moulded by Africa&apos;s circumstances</title><pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201109090734440184t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 09 May 2012 (IRIN) - Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) - a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 09 May 2012 (IRIN) - Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) - a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention. 

Originally intended to become operational in 2010, the deadline for the ASF has been reset for 2015; but despite the delay, the ASF is becoming increasingly woven into the operating procedures of current AU security operations. 

The ASF “is very much a work in progress”, African Union Commissioner of Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra told IRIN, but “at the political level there is a strong support for it under the guiding principle of bringing about African solutions to African problems.” 

Once up and running, the ASF will be based on five regional blocs each supplying about 5,000 troops: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) force (SADCBRIG), the Eastern Africa Standby force (EASBRIG), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force (ECOBRIG), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) force (ECCASBRIG), also known as the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC). 

The regional forces are not a standing army like national forces. As the AU Peace and Security Council protocol of the ASF stipulates, they “shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.” 

The ASF is the legacy and logic of the Constitutive Act of the AU adopted in 2000, the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In a complete break from the OAU, which had advocated non-interference in member states, the Act gave the AU both the right to intervene in a crisis, and an obligation to do so “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. 

Lamamra said the ASF “Implies the immediate availability of the instruments [of intervention and prevention] to be translated into concrete deeds... when they relate to some kind of enforcing decisions of the legitimate organs of African Union, such as cases of unconstitutional changes of government… or armed rebellion, such as the terrorist situation in northern Mali.” 

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was held up as an example of what the ASF could be. “I believe the learning curve for the standby force is AMISOM. We have to deliver on the lessons learned in the AMISOM process - five years of effective presence on the ground under quite challenging circumstances,” Lamamra said. 

“The lesson of AMISOM is that Africans should be ready to make sacrifices, and Uganda has wonderfully shown that they are ready to make sacrifices for the common good of Africa.” Uganda has supplied most of the AU troops supporting the Somali government against jihadist rebels. 

The AU has deployed 14 staff officers to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, “in the first ever deployment of ASF elements,” El Gassim Wane, AU Commission director of peace and security, told IRIN. 

A field exercise - Amani II, following the Amani I mapping exercise in 2010 - is being planned for 2014 and three of the five brigades are expected to take participate. 

Article 4 (h) 

Lamamra was confident that by 2015 all of the ASF’s regional brigades - with the probable exception of NARC, owing to the disruptions of the Arab Spring - would be operational and able to fulfil all the criteria of AU’s Article 4 (h), which influenced the international development of the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. 

There are six scenarios in Article 4 (h). The lowest rung is the attachment of a regional military advisor to a political mission; then an AU regional observer deployed within a UN mission; followed by a stand-alone AU regional observer mission; and deployment of a regional peacekeeping force under the auspices of a Chapter VI mandate, all within a timeframe of 30 days or less. Scenario five is a multidimensional AU peacekeeping force deployed within 90 days, and scenario six relates to “grave circumstances”, such as genocide, and deployment within 14 days. 

Lamamra said the timeline of 14 days for level-six intervention should be reassessed to about seven days. “For instance, resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council was adopted on 17 March and the actual military operation started on 19th March - 14 days would have been too much in terms of protecting civilians.” 

In a 2010 paper, The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture, [ http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/209.pdf ] Solomon Dersso, a senior researcher at the Addis Ababa office of the Institute for Security Studies, a Pretoria-based think-tank, notes that “Article 4 (h) not only creates the legal basis for intervention but also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene to prevent or stop the perpetration of such heinous international crimes anywhere on the continent.” 

However, implementation of R2P rests with the Security Council, while the imposition of Article 4 (h) resides with the AU and does not require the Security Council’s blessing. 

Scenario six of Article 4 (h) has yet to be used by the AU and Dersso told IRIN he “sincerely doubted” the article would be invoked in the short term against member states, as “it would deprive the AU of any leverage it has over a target government,” and the AU has already “shied away” from implementing the article in Darfur. 

He expected the ASF to be close to being able to comply with Article 4 (h) level-five scenarios by 2015, but the development of regional forces was proceeding at different paces. 

The two-speed progress of the regional brigades - in which ECOWAS and SADC are recognised as the furthest along the path - is not just a consequence of the two regional blocs housing the continent’s economic power houses of Nigeria and South Africa, AU Commission director of peace and security El Gassim Wane told IRIN. 

“ECOWAS and SADC have made tremendous progress, EAS Brigade too, while NARC in the north was lagging behind, but then started speeding up, but the Libyan crisis meant progress had to stop,” he said. “Money may play a role, but money alone cannot explain that. ECOWAS and SADC focused early on conflict and security issues, so had a competitive advantage in the very beginning. Experience, length of involvement in peace and security issues, have certainly played a key role.” 

Alex de Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation, told IRIN the availability of a standby force could cloud judgment. 

“Intrinsically, in most of these situations what is needed is a political response, and there is a temptation that if you have a standby force to use it because you have a military capacity… And my concern over something like Mali would be that the military option runs the danger of getting the AU into a Somalia-type situation, where the use of military force five or six years ago by the US and Ethiopia very seriously rebounded. But having said that - yes, in a situation where there is a need for some sort of peacekeeping deployment in the context of a political initiative, it makes sense.” 

Alternatives to the ASF? 

Analysts have questioned whether 30,000 troops would be sufficient to deal with the continent’s crises, and 2012 has illustrated that such concerns are valid. A range of crises this year erupted within the space of a few weeks, from the uneasy relationship between South Sudan and Sudan deteriorating into skirmishing, to coup d’etats in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. 

Wane said the establishment of the ASF did not necessarily mean it would be the only security option at the AU’s disposal, and the four-country operation against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, (LRA) a rebel movement that started in northern Uganda, could be considered as a useful model for the future. 

“It’s not an ASF operation per se, as ASF has its own processes, and it was not really conceived as an ASF operation - it was conceived as an ad hoc, very flexible arrangement to enhance effectiveness to deal with the LRA once and for all. It’s a very flexible and creative way of dealing with a specific security issue… Who knows? We may replicate it elsewhere, where there is a security problem,” he said. 

The force ranged against the LRA - comprising soldiers from the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Uganda - has fought against the LRA in past, but is set apart, as it operates under the aegis of the AU. 

Abou Moussa, the Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), based in Libreville, Gabon, told IRIN: “The specific nature of this deployment [against the LRA] is termed ‘authorised’ as compared to ‘mandated’.” 

“Under authorised deployment, each country provides for the needs and requirements of their respective troops without the AU's contribution. This is extremely important, as this can be considered as their own contribution towards the determination to put an end to Kony's actions. It is very costly. However, the AU covers the needs of staff officers - some 30 of them posted to the various coordinating centres.” 

The AU task force has three operational centres, located in Dungu, DRC, at Obo in CAR, and Nzara in South Sudan, with its headquarters in Yambio, South Sudan. 

“The Regional Coordination Initiative means more subtle changes in the way the operation is run, with representatives of all four countries involved in the command structure in Yambio,” which sidesteps the politically sensitive issue of the DRC’s refusal to host Ugandan forces on its soil, Ned Dalby, a central Africa analyst for the International Crisis Group, a conflict resolution NGO, told IRIN. 

In July 2005, the International Criminal Court indicted Kony and four of his commanders, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Raska Lukwiya and Vincent Otti, for a variety of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Lukwiya and Otti have subsequently been killed, but the arrest warrants for the remaining three remain outstanding. The LRA has not been active in Uganda since 2006. 

go/he 

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95426</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201109090734440184t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 09 May 2012 (IRIN) - Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) - a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>AFGHANISTAN: Concerns over child detention conditions in Kandahar</title><pubDate>Thu, 03 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2009/200903041t.jpg" />]]>KABUL 03 May 2012 (IRIN) - A government plan to relocate an all-boys juvenile rehabilitation centre (JRC) in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan, from the city centre to a site near Sarposa prison, where top Taliban leaders are held, could expose the children to significant risk, according to observers.</description><body><![CDATA[KABUL 03 May 2012 (IRIN) - A government plan to relocate an all-boys juvenile rehabilitation centre (JRC) in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan, from the city centre to a site near Sarposa prison, where top Taliban leaders are held, could expose the children to significant risk, according to observers.

The Kandahar JRC in its current site holds 20 to 55 boys at a time, some as young as seven, in cramped and insanitary conditions. According to the Child Rights Consortium (CRC), a program managed by Terre des Hommes in conjunction with Afghan NGOs, the centre "gathers a large number of youths who should not be in custody: the offence they committed is often trifling, or the legal age of detention is not respected". It also offers no educational, vocational or recreational activities.

"The director explained that they own sewing machines for vocational training, but the last tailoring teacher moved to another position in the prison for financial reasons and was not replaced. And although the director assured the visitors that books are at least available, the children categorically contradicted this," the Consortium said. [ http://www.crc-afghanistan.org/newsitems/crc-juvenile-justice-activities-in-kandahar ] following a visit to the centre in August 2011.

Other sources said the centre lacks adequate bed space and food, and there have been complaints of pilfering of some of the donations it receives. “The winter aid donations made to the centre, such as rice cookers and tables, cannot be found anywhere,” said one aid worker who makes frequent visits to the centre.

Drug use, sexual abuse and torture are reportedly ongoing problems, with guards, who are government employees, accused of providing drugs in exchange for sexual favors. Recently a boy was shot by one of the guards who was said to have had problems with the juvenile.

Initially, the justice ministry - then in charge of detention facilities - had decided to relocate the centre to a space inside the Sarposa maximum security prison. The move was cancelled when Afghan President Hamid Karzai in January transferred responsibility for prisons from justice to the interior ministry.

But the proposed new site is only marginally better: a building close to Sarposa offered by the US-funded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar. Locating a JRC anywhere close to the maximum security prison, observers said, was totally inappropriate.

“We naturally have a concern about security, about transferring the kids to a location where there would be greater risk, and about the facilities in general and whether the facilities themselves are appreciably better or have greater capacity so there is no overcrowding,” said James Rodehaver, spokesman for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). He also expressed concern over the sustainability of long-term funding for the proposed new centre.

Taliban risk

Sarposa prison was attacked in 2008 and again in April 2011, resulting in the escape of hundreds of Taliban commanders. The first attack was preceded by inmates stitching their mouths shut in a protest against what they claimed was their unlawful detention and unfair trials.

“Behind Sarposa, in Police District 8, is a small town named Kargonic,” said an Afghan journalist who preferred anonymity. “Kargonic is connected to Pirpaymal village in Arghandab District where the Taliban are very active. Because Kargonic borders this area insurgents sometimes plan and carry out attacks here.”

Government officials in Kandahar said the city administration was applying pressure on all parties to accept the new facility due to funding constraints. “The land has already been submitted for judicial review,” said Zelmai Ayoubi, spokesman for the governor of Kandahar. “It is at the provincial level. We have the land but are looking for donors to help with construction.”

Hundreds held

Hundreds of children are held in JRCs across Afghanistan. As at May 2011, almost 800 (including approximately 100 girls), aged 12 to 18 were being held in 31 centres, according [ http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/frontpage/2011/July/support-for-children.html ] to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.  But 29 were located in rented properties that had not been designed to house juveniles and lacked rehabilitation programmes or recreational facilities.

"In Juvenile Rehabilitation Centres children’s basic needs are not met," said the NGO War Child [ http://www.warchild.org.uk/issues/juvenile-justice-afghanistan ]. "Many children are not provided with a medical check-up before being placed in detention and those who become sick struggle to access to medical attention. The food is not nutritionally adequate, there’s nowhere to play and no toys or equipment to play with. Children also struggle to get an education as many facilities lack books, pens and writing paper."

Yet, according to the CRC, the juvenile justice system in Afghanistan has evolved over the last decade.

"The legal framework has been enriched with some of the most important international standards, such as the principle of detention as last resort (Art. 40 of the United Nations Child Rights Convention) and the principles guaranteeing a fair trial and a due process of law," it said. The 2005 Afghan Juvenile Code, for example, raised the age of criminal responsibility from 7 to 12 years old and defined alternatives to detention such as performing social services, conditional suspension of punishment or home confinement, the rights group noted.
"Until recently, these alternatives to detention have hardly been used by judges and prosecutors; the predominant trend has been to systematically send children to JRCs regardless of the severity of the offence," said CRC. "A 14 year-old child who committed a theft to survive can be detained with a 17-year-old murderer. This exposition to the justice process can have a very negative impact on juveniles."

bm/eo/oa

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 03 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95405</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2009/200903041t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KABUL 03 May 2012 (IRIN) - A government plan to relocate an all-boys juvenile rehabilitation centre (JRC) in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan, from the city centre to a site near Sarposa prison, where top Taliban leaders are held, could expose the children to significant risk, according to observers.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>AID POLICY: The myth and mystique of humanitarian space</title><pubDate>Wed, 02 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201111170949490187t.jpg" />]]>LONDON 02 May 2012 (IRIN) - The phenomenon of ‘shrinking humanitarian space’ is earnestly debated by aid workers. The often-heard complaint is that neutrality and independence is increasingly compromised by donors, peacekeepers and warring parties seeking to co-opt them, and they blame the growing toll of attacks on agency staff on the perception that they are no longer impartial.</description><body><![CDATA[LONDON 02 May 2012 (IRIN) - The phenomenon of ‘shrinking humanitarian space’ is earnestly debated by aid workers. The often-heard complaint is that neutrality and independence is increasingly compromised by donors, peacekeepers and warring parties seeking to co-opt them, and they blame the growing toll of attacks on agency staff on the perception that they are no longer impartial. 
 
Now two researchers from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London have waded into the debate, challenging the whole idea of ‘humanitarian space’ as the agencies define it, and criticising the lack of historical perspective of those who believe there was ever a humanitarian golden age, when neutrality was respected and agencies could work in conflict zones free of political considerations.
 
In their paper, Humanitarian Space: a Review of Trends and Issues [ http://www.odi.org.uk/events/details.asp?id=2922&title=humanitarian-space-aid-workers ], Sarah Collinson and Samir Elhawary do not deny that the total number of attacks on aid workers has increased. But they argue that the number of aid workers, and the scale of their operations have also increased – massively – in recent years. More than 200,000 field-based aid workers are now estimated to be employed by the UN and international NGOs, and it is not clear that they are proportionately more at risk than their far less numerous predecessors.
 
Agencies also now consider it normal to expect to be able to work in areas of conflict and have their neutrality respected.  That was not always the case.  In the 1950s and 60s, respect for national sovereignty kept UN agencies out of countries affected by war, and the refugee agency UNHCR only worked with people who had already left their homeland. In the 1970s, idealistic new NGOs defied sovereign governments and worked with rebel groups to help the oppressed.
 
In the 1990s international peacekeeping efforts became more assertive and interventionist, but, say Collinson and Elhawary, “many aid agencies accepted the need for ‘coherence’ between humanitarian and diplomatic and security agendas as long as they trusted the basic humanitarian intent of the main donor governments.”  It was only after the 9/11 attacks in the US, little more than 10 years ago, that agencies got concerned about being co-opted into the much more explicit security agenda of the so-called Global War on Terror. 
 
“Humanitarian space is generally understood as a space that exists separate from politics,” Elhawary told an audience at the ODI this week, “and that to reverse politicisation we need to return to a clear, solid and predictable model, namely that by upholding these principles, and remaining outside of politics, an agency’s access will be guaranteed. But all access is essentially based on political compromise and results from the interplay of a range of actors’ interests and actions…We undertook a brief historical review since the cold war, and we found no past golden age for humanitarian action.”
 
The authors also criticise the way major international agencies use the term ‘humanitarian space’, when what they are actually talking about is agency space, space in which they – the UN and major NGOs - can operate as they wish, disregarding the fact that the situation may be very different for other actors doing humanitarian work, or for local people at risk.
 
In the audience at the launch of the report were people from the very agencies in its firing line. 
 
Marc Dubois, executive director of Medecins Sans Frontieres-UK, conceded there could be merit in looking at humanitarian space in more realpolitik terms, where you negotiate, buy or elbow your way to get what you need. “It’s about understanding interests; it’s about understanding the power play on the ground. And it’s about understanding that while the principles do have meaning, they only have meaning within a given context.”
 
How that might work in practice was indicated by Brian Martin, until recently the country manager in Sri Lanka for Christian Aid. “In each case you need to look at the contextual side of it,” he told the meeting, “and you’ve got to look at ‘what can I do and what can’t I do.’ I was amazed at some of my colleagues’ arrogance in the way they wanted to do things, and the reluctance they would have to speak to the authorities or to the military…There is a great need to engage and talk with the authorities and get them to agree. Some things you are not going to get. But in Sri Lanka we worked with the military, and the further we were away from Colombo, up in the north, the military were actually doing quite a lot of good things to help the population.”
 
Participants with longer memories welcomed the report’s historical perspective. “I think we need to understand how we got into this discourse in the first place,” said Jeff Crisp, the Head of Policy, Development and Evaluation at UNHCR. “And I think it says something about humanitarian policy research in that it has always been totally a-historical…We have to get away from the situation where we are only concerned with what’s happening today and tomorrow.”
 
But there was a word of warning from Dubois. The neutrality of humanitarian space and ideal of the aid worker standing apart from politics might be a myth, but he said: “I think that this notion of agency space as humanitarian space has a lot to do with our identity and the myths that we have about ourselves that are very, very important to the way we run, our culture, our drive and dedication.  And I worry about an organisation where everyone is a political animal.”
 
eb/oa

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 02 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95394</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201111170949490187t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">LONDON 02 May 2012 (IRIN) - The phenomenon of ‘shrinking humanitarian space’ is earnestly debated by aid workers. The often-heard complaint is that neutrality and independence is increasingly compromised by donors, peacekeepers and warring parties seeking to co-opt them, and they blame the growing toll of attacks on agency staff on the perception that they are no longer impartial.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Negotiating humanitarian access in the north</title><pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205010838450199t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 01 May 2012 (IRIN) - Aid agencies in northern Mali are debating how or whether they should negotiate with newly installed rebel groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine, which is affiliated to Al Qaeda, to reach people in need.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 01 May 2012 (IRIN) - Aid agencies in northern Mali are debating how or whether they should negotiate with newly installed rebel groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine, which is affiliated to Al Qaeda, to reach people in need.

There are layers of complexity. Agencies have divergent approaches to securing humanitarian access - some refuse to use armed escorts under any circumstances, others see them as necessary in extreme situations; some US agencies cannot negotiate with terrorist-affiliated groups, others are already doing so. IRIN spoke to humanitarian agencies operating in the north to find out how they are delivering aid.

Prior to the March 2012 rebel fight for the north, northern Mali had for years been a volatile operating environment, mainly because of kidnapping and banditry. Most agencies leave all non-African and expatriated staff in the capital, Bamako. Some, such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which operates in Gao, work only through local partners. Others, such as the World Food Programme (WFP), have for years used private transport companies to deliver aid.

When rebel groups succeeded in taking power in the north in early April 2012, aid agency operations were made more complicated, initially as each was forced to scramble to rebuild their stocks and equipment after widescale looting of their northern offices. CRS estimates that “several million” dollars, which would have gone into launching a large-scale food security operation from April to June in the region has been lost, and only last week two of their warehouses full of food were pillaged.

Agencies have to establish how they will approach rebel groups now in control, so as not to lose more time. There are some 75,000 people internally displaced in northern Mali; while thousands more were already facing food insecurity due to poor harvests, lack of pasture and high food prices. Alassane Maiga, a teacher at the Yanna Maiga intermediate school in Gao, told IRIN: “People are getting hungry - there are volunteers to provide first aid to the injured, but that’s all.”

Operating modes

Approaches vary when it comes to negotiating with rebels. CRS, which is largely US-funded, will not do so and relies on others in the humanitarian community to deliver aid. The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC) - in some ways the ‘guardian’ of the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality - will, but is taking a thorough, gradual approach said its spokesperson, Stephen Ambrose. This has not stopped them from working - they have been fuelling Gao’s generator to ensure the city’s water supply, and have kept Gao and Timbuktu hospitals supplied with medicines - but nowhere near as much as they would like.

Several aid agency representatives told IRIN that the MNLA are relatively open when it comes to discussing access, but Ansar Dine spokespeople change regularly, making it difficult to rely on agreements already made. They have also officially called for only Malian agencies to work in the north.

A few agencies, including the Malian Red Cross and international medical NGO Doctors of the World (Medecins du Monde or MDM), have already approached all the groups to discuss access. “We give the same information to all but we remain fully independent in the way that we operate,” said Olivier Vandecasteele, coordinator of MDM in Mali, which focuses on health and nutrition work.

“You need to spend a lot of time on the phone, and verify through all of your different contacts how a convoy will pass - so far, we have never had a convoy that was stopped,” he said. MDM staff say so far they have had no major access problems in Kidal or Gao.

Vandecasteele said this is partly because MDM has been in the region a long time, many locals have participated in its activities, and it has widespread acceptance. MDM owns none of its own cars and rents vehicles locally, so it lost none during the looting.

Being absolutely rigid in its approach to independence and impartiality will help the agency operate in the long term if conflict flares up again, which it well could, said Vandecasteele. ECOWAS has announced it will take all measures “including use of force” to ensure the territorial integrity of Mali.  Vandecasteele believes that aid groups might be surprised if they tried to negotiate humanitarian access. “They might just find they get it,” he told IRIN.

The Mali Humanitarian Country Team, made up of UN and some NGO agency heads, is working out an access strategy based on the importance of upholding impartiality, said David Gressly, regional humanitarian coordinator for the Sahel. While some UN agencies are already operational, security concerns mean that UN Refugee Agency UNHCR has very limited access to assess the needs of the displaced, said its spokesperson Fatoumata Lejeune-Kaba.

Armed escorts

One area of contention is the use of armed escorts. Humanitarian agencies generally shun the use of armed escorts or armed protection for their warehouses and other property, so as to avoid affiliation with one side or the other in a conflict. While some agencies - like MDM - will never use them, others - like WFP - will do so in extreme circumstances, said its acting representative, Martine Ohlsen.

“It is partly a question of scale - as the volume goes up, so do the risks,” said Gressly. Vandecasteele told IRIN he recognizes the temptation for some agencies to use armed guards, particularly with highly valuable stock at stake, but that "it sets a dangerous precedent." As one agency head put it, an armed escort can become an active belligerent in a conflict overnight.

Some aid groups have already accepted armed escorts. Hearing of people’s needs in the north, local group Cri du Coeur (Cry of the Heart) collected money and aid donations from Bamako residents and sent a convoy north, accepting MNLA escorts between Douentza in the Mopti region and Gao. “We established contacts with MNLA and Ansar Dine, and they demanded they secure the convoy themselves, and that they supervise the distribution of food,” Tidiane Guindo, the public relations officer of non-profit Cri du Coeur told IRIN. When they arrived, a distribution committee made up of prominent local citizens were in place to distribute he goods, he said.

In Timbuktu, local resident Moulaye Sayah told IRIN, the food and medicines sent there are “distributed under the very close supervision of Ansar Dine." Some say it is better to have aid delivered that way than not at all.

Others however, worry that it has dangerous repercussions, including contributing to a war economy. “They [the guards] don’t do it for free; and then there is their fuel to cover,” said the agency head. “Aid can be delivered through armed convoys, but don’t call it humanitarian.”

aj/sk/he

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95390</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205010838450199t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 01 May 2012 (IRIN) - Aid agencies in northern Mali are debating how or whether they should negotiate with newly installed rebel groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine, which is affiliated to Al Qaeda, to reach people in need.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>LIBYA: Thousands still afraid to return home</title><pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204301420440860t.jpg" />]]>TRIPOLI 01 May 2012 (IRIN) - Six months after an uprising brought down Muammar Gaddafi&apos;s government, thousands of displaced Libyans are still living in abandoned construction sites, empty student dormitories or with host families, too afraid to return to their homes.</description><body><![CDATA[TRIPOLI 01 May 2012 (IRIN) - Six months after an uprising brought down Muammar Gaddafi's government, thousands of displaced Libyans are still living in abandoned construction sites, empty student dormitories or with host families, too afraid to return to their homes.

“We want to go back but cannot,” said Abdul Aziz al-Irwi, who lives in Sidi Slim camp in the capital, Tripoli.  "Some people from another camp tried to return about two months ago, but about seven of them were captured by forces from Zintan and imprisoned.”

Al-Irwi is from the Mshashiya community, an ethnic group from the Nefusa Mountains in Western Libya who were targeted during the uprising by opposition fighters from Zintan, allegedly for being allied with pro-Gaddafi forces. Zintan is a small city also located in the Nefusa Mountains area.

“I am here because Gaddafi’s forces came to the town of Mshashya, so we had to leave," he told IRIN. "They used our town to bomb other areas. We went to Gharyan, and then came to Tripoli.” 

Records from the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, show that an estimated 14,500 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were living in Tripoli as of March. Across Libya, the total number of those still displaced is estimated at 70,000.

Apart from the Mshashiya, others included the Qawalish, also from the Nefusa Mountains, the Tawergha, a group of Touareg families from the west, and those perceived as being loyal to the previous regime from al-Zawiya, Bani Walid and Sirte. 

A sizeable group of the displaced living in Tripoli and Benghazi cities were Tawergha. They were accused of participating in Gaddafi’s assault on Misrata, murdering and raping thousands of people. Reprisal attacks ensued, forcing their entire town of more than 30,000 to flee their homes.  Today, the Tawergha-Misrata case remains a particularly sensitive one in post-Gaddafi Libya. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94455/LIBYA-Rocky-road-ahead-for-Libya-s-Tawergha-minority ]

Until recently, the dark-skinned Tawergha minority - former slaves brought to Libya in the 18th and 19th centuries - lived in a coastal town of the same name 250km east of Tripoli. With the rise to power of the rebels, the Tawergha are now on the defensive. The sign leading to their city has been changed to New Misrata and its population told not to return. 

Needs and security

According to UNHCR, an estimated 100-150,000 people were displaced in October 2011, but that number has reduced progressively with many returning to their communities, including in Bani Walid and Sirte. 

Camp managers at Sidi Slim say conditions are difficult, and the monthly supply of food delivered by agencies and Libaid, the humanitarian arm of the Libyan government, is not enough for each family. 

“In our opinion, food is not a problem,” Muftah M Etwilb, the Chief Executive Officer of Libaid, told IRIN. “There are other needs like education, health and protection. Health is free of charge for all Libyans, but still some people in the camp need immediate services from a dispensary. The other issue is proper housing. We are trying to get the government to provide alternative housing since some of these camps are owned by international companies.” 

Providing protection for the displaced communities, particularly from armed militias still roaming the main cities, remains one of the biggest challenges to date for the transitional government. 

“Since August 2011, we have been subjected to arbitrary attacks and detention,” Abdelrahman Mahmoud, head of the Local Council of the Tawergha in Tripoli, told IRIN. “If Tripoli is safe, then the camps are safe, but if it is not, then we are not safe,” 

In February, militias raided the Marine Academy where about 2,000 Tawergha had taken shelter, killing seven people and abducting three men. [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/05/libya-bolster-security-tawergha-camps ] Witnesses claim the militias were from Misrata. 

“The guards from the Marine Academy didn’t have any weapons. When the Misrata brigades came in with weapons, they just moved aside,” Emmanuel Gignac, UNHCR head of mission told IRIN. “What you see now is individual cases inside or outside camps, for instance the Tawergha, including kidnapping for ransom. You can attack people from Tawergha and there is total impunity.”

Amnesty International and other groups have also documented testimonies from among the Mshashiya and Qawalish in Tripoli, who say they were detained and tortured by militias.

Responsibility 

A common refrain heard among agencies and ordinary Libyans is that the government needs to assume responsibility for a host of problems, and internal displacement is no exception. To address the humanitarian needs of IDPs across the country, Libaid is organizing a national conference in May involving government ministries, agencies and representatives of the displaced.  

“It is not exactly a neglected issue, but it’s not the number one priority in Libya. People also have to deal with security, and with the upcoming elections,” said Etwilb. “But we want to make the IDP issue visible on the day-to-day agenda of the government.” 

Contacted for comment, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Social Affairs said:  “We have made available a fund of 400 dinar [US$ 320] a month for people who wish to rent a house outside the camps,” Naima Etaher said. “Concerning the non-Tawergha people, a lot of their houses were not destroyed, and it’s safe to go back, but they just stay in these camps to take advantage of the government.” 

But families in Sidi Slim camp saw things differently. 

In the sweltering heat of a room occupied by a Mshashiya family, people gather to look at footage on a mobile phone which they claim is of destroyed buildings in their home town. “I want to go back. We have been in Mshashiya for over 1,200 years,” said Khalifa Saad Mabrouk, tracing on the floor with his finger what his farm looks like. “I have my trees there, and my houses, my land.” 

When asked if remaining in Tripoli or moving elsewhere would be a solution, Mabrouk and his family were unequivocal. “Absolutely not. Even if conditions here are okay, we want to go home.” 

Reconciliation

What has still not been addressed, and will determine when people might return to their abandoned homes, are the underlying political tensions fueling animosity between different groups and deterring reconciliation, say observers. 

The upcoming conference organized by Libaid is aimed at dealing with the short-term humanitarian needs of displaced populations, but not the political issues. “We try not to politicize the conference,” said Etwilb. “There is a risk if we just make it very open.” 

Likewise, the “Reconciliation committees”, set up by recently by the government to restore relations between different communities, can only deal with minor disputes. “We are trying to get people out of prison, but we are not able to do much for people who killed, raped or stole,” Naji Regebi, a member of one of the committees, told IRIN. “The more serious issues will have to go to the justice system.” 

Some Tawergha like Ismael Shaaban, an elder in Fallah Ladco camp in Tripoli, believe both sides should go to court.  “We will hand over anyone who is guilty to the Libyan government, but we also want people torturing and abusing Tawerghans to be brought to justice,”  he said.

Others like Khadija Absalaam (not real name), whose three sons she claims were detained in Misrata, are more skeptical. “We don’t want peace with the Misratans, we just want a wall between our two cities," she said. "We can live without communicating.” 

The Misratan Local Council, in response to concerns raised by Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/misrata-local-council-response-human-rights-watch ] about widespread torture and crimes committed in detention centres and toward the Tawergha, denied responsibility saying: “Treatment in the city’s prisons is good….many accusations have been wrongly and falsely attributed to Misrata revolutionaries.”

For the Tawergha and Misratans, long-term reconciliation will need a fully functional formal justice process. But, given that the government is still “settling down” in the words of one official, that is not likely to occur until after the elections, scheduled to take place in June. And even then, true reconciliation on the ground is likely to take time. 

“Even if the humanitarian issues are dealt with by organisations, it is not enough,” said Gignac. “It is about coming to terms with the past and it is going to be a long process.” 

zm/eo/oa

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95389</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204301420440860t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">TRIPOLI 01 May 2012 (IRIN) - Six months after an uprising brought down Muammar Gaddafi&apos;s government, thousands of displaced Libyans are still living in abandoned construction sites, empty student dormitories or with host families, too afraid to return to their homes.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>UGANDA: Inadequate healthcare and rising HIV prevalence in Karamoja</title><pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204301022560882t.jpg" />]]>MOROTO 30 April 2012 (IRIN) - The nomadic Karimojong ethnic group, once regarded as a low-risk HIV population because regional instability in northeastern Uganda and strong adherence to their culture kept them relatively isolated, have not been a priority on the country&apos;s HIV agenda, but recent statistics show prevalence among this community is now 5.8 percent, up from 3.5 percent five years ago.</description><body><![CDATA[MOROTO 30 April 2012 (IRIN) - The nomadic Karimojong ethnic group, once regarded as a low-risk HIV population because regional instability in northeastern Uganda and strong adherence to their culture kept them relatively isolated, have not been a priority on the country's HIV agenda, but recent statistics show prevalence among this community is now 5.8 percent, up from 3.5 percent five years ago. 

Over the past decade large numbers of Karimojong have settled in urban centres, where business is flourishing and many NGOs have set up shop; there has also been heavy military deployment in the area as part of a disarmament exercise. These and other changes in a strongly traditionalist society have combined to push prevalence closer to the national average of 6.7 percent. 

"The drivers of the pandemic that exist elsewhere are now occurring here. There is also a lot of alcoholism and [domestic] abuse here, which is one of the drivers of HIV/AIDS infection," Dr Michael Omeke, health officer for the Karamoja region's Moroto District, told IRIN/PlusNews. 

Limited health services

Just five hospitals serve seven districts and a population of 1.2 million scattered over some 28,000 square kilometres. "In general, HIV treatment and care services are still low in the region," said David Wakoko, Karamoja area manager for the Mulago-Mbarara Teaching Hospitals' Joint AIDS Programme (MJAP). 

Most health centres in the region do not have clinical officers trained to provide life-prolonging antiretroviral (ARV) drugs or offer HIV care and treatment. Kaabong District for example, has five health facilities, but only the district hospital has a medical officer authorised to treat HIV-positive patients, and the hospital does not have a CD4 machine to test blood samples and measure immune strength. 

Few health workers are keen to live in the remote and underdeveloped region. "Human resources are a big challenge. You need someone who is qualified to help these people, but we are not attracting… personnel," said Dr John Anguzu, District Health Officer in Nakapiripirit. "Even the local people we try to train here to help, they leave." 

The region has also not been spared the drug shortages that have occurred in other parts of the country. "We do experience ARVs stock-outs... We are trying to work with the Ministry of Health and National Medical Stores to see that these stock-outs are reduced," said Omeke. 

A lack of food in the arid region and the long distances to health centres are major problems for people living with HIV. "These are weak people and can't move long distances to go for treatment and drugs. The health centres are too far," said Gabriel Lokubal, who lives in Moroto. "ARVs are very strong drugs, which require a lot of eating. However, most of us don't have food, so some people have stopped going for drugs." 

Knowledge about HIV is also very low. A recently released preliminary report on the AIDS Indicator Survey shows that just 30 percent of women and 45 percent of men in the northeast are well-informed about HIV/AIDS. 

A complex region

Spreading the word about HIV is not easy in Karamoja, where open discussions about sex are extremely unusual and the population is largely uneducated. According to MJAP statistics only 35 percent of Karimojong men have accessed HIV/AIDS services, compared to 65 percent of women. 

"Because of the nature of the society and tradition, the men remain in the kraals [communal cattle pens] and are on the move in search of pasture and water for their cattle. They have little interest in seeking HIV services," said MJAP's Wakoko. "Most of those who access HIV/AIDS services are women, especially the pregnant ones, who visit health facilities for ante-natal services." 

"The HIV patients also tie HIV services to food. If you don’t have food, people don’t come," Anguzu said in Nakapiripirit. 

Stigma is highly problematic for health services trying to reach people living with HIV. "When you test a person and… [the result] is HIV-positive, he or she will never come back again for further… [treatment]," said a nurse at the ARV clinic at Moroto Regional Referral Hospital. "We are trying to sensitize the community to accept their status and learn to live positively." 

In an effort to bring the services closer to the people, Uganda's Ministry of Health and MJAP are running a home-based HIV counselling and testing programme, but low staffing and occasional insecurity in the region are affecting the door-to-door campaign. 

"The security situation remains fluid, as it changes any time despite general improvement in the sub-region, thereby affecting the implementation of programme in most of the catchment areas," said MJAP's Wakoko. 

Health workers in the region say the nature of the causes and effects of HIV mean it cannot be tackled in isolation, and a holistic approach should be used. 

"The interventions need to be shared among sectors - health is concept which is determined by social, economic and cultural aspects," said Samuel Enginyu, a health educator with the Ministry of Health. "We are working on an integrated and collaborative approach with the Minister of Gender and Culture and other stakeholders." 

so/kr/he

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95383</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204301022560882t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MOROTO 30 April 2012 (IRIN) - The nomadic Karimojong ethnic group, once regarded as a low-risk HIV population because regional instability in northeastern Uganda and strong adherence to their culture kept them relatively isolated, have not been a priority on the country&apos;s HIV agenda, but recent statistics show prevalence among this community is now 5.8 percent, up from 3.5 percent five years ago.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>YEMEN: Timeline of key events under new president</title><pubDate>Thu, 26 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202080902110728t.jpg" />]]>SANA'A 26 April 2012 (IRIN) - Two months after Yemen’s new government was sworn in, violence in the south appears to be increasing with attacks and kidnappings blamed on militants, while more than 10 million people are food insecure and almost half a million internally displaced. The UN says at least 800,000 children are acutely malnourished.</description><body><![CDATA[SANA'A 26 April 2012 (IRIN) - Two months after Yemen’s new government was sworn in, violence in the south appears to be increasing with attacks and kidnappings blamed on militants, while more than 10 million people are food insecure and almost half a million internally displaced. The UN says at least 800,000 children are acutely malnourished.

The new president, Abdurabu Mansour Hadi, is struggling to restructure the army and rid it of relatives of former president Abdallah Saleh on the one hand, and key opposition leaders (his former adversaries) on the other. Meanwhile, the protests continue. Below is a timeline of key events during Hadi’s first 60 days in office:
25 February: At least 26 Republican Guard soldiers killed and more than 10 injured at a presidential palace in Mukalla city, Hadhramaut Governorate, just one hour after Hadi takes office.

27 February: Ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh officially hands over power to Hadi at a ceremony in Sana’a in the presence of foreign diplomats and Yemeni dignitaries.

1 March: Thirty killed in sectarian clashes between Houthi-led Shia fighters and members of the Islamist Islah Party in Hajjah Governorate. 

2 March: Tens of thousands of protesters take to streets in Sana’a and other main cities on so-called “Friday of Restructuring the Army”, demanding the removal of Saleh’s relatives from their military and security posts. 

4 March: Four soldiers killed in clashes with Islamic militants in Beidha Governorate, some 250km southeast of Sana’a. 

5 March: Islamic militants storm a military camp in Abyan Governorate, leaving 185 soldiers dead and dozens of others injured; they loot heavy weapons including a tank and artillery pieces.

8 March: Seven killed in clashes between army members and Houthi fighters in Amran Governorate. 

9 March: Tens of thousands of protesters take to streets in 14 governorates, demanding Hadi begin restructuring the divided army. Twenty-six Islamic militants killed in air raids in Beidha Governorate. 

11 March: Gunmen in Marib Governorate attack the country’s main power plant and blow up an oil pipeline. 

12 March: One killed, six injured in clashes between police and armed members of the Southern Movement (SM) in Hadhramaut Governorate. 

13 March: Eight people, including four Republican Guard soldiers, killed and more than a dozen injured in a car suicide bombing in Beidha Governorate. 

16 March: Tens of thousands rally in Sana’a and other main cities, demanding removal of Saleh’s relatives from top posts in the military and security institutions, and the abolition of the law granting immunity to Saleh.

18 March: Hundreds of thousands demonstrate in Sana’a and other main cities, commemorating the first anniversary of “Friday of Dignity” when 52 protesters were killed in Sana’a.
 
19 March: Three killed and another dozen injured in clashes between police and SM gunmen in the southern city of Aden. 

22 March: Ten killed, several injured in landmine blasts in Kusher District, Hajjah Governorate, following clashes between Houthi fighters and armed tribesmen. 

23 March: Hundreds of thousands protest in Sana’a and other main cities on so-called Friday of “Executing killers of protesters is our demand”.

26 March: President Hadi makes a surprise visit to neighbouring Saudi Arabia, to get support for implementation of transitional reforms.

31 March: More than 28 soldiers killed, dozens injured or held captive by Islamic militants in Lahj Governorate. 

1 April: Seven soldiers ambushed, killed by Islamic militants in Hadhramaut. 

7 April: Hadi begins to remove some of Saleh’s relatives and defected leaders from their posts.

10 April: More than 100 soldiers killed in an attack by Islamic militants in Lawdar, Abyan. Another seven killed on the highway between Marib and Shabwa governorates. 

13 April: Tens of thousands of protesters in Sana’a and other main cities demand that Hadi remove other relatives of the ex-president from key posts in the military and security institutions.

15 April: Dismissed Air Force Commander Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar, who is a half-brother to the ex-president, given a 48-hour deadline to hand over to his successor Rashad al-Janad. The decision is supported by EU diplomats who meet Hadi. Tariq Saleh, nephew of the ex-president and commander of the Presidential Guard, refused to be moved to an Armoured Division in Hadhramaut.

16 April: Hundreds of Saleh supporters demonstrate in Sana’a, demanding his return to power. Speaking in front of hundreds of young supporters, Saleh said: “No one may surrender himself to death or liquidation”, giving a signal that his relatives should not be removed from their senior army and security posts. 

17 April: Dismissed commander al-Ahmar prevents demilitarization committee from accessing the Air Force Headquarters to arrange a handover to his successor. The issue is transferred to the UN Security Council, which is supervising the transition in Yemen.

18 April: UN Envoy Jamal Binomar visits Yemen to discuss the power transition process.

20 April: Tens of thousands of protesters take to the streets in most Yemeni cities demanding the prosecution of military leaders who refused Hadi’s orders on their dismissals.

24 April: Dismissed Air Force Commander Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar hands over to his successor.


Sources:

http://www.irinnews.org/Country/YE/Yemen
http://www.barakish.net
http://www.newsyemen.net 
http://www.yementimes.net 
http://www.al-tagheer.com
http://www.aljazeera.net 
Saeeda TV station 
Ministry of Interior
http://www.yemenfox.net 
Yemen Today TV station 
http://www.hajjah.net 
http://www.marebpress.net 
Yemen Polling Centre (local think-tank) 

ay/eo/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 26 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95362</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202080902110728t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">SANA'A 26 April 2012 (IRIN) - Two months after Yemen’s new government was sworn in, violence in the south appears to be increasing with attacks and kidnappings blamed on militants, while more than 10 million people are food insecure and almost half a million internally displaced. The UN says at least 800,000 children are acutely malnourished.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SIERRA LEONE: &quot;Now we can move on&quot;</title><pubDate>Thu, 26 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201110241139480298t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 26 April 2012 (IRIN) - Sierra Leoneans are relieved that former warlord and President of Liberia Charles Taylor has been convicted by the Special Court of Sierra Leone on 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 26 April 2012 (IRIN) - Sierra Leoneans are relieved that former warlord and President of Liberia Charles Taylor has been convicted by the Special Court of Sierra Leone on 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  

Taylor was convicted today by the UN-backed court in The Hague, capital of The Netherlands, of acts of terrorism, murder, violence to life, rape, sexual slavery, outrages to personal dignity, cruel treatment, the use of child soldiers, enslavement and pillage. He has denied the charges.  

President of Liberia from 1997 to 2003, Taylor was accused of supporting the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) who killed, raped and injured tens of thousands of people during Sierra Leone’s 1991-2002 civil war.  

Abioseh, 31, who was used as a sexual slave or “wife” of an RUF commander during the conflict, told IRIN from Makeni, central Sierra Leone, that “Taylor got what he was due - now we have seen justice and can move on.”  

The verdict will not make her daily life or that of other survivors any easier. The father of one of her three children is an ex-RUF commander, and the associated stigma means she has never married and now struggles to provide for her children.  

The RUF were known for their brutal violence, using machetes to cut off people’s limbs, training and coercing thousands of children to injure and kill civilians, and perpetrating widespread sexual violence and rape. An estimated 27,000 Sierra Leoneans were disabled or had one or more of their limbs amputated during the conflict. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94037/SIERRA-LEONE-Amputees-still-waiting-for-reparations-almost-10-years-on ]

The verdict “marks a watershed for efforts to hold the highest level leaders accountable for the greatest crimes, and for the victims of Sierra Leone’s brutal armed conflict”, Annie Gell, an attorney at the Human Rights Watch International Justice Programme, told IRIN.  

This is the first time since the Nuremburg trials in 1947, after World War II, that a former head of state has faced a judgement in an international court, and should be a “wake-up call to leaders everywhere that those in power can be held to account for their crimes”, said Gell.  

Many Sierra Leoneans see Taylor as accountable for atrocities committed during the civil war. His trial, held in The Hague due to stability concerns in Sierra Leone, has taken almost five years. So far eight more people associated with the three main warring factions have been tried and convicted by the court in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, and are serving sentences in Rwanda.  

Reactions to the verdict in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, have been mixed, with some Taylor supporters angry that he has been singled out.  

Though only on trial for his actions relating to the violence in Sierra Leone, Taylor also played a key role in bringing neighbouring Liberia into the civil war in the late 1980s, but no such judicial process has taken place there. Instead, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was rolled out but its recommendations have not been implemented, partly because some of them are so controversial. Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was one of 50 Liberians recommended for subjection to public sanctions - in her case for providing financial support to Charles Taylor. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/85158/LIBERIA-Opinion-divided-on-Truth-and-Reconciliation-findings ]  

While the survivors of the violence in Sierra Leone maybe pleased with the verdict, many also stress that practical assistance to help them rebuild their lives is just as important. Those who were sexually abused, wounded or injured during the war were promised reparations to help them move on, but many have yet to receive help, and the amounts are too small to make any significant difference, survivors have told IRIN.  

James Kpomgbo, whose arm was cut off during the war, told a reporter in Freetown after the verdict had been announced: "I will reflect on the suffering we suffered today, but I want to forget - we have known all along Charles Taylor is guilty. Today is just another day where we must find food."

aj/he

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 26 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95368</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201110241139480298t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 26 April 2012 (IRIN) - Sierra Leoneans are relieved that former warlord and President of Liberia Charles Taylor has been convicted by the Special Court of Sierra Leone on 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>COTE D&apos;IVOIRE: Displaced in west feel “forgotten”</title><pubDate>Thu, 26 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201110271404540941t.jpg" />]]>DUÉKOUÉ 26 April 2012 (IRIN) - President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire promised paved roads, an end to power cuts and water shortages, better mobile phone coverage, and a new university in the country’s west as part of an “emergency plan” to develop a region that has been steeped in violence and insecurity for a decade. But for some displaced Ivoirians still unable to return to their homes, the promises ring hollow.</description><body><![CDATA[DUÉKOUÉ 26 April 2012 (IRIN) - President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire promised paved roads, an end to power cuts and water shortages, better mobile phone coverage, and a new university in the country’s west as part of an “emergency plan” to develop a region that has been steeped in violence and insecurity for a decade. But for some displaced Ivoirians still unable to return to their homes, the promises ring hollow.

Ernest Téhé, 46, a displaced person living in Nahibly camp near the western town of Duékoué, told IRIN he feels the displaced have been forgotten. Some 30,000 people fled to the Catholic Mission in Duékoué after a massacre in March 2011 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/92372/COTE-D-IVOIRE-Who-is-responsible-for-the-Duékoué-killings ]. Earlier this year most of those still at the Catholic Mission were moved to Nahibly, where 4,500 people are currently sheltering.

“We haven’t even been counted as part of the population,” said Téhé. “No authority has come to say, ‘The president is coming. Come, explain yourselves, your concerns - what do you need? What do not need? What’s preventing you from returning home?’”

Most displaced families told IRIN they could not return to their homes because they were destroyed, or because their farms were taken over by other groups and are now being guarded by armed guards or “dozos”. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93378/COTE-D-IVOIRE-Dozo-as-protector-dozo-as-assailant ]

Téhé comes from a village 5km outside of Duékoué but he has not returned home because his fields were taken over during his absence. “It’s because we’re Guéré,” he says, referring to his ethnic group, whose members overwhelmingly supported the former president, Laurent Gbagbo.

Much of the long-term inter-community conflict in the west is rooted in issues of land tenure, as members of different ethnic groups claim ownership to the same land.

President Ouattara recognized that the west is still very unstable, with forests “infested with armed persons”, which is “not acceptable”. Nonetheless, during his visit to the towns of Toulépleu, Bloléquin and Duékoué he repeated calls for the displaced to return home, and called on Ivoirians to leave it to the justice system to punish those who have committed crimes. He stressed that he is the president of all Ivoirians, regardless of ethnicity, religion or region.

Security: “More needs to be done”

Constant Bohé, president of the committee for returnees in the Carrefour neighbourhood of Duékoué, says he thinks security is no longer a problem in his area. “In our neighbourhood there is no problem, it’s in the surrounding villages that there are armed persons,” he told IRIN.

Olivier Mette Aubin, 50, president of a youth forum in the region, says “more needs to be done”, even though security has improved a lot. “We need security reinforced along the border so that people feel at ease." He has not heard of any recent attacks, but there have been threats. "There are still militia groups on the other side [of the border], and people fear they could attack at any time.”

The United Nations has reported continued cross-border attacks near the town of Tai in southwest Cote d’Ivoire. The latest incident occurred south of Tai on 25 April, killing six people. In September 2011 some 20 people were killed in an attack near Tai.

In March the UN missions in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) and Liberia (UNMIL) announced they were launching border patrols to ensure the safe return of refugees, and prevent the flow of weapons and cross-border attacks. However, a UN military official, who asked to remain unnamed, said after the announcement they were only devoting 34 troops to patrol the porous 450 mile-long border. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93808/COTE-D-IVOIRE-Military-build-up-in-west-following-attacks ]

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) have been slow to roll out. Thousands of illegal weapons are circulating in the country, even though the UN constantly gathers weapons and ammunition. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93886/COTE-D-IVOIRE-Rebranding-the-army ]

The Commission for Truth, Dialogue and Reconciliation, launched in September 2011, is still in the “preparation phase” and aside from a mourning ceremony in March, Ivoirians have not seen many signs of it in action.

The president brought a message of reconciliation to towns that were hard-hit in post-election violence last year after former President Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede defeat to Ouattara. “I want everywhere in Côte d’Ivoire, every town in every region, to have clean water, electricity, telephone and television, and this should be done before the end of the year,” Ouattara said during his three-day tour of the region - the first since his inauguration in May 2011.

The villages would not be forgotten, he stressed, promising to install electricity production units in all villages with more than 500 inhabitants. “This region has suffered a lot from the different crises we have gone through in the last ten years,” he said. “We have to make sure the divisions of the past do not ever repeat themselves.”

Many of the towns Ouattara visited opposed his election last year but the president, at least outwardly, received a warm welcome in each town he visited.

“We wanted peace. Peace has come,” says Agnes Zran, 56, from Man in the Dix-huit Montagnes region of the west, who lost a child and her father during “the crisis”, as it is called here. “Now we want him [the president] to help rebuild the dilapidated west.”

lb/aj/he 

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 26 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95366</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201110271404540941t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUÉKOUÉ 26 April 2012 (IRIN) - President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire promised paved roads, an end to power cuts and water shortages, better mobile phone coverage, and a new university in the country’s west as part of an “emergency plan” to develop a region that has been steeped in violence and insecurity for a decade. But for some displaced Ivoirians still unable to return to their homes, the promises ring hollow.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>DRC: Concern over welfare of IDPs in Katanga</title><pubDate>Tue, 24 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2008/2008103121t.jpg" />]]>KINSHASA 24 April 2012 (IRIN) - Aid agencies are unable to access thousands of people displaced from the town of Mitwaba, in the southeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) province of Katanga as a result of recent fighting between rebels and government forces.</description><body><![CDATA[KINSHASA 24 April 2012 (IRIN) - Aid agencies are unable to access thousands of people displaced from the town of Mitwaba, in the southeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) province of Katanga as a result of recent fighting between rebels and government forces. 

"Since 11 April, thousands of people have been forced to move from Mitwaba to Kasungeshi 45km away because of an attack by Mayi Mayi rebels led by Gédéon Kyungu on the armed forces of the DRC," Medard Lobota, information officer for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the DRC, said at a recent press conference.  

"Distribution of food and other humanitarian assistance has been postponed as a result of insecurity in the area," he told IRIN.  Local sources told IRIN the latest attack is estimated to have displaced 18,000 people. However, the region has been volatile for several months. 

According to OCHA, the Mayi-Mayi group attacked soldiers of the Congolese army (FARDC) in Katanga's Shamwana village on 29 February, displacing an estimated 26,000 people in the Manono, Mitwaba and Pweto territories. 

In December 2011, more than 16,000 people were displaced in the Mitwaba, Pweto, Manono and Malemba Nkulu territories as a result of fighting between FARDC and the rebels.  

The UN World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) appealed for US$4 million on 27 March to respond to the humanitarian needs of those displaced by the violence in Katanga.  

"The priorities are food, non-food items and emergency shelter, the protection of civilians, protection of children against abuse, access to health services, water and sanitation, treatment of acute malnutrition in young children and the return of displaced children to school," said the appeal. 

Aid agencies noted that women and children constituted 86 percent of the internally displaced persons (IDPs), with 25 percent of children under the age of five. Many IDPs were living with, and depending on, already impoverished families within host communities. 

"A recent study by Médecins Sans Frontières demonstrates that this situation is gradually getting worse among the internally displaced in Mitwaba, mainly due to malnutrition, malaria and anaemia," the agencies noted, adding that no vaccinations had been performed in Mitwaba since December 2011 as a result of insecurity, while poor sanitation in the IDP sites was raising the risk of epidemics.  

sw/kr/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 24 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95350</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2008/2008103121t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KINSHASA 24 April 2012 (IRIN) - Aid agencies are unable to access thousands of people displaced from the town of Mitwaba, in the southeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) province of Katanga as a result of recent fighting between rebels and government forces.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Rebels and their cause</title><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204201412070560t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - After months of fighting in northern Mali, the Mouvement National de Libération de L’Azawad (MNLA) - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad - declared an end to military operations. The rebels refer to the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali as Azawad. However, following international and regional condemnation of the movement’s declaration of independence on 6 April, several factions have emerged, exposing deep divisions between Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamist groups, and Tuareg groups.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - After months of fighting in northern Mali, the Mouvement National de Libération de L’Azawad (MNLA) - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad - declared an end to military operations. The rebels refer to the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali as Azawad. However, following international and regional condemnation of the movement’s declaration of independence on 6 April, several factions have emerged, exposing deep divisions between Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Islamist groups, and Tuareg groups. 

If effective measures are not taken to wrest back power in the north and reassert the position of the Malian authorities, the country could become the “Afghanistan of Africa”, the African Assembly for the Defence of Human Rights has reportedly warned. 

IRIN sought the views of three specialists in Tuareg matters for a greater understanding of the situation and possible next steps. 

The Analysts

Naffet Keita is a professor of Anthropology at the University of Bamako, in the capital of Mali, specializing in the Tuareg. 

Baz Lecocq is a history professor at Ghent University, Belgium, and the author of a book called Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Mali, published in 2010.

Zeidan Ag Sidalamine is a former leader of the Front Populaire de Liberation de l’Azawad, [FPLA or Popular front for the Liberation of Azawad] who knows the current leadership of the MNLA. He has been involved in several peace talks that ended Tuareg rebellions and was a technical adviser to ousted Malian president, Amadou Toumani Touré.

IRIN: What is the current relationship between the MNLA, Ansar Dine, AQMI [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95208/MALI-Holy-wars-and-hostages-Al-Qaeda-in-the-Maghreb ], and MUJWA (the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa?)

NK: The MNLA is a collective of several heterogeneous groups which, from their inception, have had different objectives. The MNLA evolved out of an old political movement known as the Mouvement National de l’Azawad - the Azawad National Movement. It was when its fighters returned from Libya in 2011 that it became the MNLA. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95252/MALI-A-timeline-of-northern-conflict ]

Ansar Dine was formed by Iyad Ag Ghali. At the end of the 1990s he started networking in Pakistan, and in the early 2000s he became an Islamist. Ansar Dine and MUJAO are connected to the international jihadist movement.

Malians had overestimated the MNLA’s military strength in the Mali fighting. Now, we know that the real power lies with Ansar Dine or MUJAO. This realization rushed the MNLA to a premature declaration of independence.

Baz Lecocq (BL) What I deduce from reading MNLA communiqués is that they disagree with Ansar Dine's goals. The MNLA’s stated primary goal is the independence of Azawad. As it expects a Malian army counter-attack, possibly supported by ECOWAS troops, or even US or French troops, they cannot afford to attack Al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique (AQIM) or MUJWA right now, which they have said they want to do, but are refraining from doing at the moment. This is, according to their website, based on demands from the local population.

In another way the presence of the Islamists 'helps' perhaps, but this is speculative reasoning. By stressing that no one has been able to dislodge this nuisance but them, the MNLA might be hoping to forestall outside interference in the conflict and gain international recognition for its independence bid. Therefore, destroying the Islamists before MNLA’s demands to the Malian state are met, would take away a trump card in any future negotiations.

ZS: Each group has different objectives. There are three kinds of movements operating: drug traffickers, Islamic militants and Tuareg rebels. It’s easier to negotiate with the MNLA because [they are nationals] - there is certainly no common ground to negotiate with each of them at the same time.

AQIM and Boko Haram are internationalist entities. The concern is that Boko Haram will recruit non-armed Islamists - that’s the issue. 

IRIN: What have you heard about a gathering of AQMI leaders in northern Mali? What was the purpose?

BL: It has been acknowledged on Toumastpress.com [ http://toumastpress.com/ ] that they met. AQMI’s motives can only be guessed at: Propaganda? Showing they can be there? From blogs like The Moor Next Door [ http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/ ] I can see there are internal disputes within AQMI and MUJWA. Perhaps this was a reconciliatory meeting.

ZS: Their motives are not the same as those of MNLA. AQMI are there primarily for narco-trafficking and to further their Islamist agenda. 

What is the position of international groups in terms of intervention? 

BL: It depends largely on who among ECOWAS's decision-makers support intervention.

It seems that the current situation is everything any politician or military man with interests in AFRICOM, be it in the US or Africa, would dream of. The US government is silent but I can imagine its AFRICOM generals are praying quietly that they will get a call for help.

As for France: statements by French politicians went from no intervention to support, and might go to military assistance.

The abduction of Algerian consular staff in Gao will, no doubt, make that country be taken seriously in the conflict. I am suspicious about this abduction. Before, Algeria was clearly sidetracked in this conflict. It is highly unlikely that the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité - (the Algerian secret service) has not infiltrated AQMI or MUJWA, and that it does not have some influence on their behaviour, and that this influence might account, in part, for this abduction.

ZS: ECOWAS countries need to share their expertise in fighting terrorism and drug trafficking. We will not be able to do it on our own. The MNLA is more of a Malian problem. However, Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and AQIM are all involved in several countries, and there are no solutions without the involvement of all the countries where these groups operate, so, ECOWAS has to be involved. The MNLA will return to negotiate - there is more common ground to strike a bargain with the MNLA. 

NK: France has wanted to use Ibrahim Ag Bahanga [who led an uprising against Mali in 1996] to fight AQIM. France and the Westerners will, at all costs, prefer Mali to negotiate with the MNLA to fight the other emerging groups. However, most people do not believe negotiations will work - over the last 20 years there have been several [failed] agreements. 

An important point is Algeria’s strategy against the GSPC [the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat], now AQIM. Algeria had confined the GSPC to the Sahel so it could fight it better. Algeria no longer wants to fight GSPC on its soil. Amadou Toumani Touré [the recently ousted Malian president] had protested against this strategy, but was ignored. 

IRIN: Who is financing these armed groups?

NK: Ansar Dine and the others get their money from the jihadist movement and from AQIM, which gets money from kidnappings. 

In addition, partly based on the knowledge that former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Senussi, had stayed in northern Mali - - the MNLA must have received money from him and from several funds before Gaddafi's downfall. The MNLA might have received money from Western countries and neighbours to fight AQMI.

Ansar Dine’s leader, Iyad ag Ghali, has been able to fund his war by taking advantage of the Malian government’s largesse for being the point man in negotiations to release several Western hostages. 

BL: Probably part of the money comes from `taxes' on the drugs trade and other smuggling practices. Some of the drugs might have been flown into the Sahara, but the more likely route is that cocaine was brought in via Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, then overland through southern Mali to the Sahara. In the past, part of the resources for the rebellion came from the local population, either voluntarily or otherwise, but given the current crisis I guess this is hardly possible.

ma/aj/oss/he/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95339</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204201412070560t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - After months of fighting in northern Mali, the Mouvement National de Libération de L’Azawad (MNLA) - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad - declared an end to military operations. The rebels refer to the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali as Azawad. However, following international and regional condemnation of the movement’s declaration of independence on 6 April, several factions have emerged, exposing deep divisions between Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamist groups, and Tuareg groups.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Syria’s forgotten refugees</title><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2007/200705152t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - It was 21 February 2006. The date is etched in Samia’s* mind. She was in her kitchen making tea for her brother’s family, who was visiting her at her home in the Iraqi capital Baghdad, when gunfire broke out in the sitting room.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - It was 21 February 2006. The date is etched in Samia’s* mind.
 
She was in her kitchen making tea for her brother’s family, who was visiting her at her home in the Iraqi capital Baghdad, when gunfire broke out in the sitting room.
 
“It was as if there was a war in my home,” she recounted.
 
She could not move; could not breathe; could not do anything. Militias killed nine members of her family that day, while she stood in the other room, effectively paralysed.
 
Those were the early days of sectarian warfare in Iraq. Tens of thousands of other deaths would follow over the course of the next two years.
 
***Samia told IRIN her story [ http://irinnews.org/Report/95338/Samia-Why-can-t-they-just-take-us-out-of-here ] years later from the rural suburbs of the Syrian capital, Damascus, where she now lives as a refugee with her husband and two of her children.
 
She is desperate to get out of Syria, where she says she continues to receive threats from across the border in Iraq.
 
“Until now, I get calls saying if you come back, we will kill you,” she said.
 
The current unrest in Syria has only made things worse - food prices have risen, she is reliving memories of war, and worst of all, her family’s resettlement in the USA has been indefinitely stalled, with limited alternatives for leaving Syria if the situation there continues to deteriorate.
 
While the world focuses on the tens of thousands of Syrian refugees fleeing an increasingly violent conflict between the government and opposition forces, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis in Syria - the largest Iraqi refugee population in the world - have been all but forgotten. The 102,000 registered refugees, amid a government estimate of 1 million Iraqis in total, now face a more uncertain future than ever - and some of them are crying out for help.
 
“Please,” Samia begged this IRIN reporter, “Consider me your mother. Do something to help me. Let our voices reach America…Why can’t they just take us out of here?”
 
Flight from Syria
 
Until now, there has been no mass departure of Iraqi refugees from Syria. But according to government figures, in 2011, 67,000 Iraqis in Syria returned to an Iraq which, while significantly safer than in 2006-7, is still one of the most dangerous places in the world. That number is a significant jump from previous years: In 2009 and 2010 combined, the number of returns from Syria was less than half that, according to statistics recorded by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration.
 
The number of Iraqi refugees in Syria is expected to keep dropping, with the overall registered refugee population expected to be 90,000 in the course of 2012, down from 127,859 in January 2011, according to international community’s 2012 Response Plan for Iraq. [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full%20Report_604.pdf ]
 
One senior aid worker told IRIN most of these returns have been willing, voluntary and ultimately “the best solution”.
 
But the Brookings Institution, calls their return “premature” [ http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0227_syria_humanitarian_ferris.aspx ] and a survey [ http://www.unhcr.org/4caf376c6.html ] by UNHCR just before the unrest in Syria started found that most refugees in Syria were still unwilling to return home permanently.
 
“In situations like this, often, refugees have to decide between two difficult situations and they will have to decide which is the least problematic,” Panos Moumtzis, UNHCR’s newly-appointed regional coordinator for the Syria crisis, told IRIN last month.
 
Much smaller numbers of Iraqis in Syria have fled a second time - into Turkey, and to a lesser extent Lebanon and Jordan, where entry poses some challenges.
 
Struggling to survive economically
 
Most Iraqis in Syria live in Damascus and the business capital, Aleppo, relatively unaffected by the violence in Syria, which has killed an estimated 9,000 Syrians since March 2011. Thus “they have continued to enjoy relative stability and peace,” Moumtzis said.
 
Until now, UNHCR has been able to continue its regular assistance programmes for Iraqi refugees, even in places as far as Hassakah, in the northeast.
 
But the devaluation of the Syrian currency, sanctions and a deepening economic crisis in Syria have affected everyone, including refugees who were economically vulnerable to begin with and who are forbidden from legal work as refugees in Syria.
 
The vast majority of the Iraqi refugee population in Syria gets food assistance, which UNHCR says has helped to stave off negative coping mechanisms and keep malnutrition at bay, but refugees say they are eating less and even selling food to make ends meet.
 
Mohamed*, an Iraqi refugee in the northern Syrian city of Halab, receives 10,500 Syrian pounds a month (about $183) for his family of seven as a food allowance from UNHCR; but the bill for rent, water and electricity is higher. And as food and gas prices have more than doubled in some cases, his family has been forced to change their eating habits, eating one loaf of bread per day instead of two, for example.
 
His family depends on remittances - now affected by the devaluation of the Syrian currency - from family in Iraq to survive. UNHCR recently increased the food allowance from 1,100 to 1,500 pounds per person per month (about $19 to 26); and intends to increase cash assistance for the most vulnerable by 40 percent to compensate for the increase in prices.
 
Samia, in rural Damascus, says her family sells the food they receive from the World Food Programme in order to pay rent and carry them over until the end of the month.
 
“I try to manage, scraping a bit from here, a bit from there to make ends. Only God knows how much I’m suffering,” she said.
 
Her daughter has lost significant weight, she said, and the family has reduced its food intake to basics like bread, tomatoes and oil, refraining from fruit, chicken, cheese and other perceived luxuries.
 
Forbidden from formal employment in Syria, most Iraqis work in the informal sector - in hotels or in tourism - an industry hard-hit by the unrest. During a UNHCR survey of more than 800 refugees in February, 40 percent of respondents reported a decrease in their monthly income, and 13 percent had lost their employment altogether, Helene Daubelcour, UNHCR spokesperson in Syria, told IRIN. Ninety percent of them said they had higher food expenditures.
 
According to UNHCR, about 10,000 Iraqi refugees were living in hot spots like Homs, Dera’a and areas of rural Damascus (Harasta, Zabadani, Duma) when the Syrian conflict began. About half of them have since moved to other areas of the country, displaced once again and in need of more assistance.
 
Their secondary displacement has also driven up rent prices, as the pressure on the availability of accommodation increase.
 
“You see the domino effect,” Daubelcour said.
 
At a roundtable discussion [ https://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2012/0224_iraq_displacement/Event%20Report.pdf ] hosted by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and the International Rescue Committee in February, participants pointed to tensions between Iraqi refugees and displaced Syrians as they compete for diminishing resources.
 
Re-traumatization
 
More than direct violence, refugees in Syria are at risk of re-traumatization, with 78 percent of refugees surveyed by UNHCR saying the current situation had had a negative impact on their mental and physical well-being, including nightmares and recollections of the past. The anxiety has led to an increase in domestic violence, Daubelcour said.
 
“We feel that what happened in Iraq could happen again,” said Mohamed, who says he was kidnapped and tortured by the Mahdi Army, a Shia militant group, in May 2006.
 
“I’m afraid of everything around me,” said Samia, the Iraqi who was in the other room when her family was killed.
 
In response, UNHCR has further developed its psychosocial support and counselling.
 
Of the 1,600 Iraqis from Syria who registered with UNHCR in Turkey, most said they did not feel safe.
 
“[They said] they already went through this once in Iraq and they have no intention whatsoever of waiting for it to hit them more particularly,” one senior aid worker in Turkey told IRIN. “It seems to be that they are leaving pre-emptively.”
 
Stuck in Syria
 
The problem is that many of them cannot do so.
 
Some 18,000 Iraqi refugees who had already been accepted for resettlement to a third country or were awaiting interviews, have had their files frozen. Initially delayed due to new US security procedures, the cases have now been put on indefinite hold because resettlement countries have had more difficulty conducting interviews amid the unrest.
 
Both Samia and Mohamed’s families have had their suitcases ready for months, believing they were to travel any day; others were reportedly turned back at the airport. They are now “stuck” in Syria until a solution is found.
 
“There are a lot who had the expectation of resettlement and will not be resettled any time soon,” said Andrew Harper, UNHCR representative in Jordan.
 
Refugee advocates have called for completing the process by video conference, but UNHCR representatives say that option, as well as the possibility of processing them in another country, is simply not manageable for such a large number of people.
 
“Frankly speaking,” said the aid worker based in Turkey, “I don’t think it is realistically doable.”
 
Nor would it necessarily be welcomed in neighbouring countries, which are themselves hosting Iraqi refugees and have resettlement processes of their own.
 
“Whether they jump the cue or not, that’s quite a sensitive issue,” the aid worker pointed out.
 
This has left people like Samia and Mohamed “between a rock and no place”, [ http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/world/middleeast/unrest-strands-iraqis-in-syria-awaiting-american-visas.html ] as the Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project [http://refugeerights.org/ ] put it - unwilling to return to Iraq’s continued violence, uncomfortable with the rising insecurity and economic challenges in Syria, but unable to leave for fear of losing their chance at permanent resettlement elsewhere.
 
Mohamed said he was told that if he left for Jordan or Turkey, his case could be closed. UNHCR says there is no guarantee resettlement cases will be taken up at the same stage if refugees leave for another country.
 
“I don’t want to waste these years that I invested here and throw them away for nothing,” he told IRIN. “I spent six years here. There’s no way I’m going to start over again.”
 
Freedom of movement
 
Others don’t have the financial means to leave Syria in the first place.
 
“If we had any way of going elsewhere, we would have left,” Samia’s daughter, Zeinab*, told IRIN.
 
But the doors would not necessarily be open to them. Iraqis can get a visa for Turkey at the border, and have been able to enter Lebanon on tourist visas (about 100 have done so). But Jordan, which has opened its doors to fleeing Syrians, has all but closed the border to Iraqis, observers say, out of a fear that a mass influx of Iraqis would overrun the already strained infrastructure in their small country, already hosting many Iraqis from 2003 onwards.
 
“Of course, there are different considerations [for Iraqis],” Jordanian government spokesperson Rakan al-Majali recently told IRIN. “There are specific rules and regulations governing the entry of Iraqis which existed before the crisis in Syria and continue to exist.
 
“A humanitarian situation does not justify breaking rules that apply to a specific group.”
 
UNHCR acknowledges that this could lead to a situation in which it becomes too violent for Iraqis to stay in Syria, too dangerous to go back to Iraq and impossible to enter Jordan. It would then be up to the international community to lobby other countries to take these refugees in.
 
In addition to the Iraqis, there are around half a million Palestinians and some 8,000 refugees from other countries - Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, even Afghanistan - who can’t necessarily go back to their countries of origin.
 
“At the moment, we would like to see the borders remain open,” regional refugee coordinator Moumtzis said. “Of course, the final decision is on the neighbouring countries to make sure that this is implemented.”
 
“With 45% of registered Iraqi refugees having been in Syria for over five years, and decreasing opportunities for resettlement, the character of the refugee situation will become protracted in nature,” says the response plan.
 
*Names changed to protect identities of refugees
 
ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95336</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2007/200705152t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - It was 21 February 2006. The date is etched in Samia’s* mind. She was in her kitchen making tea for her brother’s family, who was visiting her at her home in the Iraqi capital Baghdad, when gunfire broke out in the sitting room.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SYRIA: New UN response plan awaits government agreement</title><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203260835300869t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - The UN has presented a multi-million dollar plan to respond to humanitarian needs in Syria, but still lacks government approval to implement it.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - The UN has presented a multi-million dollar plan to respond to humanitarian needs in Syria, but still lacks government approval to implement it.

The director of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, John Ging, presented the plan to governments, NGOs and regional organizations at a meeting of the Syria Humanitarian Forum, the international platform used to discuss humanitarian concerns in Syria, on 20 April.

"Syria has recognized there are serious humanitarian needs and that urgent action is required," Ging said. "We now need to get agreement from the Syrian authorities to implement the Response Plan. In the meantime, we're mobilizing resources to make it happen."

The US$180 million plan includes dozens of projects to respond to the needs of one million people over six months, with the bulk of the money going towards food and health care, but also for the repair of basic services and to support livelihoods to avoid a descent into poverty by many Syrians affected by a deteriorating economy.

What began as peaceful protests against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in March 2011 has become an increasingly violent conflict between an armed opposition and government security forces, resulting in a death toll of more than 9,000, according to Robert Serry, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, with many more injured or detained.

The head of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent has told IRIN there could be as many as 400,000 people displaced, and the International Committee of the Red Cross says there is a “continuous flow” of people leaving their homes in search of safety, some of them living in schools, mosques and churches.
 
The response plan comes after a nine-day government-led assessment in March of areas affected by the unrest. The government has not accepted the UN figure that one million people are in need in Syria.

"We don't have any crisis in Syria; it is not Somalia," Syria's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Faysal Khabbaz Hamoui, told reporters after the 20 April meeting of the Syria Humanitarian Forum, according to Reuters. [ http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL6E8FK6LC20120420?sp=true ] State media has often said there is no problem in Syria except for the “terrorists” it blames for the violence.

In recent days, however, the government has become increasingly willing to recognize humanitarian needs in the country, with al-Assad and his first lady appearing on state TV packing food parcels for distribution.

But the government insists the state should lead humanitarian assistance.

Syrian Arab Red Crescent

“The government is concerned about a number of things,” Valerie Amos, UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, told IRIN in an interview on 5 April. “They are keen that any help in country comes from the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. Their capacity is already stretched, and they need support. So getting additional supplies in, but also getting additional capacity on the ground, is critical.”

The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) has been trying to shake off perceptions among some donors of partiality, [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95204/Analysis-Syrian-Red-Crescent-fighting-perceptions-of-partiality ] and while international aid agencies have commended SARC for “outstanding” work in extremely difficult circumstances, they insist other agencies must be allowed in to help share the burden.

There were international aid agencies in Syria before the unrest, but their roles have largely been limited to helping Iraqi refugees and other developmental projects, unrelated to the current situation.

“We have put some very clear proposals,” Amos said. “The government has come back. They have said they want the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to take the lead. We are happy for the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to take the lead, but we need additional capacity on the ground.”

The release of this response plan comes amid those negotiations with the government. The UN says they wanted to share the plan with donors so that there was no delay when approval for implementation is given.

Observers say going ahead with its release without government buy-in was a bit of a gamble: it could pressure Damascus to move more quickly to ensure humanitarian access; but could also backfire by raising the government’s defences.

Either way, the UN is well aware the plan’s success depends on the government’s consent, including its willingness to quickly issue visas to aid workers, clear shipments at customs and allow the UN to set up field offices.

Khaled Erksoussi, head of operations at SARC, told IRIN the Red Crescent has already been in discussions with UN agencies like the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme, to coordinate the implementation of the response plan, but said he did not have information about whether the government had agreed to it.

A separate $84 million plan [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95149/MIDDLE-EAST-UN-asks-for-help-in-responding-to-Syrian-refugee-crisis ] by UNHCR to respond to the needs of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan has been funded at less than 20 percent since it was launched at the end of March.

ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95332</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203260835300869t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - The UN has presented a multi-million dollar plan to respond to humanitarian needs in Syria, but still lacks government approval to implement it.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>IRAQ-SYRIA: Samia, &quot;Why can&apos;t they just take us out of here?&quot;</title><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2007/200706284t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - Syria is home to the largest Iraqi refugee population in the world - an estimated one million people, of whom 102,000 are registered with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - Syria is home to the largest Iraqi refugee population in the world - an estimated one million people, of whom 102,000 are registered with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).
 
For years, it was a stable and welcoming refuge, but since an uprising against the government began last year, Syria, too, has become a dangerous place. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95336/Syria-s-forgotten-refugees ].
 
Among the refugees are 18,000 who were in the pipeline or final stages for resettlement abroad. Initially delayed due to new US security procedures, the cases have now been put on indefinite hold because resettlement countries have had more difficulty conducting interviews amid the unrest. Samia* and her daughter Zeinab* told IRIN their story from the outskirts of Damascus.
 
Samia: “My brother and his kids were visiting [Samia’s house in Baghdad]. I was making tea in the kitchen. Militias entered the house. I could hear gunfire in the other room. It was as if there was a war in my home.
 
“I was virtually paralyzed. I wasn’t able to move. I couldn’t do anything.
 
“Nine members of my family were killed: my brother, his wife, their young kids and my parents.
 
“Me and my daughter were in the kitchen. My husband and other kids were at the petrol station. That’s why we weren’t killed.
 
“I couldn’t speak for hours. I didn’t know what to do until the neighbours came to my house… At first, they hid us in the garden, and then they brought us to Syria.
 
“Until now, I get calls saying, ‘If you come back, we will kill you’… We didn’t know who they were… and I don’t know anything until now.
 
“Since 21 February 2006, until this hour, I swear to God, it’s as if I’ve been slaughtered. It’s as if I am dead.
 
“When we came to Syria, we applied for resettlement... We are five: the three kids, and me and my husband…We [were accepted in December 2010] and were supposed to travel in February 2011.
 
“But someone from the [International Organization for Migration, IOM] got in touch and said the papers for my youngest son were not complete. She said the other four of us could travel, and he would follow in two weeks or a month at most.
 
“From February to October, we waited for the visa for America for the four of us.”
 
Zeinab: “In October, they said `Get your bags ready. You will travel to America’.”
 
Samia: “Then, the IOM got back in touch with us, saying only my youngest son would travel. Now he’s in America and I’m still here… I fled Iraq with my son so that he’s not killed. Now they’re taking him to America and leaving me behind? ... There is nothing dearer than a son… If they tell me I can’t go to my son, I’ll just set myself on fire now. Death is better for me.”
 
Zeinab: “They shocked us. It was a big surprise to us… People with cases that were [not as serious] as ours have travelled. Why are we still here? What is the secret?”
 
Samia: “I don’t eat. I don’t drink. Wherever I go, I cry…
 
“My situation is dire… Help me because I can’t stand it any more. I don’t have a home. I don’t have money. My son is in America… My husband is 60 years old. He has kidney failure. He needs an operation outside Syria.
 
“My daughter volunteers with a humanitarian organization. We are living off of her stipend: $150 a month [much of which goes towards her expenses].
 
“If only you could see my daughter, she is extremely thin because we don’t have enough food. We sell the food that comes to us from the UN to pay the rent. I try to manage, scraping a bit from here, a bit from there to make ends meet. Only God knows how much I’m suffering.
 
Zeinab: “Prices used to be so cheap in Syria. We were comfortable. But now the situation has changed. Everything is frightening. The prices are higher. The situation is different.”
 
Samia: “I am scared and worried. We don’t want a repeat of what happened in Iraq… My [Syrian] neighbour, who lives below me, was killed. Nobody knows who did it. If they come to kill my neighbour, how do you want me not to be affected? If the violence is reaching the citizens of the country, can’t it affect me too?
 
“I am not a citizen of this country. The citizens of this country are fighting each other. How can I ensure my security? How can I feel safe? I don’t know where to go. I was safe here, I was comfortable. But now I am afraid. I don’t sleep at night.
 
“They could come from Iraq and kill me. They can reach me here…We heard of an Iraqi store owner in Syria who was killed. People came from Iraq to kill him… Until now, I am getting threats from Iraq… I’m afraid of everything around me.
 
“I don’t understand [what the problem with the resettlement is]. All I understand is that until now, the visa hasn’t come.
 
“What is our fate? They could get us out if they wanted to. They already registered us and accepted us. Why can’t they just take us out of here? The same way some people have been taken to Romania. Why not us?
 
“My suitcases are packed. I’m just waiting.”
 
Zeinab: “If we had any way of going elsewhere, we would have left.
 
“We can’t go back to Iraq, me and my family. We are afraid. What happened to us - we don’t want to go through that again.
 
“We know people who have gone to Turkey, Jordan… But we have no money… The visa costs money... How am I going to earn a living in Jordan?
 
“So we’re here, waiting for the visa…
 
“My mother has psoriasis all over her body. My father’s left kidney failed. My younger brother has no work. He is frustrated. He can’t propose [to any woman]. He has no means to propose… no money, no stability. We are all just sitting here.
 
“We are frozen. Our lives are frozen right now.
 
“Day after day, we tell ourselves, `Maybe the visa will come in a day, a week, a month.’ That’s how we’re living. Every day, we hope that nothing [bad] is going to happen… We are wondering where we can go if things get worse. That is what we are worried about. We spend all night thinking.
 
“We’ve almost lost faith.”
 
Samia: “Please… Consider me your mother. Do something to help me. Let our voices reach America… so that they find us a solution.”
 
*Names have been changed to protect the identities of the refugees
 
ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95338</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2007/200706284t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - Syria is home to the largest Iraqi refugee population in the world - an estimated one million people, of whom 102,000 are registered with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>NIGERIA: School attendance down after Boko Haram attacks</title><pubDate>Fri, 20 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204201423330914t.jpg" />]]>BORNO STATE 20 April 2012 (IRIN) - So far this year 14 schools have been burnt down in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, northern Nigeria, forcing over 7,000 children out of formal education and pushing down enrolment rates in an already ill-educated region.</description><body><![CDATA[BORNO STATE 20 April 2012 (IRIN) - So far this year 14 schools have been burnt down in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, northern Nigeria, forcing over 7,000 children out of formal education and pushing down enrolment rates in an already ill-educated region.

In a video posted on YouTube in February, Boko Haram, the Islamic jihadist group based in Nigeria, called on their followers to destroy schools providing Western education. [ http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3DlUd0Vcs8Tm4 ]

School enrolment is already lower in Borno - 28 percent - than in any other state in Nigeria, according to the Nigeria Education Data Survey 2010. The recent attacks are making it even harder for teachers and aid groups to persuade parents to let their children stay on at school.

“We are appealing to parents to keep their children in school and not to be intimidated,” Musa Inuwa, the Commissioner for Education in Borno State, told IRIN. State officials are assuring parents that it is still safe to send their children to school, and Inuwa has begun visiting schools more frequently to give motivational talks to pupils and staff.

Eric Guttschuss, Researcher on Nigeria for the watchdog organization, Human Rights Watch, told IRIN: “It’s not just the students at the targeted schools that end up being affected. Targeting of schools can lead children in neighbouring schools to stay home or drop out completely for fear of further attacks.” [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/07/nigeria-boko-haram-targeting-schools ]

School patrols

The authorities have responded to the crisis by pledging to rebuild all state schools that have been burned or bombed. Five private schools were also destroyed and a teacher at the Success Stars Secondary School, who did not want to be named for fear of reprisals by Boko Haram, said his school deserved state funds for rebuilding. “Many of our students enrolled with us because the state schools are full - but where is the state now?”

Staff attendance has also dwindled, said Suleiman Aliyu, headmaster of the Future Prowess Islamic Foundation, a private school offering both Islamic and Western education, which opened to cater for the growing number of orphans in the state. “It happens almost every week that a teacher calls in to say they are staying at home because there is shooting in their area,” he told IRIN. So far, the school has not been targeted by Boko Haram, but the headmaster fears that “it’s only a matter of time”.

The Joint Military Task Force deployed to Borno State to enforce Operation Restore Order in 2011 has stepped up patrols around state schools. 

Out to beg

Most of the schools targeted by suspected Boko Haram members provide Western as well as Islamic education, sending a message to parents that they must choose only Islamic education for their children.

Although Islamic schools have a long tradition in the region, they are not regulated by the authorities and graduates have no formal qualifications. The system is known locally as Almajari, and boys as young as six are sent to live with a religious teacher, or Mallam, who teaches them how to interpret and recite the Koran for a period of up to 10 years. The system also permits Mallams to send the children in their care out to beg on the streets. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88828/SENEGAL-Koranic-students-kept-in-slave-like-conditions-HRW ]

“Young people should be employable. Having only Islamic education will not make you employable, which is why we need to encourage parents to choose Western education for their children,” says Inuwa. 

Some Maiduguri residents say Boko Haram has been infiltrated by criminals, and it is they who are behind the school attacks. 

Aisha Alkali Wakil, a lawyer who defends Boko Haram suspects, openly admits that Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, was “a personal friend” before he died in police custody in July 2009. “He wasn’t against Western education, and nor are his followers. What he was against is the influence of Westerners on our culture…The leaders all have Western education, and their children too are all in Western education,” she told IRIN.

However, most people feel that it is Boko Haram who must bear responsibility for the attacks on schools. “We know there are people who feel aggrieved,” said Inuwa, “but everybody knows burning schools will not solve anything.” 

rc/aj/he

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 20 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95327</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204201423330914t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BORNO STATE 20 April 2012 (IRIN) - So far this year 14 schools have been burnt down in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, northern Nigeria, forcing over 7,000 children out of formal education and pushing down enrolment rates in an already ill-educated region.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: DDR in CAR - hopes and hurdles</title><pubDate>Thu, 19 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201110937450253t.jpg" />]]>BANGUI 19 April 2012 (IRIN) - Pacifying the six rebel groups that hold sway across the north and northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR) is both a key component of the country’s security reform and a prerequisite for the economic development needed to end the spiral of violence and criminality that has dogged the state for almost two decades.</description><body><![CDATA[BANGUI 19 April 2012 (IRIN) - Pacifying the six rebel groups that hold sway across the north and northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR) is both a key component of the country’s security reform and a prerequisite for the economic development needed to end the spiral of violence and criminality that has dogged the state for decades.  

But funding shortfalls and the 12 January 2012 arrest of a prominent rebel leader have put the brakes on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process, the active phase of which got under way in August 2011. 

Why is DDR so important? 

State security forces have little presence outside the capital, Bangui. Much of the north of the country is under the control of armed groups or criminal gangs. The insecurity has displaced about 170,000 people [ http://reliefweb.int/node/458067 ], devastated basic infrastructure and stifled economic development and agricultural production. 

CAR, in the recent words of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, [ http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/2012/SGSM14217.doc.htm ] is blighted by “weak national institutions, extreme poverty, corruption, human rights violations and impunity”. Any progress on these problems depends on consolidating peace, which in turn, depends on DDR, a central provision of a comprehensive peace accord signed in Libreville in 2008.

 “We must act quickly to avoid a new cycle of generalized violence leading to the disintegration of the country,” Ban’s CAR envoy, Margaret Vogt, told the security council in December 2011. [ http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/2011/CS10488.doc.htm ] 

What’s happened so far? 

DDR preparations took place between September 2009 and May 2010 under the guidance of a Steering Committee (see below). This was followed by an awareness-raising campaign for members of armed groups. 

Between May and July 2010 lists of combatants were verified. Almost 5,000 members of one group have demobilized. Which armed groups are involved? The following groups have taken part in the verification stage, which resulted in a list of 10,600 combatants destined for demobilization. 

· The Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie (People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy - APRD), led by Jean-Jacques Démafouth (see below) and present in the regions of Paoua, Bocaranga Bozum, Kaga-Bandoro and Wandango.  

· The Union des forces républicaines (Union of Republican Forces - UFR) led by Florian Njadder and only present in the Kabo region. 

· The Front Démocratique du people centrafricaine (Central African People’s Democratic Front - FDPC) led by Abdoulaye Miskine and based in Kabo and Sido. The FDPC has recently withdrawn from the DDR process and threatened to resume hostilities against the government, accusing it of reneging on its peace deal commitments. 

Only the APRD has actually progressed beyond verification, with 4,800 of its estimated 6,000 members demobilizing in Ouham Pende Prefecture. These former fighters are still waiting for assistance to help them reintegrate into civilian life. 

Which are not? 

The following groups have not yet entered the verification stage of DDR, in large part because of lack of funds to move the process forward: 

· The Union des forces pour le rassemblement et la démocratie (Union of Forces for Democracy and Unity - UFDR), led by Zakaria Damane with around 4,000 fighters. 

· The Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice (Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice - MLCJ) led by Abakar Sabone and based in Birao, with around 2,000 fighters. 

· The Convention des patriotes pour la justice et al paix (Patriots Convention for Justice and Peace - CPJP) has about 2,500 fighters in the regions of Ndélé and Bria. It signed a ceasefire in June 2011 and is involved in negotiations with the government but - uniquely among the country’s armed groups - has yet to sign up to the comprehensive peace accord drawn up in Libreville.  This group clashed with the UFDR in Haute-Kotto and Vakanga provinces in September 2011.     

The following two armed groups are foreign, and so not involved in DDR, but their presence in CAR poses a threat to security and therefore, in the absence of effective government forces, a disincentive for other groups to disarm: 

· The Front populaire pour le rédressement (People’s Front for Recovery - FPR) is a group from neighboring Chad present in CAR since 2008 and which in January 2012 clashed with the FDPC [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94624/CENTRAL-AFRICAN-REPUBLIC-UN-highlights-security-vacuum-as-northern-clashes-continue ]

· The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) [ http://www.irinnews.org/In-Depth/94259/92/On-the-trail-of-the-LRA ] consisting of a few hundred remnants of a Ugandan insurgency which began in the mid 1980s. 

Who else is involved? 

The DDR Steering Committee is made up of representatives of the government, armed groups, the UN, the African Union, the European Union, France, the World Bank and MICOPAX (Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR).  

What are the problems? 

Chiefly, time, money and Démafouth’s arrest. 

“Further delays will only exacerbate tensions and compromise an already fragile process, with potentially disastrous consequences,” warned Ban, who added that the onset of rains in June will make it hard to advance DDR in the northwest. 

In December 2011 CAR President Francois Bozizé said: "The DDR coffers are empty - a situation that requires further negotiations with our financial partners to replenish the fund." 

Vogt said the same thing a few months earlier at a UN Security Council meeting: "The government needs US$3 million to complete the disarmament programme across the country and $19 million for its reintegration programme." 

Echoing her, CAR Prime Minister Faustin Archange Touadera, also present at the meeting, said: "This lack of funding could wipe out all efforts to date." 

Why was Démafouth arrested? 

Justice Minister and government spokesman Firmin Feindiro accused the APRD leader of trying to destabilize the government. He was arrested together with UFDR members Mahamat Abrass, a former member of parliament for Birao, and Abdel Kader Kalil. A month after his arrest Démafouth was charged with endangering state security. He was released on bail after being detained for three months. 

Why does it matter? 

Days after the arrest, the DDR Steering Committee, of which Démafouth was the first vice-chairman, warned the development would block the DDR process. Vogt echoed this in a 25 January statement, saying it could “jeopardize the efforts already made and those that should be undertaken to consolidate a process that remains very fragile in the country… The will of the Steering Committee is that DDR continue as originally planned across the country to help consolidate a permanent peace throughout the national territory." 

The Steering Committee remains inactive; other leaders of armed groups rejected the government’s proposal to appoint one of their number to succeed Démafouth and his position on the committee remains vacant. 

cd-k/am/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 19 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95321</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201110937450253t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BANGUI 19 April 2012 (IRIN) - Pacifying the six rebel groups that hold sway across the north and northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR) is both a key component of the country’s security reform and a prerequisite for the economic development needed to end the spiral of violence and criminality that has dogged the state for almost two decades.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SECURITY: Talking truth to power</title><pubDate>Thu, 19 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204191228560856t.jpg" />]]>BAHIR DAR 19 April 2012 (IRIN) - On the surface it had all the trappings of a gathering of current and former heads of state: Legions of presidential bodyguards speaking into their sleeves, electronic security at every entrance, rooftop snipers, road closures and a small army of waiters serving snacks and coffee on the banks of Ethiopia’s Lake Tana. </description><body><![CDATA[BAHIR DAR 19 April 2012 (IRIN) - On the surface it had all the trappings of a gathering of current and former heads of state: Legions of presidential bodyguards speaking into their sleeves, electronic security at every entrance, rooftop snipers, road closures and a small army of waiters serving snacks and coffee on the banks of Ethiopia’s Lake Tana. 

To the casual observer it was indistinguishable from any meeting of African Union (AU) luminaries, but at the opening session of the inaugural 14-15 April Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa, chaired by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, it became apparent diplomatic protocols were to be dispensed with: In an act of pure theatre Obasanjo removed his formal traditional robe to highlight the intent of informality. 

The Tana conference, coordinated by Addis Ababa University’s Institute for Peace and Security Studies, borrowed elements from the Munich Security Conference founded by German publisher Ewald-Heinrich von Kleist-Schmenzin, who recognized diplomatic protocol can often stymie debate. 

Oliver Rolofs, spokesperson for the Munich conference, told IRIN the meeting provides an “open forum and free discussion” and acts as a “catalyst” for security issues providing fresh ideas and insights for when participants return to the niceties and strictures of diplomacy. 

Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi in his welcoming speech to the delegates acknowledged he had been influenced by the style of the German conference and hoped for more of the same at the Tana gathering. 

A soft approach 

The architecture of Africa’s peace and security structures since the launch of the AU in 2002 and the subsequent May 2004 ratification of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) endowed the continent with a comprehensive security armoury allowing for intervention in states to resolve or prevent conflicts, using such instruments as the yet-to-be-constituted African Standby Force (ASF) and the Panel of the Wise - an AU five-member consultative body drawn from the continent’s five geographical regions, to provide views and opinions for conflict prevention and resolution. 

A delegate at the Tana conference lauded the AU’s peace and security structures, but noted these were rigid and “hard”, that did not allow for a “soft” approach to the issues, and the Tana conference was envisaged to provide such a layer of interaction, where there was equal access to debate for presidents, ambassadors, academics, activists and AU officials. 

Hesphina Rukato, the forum’s coordinator, said in an opening address: “We wanted to create a different type of gathering, more a retreat than a conference, and with the wide participation of people who are concerned and open to share their experiences.” 

The discussions were off-limits to the media, apart from the opening and closing sessions, in the interests of garnering an intimacy among the participants that was designed to flow from the meeting room, to the corridors and dinners - under the two guiding themes of managing diversity and state fragility. 

Alex de Waal, a veteran Africa analyst and executive director of the World Peace Foundation, was effusive about the format. “What was great about this was the extent to which there was a conversation. There were a couple people there who you just felt were giving their government position. But that was very exceptional. There was real substance as to what was being said. And the issues were really coming out in the discussion and that was very unusual.” 

Among present and past leaders were host Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, President Ismail Guelleh of Djibouti, President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed of Somalia, former South African president Thabo Mbeki, and Mozambique’s past prime minister Luisa Diogo, although the flattening of hierarchies came as a shock for some. 

Museveni makes waves 

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was not scheduled in the programme to make a speech, nor was he selected as a panellist, but he eventually made an off-the-cuff address from the podium following intense lobbying by his aides. 

He questioned the West’s penchant for sanctions against countries for their treatment of homosexuals, or disrespect for women’s rights, and asked why they did not impose similar economic measures on states that failed to provide such social services as electricity to their citizens. He then managed to provoke a walk-out by a Libyan national after slamming the 2011 “unconstitutional removal” of Muammar Gaddafi, creating a “diplomatic incident” in the absence of diplomatic protocols. 

Brig-Gen Hadi Ali Gibril, executive secretary of the North African Regional Capability (NARC), walked out as a Libyan and not in his capacity as an official of the regional ASF. “Although I respect his [Museveni’s] friendship with Gaddafi, there are many things he does not know,” he told IRIN. 

“Libyan people were suffering for 42 years. There was no freedom. And when the people said they wanted freedom, he killed them and ordered his soldiers to rape the women. Do you know the capital of Libya [Tripoli] with two million citizens has no sewage and no water system,” he said. 

There was a sharp exchange between a sitting president and a past president, the latter accusing the former of “taking his country to hell”, according to a source privy to the discussions. 

Odd bedfellows 

The diverse array of delegates made for odd-bedfellows, Mahmood Mamdani, the executive director of Uganda’s Makerere Institute for Social Research, told IRIN. “[Politicians] by their very nature are very present minded and fixed on the moment and are impatient with scholarly talk, and scholars think practitioners and policymakers are always rushing to solutions and just never solving the problem, because they never really understand it.” 

He said politicians used consultants “who know which side their bread is buttered and tread softly when it comes to critiques. By getting them in touch with scholars who are not employed by them and who have much more freedom to talk, I think that is useful”. 

Governor of Nigeria’s Ekiti State, Kayode Fayemi, told IRIN the conference’s billing was “to speak truth to power and I am not sure we have successfully done that. It was meant to be a no-holds bar conversation. 

“Hierarchy by its very nature is recognized in Africa. We respect age, we respect authority and order and those representations of authority are notionally assumed to also have wisdom and knowledge, which is not necessarily true, and we have seen that replicated here. Those in political office are not necessarily the smartest in the room,” he said. 

Daniel Adugna, youth programme manager at the AU commission, told IRIN the difference between the 17th AU Summit in the capital of Equatorial Guinea, Malabo, in June 2011 and the Tana conference “was we were not able to engage leaders and talk to them directly because of certain procedures the [AU] summit has. But here we could raise our hands together with our leaders and make a comment.” 

When the delegates overlooked youth in the diversity debate, Adugna said he was able to put it back on the agenda. “The opportunities I would have to sit and speak in the same room as the prime minister were probably impossible, close to zero and it has never happened until today… Having no protocols is a big advantage, as you are able to understand how structures, institutions and certain personalities think.” 

Francis Deng, special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide, told IRIN the diversity theme was discussed at length “as the way we deal with our mandate on genocide prevention is to demystify genocide and see it as an extreme form of identity related conflicts that result from denial of rights, inequality [and] marginalization… and this is connected with the fragile states [theme].” 

He said “there was decent informality… people were very candid on sensitive issues and all in all it was a good beginning… As Obasanjo said, within the AU if you mentioned a country negatively there would immediately be responses of hands raised and people saying point of order. Here there were no such sensitivities and it is a good model to be continued with.” 

go/cb 

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 19 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95323</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204191228560856t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAHIR DAR 19 April 2012 (IRIN) - On the surface it had all the trappings of a gathering of current and former heads of state: Legions of presidential bodyguards speaking into their sleeves, electronic security at every entrance, rooftop snipers, road closures and a small army of waiters serving snacks and coffee on the banks of Ethiopia’s Lake Tana. </td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>NIGERIA: Urgent need for police reform</title><pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2010/201005211423170614t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 18 April 2012 (IRIN) - Chidi Odinkalu, chair of Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission, was summoned for an interview with police yesterday over remarks he made in March about the judiciary and the police.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 18 April 2012 (IRIN) - Chidi Odinkalu, chair of Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission, was summoned for an interview with police yesterday over remarks he made in March about the judiciary and the police.

In a presentation on 5 March at an event organized by the National Association of Judiciary Correspondents, he said Nigeria was “in the throes of a severe safety and security crisis”. He said politicians, judges, magistrates and lawyers were part of the problem. 

“The response of law enforcement to the incapability of the legal system to ensure convictions is an epidemic of third-degree policing, torture and extrajudicial executions,” he said.

Local and international rights bodies have regularly criticized the police for human rights abuses. 

The Network on Police Reform in Nigeria [ http://www.noprin.org ] (also known as NOPRIN) monitors police behaviour and is among their leading critics. In a 2010 report entitled Criminal Force, NOPRIN recounts several cases of police abuse.

“Personnel routinely carry out summary executions of persons accused or suspected of crime; rely on torture as a principal means of investigation; commit rape of both sexes,” it said.

It gave examples of suspects being bound, suspended from ceilings, kicked and beaten with machetes, gun butts, boots, fists, electrical wires and animal hides. Female detainees have been reportedly raped, and males have had sharp objects inserted into their genitals. Such behaviour, NOPRIN said, was sanctioned or even commissioned by some senior officers. 

Killings 

The number of extralegal police killings is estimated at 2,500 each year, although accurate statistics are difficult to ascertain. 

“Killings happen out of the glare of the public eye,” said Innocent Chukwuma, director of the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN). [ http://cleen.org ]

The police spokesman, Deputy Commissioner Olushola Amore, could not be reached for comment on the accusations. 

NOPRIN has identified two departments well-known for their violent methods: Department B, which responds to active threats to law and order or public safety and security; and Department D, which deals with intelligence gathering and criminal investigations.

A unit known as the Police Mobile Force, or MOPOL, falls under the command of Department B. It is a rapid deployment paramilitary outfit of some 30,000 men divided into 47 squadrons of roughly 632 men each. Known by Nigerians as “kill and go”, its personnel are feared.

Within Department D are the State Criminal Investigation Departments which operate in the country’s 37administrative divisions. There is no evidence-based policing here, critics say. Rather, personnel routinely abuse suspects under interrogation to obtain confessions of guilt. 

Special Anti-Robbery Squads, under the state criminal investigation departments, are another feared unit, created initially in response to what NOPRIN said was “a perceived” nationwide escalation of gun-related robberies and killings. Human rights activists say genuine attempts to reform the police have not been implemented.

Given these problems, public perceptions of the police are abysmal. People tend to avoid the police. CLEEN’s Chukwuma said annual research indicated that 80 percent of Nigerians do not report crimes or problems to the police. “Rather, they use traditional means to solve problems,” he said, “especially in the rural areas”.

Chukwuma said a public alienated from the police was an indicator of public alienation from the government which, occasionally, talked about police reforms but never followed through. 

Understanding police behaviour

Many reasons have been cited for improper police behaviour: a repressive colonial police heritage; a poorly funded and ill-equipped police force; a highly centralized police structure plagued by political interference. 

Recruitment has been compromised and police training is poor, leading to the hiring of unsuitable personnel. Salaries are bad, making police prone to corruption and other crimes. 

Suspects are tortured for confessions because police lack the ability and means to conduct thorough criminal investigations. NOPRIN says in many police stations, one staff member oversees torture in a room specially set aside for this practice. 

Human rights organizations acknowledge that police are killed in their hundreds or even thousands every year, which may in part explain their behaviour and their attitude to the public. 

Police complain of poor working conditions, unhealthy environments, long hours and inadequate housing - all demotivating factors.

“Some policemen sleep in broken-down vehicles,” Chukwuma said. 

“The thing that is striking [about police stations] is the scent,” he added. 

Reform efforts

Reforming the police requires considerable government commitment and funding. Enhanced training; curricular reviews at training institutions; the vetting of recruits and serving police; competent forensic technicians and fit-for-purpose laboratories; DNA analysis and modern finger printing capability; and community policing - are just some measures suggested. 

A measure of reform is under way. Recently, the police force converted its academy to a university-level institution. 

“There is only so much the police can do because often when they plan or begin something, newly-elected politicians come and halt the process,” Chukwuma said.

Since assuming office in January, Inspector-General of Police Mohammed Abubakar has said public recklessness, or abuse of human rights by police, would no longer be tolerated, irrespective of rank. As a start, he has opened special phone lines for people to lodge complaints against the police; disbanded checkpoints and roadblocks, which had become nodes of extortion; and set up a team to arrest any police manning illegal checkpoints. 

The removal of checkpoints has reduced extortion and extrajudicial killings, said NOPRIN National Coordinator Emeka Nwanevu. 

“The current Inspector-General needs to be supported by government in investing heavily in training - back to basics policing,” Chukwuma added. “Police work is driven by intelligence, so that funds and equipment need to be made available so that police can gather this and act on it rather than harassing and brutalizing suspects.”

Reformers would like an external oversight body for the police. The rationale is that this would help lessen police impunity. Reformers also want skilled civilians to staff police administration, ballistic and forensic centres. 

“What we need are a non-police people who can help the police to plan and put in structures to improve their service,” he said. 

Nwanevu, who was a member of a presidential police reform committee in 2008, said new recommendations by the current president and police inspector-general were expected to be made known within two months. 

One likely reform, Nwanevu said, could result in improved police training. NOPRIN would also like to see greater involvement by civil society in ensuring that police act as expected. The organization also wants telephone numbers of divisional commanders to be made readily available to the public so that complaints can be made against specific officers. 

Funding reform is another requirement. Currently, he said, money voted for the police never seems to trickle down to the station unit level, leaving them impoverished, dirty, lacking equipment (including basic administrative documents), and police wearing different shades of uniform. Reform, he said, would stop station commanders extorting money from the public to pay for these requirements. 

“We are recommending a structured approach for the dispensing of funds for the police so that everyone in the command chain knows how much is available to them for their work,” he said. 

os/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95314</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2010/201005211423170614t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 18 April 2012 (IRIN) - Chidi Odinkalu, chair of Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission, was summoned for an interview with police yesterday over remarks he made in March about the judiciary and the police.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>YEMEN: Rising landmine death toll in Hajjah Governorate</title><pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204181014070662t.jpg" />]]>HAJJAH 18 April 2012 (IRIN) - Mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) have killed 27 people and injured at least 36 in the last two months in Hajjah Governorate, northwestern Yemen, according to a 14 April Interior Ministry report. Many of the injured will be left permanently disabled.</description><body><![CDATA[HAJJAH 18 April 2012 (IRIN) - Mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) have killed 27 people and injured at least 36 in the last two months in Hajjah Governorate, northwestern Yemen, according to a 14 April Interior Ministry report. Many of the injured will be left permanently disabled.
 
Children are particularly at risk and the situation is hampering the return of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs), according to Hajjah Deputy Governor Ismail Mahim.
 
“Given the lack of mine-maps and experts, more children will be at high risk if displaced families return home,” Mohammed Rashid, a child protection specialist at Hajjah Social Affairs and Labour Office, told IRIN. “We fear the tragic stories of landmine-hit children in Sa’dah [Governorate] may be repeated in Hajjah.”
 
Mansour al-Azi, director of Yemen’s National Mine Action Programme (NMAP), said there were plans to deploy teams this week to carry out mine risk education campaigns in two badly affected districts, Kusher and Mestaba, but no decision had been taken because “the situation is still fluid.”
 
Kusher and Mestaba have seen intermittent clashes between Houthi-led Shia fighters and local armed militiamen, who are reported to be supporters of the Islamist Islah Party. Some 600 people from both sides are reported by local authorities to have been killed since November 2011. 
 
The two warring sides reached a truce in February described by local analysts and journalists as “fragile”. Meanwhile, landmines and ERW are putting the lives of civilians - mostly farmers or herders - at risk, and stalling the return of thousands of IDPs. 
 
Unofficial estimates indicate that at least 3,000 landmines have been planted in Kusher and Mestaba since sectarian clashes first broke out in November 2011, the local independent news website marebpress.net reported on 24 March. [ http://marebpress.net/news_details.php?lang=arabic&sid=41911 ] 
 
“Landmines were even planted inside dead bodies. Last month, a landmine inside a corpse exploded, killing five people taking the corpse for burial,” Sheikh Yahya Qasim al-Saeedi, a spokesperson for Kusher tribesmen, told IRIN. 
 
“We have been appealing for mine clearance actions and mine risk education campaigns to save lives of innocent children but received no response from those concerned,” Fawaz Felaitah, a school teacher in Mestaba District, told IRIN. 
 
Inquisitive
 
Children are most at risk as they tend to be unaware of the dangers and inquisitive at the same time. Many mistake ERW for toys or pick them up as they herd sheep, said Ahmad al-Qurashi, chairman of local NGO Seyaj Organization for Childhood Protection.
 
IRIN visited eight-year-old Rahaf Hadi from Kusher District who was injured in a 12 April blast near her family home, and in great pain in a Hajjah city hospital. Her two older brothers, Mushtaq and Abdu, were killed, while Rahaf sustained serious injuries to her face, belly, back and left arm.
 
“The painkillers she receives five times a day are no longer effective. No signs of recovery yet… I can neither eat nor sleep seeing Rahaf suffering before my eyes,” her mother Aisha told IRIN.
 
IDP returns affected
 
One blast has directly affected the return of IDPs.
 
In March, seven people were killed and 15 injured after a blast inside a home in Hazah village, Kusher District. One of those killed was 40-year-old Mohammed al-Deashi, who had returned to his village to check on the family home with a view to moving back with his wife and five children, who have been living in a school in Hajjah Governorate’s Khair al-Muharaq District.
 
Mohammed al-Tam, an investigator at the Hajjah Security Department, told IRIN that as a result of the blast hundreds of IDPs in Khairan Muharaq District had cancelled planned journeys home.
 
The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) says more than 50,000 people have been displaced since November 2011 by sectarian conflict in the north.

In nearby Sa’dah Governorate, Abdulaziz Hanash, a coordinator for landmine victims, was quoted by local media [ http://yementimes.com/en/1552/report/524/Time-to-refocus-on-reconstruction-in-Sa%e2%80%99ada.htm ] as saying over 2,000 people had been handicapped by mines and ERW. “No one talks about these victims… Many people have not only lost their homes, jobs or members of their family, but also a limb or an ability.”

According to the Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor, [ http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/countries/yemen.html ] Yemen is contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance as a result of conflicts dating back to 1962. Most mines were laid in border areas between northern and southern Yemen prior to unification in 1990. As of August 2008, all governorates were contaminated.

ay/eo/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95309</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204181014070662t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">HAJJAH 18 April 2012 (IRIN) - Mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) have killed 27 people and injured at least 36 in the last two months in Hajjah Governorate, northwestern Yemen, according to a 14 April Interior Ministry report. Many of the injured will be left permanently disabled.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Living in the Kabul bubble</title><pubDate>Mon, 16 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2009/200910291522360264t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 16 April 2012 (IRIN) - A sustained attack by militants on Afghanistan’s parliament and various targets in the diplomatic zone on 15 April temporarily shut down the capital, Kabul, to all movement by UN personnel and raised alarm among aid workers that the Taliban are now able to penetrate even the most secure parts of the city. </description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 16 April 2012 (IRIN) - A sustained attack by militants on Afghanistan’s parliament and various targets in the diplomatic zone on 15 April temporarily shut down the capital, Kabul, to all movement by UN personnel and raised alarm among aid workers that the Taliban are now able to penetrate even the most secure parts of the city.  

It’s the latest in a long list of incidents – though none as spectacular – that have forced aid workers to hole up behind concrete walls and inside bomb shelters.  But even on a “regular day” in Kabul, the costs of security restrictions on aid workers are very high. Here’s a taste of life in the “Kabul bubble”, as one aid worker put it.  

UN aid agencies can open offices only within a so-called “ring of steel” or “green zone” that is no more than seven-square kilometers – a heavily guarded district where many embassies and international organizations have set up shop. It was one of the areas targeted in yesterday’s attacks.  

UN staff can live in one of only a handful of places in Kabul: heavily-guarded guesthouses run by various UN agencies; the Park Palace Hotel; or the United Nations Office Complex in Afghanistan (UNOCA).  

The latter is some 20-minutes outside of town, boxed away by 3-4-meter high walls, topped with barbed wire. Its entrance is framed by a zigzagging set of concrete barriers, with two checkpoints, where security guards check for IDs and for bombs, using dogs and mirrors poked under the chassis of vehicles.  

Inside that compound, aid workers eat, sleep and work during missions that can last years. Many complain about unhealthy lifestyles. On Sunday afternoons, for example, there is no cafeteria open in the compound, and many aid workers resort to crackers or cans of tuna for dinner. They have limited facilities for cooking in their pre-fab containers, some as small as 14-square meters – consisting of a single bed, bathroom and desk with two hot burners.  

Many go days without ever leaving the compound (for that they must wait for a driver to be available), simply walking from the container where they sleep to the container where they work.  Guests must submit their name, nationality, passport ID and vehicle plate number 12 hours before visiting the compound.  

Travel within Kabul is largely limited to government offices, a handful of specific restaurants and hotels or compounds of other aid agencies. Security officers recommend that travel outside the “steel ring” be for limited periods only.  Outside of the perimeter of Kabul city, UN aid workers must travel in two-car convoys of blast-resistant 4x4s with teams of Afghan police as armed escorts in front and behind.  

Aid workers regularly complain that they cannot meet local people, cannot go to the market, and cannot feel a part of the community in which they work. The psychological challenges of the limitations in movement are compounded by the burden on relationships that Afghanistan can impose. It’s not a family duty station, so staff must resign themselves to Skype conversations on bad internet connections with family and friends, and visits during R&R.  

The hardships do not compare with what Afghan civilians face, caught in the middle of this conflict.

The cost of mandatory R&R is one of many financial burdens for UN agencies when working in these environments. Add to the list the rising costs of armoured 4x4s, the private security firms that provide protection inside the compounds, the security guards who perform checks at the gate, the helmets and body armour for staff…The list goes on and on. And with questionable success.  

“The way the Taliban attack now, millions [of dollars] will not work,” one aid worker said.  The larger cost, though, is in the impact on aid delivery.  

Here’s how Laurent Saillard, a veteran of Afghanistan and head of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid arm, ECHO, in the country, described the situation:  

“You have a bunch of people who have barely any access to the field. Most of them are very young, inexperienced in the country. They don’t know what they are talking about. They have never visited the country; never moved around; never physically monitored a project; never spent time with the Afghan population. The only Afghans they know are their cook, their cleaner or their driver. They don’t know anything about this country. They arrive at the airport, step into an armored vehicle, into their compound, and that’s it… 

“They are living in the Kabul bubble.”  

ha/oa]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 16 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95302</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2009/200910291522360264t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 16 April 2012 (IRIN) - A sustained attack by militants on Afghanistan’s parliament and various targets in the diplomatic zone on 15 April temporarily shut down the capital, Kabul, to all movement by UN personnel and raised alarm among aid workers that the Taliban are now able to penetrate even the most secure parts of the city. </td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>
