<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Middle East</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 09:32:53 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>Libyans in North Africa scared to return home</title><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305160746270426t.jpg" />]]>CAIRO 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Until government and revolutionary forces attacked the Libyan town of Bani Walid, about 170km southeast of the capital Tripoli in October last year, Abdullah Warfella had been determined never to leave.</description><body><![CDATA[CAIRO 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Until government and revolutionary forces attacked the Libyan town of Bani Walid, about 170km southeast of the capital Tripoli in October last year, Abdullah Warfella had been determined never to leave.

But after two weeks of imprisonment and torture, the 68-year-old former contractor fled.

“They accused me of supporting [former ruler Muammar] Gaddafi during the revolution, which is not true at all,” Warfella told IRIN in Cairo. “These people have turned life into hell for people, not just in Bani Walid, but everywhere in Libya.”

Warfella is one of tens of thousands of Libyans who have fled to Egypt. Many are accused, often falsely they say, of having fought in pro-Gaddafi forces in 2011, or having publicly expressed support for him.

Far from home, many struggle to find employment and affordable accommodation, and lack almost any formal support. But they fear revenge attacks should they return home.

“There is a persistent desire inside Libya now for taking revenge on whoever took sides with Gaddafi against the revolutionaries, even if these people who took sides with Gaddafi were not influential people or fighters themselves,” said Salah Al Turki, a senior executive from the Cairo-based NGO Libyan Foundation for Human Rights (LFHR).

“Some of Gaddafi's supporters who initially left Libya in the wake of the downfall of the Libyan dictator and then returned to their home towns faced problems. Gaddafi's supporters in other countries watch all this and are filled with fear to return, lest they should meet the same fate.”

The number of Libyans who have fled the country is not clear as very few register with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

A source in the Libyan Ministry of Social Affairs said there were 430,000-530,000 Libyans in Tunisia. LFHR estimates the number of Libyans who had come to Egypt after the demise of Gaddafi's regime at 750,000, although the Libyan Embassy in Cairo told IRIN the number is not more than 30,000. Algeria is also thought to shelter tens of thousands of Libyans.

Despite, its geographical size, the Libyan population is only around six million, and government officials say that having such large numbers of citizens outside Libyan borders is a humanitarian and security concern for the government.

Some Libyans in Egypt were formerly high-ranking figures, like Ahmed Gaddaf Al Dam, a cousin of Gaddafi and a close associate who is now at the centre of a legal tussle [ http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2010/17/The-price-of-extradition.aspx ] in Cairo, aimed at paving the way for his extradition to Libya. 

But most lacked senior roles in the Gaddafi administration, and say they feel under threat because of their previous public support for Gaddafi, or for simply belonging to a tribe or town judged “pro-Gaddafi”.

Safe haven?

Though many Libyans who have fled to Egypt told IRIN they thought it was not yet safe to return, life in Egypt is far from easy and they say they continue to live in fear.

“Most of these people, particularly those who had committed crimes in Libya before coming here, think that state institutions or even international organizations will spy on them for the sake of the new government in Libya,” Omar Mohamed Al Ogaly, a plenipotentiary minister at the Libyan Foreign Ministry, told IRIN.

“They have this general fear of state or official agencies and this is why they stay away from these agencies.”

Egypt is undergoing economic and political strife of its own after the Arab Spring, and Libyans abroad are struggling with rising food prices and a lack of work.

Mohamed Al Salak, a TV host from the Libyan channel Libya TV, describes meeting one Libyan family living in a cemetery west of Cairo.

“Despite this, the members of this family are afraid to approach the Libyan Embassy for help,” Al Salak said. “Some of them have medical problems, but they are even afraid to go to the hospital, lest their whereabouts are known to the government in Libya.” 

LFHR tries to find ways of reducing the suffering of Libyan refugees in Egypt. Organization staff meet these refugees, try to give some financial support and present their plight to the Libyan government.

Division 

The current debate [ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-05/world/39048298_1_islamists-militias-parliament ] within Libya about what sort of role ex-Gaddafi supporters should have in the new administration is a subject that also divides Libyans in Egypt. 

In Cairo, fights have taken place in public areas like shopping centres between Libyans who used to support Gaddafi and others who detested his rule and rose up against him.

“We all had to keep silent under Gaddafi even as we did not like the man or his rule,” said Fawzi Al Trapolsi (not his real name), who worked for years as plenipotentiary minister under Gaddafi.

“There must be some forgiveness. Libya will not move a step forward if this desire for revenge continues to control everything.” 

On the other side of the political debate are Libyans like Adel Abdel Kafi, an ex-Libyan fighter pilot who flew his military plane from Tripoli to Cairo in the early 1980s and applied for political asylum in protest against what he called “Gaddafi's despotism”.

“Forgiveness?” he said to IRIN. “How can we forgive the people who either participated in killing innocent Libyans or who kept silent while the Libyans were being humiliated for more than 40 years?” 

Building trust

The Libyan government is taking some steps towards reconciliation. In Tunisia, Naema M. Elhammi, the deputy head of the General National Congress, told IRIN she had met Libyans living in poverty but not yet willing to return.

“They are all afraid,” Elhammi told IRIN. “They think they will face many troubles when they go back. The fact is that some Libyans do nothing but settle old scores with their compatriots. This makes everybody afraid.” 

A group of parliament members, including Elhammi herself, are paying visits to neighbouring countries to talk to the Libyan refugees and convince them to go back. But they still have to build trust. 

In Cairo, the Libyan Embassy has opened a separate office in a different part of the city to the embassy to listen to the problems of the refugees and try to convince them to go back.

Mabrouk Raheel, an embassy official responsible for the office, says 5-7 Libyans visit the office every day to demand help either to continue living in Egypt or to go back to Libya.

“People who did not commit crimes during the revolution have no problem in going back,” Raheel said. “Those who committed crimes, however, must go to court.” 

Al Ogaly, the plenipotentiary minister, says if some Libyans are not able to go to Libya at present, at least Libya must go to them.

“We want these people back,” Al Ogaly said. “They must return to their country. Why should they stay abroad?” 

He says Libya's revolutionaries are now more receptive than ever before to the idea of the return of their compatriots who supported Gaddafi.

Warfella from Bani Walid, whose son is currently in jail in Libya accused of fighting the anti-Gaddafi revolutionaries, says he is not yet convinced.

“We need a justice system that guarantees that nobody will be put in jail unjustly,” Warfella said. “We need security and assurances that nobody will come out, of his own will, and attack us or accuse us of imaginary things. We want Libya to be for all Libyans.”

When asked, however, whether he thinks these conditions can be met in the near future so he can return and see his children and wife, he sighs wearily: “I have hope in God.”

ae/jj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98045/Libyans-in-North-Africa-scared-to-return-home</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305160746270426t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">CAIRO 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Until government and revolutionary forces attacked the Libyan town of Bani Walid, about 170km southeast of the capital Tripoli in October last year, Abdullah Warfella had been determined never to leave.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Egypt rethinks its subsidy system for the poor</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141109580576t.jpg" />]]>CAIRO 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Egyptian government has taken tentative steps towards reducing the roughly US$20 billion subsidy system that supporters say provides vital aid to the one-in-four Egyptians in poverty, and critics say is unsustainable and enriches the corrupt.</description><body><![CDATA[CAIRO 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Egyptian government has taken tentative steps towards reducing the roughly US$20 billion subsidy system that supporters say provides vital aid to the one-in-four Egyptians [ http://www.capmas.gov.eg/pdf/studies/pdf/enf1.pdf ] in poverty, and critics say is unsustainable and enriches the corrupt.

“Most of the subsidies do not go to the people who really need them,” said Osama Kamal, who until the 7 May cabinet reshuffle was petroleum minister.

The government plans a series of piecemeal reforms to revolutionize its decades-old subsidy system in a bid to rein in a runaway budget deficit, and adapt to the conditions of a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.

But as Minister of Supply and Internal Trade Bassem Auda said recently, the subsidy system protects at least eight million Egyptians against poverty, and any changes are highly sensitive.

The government wants to reduce the budget deficit to 5.5 percent in the 2016-2017 budget from 10.7 percent in the 2012-2013 budget, according to the Finance Ministry [ http://www.brecorder.com/world/africa/118022-egypt-eyes-55pc-budget-deficit-in-2016-17.html ].

A high priority in the subsidy reform scheme is energy subsidies, which are estimated at 115 billion pounds ($16.8 billion), and bread subsidies [ http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1398046 ] (Arabic), which are estimated at 21 billion pounds ($3.1 billion).

Manal Metwaly, an economics professor from Cairo University, says cuts will have a devastating effect on the poor: “The government says the subsidy system opens the way for corruption, but it doesn’t have to slash subsidies in order to fight corruption.

“The subsidies keep millions of people afloat, while commodity prices keep rising. This means that any change in the system can affect the lives of millions of people.”

What’s the plan to reduce bread subsidy corruption?

Subsidized bread is a permanent item on almost all Egyptian tables; it is a lifeline for the poor, but the system is also frequently abused.

Egyptians consume as many as 210 million loaves of subsidized flat bread every day, helping to make it the world's largest wheat importer.

The government sells a subsidized loaf of bread at the nation's more than 25,000 bakeries for five piasters (less than one US cent) whereas the production cost of the same loaf is more than 40 piasters (six US cents).

“Bread subsidies are a real headache for the government because, like most other subsidies, they open the way for massive corruption and profiteering by a group of dishonest traders,” Hamdy Allam, a senior official at the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, told IRIN.

In order to reduce corruption resulting from the selling by bakery owners of subsidized flour on the black market, the government introduced a new system in April, which has been implemented in several governorates and accepted by 15,000 bakeries.

Instead of selling subsidized flour to the bakeries, the bakers buy the flour at the market rate, but are then reimbursed 35 piasters by the government per loaf, to make sure the sales price remains 5 piasters.

The system is expected to be implemented across Egypt in the next two months after all the nation's bakeries sign up to the reforms.

The government’s aim here is to reduce corruption rather than financial support for poor consumers.

What’s the plan for ration cards?

Egypt's ration cards date back to 1964 when the population was less than 30 million. Back then, the government earmarked two million pounds ($301,204) to give citizens rice, sugar, lentils, cooking oil, and tea at subsidized rates.

Now, the government spends as much as nine billion pounds (US$1.3 billion) every year on the food subsidies, which go to around 17.6 million families (around 68 million people).

In July, the government plans to start limiting ration cards to citizens whose monthly income is below 1,500 Egyptian pounds (US$216), but at the same time is planning to allow children born after 2005 in low-income households to be registered for the cards, reversing a suspension of registrations introduced under President Hosni Mubarak.

The minister of supply also announced last week that it would be working to improve the quality of ration card goods, which have a poor reputation.

…and for energy subsidies?

Energy is by far the largest recipient of subsidies.

The Petroleum Ministry produces oil to the value of 165 billion pounds (US$23.8 billion) every year, but then sells these products for 50 billion pounds [ http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Policy.aspx?Serial=1239531 ] (Arabic).

Most energy subsidies go on factories and industrial projects, which get their energy needs at less than market prices. But private vehicle owners also benefit.

The government has already started reducing subsidies on car fuel, and targeting 95-octane gasoline was the first step in this regard [ http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/58834/Business/Economy/Egypt-announces-cut-of-octane-gasoline-subsidies.aspx ].

The government says that from July it plans to cut subsidies on car fuel by 10 percent in the first stage of the reforms, but this will rise to 50 percent within five years. If applied in July, the government says, the plan will bring overall fuel subsidies down to 99 billion pounds (US$14.5 billion).

To do this, it plans to give coupons or smart cards to car owners allowing them to purchase limited amounts of subsidized fuel.

…and gas cylinders?

Gas cylinder subsidies are enjoyed by almost every Egyptian household.

The government says gas cylinder subsidies amounted to 60 billion Egyptian pounds (almost US$8.9 billion) in the 2012-2013 budget [ http://www.mss.gov.eg/mss/ar-eg/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9.aspx?udt_517_param_detail=14 ] (Arabic).

Although the production of one cylinder costs 78 pounds ($11.2), until recently the government sold the same cylinder to the public for five pounds (72 US cents).

Now, the government plans to link subsidized gas cylinders to ration cards.

Ration card holding families made up of three people will be allowed to get one gas cylinder every month at the subsidized rate of five pounds. Families of more than three people will get 1.5 gas cylinders at the same subsidized rate every month.

The government started implementing the first stage [ http://dostor.org/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1/172028-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%82%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2 ] (Arabic) of the gas cylinder subsidy reform plan in April by raising the price of the cylinders to eight pounds ($1.15) for homes and 16 pounds for restaurants and shops ($2.30).

The government says it will start distributing gas cylinder coupons in July in all governorates.

The price of a cylinder without the coupons is expected to rise to 30 pounds ($4.3). The government says the coupon system will save three billion pounds a year.

Egyptians consume as many as 360 million gas cylinders every year.

What might the consequences be?

Egypt has long discussed subsidy reforms [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/77691/EGYPT-Can-bread-subsidies-continue-in-their-present-form ], but has struggled to change a system seen as both unsustainable but too sensitive to reorganize.

A senior Muslim Brotherhood official, who asked not to be named, told IRIN the government was determined to push through reforms.

“We will not buy votes at the expense of the national economy. This subsidy system must be reformulated in ways that allow the subsidies to reach the people who really need them.”

Given the continued street protests and the upcoming parliamentary elections, analysts say the government will need to argue that reforms are about reducing corruption rather than hitting the poor.

“Some of the measures we take are unpopular. They will make people hate us. But this is not what we care about. We only care about putting the economy of this country back on track,” said the official.

Politicians have always feared social unrest from the inevitable price rises that will result.

“The price of one ton of concrete iron [iron bars used in the construction industry] jumped 30 percent as soon as the government slashed the subsidies on energy for concrete iron factories,” Rashad Abdo, head of local think tank Egyptian Economic Forum, told IRIN. “The same will happen with all other commodities. Ordinary citizens will foot the bill at the end of the day.”

ae/jj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98031/Briefing-Egypt-rethinks-its-subsidy-system-for-the-poor</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141109580576t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">CAIRO 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Egyptian government has taken tentative steps towards reducing the roughly US$20 billion subsidy system that supporters say provides vital aid to the one-in-four Egyptians in poverty, and critics say is unsustainable and enriches the corrupt.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>&quot;Sometimes you cannot apply the rules&quot; - Syrian rebels and IHL</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091143410929t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - In recent months, Syrian rebels have faced increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. For guidance on the laws of war, they turn to a combination of Islamic law, IHL and their own sense of righteousness or, as one expert put it, “revolutionary justice” - with mixed results.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Syrian rebels facing increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law turn for guidance on the laws of war to a combination of Islamic law, IHL - where they are aware of it - and their own sense of righteousness, according to analysts and IRIN interviews with fighters [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words ].

A report [ http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Syria_Public_Brief_Dec_2012.pdf ] late last year by the Center for Civilians in Conflict pointed to the opposition’s lack of coherent control and command structures as a roadblock to the rebels’ ability to mitigate civilian harm and enforce IHL and human rights principles throughout their ranks. As a result, with hundreds of different militias and battalions operating on the ground, each group seems to be following its own set of rules.

As Aron Lund, an expert on Syrian opposition groups, put it: “Some groups go by Shariah law, and some groups go by rule of the gun - revolutionary justice.”

Sources of guidance

Faris al Bayoush, a former colonel now commanding a unit of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in the northwestern governorate of Idlib, said he sees the regime’s blatant disregard for human rights as all the more reason to commit himself to international norms.

“The abuses were one of the main reasons the revolution started, so of course we should respect humanitarian laws.”

He told IRIN he was well-informed of the content of all relevant international agreements because the Syrian army used to hold training courses on IHL for its officers. “They don’t respect IHL, but they teach it,” he said. He tries to ensure all his men also follow the rules by briefing them before each operation. His unit’s behaviour is, however, not only regulated by IHL but also by Islamic law, or Shariah. He views the two as complementary sources.

“[Shariah] gives us more detailed instructions,” he said. “For example, the Prophet said that you are not allowed to kill an old man, harm a child or cut down a tree.”

In contrast, an increasing number of fighters within the FSA view Islamic teachings alone as providing adequate guidance, though in many cases, they do indeed overlap, especially in the treatment of women and children.

“As Muslims, we regard Shariah law as our essential source,” said Raed al Aliwi, an engineer turned FSA commander in Hama Governorate. “We don’t have to study international laws because respecting human rights comes naturally with our religion.”

He claimed that breaches are rare, but conceded that it is sometimes difficult to make all lower-level fighters respect the rules. Many of them lack even basic knowledge of international norms, codified in the four Geneva Conventions on the laws of war and their associated protocols, which add up to more than 500 articles.

“We can do anything to topple [Syrian President Bashar al-]Assad,” said Abu Bakr, an FSA fighter in the central city of Homs. He argued that there is no need for regulations because he sees the rebels’ own judgment as sufficient: In his view, since the rebels are battling a dictatorship, they necessarily have higher ethical standards.

“We can see what is true and false,” he said, “and we are on the right side.”

Al-Ansar Brigades, a jihadist group affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra (The Front for the Support of the people of Syria), which is considered a terrorist organization by the USA, relies on a religious scholar among its commanders who provides guidelines that all the members adhere to.

“I have no idea of what the Geneva Conventions or any other treaties say,” said Abu Mousab, one of the group’s commanders, “but I’m sure Islamic law is much better because it is the most just law in the world.”

Even among the FSA fighters who stressed their commitment to IHL, there is a growing frustration with the international community and its principles.

“We are living in the days of the fighters,” said an FSA-member who goes by the name Manhal Abu Bakr in Hama. “Sometimes you cannot apply the rules when no one else does. We lost faith in international laws and policies.”

Proclamation of principles

Rebel crimes have persisted despite codes signed by FSA leaders to address misconduct and lawlessness within the opposition ranks. For example, the FSA’s high command issued a “Proclamation of Principles” [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/FSA_Proclimation_of_Principles.pdf ] in July, committing to human rights, pluralism and democracy, and pledging to do their “utmost to uphold international humanitarian law and norms, including by treating prisoners humanely, even as the Assad regime engages in crimes against humanity”.

For observers like Michael Shaikh, director of country operations at the Center for Civilians in Conflict and author of the Center’s report examining how the Syrian opposition views the principles of IHL, this shows a certain desire to engage with these principles.

“The codes of conduct are initially often more for public perception than about actual battlefield behaviour, but there is a clear opening here.”  

Some groups are making an effort to establish disciplinary systems.

“Many rank and file said they were reprimanded when they blew something up or fired their weapons without necessity; that weapons were taken away when there were incidents of civilian harm,” said Shaikh, who conducted interviews with rebel fighters between June and October 2012. “There was an inherent perception that they had to distinguish themselves from the Assad regime.”

Some groups have been trying to encourage rebels to follow the laws of war. According to a Westerner working with makeshift hospitals near Aleppo, one activist group tried distributing pamphlets on the laws of war, supported by verses from the Koran and the Bible, and quotes from Martin Luther King as well as Mahatma Gandhi. But it was chased away by an extremist group.

The International Committee of the Red Cross recently began arranging workshops on IHL for armed opposition groups, and is in dialogue with them with the aim of visiting places of detention under their control. It also distributes pamphlets on IHL obligations to both armed opposition groups and Syrian government soldiers it meets while in the field.

The UK is also funding [ https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-to-parliament-on-syria ] a programme by two consultancy firms to train rebels using an Arabic curriculum about international humanitarian law. And the Syrian Support Group [ http://syriansupportgroup.org/about/ ], a US-based group with a license to fundraise for the FSA in the US, says it only finances military councils that have adopted the FSA’s Proclamation of Principles.

Protecting their reputation

Efforts to limit rebel abuses have also been hampered by the escalation of chaos and violence.

“The big problem in Syria is not so much extremism but lawlessness and a lack of joint leaderships and structures that can deal with these kinds of things,” said Lund, who has authored several reports on Islamist groups in Syria for the Swedish Institute for International Affairs.

As such, criminality is a bigger threat to minorities than even the most extreme Islamist groups, like the Syrian Islamic Front, which has gone out of its way to reach out to Christians (though most extremist groups take a harder line on those belonging to Assad’s Allawite sect, who are often considered apostates from Islam).

“They [extremist groups] want to protect their reputation,” Lund said. “They want to do this work for the larger purpose of defeating Assad. They realize atrocities would undermine that... Random killing is not even part of al-Qaeda’s doctrine.”

Civilian protection

All rebels interviewed claimed they protect local residents during their operations by not targeting areas inhabited by civilians, or by telling people to vacate the area before they strike.

“We’ve even aborted operations when we realized we might hurt civilians,” said Abu Mousab of the jihadist al-Ansar Brigades.

The Center for Civilians in Conflict refers to other strategies to protect civilians, such as sending out scouts before their advance, or launching ambushes at night when people are less likely to be outside.

Nevertheless, civilians have often borne the brunt of the conflict due to a lack of consideration by the rebels. For example, rebels frequently endanger the population by positioning military objectives inside residential areas. In September 2012, 10 civilians were killed when the regime forces shelled a rebel position right next to an apartment building, according to the Center.

To make matters worse, rebel groups have been increasingly employing guerrilla tactics such as suicide bombings, often resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In September, for example, a twin suicide bombing in Damascus reportedly carried out by Jabhat al-Nusra killed dozens of people.

Who is a civilian?

One of the main causes for concern is, according to experts, the absence of a clear definition of who is to be considered a civilian.

“Many rebels I spoke with see themselves as civilians who picked up arms - they don’t think the rules apply to them,” Shaikh said. At the same time, when looking at their opponents, “they had a very loosy-goosy understanding of civilians as someone without a gun,” but did not apply the term to Alawis or people they perceived to be members of the Shabiha militias supporting government forces.

Others do not think in terms of “civilian” and “combatant”, which in Shariah law are not the only determinants of whether someone is a legitimate target.

In a TV interview [ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yexixuNzuaY ] posted on the internet, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, traditionally considered a more moderate voice among Muslim scholars, said all collaborators working with the “unjust” Syrian government, whether civilian or combatant, should be killed, an opinion echoed by some of the fighters.

Businessmen who help fund pro-government militias “are considered like fighters” and are usually sentenced to death if found guilty of supporting the regime in one of the group’s judicial courts, said Hamza Abdulrahman, a member of the Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib.

He, like others, admitted his brigade interrogates prisoners, using beatings - “but we don’t torture like Assad does”. Afterwards, prisoners are transferred to one of the group’s courts. Anyone found guilty of murder, kidnapping or even theft might be executed, he said. Captured soldiers from the regime’s army are also routinely killed, unless they were caught when defecting.

In spite of their growing influence, extremist groups are acting with more restraint in Syria than they did in Iraq, Lund said, “probably because they learned that when they let things go out of hand, they lose popular support and because they know the minority issue is so explosive in Syria, so they have to tread carefully.”

He warned, however, that “with time, this will probably change.”

For the full interviews with rebel fighters, click here [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words ].

gk/ha/cb

 

How Syrian rebels view aid access

Under international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of aid, subject to their right of control. So where do Syria’s rebels stand on this? 

In spite of the differences between the various groups, all fighters interviewed said they would never attack an aid convoy, with even the most extreme groups saying they would be prepared to facilitate access for aid workers and protect them - on certain conditions.

“No one would mind aid workers, unless they are coming to spy on us,” said Manhal Abu Bakr. “We’d need to know exactly who they are. Otherwise it wouldn’t go well. There would be suspicion.”

“We have no objection to anyone coming to help, but only in coordination with us,” added Osama Hadba, a member of the FSA’s Liwaa al Fateh brigade in Aleppo.

According to one aid worker, some organizations have been careful not to brand their distributions with USAID logos, and the Washington Post [ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-14/world/38537333_1_aid-workers-syrians-obama-administration ] reported recently that the US “feeds Syrians, but secretly”.

In addition, many rebel groups are doing their own aid distributions. “It’s a big part of their propaganda,” Lund said. “They want to come off as concerned with civilian affairs and not just fighting.” Jabhat al-Nusra, for example, has put a lot of effort into organizing bread distributions and restarting bus traffic.

Hadba, like other fighters IRIN spoke to, insisted that all civilians are equally deserving of aid, regardless of religion or political affiliation.

“If we distribute food supplies, we go from house to house and check who is in need,” said Raed al Aliwi, the FSA commander in Hama. “We don’t ask about people’s religion or political opinion.”

However, fighters conceded they mainly hand out supplies in areas where residents support their side because they do not have access to areas dominated by regime supporters.

“The real test,” one international aid worker said, will come when aid workers try to access neighbourhoods that support the government but are encircled by opposition groups. “So far, it has generally been the other way around and they've had no reason to make life difficult for us.”

Some rebel groups have, however, stopped aid trucks at gunpoint, looted their belongings, and re-distributed them to their constituents whom they believe to be in more need.

gk/ha/cb


For more on violations of IHL in Syria, see documentation by Amnesty International [ http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/summary_killings_by_armed_opposition_groups.pdf ], Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/17/syria-end-opposition-use-torture-executions#torture ], and the UN Commission of Inquiry for Syria [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf ], as well as the report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict [ http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Syria_Public_Brief_Dec_2012.pdf ].

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98021/quot-Sometimes-you-cannot-apply-the-rules-quot-Syrian-rebels-and-IHL</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091143410929t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - In recent months, Syrian rebels have faced increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. For guidance on the laws of war, they turn to a combination of Islamic law, IHL and their own sense of righteousness or, as one expert put it, “revolutionary justice” - with mixed results.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Syrian rebels on IHL: In their own words</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091208460593t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the UN Commission of Inquiry accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, including UN peacekeepers, and possibly using chemical weapons. So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International [ http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/summary_killings_by_armed_opposition_groups.pdf ] and Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/17/syria-end-opposition-use-torture-executions#torture ] to the UN Commission of Inquiry [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf ] accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, and possibly using chemical weapons [ http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uns-carla-del-ponte-says-there-is-evidence-rebels-may-have-used-sarin-in-syria-8604920.html ]. The capture and detention of 21 UN peacekeepers in March and another four last week also constituted a violation of IHL.

So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?

IRIN interviewed rebel fighters of various leanings and levels of authority to better understand their mindset.

(See our analysis on this issue here [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98021/Analysis-Sometimes-you-cannot-apply-the-rules-Syrian-rebels-and-IHL ]) 

Faris al Bayoush, former Colonel in the army, now commanding a unit of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Idlib Governorate:

“I’ve read all about IHL during the training courses that were organized for the officers in the Syrian army, so I know all the rules. The majority of Syrians are civilians, good people. We naturally wouldn’t want to do anything to hurt them. Of course we respect IHL because violating human rights is what the regime stands for. The FSA has been formed to protect people from their crimes... We’re also guided by Islamic law. There is no contradiction between both because their content is similar: Both sources tell us not to harm civilians, particularly not weaker elements, but the Koran gives us more precise instructions... Before each battle, I give a speech to everybody to make sure everybody has the same idea of what is permissible and what isn’t. Then we talk and discuss the issue…

“Any foreign aid worker would be treated like our guest because the civilians here are really in need of assistance… A civilian is someone who doesn’t carry a gun, no matter what sect he belongs to... Do we take precautions so that we don’t harm civilians? Frankly, I find that question weird. Everybody is in God’s hands. But of course we don’t usually launch attacks if there are civilians around…

“We try to take good care of our prisoners. We’ve taken 53 lately, and we let them go home because we had nothing to charge them with.”

Manhal Abu Bakr, FSA member, Hama Governorate:

“We’ve lost faith in international laws and policies. This is why Islamist groups are gaining ground. At first they were weak, but then people realized it doesn’t help them if they adhere to Western standards, so they grew stronger... Some say this is hypocrisy. The international community expects us to comply with IHL, but nobody cares if our rights are being violated. For example, if you catch a Syrian air force pilot who is responsible for killing hundreds of people, of course you’d kill him…

“Foreign aid workers would have to be careful. There are bad groups, thieves and criminals; they might steal their supplies or kidnap them. No one of us would mind them unless they’re coming to spy on us. We’d need to know exactly who they are before we let them near us. Otherwise there would be suspicion. We cannot afford to make mistakes because the [one mistake could be our undoing].

“We try to distribute all aid supplies coming in from Turkey evenly. Usually we give it to people who support the revolution. We wouldn’t give anything to people who support the government because as rebels, we cannot enter their neighbourhoods. But we don’t differentiate between different sects. When you see all the need, you forget about religion... We always try to take measures not to harm civilians during out operations. This is the first thing we look into when planning an attack. We alert them and tell them to vacate the area. If they feel we don’t protect them, we’d lose their support.”

Raed al Aliwi, engineer, FSA commander, Hama Governorate:

“International humanitarian law is our be-all and end-all. It’s natural for us to comply with these standards because the FSA’s main purpose is to defend the people. This is why the FSA only launches attacks on very specific places where there are armed regime supporters. In many cases, we had to stop operations because there were civilians in the vicinity... It’s easy to differentiate between Shabiha [militias who support the government] and civilians because Shabiha always carry weapons, at least a small pistol; and they only show up in places where regime troops are close by. We also know them by their dialect… Alawis in general are not a problem for us. We’re not opposed to any sect as such…

“We wouldn’t object to any aid team coming to our area, no matter where they’re from, even if they’re Israeli…

“As Muslims, we regard Sharia law as our essential source from which we derive our rules. The problem is that there are groups who draw false conclusions from it, and then they turn extremist and do terrible things...

I’m commanding 60 men, and sometimes it’s difficult to make everybody follow the rules. If anyone violates our standards, he’d be punished. The important thing is that the leader behaves well because he is the role model that all the other men follow in their actions.”

Osama Hadba, member of the FSA’s religiously conservative Liwaa al Fateh brigade in Aleppo Governorate:

“We rely on the Koran as the key source of our rules, but we also take all international agreements into account. We know about IHL because everyone can see the violations committed by the regime with their own eyes... We are humans that have been forced to take up weapons. Of course we don’t violate any human rights, unlike the criminal regime we are opposing…


“In our office, we register all human rights breaches that occur. When we arrest somebody who is charged with any of those crimes, he’ll be transferred to one of the military courts that have been established to deal with such cases. A lot of lawyers and judges have defected and started working for the revolutionary courts.

“We stop only aid convoys that supply the regime army, not the ones heading towards civilian areas… We have no objection to any foreign aid workers coming to help, but only in coordination with us. I’d be happy to accompany them…

“We protect the civilian population as much as possible. Before launching an attack, we declare the area in question as a military zone, and civilians are requested to stay away.  It’s difficult to prevent harm from the population in neighbourhoods [that support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad] because the regime troops put their tanks inside the residential areas and use the civilians as shields.”

Abu Mousab, a commander of the al-Ansar Brigades (a jihadist group affiliated with US-designated terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nusra), Deir-ez-Zor Governorate:

“One of our commanders is a religious scholar, and he is responsible for setting our rules and principles. We’re fighting for religious reasons, so following the Koran and the Sunnah [teachings of the Prophet] is paramount for us. We’re not interested in IHL because Islamic law is much fairer than any secular law…

“I have no clue what the Geneva Conventions or any other international laws say because I’m a believer, and I’m sure that the Shariah is the best law in the world. All other laws are no solution…

“We announce our attacks beforehand if it’s possible. We’ve even aborted operations when we realized we might hurt civilians… We also consider regime supporters as civilians as long as they don’t carry weapons - except informers since they are causing huge damage. If we have proof that someone is an informer, we execute them. Sometimes people are stubborn, so sometimes you have to torture them to get the information you need. If we have a prisoner who has killed people, we’ll kill him...

“Everyone responsible for crimes committed against the Syrian people deserves to be killed…

“But we’re not killing randomly, even if people aren’t Sunni. If we arrest someone, it’s forbidden to kill him unless he has committed crimes. If he has, however, he deserves to be executed…

“Any aid group wanting to help people would be welcome here. We’d be prepared to give them protection. If we have supplies to hand out, we give it out to everyone equally, also to Christian families.”

Hamza Abdulrahman, member of Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham, Idlib Governorate:

“We don’t care about IHL because the Shariah is our law. For instance, if we arrest a prisoner, we’d take him to a court. We have our own Shariah courts in every area now. We don’t execute anyone unless they are killers, or guilty of theft or kidnapping. Anyone who helps the regime in any way will also be killed, for instance businessmen who support the regime financially. They are considered as fighters, not civilians. We also execute regime soldiers if we catch them, except if they were about to defect…

“Before they are taken to court, we interrogate them, and if they don’t say what they know, we beat or punish them - but we don’t torture like Assad does. According to Shariah law, it’s forbidden to hurt anyone’s head or face. There are laws, and we follow them. We also have our own charities which distribute aid supplies. The only criterion is people’s need; their political opinion or sect is irrelevant…

“If we plant a bomb, we don’t detonate it if there are civilians around. We only launch missiles on areas held by regime forces so that civilians don’t get hurt… We wouldn’t obstruct any foreign aid team, as long as they are unarmed. Other Islamist groups might have a different view on that, for example Jabhat al Nusra. They haven’t commented on this issue, so I’m not sure. But they think like al-Qaeda. They don’t think a European or American could contribute anything good to our revolution.”

gk/ha/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091208460593t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the UN Commission of Inquiry accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, including UN peacekeepers, and possibly using chemical weapons. So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Getting governments to cough up for DRR</title><pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301091116460112t.jpg" />]]>AQABA 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - Investing in preparation for potential disasters is a “no brainer”, Elizabeth Longworth, director of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), told a recent disaster risk reduction (DRR) conference in Aqaba, Jordan.</description><body><![CDATA[AQABA 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - Investing in preparation for potential disasters is a “no brainer”, Elizabeth Longworth, director of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), told a recent disaster risk reduction (DRR) conference in Aqaba, Jordan.

And yet a report [ https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/WEB%20Humanitarianism%20in%20the%20Network%20Age%20vF%20single.pdf ] published last month by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said DRR funding accounts for only 3 percent of humanitarian aid and just 1 percent of all other development assistance.

Last year (seen as a relatively quiet year by natural disaster experts), the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) [ http://cred01.epid.ucl.ac.be/f/CredCrunch31.pdf ] recorded 310 natural disasters, leading to 9,930 deaths affecting 106 million people.

In total in the last three years, disasters have caused more than US$300 billion of recorded damage [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97655/Tallying-natural-disaster-related-losses ].

So, if the scale of the damage is not in dispute, why is DRR not better resourced? Has the funding argument not yet been won?

Improving funding

“Funding is a challenge,” said Jordan Ryan, director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery at the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

“DRR doesn’t always get sufficient funding. Sometimes the donors don’t put a priority on disaster risk. They don’t always come through. So, I think we need even more attention.”

But natural disaster experts are emphatic that DRR funding is fundamentally a good investment. Estimates vary about how much can be saved, but the most conservative figures say that every $1 spent on DRR is worth $4 later on.

One example of the difference preparation can make is in what is now Bangladesh where in 1970 the Bhola cyclone killed up to 500,000 people. Nearly four decades later when another destructive storm hit (Cyclone Aila, 2009), early warning systems, hundreds of cyclone shelters, and disaster volunteer networks helped keep the country’s death toll below 200.

When natural hazards meet unprepared communities, populations are left extremely vulnerable, as seen when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008, a country without early warning systems or storm shelters.

Perceptions of the importance of disaster preparedness vary from country to country.

“In Japan people understand this is money well spent,” Kimio Takeya, visiting senior adviser for the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), told IRIN, saying the country had been buffeted by earthquakes, typhoons and floods in the last 50 years: “Everything hit Japan.”

This follows a clear pattern. Governments find it difficult to appreciate risk and the need for risk reduction, until disaster strikes.

Changing perceptions

“I suppose that if we had won the argument [about DRR funding], we wouldn’t be making the case for increased donor commitment anymore as much as we do, so I guess the simple answer is no, we haven’t won it yet. But I do also believe that it is changing,” said Jo Scheuer, team leader for DRR and recovery at UNDP.

“The recent events, including in Japan and US, have shown clearly that they disasters affect everybody. It is an increasing risk that we are facing, particularly in terms of climate change, and if you look at the global discussions around also humanitarian aid and the resilience debate, there is a clear movement - I would say a political will - to move away from just responding to humanitarian crises or disasters, to actually building resilience.”

For donors, agencies like UNDP make the argument that DRR spending can be a means of reducing the long-term emergency humanitarian aid needed annually to deal with each new natural disaster.

“Donors are now increasingly putting money into preparedness and resilience, so that there aren’t only these millions of dollars that are for response, but that you can actually prepare countries beforehand for building their resilience, particularly in urban cities, where there’s growing infrastructure and the risk of massive potential economic damage,” Aditi Banerjee, disaster risk management specialist in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region at the World Bank, told IRIN.

But beyond donors, experts say there needs to be a change of attitude in governments, which find it difficult to reallocate funds from areas like health and education to DRR.

“Of course it is very difficult to convince the political leaders or the people to spend money before the disaster. This needs something like far-sightedness,” said Takeya.

He has been looking at the impact of DRR spending on GDP growth. “We are modelling and trying to calculate and analyse for each country. There’s a definite positive pattern - we can show the evidence that… your GDP growth will go down without DRR investment,” he said.

Convincing governments that they are not yet spending what they should on DRR is crucial, said Longworth.

“The sustainability of DRR is when budget-holders, whether they be governments, local governments, or other entities actually start re-orientating their budget allocations to DRR, and that’s why we’re putting so much attention on the economic case. It is absolutely well established now that the scale of economic losses from disasters justifies significantly more investment in reducing risks.”

More data, a growing awareness of the link between the scale of a disaster and preparedness, and international initiatives like the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), agreed in January 2005 just after the Indian Ocean tsunami, have helped change perceptions about DRR.

For Banerjee at the World Bank, even in the MENA region, which has been less affected by natural disasters than others, thinking is clearly changing.

“To me this shift has been the most intense in MENA, because MENA is not typically a region that is like Asia or Latin America that is hit by a disaster every few months. It’s hit by big disasters but over time, which is why sometimes the institutional memory is forgotten. But in the five years that I’ve been here there’s been so much more dialogue on this.”

Using climate funds

One potential source of funding for DRR projects that garnered a lot of interest from delegates at March’s first DRR conference in the Arab world [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97941/Arab-cities-aim-to-build-resilience-to-natural-disasters ] is climate change resource streams.

“This is already happening. If you look at some of the projects, programmes, entities that have been funded from the various existing financial instruments related to climate change adaptation, many of those activities are actually classic DRR activities - from early warning systems to agricultural livelihood measures and so on,” said Scheuer.

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is in charge of three climate funds: the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Special Climate Change Fund, set up under the Kyoto Protocol to offset the negative effects of climate change in the developed world.

The first two projects [ http://irinnews.org/Report/90571/CLIMATE-CHANGE-Adaptation-Fund-starts-delivering ] under the Adaptation Fund were to help handle rising sea levels in Senegal, and water management in Honduras.

Another recent US$7.6 million project in northern Pakistan funded by the Adaptation Fund is to help communities better prepare for sudden glacial lake flooding.

“If it’s rising sea levels, or depleted water table, when you address it, you are reducing the risk, you’re also anticipating what’s coming in terms of global warming,” said Longworth.

Several Pacific countries are drawing up joint strategies at a national level to tackle DRR and climate change adaptation together.

“The issue here is not that you get a transfer from the climate pots into the disaster pots of money. The issue is that programmatically and substantively speaking, we make sure that we have the synergies between those two funding streams,” said Scheuer.

“It doesn’t matter where the money comes from; it matters that we address the issue of risk and build resilience,” he said.

But preparedness is not all about big money - much DRR work, experts stress, can be relatively cheap things like training volunteers, teaching basic first aid techniques, and making better use of tools like mobile phones that many people already have.

Sometimes it can even just be a question of remembering former ways of living that were more resilient in terms of natural hazards.

In Japan, flood prone areas in traditional communities normally had an elevated building somewhere in the area that people could escape to, with second floors commonly storing a boat to help residents escape.

Build back better

In reality, it is very difficult for governments to grasp the value of DRR until they have been the victim of a major disaster.

In the case of Algeria, it was only after the Boumerdès earthquake of 2003 and the deaths of around 3,500 people that the government beefed up regulations for the construction of schools and hospitals, according to Hichem Imouche from the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The same thing happened after the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, which levelled most of Tokyo. Building regulations were strengthened again in Japan after the Great Hanshin earthquake near the city of Kobe in 1995; rubber blocks were placed under bridges and earthquake proof shelters constructed.

“Once disaster happens it is of course a bad situation but it is a chance to revise the way of thinking,” said Takeya.

No doubt the debate will move forward when DRR experts and officials meet on 19-23 May for the Fourth Session of the Global Platform for DRR [ http://www.preventionweb.net/globalplatform/2013/ ] in Geneva, Switzerland.

jj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98003/Analysis-Getting-governments-to-cough-up-for-DRR</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301091116460112t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">AQABA 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - Investing in preparation for potential disasters is a “no brainer”, Elizabeth Longworth, director of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), told a recent disaster risk reduction (DRR) conference in Aqaba, Jordan.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Towards increased services for Syrian survivors of sexual violence</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304250551050096t.jpg" />]]>NIZIP 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Turkey&apos;s camps for Syrian refugees are, by many measures, a model of humanitarian assistance. But one important detail appears to have been overlooked: According to aid workers, nowhere in Turkey&apos;s 17 refugee camps can survivors of sexual violence find the level of specialized psychosocial support experts say they so desperately need.</description><body><![CDATA[NIZIP 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - More has to be done to ensure the health and wellbeing of women and children affected by the Syrian conflict, said Babatunde Osotimehin, executive director of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), on a recent visit to Turkey’s Nizip refugee camp, about 40km east of the southern city of Gaziantep.

One of Turkey’s newest camps, Nizip houses some 10,000 refugees, or “guests” as the government prefers to call them, in white canvas tents and containers arrayed in neat numbered rows along the rocky, sun-bleached banks of the Euphrates. 

It is, by many measures, a model of humanitarian assistance.

Amenities include a laundry facility, a mosque, a health clinic, hot water and hot meals, schools and playgrounds, teahouses, hairdressers and a supermarket where refugees can shop for extras using electronic voucher cards. Kids can play organized football and compete in chess tournaments, watch TV and weave rugs. There is gas and electricity, sanitation and tight security.

But Turkish authorities seem to have overlooked one important detail. According to aid workers, nowhere at Nizip, or at any of Turkey’s 16 other camps, can refugee survivors of sexual violence find the level of specialized psychosocial support experts say they so desperately need.

“I am impressed by what I have seen here,” Osotimehin, a former Nigerian health minister, told a group of reporters gathered outside the camp’s school. “It’s remarkable what Turkey has done at its own expense.” But he had also come, he said, to highlight the urgent needs of pregnant and lactating women as well as victims of the sexual violence said to be on the rise across conflict-battered Syria. 

Sexual violence in Syria

Indeed, as a January report  by the International Rescue Committee put it, “rape is a significant and disturbing feature of the Syrian/civil war” - an assertion supported by surveys of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon who consistently cited sexual violence “as a primary reason their families fled the country” [ http://www.rescue.org/press-releases/syria-displacement-crisis-worsens-protracted-humanitarian-emergency-looms-15091 ].

Weeks later, Erika Feller, assistant UN High Commissioner for Refugees, echoed, those concerns, warning of reports that “the conflict in Syria is increasingly marked by rape and sexual violence employed as a weapon of war.” [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44230#.UWQlm_Vfo3G ]

And writing in the Atlantic last month, Lauren Wolfe, director of the Women Under Siege Project, which documents the incidence of rape in conflict zones, described how Syria’s “massive rape crisis” is “creating a nation of traumatized survivors” [ http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/syria-has-a-massive-rape-crisis/274583/ ].

To date, Turkey has taken in around 193,000 refugees in 17 camps, and six new camps are currently under construction. Stretched to capacity, the country has been lauded for its open-door policy and generous aid. But at least one gap remains [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97851/Is-Turkey-s-approach-to-Syrian-refugees-sustainable ].

“From what we have been able to learn, there is virtually no trained psychosocial support [specific to survivors of sexual violence] currently available in the camps,” said Leyla Welkin, a clinical psychologist and gender-based violence consultant working with UNFPA.

Specific services for survivors of SGBV are rarely at the top of the priority list in emergency settings, said Meltem Agduk, a gender programme officer with UNFPA. Like others have done elsewhere, Turkish officials first focused on providing adequate food and shelter to a spiralling number of refugees.   

“You can see that our camps are in better condition compared to Jordanian camps,” said a senior Turkish official. “The people are very happy.”

The government has informed the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) that specialized staff are available to the Syrian refugees, who can be treated inside the camp or referred to hospitals outside the camp where necessary, UNHCR's office in Ankara said. 

But as Welkin told IRIN after a meeting with women `mukhtars’, or village leaders, who teared up when asked about sexual violence, “there is a significant need for professional support.” 

Psychosocial services, more generally, are available to both women and children in the camps, but a lack of private space makes it difficult for women to talk about their experiences of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), perpetuating a culture of silence that severely impedes efforts to address it.

Building capacity

That dearth of psychosocial support for survivors of sexual violence in Turkey’s refugee camps is a function of its scarcity in the country at large, said Welkin, who is based in UNFPA’s office in the Turkish capital Ankara. “When it comes to SGBV, Turkey is very underserved.” 

Lack of personnel is a challenge for the Ministry of Family and Social Policy more widely, Agduk added. In some cities, there is just one psychologist and one social worker to deal with both the normal Turkish caseload, as well as the influx of Syrian refugees (an additional 130,000 have been registered outside the camps). 

In recent years, Turkey has focused on increasing its ability to respond to domestic cases of SGBV, opening one-stop centres where survivors of SGBV can access counselling, legal advice, and other kinds of support all in one place. But Turkey has less experience in treating SGBV in the context of disasters, in which trauma is multiplied, Agduk said. 

The Turkish government has been keen to address the issue of disaster-related SGBV, she added, and has turned to UNFPA for technical expertise.

Together with the Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Policy, UNFPA has designed a pilot programme to prepare and train 24 health care workers to conduct preliminary psychological assessment and treatment in the camps. The programme will also provide general public education on SGBV, said Welkin, including an intervention specifically targeting men, “some of whom will be perpetrators”.

UNHCR has also given Turkish officials its guidelines, or standard operating procedures, for the prevention of and response to SGBV "to be shared among their staff working with Syrian refugees in the camps."

UNFPA has already trained Turkish health care workers in the clinical management of rape, including emergency contraception, prevention of sexually transmitted infections, and collection of forensic evidence. But in the absence of access to counselling, said Welkin, victims are unlikely to present for medical treatment, largely because of the stigma surrounding the issue. Cultural differences and language barriers have also posed challenges, Agduk said.

The new training will begin within a couple weeks, with services likely to be up and running within two months, she said. This first phase of the programme targets health care workers, psychologists and social workers at the municipality and governorate level, with the aim of building capacity inside institutions that can be carried forward. 

“My hope is that this catastrophe can serve as an opportunity for Turkey to take a step forward in SGBV prevention and intervention - that the professionals we train will be able to take these skills from the camps to their own communities,” Welkin said. 

Indeed, government officials see this programme as “opening a door” through which they can establish new services that will be available not only for Syrian refugees, but in case of future disasters.

“It is important that they are now taking it seriously,” Agduk said.

New legislation, passed last year, has significantly improved the laws governing SGBV, for example by expanding the definition to include non-married victims of domestic violence or divorced women who are assaulted by their ex-husbands.

Understanding the needs

Still, the task ahead is not easy, and not least for the fact that the UN now faces a major funding shortfall. Of the US$1.5 billion pledged by international donors to cover Syrian refugee needs for the first half of 2013, just over half has been committed. UNFPA requirements for the Syrian crisis, across the region, for the same period were $20.7 million, but so far, say representatives, the agency has received less than half of that [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97877/Promised-aid-funding-for-Syria-reaches-half-way-point ].

Another challenge is that the scale and range of SGBV-related needs among Syrian refugees are not fully clear. 

“Our concern is not about the number of psychologists trained, but the lack of information about the reality on the ground,” said Ayman Abulaban, Turkey representative of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). He said UNICEF does not currently have information about this, but hopes to in the near future when project activities begin. 

Abulaban said there was a need to assess the gaps, to increase comprehensive prevention and response services, and to create a standardized referral system. He said he hoped a new UNICEF project to increase resilience among children and youth in the camps would help support the government in addressing the needs. (According to a recent Save the Children report, sexual violence in conflict disproportionately affects children and teenagers) [ http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0-df91d2eba74a%7D/UNSPEAKABLE_CRIMES_AGAINST_CHILDREN.PDF ].

“It is of utmost importance that Syrian refugees can access SGBV services,” he said in a written statement.

In the lead-up to its training, UNFPA, the Ministry of Family and Social Policy and AFAD, the government’s disaster and emergency management unit, will conduct a large assessment of the needs, Agduk said.

Meanwhile, as the fighting in Syria rages on, refugees continue to pour over the border, with some 7,000 new arrivals registering each day across the region. By the end of the year, warned UNHCR’s regional coordinator for Syrian refugees, the number of Syrian refugees in the region could surpass four million [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44602&Cr=syria&Cr1=#.UXjrJiuPgjU ].

The Ministry of Family and Social Policy did not answer IRIN's request for comment. 

pa/ha/cb

*This article provides additional information to an original version published on 2 May 2013. 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97953/Analysis-Towards-increased-services-for-Syrian-survivors-of-sexual-violence</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304250551050096t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NIZIP 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Turkey&apos;s camps for Syrian refugees are, by many measures, a model of humanitarian assistance. But one important detail appears to have been overlooked: According to aid workers, nowhere in Turkey&apos;s 17 refugee camps can survivors of sexual violence find the level of specialized psychosocial support experts say they so desperately need.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Coffee and patience: a day in the life of a family hosting Syrian refugees</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081000090696t.jpg" />]]>SAADNAYEL, BEKAA VALLEY 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The experiences of 1.4 million Syrian refugees are increasingly well-documented, but little is known about the people who open up their homes to host them. How do you organize your house to accommodate people you may only barely know? What are the stresses and strains? Do politics get in the way? IRIN spent a day in the life of a host family to bring you this portrait.</description><body><![CDATA[SAADNAYEL, BEKAA VALLEY 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Two years ago, as Syrian refugees began streaming across borders, Lebanese families opened up their homes. Unlike in Jordan, Turkey and Iraq, where hundreds of thousands of refugees are being housed in camps, at the beginning of the influx into Lebanon, the majority of refugees were hosted by families. Some Lebanese households took in as many as six refugee families.

But as the conflict next-door has dragged on and the number of refugees in Lebanon has grown, so too has the burden on their Lebanese hosts.

Today, most of the 425,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon are renting homes or apartments; with only 6 percent hosted by families, according to a survey by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

IRIN spent a day with some Lebanese hosts, bringing you this portrait of a family trying to balance obligation and sacrifice.

It was a series of twists of fate that brought together two families - one Lebanese, one Syrian - that did not know one another.

They met 15 years ago in a shared cab on the way to Syria, where the Lebanese family often shopped for cheaper products. Becoming friends, they met once or twice a year in Syria after that.

When Israel began bombing Lebanon in 2006, as part of a war with the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, the Lebanese family fled to Syria, where their new acquaintances hosted them for one month.

Six years later, the tables were turned.

On a sunny Thursday morning, Hannan is preparing a simple Lebanese breakfast of bread and vegetables for guests in the small Sunni village of Saadanayel, in Lebanon’s eastern Beka’a Valley.

Houda, 7, Bassima, 14, and their grandparents Sadika and Mohammad are seated on the floor of the living room, preparing to eat.

Hannan has been hosting the family of seven Syrian refugees in her humble two-bedroom house for the last five months. The children’s parents, Fadia and Houssam, have been out since early morning, like every day, searching for jobs in the surrounding cities of the Beka’a Valley. Their third child, 10-year-old Kamal, is out fetching water.

When their neighbourhood near the Syrian capital Damascus was bombed in December 2012, Fadia and Houssam called the only people they knew in Lebanon, and Hannan immediately responded.

“It's a pity. They had nowhere to go,” she said. “I couldn't say no. It would have been an offence against God not to help them.”

Hannan’s husband has a second wife, and only sleeps at the house every other day. Their five grown children do not live at home any more. So Hannan gave up her bedroom for the young Syrian couple, and is now sharing the second room with the grandparents and three children.

She spends her morning with the grandparents, interrupting their chit-chat every five minutes to take laundry off the clothesline, prepare coffee, garden, and watch over the refugee children playing in the field next door (They arrived in Lebanon too late in the year to enrol in school).

Everyone helps out with the household tasks, even Sadika, who has arthritis and leg pains. Fadia helps with the cooking and cleaning when she gets home from the job search. But as far as Hannan is concerned, that’s the easy part.

“I am used to cooking a lot of food for my visitors, so I don't mind cooking for 10 people. It is not the logistical side which is difficult. It is the financial side,” she whispers. “We are struggling to get enough food for everyone.”

The Syrian family has run out of money, so she, her husband and her seven guests live off the little money her husband gets from his pension, from their rented out horse pen, and from the garlic they grow in the backyard, which they trade for other vegetables.

They have cut back on meat almost completely and Hannan and her husband no longer buy new clothes or things for the house.

“I don't want to tell them that it's difficult, because I fear God,” Hannan says. “In 2006 when I stayed at their place it was different. I was staying with the grandparents, and it was only for a month.”

Around midday, the visitors begin stopping by. First it is the neighbours; then shisha-smoking friends of Hannan’s son, some of them Lebanese soldiers; then her own friends. They pass the time under the shadows of trees in the garden. The coffee is always flowing. The visits do not stop until late afternoon.

They chat about everything and nothing, and when the discussion turns towards the situation in Syria, Hannan springs out of her seat, and disappears into the house, finding a new task to keep busy. She doesn’t say so, but the discussions appear to make her uncomfortable. At the very least, she’s tired of it. “They spend all day talking about Syria,” she says.

At 2pm, the school bus drops off the neighbours’ children, who join the Syrian children chasing each other around the field. Shortly after their arrival, Fadia returns from hours of job-hunting. She cannot afford to take the bus every day, so sometimes she walks for kilometres.

She checks on her children, then immediately turns to helping Hannan with the daily tasks. She doesn’t get very far before a new visitor arrives.

A local representative from the Sunni political party Future Movement has stopped by. (He sometimes distributes food vouchers to the Syrian refugees, but he does not have any with him this time).

“They're lucky to have found a host family,” Anouar Choubasse says. “A lot of Syrian refugees have nothing, not even a roof.”

Fadia is a little surprised by his arrival and keeps her distance. She has tried to keep her family’s presence as discrete as possible - potentially for fear of the growing resentment [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97354/UN-To-avoid-tensions-with-refugees-Lebanese-hosts-need-support ] towards the refugees in Lebanon. She never shares her opinions about politics.

“Saadnayel has always been a [hospitable] community,” says Choubasse. “But now, I can feel the racism growing. A lot of Lebanese people are in a difficult situation and don't get any help. It's not as bad [here] as in certain villages, where they imposed curfews on the Syrians. But people are losing patience.”

This Lebanese host family appears to be no exception.

His wife may fear God, but Hannan’s husband Ali does not hesitate to speak openly when he comes home later in the afternoon.

“When I sleep here, I have to sleep on the couch in the living room. I want to sleep in the same bed as my wife again. If the situation lasts for more than two more months, I will set up the family in a tent in the garden. If they will be staying for the long term, I will build a permanent structure for them.”

He pauses to consider.

“Of course we need to help them,” he goes on. “As the Arabic saying goes: ‘If someone is good to you, be twice as good to them’. But we need our intimacy at some point.”

By 4.30pm, the visitors begin trickling out. The Syrian father, Houssam, is still not home. His wife hopes his delay means he has found a job.

While Mohammad, the grandfather, takes a nap in the living room, Fadia and Hannan have lunch together. To accommodate the constant stream of visitors, they have to eat in two shifts. Today, the women eat first. They usually mix with the men, but this change of circumstances makes them laugh. “In the old Damascene tradition, the men ate before the women,” Fadia says. “Now it's the opposite.”

Whereas both Fadia and Hannan seemed uncomfortable with some of the visitors talking politics, the atmosphere during lunch is much more relaxed.

Houssam eventually returns, still jobless. He is frustrated, but does not show it.

“I have been looking for a job for five months now and haven't found anything,” he says. “There is too much unemployment in the area and they hire the Lebanese before hiring Syrians… I could take any job, as long as it's not too physical because I have heart problems,” he adds.

They chit-chat together on the front porch until the sun sets.

At night, they watch a drama series - careful to turn on the TV only after the news is over. Hannan tries to distract them with happier thoughts.

“We don't want to follow what is happening in Syria,” she explains. “It is too emotional for the Syrian family to talk about it. When you host a Syrian family, you have to be careful and subtle about the topics you talk about. You also have to be really patient.” And apparently, you also have to have a lot of coffee.

ar/ha/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97997/Coffee-and-patience-a-day-in-the-life-of-a-family-hosting-Syrian-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081000090696t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">SAADNAYEL, BEKAA VALLEY 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The experiences of 1.4 million Syrian refugees are increasingly well-documented, but little is known about the people who open up their homes to host them. How do you organize your house to accommodate people you may only barely know? What are the stresses and strains? Do politics get in the way? IRIN spent a day in the life of a host family to bring you this portrait.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: The plight of LGBTI asylum seekers, refugees</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305070711300235t.jpg" />]]>KATHMANDU 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Refugees and asylum seekers face a host of challenges when crossing borders, but the obstacles are particularly pronounced for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) persons, say experts.</description><body><![CDATA[KATHMANDU 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Refugees and asylum seekers face a host of challenges when crossing borders, but the obstacles are particularly pronounced for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) persons, say experts.

“LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees face a range of threats, risks and vulnerabilities throughout the displacement cycle,” Volker Türk, director of international protection at the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), told IRIN from Geneva.

“And while the world has come a long way since first recognizing asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity in the 1980s, residual factors ranging from criminalization to disbelief result in LGBTI people suffering at the hands of a variety of actors as they flee oppression and seek safety,” he said.

A new edition of the Forced Migration Review (FMR) released on 29 April [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/ ] highlights many of the remaining challenges for LGBTI migrants and asylum seekers.

According to UNHCR, targeting people based on real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity for persecution, discrimination, and harassment can stem from the belief that they are encouraging unwanted or unnatural social change [ http://www.unhcr.org/505c18af9.html ].

LGBTI people leave home for the same reasons as everyone else: to flee war, persecution, and oppression; to seek stability, education, employment, and freedom. In situations of upheaval or conflict, sexual and gender minorities have become targets for scapegoating [ http://www.hias.org/uploaded/file/Invisible-in-the-City_full-report.pdf ] or “moral cleansing” campaigns [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/01/11/nepal-police-sexual-cleansing-drive ], compounding the inherent vulnerability created by unrest, activists say.

LGBTI persecution

LGBTI people experience torture, violence, discrimination, and persecution in countries around the world, sometimes deliberately carried out by the state and often conducted with impunity.

Homosexual acts are punishable with the death penalty in five countries (Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen), as well as some parts of Nigeria and Somalia, the International Lesbian and Gay Association [ http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2012.pdf ], the oldest and only membership-based LGBTI organization in the world, reported in 2012.

According to research by Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/12/15/we-are-buried-generation ], gay Iranians [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/25296/IRAN-IRAN-Activists-condemn-execution-of-gay-teens ] are fleeing, frequently to Turkey, due to the state-sponsored persecution they face at home, while thousands of LGBTI people have sought international protection in Europe in recent years on the basis of their sexual orientation and gender identity [ http://www.rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf ].

And while few countries keep LGBTI-specific data, Norway and Belgium [ http://www.rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf ], which both track asylum decisions based on sexual orientation and gender identity, have shown a steady uptick in recent years.

From 2008-2010, LGBTI asylum decisions in Belgium increased from 226-522. During the same period in Norway they increased from 3-26.

But information about abuses against LGBTI people - called “Country of Origin Information” (COI) in the asylum process - can be scant in hostile countries, argued Christian Pangilinan, a Tanzania-based refugee lawyer cited in the Forced Migration Review [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/pangilinan ].

For transgender people, COI can mislead agencies, such as in Iran where authorities “allow transsexual surgery as a forced method of preventing homosexuality rather than supporting trans identities,” according to a gender expert’s FMR chapter [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/bach ].

Crossing borders of geography and identity

The multiple document checks migrants might encounter can be particularly difficult for transgender or gender-variant people. While international standards for travel documents officially recognize three genders - marked M, F, or X - [ http://www.icao.int/Security/mrtd/Pages/default.aspx ] only a handful of countries have incorporated the third category [ http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/eilr/26/26.1/Bochenek_Knight.pdf ], meaning that high-security travel environments, such as airports or emergency residential camps, can threaten humiliation or exclusion to people whose gender identity or expression is different from what is indicated by their documents [ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1926681 ] [ http://www.worldwewant2015.org/node/283239 ].

Sexuality and gender are nuanced personal matters. According to research by psychologists [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/shidlo-ahola ], some individuals may have had limited experience expressing or experiencing his or her deeply-felt sexual orientation or gender identity, and may outwardly appear very different than how he or she feels - to the extent of even being in a heterosexual relationship.

With the asylum process taking increasingly extended periods of time [ http://www.unhcr.org/4381c5832.pdf ], some may start the migration or asylum process with one identity, and change over time, complicating the matter both personally and administratively and exposing the individual to further discrimination or ill-treatment [ http://www.rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf ].

UNHCR’s guidelines for claims to refugee status based on sexual orientation and gender identity take the progressive step of acknowledging that “sexual orientation and gender identity are broad concepts which create space for self-identification” which may“continue to evolve across a person’s lifetime” [ http://www.refworld.org/docid/50348afc2.html ]. Nonetheless, according to UN Office of Drugs and Crime guidelines, discriminatory attitudes regarding sexual orientation and gender identity can mean the credibility of LGBTI people is dismissed by authorities [ http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Prisoners-with-special-needs.pdf ].

"That no one should be compelled to hide, change or renounce his or her identity in order to avoid persecution is a central tenet of refugee law, and this applies to sexual orientation and gender identity on equal footing with other claims,” UNHCR’s Türk told IRIN.

“There is no space for decision-makers determining refugee status to expect them to conceal who they are."

Safety and security

“There is harassment in the camp against us, sometimes beatings,”said Yoman Rai, a 19-year-old Bhutanese refugee living in a camp in Nepal. “We have a protection unit and complaint mechanism, but we are still facing problems,” he said, adding that just last month a transgender woman was beaten by other people in the camp.

Security in refugee camps is complicated and contingent on numerous, unpredictable factors. For members of the LGBTI community, vulnerabilities are exacerbated. Sexual abuse is common, but often goes unreported because the right questions are not being asked, and because survivors of sexual violence are reluctant to report [ http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=5006aa262 ] events that will “out” them to legal authorities.

Explained Rai: “Many Bhutanese are not `out’ to anyone except for the outreach workers because they still believe being LGBTI will put them in danger and negatively affect their resettlement process,” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91459/NEPAL-Resettlement-of-Bhutanese-refugees-gathers-momentum ] adding that the outreach educators’ network was operated by a Nepalese LGBTI rights NGO.

Emergency shelter settings -such as relief camps or refugee housing- pose specific challenges for transgender people. Access to male-female gender-segregated facilities, such as dormitories or bathrooms, can be perilous [ http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-55/making-disaster-risk-reduction-and-relief-programmes-lgbtiinclusive-examples-from-nepal ]. New research is exploring how immigration detention centres can respect and protect LGBTI residents, a US-based prisons expert explained in FMR [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/fialho ].

For LGBTI migrants who end up in urban areas, research has shown that cities can be unwelcoming and unfamiliar and access to basic social services limited by scant local resources, exclusion of foreigners, or limitations to access including finances, language, and cultural barriers. [ http://www.hias.org/uploaded/file/Invisible-in-the-City_full-report.pdf ]

“The single most threatening factor for these migrants is isolation,”said Neil Grungras, executive director of the Organization for Refugee Asylum and Migration (ORAM) [ http://www.oraminternational.org/ ], a leading advocacy group for refugees fleeing persecution due to sexual orientation or gender identity.

With UNHCR data showing the average major refugee situation lasting 17 years, these circumstances can impinge on a significant portion of an individual’s life [ http://www.unhcr.org/4444afcb0.pdf ].

Migrant populations are generally more at-risk for HIV due to disruption and displacement [ http://www.unhcr.org/4ef3056d9.html ], and according to UNAIDS are often overlooked in host-country HIV policies [ http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/briefingnote/2007/policy_brief_refugees.pdf ].

“It is critical that refugee organizations identify what the best ways of offering protection are, such as providing access to safe shelter, requesting expedited resettlement, and, if possible, working with the police and refugee communities to address specific threats of violence,” said Duncan Breen, a senior associate in the refugee protection programme at Human Rights First.

Evolving frameworks

Recent UN reports [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40743#.UX8oC7Xkvzw ] and statements [ http://www.iglhrc.org/content/un-ban-ki-moon-condemns-homophobic-laws ] demonstrate increased international attention to the human rights of LGBTI people.

On the programme level, agencies have begun to adjust to include considerations of sexual orientation and gender identity.

For example, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is implementing a “safe space” project for refugees at its four US Refugee Admissions Program Resettlement Support Centers.

Jennifer Rumbach, IOM resettlement support centre manager for South Asia, told IRIN the programme is designed to help LGBTI refugees at “every step along the way - whether during counselling, interviews, orientations, travel, or post-arrival…

“Disclosing sexual orientation and gender identity overseas works to the refugees’ benefit because it ensures we can provide appropriate and respectful services, ask questions that are critical to their resettlement experience, and try to get them any special help they need while they wait to be resettled,” she explained.

But ORAM’s Grungras warned:“We have to be extra careful to talk with refugees and migrants on their own terms - to understand them as they understand themselves, and not label them as“LGBTI” just because it fits our programmes.”

In spite of challenges such as a dearth of respectful terms used in some languages referring to sexual and gender minorities, IOM’s programmes also attempt to engage with local terminology.

“While it's important for staff to understand sexual orientation and gender identity terms used by the international community, we make special efforts to use relevant and respectful local terminology in our signs, handouts and interview and counselling scripts,” said Rumbach.

Supporting and protecting LGBTI people as they migrate requires nuance, sensitivity, and an appreciation of evolving identities, legal frameworks, and programmatic potential.

kk/ds/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97989/Analysis-The-plight-of-LGBTI-asylum-seekers-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305070711300235t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KATHMANDU 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Refugees and asylum seekers face a host of challenges when crossing borders, but the obstacles are particularly pronounced for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) persons, say experts.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Less dependent on food rations</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011150703500206t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - The number of Iraqis without secure access to food dropped by more than a quarter of a million people between 2007 and 2011, part of a generally positive trend of increasing food security in Iraq over the last decade.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Food security in Iraq has improved in the last decade, as the American-led invasion brought an end to sanctions and a resumption of open relations between Iraq and the rest of the world.

Historically, Iraq’s vulnerability to food insecurity has been largely due to barriers to international trade - caused by two decades of wars and sanctions - which hindered the export of oil and import of food commodities. These barriers also affected Iraq’s ability to modernize the agricultural sector and employ new technologies; local production could not meet the country’s growing food needs.

As such, even during the worst years of sectarian violence in the last decade, access to food improved on average, compared to the years under sanctions.

Recent history

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in 1980, just four percent of Iraqis were undernourished or “food deprived”, meaning they consumed less than the minimum energy requirement, which in Iraq is currently estimated at 1,726 kilocalories per person per day. Despite years of war with Iran in the 1980s, agricultural subsidies and food imports from the US and Europe helped keep the level of food deprivation low [ http://www.fao.org/NEWS/1999/img/SOFI99-E.PDF ].

But when the UN leveled sanctions against Iraq in August 1990, and US government credits for agricultural exports to Iraq ceased, Iraq - almost completely dependent on imports for its food needs - saw food deprivation rise to 15 percent by 1996, according to FAO. Throughout the 1990s, food deprivation continued to climb, reaching a peak of close to one-third of the population in the late 90s, by some counts.

Humanitarian food supplies delivered through the UN’s Oil-for-Food Programme, initiated in 1995, helped ease the strain, but during the early to mid-2000s, the Public Distribution System (PDS) - the government’s subsidy scheme created in 1991 - remained “by far the single most important food source in the diet” for the poor and food insecure population, according to a 2006 report by the government and the World Food Programme (WFP) [ http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp193132.pdf ].

Post-2003

Food deprivation levels began to fall just before the turn of the century, and the decline increased with the toppling of former president Saddam Hussein, which saw Iraq regain the ability to import freely. In the last decade, the country has experienced a “huge transformation”, as one observer put it.

In 2003, months after the invasion, a WFP survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/122/wfp086624.pdf ] found that 11 percent of the population lacked secure access to food, a large drop from the high of the 1990s.

While food insecurity was found to have risen slightly, to 15.4 percent, in a 2005 WFP-government survey [ http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp193132.pdf ], it fell right back down shortly afterwards.

Joint government-UN analysis [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1110/Food%20Deprivation%20in%20Iraq.pdf ] of 2007 survey data [ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRAQEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22032522~menuPK:313111~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:313105,00.html ] found that 7.1 percent of the population was food deprived; this dropped to 5.7 percent in 2011, according to the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1685/IKN_S8_FoodSecurity_en.pdf ].

The government credits an improvement in security, economic growth and increased humanitarian aid.

PDS

Whereas aid workers estimated 60 percent of the population was food aid-reliant during Hussein’s reign, the PDS is now essential only to the poor [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/24110/IRAQ-Food-security-still-problematic-WFP ].

Sa’ad al-Shimary, a government employee from Baghdad, said his family used to be dependent on the PDS. “I don’t even need the food supplies we get from the ration card now,” he said. “I can buy good quality food from the markets, as everything is available now.”

But while the value of the PDS basket has diminished for most Iraqis (it now represents only 8 percent of the total cash value of food expenditures), it remains a major source of wheat and rice for 72 percent and 64 percent of households respectively, according to the 2011 IKN survey. (Iraq’s PDS is the largest in the world, according to the US Agency for International Development, providing virtually free basic food rations to any Iraqi; as such, it is not only utilized by the poor.) [ https://www.inma-iraq.com/sites/default/files/11_transforming_the_iraqi_public_distribution_system_2011jan00.pdf ]

The PDS is the source of more than one-third of Iraqis’ calorie consumption, and more than half of the poor’s consumption.

And at 35 percent, food continues to comprise the highest proportion of Iraqi household expenditures. Nearly one-quarter of IKN respondents said they used coping strategies to eat enough in 2011. In addition to the 5.7 percent of Iraqis now considered to be undernourished, an additional 14 percent would become undernourished if the PDS did not exist, according to the IKN.

Malnutrition

Malnutrition indicators paint a blurrier picture.

While the percentage of children under five who are underweight nearly halved from 15.9 percent in 2000 to 8.5 percent in 2011, according to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), conducted by the government and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), chronic and acute malnutrition indicators look less positive.

The percentage of children under five who are moderately or severely stunted (too short for their age) or wasted (underweight for their height) both increased - if only slightly - over the same period, a “worrying” trend, aid workers said, given the long-term impacts of malnutrition on mental development.

According to UNICEF, one out of every four Iraqi children suffers from stunted growth. High levels of chronic and acute malnutrition are a sign that mothers and children do not have access to quality food. While access to food has improved, stunting and wasting are difficult trends to reverse in a short period of time. As such, it may take years before improved access to food reflects in malnutrition rates across the board.

Impact of violence

Although the last decade has seen overall gains in food security, the sectarian violence of 2006-2007 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97905/The-forgotten-displacement-crisis ] did have a negative impact. For example, a WFP report based on 2007 data found that levels of food deprivation differed by area: in Diyala Governorate, one of the most volatile during the conflict, 51 percent of the population was deprived of food, while in the northern autonomous Kurdistan region, largely spared the consequences of the invasion, just one percent of the population suffered from food deprivation [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1110/Food%20Deprivation%20in%20Iraq.pdf ].

Here, too, there has been change. While in 2007, insecurity had a huge bearing on food security, the food insecure today are traditionally vulnerable groups - the illiterate, the unemployed, the displaced and female-headed households.

Iraq also faces new challenges to its food security, according to Edward Kallon, WFP’s director in Iraq, including rising global food prices, poverty, climate change, desertification and drought.

For more, check out this UN fact-sheet on food security [ http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1824/ExecutiveSummer.pdf ] and this presentation by UNICEF comparing the child indicators in Iraq over the last three to five decades [ http://www.unicef.org/equity/files/PMACEquitypresentation.pdf ]. The bulk of statistics come from WFP/government surveys in 2003 [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/122/wfp086624.pdf ], 2005 [ http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp193132.pdf ] and 2007 [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/227/WFP_VAMSurvey_2007_CFSVA%20final.pdf ]; and UNICEF/government surveys in 2000 [ http://www.childinfo.org/files/iraq1.pdf ], 2006 [ http://www.childinfo.org/files/MICS3_Iraq_FinalReport_2006_eng.pdf ] and 2011 [ https://www.yousendit.com/download/UVJneFlUY1M1bmo1SE1UQw ]. This 2010 report [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1110/Food%20Deprivation%20in%20Iraq.pdf ] on food deprivation analyzes 2007 data collected in a survey by the government and the World Bank [ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRAQEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22032522~menuPK:313111~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:313105,00.html ], just as this 2012 report [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1824/WFP-final-view.pdf ] analyzes food security data from the 2011 IKN survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/ikn ]. The FAO has its own figures on food deprivation [ http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf ]. The government has also tracked statistics [ http://cosit.gov.iq/english/AAS2012/section_19/2.htm ] on underweight children from 1991 through 2009.

For other development indicators, visit IRIN's series: Iraq 10 years on [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-ten-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact ].

af/da/ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97991/Less-dependent-on-food-rations</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011150703500206t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - The number of Iraqis without secure access to food dropped by more than a quarter of a million people between 2007 and 2011, part of a generally positive trend of increasing food security in Iraq over the last decade.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Women yet to regain their place</title><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041258200194t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - In the 1980s, Iraqi women enjoyed more basic rights than their counterparts in the region; today, despite steps taken after decades of conflict and sanctions, Iraqi women do not have equal educational or employment opportunities, and many are subjected to gender-based violence.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - In the 1980s, the UN says, Iraqi women enjoyed more basic rights than other women in the region. But years of dictatorship, sanctions and conflict, including the US-led invasion one decade ago, led to deterioration in women’s status. 

“Across the board, women are suffering more [than they used to],” said Sudipto Mukerjee, deputy head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq. 

Despite steps taken towards gender equality since 1990, Iraqi women today do not have equal educational or employment opportunities, and too many are subjected to gender-based violence 

Due to years of war and political instability, 10 percent of households are headed by women, most of them widowed, but many of them divorced, separated or caring for sick spouses. 

“They represent one of the most vulnerable segments of the population and are generally more exposed to poverty and food insecurity as a result of lower overall income levels,” the UN said in a March 2013 fact-sheet [ http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=xqx9gxy7Isk%3D&tabid=2790&language=en-US ].

Education 

According to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) conducted by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the government, the ratio of girls to boys in primary school rose from 0.88 in 2006 to 0.94 in 2011; in secondary school, the ratio rose from 0.75 in 2006 to 0.85 in 2011. According to IRIN calculations, the enrolment of girls is growing at a faster rate than that of boys.

However, had Iraq progressed at the same rate as other countries in the region, according to UNICEF, it would have already reached 100 percent enrolment for both boys and girls in primary schools - achieving the third Millennium Development Goal of eliminating gender disparity in education [ http://www.unicef.org/equity/files/PMACEquitypresentation.pdf ]. 

According to Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey of 2011, 28.2 percent of women 12 years or older are illiterate, more than double the male rate of 13 percent. Young women - those aged 15 to 24 - living in rural areas are even less educated; one-third of them are illiterate. 

Employment 

Similar inequality can be seen in the labour force. 

According to the IKN survey, only 14 percent of women are working or actively seeking work, compared to 73 percent of men [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1681/IKN_S4_LaborForce_en.pdf ]. Those who are employed are mostly working in the agricultural sector, and women with a diploma have a harder time finding jobs: 68 percent of women with a bachelor’s degree are unemployed. 

The representation of women in parliament increased from 13 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 2006, meeting the one-quarter female representation quota imposed in 2005, but this is still far below the national target of half. 

Physical safety 

Women’s health concerns have seen some gains. The percentage of births attended by skilled personnel has risen significantly in the last decade [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97964/War-leaves-lasting-impact-on-healthcare ]. And the maternal mortality rate - which at 84 per 100,000 births in 2006 was the highest in the region - appears to have dropped significantly, to 24 per 100,000 in 2011, according to the World Health Organization [ http://rho.emro.who.int/rhodata/ ].

Still, domestic violence, honour killings, female genital mutilation (FGM) and human trafficking remain threats to many Iraqi women and girls. In the northern autonomous Kurdistan region, 42.8 percent of women have experienced FGM, according to the 2011 MICS [ https://www.yousendit.com/download/UVJneFlUY1M1bmo1SE1UQwv ].

In 2011, nearly half of girls aged 10 to 14 were exposed to violence at least once by a family member, and nearly half of married women were exposed to at least one form of spousal violence, mostly emotional, but also physical and sexual, according to a survey by the government and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/I-WISH_Report_English.pdf ].

For more, check out this UN fact-sheet on women in Iraq [ http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=xqx9gxy7Isk%3D&tabid=2790&language=en-US ].

For other development indicators, visit IRIN's series: Iraq 10 years on [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-ten-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact ].

ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97976/Women-yet-to-regain-their-place</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041258200194t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - In the 1980s, Iraqi women enjoyed more basic rights than their counterparts in the region; today, despite steps taken after decades of conflict and sanctions, Iraqi women do not have equal educational or employment opportunities, and many are subjected to gender-based violence.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Syria refugees film - &apos;Where the war still echoes&apos;</title><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304301148480319t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - This new IRIN film series, Where the war still echoes, follows the family over the course of a year, from their arrival in December 2012. The series provides an intimate view of their struggles to adjust to camp life and the traumatic effects of the conflict back home, as well as the pressure felt by Selim to return and join the rebellion.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Selim and Leila were farmers in Dera'a, southwestern Syria, until the day their village was shelled by government forces and they decided to leave the country. This entailed a terrifying nighttime journey on foot through government-held territory, escorted by the Free Syrian Army. To keep the children quiet and avoid detection, they gave them sleeping pills. Many of their relatives are still stuck in Syria.

Selim, Leila and their eight children now live in Za'atari, a sprawling tented camp in Jordan, just 15km from the Syrian border, which is home to more than 110,000 refugees.

This new IRIN film series, Where the war still echoes [ http://www.irinnews.org/SyriaSpecial/index.html ], follows the family over the course of a year, from their arrival in December 2012. The series provides an intimate view of their struggles to adjust to camp life and the traumatic effects of the conflict back home, as well as the pressure felt by Selim to return and join the rebellion.

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97954/Syria-refugees-film-apos-Where-the-war-still-echoes-apos</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304301148480319t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - This new IRIN film series, Where the war still echoes, follows the family over the course of a year, from their arrival in December 2012. The series provides an intimate view of their struggles to adjust to camp life and the traumatic effects of the conflict back home, as well as the pressure felt by Selim to return and join the rebellion.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In Brief: Raids free enslaved migrants/refugees in Yemen</title><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201111081458460657t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - The army in Yemen has started a crackdown on illegal smuggling hideouts in the north where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa are frequently held against their will and tortured by criminal gangs looking for ransom money.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - The army in Yemen has started a crackdown on illegal smuggling hideouts in the north where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa are frequently held against their will and tortured by criminal gangs looking for ransom money.

In the last four weeks, 1,620 migrants, including women and children, have been freed in army raids around the northern town of Haradh close to the border with Saudi Arabia, according to information from the International medical NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) [ http://www.msf.org/article/yemen-msf-assists-migrants-freed-clutches-human-traffickers ]. It says most of the released migrants it treated at the MSF-run Al-Mazraq hospital had been victims of human trafficking, forced labour and slavery.

“There are clear signs of extreme violence. Fingernails have been pulled out and many are badly beaten. We welcome this clampdown, but there are almost certainly thousands more migrants in captivity, and for those released, welcome centres and humanitarian NGOs are seriously overstretched,” Tarek Daher, MSF’s head of mission in Yemen, told IRIN.

Migrants recently told IRIN horrific stories [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97826/Migrant-voices-Ethiopians-in-Yemen-describe-kidnapping-and-torture ] of the kidnapping and torture they had experienced after landing in Yemen. Around a 107,000 crossed from the Horn of Africa into Yemen in 2012, most originally from Ethiopia, according to UNHCR [ http://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/arrivals-yemen-2010-2013-31-january-2013 ], and at least 30,000 have made the journey so far this year [ http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/over-30000-refugees-and-migrants-arrive-yemen-so-far-year ].

See previous IRIN reporting on migration in Yemen here:

Migrant voices - Ethiopians in Yemen describe kidnapping and torture
[ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97826/Migrant-voices-Ethiopians-in-Yemen-describe-kidnapping-and-torture ]

DJIBOUTI-ETHIOPIA: Irregular migration continues unabated
[ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97097/DJIBOUTI-ETHIOPIA-Irregular-migration-continues-unabated ]

ETHIOPIA-YEMEN: Jemmal Ahmed, “I survived a deadly trip to Yemen"
[ http://www.irinnews.org/HOV/97104/ETHIOPIA-YEMEN-Jemmal-Ahmed-I-survived-a-deadly-trip-to-Yemen ]

YEMEN: Tortured for ransom
[ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95051/YEMEN-Tortured-for-ransom ]

jj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97961/In-Brief-Raids-free-enslaved-migrants-refugees-in-Yemen</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201111081458460657t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - The army in Yemen has started a crackdown on illegal smuggling hideouts in the north where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa are frequently held against their will and tortured by criminal gangs looking for ransom money.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>War leaves lasting impact on healthcare</title><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208310937080561t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Of all the areas of Iraq’s development that were affected by the US-led invasion 10 years ago, healthcare has probably taken the biggest hit. And much of the damage incurred in the first few years of the invasion continues to have an impact on health indicators today.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Of all the areas of Iraq’s development that were affected by the US-led invasion 10 years ago, healthcare has probably taken the biggest hit. 

The impact of the 2003 invasion and subsequent conflict on Iraq’s healthcare system has been well-documented [ http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(11)61399-8/fulltext ]. (Check out consistent coverage of the health consequences of Iraq’s conflict by the Lancet medical journal here [ http://www.thelancet.com/search/results?searchTerm=iraq&fieldName=AllFields&journalFromWhichSearchStarted= ].) The conflict shattered Iraq's primary healthcare delivery, disease control and prevention services, and health research infrastructure. Attempts to resurrect Iraq's healthcare system remain hindered by a number of factors, including fragile national security and lack of utilities like water and electricity.

Much of the damage incurred in the first few years of the invasion continues to have an impact today. 

Lasting legacy 

Iraq had prioritized healthcare at least since the 1920s, when the Royal College of Medicine was formed to train doctors locally. By the 1970s, Iraq’s health care system was “one of the most advanced” in the region, according to researcher Omar Al-Dewachi, a medical doctor who worked in Iraq during the 1990s before emigrating to the US [ http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/17/attachments/Dewachi,%20Public%20Health%20Impacts,%20Iraq.pdf ]. Health indicators improved quickly and significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, only to deteriorate again after the first Gulf War of 1991, which destroyed health infrastructure, and during a decade of sanctions, which drastically reduced government spending on health and led to a brain drain in the medical profession.   

After the 2003 invasion, the healthcare situation deteriorated considerably, and Mac Skelton, a contributor to the Costs of War project [ http://costsofwar.org/ ], fears it may never recover. Between 2003 and 2007, half of Iraq’s remaining 18,000 doctors [ http://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CEQQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.medact.org%2Fcontent%2Fviolence%2FIraq%2520Commission%2520Medact%2520submission.doc&ei=PrJhUcfsMMH-rAeCyoGABQ&usg=AFQjCNGlxW-aKXzPKiWiWv04q7Ln6pFc2A&sig2=F3p8IseTAaoOkp4HxchaCg&bvm=bv.44770516,d.bmk ] left the country, according to Medact, a British-based global health charity. Few intend to return [ http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20349702 ].

“Getting back to that robust, excellent standard [of healthcare] is not going to happen anytime soon,” Skelton told IRIN. “Unlike buildings that can be rebuilt, migration patterns aren’t reversed easily.” 

In 2011, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), Iraq had 7.8 doctors per 10,000 people - a rate two, if not three or four times lower, than its neighbours Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and even the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the Muslim world, Iraq’s doctor-patient ratio is higher only than Afghanistan, Djibouti, Morocco, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen [ http://applications.emro.who.int/docs/RD_Annual_Report_2011_country_statistics_EN_14587.pdf ].

In a recent article in the Lancet, the aid group Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) said that “until now, it is extremely difficult to find Iraqi medical doctors willing to work in certain areas because they fear for their security.” [ http://download.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140673613606649.pdf ]

According to MSF, many remote areas were excluded from state reconstruction and development efforts, “leaving thousands of Iraqis without access to essential healthcare to this day.” 

Nearly all families - 96.4 percent - have no health insurance whatsoever and 40 percent of the population deems the quality of healthcare services in their area to be bad or very bad, according to the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey of 2011.

As a result of the poor quality of care in their country, many Iraqis now seek healthcare abroad, increasingly selling homes, cars and other possessions to afford to do so, according to Skelton, who interviewed Iraqis seeking healthcare in Lebanon [ http://costsofwar.org/sites/all/themes/costsofwar/images/Health_and_Health%20Care.pdf ].

And researchers are still questioning the degree to which white phosphorus and depleted uranium, the armour-piercing, radio-active metal used in British and American ammunition, has increased cancer rates and caused birth defects [ http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/media/files/in-a-state-of-uncertainty.pdf ]. 

The environmental damage caused by the war - degradation of forests and wetlands, wildlife destruction, greenhouse gases, air pollution - will also have a longer-term impacts on health, according to the Costs of War project [ http://costsofwar.org/article/environmental-costs ].

Mental health 

A 2007 survey [ http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2008/pr02/2008_iraq_family_health_survey_report.pdf ] by the government and WHO found that more than one-third of respondents had “significant psychological distress” and presented potential psychiatric cases. A 2009 government mental health survey concluded that mass displacement and a climate of fear, torture, death and violence have contributed to the high ratio of mental illness in the country.

In a new report released last month, MSF said mental health continues to be a major problem in the country. 

“Many Iraqis have been pushed to their absolute limit as decades of conflict and instability has wreaked devastation,” Helen O’Neill, MSF’s head of mission in Iraq, said in a statement [ http://www.msf.org/article/iraq-mental-healthcare-helps-iraqis-rebuild-their-lives ].

“Mentally exhausted by their experiences, many struggle to understand what is happening to them. The feelings of isolation and hopelessness are compounded by the taboo associated with mental health issues and the lack of mental healthcare services that people can turn to for help.” 

Improvements?

The statistics, as always in Iraq, tell a story that is less clear-cut [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/491/Stocktaking%20of%20existing%20indicators%20and%20information%2013%20March%202008.pdf ].

The number of fully immunized children, for example, dropped from 60.7 percent in 2000 to 38.5 percent in 2006, then rose to 46.5 percent by 2011 - still less than pre-invasion levels, according to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) conducted by the government and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Acute and chronic malnutrition trends for children under five also showed a slight regression.

However, other indicators show some improvement over pre-2003 levels - unsurprising, some say, if you consider the “semi-starvation diet” of many Iraqis during the sanctions. 
According to the UN’s Human Development Reports, life expectancy at birth rose from 58.7 before 2000 to 69.6 in 2012. (These figures are quite similar to those of WHO [ http://rho.emro.who.int/rhodata/?vid=2639 ], but differ significantly from those of the World Bank, which show a regression from 70 to 71 years during the mid-1990s and early 2000s, to 69 years in 2011 [ http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?page=2 ])

The last decade undoubtedly saw a great reduction in infant mortality rates, not only over pre-invasion levels, but even compared to the early 1980s, when about 80 infants died per 1,000 live births [ http://www.unicef.org/equity/files/PMACEquitypresentation.pdf ]. By the year 1990, this figure was down to 50, and decreased further to 31.9 in 2011, according to a 2012 government report monitoring progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) [ http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bgHcDIXr8-s%3D&tabid=2790&language=en-US ].

Still, this rate remains more than double the national target of 17 per 1,000 by 2015; and while Iraq’s rate in the early 1980s was among the best compared to other countries in the region, today, it is among the worst.

The mortality rate of children under five also dropped from 42.8 per 1,000 births in 2000 to 37.2 in 2011, well ahead of 1960s levels, but far off the national target of 21 by 2015, according to the government report, which monitored MDG indicators at the governorate level. The percentage of births attended by skilled personnel also rose from 72.1 percent in 2000 to 90.9 percent in 2011, according to the MICS.

(WHO shows a similar trend of decrease in mortality rates, but its statistics are quite different, showing a much larger drop in infant mortality [ http://rho.emro.who.int/rhodata/?vid=2644 ] from 108 deaths per 1,000 in 1999 to 21 per 1,000 in 2011, and a decrease in child mortality [ http://rho.emro.who.int/rhodata/?vid=2645 ] from 131 in 1999 to 25 in 2011.)

Government expenditures on health have increased in the last decade. From a high point in 1980s, they dropped significantly due to the 1991 Gulf war and sanctions. But spending jumped from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2003 to 8.4 percent in 2010, according to the World Bank. According to Yasseen Ahmed Abbas, head of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society, government allocations for health spending have risen from $30 million a year under former president Saddam Hussein to $6 billion a year today. 

af/ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97964/War-leaves-lasting-impact-on-healthcare</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208310937080561t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Of all the areas of Iraq’s development that were affected by the US-led invasion 10 years ago, healthcare has probably taken the biggest hit. And much of the damage incurred in the first few years of the invasion continues to have an impact on health indicators today.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>From aid restrictions to access challenges</title><pubDate>Wed, 01 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304261033290092t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 01 May 2013 (IRIN) - Aid work in Iraq has always had a bumpy ride, from the restrictions imposed under former president Saddam Hussein to the corruption associated with the Oil-for-Food Programme. But it has arguably never been as challenging as in the last decade, when violence and insecurity made access to much of the country nearly impossible.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 01 May 2013 (IRIN) - Aid work in Iraq has always had a bumpy ride, from the restrictions imposed under former president Saddam Hussein to the corruption associated with the Oil-for-Food Programme. But it has arguably never been as challenging as in the last decade. 

Aid work was tightly controlled under Hussein’s rule, according to Yaseen Ahmed Abbas, president of the Iraq Red Crescent Society. “The Society was managed by the government - completely,” he told IRIN. “We have much more freedom now. You can’t compare.” 

But aid work in the post-2003 era takes place in a more “dangerous and volatile operating environment”, according to the UN [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/389/WHD%20Factsheet%20English.pdf ].

Dangers limit access 

Just a few months after the US-led invasion in 2003, a truck bomb targeting UN headquarters in the capital, Baghdad, killed 22 UN staff, including the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Iraq, Sérgio Vieira de Mello.

Between 2003 and 2007, an estimated 94 aid workers in the country died and 248 were injured. 

In response, aid agencies largely managed their operations remotely from Jordan, at a cost to the quality of the services, aid workers say [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/85756/IRAQ-Remote-control-aid ].

Aid throughout the past decade “was mainly limited to the provision of supplies and training from abroad, without direct population contact and the ability to provide prompt and targeted adjustment to the support,” Gustavo Fernandez, who headed Médecins sans Frontières’s mission in Iraq from 2008 to 2010, wrote in a recent article in the Lancet [ http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2813%2960664-9/fulltext#aff1 ].

Since 2009, security has improved, but aid workers are still exposed to considerable risk, the UN says. In January 2010, for example, a bomb devastated a hotel in Baghdad containing the offices of the International Rescue Committee, injuring staff and destroying assets. 

Hazards for local aid workers 

Local aid workers also face challenges operating in the high-security context of Iraq. For example, it can take an hour and a half every morning for Iraqis working with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in Baghdad to get past all the checkpoints and into the fortified Green Zone, where the US embassy is located.

And many Iraqis continue to hide their employment with USAID or the UN from neighbours, friends and even family to protect themselves in case widespread violence resumes. 

Mohamed*, a UN driver, told IRIN he leaves his house before 6am so that no one sees where he is headed. He lies to friends about his employer and only his family knows the truth. 

“You never know how things will change here. It could go back to how it was before. Working with the UN is perceived as working with the US.” 

While the dangers of association have diminished in recent years (USAID has doubled the number of local staff it employs), many local aid workers still refuse to travel to field sites in UN vehicles, preferring to arrive in their personal vehicles, and choose to wear UN-marked clothing only under specific circumstances. 

“Humanitarian aid workers in Iraq live with the daily fear of being targeted by militias,” the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs wrote in a 2010 fact-sheet [ http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/389/WHD%20Factsheet%20English.pdf ]. “Lack of access to beneficiaries, corruption, underfunding and poor information on humanitarian needs are just some of the other problems faced by aid workers on a daily basis.” 

*not a real name 

ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97952/From-aid-restrictions-to-access-challenges</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304261033290092t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 01 May 2013 (IRIN) - Aid work in Iraq has always had a bumpy ride, from the restrictions imposed under former president Saddam Hussein to the corruption associated with the Oil-for-Food Programme. But it has arguably never been as challenging as in the last decade, when violence and insecurity made access to much of the country nearly impossible.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>More freedom but less security?</title><pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201212181454160527t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - After a decade of sanctions, Iraq’s GDP has been growing consistently since 2003, and poverty rates have more than halved since 1990. But observers say billions of dollars in oil revenues have not translated into adequate gains in Iraqi well-being.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - US officials and others argue former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was a “clear danger” to the Iraqi people and to the region, pointing to the two wars he instigated in the 1980s and 1990s, the execution of his political opponents and the atrocities he committed against his own people. In an editorial this month in the Washington Post, Paul Wolfowitz argued [ http://www.aawsat.net/2013/04/article55298231 ] Hussein’s removal by US-led forces saved many lives and prevented the completion of a “genocide”.

For Kurds in the north, who were victims of severe violations of human rights under Hussein’s rule, the invasion has brought a new sense of security. But for many others in the country, the opposite is true.

More than 111,000 Iraqis have been killed since 2003, according to the tracking group Iraq Body Count [ http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ ]; most of these deaths occurred in 2006-2007, the worst period of sectarian violence in the last 10 years. Security improved in subsequent years - from nearly 30,000 civilian deaths in 2006 to fewer than 10,000 in 2008, and fewer than 5,000 in 2009. In the years following, it stabilized at around 4,000 civilian deaths per year.

In 2011, nearly three-quarters of the population perceived themselves to be secure or very secure, according to the Iraq Knowledge Network survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1677/IKN_Introduction_en.pdf ].

However, civilian deaths increased [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94677/IRAQ-People-consider-fleeing-as-violence-increases ] by about 10 percent in 2012, after the withdrawal of American forces. Established insurgent groups, like al-Qaeda in Iraq, have been regaining strength, and new ones, like the Free Iraqi Army, have emerged. Anbar Province, the epicentre of the Sunni insurgency in 2007-2009, has become restive once more.

Sectarianism increasing

Under Hussein, power was concentrated in the hands of Sunni partisans; the end of Hussein’s rule brought new opportunities to the long-marginalized Shia majority. But as Shiites have risen to power, sectarianism has become a major feature of Iraqi politics.

This is due, in part, to the decades of repressive policies seen under Hussein, but analysts also point a finger at US policies, which created a political system based on the repartition of power among three main groups: the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. The US also sought to purge the government of members of Hussein’s Baath party, which many Sunnis saw as a move to alienate them.

“At his most vulnerable position, Saddam Hussein used sectarianism and nationalism as weapons against his internal enemies,” the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) wrote in a recent briefing on the risk of a renewed breakout of large-scale violence [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/20130415_Thematic_Anbar_Province_Final.pdf ]. “Today’s Iraqi Shiite parties and government appear to be doing far worse as governmental rule is justified on a sectarian basis.”

This sectarianism has inspired many of the suicide bombings, kidnappings and terrorist attacks [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95999/Briefing-Why-is-Iraq-still-so-dangerous ] that have affected civilians in the past 10 years. According to CFC, “There is a legitimate, growing fear of civil conflict due to unaddressed grievances in Anbar and other Sunni-majority provinces.”

More freedoms

Despite the insecurity, some point to a new level of freedom, including increased personal rights, improved access to legal services and democratic structures in government.

“It’s not just about access to basic services. People have other aspirations [now],” says Sudipto Mukerjee, deputy head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). “The whole issue of equal opportunities, access to decent jobs and [having a] voice is coming up much more strongly than ever before.”

But this, too, is a mixed blessing, countered by what many observers call a dysfunctional parliament and corrupt cabinet.

“Now, we can write whatever we want,” says journalist Safa Muhammed. “We are not afraid of saying anything or criticizing anyone. We have that freedom, but it’s useless. No matter how much you write, no one [in government] is listening or willing to make changes.”

For other development indicators, visit IRIN's series Iraq 10 years on [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-ten-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact ].

af/da/ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97937/More-freedom-but-less-security</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201212181454160527t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - After a decade of sanctions, Iraq’s GDP has been growing consistently since 2003, and poverty rates have more than halved since 1990. But observers say billions of dollars in oil revenues have not translated into adequate gains in Iraqi well-being.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Arab cities aim to build resilience to natural disasters</title><pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201008101236340196t.jpg" />]]>AQABA 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Prevention may be better than a cure, but for the authorities in Arab cities and towns, natural disasters up to now have been largely about coping with them after they have taken place.</description><body><![CDATA[AQABA 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Prevention may be better than a cure, but for the authorities in Arab cities and towns, natural disasters up to now have been largely about coping with them after they have taken place.

“We react to disasters without any planning; we just go for the response, and you know that without any planning you can’t do the proper things,” Abdulmalek Al-Jolahy, first deputy minister at Yemen’s Ministry of Public Works and Highways, told IRIN.

But disaster prevention experts say the region took a step in the right direction this month, with the official finalization of the Aqaba Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction in Cities. [ http://www.preventionweb.net/files/31093_aqabadeclarationenglishfinaldraft.pdf ]

“We want some modest, achievable targets for improving DRR [disaster risk reduction] in Arab cities,” said Zubair Murshed, a DRR regional adviser with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Cairo, speaking at last month’s first ever regional conference [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97685/Disaster-Risk-Reduction-in-the-Arab-world ] on the subject in Aqaba, Jordan.

City mayors and representatives from some 40 cities and towns in the region, including Aqaba, Gaza, Mogadishu and Tunis, drew up a provisional agreement on non-binding commitments over the next five years at March’s Aqaba conference, a document which this month became final following further consultations.

The targets include devoting at least 1 percent of cities’ annual budgets to DRR, preparing a risk assessment report to guide urban development planning, and implementing at least one law to improve safety.

The Arab officials agreed to meet in 2015 to review their performance, though otherwise there is no formal mechanism to monitor progress.

If officials follow through on their agreement it would be an important step in reducing risk - including from flash floods, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis, droughts, sandstorms and tropical cyclones - for the region’s inhabitants, over 55 percent of whom live in urban areas.

Rapid urban growth

Population growth in the Arab region is among the highest in the world, with the urban population more than quadrupling since 1970 and expected to double again by 2050, according to UN-Habitat’s State of Arab Cities 2012 report. [ http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=3320 ]

“The region’s environment and wealth are increasingly concentrated in a small number of highly vulnerable cities and many such communities are at risk from multiple hazards,” said Djillali Benouar, director of the Built Environment Research Laboratory at the University of Science and Technology Houari Boumediene in Algeria.

“Many recent disasters in the last decades had their main impact in urban areas where there is a large concentration of people with a heavy dependency on infrastructure and services.”

The problem has been exacerbated by the influx of people displaced by conflict who often settle on sub-prime land - either flood prone lowlands or unstable hills, and with 87 percent of the region classed as desert, urban centres play a vital role in the economy - making any disaster in a major city a national catastrophe.

“Many of these cities are almost equal to the country - Djibouti for example. Take Cairo and Beirut as well. You only have one major civil airport in Lebanon and it’s in Beirut,” said UNDP’s Murshed, adding that many of these Arab cities were sitting on major seismic fault lines.

The past destruction of cities like Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut, Algiers and Alexandria is an indication of the potential threat from earthquakes alone.

Disaster risk experts say the Arab region has been relatively lucky in the last century, but even so, there have been more than 270 disasters, [ http://www.emdat.be/ ] and at least 150,000 deaths in the past three decades.

Natural hazards may be impossible to avoid, but good DRR can make the difference between an event that destroys growth for many years to come, or simply knocks the city back for a few months.

“If cities and local governments decide to tackle these issues then they will really reduce global risk,” said Margareta Wahlstrom, special representative of the UN Secretary-General for DRR.

The motto: Be prepared

Natural hazards become disasters especially when they hit ill-prepared vulnerable communities, but cities can do more to be better prepared - from setting up early warning systems, building the institutions and infrastructure to better handle disasters, to gathering an accurate picture of the risks they face.

The Jordanian port city of Aqaba was recognized last month as the UN’s first “role model city for DRR” and has implemented a number of measures to reduce risk.

In a corner of the Aqaba Secondary School for Boys a shipping container provides a base for the city’s Neighbourhoods Disaster Volunteers. Inside shelves are lined with first aid kits, pick axes, power tools, reflective jackets, among other things, all regularly inspected by the volunteers.

“In this team, we have to be prepared 24 hours a day to help people and reduce the effects of disasters. By being prepared, we can manage any disaster,” said Nouh Al Khattab, one of the volunteers.

They perform regular drills to practice disaster response, says Khaled Abu Aisha, head of the DRR unit at the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA).

“The volunteers are normal people just like you and I - living in the neighbourhood; women, men, young, small, normal employees. We meet twice a month.”

Jordan’s three main cities (Amman, Zarqa and Irbid) - with more than 70 percent of the population - are 30km or less from the Dead Sea Transform fault line which divides the African and Arabian tectonic plates.

Aqaba sits close to the fault line as well, and a 7.3 earthquake in 1995 killed at least eight people and damaged buildings throughout the city. Over the last 2,500 years, the area has seen some 50 serious earthquakes.

In 2006-7 UNDP helped ASEZA carry out a seismic risk assessment of the city to determine vulnerabilities.

While earthquakes may be a natural phenomenon unlinked to human activity, construction norms can make a big difference to the scale of the disaster. As Jalal Al Dabeek, director of the Urban Planning and DRR Centre at An Najah National University, Palestine, says, “Buildings kill people, not earthquakes.”

“Until now the problem is that the minimum requirements are not there yet. We are facing an Arab reality that construction in the Arab world is a long way from the minimum requirements.”

Engineers and officials are drawing up a regional Arab building code, but even when it is agreed, the regulations will need implementing and enforcing in practice.

Meanwhile, risk experts fear most Arab cities continue to be almost completely unprepared.

“We are definitely worried. Many cities like Aqaba are prepared but at the same time there are others which are not really prepared, and this is a worrying thing,” Shahira Wahbi, head of Sustainable Development and International Cooperation at the League of Arab States, told IRIN.

Flash floods

The danger of uncontrolled construction on wadis was highlighted during the 2009 floods in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, when more than 150 people were killed after a sudden downpour (90mm of rainfall in four hours - twice the average yearly rainfall).

Many of those who died in Jeddah were migrant workers living in slums build in the wadis. A highway junction built in one of the wadis was also submerged killing drivers and creating widespread destruction.

The Al-Shallalah community in Aqaba, built near a dry wadi, was hit by flash floods in 2010 causing several deaths. ASEZA decided to move the 5,000 residents from the area: 700 families went to a new development in Al-Karamah, while the rest were given vacant land and compensation.

Flooding prevention can often require major expenditure. In Al Mukalla, the capital of Yemen’s Hadhramaut Governorate, three river valleys converge on the port city creating frequent floods. Residents dug a 600-metre channel through the city centre to allow the waters to flow unhindered into the ocean.

Resilient cities

To encourage cities to better prepare, the UN Office for DRR (UNISDR) [ http://www.unisdr.org/ ] in 2010 launched the Making Cities Resilient campaign, encouraging local municipalities to establish DRR programmes.

Of the 1,419 cities and towns that have joined the scheme, around 270 are in the Arab world, almost all of them in Lebanon where 87 percent of the population lives in urban areas. In February, Nablus became the first Palestinian city to join the resilience campaign.

But overall, DRR experts say most Arab cities continue to prioritize other more palpable issues like water shortages and security, and are almost completely unprepared for major disasters like earthquakes, despite the devastating impact they can have.

“The people are not prepared. Nobody talks about that. It will be panic. People will be killed, not just by the earthquake and things falling down, but from the panic because they don’t know what to do,” Benouar from the university of Science and Technology Houari Boumediene in Algeria, told IRIN.

jj/cb


]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97941/Arab-cities-aim-to-build-resilience-to-natural-disasters</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201008101236340196t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">AQABA 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Prevention may be better than a cure, but for the authorities in Arab cities and towns, natural disasters up to now have been largely about coping with them after they have taken place.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Schools try to play catch-up</title><pubDate>Fri, 26 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/20071029t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 26 April 2013 (IRIN) - Iraq’s education system was once the jewel of the Middle East. Today, it is struggling to catch up, with five million children out of school, according to a 2007 survey.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 26 April 2013 (IRIN) - Thanks to growing oil revenues in the 1970s, Iraq had, by the early 1980s, developed a generous public services system. It was seen to have the best education system in the region, with near-universal primary school enrolment and an effective literacy programme. 

Had Iraq progressed at the same rate as other Middle Eastern countries, primary school enrolment for both boys and girls would be 100 percent today, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) [ http://www.unicef.org/equity/files/PMACEquitypresentation.pdf ].

Instead, Iraq’s education system is largely playing catch-up. 

Its downfall began with the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, and the Gulf War of 1991. It was exacerbated by the squeeze on resources caused by a decade of international sanctions throughout the 1990s, which resulted in lower teacher salaries, higher turnover, fewer qualified teachers, less professional development, neglected infrastructure and reduced access to resources like periodicals, according to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Government statistics [ http://cosit.gov.iq/english/AAS2012/section_19/3.htm ] show a 10 percent drop in primary school enrolment rates, from 90.8 in 1990 to 80.3 in 2000. Enrolment in Iraq’s vocational and technical schools dropped by half in the same decade. 

Following the US-led invasion of 2003, UNESCO reported [ http://www.unesco.org/education/iraq/na_13jan2005.pdf ] widespread arson and looting of educational facilities, with vocational schools, for example, losing 80 percent of their equipment, according to the Ministry of Education. A 2003 assessment [ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIRAQ/Overview/20147568/Joint%20Needs%20Assessment.pdf ] by the UN found that looting had affected 3,000 schools. Teacher training institutes were affected in all but the northern Kurdish governorates; libraries and colleges were looted and burned, UNESCO said. 

Brain drain 

De-Baathification - the occupying forces’ policy of removing from office all officials belonging to the deposed leader’s Baath party - furthered the educational decline by triggering a brain drain in universities, it added. 

“Emerging evidence indicates that the third war in three decades - the US-led invasion from 2003 to 2010 - has left behind a dilapidated education system affected by safety concerns, rising costs, and acute shortages of teachers and learning materials,” the University of Pittsburgh’s M. Najeeb Shafiq wrote in a 2012 article [ http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059312000685 ] in the International Journal of Educational Development. 

In the four years following the invasion, at least 280 academics were killed by insurgents and militias, IRIN report in 2007, leaving Iraq without a strong, educated elite to help the country - and the education system - recover [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/62983/IRAQ-The-exodus-of-academics-has-lowered-educational-standards ].

“We used to have all [sorts of] qualified people that build the country and organize the system in all fields,” said Hassan al-Hamadani, a member of parliament. “Now most of those people have left the country; many doctors and engineers have left as they were threatened.” 

Enrolment, attainment 

The impact of the 2003 invasion on enrolment rates, specifically, is less clear because statistics are inconsistent. 

Some, like those in the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), conducted by the government and UNICEF, show an increase in net enrolment of children aged 6 to 11, from 68.2 percent in 2000 [ http://www.childinfo.org/files/iraq1.pdf ] to 85.8 in 2006 [ http://www.childinfo.org/files/MICS3_Iraq_FinalReport_2006_eng.pdf ]. Other statistics [ http://www.ibo.org/ibaem/conferences/documents/EDUCATIONINIRAQBYWARANDOCCUPATIO1.pdf ] show the opposite: a massive drop from 93 percent enrolment in 2000 to 54 percent in 2006. Statistics in Iraq in general are widely viewed as unreliable, and those on enrolment differ based on children’s age groups and whether they are measuring net enrolment (the percentage of children of official primary school age who are enrolled in primary school) or gross enrolment (the percentage of children of any age who are enrolled in primary school). 

What appears clear, however, is that Iraq is not as far ahead as it could have been. The 2011 MICS produced a net enrolment rate of 90.4 percent (among those 6 to 11 years old), just under the government’s 1990 rate of 90.8. Yet one in seven secondary-school-age children is studying at the primary level. Only 44 percent of students complete primary school on time. 

And while secondary school enrolment has increased in recent years, according to the MICS, less than half of students continue past grade 6. In 2007, a joint World Bank and government survey found five million school-age children out of school. 

“Enrolment is not the same as attainment,” said Sudipto Mukerjee, deputy head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq. “Getting them to school is easy, but getting them to complete their studies is more difficult.” 

In addition, enrolment rates vary significantly based on gender, social status and geographic region. And while the quality of the textbooks has improved in the past decade, and there is no longer pressure on students to join the Baath party, some degree of sectarianism and corruption has found its way into the school system since 2003, said Ali al-Hussaini, a high-school student in Baghdad. 

“Sometimes a teacher makes fun of Sunnis and some other teacher makes fun of Shiites,” al-Hussaini said. “Now, all the teachers are corrupt. If I want to pass in the exams, I have to pay money - $200 for each class. Otherwise, they will make it impossible to pass.” 

Literacy 

Like primary education, literacy was an important focus in Iraq decades ago. In 1978, the government launched the Comprehensive National Campaign for the Compulsory Eradication of Illiteracy, but that campaign slowed after the wars of the 1980s and 1990s. 

Statistics on the adult literacy rate also vary widely: UNESCO notes an increase [ http://www.uis.unesco.org/literacy/Documents/UIS-literacy-statistics-1990-2015-en.pdf ] from 74.1 percent in 2000 to 78.2 percent in 2010, but a 2010-2015 strategy document [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/Literacy_needs_report.pdf ] points to evidence suggesting that “Iraq faces a critical situation with increasing numbers of out-of-school children and rising adult illiteracy rates, especially in the rural areas, among youth and adults, and among women and other socially marginalized groups.” 

A literacy campaign launched in 2010, Literacy Initiative for Empowerment (LIFE), and a new literacy law approved in 2011 are likely to improve the rates further [ http://www.unesco.org/new/en/iraq-office/about-this-office/single-view/news/unesco_praises_the_iraqi_parliament_for_approval_of_the_new_literacy_law/ ].

For other development indicators, visit IRIN's series: Iraq 10 years on [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-ten-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact ].

af/da/ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97928/Schools-try-to-play-catch-up</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/20071029t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 26 April 2013 (IRIN) - Iraq’s education system was once the jewel of the Middle East. Today, it is struggling to catch up, with five million children out of school, according to a 2007 survey.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Economy grows, but how many benefit?</title><pubDate>Wed, 24 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207270841090813t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 24 April 2013 (IRIN) - After a decade of sanctions, Iraq’s GDP has been growing consistently since 2003, and poverty rates have more than halved since 1990. But observers say billions of dollars in oil revenues have not translated into adequate gains in Iraqi well-being.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 24 April 2013 (IRIN) - Iraq’s development has historically been linked to its ability to sell and produce oil, and to world oil prices. Yet oil-related measures of economic growth may obscure some of the economic conditions facing ordinary Iraqis.

In 1980, after the oil crisis of the mid-1970s led to higher oil prices, Iraq’s GDP per capita was higher than any other country in the region (except Israel and the Gulf states), at US$3,453, according to the World Bank [ http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries?page=6 ]. But this number plummeted in the 1990s, during the Iran-Iraq war and years of sanctions, hitting a low of $455 in 1997. After rising slightly in 2000, it dipped again, to $742 in 2000. By 2011, it had returned to $3,501, though these figures are not adjusted for inflation.  

Iraq is now the second-largest producer of crude oil and has the fifth-largest proven crude oil reserves in the world. With an expected annual growth of 9.4 percent through 2016, Iraq has the region’s fastest growing economy, according to the government.

Rising oil prices brought in revenues of $94 billion in 2012 and are projected to bring in more than $100 billion in 2013, according to the Middle East Economic Survey. The International Monetary Fund projects Iraq’s GDP will grow by nine percent in 2013.

Public sector growth

As a result of its increased ability to sell oil post-sanctions, the public sector has expanded, and salaries of public sector workers have increased significantly, giving rise to a strengthened middle class.

“Before 2003,” said government employee Sa’ad al-Shimary, “[former President Saddam Hussein’s] Baath Party was everywhere. It was hard to work in such an environment. I feared they might write a report against me, as they always did, if we tried to criticize their work for any reason. I feared I might go to work and not return home.”

Back then, he told IRIN, he had to work extra hours as a taxi driver to pay the bills. “Now my salary is enough for me and my family. I have no fear in the ministry. My life has changed for the better; I have more money, and I have a new car.”

Year-on-year, Iraq’s recent economic growth (“real GDP” adjusted for inflation) has been more modest than nominal GDP growth, though still healthy. The economy retracted by 28.3 percent in 2003, according to Business Monitor International, but it rebounded by 39.6 percent the year after. Between 2005 and 2011, the economy grew by an average of 6.5 percent per year, even during the worst years of violence.

Still, Bassam Yousif, a professor of economics at Indiana State University, describes Iraq’s economic growth in the last decade as “anemic” given its weak starting point - an economy depressed by sanctions and a government restricted in trade, unable to spend any money domestically - and the sudden influx of cash when it was able to resume oil exports [ http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/32/attachments/Yousif_Iraq_Economy_08-19-2012.pdf ].

“What you would have thought Iraq could do with this windfall money 10 years ago is very different than what actually happened,” he said.

Waiting to see benefits

Economists and aid workers say much of the newfound wealth has not trickled down, largely due to Iraq’s economic dependence on oil, government corruption, a lack of capacity to execute budgets and a failure to develop the private sector.

“Even though GDP is going up, the average Iraqi doesn’t see that because the ability to spend that money is constrained,” Yousif said.

In 2012, Transparency International classified Iraq’s public-sector corruption as among the highest in the world; the country was ranked 169 out of 176 countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index [ http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results ].

“Macro-economic growth has not translated into commensurate improvements in people’s well-being,” Sudipto Mukerjee, who leads the economic recovery and poverty alleviation team at the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq, told IRIN.

Iraq has always been dependent on imports, and its agricultural and industrial sectors - already small - stagnated under the American push for import liberalization, which brought in a flood of cheaper goods. The oil sector has also failed to produce many jobs. The sector represented about half of Iraqi GDP in the 2000s, but employed less than one percent of the economically active.

After a massive jump in unemployment from 1990 to 2004, according to government statistics [ http://cosit.gov.iq/english/AAS2012/section_19/15.htm ], the unemployment rate fell from 28.1 percent [ http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/arpro/beirut/downloads/publ/publ_10_eng.pdf ] in 2003 to 11.7 percent in 2007, rising again to 15.3 percent in 2008.

Today, the rate is eight percent, according to the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1582/LB%20Factsheet-English.pdf ], based on the narrowest definition of unemployment (people who did not work at all in the seven days preceding the interview and were available for work and actively seeking a job that week), and 11 percent using the more relaxed definition (those who are not “productively” or “usefully” occupied, and are not actively seeking work but would do so if conditions in the labour market improved). Government numbers, which use an even broader definition, are higher. Women, youth and people living in rural areas have higher-than-average unemployment rates.  

A survey [ http://www.ndi.org/files/NDI-Iraq%20-%20April%202012%20National%20Survey%20-%20Report.pdf ] by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) late last year found that more than half of Iraqis - 55 percent - named unemployment as one of their top two concerns for the government to address.

For those who do have jobs - mostly with the public sector - larger salaries have not necessarily meant more purchasing power because inflation has risen. At its height over the last decade, consumer price inflation surpassed 50 percent (some sources put it as high as 76.5 percent) in 2006. As of January 2013, it was down to 2.2 percent, according to the Central Bank of Iraq.

Mustafa Ahmed, a father of two from Baghdad, complains that everything is more expensive now: “I used to buy a sandwich for 500 Iraqi dinars. Now it costs 5,000. I used to fill the car with gas with 6,000 dinars, and now [it costs me] 30,000.”

Measuring poverty

Still, the picture has vastly improved since the years spent under sanctions. Of all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) [ http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ ], Iraq has made the most progress on the first, already achieving the target of halving the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty by 2015. The percentage of people living on less than US$2.50 (adjusted for purchasing power parity) dropped from 28 percent in 1990 to 13.9 in 2007, then to 11.5 in 2011.

“With the end of the economic embargo in 2003 and the wage and salary hike of 2007, the standard of living of [Iraqi] households witnessed a significant improvement,” the Central Statistics Organization wrote, explaining the statistics. “Income of people working in the public sector (which constitutes 45 percent of the total household income) went up, leading to a significant decrease in the proportion of people living on  less than dollar a day compared to the1990 level.”

However, the World Bank deems the national poverty line - 76,896 Iraqi dinars per month - a “far more useful” [ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/MENAEXT/Resources/Confronting_Poverty_In_Iraq_E_Chapter_3.pdf ] gauge of economic well-being. By that measure, 23 percent of the population lived in poverty in 2007, according to a survey by the government and the Bank [ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRAQEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22032522~menuPK:313111~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:313105,00.html ].

“While unemployment has declined substantially, poverty rates have remained stubbornly high since 2004,” Yousif said.

Research to be released later this year by the government and the UN examines levels of multi-dimensional poverty - the absence of access to certain basic needs - which could reveal even higher levels of deprivation.

“In a middle-income country which has seen significant economic growth,” said Mukerjee, “should we still have so much unemployment? Should we still have so many people below the poverty line?”

He and others are quick to point out that national averages are skewed by relatively faster progress in the autonomous, more peaceful Kurdish region in the north, obscuring deprivations in other governorates such as Qadissiya, Muthanna and Diyala.

The silver lining, perhaps, is that poverty in Iraq is not very deep: the poverty gap index, which measures the average gap between how much the poor spend as a percentage of the poverty line, has fallen from 5.0 percent in 2006 to 2.6 percent in 2011, according to government statistics - much lower than most other countries. As such, while there are many people at the edge of the threshold, who could easily fall into poverty, there are also many in poverty who could easily could be brought out of it with a bit of support.

For more, check out Confronting Poverty in Iraq, a 2011 book by the World Bank [ https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2253 ] analysing the findings of its 2007 household socio-economy survey [ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRAQEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22032522~menuPK:313111~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:313105,00.html ]. Bassam Yousif’s work, both for the Costs of War [ http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/32/attachments/Yousif_Iraq_Economy_08-19-2012.pdf ] project and the Middle East Report magazine [ http://www.merip.org/mer/mer266/aspiration-reality-iraqs-post-sanctions-economy ], is also useful. You can find all sorts of government statistics, including financial and oil-related, here [ http://cosit.gov.iq/english/sections2010-2011.php ] and a UN fact-sheet on the labour force here [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1582/LB%20Factsheet-English.pdf ]. The government’s National Report on the Status of Human Development of 2008 lays out the government’s vision for addressing the imbalance between oil revenues and poor living standards [ http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-national-report-status-human-development-2008 ].

af/da/ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97909/Economy-grows-but-how-many-benefit</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207270841090813t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 24 April 2013 (IRIN) - After a decade of sanctions, Iraq’s GDP has been growing consistently since 2003, and poverty rates have more than halved since 1990. But observers say billions of dollars in oil revenues have not translated into adequate gains in Iraqi well-being.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Iraq 10 years on: the humanitarian impact</title><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041322550503t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - The humanitarian legacy

Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97895/Iraq-10-years-on-The-humanitarian-legacy ]

Water and Sanitation: Are the taps flowing? [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97894/Are-the-taps-flowing ]

Electricity: Blistering black-outs [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97896/Blistering-black-outs ]

The forgotten displacement crisis [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97905/The-forgotten-displacement-crisis ]

Economy grows, but how many benefit? [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97909/Economy-grows-but-how-many-benefit ]

Education: Schools try to play catch-up [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97928/Schools-try-to-play-catch-up ]

Human Security: More freedom but less security? [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97937/More-freedom-but-less-security ]

Aid work: From restrictions to access challenges [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97952/From-aid-restrictions-to-access-challenges ]

War leaves lasting impact on healthcare [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97964/War-leaves-lasting-impact-on-healthcare ]

Gender: Women yet to regain their place [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97976/Women-yet-to-regain-their-place ]

Food security: Less dependent on food rations [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97991/Less-dependent-on-food-rations ]

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-10-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041322550503t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The forgotten displacement crisis</title><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304211734550194t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - At the height of Iraq’s sectarian violence in 2007, some five million people were displaced from their homes. In recent years, people have returned in larger numbers, but two million remain either refugees or internally displaced.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Iraq has experienced waves of displacement in recent decades, but none compare in size or scale to the flight of Iraqis after the bombing of a Holy Shi’ite shrine in 2006, an event that marked the start of two years of deadly sectarian violence.

Over the course of several decades, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced by: the Kurdish revolt of 1975; the atrocities committed against Kurds during former president Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign in the late 1980s; Hussein’s forced relocation policies, which attempted to shift the demographic balance of specific areas in favour of Sunni Arabs; and the first Gulf war in 1991.

Another 190,000 people were displaced in the first two years of the American-led invasion, from 2003 to 2005, according to estimates by aid workers at the time. By 2006, an estimated 1.2 million people were internally displaced people in Iraq.

The 2006 Samarra mosque bombing set off what the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) called at the time the largest population movement in the Middle East since 1948. Some 1.6 million people fled internally, according to the International Organization for Migration, and an estimated 2.2 million [ http://www.unhcr.org/46653e804.html ] became refugees, escaping mainly to Syria and Jordan. As such, at the height of the civil conflict in Iraq, 2006 to 2007, nearly five million Iraqis had left their homes.

The current picture

Today, nearly one million Iraqis are still living as refugees in neighbouring countries, according to government estimates, with more than 126,000 of them registered with UNHCR.

That number was even higher before the conflict erupted in Syria, which forced tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95336/Analysis-Syria-s-forgotten-refugees ] to return to their homes, perhaps prematurely.

Another 1.1 million remain internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Iraq, according to the latest figures from the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. Many of them live in slum-like settlements, with no clear government policy to address their future [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96240/Still-no-clear-policy-to-tackle-displacement ].

Some researchers have even higher estimates.

“Perhaps three million people, 10 percent of Iraq's population, remain displaced - and forgotten,” Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Project on Internal Displacement run by the Brookings Institution and the London School of Economics, wrote last month [ http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/03/18-iraq-displaced-ferris ].

Localized violence along the disputed boundaries between Iraq and its autonomous Kurdistan region, as well as drought and desertification, have continued to force small numbers of Iraqis to leave their homes in recent years.

At the same time, in the last couple years, the number of people returning from displacement has increased. But these returnees often struggle to make ends meet. A UNHCR survey in late 2010 showed that 87 percent of returnees could not make enough money to support their families.

Displacement trends have also left much of Iraq divided along sectarian lines.

“Today, the governorates and neighbourhoods which were most affected by displacement are now more ethnically or religiously homogenous than at any time in Iraq’s history,” the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre wrote in 2010 [ http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/3D35B6E12A391265C12577F90045B37E/$file/Iraq_Overview_Dec2010.pdf ].

For more, take a look at the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s comprehensive report on the history of forced displacement in Iraq [ http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4958d9112 ]; IOM’s assessment of the condition of IDPs, five years after their displacement [ http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iom-iraq-report-5-years-post-samarra-displacement ]; and this research [ http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/17/attachments/Dewachi,%20Public%20Health%20Impacts,%20Iraq.pdf ] by Iraqi professor Omar Dewachi on displacement as part of the Costs of War project [ http://costsofwar.org/ ].

ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97905/The-forgotten-displacement-crisis</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304211734550194t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - At the height of Iraq’s sectarian violence in 2007, some five million people were displaced from their homes. In recent years, people have returned in larger numbers, but two million remain either refugees or internally displaced.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Are the taps flowing?</title><pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200911080903590500t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - While access to clean water has improved over the last decade, more than one quarter of Iraqis still have less than two hours of access to water from the general network every day.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - For much of the past decade, Iraqis have cursed about two things: ‘maya’ and ‘kahraba’ - water and electricity.

These are more than petty complaints; they have become a benchmark by which Iraqis judge progress in their country. A recent survey by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) [ http://www.ndi.org/files/NDI-Iraq%20-%20April%202012%20National%20Survey%20-%20Report.pdf ] found that 42 percent of 2,000 Iraqis surveyed considered basic services - like water and electricity - among the top two concerns they want the current government to address.

In 2011, more than one-quarter of the population had access to water from the general network for less than two hours a day, and nearly half the population rated the quality of water services in their area as bad or very bad, according to the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) [ http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1677/IKN_Introduction_en.pdf ], a survey of nearly 30,000 households  conducted by the Ministry of Planning’s Central Statistics Organization, the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office and the UN.

According to the UN, most Iraqis have limited access to clean water because of poor infrastructure maintenance and inadequate funding of the water supply system. One-fifth of Iraqis relied on bottled water as their main source of water, and only one-fifth of people had access to water from the general network all day long, the 2011 IKN survey found. The state of disrepair forced significant numbers of people into using river water, despite the health risks, IRIN reported in 2007 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/70243/IRAQ-Water-shortage-leads-people-to-drink-from-rivers ].

Still, statistics appear to show that access to clean water has improved in the last decade.

In the 1980s, more than 90 percent of Iraqis were estimated to have sustained access to clean water. By 1990, this percentage had dropped to 81 percent, according to the government. [ http://cosit.gov.iq/english/AAS2012/section_19/13.htm ] Since, then, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the percentage of households using an improved water source, including bottled water, has risen from 83 percent in 2000 to 91 percent in 2011, after a drop in 2006. The percentage of Iraqis with access to improved sanitation also rose from a government estimate of 71.5 percent in 1990, to 92.5 percent in 2000 and 93.8 percent in 2011, according to UNICEF figures [ http://cosit.gov.iq/english/AAS2012/section_19/14.htm ].

But experts warn that statistics vary significantly by region, and some Iraqis perceive there to be discrimination by sect. Just as deposed former president Saddam Hussein politicized service delivery, the current Shia-led government is seen, by some, to provide preferential service to Shia communities. In recent months, for example, large-scale protests in Sunni-led provinces have been partly inspired by dissatisfaction over service delivery in Sunnis areas.

For some, like Mustafa Ahmed, a father of two from Baghdad, the change in service provision has been negative. He told IRIN that, before 2003, he could get clean water from the network, but now he has to buy bottled water.

Meanwhile, water levels in Iraq’s rivers, lakes and reservoirs have decreased to “critical levels”, according to the UN, with the two main sources of surface water - the Tigris and Euphrates rivers - down to one-third of their normal capacity [ http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1866/Water-Factsheet.pdf ]. Resulting water shortages have affected Iraq’s previously almost self-sufficient agricultural sector [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/94921/IRAQ-Call-to-adopt-modern-irrigation-techniques ], which is now depressed and underproductive, the UN says.

For more, check out this UN fact-sheet on water in Iraq [ http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1866/Water-Factsheet.pdf ] and the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys of 2000 [ http://www.childinfo.org/files/iraq1.pdf ], 2006 [ http://www.childinfo.org/files/MICS3_Iraq_FinalReport_2006_eng.pdf ] and 2011 [ https://www.yousendit.com/download/UVJneFlUY1M1bmo1SE1UQw ], which measure access to water and sanitation, among other things.

af/da/ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97894/Are-the-taps-flowing</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200911080903590500t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - While access to clean water has improved over the last decade, more than one quarter of Iraqis still have less than two hours of access to water from the general network every day.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Humanitarian overview</title><pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011280721150248t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Ten years after US forces took over Iraq, opinions on the progress made are as polarized as ever.

On one side, the Iraqi and American governments argue, the gains have been significant.

“Despite all the problems of the past decade, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis agree that we are better off today than under Saddam’s brutal dictatorship,” Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki wrote in a 9 April opinion piece in the Washington Post, marking 10 years after the fall of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein [ http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nouri-al-maliki-the-us-has-a-foreign-policy-partner-in-iraq/2013/04/08/dcb9f8a6-a05e-11e2-82bc-511538ae90a4_story.html ].

Paul Wolfowitz, who served as the US Deputy Secretary of Defence between 2001 and 2005, wrote the same day in Asharq al-Awsat newspaper that given the hardships under Hussein, “it is remarkable that Iraq has done as well as it has thus far.”

Others are more circumspect in evaluating these gains, looking to the 1980s - under Hussein’s rule - as a time when Iraqi society was much further ahead.

“By all measures and standards, there has been a deterioration in the quality of life of Iraqis as compared to 25 years ago,” said Khalid Khalid, who tracks Iraq’s progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at the UN Development Programme (UNDP). “The invasion comes on top of sanctions that came before it and the Iran-Iraq war. It’s one continuous chain of events that led to the situation Iraqis are facing now.”

Mixed blessings

In the early 1980s, Iraq was regarded by many as the most developed state in the Arab world. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the Gulf War of 1991 and subsequent years of sanctions took a heavy toll on developmental indicators, yet Iraq continued to have strong state institutions, even if they were used repressively to maintain Hussein’s power. For example, even after 10 years of an international embargo, the system of food ration distribution operated effectively.

The US invasion and subsequent civil conflict changed this, said Maria Fantappie, Iraq analyst at the International Crisis Group, as violence and de-Baathification drove away the human resources needed to run effective institutions. In many ways, the country has yet to recover.

“In 2003, that heritage of an efficient Iraqi state was completely lost,” Fantappie said. “We have the consequences of this until today… We are not yet at the level of state institutions that can deliver services equally to all citizens."

Iraq is the only country in the Middle East where living standards have not improved compared to 25 years ago, the World Bank says. In areas such as secondary school enrolment and child immunization, Iraq now ranks lower than some of the poorest countries in the world.

“The war is just such a series of mixed blessings,” said Ned Parker, a former fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and long-time Iraq correspondent for the Los Angeles Times. “For every positive development, there’s a negative development that counters it.”

Looking at the data

IRIN has taken a look development and humanitarian indicators [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-ten-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact ] for Iraq, which show a decade of fits and starts, with progress in one area met by stagnation in another.

Of course, statistics in Iraq are often “wrong, simply not available or politically misused,” as one researcher put it. While a wealth of information and data exists, it comes from a multitude of sources using different methodologies, and much of it is based on relatively small sample sizes. The UN’s Information and Analysis Unit said in a 2008 report: “As is typical in volatile working environments, data reliability in some instances is questionable, contradictory figures exist, and geographic coverage of the indicators is often compromised for either security or political reasons.” [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/491/Stocktaking%20of%20existing%20indicators%20and%20information%2013%20March%202008.pdf ]

There are also huge discrepancies when national statistics are broken down by region, with the capital Baghdad and the autonomous Kurdish region in the north often the only governorates ranking above national average in measures of development. As Médecins sans Frontières wrote in a recent article in the Lancet journal [ http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2813%2960664-9/fulltext#aff1 ], “Much more attention needs to be given to remote areas, where the reality for Iraqis has not substantially improved over the past 10 years.”

What is more, much of the progress is seen in indicators tracking inputs, like how many children enrol in school, rather than outcomes, such as how much they actually learn, said Sudipto Mukerjee, deputy head of UNDP in Iraq.

But even with these caveats, the best available data offer a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling. For example, a recent overview of Iraq’s headway towards the Millennium Development Goals [ http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bgHcDIXr8-s%3D&tabid=2790&language=en-US ] found great strides in the eradication of poverty over 1990 levels, but slower progress on primary education enrolment, which still lags behind 1990 levels.

A million Iraqis remain refugees, and over a million are internally displaced; sectarianism holds sway over political institutions; and healthcare is undermined by a lack of medical personnel, unreliable utilities and fragile national security. Women and girls, who once enjoyed more rights than other women in the region, now regularly find themselves excluded from school and work opportunities, though great progress has been made towards gender equality in recent years. While living conditions, clean water access, poverty rates and education levels are all disappointing compared to historical highs in the 1980s, they are greatly improved from the years Iraq spent under sanctions. And increased decentralization of power has offered some hope for the future.

No easy narrative can be accurately applied to the country’s experiences over the past 10 years, and in many ways, the direction the country has taken may only become clear over the decade to come.

In the coming days, we will bring you our findings on each of the following indicators. Check back regularly!

Water and Sanitation [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97894/Are-the-taps-flowing ]
Electricity [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97896/Blistering-black-outs ]
Displacement [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97905/The-forgotten-displacement-crisis ]
Education [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97928/Schools-try-to-play-catch-up ]
Poverty/Economic Growth [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97909/Economy-grows-but-how-many-benefit ]
Health [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97964/Iraq-10-years-on-War-leaves-lasting-impact-on-healthcare ]
Food Security/Malnutrition [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97991/Iraq-10-years-on-Less-dependent-on-food-rations ]
Governance/Human Security [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97937/More-freedom-but-less-security ]
Gender [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97976/Women-yet-to-regain-their-place ]
Aid work [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97952/From-aid-restrictions-to-access-challenges ]

In the process of our research, we’ve come across some interesting bits and pieces. For more, check out:

A recent Op-Ed by Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, where he makes the case that Iraq has progressed
[ http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nouri-al-maliki-the-us-has-a-foreign-policy-partner-in-iraq/2013/04/08/dcb9f8a6-a05e-11e2-82bc-511538ae90a4_story.html ]

The case for why the US intervention was necessary and successful - by Paul Wolfowitz 
[ http://www.aawsat.net/2013/04/article55298231 ]

An entire issue of the Middle East Research and Information Project dedicated to the 10-year mark of Hussein’s toppling 
[ http://www.merip.org/mer/latest ]

The Guardian newspaper also has a special section on its website dedicated to articles on Iraq 10 years on from the invasion
[ http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/series/iraq-war-10-years-on ]

A pioneering project to track the costs of American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: Costs of War
[ http://costsofwar.org/ ]

The National Democratic Institute has done a series of public opinion polls in Iraq since 2010. Here is the latest
[ http://www.ndi.org/Iraq-survey-growing-optimism ].

The UN’s Joint Analysis and Policy Unit [ http://www.japuiraq.org/ ] for Iraq is a wealth of detailed, statistical information, including the Iraq Knowledge Network [ http://www.japuiraq.org/ikn ] survey the UN helped conduct in 2011.

Over the years, a number of other household surveys have been conducted by the government in collaboration with various UN agencies, including the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) [ https://www.yousendit.com/download/UVJneFlUY1M1bmo1SE1UQw ], supported by UNICEF; the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES), [ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRAQEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22032522~menuPK:313111~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:313105,00.html ] supported by the World Bank; the Iraq Living Conditions Survey [ http://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/english_tabulation.pdf ], supported by UNDP; and the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/227/WFP_VAMSurvey_2007_CFSVA%20final.pdf ], supported by WFP.

The government Central Statistics Organization has assembled statistics on human development indicators from various sources, from 1990 onwards, which you can find here [ http://cosit.gov.iq/english/section_19.php ].

The World Bank also allows you to download full sets of comparative statistics [ http://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq ] and the World Health Organization keeps year-by-year statistics since 1999 on each of the health-related Millennium Development Goals [ http://rho.emro.who.int/rhodata/?theme=country&vid=10702 ].

If you want to crunch numbers, check out the UN Human Development Reports over the years [ http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/ ].

The UN recently took stock of Iraq’s progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, with less than 1,000 days to go before the deadline [ http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bgHcDIXr8-s%3D&tabid=2790&language=en-US ].

IRIN has covered many of these issues over the years. Our Iraq archives are here [ http://www.irinnews.org/AdvancedSearchResults.aspx?DoAdvanced=true&Country=IQ&PageNo=4_20 ].

An interesting debate in Foreign Affairs magazine about whether Iraq is on track [ http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137700/antony-j-blinken-norman-ricklefs-ned-parker/is-iraq-on-track ].

The US auditor on Iraq reconstruction’s latest and final report that says $60 billion invested in Iraq’s reconstruction had “limited positive effects” [ http://www.sigir.mil/learningfromiraq/ ]

And on that theme, check out this cynical, almost satirical, book (and subsequent blog) by Peter Van Buren: We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People [ http://wemeantwell.com/ ]

af/ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97895/Humanitarian-overview</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011280721150248t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Ten years after the toppling of Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein, human development statistics – flawed as they are – paint a complex portrait of a country that has seen improvement over the last decade, but is still largely struggling.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Blistering black-outs</title><pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304221105270836t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Despite investment in the generation capacity in recent years, Iraq’s electricity supply system remains unreliable, offering an average of eight hours of electricity a day.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - The electricity supply system in Iraq has suffered from decades of neglect and lack of new investment, according to the UN.

It has also suffered from previous wars: the Gulf War, for example, rendered all but two of Iraq’s 20 power-generating plants unoperational, according to a study published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1991. Six months after the end of the war, Iraq had regained about two-thirds of its pre-war output, the report said, but a decade of sanctions made it difficult to replace spare parts and import supplies for repairs [ http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM199109263251330 ].

By 2003, the government had managed to provide acceptable levels of electricity supply to Baghdad, but other governorates received less than the capital.

Electricity production took a major hit after the American invasion. Within a month of the incursion, daily energy production had dropped from 4,075 megawatts to 711 due to post-war looting and sabotage, according to the US Special Inspector for Iraq Reconstruction. By the time the Americans handed over power to an Iraqi interim government in June 2004, production had climbed back up to 3,621 megawatts per day [ http://www.sigir.mil/files/HardLessons/Hard_Lessons_Report.pdf ].

Long-term investments made into electricity-generation capacity in recent years have not fully borne fruit, observers say, and have not been matched by similar investments into networks for electricity transmission and distribution. “It’s like pouring water into a leaking bucket,” said Sudipto Mukerjee, deputy head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq.

According to the UN’s Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU) in Iraq, the electricity supply system is “particularly unreliable and serves its users only a few hours each day.” [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1725/Electric%20Power%20subsector.pdf ]

Iraqi households receive an average of eight hours of electricity from the public network, according to the 2011 Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey, though the government promises to provide electricity 24 hours a day by the end of this year. In the 2011 IKN survey, seventy percent of respondents reported daily electricity cut-offs of more than 12 hours a day. An additional 26 percent had cut-offs of at least three hours a day. Summer temperatures in Iraq can surpass 50 degrees Celsius.

Conflicting views

Former president Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, is said to have discriminated against the Shia heartland in the south by providing them less consistent electricity access. Observers say electricity continues to be politicized by the government, more consistently provided to some groups for political reasons. However, aid workers say this is not reflected in the statistics.

IRIN interviews with two residents of Baghdad show part of this picture:

Sa’ad al-Shimary, a Shiite government employee, said: “Electricity is not a problem. The government supports us with 10 hours, and the rest we get from the private generator for only US$100 a month, so in my home I have 24 hours of electricity, as do most Iraqi families.”

But Mustafa Ahmed, a Sunni, disagreed: "Before 2003, electricity was bad, and now it's worse. We used to get between 12 to 15 hours of electricity. Now, if we’re lucky we get eight hours a day.”

For more, see this UN fact-sheet on the electrical power sector [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1725/Electric%20Power%20subsector.pdf ] and the IKN survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/ikn ]. In the latest issue of Middle East Report, Nida Alahmad of the European University Institute in Florence looks at American attempts to rebuild Iraq’s electricity supply immediately after the invasion [ http://www.merip.org/mer/mer266/rewiring-state ].

af/da/ha/rz

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97896/Blistering-black-outs</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304221105270836t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 22 April 2013 (IRIN) - Despite investment in the generation capacity in recent years, Iraq’s electricity supply system remains unreliable, offering an average of eight hours of electricity a day.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Promised aid funding for Syria reaches half-way point</title><pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304181456150982t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 18 April 2013 (IRIN) - Nearly three months ago, donors pledged $1.5 billion in humanitarian aid for the Syrian crisis. Today, Kuwait announced the transfer of its pledge of $300 million to international aid agencies and with that, half of the pledges have been fulfilled. IRIN takes a look at the status of the remaining pledges made in Kuwait, as aid agencies threaten to suspend their work for lack of funding.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 18 April 2013 (IRIN) - UN officials are lauding as a “big achievement” today’s announcement that Kuwait has officially allocated $300 million promised for humanitarian aid in Syria. 

Only once before has a Gulf country contributed such a large amount of money through multilateral channels - when Saudi Arabia made a $500 million contribution to the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2008, the single largest cash donation ever made to a UN agency. 

Kuwait’s announcement is a follow-through of the pledge it made at a major international conference on 30 January, in Kuwait, which saw more than US $1.5 billion in aid promised [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97376/Donors-pledge-1-5-billion-in-aid-to-Syria-while-demanding-more-access ]; it was one of the largest and most successful fundraising events in UN history (See the full list of pledges here) [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97395/Breakdown-of-Syria-aid-pledges-in-Kuwait ]. Yet hundreds of millions of dollars pledged at the conference by other donors have yet to materialize, and aid agencies in Syria are threatening to cut programming because of funding shortages. 

Kuwait has already begun handing over $275 million in cheques to UN agencies, with another $25 million going to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 

“We are … matching our words with our deeds,” Dharar Abdul-Razzak Razzooqi, Kuwaiti ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, told journalists at a press conference today [ http://webtv.un.org/watch/kuwaits-contribution-to-the-humanitarian-situation-in-syria-press-conference/2308918834001/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter#full-text ].

With Kuwait’s allocations, about half of the $1.5 billion has been committed or contributed, meaning the donor has provided details of the amount each recipient agency will receive or has actually transferred the money. 

“Without the Kuwait timely contribution now, we would all be in extreme difficulties, immediately,” Antonio Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, said at the press conference. “This gives us the breathing space to allow [us] to wait for other countries to commit themselves as Kuwait did and to make their pledges transformed into reality.” 

In December 2012, the UN appealed for $1.5 billion to help people both inside and outside Syria in the first six months of 2013, through two UN-coordinated response plans. As of 18 April, aid agencies had received approximately $810 million towards those appeals - or about 52 percent of the requested funding.

While the January conference was meant to meet those financial needs, not all the $1.5 billion pledged at the event will go towards the $1.5 billion needed for the response plans, with some donors choosing to fund project through other channels. 

FTS has so far tracked $336 million committed for humanitarian aid towards the Syrian crisis in 2013 outside of the two appeals [ https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/pub?key=0AusGu5uwbtt-dEp0eHRzcWdVd2hBQmpBVWwxUHRjcUE&single=true&gid=0&output=html ].

Revised UN-coordinated plans, including the financial costs of aid programs for the second half of the year, will be presented at the end of May. Guterres said the number of refugees by year end could easily be triple the number accounted for in the current plans. 

Gulf donors 

The bulk of the money pledged at the conference came from Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. 

Several sources told IRIN the Emirati government is unlikely to channel much or any of its promised funding through the UN, instead spending the money through Emirati channels, including the UAE Red Crescent Authority, the Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. 

The UAE Red Crescent Authority is running a new camp for Syrian refugees, which opened in Jordan last week and was described by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) as “five-star”. Ahmad Al Mazrouie, chairman of the Authority, told a local newspaper that the camp was “strong proof” of the commitment made at the January conference, with the Authority having spent more than 50 million Emirati dirham ($13.6 million) so far [ http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/uae-funded-camp-offers-refuge-to-fleeing-syrians ].

Sulaiman Al-Turki, of the Saudi Ministry of Finance’s department of international financial affairs, told IRIN that Saudi Arabia’s contribution has already been allocated to UN agencies and the Saudi Relief Committees and Campaigns, a local NGO active in the countries hosting Syrian refugees. The National Campaign for Syria has already received some of the funding, Al-Turki said, disbursed on an “as-needed basis, according to the National Campaign assessment.” 

A group of Gulf NGOs, which pledged an additional $183 million at the conference, has yet to raise the full amount promised, according to Suleiman Shamsaldeen, general manager of the International Islamic Charitable Organization, one of the organizations in the coalition. The commitment made in January, he told IRIN, was to raise and spend that amount by the end of 2013.

“They are trying to finalize the formulation…“The way it works is that these societies and NGOs commit themselves, but it doesn’t mean… they [already] have money in their pockets,” he said. 

However, Gulf NGOs have already started implementing projects, said Othman al-Haggi, head of relief at the Kuwait Relief Society, which is coordinating the efforts. A complete action plan - aimed in part at supporting fundraising efforts, focused around the Muslim holy month of Ramadan - will be published by the end of the month, he said. 

Separate from the conference, Qatar announced it would give $100 million to the opposition Syrian National Coalition’s humanitarian aid arm, the Assistance Coordination Unit. 

Other donors 

After the Gulf donors, the next largest pledges at the Kuwait conference came from the US, the European Commission’s humanitarian arm ECHO and the UK, each of which have fully allocated their funds. (The UK’s full commitment, finalized today, has yet to be reflected on FTS)

Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Malta, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia have also completely paid off their pledges, though many countries had planned their funding in advance in order to announce it at the summit. 

There are also other sources of funding for UN agencies and NGOs working on the Syria crisis, including the UN-managed Central Emergency Response Fund, which just approved $20.5 million for use by UN agencies.

The separate Emergency Response Fund (ERF) for Syria, established last June, has received $36 million in funding, of which $10 million remains available for use, awaiting project proposals from NGOs. (The ERF only funds small short-term projects to a maximum of $500,000, which must meet certain criteria. Many local NGOs do not have the awareness or the skills to submit proper proposals).

Funding machinery 

Massive bureaucratic machinery is involved in the funding of humanitarian responses to crises. Contracts have to be negotiated, signed and counter-signed, often both in the field and at the headquarters level. Depending on the amount of money involved and the sophistication, funding cycles and bureaucracy of the donor, it can take days - or months - from the moment funding is authorized to when the money is transferred to a bank account. 

Aid agencies rarely have any guarantee that promised funding will come through on any given day. Many donors, like ECHO, have separate mechanisms in place to fund emergencies, meant to speed up the process. 

However, pledging conferences, like the one in January, are almost never fulfilled completely, according to donor transparency groups.

For example, according to an analysis done by the Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, of $9 billion pledged for Haiti at a conference in March 2010, after the 7.0-magnitude (Mw) earthquake struck the island nation, $3.9 billion had been recovered by the end of 2010. By 2012, $6.4 billion had been received. (However, many pledges were multi-year commitments) [ http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/download/International_Assistance/5-ny-pledge-total.pdf ].

On average, from 2000-2012, year-long UN humanitarian appeals have been funded at 66 percent [ http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/gha-CAP-2013-analysis-1412121.pdf ].

While awaiting funds at the initial stages of the Syria emergency, many large operational UN agencies tapped into financial reserves from their headquarters, “at times taking some risks,” Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for Syria Radhouane Nouicer told IRIN. Even with these funds, UN agencies are now overstretched. “This practice has limitations and cannot accommodate all urgent needs,” Nouicer said. 

“If fresh funding does not come urgently,” he added, “the response will be seriously disturbed.”

Growing needs 

Inside Syria, at least four million people are displaced; millions more have lost their jobs and are struggling with increasing food prices [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97036/SYRIA-Bread-shortages-rising ], and unavailable healthcare [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97011/SYRIA-Healthcare-system-crumbling ].

UNHCR has registered more than 1.4 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries, and the unofficial number of refugees is thought to be much higher. In addition to their growing needs, refugees are also placing a massive burden on their host communities in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, with the potential to undermine stability in the entire region. 

During the press conference, Guterres lobbied for a special fund through which governments could more sustainably support Syrian refugees and their host countries. “This is not a crisis like any other. The dimension, the intensity, the level of suffering, the level of destruction are such that this cannot be funded with usual humanitarian aid budgets,” he said. 

Funding is not the only constraint for the aid operation in Syria. Insecurity, a lack of information, and layers of required clearances from both the government and UN have also limited aid delivery. But inadequate funding has played a significant role. 

“We are precariously close, perhaps within weeks, to suspending some humanitarian support,” the heads of five UN agencies responding to the crisis said in an editorial in the New York Times this week [ http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/opinion/global/a-un-appeal-to-save-syria.html?_r=0 ].

The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has already announced that without additional funding “in the coming days and weeks”, it will have to cut certain aid programmes inside Syria, including vaccination efforts, mobile health teams, water provision [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97518/Diseases-spreading-in-Syria-as-WASH-systems-collapse ] and recreational activities for children. In neighbouring countries, UNICEF will no longer be able to provide water for drinking, showering or latrines for tens of thousands of refugees, and will have to cut off education for tens of thousands of Syrian children studying in Jordanian and Lebanese schools.

UNHCR is struggling to afford simple things like lighting and blankets in some of the refugee camps, let alone sufficient security measures in the increasingly insecure Za’atari camp in northern Jordan [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97778/Despite-new-police-presence-security-concerns-persist-at-Syrian-refugee-camp ]. Without new funding, UNHCR said it will have to reduce the healthcare coverage it provides to current refugees. It will also become “simply impossible” for UN agencies to provide food, clean water, schooling, shelter and healthcare for new refugees who keep streaming in, it said [ http://www.unhcr.org/516576b66.html ].

WFP has in the past had to cut food rations for people inside Syria due to lack of funding in the pipeline. It recently warned it would have to stop providing food vouchers to 400,000 refugees in Lebanon in one month and reduce the value of food vouchers for 175,000 refugees in Jordan [ http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/un-says-81-million-urgently-needed-food-relief-35-million-syrians ].

“We heard [about] the huge generosity announced in Kuwait. We’d like to see it materialized now,” Panos Moumtzis, UNHCR’s regional coordinator for Syrian refugees, told IRIN. “The needs are more than what we are able to respond [to]. We don’t know how much longer we will be able to continue, unless a miracle happens with significant contributions.” 

Julie Thompson, who tracks donor commitments for FTS, also urged donors and recipients to inform FTS of money flows, “so we can help identify the gaps and direct resources where they are most needed”. 

af/ha/rz

*This article was amended on 19 April to correct Kuwait's allocation to UN agencies from $285 to $275 million. 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97877/Promised-aid-funding-for-Syria-reaches-half-way-point</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304181456150982t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 18 April 2013 (IRIN) - Nearly three months ago, donors pledged $1.5 billion in humanitarian aid for the Syrian crisis. Today, Kuwait announced the transfer of its pledge of $300 million to international aid agencies and with that, half of the pledges have been fulfilled. IRIN takes a look at the status of the remaining pledges made in Kuwait, as aid agencies threaten to suspend their work for lack of funding.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Egypt&apos;s food security in peril as fuel crisis intensifies</title><pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304161316580383t.jpg" />]]>FAYOUM 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Abdel Tawab Haron, in his late 40s, is late harvesting the wheat at his farm in Fayoum Governorate, 90km southwest of Cairo.</description><body><![CDATA[FAYOUM 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Abdel Tawab Haron, in his late 40s, is late harvesting the wheat at his farm in Fayoum Governorate, 90km southwest of Cairo.

“This is catastrophic,” Haron told IRIN. “I can lose everything if I fail to harvest the crop.”

But fuel shortages mean the cost of renting the machinery he needs to harvest the wheat would be almost the same as any income he would earn from selling it.

Like Haron, tens of thousands of farmers in Egypt are preparing for the annual wheat harvest, and the government - which faces a growing population, a sputtering economy and decreasing amounts of farmland - is hoping for a big crop.

As the world’s biggest wheat importer, it is struggling to find the foreign currency reserves to pay for imports. With less than US$14 billion in foreign currency reserves, Egypt has lost more than two-thirds of its total reserves since the 2011 exit of the former president Hosni Mubarak.

But shortages of the subsidized diesel needed to run irrigation and harvesting equipment are threatening food security.

Black market dilemma

The tractor owner in Haron’s village used to charge him 12kg of wheat per every 120kg harvested. These costs have now doubled, as have those for renting a chaff cutter.

“He tells me that he buys the diesel to run the machine for more money,” Haron said. “This means that I will end up distributing everything for free.”

From before dawn to late evening, long queues of trucks, tractors and farmers holding jerry cans form in front of petrol stations.

“A lack of fuel brings a total halt to agricultural machinery - and all agricultural activities as a result,” Abdullah Al Maamoun, a researcher from local NGO Land Centre for Human Rights, which defends the rights of farmers, told IRIN.

“This means that the farmers will not either harvest the crops or start any new farming cycles.”

Farmers face a choice between either waiting for subsidized fuel or turning to the higher prices on the burgeoning fuel black market. A litre of diesel on the black market costs 3 pounds ($0.44), instead of the subsidized rate of 110 piastres ($0.16).

A Ministry of Petroleum official said on 13 April that his ministry had decided to pump as much as 2,500 tons of diesel into the market every day to help farmers through the current harvest season.

“These amounts are enough to bring an end to the crisis,” Mahmud Nazim, a senior ministry official, told the newspaper of the Freedom and Justice Party [ http://www.fj-p.com/article.php?id=55489 ] (Arabic).

He said that in order to curb the smuggling of diesel, his ministry would send fuel directly to agricultural associations across Egypt, which would in turn distribute the fuel to farmers.

But farmers are still waiting to see these announcements put into practice.

To avoid paying the high cost of black market fuel, Haron has decided to search at home for an old scythe his father used long ago to harvest wheat manually, a physically punishing and time-consuming task.

Buy local

The government - struggling under the financial impact of two years of unrest - has drawn up plans to reduce food imports by buying more locally produced wheat.

But the government said in a statement on 3April that Egypt's wheat reserves are enough for only 81 days [ http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1004239 ].  

Seventy-five per cent of Egypt's wheat consumption comes from other countries. Last year, the country imported 11.7 million tons, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) [ http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=EGY ].

President Mohamed Morsi’s government is aiming to reverse those percentages and produce 75 percent of wheat locally.

The government has allocated 11 billion pounds ($1.6 billion) to buy 4.5 million tons of wheat from the farmers during 2013, according to the Middle East News Agency [ http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/130403/egypt-wheat-imports-be-cut-10 ].

In order to convince the farmers to sell them their wheat, the government has raised the price it pays for 150kg of wheat from 380 Egyptian pounds ($56) to 400 ($58).

But the fuel shortage crisis might sabotage all this. Al Maamoun says few farmers will think of selling their wheat to the government.  

“With farmers paying more money to get the fuel from the black market, the production cost of all agricultural products will rise,” he said.

“This means that the 400 pounds offered by the government to buy the wheat will be dwarfed in front of all the money the farmers paid to grow the wheat, irrigate it and then harvest it. This is why the farmers will think of selling their crops to the private sector, not to the government.”

Ragaa Abdo Al Metwaly, a 55-year-old farmer from Monshaat Abdel Rahman Village in Daqahlia, about 120km north of Cairo, says that, like many farmers, she will sell to the highest bidder.

“The only solution for the government is to raise the price it will buy the wheat for,” she said. “Farmers have bank debts to repay and families to feed; the government should have some mercy on us.”

Spoiling wheat

But the delays farmers have faced in harvesting and selling their crop leaves them exposed.

Al Metwaly says she does not know how to keep insects away from her wheat, and quality quickly deteriorates.

Hashim Farag, the head of the Small Famers' Association, warns against further delaying the harvest.

“Association members report crop loss already because of their failure to harvest the wheat in time,” said Farag, whose union has thousands of members, each with less than 2.5 hectares of farmland.

“Insects and birds eat the crops, and this means that the farmers will lose half of their production even before they harvest the crops.”

The government finds itself in a bind: It wants to buy as much of the Egyptian crop as possible for its subsidized bread, avoiding using foreign reserves for imports, but its the current financial problems make its ambitions difficult to fund.

Talks on a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund have struggled over the Fund’s desire for reforms to the subsidy system.

Other countries like Qatar and Libya have stepped in - the former offering a loan of $3 billion and Libya depositing $2 billion in the Egyptian Central bank.

Meanwhile, the government is finding it increasingly difficult to afford the 10 billion pounds ($1.5 billion) it spends on subsidized bread, and any disruption could provoke further unrest [ http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=417375&eid=87 ] (Arabic).

ae/jj/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97859/Egypt-apos-s-food-security-in-peril-as-fuel-crisis-intensifies</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304161316580383t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">FAYOUM 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Abdel Tawab Haron, in his late 40s, is late harvesting the wheat at his farm in Fayoum Governorate, 90km southwest of Cairo.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>