<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Security</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 08:30:52 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>Analysis: Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram</title><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201211231327300482t.jpg" />]]>KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.</description><body><![CDATA[KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.

The attacks on BH camps in northern parts of Borno close to the borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroon followed the 14 May declaration of a state of emergency by Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. 

Musa Karimbe fled his village of Bulabute near Marte, BH's major stronghold in the area, on 17 May to Kusiri, 100km inside Cameroon where he is staying with a friend. "We are afraid of a repeat of Baga attacks on our homes," Karimbe said, referring to fighting on 16 and 17 April between troops from the Chad-Niger-Nigeria Joint Multi-National Task Force and BH members in which 187 residents from Baga town on the shores of Lake Chad were killed, and 2,128 homes burnt, according to Human Rights Watch [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria ].

People from villages around Abadam District, including Malamfatori, fled to Bosso in Niger’s Diffa Region, while others have taken refuge in the Cameroonian towns of Fotokol, Amchide, Darak and Kusiri, according to interviews with displaced Nigerians. Officials say 2,000 people have fled across borders, though several of the displaced told IRIN they thought the number was higher.  

The number of casualties from the fighting is not yet clear, though Nigeria defence spokesman Brig-Gen Chris Olukolade said on 17 May that there had been BH casualties, and that 100 BH members had been arrested.

An official with the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in the capital, Abuja, said they had not yet been able to establish contact with their teams to find out the details of the humanitarian situation, because telephone networks in Borno and Yobe states have been shut down since 16 May. “The areas where military operations are ongoing, are not accessible,” he told IRIN.

Residents of Gamboru Ngala in Borno State said military forces screened them thoroughly before allowing them to cross the border; others passed through the network of unofficial trade routes that criss-cross the region.

The military has placed a “food blockade” on northern Borno, refusing to allow trucks laden with household commodities from leaving Maiduguri (the state capital) to the northern part of the state, in case they end up in BH hands. As a result, prices have shot up, said Bukar Zanna, head of the Traders’ Association in Gamboru Ngala.

Since January 2013 BH has taken control of Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala-Balge and Gamboru Ngala local government areas in northern Borno, chasing out local government officials, taking over control of government buildings and imposing Sharia law.

This prompted President Goodluck Jonathan to declare last week that he would “take all necessary action... to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists,” including the arrest and detention of suspects, taking over BH hideouts, the lockdown of suspected BH enclaves, raids, and arresting anyone possessing illegal weapons.

The military crackdown came after several attempts at dialogue [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/Analysis-Hurdles-to-Nigerian-government-Boko-Haram-dialogue ] - the most recent on 17 April, when the president set up a 26-member Amnesty Committee (headed by Nigerian Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu) with a three-month mandate to try to convince BH to lay down its arms in exchange for a state pardon and social reintegration.

Dialogue soon broke down, and BH stepped up bombing attacks and assassinations in April and May in apparent defiance of the proposed amnesty. BH has repeatedly rejected peace talks, citing insincerity on the part of the Nigerian government following a series of failed mediated negotiations. 

On 8 and 9 May the Amnesty Committee met Nigerian security chiefs in Abuja and then BH members in detention in Kuje prison near Abuja to gather information on how to reach out to the BH leadership for talks. But on 9 May around 200 BH gunmen, armed with rocket launchers and rifles, launched coordinated attacks on security forces in the town of Bama in northern Borno, including a military barracks, a prison and police buildings, killing 42 people including soldiers, policemen, prison guards and civilians and freeing 105 inmates. Some 13 BH gunmen were killed in the attacks, according to the military.

In a 13 May video, BH leader Abubakar Shekau rejected the government’s amnesty overtures and vowed not to stop his group’s violent campaigns to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. 

Flip-flopping

The government’s flip-flop approach is evidence of its frustration with the deteriorating security situation. But the next steps are not clear. “Deployment of troops and the declaration of war on BH by the president have put a huge stumbling block on the path of the Amnesty Committee,” said Mohammed Kyari, a political science professor at Modibo Adama University of Science and Technology in neighbouring Adamawa State capital Yola, which is also affected by the emergency decree.

“It will now be difficult to win the confidence of BH which is crucial in bringing them to the negotiating table because you can’t talk of peace on one hand and be deploying troops on the other.” A leading rights activist in the north, Shehu Sani, who has participated in past negotiations with BH, agrees. 

But many say the government had no choice. Yahaya Mahmud, a prominent constitutional lawyer in Nigeria, told IRIN: “No government anywhere will allow a group to usurp part of territorial sovereignty. The declaration of a state of emergency was necessitated by the constitutional obligation to restore a portion of Nigeria’s territory taken over by an armed group which involves the suspension of constitutional provisions relating to civic rights.”

The fear now is that the more violent the crackdown, the greater the chance of radicalizing angry young men to join the rebel cause. Babagoni Kachalla, a resident of Wuljo, one of the areas taken over by BH in northern Borno, said BH has been going village-to-village since January in all-terrain vehicles fitted with loudspeakers to gather recruits and preach their ideology. In the days leading up to the military response, BH fighters stepped up their recruitment drive, said Borno State residents.

Political scientist Kyari worries, in response to the crackdown, that BH will just shift their bases. “BH can’t face Nigerian troops in conventional war; the troop deployment to northern Borno means they will move out to other towns and cities with less military presence and launch guerrilla war, which is deadlier.”

The deployment of troops to Maiduguri in June 2011 and military crackdowns pushed some BH members northwards within Borno, and others to northern Mali, which they fled during the French, Chadian and Malian intervention in the north.

Trust

Many analysts and politicians are pushing for dialogue as the only way out of the impasse, but trust between the government and BH is very low.

Conspiracy theories in the north abound, including that prominent politicians, including the president, are fanning some of the violence in the north since they would benefit from chaos continuing there in the run-up to 2015 presidential elections. 

While not endorsing the theories, Abdulkarim Mohammed, author of Paradox of Boko Haram, said they should be investigated if the government is serious about understanding the roots of BH’s insurgency. 

The Amnesty Committee stated yesterday it would meet BH leaders anywhere they chose, to negotiate a way out of the violence. 

If the government does not win the confidence of BH soon, to at least bring them to the negotiating table, we are going to be in this much longer than we thought,” said Kyari, adding: “and if it is not managed well, it will engulf neighbouring countries.”

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98076/Analysis-Nigerians-on-the-run-as-military-combat-Boko-Haram</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201211231327300482t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Libyans in North Africa scared to return home</title><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305160746270426t.jpg" />]]>CAIRO 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Until government and revolutionary forces attacked the Libyan town of Bani Walid, about 170km southeast of the capital Tripoli in October last year, Abdullah Warfella had been determined never to leave.</description><body><![CDATA[CAIRO 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Until government and revolutionary forces attacked the Libyan town of Bani Walid, about 170km southeast of the capital Tripoli in October last year, Abdullah Warfella had been determined never to leave.

But after two weeks of imprisonment and torture, the 68-year-old former contractor fled.

“They accused me of supporting [former ruler Muammar] Gaddafi during the revolution, which is not true at all,” Warfella told IRIN in Cairo. “These people have turned life into hell for people, not just in Bani Walid, but everywhere in Libya.”

Warfella is one of tens of thousands of Libyans who have fled to Egypt. Many are accused, often falsely they say, of having fought in pro-Gaddafi forces in 2011, or having publicly expressed support for him.

Far from home, many struggle to find employment and affordable accommodation, and lack almost any formal support. But they fear revenge attacks should they return home.

“There is a persistent desire inside Libya now for taking revenge on whoever took sides with Gaddafi against the revolutionaries, even if these people who took sides with Gaddafi were not influential people or fighters themselves,” said Salah Al Turki, a senior executive from the Cairo-based NGO Libyan Foundation for Human Rights (LFHR).

“Some of Gaddafi's supporters who initially left Libya in the wake of the downfall of the Libyan dictator and then returned to their home towns faced problems. Gaddafi's supporters in other countries watch all this and are filled with fear to return, lest they should meet the same fate.”

The number of Libyans who have fled the country is not clear as very few register with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

A source in the Libyan Ministry of Social Affairs said there were 430,000-530,000 Libyans in Tunisia. LFHR estimates the number of Libyans who had come to Egypt after the demise of Gaddafi's regime at 750,000, although the Libyan Embassy in Cairo told IRIN the number is not more than 30,000. Algeria is also thought to shelter tens of thousands of Libyans.

Despite, its geographical size, the Libyan population is only around six million, and government officials say that having such large numbers of citizens outside Libyan borders is a humanitarian and security concern for the government.

Some Libyans in Egypt were formerly high-ranking figures, like Ahmed Gaddaf Al Dam, a cousin of Gaddafi and a close associate who is now at the centre of a legal tussle [ http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2010/17/The-price-of-extradition.aspx ] in Cairo, aimed at paving the way for his extradition to Libya. 

But most lacked senior roles in the Gaddafi administration, and say they feel under threat because of their previous public support for Gaddafi, or for simply belonging to a tribe or town judged “pro-Gaddafi”.

Safe haven?

Though many Libyans who have fled to Egypt told IRIN they thought it was not yet safe to return, life in Egypt is far from easy and they say they continue to live in fear.

“Most of these people, particularly those who had committed crimes in Libya before coming here, think that state institutions or even international organizations will spy on them for the sake of the new government in Libya,” Omar Mohamed Al Ogaly, a plenipotentiary minister at the Libyan Foreign Ministry, told IRIN.

“They have this general fear of state or official agencies and this is why they stay away from these agencies.”

Egypt is undergoing economic and political strife of its own after the Arab Spring, and Libyans abroad are struggling with rising food prices and a lack of work.

Mohamed Al Salak, a TV host from the Libyan channel Libya TV, describes meeting one Libyan family living in a cemetery west of Cairo.

“Despite this, the members of this family are afraid to approach the Libyan Embassy for help,” Al Salak said. “Some of them have medical problems, but they are even afraid to go to the hospital, lest their whereabouts are known to the government in Libya.” 

LFHR tries to find ways of reducing the suffering of Libyan refugees in Egypt. Organization staff meet these refugees, try to give some financial support and present their plight to the Libyan government.

Division 

The current debate [ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-05/world/39048298_1_islamists-militias-parliament ] within Libya about what sort of role ex-Gaddafi supporters should have in the new administration is a subject that also divides Libyans in Egypt. 

In Cairo, fights have taken place in public areas like shopping centres between Libyans who used to support Gaddafi and others who detested his rule and rose up against him.

“We all had to keep silent under Gaddafi even as we did not like the man or his rule,” said Fawzi Al Trapolsi (not his real name), who worked for years as plenipotentiary minister under Gaddafi.

“There must be some forgiveness. Libya will not move a step forward if this desire for revenge continues to control everything.” 

On the other side of the political debate are Libyans like Adel Abdel Kafi, an ex-Libyan fighter pilot who flew his military plane from Tripoli to Cairo in the early 1980s and applied for political asylum in protest against what he called “Gaddafi's despotism”.

“Forgiveness?” he said to IRIN. “How can we forgive the people who either participated in killing innocent Libyans or who kept silent while the Libyans were being humiliated for more than 40 years?” 

Building trust

The Libyan government is taking some steps towards reconciliation. In Tunisia, Naema M. Elhammi, the deputy head of the General National Congress, told IRIN she had met Libyans living in poverty but not yet willing to return.

“They are all afraid,” Elhammi told IRIN. “They think they will face many troubles when they go back. The fact is that some Libyans do nothing but settle old scores with their compatriots. This makes everybody afraid.” 

A group of parliament members, including Elhammi herself, are paying visits to neighbouring countries to talk to the Libyan refugees and convince them to go back. But they still have to build trust. 

In Cairo, the Libyan Embassy has opened a separate office in a different part of the city to the embassy to listen to the problems of the refugees and try to convince them to go back.

Mabrouk Raheel, an embassy official responsible for the office, says 5-7 Libyans visit the office every day to demand help either to continue living in Egypt or to go back to Libya.

“People who did not commit crimes during the revolution have no problem in going back,” Raheel said. “Those who committed crimes, however, must go to court.” 

Al Ogaly, the plenipotentiary minister, says if some Libyans are not able to go to Libya at present, at least Libya must go to them.

“We want these people back,” Al Ogaly said. “They must return to their country. Why should they stay abroad?” 

He says Libya's revolutionaries are now more receptive than ever before to the idea of the return of their compatriots who supported Gaddafi.

Warfella from Bani Walid, whose son is currently in jail in Libya accused of fighting the anti-Gaddafi revolutionaries, says he is not yet convinced.

“We need a justice system that guarantees that nobody will be put in jail unjustly,” Warfella said. “We need security and assurances that nobody will come out, of his own will, and attack us or accuse us of imaginary things. We want Libya to be for all Libyans.”

When asked, however, whether he thinks these conditions can be met in the near future so he can return and see his children and wife, he sighs wearily: “I have hope in God.”

ae/jj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98045/Libyans-in-North-Africa-scared-to-return-home</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305160746270426t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">CAIRO 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Until government and revolutionary forces attacked the Libyan town of Bani Walid, about 170km southeast of the capital Tripoli in October last year, Abdullah Warfella had been determined never to leave.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The price of fear</title><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200801305t.jpg" />]]>RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In slums where killings, rape, kidnappings and other criminal violence are commonplace, say researchers, lives and livelihoods are hampered by a force that is tough to measure: Fear.</description><body><![CDATA[RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In slums where killings, rape, kidnappings and other criminal violence are commonplace, say researchers, lives and livelihoods are hampered by a force that is tough to measure: Fear.

“We talk about homicide rates and deaths. Fear is a huge part of the protection mandate, and we don’t measure it well,” said Ronak Patel, director of the urbanization and crises programme at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. He said surveys in recent years in slums in the Kenyan capital Nairobi - in a “non-crisis” peacetime setting - showed that 34 percent of people altered their daily activities for fear of violence and a quarter felt afraid in their own homes.

“This doesn’t get measured like mortality rates or rape incidence, but it has a huge impact that the humanitarian community needs to address.” For example this fear affects a woman’s ability to access a market, a prospective workplace or health care, he said.

Carlos Vilalta, professor and researcher at the Center for Economic Research and Education in Mexico City, at a recent conference [ http://hasow.org/Seminarios/Index/1 ] presented preliminary findings from research under way in Mexico.

Based on government survey data, he estimates that in 2010 it cost a family driven from home by fear of gang violence about US$611 to relocate, where the average monthly income was about $800. Very few studies into the fear of crime exist: it is an area that needs more attention, Vilalta said.

“Governments and particularly the police are obviously working very hard in fighting crime. However they seem to forget that fear of crime is also an issue for civil society and a matter of criminal policy.”

He said the premise that reducing crime will automatically reduce the sense of insecurity is false: “Mexico today has a lower crime rate than in the 1990s and, ironically, fear of crime is much higher.”

The European Commission’s humanitarian aid department, ECHO, says that in Central America, fear of organized violence is a constant.

“A frequent scenario is that people first escape inside the country, trying to seek refuge with family or friends, but are then localized by their aggressors and decide to leave the country,” ECHO said in its 2013 humanitarian implementation plan [ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2013/HIPs/central_america_en.pdf ] for the region.

A recent report [ http://www.cidehum.sitew.com/fs/Root/8svj6-Informe_CIDEHUM_Desplazados.pdf ] (Spanish) by the Costa Rica-based International Centre for the Human Rights of Migrants (CIDEHUM ) confirmed that organized crime is driving the displacement of populations in Central America.

Overlooked

The UN Refugee Agency, which commissioned the CIDEHUM study, three years ago issued guidance [ http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4bb21fa02 ] for assessing whether victims of gang violence may be eligible for international protection. For now in Central America the human impact is largely overlooked, UNHCR said.

“While organized crime is being dealt with from a security angle, such as crime prevention and response, little attention has so far been paid to the impact of this phenomenon from a humanitarian and protection perspective,” the agency said in a February 2013 paper [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/UNHCR_Overview_Americas.pdf ].

The 1951 Refugee Convention does, however, recognize the concept of fear: it defines refugees as individuals with a genuine fear of persecution, not people who have necessarily experienced persecution.

Still, Javier Rio Navarro, Médecins Sans Frontières operational adviser in Mexico and Central America, says emigrants from Mexico or Central America are generally regarded as economic migrants.

"This is no longer applicable to all of them. A significant number of them are survival migrants, or displaced, or as they would be called anywhere else in the world - refugees."

np/ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98039/The-price-of-fear</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200801305t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In slums where killings, rape, kidnappings and other criminal violence are commonplace, say researchers, lives and livelihoods are hampered by a force that is tough to measure: Fear.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Humanitarian intervention in violence-hit slums - from whether to how</title><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200801304t.jpg" />]]>RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In a move that experts say could open the door to a more robust aid response to chronic violence in urban areas, the European Commission’s humanitarian aid arm, ECHO, has approved 2 million euro in funding for interventions in cases of violence outside of conventional war in Central America and Mexico until the end of 2014. If large-scale aid work in so-called &apos;other situations of violence&apos; is the way of the future, there are certain things humanitarian workers will have to keep in mind.</description><body><![CDATA[RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In a move that experts say could open the door to a more robust aid response to chronic violence in urban areas, the European Commission’s humanitarian aid arm, ECHO, has approved two million euros in funding for violence-hit slums in Central America and Mexico until the end of 2014.

The world’s 10 most violent cities in 2012 were in Latin America, according to a study [ http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/sala-de-prensa/759-san-pedro-sula-otra-vez-la-ciudad-mas-violenta-del-mundo-acapulco-la-segunda ] (Spanish) by the Mexico-based Citizens’ Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice; and Latin America is considered the part of the world where slum residents are most heavily burdened by organized crime and violence not linked to traditional armed conflict. But as more and more cities see rapid and often haphazard urbanization, experts say other parts of the world could increasingly face similar challenges.

If large-scale aid work in so-called “other situations of violence” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97188/Urban-violence-new-territory-for-aid-workers ] is the way of the future, there are certain things humanitarian workers will have to keep in mind.

“It’s particularly true in situations of urban violence but it's true with urban issues in general - they are a real and significant challenge to the existing model of humanitarian action,” Paul Knox Clarke, head of research and communications at the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), told IRIN.

ALNAP is putting together a “lessons learned” paper drawing from the handful of cases where humanitarian agencies have intervened in slums hit by violence.

In the meantime, here are a few strategies:

Go beyond basic needs

As one of Rio de Janeiro’s notoriously violent slums prepared for the April opening of a visual arts centre, some people asked why a slum would possibly need such a thing.

“It’s wrong to see a favela as solely a bundle of scarcity,” says Jailson de Souza e Silva, associate professor at Universidade Federal Fluminense and head of Brazil’s Observatório de Favelas [ http://observatoriodefavelas.org.br/en/ ] (the Slums Observatory).

While many slum communities are poor, that does not define them.

“In these areas you have deprivation of basic rights, but you have a very active social fabric,” said Adriano Campolina, head of ActionAid in Brazil. Such communities can be seen as very weak and humanitarians might misguidedly focus only on the most basic of needs - shelter, food, emergency care, Campolina told IRIN on the sidelines of a conference in Rio [ http://hasow.org/Seminarios/Index/1 ].

“Depending on the way [a humanitarian agency intervenes], if you focus only on this and you don’t appreciate that the community’s struggle is for the full range of rights as a citizen, you risk undermining these people.”

Build on existing community responses

Humanitarian aid in already marginalized slum communities could further stigmatize residents, ActionAid’s Campolina said. “The people in these communities have over the years built their own ways of mobilizing, organizing, and negotiating. If you ignore that and you just dump humanitarian aid, you may actually further ostracize the people.”

Robert Muggah, professor at the Institute of International Relations at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and research director at Igarapé Institute, a Rio-based think tank [ http://pt.igarape.org.br/ ], says humanitarian actors with their “quick-in and quick-out mentalities” could undermine local forms of resilience and response.

He says city dwellers are dependent on services to ensure their livelihoods in ways the rural poor are not. “The rapid distribution of aid can unintentionally disrupt their networks and associations, often in dangerous ways. [Humanitarian action here] will require a high degree of sensitivity to local realities, willingness to work through community partnerships, and a considerable level of situation awareness.”

Understand local dynamics - even more so

At the conference, hosted by HASOW (Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War) [ http://hasow.org/ ], discussions about Brazil’s slums pointed out the importance of understanding what Harvard Humanitarian Initiative's Ronak Patel called slums’ “small-p politics”: power relationships among various groups; factors determining identity and status; and interplay among residents, authorities, and armed groups [ http://hhi.harvard.edu/programs-and-research/urbanization-and-humanitarian-emergencies ].

Aid experts say while an understanding of the local context is important in any humanitarian intervention, it is that much more critical - and complicated - in violence-hit slums.

“This is going to make the difference between a relevant and valid operation and something you're doing completely blindly,” said Vicente Raimundo, rapid response coordinator with ECHO’s office for Latin America & the Caribbean. “What is going on in El Salvador, for example, has little resemblance to what's going on in Honduras or in Guatemala. `Other situations of violence’ is a regional phenomenon that has a lot of local characteristics.”

But the complexity of the local context is no reason for humanitarian aid agencies to stay away, says Javier Rio Navarro, Médecins Sans Frontières operational adviser in Mexico and Central America.

“During any intervention, there is the need to understand the actors and the context to be responsible in the way you interact,” Navarro told IRIN. “Yes, working in urban settings is different from working in the bush. In the bush it's you and your patients. In these urban settings you've got a much wider range of actors - also a wider set of perpetrators of violence. This makes things more complicated, but does not fundamentally change our function and mission and should not turn violent urban settings into no-go areas for humanitarians.”

Be extra meticulous in targeting

The fairly narrow targeting typical of humanitarian interventions would not be suitable for most urban areas, particularly where violence has taken hold, says François Grünewald, executive director of the France-based research, training and evaluation group, Urgence, Réhabilitation et Développement (Groupe URD).

“In these urban societies where you have violence, people do not survive on their own,” he said. “They belong to networks - be they gangs, age groups, neighbourhood cliques. But if you get stigmatized because you’re targeted by a humanitarian agency, you’ve got to choose between being part of that targeted group or part of your network. And this is sometimes a choice between life and death.”

Stigmatization can be for reasons as simple as being “singled out” as a recipient of aid, in ways others in your network have not been.

Grünewald says he finds it “both fascinating and terrifying” how little interest there seems to be in the humanitarian aid and donor community for the kind of anthropological study required to understand these dynamics. He says getting to know the sociological and anthropological setting is a vital operational issue.

Be wary of your mandate - and your expertise

Many aid experts say the debate over intervening in such settings is shifting from whether to how. Still there are more questions than answers, including the applicability of international humanitarian law.

Some observers say such engagement by humanitarian agencies is mandate creep. For international affairs and political science professor Michael Barnett, author of Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, international humanitarian agencies should limit themselves to their terrain: emergencies. Even if international agencies could base their operations in violent cities in a legal framework, he said, it is better to fund local agencies - “those who know the terrain, not outsiders.” [ http://elliott.gwu.edu/research/books/books11.cfm#barnett ]

“What possible role could outsiders provide in terms of advancing the situation on the ground that locals couldn’t do? Perhaps there’s the neutrality aspect, but not operationally… I don’t think they [international NGOs] bring anything to the table. In urban settings - [there is a] clear role for humanitarians in assisting refugees or in natural disasters - beyond that, no.”

He acknowledged that the definition of humanitarianism has been stretched in recent decades. “But one of the things that has made humanitarian action effective is that it worked in emergency settings... Violence in urban settings is a classical human rights and development situation.”

Some agencies and donors, including ECHO, say uncertainty about the legal framework does not bar them from acting.

“We focus on the humanitarian consequences, on humanitarian needs, regardless of the causes,” ECHO’s Raimundo told IRIN. “If there are proven, unmet needs then there is a basis to act.”

For more, see IRIN’s piece on how fear of urban violence [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98039/The-price-of-fear ] is creating humanitarian need. 

np/ha/cb


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Does IHL apply? 

International humanitarian law (IHL), which gives civilians affected by conflict the right to humanitarian assistance, applies in situations deemed international or non-international armed conflicts. Traditionally, this has not been interpreted to include urban gang violence. But this may be beginning to change. 

Ronak Patel, director of urbanization and crises program, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative: 

“More and more, in these `other situations of violence’, we’ll move away from IHL because they won’t be international conflicts. Even to call them `non-international armed conflicts’ we have to meet the two criteria - organization and intensity. In many cases the intensity is clearly there; these are areas that look very much like war. Organization is much more difficult. No longer is it one or two large paramilitary forces fighting the state; it’s a multiplicity of actors - some very weak, others very organized. But attempting to call these `non-international armed conflicts’ so we can apply IHL and engage as humanitarians doesn’t work very well.

“Some have promoted a case-by-case approach; to me this seems very unwieldy but it might be all we have right now and this is an area that needs a lot of work; we’re lacking a legal framework for this kind of intervention.

“The diversity of armed actors makes application of some of the traditional methods of engaging them with IHL very difficult - e.g. teaching them about neutrality, teaching them to stockpile weapons, to minimize effects on citizens. Because they’re so many and so diverse, it’s difficult; even if leaders of many groups agree with these principles there’s no guarantee that this can be commanded all the way down the line.”

Robert Muggah, professor at the Institute of International Relations at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and research director at Igarapé Institute:

“From an international relations perspective, the question of whether or not to apply IHL or to intervene in a city like Rio is an extraordinarily sensitive one for governments. The declaration of war, the determination of armed conflict, or the introduction of IHL has dramatic implications for everything - from notions of sovereignty, notions of the right to intervene, all the way to credit ratings, to tourism and even national pride and prestige. Even so, it is interesting that for most cities HASOW covers - Rio, Medellin, Ciudad Juarez, and Port-au-Prince - most municipal public officials, elected or otherwise, have no such qualms. They readily describe their cities as at war - less conscious perhaps of the diplomatic connotations.”

Vicente Raimundo, rapid response coordinator, ECHO office for Latin America & the Caribbean:

“ECHO does have a legal basis that rules and regulates our actions. A 1996 piece of European Commission legislation [ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/humanitarian_aid/r10001_en.htm ] regulates humanitarian aid funded by the Commission.

“We operate guided by the so-called humanitarian principles. And nothing in them prevents us from funding OSV [“other situations of violence”]. In fact, it has been done always, virtually everywhere. We focus on the humanitarian consequences, on humanitarian needs, regardless of its causes. If there are proven, unmet needs, then there is a basis to act. 

“Finally, nowhere in our legislation is it defined that we have to operate only on IHL qualified situations. It is mentioned: `Whereas people in distress, victims of natural disasters, wars and outbreaks of fighting, or other comparable exceptional circumstances have a right to international humanitarian assistance where their own authorities prove unable to provide effective relief.’

“Therefore, acknowledging that we are not facing an officially-qualified armed conflict, we note as well that there are unmet humanitarian needs, that the victims do have the right to receive humanitarian assistance relevant and proportional to their needs from neutral aid actors, and that we believe that as a donor, ECHO has an added value justifying its intervention supported both by its legal mandate and previous experience.”

np/ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98038/Humanitarian-intervention-in-violence-hit-slums-from-whether-to-how</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200801304t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">RIO DE JANEIRO 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - In a move that experts say could open the door to a more robust aid response to chronic violence in urban areas, the European Commission’s humanitarian aid arm, ECHO, has approved 2 million euro in funding for interventions in cases of violence outside of conventional war in Central America and Mexico until the end of 2014. If large-scale aid work in so-called &apos;other situations of violence&apos; is the way of the future, there are certain things humanitarian workers will have to keep in mind.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Towards internal solutions to the DRC crisis</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97999/Is-more-force-in-the-DRC-more-of-the-same ] will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there. 

The over-3,000-strong military force will work alongside the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) to carry out targeted offensives against militia groups, which have caused numerous civilian deaths and massive population displacements. 

While some welcome the forthcoming military intervention, many analysts are advocating for Kinshasa-led initiatives - such as reforming key institutions - as necessary, if not alternative, solutions. 

In this briefing, IRIN highlights some of the key issues that the DRC government needs to address to secure its restive east.  

How can the security sector be reformed? 

An effective security sector is key to resolving most of DRC’s problems, according to analysts. 

“The Congolese government’s inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else,” according to The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, a 2012 report by a group of Congolese and international civil society organizations [ http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/drc-ssr-report-20120416-1.pdf ]. 

“An effective security sector - organized, resourced, trained and vetted - is essential to solving problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals,” the report says. 

But little money is being directly spent on security sector reform (SSR), it notes.  For example, while official development assistance to DRC post-2006 has amounted to at least US$14 billion, just over one percent, or about $84.79 million, has gone to SSR. 

The report blamed the international community for being “politically incoherent and poorly coordinated” with regard to SSR. It also blamed the DRC government’s lack of political will to take on SSR, attributed to its endemic corruption.  

According to Naomi Kok, a research consultant with the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), “SSR is a long-term project for the DRC, and Kinshasa should take most of the responsibility for completing this successfully.” 

But DRC’s government needs to take charge first. “The problem of the DRC is a weak, and some may argue an illegitimate, government, unable to take full control and charge of its vast territory,” Nicholas Opiyo, a Kampala-based lawyer with the Akijul consultancy [ http://www.akijul.org/index.php ], told IRIN. 

He added:  “The weakness or division in the Congolese army is only... a manifestation of the broader breakdown in the governance infrastructure of the country. As a result, everyone finds resort in a patchy solution, taking control of the instruments of violence.” 

How can the army be reined in? 

Acts of violence against civilians in eastern DRC are rampant, with the DRC army (FARDC) and dozens of militia groups culpable. 

FARDC troops are accused of violating human rights around the town of Minova, in South Kivu Province, last year while retreating from North Kivu Province  after the city of Goma fell to the M23 militia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96833/DRC-Fall-of-Goma-puts-200-000-children-at-risk ], according to  a  May UN Joint Human Rights Office report [ http://monusco.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Pj7jOWjAxWo%3d&tabid=10662&language=en-US ]. 

“In this context, at least 102 women and 33 girls were victims of rape or other acts of sexual violence perpetrated by FARDC soldiers,” says the report, which noted the soldiers had arbitrarily executed at least two people, used forced labour and looted from villages. 

FARDC is often regarded as weak, with poorly organized, unmotivated troops. The M23 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] mutiny in eastern DRC in 2012 by ethnic Tutsi FARDC officers, for example, was in part fuelled by grievances over pay and living conditions. 

Training alone will not address FARDC’s problems, which are structural, say experts. 

“There is an overestimation about what training can achieve. Foreign partners (Belgium, USA, France, Angola, South African and China) have now been training the Congolese army since 2006, and the results are very poor,” Thierry Vircoulon, an International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst, told IRIN in an e-mail. 

“Training is only good when it can be applied but, given the state of the Congolese army, the trained soldiers are sent back to a dysfunctional organization without decent pay and working conditions. Training will not solve the structural problems of the Congolese army.” 

FARDC has also been plagued by ethnic divisions, with some troops still loyal to militia groups. 

“The so-called Congolese army is a patchwork of fighters with various backgrounds - former Mobutu military personnel, militiamen from the MLC [Mouvement de liberation du Congo] of Jean-Pierre Bemba, Mai Mai, AFDL [Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo] fighters, etc. And there was not a process to unite these groups, and some of them managed to stay in their territories of origin - CNDP [Congrès national pour la défense du people]/M23 in North Kivu,” noted Vircoulon. 

“Therefore, ethnic and past affiliations remain and are stronger than the military discipline and command. The Congolese army is not an institution; it is a patchwork of undisciplined and untrained groups of fighters.” 

What about demobilization? 

The process of integrating ex-combatants into the Congolese army, part of the government’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, is also mired in challenges. 

“Currently, the national military is in a shambles, and there are various armed groups that are in various stages of DDR. This situation is aggravated by domestic and regional political manipulation,” ISS’s Kok told IRIN.  

Another challenge is the failure to address the causes of armed rebellion, making disarmament often short-lived.  In 2009, for example, the DRC government signed a deal with members of the CNDP, but failure to fully implement the deal led to the 2012 mutiny that gave rise to M23. 

“[When] the M23 were integrated into the FARDC in 2009… their command and control structures [were] more or less intact. Thus, when the time came for them to defect and form a new rebellion, they were ready to do so,” explained Kok.   

The absence of a vetting process for ex-combatants is also a problem. 

“A strategy of integrating abusive warlords and their fighters into the Congolese army - in often short-lived deals with little or no vetting or training before former combatants are redeployed as Congolese army soldiers - have fuelled the cycles of violence and horrific human rights abuses in eastern Congo,” Ida Sawyer, a researcher and advocate with Human Rights Watch (HRW), told IRIN.  

Reforming the judiciary   

Inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms further enable impunity for abuses. 

Between 15 November and 2 December 2012, at least 58 cases of rape were reported during M23’s occupation of Goma, according to the May UN Joint Human Rights Office report. M23 also executed 11 civilians, recruited and used child soldiers, and engaged in forced labour and looting. 

Only a few DRC militia leaders have been arrested and convicted, among them Thomas Lubanga , who in, March 2012 was found guilty [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95073/DRC-Lubanga-verdict-a-first-step ] of conscripting child soldiers in the northeastern  Ituri  region by the International Criminal Court (ICC).  In March, former M23 commander Bosco Ntaganda surrendered to the ICC.   

Experts are calling for the establishment of specialized courts within DRC to try human rights crimes outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. 

“Together with Congolese civil society organizations, we have also called for the establishment of specialized mixed chambers or a specialized mixed court within the Congolese justice system, with the involvement of international prosecutors, judges and other personnel to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Congo since 1990,” said HRW’s Sawyer.  

“The need to hold to account those responsible for perpetuating grave crimes (government troops, rebels and militia) must not be short-changed for any short-term gains,” added  analyst Opiyo. 

According to ICG’s Vircoulon, “The blocking of justice reform is the reason why impunity is rife in the DRC.” 

What about negotiating local solutions? 

Peace talks  between M23 and the DRC government are ongoing in Kampala, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), an approach favoured by analysts sceptical of the military intervention force [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44523&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo ].   

“It all depends on the effectiveness of the UN intervention brigade, but from the point of the organization [ICGLR], we don’t believe the intervention brigade is the final solution to the conflict,” Stephen Mwachofi Singo, an ICGLR programme officer, told IRIN. 

“Already, through [the] ICGLR process, there is a political process ongoing in Kampala. Such a process should be supported to its logical conclusion,” added Singo. 

Tackling ethnic tensions is key to pacifying conflict areas. 

“DRC is a vast, multi-ethnic country, with some of the ethnic groups spanning the borders of neighbouring countries such as Angola and Rwanda. Unfortunately, past and the current DRC government[s] have used this multiplicity of ethnic groups against each other and for political connivance. This has brewed a sense of favour and disfavour,” said analyst Opiyo. 

“In order for the ethnic-based tensions to ease, there is need for not just a nationalistic army but a representative government. A centralized rather than devolved administration would provide a platform for a national, rather than an ethnic, outlook among the Congolese people.” 

According to Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, a political scientist at Makerere University, “Lasting peace in the DRC cannot come out of the deployment of aggressive foreign forces.” 

“The causes of violence in that country [DRC] are internal. The solution therefore lies in resolving the internal problems that fuel the fighting. Only [the] Congolese can solve their problems in a sustainable way. Foreigners will not do it for them.” 

so/aw/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98036/Briefing-Towards-internal-solutions-to-the-DRC-crisis</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boko Haram attacks hit school attendance in Borno State</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg" />]]>KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</description><body><![CDATA[KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.

Most of the children are primary school students, according to the official. Thus far Boko Haram (BH) has burned or destroyed 50 of the state's 175 schools, he said. Teachers in the state confirmed the estimate.

Students are staying at home for fear of attack, or are being transferred to private Islamic schools, known in the north as Islamiyya. On 6 May state schools officially reopened following a six-week break, but many have stayed closed, as officials and teachers fear attack.

BH gunmen had initially targeted schools - most of them primary - at night, detonating grenades and home-made explosives or dousing classrooms with gasoline and setting them alight, according to military and education officials.

But on 18 March BH shifted tactics, attacking four schools in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State (population 4.17 million, according to the 2006 census), in broad daylight, killing four teachers and seriously injuring four students.

On 9 April suspected BH members killed two school teachers in their homes, and four officials of the Borno State Feeding Committee, which runs a primary and secondary school feeding programme, while they were on an inspection tour of schools in Dikwa town, Borno State.

The shift to direct attacks on educators and students has rattled teachers, leaving many too frightened to go to work.

"We have been asked to resume classes but we are too afraid to return to school despite the stationing of a military post outside the school,” said Hajara Modu, a school teacher at Customs primary school in Maiduguri.

Secondary school enrolment is only 28 percent in Borno State - the lowest in the country, according to a 2010 Nigeria Education Data Survey.

On 10 April BH leader Abubakar Shekau claimed ordering the attacks on schools in an Internet video post, citing Nigerian military raids on Islamic schools in Maiduguri as the impetus.

Adama Zannah, a father of four students attending Sanda Kyarimi secondary school, one of the four schools affected in the 18 March attacks, told IRIN: "I want my children to attend school but they can only do that if they are alive... I can't allow them to go to school in this atmosphere of fear when schools are burnt and gunmen open fire during classes."

Islamic school attendance up

Many parents see the safest option as Islamic schools, which have seen a sharp rise in enrolment rates over recent months. These are private religious schools which teach an Islamic education, though some include English and maths in the curriculum.

Given the demand, fees at some Islamic schools have also increased - by 300 percent since the beginning of the year in some cases, according to parent Muhammad Kolo. He used to pay US$1.90 per month to educate his two children but the fee is now $7.60.

Borno State information commissioner Inuwa Bwala said the state government will try to strengthen Islamic schools with more money and more materials, and standardize their curriculum to teach children the Koran alongside Western education. (BH literally means “Western education is a sin” in Hausa).

Militarized schools

The school districts worst-affected by the arson attacks include old Maiduguri city and four local government areas - Marte, Kala-Balge, Gamboru Ngala and Mabar - in the northern part of Borno on the border with Cameroon and Chad, where BH has a strong presence [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria ].

Many students from these areas have been taken to neighbouring Dikwa District to take their May and June exams, protected by a heavy military detail.

The government has deployed soldiers in at-risk schools across the state but some parents fear this puts their children in yet more danger.

"The presence of soldiers makes them more prone to attack by BH which considers the military as their main enemy," said Ahmad Kyari, a resident of Gwange Quarters in Maiduguri city where all the schools in the area have been burnt; his three children are at home.

Attacks on schools violate children's right to education, as well as a number of human rights. In situations of conflict, they may also violate international humanitarian law and criminal law, and may constitute war crimes [ http://www.protectingeducation.org/what-international-laws-are-violated ].

"I'm really afraid to go to school. The thought of gunmen storming the school and opening fire or throwing explosives gives me the shivers and this is a thought that fills the minds of many students like me," said Nura Babani, a student of Sanda Kyarimi secondary school which was attacked on18 March.

"It is too dangerous to go to school now, especially with the attacks on some schools in broad daylight during classes,” student Maryam Habib, told IRIN.

In some areas where the government was trying to renovate schools, BH had set them ablaze again. Gwange II primary school in the Gwange area of Maiduguri city, considered a major BH stronghold, was burnt four times by BH, each time after undergoing renovation.

The school-burnings "sabotage government's effort at improving on education in Borno State", Borno State information commissioner Bwala told IRIN.

"It is not possible to learn in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. How do you expect a teacher to put in his best and a child to learn effectively when they are always on edge, in anticipation of gun and bomb attacks. This is killing education here," said the Ministry of Education official.

The federal government is exploring ways to forge a dialogue with BH [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/Analysis-Hurdles-to-Nigerian-government-Boko-Haram-dialogue ] but thus far, there has been little progress, and in recent weeks the militants have been staging a fierce comeback in the northeast. Over 3,600 people have been killed in BH-related violence since 2009, including extrajudicial killings by Nigerian security forces, according to Human Rights Watch.

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98032/Boko-Haram-attacks-hit-school-attendance-in-Borno-State</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Quelling xenophobia in South Africa&apos;s townships</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141515080313t.jpg" />]]>PHILIPPI 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - This week marks five years since tensions between foreigners and South Africans living in impoverished communities across the country erupted in xenophobic violence, leaving more than 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced, their homes and businesses robbed and abandoned.</description><body><![CDATA[PHILIPPI 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - This week marks five years since tensions between foreigners and South Africans living in impoverished communities across the country erupted in xenophobic violence, leaving more than 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced, their homes and businesses robbed and abandoned [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/78386/SOUTH-AFRICA-Xenophobic-attacks-spreading ]. 

Since May 2008, various initiatives have been established to detect early warning signs of future xenophobic attacks and to improve responses. But while no further outbreaks have occurred on the scale of the violence five years ago, attacks on foreign nationals have continued [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96589/SOUTH-AFRICA-Foreigners-still-at-risk ]. On average, one person was killed every week in 2011, according to the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA).

The looting and victimization of foreigners has also remained a feature of the frequent service delivery protests that have rocked South African townships in recent years, as has the near impunity of perpetrators [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88052/SOUTH-AFRICA-Foreign-nationals-attacked-with-impunity ].

In a statement released on 13 May, CoRMSA concluded that “much more still needs to be done to promote peaceful communities”.

Tensions high

Philippi Township, 25km southeast of Cape Town, has been a hotspot for xenophobic violence in Western Cape Province post-2008. In an area where nearly 60 percent of residents are unemployed, according to census data, Ward Counsellor Thobile Gqola, estimated that foreign nationals run more than half of businesses.

“Generally, people are happy to live side-by-side; the problem starts when it comes to business,” he told IRIN. 

Most of the violence has been directed at Somali refugees who run many of the small grocery stores known as ‘spaza’ shops in the township [ http://www.irinnews.org/film/4903/Living-under-siege ]. Like many other Somali traders in Philippi, Abdullahi Wehliye, 28, opened a shop there after losing his shop in neighbouring Khayelitsha Township during the 2008 xenophobic violence.

“I lost everything; I had to start over,” he told IRIN as he served customers through a metal grill, a security precaution that has done little to protect him from crime. 

Wehliye said his shop had been robbed seven times since it opened in 2010. During one incident in 2012, his brother was shot and killed. Although he reported all of the robberies, no arrests have been made. Of 60 Somali shopkeepers in the area, who have formed an association that Wehliye chairs, all have had their shops robbed and the vast majority have experienced shootings, Wehliye said.

A 2012 study [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/ElusiveJustice_17October.pdf ] by Vanya Gastrow and Roni Amit, of the African Centre for Migration and Society at Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg, found that Somali-run shops suffered disproportionately from crime, including attacks orchestrated by competing South African traders. Their vulnerability to such attacks was found to be partly the result of their lack of access to informal justice mechanisms and community structures.

In township settings, noted the researchers, leaders of local street committees, most of which fall under the authority of the South African National Civic Association (SANCO), often play a more important role in responding to crime than the formal justice system. 

“People in townships still respect their ‘chiefs’,” said Charles Mutabazi, director of the Agency for Refugee Education, Skills, Training and Advocacy (ARESTA), a Cape Town-based NGO.

Peace monitoring, community building

ARESTA partnered with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to start a project in Philippi in 2012 that identified 20 community leaders in each of the townships’ five wards and trained them to be “peace monitors”. The three-day training included mediation and conflict-resolution skills as well as information about the rights of migrants and refugees. 

“There’s a lot of conflict here,” said Vra Mdledle, a SANCO member and secretary to a ward counsellor who went through the training last year. “When you’re in SANCO, they don’t give you training, they just nominate you. ARESTA gave us skills we could use in our communities.”

She gave the example of a Somali shopkeeper in her area who had recently experienced an arson attack. Following a similar attack last year, he alleged that local police had pressured him to drop the case. 

“I called all the peace monitors, and we decided to accompany him to the police station,” said Mdledle. “We asked to see the station commissioner and demanded that the previous case be reopened. I saw the police are not really doing their job.”

Although the focus of the project is to promote diversity and quell xenophobic tensions, the peace monitors do not limit themselves to advocating for foreign nationals. Locals also suffer as a result of police negligence, said Mdledle, and there are many situations that demand conflict-resolution skills in this densely populated township. 

Voyiseka Nzuzo, 24, who went through the ARESTA training in February, said peace monitors in her area had recently intervened after the family of a nine-year-old rape victim beat and stabbed a man they believed to be the perpetrator. “We found that the child had pointed out five different people. We went to the police station and tried to convince the case investigator they had the wrong suspect,” she told IRIN.

As the owner of a barber shop with foreign customers and the founder of a local business association that includes South Africans and migrants, Lefefe Mdunyelwa said he already had friends from other countries before he became a peace monitor, but that he still learned a lot from the training. “I learned that each and every person is just living for themselves; nobody’s trying to steal your business,” he told IRIN. 

Noticing that the foreign members of his association were often discriminated against when it came to the issuing of business permits and the charging of rent by municipal officials, he said his association is now advocating for equal treatment.

Although ARESTA has made efforts to include members of Philippi’s Somali community in the peace monitor training and quarterly peace marches, Mutabazi said participation had been disappointing. 

Wehliye, who is one of eight Somalis to have gone through the training, said language remained a barrier, and Gqola, the ward councillor, said foreign nationals often stayed away from meetings aimed at facilitating dialogue between local and foreign business owners because they felt intimidated.

Wehliye said he signed up for the training because “after we’d been robbed so many times, I wanted to know what rights I had. I learned I had the same rights [to justice] as local people. I feel empowered.”

Becoming a peace monitor has also brought him into contact with local leaders whom he works with to resolve conflicts. “I now feel like a member of the community,” he told IRIN.

Mutabazi said the success of the peace monitor project lay in its emphasis on changing the mindset of influential community leaders. Whether it will be rolled out in other townships will depend on funding, but Mutabazi is convinced that the value of the training has been tested. 

“It’s empowering [participants] to be better community leaders. If we’re leaving that kind of legacy behind, it’s very good for promoting social cohesion.”

ks/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98035/Quelling-xenophobia-in-South-Africa-apos-s-townships</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141515080313t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">PHILIPPI 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - This week marks five years since tensions between foreigners and South Africans living in impoverished communities across the country erupted in xenophobic violence, leaving more than 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced, their homes and businesses robbed and abandoned.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Syrian rebels on IHL: In their own words</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091208460593t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the UN Commission of Inquiry accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, including UN peacekeepers, and possibly using chemical weapons. So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International [ http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/summary_killings_by_armed_opposition_groups.pdf ] and Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/17/syria-end-opposition-use-torture-executions#torture ] to the UN Commission of Inquiry [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf ] accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, and possibly using chemical weapons [ http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uns-carla-del-ponte-says-there-is-evidence-rebels-may-have-used-sarin-in-syria-8604920.html ]. The capture and detention of 21 UN peacekeepers in March and another four last week also constituted a violation of IHL.

So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?

IRIN interviewed rebel fighters of various leanings and levels of authority to better understand their mindset.

(See our analysis on this issue here [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98021/Analysis-Sometimes-you-cannot-apply-the-rules-Syrian-rebels-and-IHL ]) 

Faris al Bayoush, former Colonel in the army, now commanding a unit of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Idlib Governorate:

“I’ve read all about IHL during the training courses that were organized for the officers in the Syrian army, so I know all the rules. The majority of Syrians are civilians, good people. We naturally wouldn’t want to do anything to hurt them. Of course we respect IHL because violating human rights is what the regime stands for. The FSA has been formed to protect people from their crimes... We’re also guided by Islamic law. There is no contradiction between both because their content is similar: Both sources tell us not to harm civilians, particularly not weaker elements, but the Koran gives us more precise instructions... Before each battle, I give a speech to everybody to make sure everybody has the same idea of what is permissible and what isn’t. Then we talk and discuss the issue…

“Any foreign aid worker would be treated like our guest because the civilians here are really in need of assistance… A civilian is someone who doesn’t carry a gun, no matter what sect he belongs to... Do we take precautions so that we don’t harm civilians? Frankly, I find that question weird. Everybody is in God’s hands. But of course we don’t usually launch attacks if there are civilians around…

“We try to take good care of our prisoners. We’ve taken 53 lately, and we let them go home because we had nothing to charge them with.”

Manhal Abu Bakr, FSA member, Hama Governorate:

“We’ve lost faith in international laws and policies. This is why Islamist groups are gaining ground. At first they were weak, but then people realized it doesn’t help them if they adhere to Western standards, so they grew stronger... Some say this is hypocrisy. The international community expects us to comply with IHL, but nobody cares if our rights are being violated. For example, if you catch a Syrian air force pilot who is responsible for killing hundreds of people, of course you’d kill him…

“Foreign aid workers would have to be careful. There are bad groups, thieves and criminals; they might steal their supplies or kidnap them. No one of us would mind them unless they’re coming to spy on us. We’d need to know exactly who they are before we let them near us. Otherwise there would be suspicion. We cannot afford to make mistakes because the [one mistake could be our undoing].

“We try to distribute all aid supplies coming in from Turkey evenly. Usually we give it to people who support the revolution. We wouldn’t give anything to people who support the government because as rebels, we cannot enter their neighbourhoods. But we don’t differentiate between different sects. When you see all the need, you forget about religion... We always try to take measures not to harm civilians during out operations. This is the first thing we look into when planning an attack. We alert them and tell them to vacate the area. If they feel we don’t protect them, we’d lose their support.”

Raed al Aliwi, engineer, FSA commander, Hama Governorate:

“International humanitarian law is our be-all and end-all. It’s natural for us to comply with these standards because the FSA’s main purpose is to defend the people. This is why the FSA only launches attacks on very specific places where there are armed regime supporters. In many cases, we had to stop operations because there were civilians in the vicinity... It’s easy to differentiate between Shabiha [militias who support the government] and civilians because Shabiha always carry weapons, at least a small pistol; and they only show up in places where regime troops are close by. We also know them by their dialect… Alawis in general are not a problem for us. We’re not opposed to any sect as such…

“We wouldn’t object to any aid team coming to our area, no matter where they’re from, even if they’re Israeli…

“As Muslims, we regard Sharia law as our essential source from which we derive our rules. The problem is that there are groups who draw false conclusions from it, and then they turn extremist and do terrible things...

I’m commanding 60 men, and sometimes it’s difficult to make everybody follow the rules. If anyone violates our standards, he’d be punished. The important thing is that the leader behaves well because he is the role model that all the other men follow in their actions.”

Osama Hadba, member of the FSA’s religiously conservative Liwaa al Fateh brigade in Aleppo Governorate:

“We rely on the Koran as the key source of our rules, but we also take all international agreements into account. We know about IHL because everyone can see the violations committed by the regime with their own eyes... We are humans that have been forced to take up weapons. Of course we don’t violate any human rights, unlike the criminal regime we are opposing…


“In our office, we register all human rights breaches that occur. When we arrest somebody who is charged with any of those crimes, he’ll be transferred to one of the military courts that have been established to deal with such cases. A lot of lawyers and judges have defected and started working for the revolutionary courts.

“We stop only aid convoys that supply the regime army, not the ones heading towards civilian areas… We have no objection to any foreign aid workers coming to help, but only in coordination with us. I’d be happy to accompany them…

“We protect the civilian population as much as possible. Before launching an attack, we declare the area in question as a military zone, and civilians are requested to stay away.  It’s difficult to prevent harm from the population in neighbourhoods [that support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad] because the regime troops put their tanks inside the residential areas and use the civilians as shields.”

Abu Mousab, a commander of the al-Ansar Brigades (a jihadist group affiliated with US-designated terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nusra), Deir-ez-Zor Governorate:

“One of our commanders is a religious scholar, and he is responsible for setting our rules and principles. We’re fighting for religious reasons, so following the Koran and the Sunnah [teachings of the Prophet] is paramount for us. We’re not interested in IHL because Islamic law is much fairer than any secular law…

“I have no clue what the Geneva Conventions or any other international laws say because I’m a believer, and I’m sure that the Shariah is the best law in the world. All other laws are no solution…

“We announce our attacks beforehand if it’s possible. We’ve even aborted operations when we realized we might hurt civilians… We also consider regime supporters as civilians as long as they don’t carry weapons - except informers since they are causing huge damage. If we have proof that someone is an informer, we execute them. Sometimes people are stubborn, so sometimes you have to torture them to get the information you need. If we have a prisoner who has killed people, we’ll kill him...

“Everyone responsible for crimes committed against the Syrian people deserves to be killed…

“But we’re not killing randomly, even if people aren’t Sunni. If we arrest someone, it’s forbidden to kill him unless he has committed crimes. If he has, however, he deserves to be executed…

“Any aid group wanting to help people would be welcome here. We’d be prepared to give them protection. If we have supplies to hand out, we give it out to everyone equally, also to Christian families.”

Hamza Abdulrahman, member of Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham, Idlib Governorate:

“We don’t care about IHL because the Shariah is our law. For instance, if we arrest a prisoner, we’d take him to a court. We have our own Shariah courts in every area now. We don’t execute anyone unless they are killers, or guilty of theft or kidnapping. Anyone who helps the regime in any way will also be killed, for instance businessmen who support the regime financially. They are considered as fighters, not civilians. We also execute regime soldiers if we catch them, except if they were about to defect…

“Before they are taken to court, we interrogate them, and if they don’t say what they know, we beat or punish them - but we don’t torture like Assad does. According to Shariah law, it’s forbidden to hurt anyone’s head or face. There are laws, and we follow them. We also have our own charities which distribute aid supplies. The only criterion is people’s need; their political opinion or sect is irrelevant…

“If we plant a bomb, we don’t detonate it if there are civilians around. We only launch missiles on areas held by regime forces so that civilians don’t get hurt… We wouldn’t obstruct any foreign aid team, as long as they are unarmed. Other Islamist groups might have a different view on that, for example Jabhat al Nusra. They haven’t commented on this issue, so I’m not sure. But they think like al-Qaeda. They don’t think a European or American could contribute anything good to our revolution.”

gk/ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091208460593t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the UN Commission of Inquiry accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, including UN peacekeepers, and possibly using chemical weapons. So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>&quot;Sometimes you cannot apply the rules&quot; - Syrian rebels and IHL</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091143410929t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - In recent months, Syrian rebels have faced increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. For guidance on the laws of war, they turn to a combination of Islamic law, IHL and their own sense of righteousness or, as one expert put it, “revolutionary justice” - with mixed results.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Syrian rebels facing increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law turn for guidance on the laws of war to a combination of Islamic law, IHL - where they are aware of it - and their own sense of righteousness, according to analysts and IRIN interviews with fighters [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words ].

A report [ http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Syria_Public_Brief_Dec_2012.pdf ] late last year by the Center for Civilians in Conflict pointed to the opposition’s lack of coherent control and command structures as a roadblock to the rebels’ ability to mitigate civilian harm and enforce IHL and human rights principles throughout their ranks. As a result, with hundreds of different militias and battalions operating on the ground, each group seems to be following its own set of rules.

As Aron Lund, an expert on Syrian opposition groups, put it: “Some groups go by Shariah law, and some groups go by rule of the gun - revolutionary justice.”

Sources of guidance

Faris al Bayoush, a former colonel now commanding a unit of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in the northwestern governorate of Idlib, said he sees the regime’s blatant disregard for human rights as all the more reason to commit himself to international norms.

“The abuses were one of the main reasons the revolution started, so of course we should respect humanitarian laws.”

He told IRIN he was well-informed of the content of all relevant international agreements because the Syrian army used to hold training courses on IHL for its officers. “They don’t respect IHL, but they teach it,” he said. He tries to ensure all his men also follow the rules by briefing them before each operation. His unit’s behaviour is, however, not only regulated by IHL but also by Islamic law, or Shariah. He views the two as complementary sources.

“[Shariah] gives us more detailed instructions,” he said. “For example, the Prophet said that you are not allowed to kill an old man, harm a child or cut down a tree.”

In contrast, an increasing number of fighters within the FSA view Islamic teachings alone as providing adequate guidance, though in many cases, they do indeed overlap, especially in the treatment of women and children.

“As Muslims, we regard Shariah law as our essential source,” said Raed al Aliwi, an engineer turned FSA commander in Hama Governorate. “We don’t have to study international laws because respecting human rights comes naturally with our religion.”

He claimed that breaches are rare, but conceded that it is sometimes difficult to make all lower-level fighters respect the rules. Many of them lack even basic knowledge of international norms, codified in the four Geneva Conventions on the laws of war and their associated protocols, which add up to more than 500 articles.

“We can do anything to topple [Syrian President Bashar al-]Assad,” said Abu Bakr, an FSA fighter in the central city of Homs. He argued that there is no need for regulations because he sees the rebels’ own judgment as sufficient: In his view, since the rebels are battling a dictatorship, they necessarily have higher ethical standards.

“We can see what is true and false,” he said, “and we are on the right side.”

Al-Ansar Brigades, a jihadist group affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra (The Front for the Support of the people of Syria), which is considered a terrorist organization by the USA, relies on a religious scholar among its commanders who provides guidelines that all the members adhere to.

“I have no idea of what the Geneva Conventions or any other treaties say,” said Abu Mousab, one of the group’s commanders, “but I’m sure Islamic law is much better because it is the most just law in the world.”

Even among the FSA fighters who stressed their commitment to IHL, there is a growing frustration with the international community and its principles.

“We are living in the days of the fighters,” said an FSA-member who goes by the name Manhal Abu Bakr in Hama. “Sometimes you cannot apply the rules when no one else does. We lost faith in international laws and policies.”

Proclamation of principles

Rebel crimes have persisted despite codes signed by FSA leaders to address misconduct and lawlessness within the opposition ranks. For example, the FSA’s high command issued a “Proclamation of Principles” [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/FSA_Proclimation_of_Principles.pdf ] in July, committing to human rights, pluralism and democracy, and pledging to do their “utmost to uphold international humanitarian law and norms, including by treating prisoners humanely, even as the Assad regime engages in crimes against humanity”.

For observers like Michael Shaikh, director of country operations at the Center for Civilians in Conflict and author of the Center’s report examining how the Syrian opposition views the principles of IHL, this shows a certain desire to engage with these principles.

“The codes of conduct are initially often more for public perception than about actual battlefield behaviour, but there is a clear opening here.”  

Some groups are making an effort to establish disciplinary systems.

“Many rank and file said they were reprimanded when they blew something up or fired their weapons without necessity; that weapons were taken away when there were incidents of civilian harm,” said Shaikh, who conducted interviews with rebel fighters between June and October 2012. “There was an inherent perception that they had to distinguish themselves from the Assad regime.”

Some groups have been trying to encourage rebels to follow the laws of war. According to a Westerner working with makeshift hospitals near Aleppo, one activist group tried distributing pamphlets on the laws of war, supported by verses from the Koran and the Bible, and quotes from Martin Luther King as well as Mahatma Gandhi. But it was chased away by an extremist group.

The International Committee of the Red Cross recently began arranging workshops on IHL for armed opposition groups, and is in dialogue with them with the aim of visiting places of detention under their control. It also distributes pamphlets on IHL obligations to both armed opposition groups and Syrian government soldiers it meets while in the field.

The UK is also funding [ https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-to-parliament-on-syria ] a programme by two consultancy firms to train rebels using an Arabic curriculum about international humanitarian law. And the Syrian Support Group [ http://syriansupportgroup.org/about/ ], a US-based group with a license to fundraise for the FSA in the US, says it only finances military councils that have adopted the FSA’s Proclamation of Principles.

Protecting their reputation

Efforts to limit rebel abuses have also been hampered by the escalation of chaos and violence.

“The big problem in Syria is not so much extremism but lawlessness and a lack of joint leaderships and structures that can deal with these kinds of things,” said Lund, who has authored several reports on Islamist groups in Syria for the Swedish Institute for International Affairs.

As such, criminality is a bigger threat to minorities than even the most extreme Islamist groups, like the Syrian Islamic Front, which has gone out of its way to reach out to Christians (though most extremist groups take a harder line on those belonging to Assad’s Allawite sect, who are often considered apostates from Islam).

“They [extremist groups] want to protect their reputation,” Lund said. “They want to do this work for the larger purpose of defeating Assad. They realize atrocities would undermine that... Random killing is not even part of al-Qaeda’s doctrine.”

Civilian protection

All rebels interviewed claimed they protect local residents during their operations by not targeting areas inhabited by civilians, or by telling people to vacate the area before they strike.

“We’ve even aborted operations when we realized we might hurt civilians,” said Abu Mousab of the jihadist al-Ansar Brigades.

The Center for Civilians in Conflict refers to other strategies to protect civilians, such as sending out scouts before their advance, or launching ambushes at night when people are less likely to be outside.

Nevertheless, civilians have often borne the brunt of the conflict due to a lack of consideration by the rebels. For example, rebels frequently endanger the population by positioning military objectives inside residential areas. In September 2012, 10 civilians were killed when the regime forces shelled a rebel position right next to an apartment building, according to the Center.

To make matters worse, rebel groups have been increasingly employing guerrilla tactics such as suicide bombings, often resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In September, for example, a twin suicide bombing in Damascus reportedly carried out by Jabhat al-Nusra killed dozens of people.

Who is a civilian?

One of the main causes for concern is, according to experts, the absence of a clear definition of who is to be considered a civilian.

“Many rebels I spoke with see themselves as civilians who picked up arms - they don’t think the rules apply to them,” Shaikh said. At the same time, when looking at their opponents, “they had a very loosy-goosy understanding of civilians as someone without a gun,” but did not apply the term to Alawis or people they perceived to be members of the Shabiha militias supporting government forces.

Others do not think in terms of “civilian” and “combatant”, which in Shariah law are not the only determinants of whether someone is a legitimate target.

In a TV interview [ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yexixuNzuaY ] posted on the internet, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, traditionally considered a more moderate voice among Muslim scholars, said all collaborators working with the “unjust” Syrian government, whether civilian or combatant, should be killed, an opinion echoed by some of the fighters.

Businessmen who help fund pro-government militias “are considered like fighters” and are usually sentenced to death if found guilty of supporting the regime in one of the group’s judicial courts, said Hamza Abdulrahman, a member of the Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib.

He, like others, admitted his brigade interrogates prisoners, using beatings - “but we don’t torture like Assad does”. Afterwards, prisoners are transferred to one of the group’s courts. Anyone found guilty of murder, kidnapping or even theft might be executed, he said. Captured soldiers from the regime’s army are also routinely killed, unless they were caught when defecting.

In spite of their growing influence, extremist groups are acting with more restraint in Syria than they did in Iraq, Lund said, “probably because they learned that when they let things go out of hand, they lose popular support and because they know the minority issue is so explosive in Syria, so they have to tread carefully.”

He warned, however, that “with time, this will probably change.”

For the full interviews with rebel fighters, click here [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words ].

gk/ha/cb

 

How Syrian rebels view aid access

Under international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of aid, subject to their right of control. So where do Syria’s rebels stand on this? 

In spite of the differences between the various groups, all fighters interviewed said they would never attack an aid convoy, with even the most extreme groups saying they would be prepared to facilitate access for aid workers and protect them - on certain conditions.

“No one would mind aid workers, unless they are coming to spy on us,” said Manhal Abu Bakr. “We’d need to know exactly who they are. Otherwise it wouldn’t go well. There would be suspicion.”

“We have no objection to anyone coming to help, but only in coordination with us,” added Osama Hadba, a member of the FSA’s Liwaa al Fateh brigade in Aleppo.

According to one aid worker, some organizations have been careful not to brand their distributions with USAID logos, and the Washington Post [ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-14/world/38537333_1_aid-workers-syrians-obama-administration ] reported recently that the US “feeds Syrians, but secretly”.

In addition, many rebel groups are doing their own aid distributions. “It’s a big part of their propaganda,” Lund said. “They want to come off as concerned with civilian affairs and not just fighting.” Jabhat al-Nusra, for example, has put a lot of effort into organizing bread distributions and restarting bus traffic.

Hadba, like other fighters IRIN spoke to, insisted that all civilians are equally deserving of aid, regardless of religion or political affiliation.

“If we distribute food supplies, we go from house to house and check who is in need,” said Raed al Aliwi, the FSA commander in Hama. “We don’t ask about people’s religion or political opinion.”

However, fighters conceded they mainly hand out supplies in areas where residents support their side because they do not have access to areas dominated by regime supporters.

“The real test,” one international aid worker said, will come when aid workers try to access neighbourhoods that support the government but are encircled by opposition groups. “So far, it has generally been the other way around and they've had no reason to make life difficult for us.”

Some rebel groups have, however, stopped aid trucks at gunpoint, looted their belongings, and re-distributed them to their constituents whom they believe to be in more need.

gk/ha/cb


For more on violations of IHL in Syria, see documentation by Amnesty International [ http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/summary_killings_by_armed_opposition_groups.pdf ], Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/17/syria-end-opposition-use-torture-executions#torture ], and the UN Commission of Inquiry for Syria [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf ], as well as the report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict [ http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Syria_Public_Brief_Dec_2012.pdf ].

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98021/quot-Sometimes-you-cannot-apply-the-rules-quot-Syrian-rebels-and-IHL</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091143410929t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - In recent months, Syrian rebels have faced increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. For guidance on the laws of war, they turn to a combination of Islamic law, IHL and their own sense of righteousness or, as one expert put it, “revolutionary justice” - with mixed results.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Understanding the causes of violent extremism in West Africa</title><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281140270935t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Academics and government, military and civil society representatives gathered for a conference in the Senegalese capital this week to assess the interplay between development and violent extremism in West Africa, with some participants suggesting that underdevelopment, marginalization and weak governance create a breeding ground for militancy.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Academics and government, military and civil society representatives gathered for a conference in the Senegalese capital this week to assess the interplay between development and violent extremism in West Africa, with some participants suggesting that underdevelopment, marginalization and weak governance create a breeding ground for militancy. 

While local factors in West African and Sahel countries have contributed to extremist violence, the rise of global jihad in the wake of the US-led "war on terror" since 9/11 has also played a part in spreading radical militancy in the region. 

"In the Sahel, there is a combination of bad governance, poverty, insecurity as well as several internal and external factors [that contribute to extremist violence]," said Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, head of the Centre for Security Strategy in the Sahel and the Sahara, at the opening of the 6-10 May Dakar conference. 

"The Sahel has provided an ideal ground for extremist violence to take root and spread beyond national borders," he said. 

The region has a history of instability. Since the first post-independence coup in West Africa that toppled Togo's founding president in 1963, it has seen a string of coups, some of which have sparked civil wars. 

West Africa is also one of the world's most impoverished regions despite its natural resources. Seven West African countries occupy the bottom 10 places in the UN Human Development Index [ http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ ].

Poor political and resource governance have often led to explosions of violence by disgruntled segments of society, and a number of studies [ http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/west_africa.pdf ] have linked bad governance to insecurity in West Africa. 

For example, Mali's Tuareg have been fighting perceived marginalization by the central government and demanded an autonomous homeland in the country's north. Following the March 2012 coup in the capital Bamako, the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad seized towns from government troops in the north, but was soon driven out by militant Islamist groups. 

Nigeria's increasingly violent Boko Haram militia, which wants an Islamic state, should be seen as a reaction the government's entrenched corruption, abusive security forces, strife between the disaffected Muslim north and Christian south, and widening regional economic disparity, according to the Council on Foreign Relations [ http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739 ].

Some observers stress the local aspect. Militant Islam in Africa, while linked to broader ideological currents, is mainly driven by the local context, with Islamist groups emerging, evolving and reacting to immediate local concerns, University of Florida's Terje Ostebo, argued in a November 2012 paper [ http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AfricaBriefFinal_23.pdf ] published by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS). 

"The Malian government's failure to consistently invest [in] and maintain a strong state presence in the north. created an enabling environment for the expansion of Islamic militancy and the escalation of violence in this region," said Ostebo, an assistant professor at the university's Centre for African Studies (ACSS) and the Department of Religion. 

Marginalization 

"Poverty and underdevelopment and a sense of marginalization and exclusion that comes from lack of governance, particularly at the local level, are seen as drivers associated with violent extremism," Benjamin Nickels, an assistant professor with the ACSS, told IRIN. 

"Supporting development is a long-term approach to undermining drivers associated with violent extremism," he added. 

"You do have a number of underlying factors that make certain regions particularly vulnerable to violent extremism and extremist ideologies, and then you have a number of factors that trigger violence. Amongst these factors there is an underlying economic dimension that often gets missed," said Raymond Gilpin, the ACSS academic dean. 

Poverty, unemployment and socioeconomic deprivation partly explain the rise of Islamist movements - violent and non-violent - argued Ostebo.

"There are other factors of extremist violence. However, it is easier for militant groups to recruit unemployed youth who see no future for themselves, than those who are in employment. The more young people are able to be employed the less chances there are that they can be recruited by militant groups," said Gilles Yabi of the International Crisis Group.

"Development is part of the measures against extremist violence. But we are already in a situation [in West Africa] where underdevelopment is so deep that reversing it is very difficult," he told IRIN. 

Ould-Abdallah cited other factors such as West Africa's wide geographical area, weak public institutions and people's and governments' loyalty to tribe and clan rather than the nation state as also contributing to crime and extremist violence in the region. 

In a bid to end insurgencies, Nigeria and Mali have attempted negotiated settlements, but they have also resorted to the use of force, which is limited in resolving the fundamental causes of rebellion. Repression by governments or external forces can cause Islamist militants to fight for their very existence and at the same time deepen perceptions of state illegitimacy, Ostebo warned. 

Spillover 

The French-led intervention in Mali has dislodged the Islamist rebels from their strongholds, but triggered fears that the fleeing militants could destabilize [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97494/The-regional-threat-posed-by-Mali-s-militants ] countries in the region from where they hail, target foreign nationals in neighbouring countries and even win the sympathy of other extremist militia. 

The January attack on an Algerian gas plant is believed to have been in retaliation for the French military drive in Mali. Nigerian troops heading for Mali as part of an African intervention force came under attack by Boko Haram-linked militants in January. 

On 7 May, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb posted a video message calling for attacks on all French interests across the world for its intervention in Mali. 

Nigeria has teamed up with its neighbours to form a multi-national force to counter Boko Haram. 

"The priority for Sahel right now is to help resolve the Mali crisis. After Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, West Africa does not need another protracted crisis," said Ould-Abdallah. 

ob/cb 

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98012/Understanding-the-causes-of-violent-extremism-in-West-Africa</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281140270935t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Academics and government, military and civil society representatives gathered for a conference in the Senegalese capital this week to assess the interplay between development and violent extremism in West Africa, with some participants suggesting that underdevelopment, marginalization and weak governance create a breeding ground for militancy.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Trading conflict for coffee in DRC</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081446130806t.jpg" />]]>GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.</description><body><![CDATA[GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.

"You should tell the population to grow coffee, as it's the best way for them to make money," he told a militia member during a recent visit to the town of Kalonge, where he and his fellow cooperative members have planted a nursery for coffee seedlings.

The Kivu Cooperative of Coffee Planters and Traders (CPNCK), which Makelele founded five years ago, has planted six of these nurseries in the Kalonge-Pinga-Mweso triangle, a hotbed of militia activity.

"If the young men in this area knew how much they could earn with coffee, they would not be interested in joining militias," Makelele told IRIN.

“A paradise for coffee”

Coffee, a traditional export crop, was virtually abandoned across much of North Kivu in the past 30 years. DRC’s production shrank from 110,000 metric tons in the late 1980s to about 50,000 metric tons in 2009, according to the DRC’s national coffee office.

CPNCK says it is giving away half a million arabica seedlings to help relaunch coffee’s cultivation.

Many people in the Kalonge area, including members of armed groups, appear to be interested in planting coffee. The militiaman told IRIN he would like to plant the crop on his ancestral land of more than 100 hectares, but that he would first have to raise US$1,000 to pay the land registry for title deeds.

Uncertainty about land titles and the involvement of Congolese and foreign armed groups are just some of the problems local farmers will face if they decide to take Makelele’s advice.  Planting coffee is a long-term investment, prices have been volatile and the market is not as reliable as that for food crops.

Nevertheless, the crop has paid off for neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda, which have increased their production in recent years. The crop is Uganda’s single most important export, and coffee and tea together account for nearly half of Rwanda’s exports.

The recent history of coffee prices could also deter would-be planters: The New York market price for mild arabica, currently slightly above the inflation-adjusted average for the past decade, has fluctuated by more than 300 percent since 2003, and has trended downwards since the late 1970s.

But coffee’s promoters argue that increasing demand in middle-income countries, plus the possibility that climate change could lead to the spread of diseases in coffee plants, point to higher prices in future - and bright prospects for Kivu coffee.

Additionally, the temperate climate in the Kivu region’s hills is thought to be protection against coffee rust, the most devastating disease affecting arabica. Partly for this reason, World Coffee Research describes the area as “a paradise for coffee”.

This optimism has helped to persuade several NGOs - including Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Oxfam, the Eastern Congo Initiative and the Fairtrade organization Twin - to launch coffee projects in the Kivu provinces.

Twin has helped a South Kivu co-operative, Sopacdi, replant coffee and improve yields, quality and post-harvest processing, enabling its 3,500 members to become the first producers in Kivu to achieve organic and Fairtrade certification.

Income potential

Sopacdi has publicized the job opportunities it has provided to ex-combatants. A number of them work at a mechanized washing centre - paid for by Twin and employing 161 people - where the coffee berries are depulped and dried.

One of the staff at the washing centre, former rebel Habamungu Engavashapa, told IRIN he was happy with civilian life because he was able to spend nights in a house rather than in the forest.

Another ex-combatant, Abdul Mahagi, said Sopacdi had trained him as a machinist and given him a contract; he said he was beginning to see a way to organize his life.

Other workers at the washing centre, however, complained that their salaries, about $60 a month, were barely enough to live on.

The main opportunities that coffee co-operatives are likely to provide for ex-combatants in the short term would be to clear land and plant seedlings.

CPNCK has been employing 50 ex-combatants on these tasks at a rate of $1 a day, much less than they would earn in artisanal mining, but not insignificant in most of the villages, says Jean-Baptiste Musbyimana, an agricultural journalist based in Goma.

The returns could be more enticing for ex-combatants and smallholder farmers who are able to grow coffee for themselves.

For information on the profitability of coffee versus that of alternative crops, IRIN consulted Franck Muke, an agronomist who has studied coffee production in DRC and in Brazil; Xavier Phemba, CRS’s agricultural project co-ordinator in Goma; and Sandra Kavira, an agronomist working for the International Fertilizer Development Centre.

Their data suggest returns from a hectare of 2,500 coffee trees could be two to three times as high as the returns from a hectare of maize or beans, assuming an absence of mineral fertilizers and only limited use of organic fertilizers.

Jean-Baptiste Musabyimana, of the Federation of Agricultural Producer Organizations of Congo (FOPAC), which does not promote coffee, said coffee is regarded as having several advantages over other crops, including the potential for intercropping with bananas, beans or legumes, which provide organic waste and additional profits from the same acreage.

Once the trees have been planted, coffee also requires less labour than annual crops and is less likely to be stolen.

"Armed groups won't cut off the berries and eat them," coffee plantation owner Eric Kulage told IRIN. "And the workers don't want the berries either, whereas when they are harvesting maize they always solicit some bags."

Coffee’s major disadvantage is the cost of planting and the fact that the trees cannot be harvested for the first three years and do not reach their full potential for five to eight years. Muke estimated costs of planting 2,500 trees per hectare, and pruning for three non-productive years, at $850 to $950. These costs, and the risks involved, limit the acreage farmers will be willing to devote to the crop.

Helping DRC compete

A significant limitation to DRC’s coffee industry is the lack of mechanized washing stations, which cut down on waste and help maintain product consistency. Washing stations are the norm in Uganda and Rwanda, but there are hardly any in Kivu, where producers depulp the berries by hand or sell the wet berries to merchants from Uganda and Rwanda.

Aid agencies are planning to install several washing stations at sites close to large population centres and to Lake Kivu. But Muke says this could be a mistake, as the lakeside areas have higher humidity, which is thought to promote coffee rust.

There could be social advantages to promoting a perennial crop in areas further from Lake Kivu, like Kalonge Pinga and Mweso, where many young men see joining an armed group as their most viable livelihood option.

“If they have a perennial crop to look after, they will want to settle down,” suggested CPNCK’s Makelele.

But a major obstacle to promoting agriculture in areas where militias recruit is, of course, insecurity. Although armed groups are unlikely to steal coffee berries, they might try to steal bulk loads of dried coffee from washing stations.

Plantation owner Kulage commented that, in his experience, armed groups had not succeeded in stealing and marketing large coffee harvests in recent years. He suggested that security forces might be deployed to protect washing stations during the limited periods when bulk loads of dried coffee are left there.

Oxfam’s co-ordinator for North Kivu, Tariq Riebl, doubted whether any donor would accept the risk of building a washing station in a place like Kalonge. He noted that 90,000 seedlings had recently been stolen from a CPNCK nursery near Kalonge.

“If you mention that to donors, they won’t want to hear anything more,” he said.

But Makelele argues that the theft was not a problem because the co-op was going to give the seedlings away anyway.

“I am very happy about it,” he told IRIN. “It shows that people want to plant coffee.”

nl/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97998/Trading-conflict-for-coffee-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081446130806t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Is more force in the DRC more of the same?</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081532470009t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters. 

The deployment of this “international brigade” made up of troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania will complement the existing UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and is designed to help quell M23 [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] and other rebel militias. 

When an intervention force was first mooted by the African Union (AU) last year, Sivuyile Bam, AU head of Peace and Support Operations Division (PSOD), told IRIN the plan was to “deal specifically with M23, and when M23 go away, they [the intervention force] go away”. That has since evolved into preventing the expansion of all armed groups, and neutralizing and disarming them by deploying an “offensive” military force, said a UN Security Council resolution [ http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10964.doc.htm ].

Pretoria-based think tank the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) [ http://issafrica.org/ ] estimates there are more than 33 armed groups currently operating in eastern DRC. They are variously involved in mineral extraction and self-defence through to acting as proxies for the strategic interests of neighbouring states. 

The intervention force, known as SADCBrig (Southern African Development Community Brigade), will “carry out targeted offensive operations… either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC [DRC national army], in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law,” says UN resolution 2098 [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098%282013%29 ].

It will consist “inter alia of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company with headquarters in Goma,” the UN resolution adds. 

Since the first deployment of “blue helmets” to the DRC in 1999, first as the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and then as MONUSCO, troop numbers have increased more than three-fold from the original 5,000-odd uniformed soldiers. There have been supplementary ad hoc military missions, such as the 2003 European Union (EU) military intervention in Bunia during the Ituri ethnic-based conflict dubbed Operation Artemis [ http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/book1/book%20vol1_part2_chapter12_operation%20artemis%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo_kees%20homan.pdf ], and the 2009 operations Umoja Wetu (Our Unity) and Kimia II, a joint military offensive of DRC and Rwandan security forces against the armed group Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération de Rwanda (FDLR). 

A military analyst serving with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), who declined to be identified, said the Security Council resolution was “a massive expansion of the task” first envisaged by the AU, but the mandate had to be “wider than M23” if the ambition was to protect civilians. 

Zuma doctrine 

The analyst told IRIN the intervention force was expected “to have initial capability by end of May and operational capability by end of June [2013]”. 

The deployment of South African troops in CAR and their participation in SADCBrig is being viewed by analysts as a departure from South Africa’s previous military ventures, with a more aggressive stance towards resolving the continent’s conflicts. It has been dubbed the [President Jacob] Zuma doctrine by analysts. 

South African Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane told a media briefing on 29 April 2013 her country was in favour of “preventative diplomacy, intervening when there are situations of strife. When we are called upon to do that, we will always be there, we will never say no.” 

In a statement adjoining the UN resolution, Rwanda’s Eugene-Richard Gasana hoped the force would tackle the “FDLR, which had sparked the 1994 [Rwandan] genocide”. Rwanda, which is suspected of supporting M23, sees it as a bulwark against the FDLR. 

The military analyst said MONUSCO had been “hesitant” to use force beyond self-defence - something for which the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation was roundly condemned when M23 walked into Goma unopposed, despite the presence of more than 1,500 armed peacekeepers in the town and nearly 6,000 in North Kivu Province. 

Ahead of the deployment of SADCBrig, and in the wake of 13 South African soldiers having been killed recently in the Central African Republic trying to prevent the rebel coup by the Séléka alliance, M23 taunted SANDF on social media saying it was “corrupt” and “old” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94597/Analysis-South-Africa-paper-tiger-of-African-peacekeeping-operations ].

Critiques 

Meanwhile, some doubt the new force can achieve its objective. 

“Armed (DRC) groups are seen as a military threat but most of them are not. The military option against the armed groups has failed repeatedly and some [armed groups] deserve a small dose of military pressure but [also] a lot of police work in order to be neutralized. The intervention brigade in particular and the UN [MONUSCO] in general are not equipped for this,” International Crisis Group (ICG) [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/ ] analyst Thierry Vircoulon told IRIN. 

He said SADCBrig deployment was “security by substitution”, and would delay reforms of the DRC national army (FARDC), which has been accused of being a serial human rights abuser by rights organizations. SADCBrig’s more offensive posture would lead to “retaliations against civilians [by armed groups] and worsening of the humanitarian situation”, unless stringent measures were put in place to protect civilians in the areas of operation. 

Liam Mahony, author of a recent report commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) entitled Non-military strategies for civilian protection in the DRC [ http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/fv-publications/Non-military_protection_in_the_DRC.pdf ], said: “The international community continues to believe that military protection of civilians in the DRC may succeed, if there are only enough soldiers or a sufficiently strong mandate. 

“However, there is little if any empirical evidence for this. Faith in military solutions is exaggerated by the mistaken belief that violence can only be met with more violence… 

“The humanitarian service machinery has become a virtually permanent fixture in the region, serving victims of multiple displacements and repeating cycles of violence for two decades, while efforts to change the underlying dynamics of conflict have been insufficient and ineffective.” 

He told IRIN the approach by policymakers to armed groups in the DRC was “one size fits all… People tend to oversimplify or choose extreme interpretations of armed groups… People assume they are unreasonable and not open to negotiation and communication… This is not specific to DRC. It is true everywhere.” 

“I would not categorically dismiss the possibility that there may be armed groups with whom such approaches would fail, and there may be armed groups who would be more deterred from human rights abuse by an effective military counter-force. It is conceivable, but it must be the result of a very specific detailed analysis, not a generic knee-jerk approach.” 

Operational difficulties 

Andre Roux, author of a recent ISS briefing [ http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1605 ] on SADCBrig’s deployment, said: “The realities of conducting operations in this remote and complex environment have been underestimated in the rush to put solutions on the table.” 

Roux said the capabilities of SADCBrig “to effectively conduct `war fighting’ operations in an integrated manner, are questionable. With different operational doctrines, a variety of tactical deployment techniques and military equipment that is often not interoperable, the battalions can fight as individual units, but questions arise about whether they can or must fight as a cohesive brigade.” 

SANDF is expected to transfer its troops serving with MONUSCO to SADCBrig, which is supposed to operate in conjunction with FARDC, though past experiences of cooperation between SANDF and FARDC appear to have been problematical. “Members of the local army [FARDC] did not share information and they would steal anything without blinking an eye,” said a June 2012 ISS report on relations between the two [ http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=31642 ].

Roux noted that apart from the challenges of integrating military “tactics and doctrines”, there was also the risk of “a protracted counter-insurgency-type scenario characterized by atrocities in which entire villages are wiped out by rebel forces in order to divert the attention of the brigade into a defensive mind-set focused on the difficult task of protecting civilians rather than neutralizing illegal armed groups… 

“Is this again a peacekeeping band-aid that will struggle to meet the high expectations that do not consider the difficult realities of the situation?” he asks. 

go/cb 

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97999/Is-more-force-in-the-DRC-more-of-the-same</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081532470009t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Displaced still homeless after clashes in Baga, Nigeria</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061639020892t.jpg" />]]>BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.

An estimated 2,275 homes were destroyed in fires, and a further 125 severely damaged, according to satellite images released by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in a 1 May statement [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-destruction-deaths-military-raid ].

“Our major worry now is finding where to stay and rebuild our homes before rain sets in. Many of us are now squatting with relations and friends here in Baga and in neighbouring towns and villages,” Ibrahim Buba told IRIN in the courtyard of his gutted four-bedroom mud house in the Pampon Gaja-Gaja neigbourhood.

Heavy fighting broke out in Baga, on the shores of Lake Chad, between MNJTF and Boko Haram (BH) on 16 April, causing fire to break out and sweep through the neighbourhoods of Pampon Gaja-Gaja, Fulatari and Budumari. The Nigerian Red Cross estimated 187 people died in the fire and fighting, but the military dispute these figures, insisting only 37 people, including 30 Islamists, six civilians and a soldier, were killed.

Many residents accused soldiers of burning their homes, while military forces disputed the accusations, blaming BH.

The area is a BH stronghold and military officials have accused Borno State residents of harbouring BH members. According to HRW, BH has killed numerous Borno State residents, creating a climate of fear in the area.

“I lost my all that I worked for in life including my house, two cars, two motorcycles, and a grinding machine which is my major source of income,” said 62-year-old Adamu Ciroma. “What preoccupies me is how to rebuild my house to shelter my family of 18.”

Maina Maaji Lawan, a Borno State senator, told IRIN there is not enough emergency shelter to house all the displaced. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has set up temporary shelter for just over 600 of the displaced, according to a recent statement.

Borno State governor Kashim Shettima has ordered that the destroyed houses be rebuilt, according to spokesperson Isa Umar Gusau.

Many still in hiding

Most Baga residents rely on fishing and farming for their income. “We don’t even have seeds to plant because the seeds we saved have been gobbled by fire,” local smallholder Ba’ana Sharif told IRIN, as he stood in the midst of his burnt granary. The rainy season begins in May and extends into September in Nigeria’s semi-arid northeastern region.

NEMA and the Red Cross arrived in Baga eight days after the fire because they had to wait for security clearance from the military which claimed the area was too dangerous for aid workers to enter, according to Nigerian Red Cross national coordinator Umar Mairiga.

Many residents are still in the bush having fled their burning homes: They fear a resumption of violence between BH and the military, residents and aid officials said.

"Many people are still in hiding. Part of our work there is to build confidence. We need to show people that what we have now in Baga is assistance, not any more attacks," said NEMA spokesman Manzo Ezekiel.

Resident Abdullahi Gumel told IRIN on 30 April that he found two residents in the bush suffering from burns and thirst. They both died within 24 hours.

Brig-Gen Austin Edokpayi, head of MNJTF, blamed the mass exodus of residents on “warnings from BH Islamists to leave the town, as the terrorists were planning reprisals against the military for the casualties they suffered at the hands of the multi-national troops.”

HRW called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to probe the events in Baga as part of a preliminary investigation the court launched in 2010 on the situation in Nigeria. The ICC has indicated that crimes committed by BH may constitute crimes against humanity.  
On 23 April, President Goodluck Jonathan ordered a full-scale investigation into the events in Baga.

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061639020892t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Countering the radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth</title><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031222150686t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya's youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.

Youth unemployment is extremely high, as are levels of political disenchantment. An estimated 75 percent of out-of-school youths are unemployed, according to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) [ http://kenya.usaid.gov/programs/education-and-youth/51 ]. 

"The unemployment crisis is a ticking bomb. Over 60 percent of the population is under 25. You cannot ignore that," said Yusuf Hassan, the Member of Parliament for Nairobi’s Kamukunji Constituency, which has a large Muslim population. "A huge and significant population is restless. And the gap between the rich and poor is getting wider."

"When access to resources is based on ethnic, cultural or religious characteristics or there is a growing divide between the 'haves' and 'have nots' in countries and communities, economic conditions further contribute to instability," says a new report by the Institute for Security Studies in Africa (ISS) [ http://www.issafrica.org/assessing-the-vulnerability-of-kenyan-youths-to-radicalisation-and-extremism ]. "Countries confronted by large differences between 'haves' and 'have nots' are additionally vulnerable to conflict, which may include resorting to acts of terrorism."

Marginalized and radicalized

A string of grenade attacks - some allegedly by Somali Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabab or their sympathizers - have occurred in the Kenyan towns of Garissa, Mombasa and the capital, Nairobi, since Kenya began its military incursion in Somalia in October 2011 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94018/KENYA-SOMALIA-A-risky-intervention ].

But Islamic radicalization is not new to Kenya. Kenyans were involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and the Tanzania city of Dar es Salaam; the coordinated attacks, which killed more than 220 people, were Africa's first suicide bombings by Al-Qaeda's East Africa cell. In a 2002 dual car-bomb and suicide attack on a hotel and plane in Mombasa, at least one of the suspects was Kenyan.

Muslims make up an estimated 11 percent [ http://www.knbs.or.ke/docs/PresentationbyMinisterforPlanningrevised.pdf ] of Kenya’s population; large Muslim communities can be found in the country’s northeast and in the coastal region. Traditionally, Kenya’s Muslims are moderate, with the community peacefully seeking participation in politics. But ISS pointed to the historical political marginalization of Muslims - right from negotiations for Kenya’s independence, in which ethnic Somalis, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, were not represented - as a contributor to the radicalization of young people. 

“Although Kenya is a secular state, it is essentially a Christian country because of the dominant Christian population… There is the perception that Islam is ‘alien’, despite the fact that it came to Kenya before Christianity,” the report notes.

The report also found that some young Kenyan Muslims have been influenced by radical preaching, which leads them to believe that wars being fought against Muslims abroad - for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq - are part of “a global campaign against Islam”.

According to a 2011 report [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 ] by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, non-Somali Kenyan nationals constituted the largest and most organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabab.

Taking advantage of vulnerable youth 

"We've already seen the rumblings of 'Pwani si Kenya' [Coast is not Kenya, the slogan of a separatist group in Kenya’s Coast Province] [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrs ] - radicalized, marginalized, poverty-stricken young people are saying, ‘we don't belong to Kenya’," said Hassan, who was seriously injured in a 2012 grenade attack in his constituency. 

The ISS report found that Islamist militants were exploiting sub-standard socioeconomic conditions, and the government's inability to provide basic services, by positioning themselves as providers of assistance. "Creating or infiltrating bona fide charity organizations... is a sure way to win the general support of ordinary people," the report said. 

The report points to the growing influence of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), a Kenyan group whose objectives include promoting community health and social welfare, but which also advocates "an extreme interpretation of Islam and prepares members to travel to Somalia for 'jihad' [holy war], thus attracting the attention of security agencies in Kenya and abroad." According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544 ], Al-Shabab announced a merger with MYC in 2012.

Hassan Sheikh, a cleric in the northeastern town of Garissa, said extremist groups have taken control of many mosques and Islamic schools, setup orphanages, and employed teachers and imams.

"North Kenya is a hub for mercenaries. You can easily get [attract] them - it’s out of poverty,” said Khalif Aabdulla, a civil rights activist from Wajir, also northeastern Kenya.
NGOs and government officials in Kenya acknowledge an urgent need to develop a counter-radicalization policy to prevent young people from turning to violent groups, and some say Kenya’s newly elected government may be an opportunity to tackle the issue. NGOs say the government must do more than promote economic empowerment among marginalized communities; it must also foster a sense of belonging.

"There are some efforts to use the Council of Imams or Islamic Preachers' Association to talk to the youths," said Mwalimu Mati, CEO of governance watchdog Mars Group Kenya. "The moderates are trying to assist the government, but I can't say it's a complete success." 

Counter-productive counter-terrorism

"The problem is exacerbated by counter-terrorism programmes by the Kenya police who carry out mass raids rather than targeted arrests. It keeps the youths feeling repressed generally. They then identify that as oppression based on religion," Mati said. He says the problem is primarily in North Eastern District, Eastleigh and Coast Province. 

The ISS report describes the current approach as "collective punishment based on perceptions".

"Most perceptions are completely wrong, especially that Somali nationals are responsible for attacks in Kenya or that Kenya is an innocent bystander when acts of terrorism are committed on its soil," it stated. 

Following attacks in Nairobi, ethnic Somalis - both Kenyan and foreign nationals - said they experienced xenophobia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94090/KENYA-Xenophobia-fear-follow-Nairobi-blasts ] and lived in constant fear of arrest.

Under the government of former president Mwai Kibaki, both the Ministry for Peace-building and Conflict Management and the Ministry for Education told IRIN that they had no programmes to address radicalization.

The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport said they ran "empowerment programmes" in conjunction with the formal education system. But as Leah Rotitch, a director in the education ministry, said, "The people Al-Shabab target are normally young people who are out of school."

The persecution felt by ethnic Somalis and other Muslim communities has only increased [ http://www.kenya-today.com/news/kenyan-muslims-fear-the-worst-over-proposals-to-boost-police-powers ] in recent years, with police allegedly engaging in extrajudicial use of force and even killings of terror suspects; the police deny these claims.

"Since the passing of the new anti-terror bill, we have seen a huge spike in extrajudicial killings. And terrorism has become an easy label," said Horn of Africa analyst Abdullahi Halakhe. "Such efforts only succeed in alienating the local population, who usually have critical human intelligence. They are turning the Islamic radicalization of young people into a matter of national security, making those young people their enemies, thus making it worse."

The ISS report calls for "introspection on the part of the police officer stopping and searching a person because he looks Somali".

Reaching the young

Tom Mboya, who established the Inuka Kenya Trust in response to the role young people played in perpetrating the post-election violence of 2007-2008, says now is an opportunity to engage the youth. "They're what should be the engine of this country," he told IRIN.

"Devolution is positive," he says, referring to the process of decentralizing power from Nairobi [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97726/Briefing-Devolution-to-transform-Kenya ], which was set in motion by Kenya's new constitution. Mboya believes this process will create opportunities for young people. But, he says, "in parts of the country more prone to violent extremism, there needs to be policy in place. The leadership will have to be more alive to that problem".

A focus on young people formed a key part of new President Uhuru Kenyatta's election campaign - his government will now have to work out an acceptable and effective approach in tackling the issue of violent extremism. 

Mars Group's Mati says using moderate imams to neutralize potentially radical youths does not work because young people no longer regard them as credible. "It's a generation gap - control over youths has somehow become difficult. In the old days, what an imam said went. The radical preachers are young," he said.

Hadley Muchela, programmes manager for Kenyan rights group Independent Medico-legal Unit, says targeting violent extremism will require sensitivity because, thanks to the way the issue has been handled in the past, it is often seen as an indictment against all of Islam. "You find very few Kenyans willing to go into it," he said. 

Abdikadir Sheikh, who works with the Sustainable Support and Advocacy Programme, a local NGO, said the group has set up a pilot project to dissuade youth in the northeastern towns of Dadaab and Garissa from joining extremist groups. 

"We are very careful or [we could] lose our lives; you can’t confront radicalization directly - you need different approaches," he told IRIN. "We have established a strong team of more than 600 youths… some have so far joined colleges. We plan to work with the county governments.” 
The ISS report warns that "there is no quick fix for the level of radicalization seen in Kenya".

"The biggest threat to stability in Kenya will be if extremists succeed in dividing Kenya between Muslim and non-Muslim," the report said. 

jh/na/kr/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97982/Countering-the-radicalization-of-Kenya-apos-s-youth</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031222150686t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Conflict cuts off civilians in DRC&apos;s Katanga</title><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201010210751260211t.jpg" />]]>KATANGA 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of displaced people in the Democratic Republic of Congo&apos;s (DRC) Katanga Province have received little or no humanitarian aid in the months since having fled ongoing conflict.</description><body><![CDATA[KATANGA 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of displaced people in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) Katanga Province have received little or no humanitarian aid in the months since having fled ongoing conflict.

In one territory, Malemba Nkulu, the number of displaced is estimated to have risen from 12,000 to 42,000 between December 2012 and January 2013, and no food distribution has yet been organized. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) says, "The global acute malnutrition rate is above 19 percent, and the severely malnourished need treatment.”

"Nineteen percent global acute malnutrition is nearly twice the emergency threshold level," Quoc Nguyen, head of operations for the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Katanga, told IRIN, adding that seven territories in Katanga have acute malnutrition rates above the 10 percent level.

UNICEF is assisting children and pregnant and lactating women suffering from acute malnutrition in several territories, including Pweto and Manono, where the rate is also above 19 percent; however this treatment is still not available in Malemba Nkulu. "There's no programme in Malemba Nkulu because of lack of funding, lack of access, insecurity and a lack of partners who can implement a programme," said Nguyen.

Malnutrition is a major contributor to the under-five mortality rate in the province, which UNICEF's latest survey put at 188 per 1,000. In its 16 April bulletin for DRC, OCHA said that in Malemba Nkulu "no humanitarian intervention has been implemented mainly because of difficulties of access and lack of funding".

Displaced people in the neighbouring territory of Manono - recently estimated to number 31,000 - have not had a food distribution since September, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) told IRIN this week, although a convoy of food trucks has just been sent there. WFP has distributed food in the past month at or near most of the other major population centres in Katanga where large numbers of displaced people have gathered.

But of 17,000 people who were displaced this year in the territories of Kalemie, Moba and Manono, most have not yet received any aid, nor have the 747 families living on the route from Mitwaba to Kisele, OCHA reported on 23 April.

Continued displacement

The total number of displaced in Katanga is estimated by the Commission on Population Movements (CMP) - an official body which collects data from aid workers - to have risen from 64,082 in December 2011 to 353,931 currently. 

"Needs are… enormous both among the displaced and the host population," OCHA said in a report published on April 10 [ http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo%E2%80%99s-neglected-%E2%80%9Ctriangle-death%E2%80%9D-challenges-protection ]. "Many IDPs have become more vulnerable due to repeated displacements, often across vast distances."

An upsurge in violence by Mai-Mai militia groups has been causing waves of displacement since late 2011. WFP's head of operations in Katanga, Amadou Samake, said the so-called 'triangle of death' between Mitwaba, Manono and Pweto had been emptied of most of its population - 75,000 households - by April 2012. By the end of last year, the displaced already numbered more than 300,000. 

The flow outwards from conflict zones has continued, and Mai-Mai violence has spread west and south, to Malemba Nkulu, Lubudi and Kambove territories.

On 17 February, a gang from the newly created Mai-Mai militia known as Kata Katanga (meaning 'cut off Katanga') killed three officials and drove out the population at Kinsevere, only 40km from Lubumbashi, the provincial capital. 

On 23 March, some 400 lightly armed Kata Katanga members marched from the bush to the centre of Lubumbashi, unopposed, before they were forced to surrender after a shootout with the elite Republican Guard. 

Amid the persistent insecurity, fewer than the 10 percent of the displaced have returned to their villages, Samake estimates. 

WFP assisted 250,000 people in Katanga last year, he said, but has not had the resources to guarantee the displaced three months of rations, the standard the agency aims for in North Kivu. Currently, he said, the agency has 5,915 tons in stock or en route and would need an additional 10,383 tons to feed 320,000 displaced people in Katanga through the second quarter of 2013.

If the displaced do not soon return to their villages, Samake added, another year of missed harvests will worsen food security across the province. 

UNICEF's Nguyen commented that much of Katanga was already in the grip of a food security crisis before the Mai-Mai’s resurgence in 2011. "There is a lack of basic services in every sector - health, water, nutrition and agriculture - and the conflict and displacement make an already bad situation much worse," he said.

Deteriorating security

OCHA reports the security situation worsened in April in Pweto, Manono and Mitwaba territories, with attacks by Mai-Mai groups on a dozen villages. 

The national army, FARDC, recently retook the town of Shamwana, at the centre of 'the triangle of death', but International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Thierry Vircoulon says the military seems to be having little success in suppressing the Mai-Mai. At the start of 2013, the army had only 1,000 men available in Katanga, but their number is now up to 2,500, UN sources told IRIN. 

Central Katanga has been unstable since Mai-Mai commander Gedeon Mtanga escaped from prison in September 2011. He and more than 1,000 of his followers were freed from Lubumbashi's central jail by eight armed men in broad daylight; there was speculation that the jail break was arranged by local power holders. Gedeon had led a Mai-Mai group known for its brutality and attacks on civilians from 2002 to 2007. Africa Confidential reported on 1 March that "his ambition is to root out the old order" and "his men have killed at least 15 traditional chiefs in Nord Mitwaba alone".

According to OCHA, the other main driver of instability in the province is Kata Katanga, which has also been fighting FARDC.

Like the brutal Mai-Mai group Morgan [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97314/Rainforest-riches-a-curse-for-civilians-in-northeast-DRC ], in DRC's Orientale Province, the Kata Katanga and Gedeon Mai-Mai seem to get much of their income from poaching, rather than minerals or agriculture. Therefore, they may not need much support from the local population.

There are no recent figures for the Mai-Mai in Katanga, but ICG estimated they might have numbered 5,000 to 8,000 in 2005 [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/103-katanga-the-congos-forgotten-crisis.aspx?alt_lang=fr ].

Following the bloody suppression of a Kata Katanga rally in Lubumbashi on 23 March, a report by local civil society activists accused senior members of the regime of providing the group with arms and funding. 

ICG's Vircoulon told IRIN he believes that several local “barons” are behind the Kata Katanga. 

The DRC's former police chief General John Numbi - a native of Malemba Nkulu who built his career as a political organizer among the Balubakat, President Joseph Kabila's ethnic group - may have held the key to security in the province. ICG reports that Numbi was supplying Gedeon with arms from 2002 to 2004. Later, he organized the manhunt that led to the Mai-Mai leader's capture. 

In 2010, Numbi was suspended as police chief following allegations that he was responsible for the murder of human rights defender Floribert Chebeya. 

Significantly, Gedeon and many of his followers were captured in 2007, after Kabila had won elections with support from a broad coalition in Katanga and elsewhere in the country. That coalition is now crumbling, allowing armed groups to be reactivated in many areas of eastern DRC. 

Protection needs

An April report [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Final%20version%20Protection%20Report%20Katanga%2011.04.pdf ] by OCHA in Katanga concludes: "Given the duration of the current conflict, humanitarian actors do not expect to see any improvements in terms of displacement numbers or humanitarian needs in the coming months."

The report highlights alleged abuses by the army as well the Mai-Mai, including allegations that 50 women and 20 girls were detained for two days and repeatedly raped by soldiers in February 2012. 

"Without an increased presence" of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), says OCHA, "such abuses will continue and may even increase, as will further displacements". 

Currently there are 450 blue helmets in Katanga, an area the size of France.

The report also calls for a political solution to the conflict in Katanga, for the government to reinitiate its programme to disarm, demobilize and re-integrate the Mai-Mai, and for humanitarian actors to establish contact with Mai-Mai groups so as to facilitate humanitarian access and sensitize the combatants on international humanitarian law.

nl/kr/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97963/Conflict-cuts-off-civilians-in-DRC-apos-s-Katanga</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201010210751260211t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KATANGA 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of displaced people in the Democratic Republic of Congo&apos;s (DRC) Katanga Province have received little or no humanitarian aid in the months since having fled ongoing conflict.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In Brief: Raids free enslaved migrants/refugees in Yemen</title><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201111081458460657t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - The army in Yemen has started a crackdown on illegal smuggling hideouts in the north where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa are frequently held against their will and tortured by criminal gangs looking for ransom money.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - The army in Yemen has started a crackdown on illegal smuggling hideouts in the north where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa are frequently held against their will and tortured by criminal gangs looking for ransom money.

In the last four weeks, 1,620 migrants, including women and children, have been freed in army raids around the northern town of Haradh close to the border with Saudi Arabia, according to information from the International medical NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) [ http://www.msf.org/article/yemen-msf-assists-migrants-freed-clutches-human-traffickers ]. It says most of the released migrants it treated at the MSF-run Al-Mazraq hospital had been victims of human trafficking, forced labour and slavery.

“There are clear signs of extreme violence. Fingernails have been pulled out and many are badly beaten. We welcome this clampdown, but there are almost certainly thousands more migrants in captivity, and for those released, welcome centres and humanitarian NGOs are seriously overstretched,” Tarek Daher, MSF’s head of mission in Yemen, told IRIN.

Migrants recently told IRIN horrific stories [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97826/Migrant-voices-Ethiopians-in-Yemen-describe-kidnapping-and-torture ] of the kidnapping and torture they had experienced after landing in Yemen. Around a 107,000 crossed from the Horn of Africa into Yemen in 2012, most originally from Ethiopia, according to UNHCR [ http://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/arrivals-yemen-2010-2013-31-january-2013 ], and at least 30,000 have made the journey so far this year [ http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/over-30000-refugees-and-migrants-arrive-yemen-so-far-year ].

See previous IRIN reporting on migration in Yemen here:

Migrant voices - Ethiopians in Yemen describe kidnapping and torture
[ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97826/Migrant-voices-Ethiopians-in-Yemen-describe-kidnapping-and-torture ]

DJIBOUTI-ETHIOPIA: Irregular migration continues unabated
[ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97097/DJIBOUTI-ETHIOPIA-Irregular-migration-continues-unabated ]

ETHIOPIA-YEMEN: Jemmal Ahmed, “I survived a deadly trip to Yemen"
[ http://www.irinnews.org/HOV/97104/ETHIOPIA-YEMEN-Jemmal-Ahmed-I-survived-a-deadly-trip-to-Yemen ]

YEMEN: Tortured for ransom
[ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95051/YEMEN-Tortured-for-ransom ]

jj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97961/In-Brief-Raids-free-enslaved-migrants-refugees-in-Yemen</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201111081458460657t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - The army in Yemen has started a crackdown on illegal smuggling hideouts in the north where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa are frequently held against their will and tortured by criminal gangs looking for ransom money.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>From aid restrictions to access challenges</title><pubDate>Wed, 01 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304261033290092t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 01 May 2013 (IRIN) - Aid work in Iraq has always had a bumpy ride, from the restrictions imposed under former president Saddam Hussein to the corruption associated with the Oil-for-Food Programme. But it has arguably never been as challenging as in the last decade, when violence and insecurity made access to much of the country nearly impossible.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 01 May 2013 (IRIN) - Aid work in Iraq has always had a bumpy ride, from the restrictions imposed under former president Saddam Hussein to the corruption associated with the Oil-for-Food Programme. But it has arguably never been as challenging as in the last decade. 

Aid work was tightly controlled under Hussein’s rule, according to Yaseen Ahmed Abbas, president of the Iraq Red Crescent Society. “The Society was managed by the government - completely,” he told IRIN. “We have much more freedom now. You can’t compare.” 

But aid work in the post-2003 era takes place in a more “dangerous and volatile operating environment”, according to the UN [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/389/WHD%20Factsheet%20English.pdf ].

Dangers limit access 

Just a few months after the US-led invasion in 2003, a truck bomb targeting UN headquarters in the capital, Baghdad, killed 22 UN staff, including the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Iraq, Sérgio Vieira de Mello.

Between 2003 and 2007, an estimated 94 aid workers in the country died and 248 were injured. 

In response, aid agencies largely managed their operations remotely from Jordan, at a cost to the quality of the services, aid workers say [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/85756/IRAQ-Remote-control-aid ].

Aid throughout the past decade “was mainly limited to the provision of supplies and training from abroad, without direct population contact and the ability to provide prompt and targeted adjustment to the support,” Gustavo Fernandez, who headed Médecins sans Frontières’s mission in Iraq from 2008 to 2010, wrote in a recent article in the Lancet [ http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2813%2960664-9/fulltext#aff1 ].

Since 2009, security has improved, but aid workers are still exposed to considerable risk, the UN says. In January 2010, for example, a bomb devastated a hotel in Baghdad containing the offices of the International Rescue Committee, injuring staff and destroying assets. 

Hazards for local aid workers 

Local aid workers also face challenges operating in the high-security context of Iraq. For example, it can take an hour and a half every morning for Iraqis working with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in Baghdad to get past all the checkpoints and into the fortified Green Zone, where the US embassy is located.

And many Iraqis continue to hide their employment with USAID or the UN from neighbours, friends and even family to protect themselves in case widespread violence resumes. 

Mohamed*, a UN driver, told IRIN he leaves his house before 6am so that no one sees where he is headed. He lies to friends about his employer and only his family knows the truth. 

“You never know how things will change here. It could go back to how it was before. Working with the UN is perceived as working with the US.” 

While the dangers of association have diminished in recent years (USAID has doubled the number of local staff it employs), many local aid workers still refuse to travel to field sites in UN vehicles, preferring to arrive in their personal vehicles, and choose to wear UN-marked clothing only under specific circumstances. 

“Humanitarian aid workers in Iraq live with the daily fear of being targeted by militias,” the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs wrote in a 2010 fact-sheet [ http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/389/WHD%20Factsheet%20English.pdf ]. “Lack of access to beneficiaries, corruption, underfunding and poor information on humanitarian needs are just some of the other problems faced by aid workers on a daily basis.” 

*not a real name 

ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 01 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97952/From-aid-restrictions-to-access-challenges</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304261033290092t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 01 May 2013 (IRIN) - Aid work in Iraq has always had a bumpy ride, from the restrictions imposed under former president Saddam Hussein to the corruption associated with the Oil-for-Food Programme. But it has arguably never been as challenging as in the last decade, when violence and insecurity made access to much of the country nearly impossible.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>More freedom but less security?</title><pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201212181454160527t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - After a decade of sanctions, Iraq’s GDP has been growing consistently since 2003, and poverty rates have more than halved since 1990. But observers say billions of dollars in oil revenues have not translated into adequate gains in Iraqi well-being.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - US officials and others argue former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was a “clear danger” to the Iraqi people and to the region, pointing to the two wars he instigated in the 1980s and 1990s, the execution of his political opponents and the atrocities he committed against his own people. In an editorial this month in the Washington Post, Paul Wolfowitz argued [ http://www.aawsat.net/2013/04/article55298231 ] Hussein’s removal by US-led forces saved many lives and prevented the completion of a “genocide”.

For Kurds in the north, who were victims of severe violations of human rights under Hussein’s rule, the invasion has brought a new sense of security. But for many others in the country, the opposite is true.

More than 111,000 Iraqis have been killed since 2003, according to the tracking group Iraq Body Count [ http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ ]; most of these deaths occurred in 2006-2007, the worst period of sectarian violence in the last 10 years. Security improved in subsequent years - from nearly 30,000 civilian deaths in 2006 to fewer than 10,000 in 2008, and fewer than 5,000 in 2009. In the years following, it stabilized at around 4,000 civilian deaths per year.

In 2011, nearly three-quarters of the population perceived themselves to be secure or very secure, according to the Iraq Knowledge Network survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1677/IKN_Introduction_en.pdf ].

However, civilian deaths increased [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94677/IRAQ-People-consider-fleeing-as-violence-increases ] by about 10 percent in 2012, after the withdrawal of American forces. Established insurgent groups, like al-Qaeda in Iraq, have been regaining strength, and new ones, like the Free Iraqi Army, have emerged. Anbar Province, the epicentre of the Sunni insurgency in 2007-2009, has become restive once more.

Sectarianism increasing

Under Hussein, power was concentrated in the hands of Sunni partisans; the end of Hussein’s rule brought new opportunities to the long-marginalized Shia majority. But as Shiites have risen to power, sectarianism has become a major feature of Iraqi politics.

This is due, in part, to the decades of repressive policies seen under Hussein, but analysts also point a finger at US policies, which created a political system based on the repartition of power among three main groups: the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. The US also sought to purge the government of members of Hussein’s Baath party, which many Sunnis saw as a move to alienate them.

“At his most vulnerable position, Saddam Hussein used sectarianism and nationalism as weapons against his internal enemies,” the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) wrote in a recent briefing on the risk of a renewed breakout of large-scale violence [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/20130415_Thematic_Anbar_Province_Final.pdf ]. “Today’s Iraqi Shiite parties and government appear to be doing far worse as governmental rule is justified on a sectarian basis.”

This sectarianism has inspired many of the suicide bombings, kidnappings and terrorist attacks [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95999/Briefing-Why-is-Iraq-still-so-dangerous ] that have affected civilians in the past 10 years. According to CFC, “There is a legitimate, growing fear of civil conflict due to unaddressed grievances in Anbar and other Sunni-majority provinces.”

More freedoms

Despite the insecurity, some point to a new level of freedom, including increased personal rights, improved access to legal services and democratic structures in government.

“It’s not just about access to basic services. People have other aspirations [now],” says Sudipto Mukerjee, deputy head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). “The whole issue of equal opportunities, access to decent jobs and [having a] voice is coming up much more strongly than ever before.”

But this, too, is a mixed blessing, countered by what many observers call a dysfunctional parliament and corrupt cabinet.

“Now, we can write whatever we want,” says journalist Safa Muhammed. “We are not afraid of saying anything or criticizing anyone. We have that freedom, but it’s useless. No matter how much you write, no one [in government] is listening or willing to make changes.”

For other development indicators, visit IRIN's series Iraq 10 years on [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-ten-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact ].

af/da/ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97937/More-freedom-but-less-security</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201212181454160527t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - After a decade of sanctions, Iraq’s GDP has been growing consistently since 2003, and poverty rates have more than halved since 1990. But observers say billions of dollars in oil revenues have not translated into adequate gains in Iraqi well-being.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boko Haram threat chokes trade with Cameroon</title><pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304291759290784t.jpg" />]]>YAOUNDE 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Tighter security in Cameroon’s Far North Region due to the widening threat posed by Nigeria-based radical Islamist militia Boko Haram is stifling cross-border trade, hurting livelihoods and raising fear among civilians.</description><body><![CDATA[YAOUNDE 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Tighter security in Cameroon’s Far North Region due to the widening threat posed by Nigeria-based radical Islamist militia Boko Haram is stifling cross-border trade, hurting livelihoods and raising fear among civilians.

Cameroon has stepped up security over the Boko Haram (BH) threat. In November 2011, Nigeria shut its border with Cameroon, prompting Yaoundé to bolster security [ http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/briefings/Boko%20Haram%20in%20Cameroon.pdf ] in the largely Muslim Far North Region, close dozens of Koranic schools and hand over suspected BH members to Nigeria, which reopened the border in 2012.

Despite the intensified security, suspected BH militants on 19 February abducted [ http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/19/us-cameroon-kidnapping-idUSBRE93I0I820130419 ] seven French tourists, including four children, from a national park in the Far North Region, freeing them two months later. 

Cross-border trade sustains the local economy in the Far North Region which sells onions, rice, maize, livestock and other agricultural goods to Nigeria, and imports sugar, cement, textile and electronics.

“Tight border security and checks are making business impossible for some of us. This was worsened by the kidnapping of [the French] tourists. Today all the goods must be checked before entry, and taxes are so high,” said Doudou Yaouba, a trader in Maroua, the regional capital.

Yaouba, who exports groundnuts to Nigeria’s Borno State and returns with sugar and textiles, said he was thinking of starting another business due to the security restrictions.

The region also depends on inferior quality petrol locally known as `zua-zua’ which is smuggled in from Nigeria. Strict border controls have caused its price to rise.

“There are so many border checkpoints and it is very difficult for `zua-zua’ suppliers to get through. Petrol now sells at 600 [CFA] francs a litre compared to 400 francs before the crisis,” said Joel Alim, a petrol trader in Maroua.

Fertilizer imports have also ceased after the Nigerian authorities banned production and distribution over fears that BH was using fertilizer to make bombs, Mahamat Abakar, an official at Cameroon’s Ministry of External Relations, told IRIN. 

The cross-border cattle trade has also taken a hit owing to the tightened security. “More than 1,000 cattle are traded into Nigeria weekly from Cameroon but the movement of herds has been very slow and is even blocked at certain points by Nigerian security,” said Maroua cattle trader Ousmanou Mamadou.

“Less than half the normal cattle supply into Nigeria is possible, and only through very difficult terrain. Recently more than 800 cattle were blocked from crossing the Nigerian border in Kotokol,” he added.

Abakar said the government had to negotiate the reopening of the border following pleas by locals.

“People living near the border requested the Cameroon government to intervene in the decision by Nigeria to close the border because they were facing a very severe impact from the closure,” said Abakar.

“The border was reopened in February 2012 after negotiations with Nigeria. Cameroon assured Nigeria that its own side of the border is secure after 600 soldiers were deployed to the region.”

Cameroon wary

Cameroonian authorities are wary of BH’s infiltration into local communities and mosques. There are cultural and religious similarities between Cameroon’s Far North Region and neighbouring northeastern Nigeria. One of the worst explosions of religious violence [ https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/africa_today/v057/57.4.adesoji.html ] in northern Nigeria in the 1980s was triggered by a Cameroonian religious scholar, Mohammed Marwa, who led the “Maitatsine” movement.

Cameroon’s north and Nigeria’s north share similar deep-seated Muslim political grievances and BH’s ideology could trigger political problems in Cameroon, say some analysts. 

“Cameroon should worry about BH. We have a civilized Islamic practice in Cameroon. However, we are not sure that we won’t have radicals one day. BH’s fight is due to the economic and political context of northern Nigeria, with disputes over the equal sharing of national resources. Cameroon finds itself in a similar context and so measures must be taken,” said Alain Didier Olinga, political analyst and lecturer in international law at the International Relations Institute of Cameroon.

“The government’s strategy to dissuade BH is basically military, but governments must understand that the absence of true knowledge of what Islam is can only encourage Islamism,” Olinga said.

Despite the deployment of troops to the northern region, it is not easy to police the 1,690km border with Nigeria. 

“The borders are vast and to ensure full security along the whole territory is practically impossible. Checkpoints are mounted at cross-border routes and patrols are being enforced around the regions, most especially on Waza National Park where the French family was kidnapped,” a senior Defence Ministry official told IRIN on condition of anonymity.

Abakar from Cameroon’s External Relations Ministry said the government was also closely monitoring suspected BH militants, Koranic schools, preachers and sermons in mosques as well as collaborating with religious leaders.

Hayatou Muhamadou, head of Islamic studies at Yaoundé Central Mosque, said: “We don’t permit unidentified preachers in mosques and the Islamic community in Cameroon has been strongly warned against such practices… What we cannot guarantee is avoiding unknown worshippers in our local mosques. It is difficult to point out extremists in worship.”

For some residents of Cameroon’s Far North Region, the troop deployments and increased security measures seem to be causing more fear than BH: “This period is very difficult for us. Our fear is not exactly BH, but the soldiers’ presence. Everyone here is presumed to be suspect by the soldiers,” said a local resident who gave his name only as Yousouf, adding: “But we have been collaborating with the security forces by giving information and reporting suspected persons.”

mn/ob/cb

 ]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97942/Boko-Haram-threat-chokes-trade-with-Cameroon</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304291759290784t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">YAOUNDE 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Tighter security in Cameroon’s Far North Region due to the widening threat posed by Nigeria-based radical Islamist militia Boko Haram is stifling cross-border trade, hurting livelihoods and raising fear among civilians.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Engaging with Philippine armed groups</title><pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304231114010299t.jpg" />]]>COTABATO 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - For Chris Rush, of the Swiss-based NGO Geneva Call, nuance is everything when engaging with armed groups. Although the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Maoist-inspired New People&apos;s Army (NPA) are both fighting insurrections on the same Philippines island of Mindanao, the choice of terminology is a tender issue when it comes to the use of such phrases as &quot;armed non-state actors (ANSAs)”.</description><body><![CDATA[COTABATO 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - For Chris Rush, of the Swiss-based NGO Geneva Call, nuance is everything when engaging with armed groups. Although the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Maoist-inspired New People's Army (NPA) are both fighting insurrections on the same Philippines’ island of Mindanao, the choice of terminology is a tender issue when it comes to the use of such phrases as "armed non-state actors (ANSAs)”. 

"The Maoists reject the word ‘ANSA’ as they see themselves having attained a situation of dual power and of having established a revolutionary government… while the MILF are more positive about the term, as they feel it provides some sort of political acknowledgement," Rush, the senior programme officer for the Philippines, told IRIN. 

The Moro, the island’s indigenous Islamic population, have fought for independence in their Mindanao ancestral homeland for about 40 years in various guises, and are on the cusp of reaching an agreement with the Philippines government for a semi-autonomous state, to be known as Bangsamoro, that could end one of the country’s longest-running conflicts. 

Rush has engaged with the MILF and its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) and other stakeholders for the past six years to provide a mechanism for the MILF-BIAF to support humanitarian laws. Armed groups are automatically excluded from signing international treaties prescribing humanitarian norms. 

There is a genuine affability between Rush and the MILF when they meet at Camp Darapanan near Cotabato on Mindanao, where the archipelago’s largest armed group has about 12,000 combatants in more than 20 heavily guarded command bases. Talks with MILF chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and other officials range beyond the armed group's commitment not to use anti-personnel mines to issues touching the prospective peace agreement. 

High aims 

Geneva Call's engagements with armed groups have strategic, long-term objectives relating to policy and practice, rather than focusing on more immediate problems like securing access to assist vulnerable populations, as is the case with many humanitarian actors. Rush said the importance of dealing with the same personalities consistently "cannot be overstated... but saying that there is only one right way to approach an armed group I would avoid, as it depends on what you are seeking to achieve." 

A document by Geneva Call to provide a format for armed groups to subscribe to humanitarian norms was first devised for anti-personnel mine usage. The MILF signed the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action in 2000, during an upsurge in the conflict [ http://www.genevacall.org/resources/deed-of-commitment/f-deed-of-commitment/doc.pdf ].

Much of the nationalist struggle took place in the Bangsamoro homeland. Because landmines harm indiscriminately and remain lethal after peace agreements are signed, the MILF-BIAF favoured a ban on anti-personnel mines, but prior to the Deed of Commitment there were no available mechanisms to formalise it, Rush said. 

In many respects the Deed mirrors the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) [ http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaty ], a state protocol ending the use of anti-personnel mines and requiring the destruction of weapons stockpiles, which entered into force in 1999. The Philippines government was among the MBT's first signatories [ http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties ].

A progress report on a 2012 Framework Peace Agreement between the MILF and the government, and its stance against the use of anti-personnel mines, was presented at two recent BIAF rallies. Rush was a guest speaker and drove home the point that " [anti-personnel] landmines are an issue of conflict, but also of peace". 

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Coalition Against the Use of Child Soldiers, and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), among others, had also approached the MILF about International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights law, and adhering to international humanitarian norms in their conduct of war. 

Geneva Call was introduced to the MILF by the Philippines Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL), the local branch of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). 

Geneva Call has developed two more Deeds of Commitment for armed groups - one for the protection of children from armed conflict, another covering the respect and rights of women - and is commencing negotiations for adoption of the latter by the MILF. “We are fighting for the cause of self-determination... you have to conform to international standards," Murad Ebrahim told IRIN. 

Humanitarian norms 

Jesus Domingo, of the government's foreign affairs department, told IRIN he became involved in the MILF commitment not to use anti-personnel mines through the department’s work in humanitarian affairs and disarmament in 2007. "The process was very much between MI [a shorthand for MILF] and Geneva Call, but we encouraged it and applauded it, as we welcome armed non-state actors embracing IHL and other international norms." 

The government assented and then stood back. "We respected their [Geneva Call’s] independence... and for them to be successful they must have the confidence of not only us, but also of MI," Domingo said. The MILF signing the Deed "was a plus”, and “It certainly contributed to the building of confidence… Geneva Call were not directly part of the peace process, but we saw them as part of the overall spectrum." 

The proposed peace agreement could allow for an autonomous region in Mindanao with tax-raising powers and a share of the profits from the island's mineral resources, with the government retaining control over defence, foreign affairs and monetary policies. Sharia law may be applied, but only to Muslims in relation to civil cases, while criminal cases will be the domain of existing courts. Once the agreement is confirmed, it would go to the Philippines Congress for approval, followed by a plebiscite in Bangsamoro. 

"During the early stages of the struggle we were using anti-personnel mines as a defence for our camps,” Murad Ebrahim noted. “There are those commanders who said we did not need to sign this commitment but, ultimately, if we continued to use landmines, our people suffer." 

He said the 2001 Tripoli agreement between the MILF and the government to resume peace talks, which included provisions for the respect of human rights and IHL, and a commitment not to use anti-personnel mines, "gave us the image of having respect for international law". 

An analyst who declined to be identified told IRIN the commitment to end the use of anti-personnel mines gave the armed group a "wider level of respect... It brings more good than bad, and more credibility [among the international community] for armed non-state actors." 

The MILF was formed in 1977 after Sheikh Salamat Hashim split from the secularist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which had begun its separatist war five years earlier. The Philippines government reached a peace agreement with MNLF in 1996, and in the following year signed an interim peace agreement with the MILF. 

Peace processes 

The long-running conflict has seen an estimated 150,000 people killed so far, amid a host of proposed and rejected peace agreements. Two million people have been displaced since 2000, of which about 22,000 remain displaced today. 

Domingo said, “There were separate tracks [of discussion] with the different Muslim groups [MNLF and MILF] in Mindanao," as well as efforts to resolve conflicts with other armed groups, such as the NPA and "the breakaway communist movements." These discussions covered social, economic and political reforms, consensus-building, separate negotiated settlements with each armed group, reconciliation, reintegration and rehabilitation, and the protection of civilians during conflict. 

One government source, who declined to be identified, told IRIN: "There are strong rumours of a breakthrough with the NPA. It may be weariness, or… [a sense of] ‘Hey, let’s not get left behind by history’." 

The National Democratic Front of the Philippines, political representatives of the NPA, signed the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CAHR-IHL) in the 1990s. Some observers say they may believe this encompasses the banning of anti-personnel mines and could be why they have not signed a Deed. 

A 2008 peace agreement gave the MILF control over more than 700 areas in the south that they considered their ancestral domain, but this was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and hostilities resumed. In the course of the fighting the Philippines government accused the BIAF of using anti-personnel mines [ http://www.genevacall.org/resources/other-documents-studies/f-other-documents-studies/2001-2010/2010-GC-Report-Philippines-Web.pdf ] and Geneva Call launched a verification mission. 

Verification 

In 2009 Geneva Call concluded that some of the explosive devices used against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were activated by remote control and therefore not prohibited under the Deed's provisions. Others may have been victim-activated - set-off by trip wires or by downward pressure and therefore be in violation of the Deed - but there was not enough evidence to attribute responsibility. "The military would have liked more definitive conclusions," Domingo commented. 

Rush noted that "Although perhaps not completely satisfied, the government did accept the findings… [but] the MILF were also a little disappointed that it was not possible to definitively conclude that its forces had no involvement in the incidents, so it was not a zero-sum game." 

The verification report showed that disavowing anti-personnel landmine use was just a first step towards the "actualization of obligations", and armed groups sometimes needed assistance to achieve this. "So they [MILF-BIAF] drafted General Order Number 3, and we assisted… [with] advice and through working with them and our local partner, the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, to disseminate the Order to their forces on the ground," Rush said. 

Domingo said the Order was seen as "a real earnest effort by MILF to educate its combatants about not using landmines", and added to "the very upbeat" feeling the government has about the Bangsamoro peace process. 

go/he 

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97918/Engaging-with-Philippine-armed-groups</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304231114010299t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">COTABATO 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - For Chris Rush, of the Swiss-based NGO Geneva Call, nuance is everything when engaging with armed groups. Although the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Maoist-inspired New People&apos;s Army (NPA) are both fighting insurrections on the same Philippines island of Mindanao, the choice of terminology is a tender issue when it comes to the use of such phrases as &quot;armed non-state actors (ANSAs)”.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Calls for Côte d’Ivoire government to tackle unrest in west</title><pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208090925290524t.jpg" />]]>ABIDJAN 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - After recent attacks in Côte d’Ivoire’s volatile western region in which more than a dozen people were killed, the authorities announced new security measures, but observers say more than a military response is required.</description><body><![CDATA[ABIDJAN 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - After recent attacks in Côte d’Ivoire’s volatile western region in which more than a dozen people were killed, the authorities announced new security measures, but observers say more than a military response is required.

In the latest spate of armed raids in March, at least 14 civilians and soldiers were killed. The region saw some of the worst fighting [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96024/COTE-D-IVOIRE-We-should-stop-killing-each-other ] during the country’s 2010-2011 post-election conflict. In 2012, at least 10 civilians and seven UN peacekeepers were killed. Weeks later gunmen raided and torched the last remaining internally displaced persons (IDP) camp hosting some 5,000 people.

At the start of 2012 there were 186,000 IDPs [ http://ivorycoast.humanitarianresponse.info/Portals/0/Reports/Others%20reports/CIV%202013%20BESOINS%20HUMANITAIRES%20Final%20February%202013.pdf ] in Côte d’Ivoire, most of them in the country’s western region. An estimated 45,000 people remained displaced by the end of 2012.

Ethnic rivalries, and disputes over land that are worsened by political rivalry, have turned western Côte d’Ivoire into a tinderbox. Mistrust and enmity have often degenerated into violence. Greater efforts are needed to reconcile communities, restore confidence and address grievances, say observers. 

“The government must fully appreciate this problem and bring a lasting solution,” Francis Niangoran, a lecturer at Abidjan’s Sainte-Marie Teaching Institute, told IRIN. “Aid groups are faced with recurrent population displacements, organizing their return, distributing relief aid - it’s a vicious circle.”

While on a visit to the west following the attacks, Interior and Security Minister Hamed Bakayoko announced an emergency security plan to bolster troop numbers, set up attack brigades and equip them with modern radios as well as build an additional police station.

“When you travel across the region, you see ill-equipped soldiers. They don’t even have radios. The telephone network is also unreliable and they cannot use their mobile phones,” said Séraphin Zégnan, who fled the western Petit Guiglo area to the commercial capital Abidjan after an attack in the area in 2012.

Army chief Soumaila Bakayoko, also visiting after the attacks, said a permanent military base would be set up in the region. In 2012, the government formed a 600-strong force to secure the western region. The force is backed by both the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire and the UN mission in neighbouring Liberia.

“The government has the will to end the instability in the west - only it seems to lack the military capacity to achieve that. The western region is a difficult zone to secure and there is need for better trained and better equipped troops,” said Rodrigue Koné of the Centre for Research and Action for Peace (CERAP), an Ivoirian organization.

Others are also sceptical about the military efforts. 

“Moving from a security plan to an emergency security plan is to play with words rather than having a real will to resolve the problem. It is proof that the government is unable to contain the situation. It doesn’t know where and how to tackle the problem,” said Niangoran.

The Interior and the Defence Ministries declined to comment.

A matter of trust

Alexandre Neth Willy, secretary-general of the Ivoirian Human Rights League (LIDHO), told IRIN that the use of drones as recently requested by Côte d’Ivoire’s UN ambassador Bamba Youssoufou “will not be sufficient to solve the problem. The confrontations, recriminations and hatred are deeper [in the west] than in the rest of the country. 

“On the one hand there’s a need to build confidence among the people themselves and on the other between the people and the army.”

CERAP’s Koné said: “Today the majority of the people in the west consider the army as the government’s militia. They have not overcome the events of the post-election crisis and the army has not been able to gain their confidence.”

He argued that the government should work to forge an army with a national outlook following the deep divisions [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96574/COTE-D-IVOIRE-Facing-insecurity-with-unreformed-army ] caused by the post-election unrest.

Who are the gunmen?

Residents of the region - an area covering 73,000sqkm and home to nearly seven million people, or a third of the country’s population - say that apart from gunmen attacking from neighbouring Liberia, there are several armed groups operating inside the region with bases in the forests. 

These militias fought for current President Alassane Ouattara during the violent dispute with his erstwhile election opponent Laurent Gbagbo, they say.

“The most famous of these armed groups is headed by Amadé Ourémi, a Burkinabé, who with his 1,000 fighters, is extending his area of operations without the slightest response from the authorities,” said Fabien Dotonin, an administrator in the western Duékoué District.

“The authorities in Abidjan make threatening statements about dislodging him. But once they come to the west, they neatly avoid talking about the problems caused by Ourémi or even meeting him, yet this is a typical case which if resolved will help a great deal in easing the security crisis,” he added. 

Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan on 4 April said all those occupying government forests will be expelled by the army, but so far no action has been taken.

aa/ob/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97920/Calls-for-Côte-d-Ivoire-government-to-tackle-unrest-in-west</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208090925290524t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ABIDJAN 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - After recent attacks in Côte d’Ivoire’s volatile western region in which more than a dozen people were killed, the authorities announced new security measures, but observers say more than a military response is required.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Red tape hits humanitarian work in NW Pakistan</title><pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201009071353040187t.jpg" />]]>ISLAMABAD 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - Delivering humanitarian aid in northwestern Pakistan has recently been hampered by attacks on schools, aid workers and polio vaccination teams, and bureaucratic procedures for aid projects are making matters worse.</description><body><![CDATA[ISLAMABAD 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - Delivering humanitarian aid in northwestern Pakistan has recently been hampered by attacks on schools [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97863/Far-from-home-but-closer-to-school-in-Pakistan ], aid workers [ http://tribune.com.pk/story/487834/swabi-bloodletting-in-grisly-attack-gunmen-kill-seven-aid-workers/ ] and polio vaccination teams [ http://tribune.com.pk/story/481267/targeting-polio-workers/ ], and bureaucratic procedures for aid projects are making matters worse.

International and national humanitarian agencies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) often face long delays waiting for local officials to grant the relevant permits.

Since 2005, procedures to obtain No Objection Certificates (NOCs) for projects and travel have made it more difficult to deliver vital aid, and in at least one case, led directly to the cancellation of projects.

Relief and recovery projects in FATA and KP require project NOCs, while international staff, including UN workers, also require travel NOCs to move around.

“We had applied for a project implementation NOC to begin a project in livestock in the Kurram Agency to the FATA Disaster Management Authority in February, and had planned the project in December last year, but have still had no response,” said Anwar Shah, CEO of the Peshawar-based national NGO Shid, which works in livestock, livelihood and education.

“Now the local livestock authorities in Kurram say it is too late to start - so everyone suffers.”

Hearing reports of delays, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) set about getting a more comprehensive picture by gathering data from agencies operating in the area.

“The problem is not a new one. It has been there for some time, but now rather than just anecdotal accounts, we are trying to properly monitor the situation and create a database to engage the authorities on this issue based on evidence,” Christina Alfirev, OCHA humanitarian affairs officer in Islamabad, told IRIN.

Of the 18 humanitarian agencies who submitted data [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20Pakistan%20Issue%2013.pdf ] on NOC project requests in January and February, related to 27 projects, 21 were still being processed; only five had been approved and one had been rejected without explanation, as of early March.

Average processing time for project NOCs in KP as of the end of February was found to be 53 days and 66 days for FATA instead of the six weeks indicated by government authorities.  One NGO had to wait 118 days for an NOC.

The OCHA bulletin published 4 April 2013 says the delays are “hampering the provision of critical services” and calls on local authorities to speed up the paperwork “to enable timely assistance to people in need in KP and FATA.”

The bulletin says one emergency project had to be cancelled because of delays, while another had to be reduced in scope.

The paper trail

Humanitarian projects in KP need an NOC from the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) [ http://www.pdma.gov.pk/PaRRSA/Humanitarian_Coordination.php ], and must be requested at least six weeks in advance.

Expatriate staff also need an NOC for travel; and in February the Home Department in KP said applications should be made “at least 6-8 weeks prior to the visit”, something one international humanitarian worker, who asked not to be named, told IRIN that if implemented, “means regular visits to projects are nearly impossible.”

Donors have been expressing concern to the government about the delays these moves could create if implemented, and there are some indications the authorities may be prepared to revoke the policy.

Applications go to the home department of the provincial government in Peshawar, and then can often follow a trail of authorizations and approvals from various military units, as well as the Inter-Services Intelligence.

“A key reason for the new procedures is security concerns. The government is worried a foreign worker or local NGO worker may be harmed, and this brings it a bad name. I think recent events like attacks on polio workers are a factor in the decisions taken,” said a PDMA official in KP who preferred anonymity because he was not authorized to speak with the press.

The delays witnessed by agencies in the last few months are also affecting relations with donors, some of whom do not transfer funds until project NOCs have been issued.

“The Project NOC is valid for six months. Then the same game starts again. At this time I have been waiting now more than six weeks for the extension of an NOC,” said the aid worker, adding that donors usually extend a project’s lifespan, though without increasing budgets, which means they are almost inevitably reduced in size, something donors do not always understand.

“Right now one of our donors is very unhappy,” he said.

Permit mission creep

Alfirev said project implementation permits date back to the 2005 earthquake which killed 73,000 people in the north: “The procedure was put in place by the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority [ http://www.erra.pk/ ] set up by the government after that disaster, and was really intended to coordinate the many agencies working in the quake zone and prevent duplication. The process worked smoothly then.”

All organizations working on relief and early recovery activities in KP/FATA are required to either apply for Project NOCs [ http://www.pdma.gov.pk ] for projects lasting up to six months, or apply for a Memorandum of Understanding for projects [ http://www.pdma.gov.pk/PaRRSA/Humanitarian_Coordination.php ] lasting more than six months.

Since 2005, there have been a series of additions to the list of documents and information needed when making NOC requests.

The latest came in February this year with the government’s announcement of a 6-8 week requirement for travel NOCs, against the normal 5-7 working days.

The Home and Tribal Affairs Department issued new directives for travel NOCs for 10 (out of 25) KP districts - Malakand, Swat, Upper and Lower Dir, Buner, Shangla, Chitral, DI Khan, Tank and Hangu. The Law and Order Department issued a similar directive covering FATA.

Humanitarian agencies are hoping the new time-scale will be officially reduced to the previous 5-7 working days, and as yet it does not seem the 6-8 week policy is being applied on the ground.

“Since 2008, the humanitarian community has raised US$1.38 billion in funding for people affected by violence in northwestern Pakistan. In order to ensure that the assistance is delivered to the people in need, we depend on the government to facilitate humanitarian operations and ease bureaucratic hurdles,” said Lynn Hastings, OCHA country director.

Aid workers say the delays are making it more difficult to deliver aid to KP and FATA. “People suffer when there are delays,” said Shah of Shid NGO.

In Mingora, the principal town in KP’s Swat District, Abdul Wali, 45, who lost his farm in the 2010 floods [ http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-6735391.html ], told IRIN: “There is a desperate need for more projects, more development here. So many people are jobless, and need help.”

kh/jj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97908/Red-tape-hits-humanitarian-work-in-NW-Pakistan</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201009071353040187t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ISLAMABAD 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - Delivering humanitarian aid in northwestern Pakistan has recently been hampered by attacks on schools, aid workers and polio vaccination teams, and bureaucratic procedures for aid projects are making matters worse.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Demining speeds up in Senegal’s Casamance region</title><pubDate>Wed, 24 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100831480343t.jpg" />]]>ZIGUINCHOR 24 April 2013 (IRIN) - Over half of the mined land in Senegal’s southern Casamance region has been cleared, according to the government’s anti-mines action centre, CNAMS, which says it is on track to reach the 2015 goal of the Ottawa treaty to eliminate such weapons.</description><body><![CDATA[ZIGUINCHOR 24 April 2013 (IRIN) - Over half of the mined land in Senegal’s southern Casamance region has been cleared, according to the government’s anti-mines action centre, CNAMS, which says it is on track to reach the 1 March 2016 deadline of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty to eliminate such weapons.

According to CNAMS head Sény Diop, 630, 204 square metres have been demined, and the residents of more than 61 communities have been able to return home or access [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97127/SENEGAL-Casamance-recovers-more-land-lost-to-landmines ] their agricultural land.

Some 322 mines have been removed since demining began in 2008.

Diop said the Kassa region near the Guinea-Bissau border, an area east of the Casamance capital Ziguinchor, and north Sindian near the Gambian border are yet to be demined. These areas account for about half of the zones that were mined.

“We are very pleased with the progress of the operations,” said Diop. “In many areas socioeconomic activities have restarted.”

The pace of demining increased under Handicap International, which was responsible for demining from 2008-2012, as the organization completed assessments of at-risk zones and identified the right kind of equipment to detect all mines used.

In 2012, South African firm MECHEM took over and, according to Diop, the amount of land demined has doubled over the past year. MECHEM logistics coordinator Jean Michel Thiam said the accelerated pace was due to the experience CNAMS has gained over the years, MECHEM’s own experience, and the fact that unlike Handicap International it is a private firm with commercial interests that rely on productivity.

However, not all are as sanguine as Diop, given active fighting [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94895/SENEGAL-No-end-in-sight-to-Casamance-conflict ] in Casamance between the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and the Senegalese army, particularly in areas near the Gambian and Guinea-Bissau borders.

Thiam said it was impossible to determine whether demining will meet the Ottawa treaty goal as no surveys had been done in certain areas under rebel control.

“It’s not possible to determine the extent of work needed in these areas because we don’t have any information regarding the size or type of terrain that has been mined or littered with explosive remnants of war,” Thiam told IRIN.

MECHEM has extracted 146 mines and three items of unexploded ordnance in an area of 269, 251 square metres since it began demining, Thiam said.

In March, a 60-year-old man was hit by a mine in the village of Djirack, near the Guinea-Bissau border; while a woman and her son were killed in northern Sindian Province as they were travelling through the bush. CNAMS has not been able to work in either of these areas.

According to Handicap International in 2012, mines were still being planted in Sindian, 100km north of the capital, Ziguinchor.

MFDC fighters are often accused of laying mines, though they in turn accuse the Senegalese army. The rebels and the state of Senegal signed a peace accord in 2004 but sporadic violence has continued ever since.

Diop said it was impossible to tell if the recent mine deaths were due to pre-existing or newly-laid mines.

Dialogue efforts

CNAMS and international NGOs have tried to find ways to work with MFDC to come to an agreement to stop laying mines and enable all affected areas of Casamance to be demined.

At the end of March 2013, CNAMS and the military wing of an MFDC faction under the control of César Atoute Badiaté, met in San Domingos, northern Guinea-Bissau, to discuss demining. International mediator NGO Geneva Call, working with local NGOs APRAN/SDP, facilitated the talks.

In a statement after the talks MFDC said it understood the need to continue humanitarian demining, but it also considered CNAMS had reached a red line beyond which the security of operators could not be guaranteed. MFDC believes demining is dependent on a wider peace process. Geneva Call encouraged both sides to continue the dialogue.

In 2008 Badiaté had agreed to humanitarian demining taking place in Casamance while reserving the right to use mines in the case of attacks.

Senegal was one of the founding signatories of the 1999 Mine Ban Treaty.

As well as demining, CNAMS, alongside partners, runs mine awareness and prevention programmes, and helps ensure mine victims receive free hospital treatment, prosthetic limbs and wheelchairs, as well as livelihood support.

Some 800-1,000 people have been killed or injured by mines in Casamance since the 1980s, according to CNAMS, peaking at 221 incidents in 1997. This came down to just one incident in 2008. “Mine awareness is really paying off,” said Diop.

mad/aj/ob/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 24 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97907/Demining-speeds-up-in-Senegal-s-Casamance-region</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100831480343t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ZIGUINCHOR 24 April 2013 (IRIN) - Over half of the mined land in Senegal’s southern Casamance region has been cleared, according to the government’s anti-mines action centre, CNAMS, which says it is on track to reach the 2015 goal of the Ottawa treaty to eliminate such weapons.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Iraq 10 years on: the humanitarian impact</title><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041322550503t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - The humanitarian legacy

Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97895/Iraq-10-years-on-The-humanitarian-legacy ]

Water and Sanitation: Are the taps flowing? [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97894/Are-the-taps-flowing ]

Electricity: Blistering black-outs [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97896/Blistering-black-outs ]

The forgotten displacement crisis [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97905/The-forgotten-displacement-crisis ]

Economy grows, but how many benefit? [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97909/Economy-grows-but-how-many-benefit ]

Education: Schools try to play catch-up [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97928/Schools-try-to-play-catch-up ]

Human Security: More freedom but less security? [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97937/More-freedom-but-less-security ]

Aid work: From restrictions to access challenges [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97952/From-aid-restrictions-to-access-challenges ]

War leaves lasting impact on healthcare [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97964/War-leaves-lasting-impact-on-healthcare ]

Gender: Women yet to regain their place [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97976/Women-yet-to-regain-their-place ]

Food security: Less dependent on food rations [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97991/Less-dependent-on-food-rations ]

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-10-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041322550503t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Plea for return of officials to northern Mali</title><pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201210050938270763t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/GAO 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Residents in the northern Mali towns of Gao and Timbuktu are calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their towns, which they say are in a state of “complete chaos”.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/GAO 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Residents in the northern Mali towns of Gao and Timbuktu are calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their towns, which they say are in a state of “complete chaos”.

French, Chadian and Malian armies have ousted insurgent groups from most the main towns in the north, including Gao and Timbuktu, following a 10-month occupation. But despite an appeal from the federal government, only skeletal teams of administrators have returned to their posts.

In the absence of officials, town residents - including village elders, chiefs, women and youths - are working to operate basic services and clean up the damage as best they can.

Disarray

At the beginning of April, Gao’s governor and prefects returned, as did the director of the academy that oversees the region’s schools. In Timbuktu, the governor and two prefects are in place. Officials responsible for health, energy, education, planning and other programmes have yet to return.

For Kidal town, which is still under the control of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the government has named a governor and advisers, all of whom are still in Bamako, the capital, and the MNLA has nominated a governor of their own.

Almost all the regional services in Gao are in disarray, said Aliou Touré, a teacher from Gao town. “Health, agriculture, taxes, social development, police, civil protection, the treasury, the banks… all are in disarray… Officials must return to [put] their city back on track.”

The return of administrators would offer some reassurance of stability, and could deter any insurgents who remain at the outskirts of the town, he said.

Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal were all attacked in March and April by insurgents hidden in nearby villages.

The Minister of Internal Security, Gen Tiefing Konaté, promised last week that police would be re-deployed in Timbuktu before the end of April.

Oumar Sangaré, another teacher in Gao, is angry. “The administration has to return to sort things out. You can’t live like animals in a jungle, with no rules, no basic sanitation, no protection. Government and banking services must re-start immediately,” he said. "It's complete chaos here."

Government teachers must travel to Mopti, 500km away, to pick up their salaries, he said, due to the lack of banking services. “It’s ludicrous.”

While local and international aid groups are providing basic food, healthcare, water and sanitation and other essentials to many vulnerable people in northern regions, essential emergency programmes like large-scale fodder distributons and vaccination campaigns for livestock - critical as herders approach the lean season - require government oversight [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97799/Mounting-crisis-for-conflict-hit-northern-Mali-pastoralists ].

Self-organizing amid shortages

With so many civil servants displaced, the federal government has asked elders and village chiefs to set up management committees in Gao and Timbuktu to try to run things as best they can.

Touré, the teacher, said these committees were struggling: “They can’t continue their work because they don’t have the experience or the means.”

Women and youths formed a group in Gao to help clean up the town, said local journalist, Daouda Traoré.

People also organized themselves into a management committee in Kidal.

Water, electricity and fuel shortages still plague most of the north. Gao’s two major generators are currently not working, which means electricity is supplied from 6pm to 11:30pm only, according to an official with Mali’s energy company, EDM. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been providing fuel for the power stations in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu to make sure water is still available. It recently called for a further US$50 million to continue this service, and to distribute food to 420,000 people, supply farmers with seeds, and provide some animal fodder and vaccinations to pastoralists [ http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2013/04-10-mali-budget-extension.htm ].

Fuel supply is more consistent in Timbuktu, thanks partly to a wealthy trader who has stepped in to provide fuel.

The government has mapped out a $198 million reconstruction and rehabilitation plan for northern Mali, said Bassidy Coulibaly, director general of the Ministry for Territorial Administration in Bamako, but it remains just 12 percent funded.

Elections

The government is under international pressure to organize elections by July, though diplomats privately admit the deadline is ambitious, saying the end of the year is more feasible.

"If the government is serious about organizing elections for July, the administration has to return as soon as possible. If not, who will organize the elections in the regions?” said Oumar Touré, a retired civil servant in Timbuktu. He also worried displaced residents would be unable to return to vote.

“It’s inconceivable that people [displaced residents] can return - the governor, the prefects are working in complete anarchy,” he told IRIN.

Fear

Many Gao residents understand the reluctance of officials to return.

Daouda Diarra, a journalist in Gao, told IRIN, “I think they [civil servants] are right to be scared. Gao isn’t completely secure, and there’s nothing set up here: Everything has been looted, destroyed or attacked. Will they work under the trees? Will they live in the trees? The government has to at least assure the basics before forcing its citizens and administrative staff to return, otherwise they’ll just be sending them to the slaughter,” he told IRIN by telephone.

Moulaye Sayah, now in Timbuktu, was a doctor in Kidal before the events of 2012. “Work is important, but life is sacred. You have to keep yourself safe first and foremost,” he said.

“I understand the complaints of the people in the north who demand the return of the administration, but how and where would we work?” he said, adding that many black-skinned Malians are too afraid to return to MNLA-controlled Kidal.

Abdoul Karim Koné, sub-prefect of Toguérécoumbé town in Mali’s central region of Mopti, disagrees. He re-joined his post two weeks ago: “There is no such thing as zero risk anywhere in the world. If our hour strikes, whether it’s in Kidal, Gao or Bamako, it’s the end. People must accept this, and take up their positions accordingly.”

sd/aj/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97892/Plea-for-return-of-officials-to-northern-Mali</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201210050938270763t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/GAO 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Residents in the northern Mali towns of Gao and Timbuktu are calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their towns, which they say are in a state of “complete chaos”.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>