<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Mali</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/irin-fp.aspx</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 17:30:55 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>FOOD: Power to the people!</title><pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201104051041120547t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 15 May 2012 (IRIN) - The UN Development Programme (UNDP) launched its first Africa Human Development Report today, stressing food security as a means to a better quality of life for all. </description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 15 May 2012 (IRIN) - The UN Development Programme (UNDP) launched its first Africa Human Development Report [http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/africa-human-development-report-2012/ ] today, stressing food security as a means to a better quality of life for all.  

The argument is straightforward: Most people in Africa depend on agriculture, and better nutrition is good for human development. More food production means more food and income in people’s pockets, which has spin-offs which are beneficial for health and education. 

The report is not another exhortation to farmers to grow more food. Pedro Conceicao, chief economist with the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, explained that exclusively looking at linkages between small-scale farmers and agriculture or gender empowerment and agriculture were “piecemeal approaches” and not helpful. “We have to move beyond silver bullet obsessions [such as agricultural subsidies] or attention-grabbing headlines.” 

He reasoned that high economic growth rates in Africa had not necessarily resulted in a reduction in poverty and food insecurity - which points to accessibility to food and purchasing power as key factors. The report emphasizes “empowerment” and participation as important levers for change. 

It argues that countries need to implement a more strategic vision of food security. An approach to emulate would be what Ethiopia had done to beef up its agriculture sector by setting up a separate Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) [ http://www.ata.gov.et/about/our-mandate/ ] right next to the prime minister’s office. It is modelled on similar initiatives in Asia which helped accelerate economic growth in South Korea and Malaysia, for instance. ATA addresses bottlenecks in areas such as soil management, research and extension services. 

The report calls for new approaches covering multiple sectors - from rural infrastructure to health services, to new forms of social protection and empowering local communities. It calls for action in four critical areas: 

1. Increasing agricultural production: It acknowledges that boosting production would be integral to any approach to becoming food secure, and calls for investment in research, infrastructure and inputs and a Green Revolution in Africa; 

2. More effective nutrition: Develop coordinated interventions which boost nutrition while expanding access to health services, education, sanitation, and clean water; 

3. Building resilience: Investment in crop insurance, employment guarantee schemes, and cash transfers to shield people from risks and make them less vulnerable to shocks; 

4. Empowerment and social justice: Gender empowerment, access to land, technology and information are important to make people food secure. 

IRIN interviewed two leading experts on the issues. 

Steven Wiggins, research fellow with the UK’s Overseas Development Institute, who has been studying agriculture and rural development in Africa since 1972: 

Africa is not one unitary entity: “There are 56 countries in Africa... When Africa is considered as a single unit, there is a great danger that it is compared to other similar units, above all Asia, leading to analyses that suggest that if only Africa were more like Asia, then things would improve. Well, I’m not sure that Botswana has very much to learn from, say, Afghanistan, thank you very much. Hyperbole aside, the point is this: in Africa we have several, if not many, cases of admirable progress in food and nutrition security, but we overlook this.” 

Real progress takes time: “A longstanding issue in African policy debates is the search not only for growth, but for growth that is `transformative’. Even when an African economy grows, the pessimists say `yes, but where is the transformation?’ usually noting that in Asia growth is transformative. Well, yes, where that has apparently happened in Asia... it is the result of 30 or 40 years of sustained progress. Yet damning judgments are made about African countries after less than 10 years of sustained and high economic growth." 

Too complicated and demanding: It would have been better had it [the overview [of the report] stuck to a few fundamental propositions that are well supported by the evidence, namely: smallholder development plus primary health plus clean water will almost always reduce child malnutrition. Yes, let’s add girls in secondary school to the list: that will strengthen these links. But it’s that simple. 

Peter Gubbels, the West Africa co-coordinator for Groundswell International, a global partnership of local farming communities, has 30 years of experience in rural development, including 20 years living and working in West Africa. He is based in Ghana. He says: 

Move beyond the Green Revolution: “The report… seems to embrace the Green Revolution approach to agricultural improvement, citing... the results... in Asia, and seeking to now apply those lessons to Africa. The report suggests implicitly, that one reason Africa still has hunger is because Africa has not benefited from `science-based, input-intensive’ support. This is highly misleading. There have been many efforts to promote Green Revolution in Africa. Almost all have failed.” 

Missing bits: “There is no mention of Conservation Agriculture, or of the Brown Revolution [to promote soil fertility and conserve water].” 

Under-funding in agricultural research: “This is true but is also misleading. There has been a great amount of funding in the CGIAR [Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research] system in Africa, including IITA [International Institute of Tropical Agriculture] in Nigeria, from the 1970s onwards. One reason donors reduced funding in the 1990s was because it was not generating good production results. 

“But this report seems to assume that investing in new seeds, fertilizers, tractors, irrigation and training is what is needed... And how many very poor small-scale farmers can afford tractors?” 

Understanding resilience: “Equally disturbing is the suggestion that long-term resilience measures can enable risk averse, poor small-scale farmers to adopt riskier, but more productive, agricultural technologies. This is twisting my understanding of resilience. The aim is to reduce (or at least manage risk), using low external inputs and local ecological systems, not to increase risk by creating dependence on external expensive inputs (insurance, etc) for poor, vulnerable farm families working in marginal conditions. The way forward would be to develop crops and technologies that both increase food production and reduce risk by conservation agricultural techniques.” 

"Subsuming” nutrition into food security: “There is not just food insecurity in Africa. There is both food insecurity and nutrition insecurity. Currently in the Sahel, there is both a food crisis and a nutrition crisis. They may be linked, but the causes are quite different, and the solutions that are [rooted] in food security are almost always inadequate. 

“Just as we need to change the strong association of agriculture with food security, we also need to move nutrition out of the confines of food security. There is still a very strong tendency to believe that food aid, and increasing food production, solves most of malnutrition. It does not. It only helps prevent major spikes in the already existing emergency level of chronic and acute malnutrition.” 

Controversial issues side-stepped: “The report also almost completely sidesteps... genetically modified seeds... the role of agribusiness in land-grabbing, control of seeds, pushing pesticides and herbicides.” 

jk/oa/cb 
]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95459</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201104051041120547t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 15 May 2012 (IRIN) - The UN Development Programme (UNDP) launched its first Africa Human Development Report today, stressing food security as a means to a better quality of life for all. </td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SECURITY: A quick reaction force moulded by Africa&apos;s circumstances</title><pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201109090734440184t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 09 May 2012 (IRIN) - Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) - a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 09 May 2012 (IRIN) - Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) - a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention. 

Originally intended to become operational in 2010, the deadline for the ASF has been reset for 2015; but despite the delay, the ASF is becoming increasingly woven into the operating procedures of current AU security operations. 

The ASF “is very much a work in progress”, African Union Commissioner of Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra told IRIN, but “at the political level there is a strong support for it under the guiding principle of bringing about African solutions to African problems.” 

Once up and running, the ASF will be based on five regional blocs each supplying about 5,000 troops: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) force (SADCBRIG), the Eastern Africa Standby force (EASBRIG), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force (ECOBRIG), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) force (ECCASBRIG), also known as the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC). 

The regional forces are not a standing army like national forces. As the AU Peace and Security Council protocol of the ASF stipulates, they “shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.” 

The ASF is the legacy and logic of the Constitutive Act of the AU adopted in 2000, the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In a complete break from the OAU, which had advocated non-interference in member states, the Act gave the AU both the right to intervene in a crisis, and an obligation to do so “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. 

Lamamra said the ASF “Implies the immediate availability of the instruments [of intervention and prevention] to be translated into concrete deeds... when they relate to some kind of enforcing decisions of the legitimate organs of African Union, such as cases of unconstitutional changes of government… or armed rebellion, such as the terrorist situation in northern Mali.” 

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was held up as an example of what the ASF could be. “I believe the learning curve for the standby force is AMISOM. We have to deliver on the lessons learned in the AMISOM process - five years of effective presence on the ground under quite challenging circumstances,” Lamamra said. 

“The lesson of AMISOM is that Africans should be ready to make sacrifices, and Uganda has wonderfully shown that they are ready to make sacrifices for the common good of Africa.” Uganda has supplied most of the AU troops supporting the Somali government against jihadist rebels. 

The AU has deployed 14 staff officers to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, “in the first ever deployment of ASF elements,” El Gassim Wane, AU Commission director of peace and security, told IRIN. 

A field exercise - Amani II, following the Amani I mapping exercise in 2010 - is being planned for 2014 and three of the five brigades are expected to take participate. 

Article 4 (h) 

Lamamra was confident that by 2015 all of the ASF’s regional brigades - with the probable exception of NARC, owing to the disruptions of the Arab Spring - would be operational and able to fulfil all the criteria of AU’s Article 4 (h), which influenced the international development of the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. 

There are six scenarios in Article 4 (h). The lowest rung is the attachment of a regional military advisor to a political mission; then an AU regional observer deployed within a UN mission; followed by a stand-alone AU regional observer mission; and deployment of a regional peacekeeping force under the auspices of a Chapter VI mandate, all within a timeframe of 30 days or less. Scenario five is a multidimensional AU peacekeeping force deployed within 90 days, and scenario six relates to “grave circumstances”, such as genocide, and deployment within 14 days. 

Lamamra said the timeline of 14 days for level-six intervention should be reassessed to about seven days. “For instance, resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council was adopted on 17 March and the actual military operation started on 19th March - 14 days would have been too much in terms of protecting civilians.” 

In a 2010 paper, The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture, [ http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/209.pdf ] Solomon Dersso, a senior researcher at the Addis Ababa office of the Institute for Security Studies, a Pretoria-based think-tank, notes that “Article 4 (h) not only creates the legal basis for intervention but also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene to prevent or stop the perpetration of such heinous international crimes anywhere on the continent.” 

However, implementation of R2P rests with the Security Council, while the imposition of Article 4 (h) resides with the AU and does not require the Security Council’s blessing. 

Scenario six of Article 4 (h) has yet to be used by the AU and Dersso told IRIN he “sincerely doubted” the article would be invoked in the short term against member states, as “it would deprive the AU of any leverage it has over a target government,” and the AU has already “shied away” from implementing the article in Darfur. 

He expected the ASF to be close to being able to comply with Article 4 (h) level-five scenarios by 2015, but the development of regional forces was proceeding at different paces. 

The two-speed progress of the regional brigades - in which ECOWAS and SADC are recognised as the furthest along the path - is not just a consequence of the two regional blocs housing the continent’s economic power houses of Nigeria and South Africa, AU Commission director of peace and security El Gassim Wane told IRIN. 

“ECOWAS and SADC have made tremendous progress, EAS Brigade too, while NARC in the north was lagging behind, but then started speeding up, but the Libyan crisis meant progress had to stop,” he said. “Money may play a role, but money alone cannot explain that. ECOWAS and SADC focused early on conflict and security issues, so had a competitive advantage in the very beginning. Experience, length of involvement in peace and security issues, have certainly played a key role.” 

Alex de Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation, told IRIN the availability of a standby force could cloud judgment. 

“Intrinsically, in most of these situations what is needed is a political response, and there is a temptation that if you have a standby force to use it because you have a military capacity… And my concern over something like Mali would be that the military option runs the danger of getting the AU into a Somalia-type situation, where the use of military force five or six years ago by the US and Ethiopia very seriously rebounded. But having said that - yes, in a situation where there is a need for some sort of peacekeeping deployment in the context of a political initiative, it makes sense.” 

Alternatives to the ASF? 

Analysts have questioned whether 30,000 troops would be sufficient to deal with the continent’s crises, and 2012 has illustrated that such concerns are valid. A range of crises this year erupted within the space of a few weeks, from the uneasy relationship between South Sudan and Sudan deteriorating into skirmishing, to coup d’etats in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. 

Wane said the establishment of the ASF did not necessarily mean it would be the only security option at the AU’s disposal, and the four-country operation against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, (LRA) a rebel movement that started in northern Uganda, could be considered as a useful model for the future. 

“It’s not an ASF operation per se, as ASF has its own processes, and it was not really conceived as an ASF operation - it was conceived as an ad hoc, very flexible arrangement to enhance effectiveness to deal with the LRA once and for all. It’s a very flexible and creative way of dealing with a specific security issue… Who knows? We may replicate it elsewhere, where there is a security problem,” he said. 

The force ranged against the LRA - comprising soldiers from the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Uganda - has fought against the LRA in past, but is set apart, as it operates under the aegis of the AU. 

Abou Moussa, the Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), based in Libreville, Gabon, told IRIN: “The specific nature of this deployment [against the LRA] is termed ‘authorised’ as compared to ‘mandated’.” 

“Under authorised deployment, each country provides for the needs and requirements of their respective troops without the AU's contribution. This is extremely important, as this can be considered as their own contribution towards the determination to put an end to Kony's actions. It is very costly. However, the AU covers the needs of staff officers - some 30 of them posted to the various coordinating centres.” 

The AU task force has three operational centres, located in Dungu, DRC, at Obo in CAR, and Nzara in South Sudan, with its headquarters in Yambio, South Sudan. 

“The Regional Coordination Initiative means more subtle changes in the way the operation is run, with representatives of all four countries involved in the command structure in Yambio,” which sidesteps the politically sensitive issue of the DRC’s refusal to host Ugandan forces on its soil, Ned Dalby, a central Africa analyst for the International Crisis Group, a conflict resolution NGO, told IRIN. 

In July 2005, the International Criminal Court indicted Kony and four of his commanders, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Raska Lukwiya and Vincent Otti, for a variety of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Lukwiya and Otti have subsequently been killed, but the arrest warrants for the remaining three remain outstanding. The LRA has not been active in Uganda since 2006. 

go/he 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95426</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2011/201109090734440184t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 09 May 2012 (IRIN) - Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) - a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SAHEL: Aid efforts under strain as refugees numbers mount</title><pubDate>Fri, 04 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205030755480944t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR/OUAGADOUGOU 04 May 2012 (IRIN) -  Sahelian governments and local and international aid groups are struggling to cope with both the continual arrivals of people fleeing the regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal in northern Mali, and the mounting number of hungry people across the region as the lean season gets underway. </description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR/OUAGADOUGOU 04 May 2012 (IRIN) - Sahelian governments and local and international aid groups are struggling to cope with both the continual arrivals of people fleeing the regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal in northern Mali, and the mounting number of hungry people across the region as the lean season gets underway.
 
Altogether some 284,000 Malians have fled the north according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 107,000 of them thought to be displaced within Mali; 177,000 in neighbouring countries. New arrivals have pushed refugee numbers to 56,664 in Burkina Faso and to 61,000 in Mauritania, and to 39,388 in Niger, according to UNHCR. [ http://data.unhcr.org/MaliSituation/Current_Emergency_Response_Appeal.pdf ] These governments are already struggling to get aid to millions of their inhabitants, who are facing hunger due to drought. Fleeing Malians have told the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) they want to avoid getting caught up in possible conflict if government soldiers or foreign troops intervene in the north.

The UN estimates that 16 million people across the Sahel are facing hunger this year, and hunger levels are rising as the lean season gets fully underway. Families across the Sahel are also experiencing a significant loss of income as hundreds of thousands of Mauritanians, Burkinabes and Malians fled conflict in Libya, bringing a halt to the remittances they regularly sent.

New appeals

This complex mix of slow and fast-onset crises means the UN will be revising or launching new funding appeals from the current US$1 billion to $1.5 billion in coming weeks, said Noel Tsekouras, deputy head of office at the West Africa bureau of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Dakar.

Donors have given or pledged US$750 million in aid, most of it for food or nutrition needs, which many in the chronically underfunded region welcome as a strong response, but mounting demands will make this just half of the total necessary.

The World Food Programme (WFP) alone needs $360 million to bridge its immediate funding gap, having received just over half of the US$790 million it requires for the Sahel so far, said Claude Jibidar, deputy director of WFP in West Africa. The agency desperately needs cash so that it can start buying food in regional markets, he said.

In early May most food sectors remained severely underfunded. The Niger cluster appeal is only 7 percent funded for protection activities, 19 percent for water and sanitation, and has received no funding at all for education. [ http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R32sum_A952___2_May_2012_(02_03).pdf ]

UNHCR will also be upping its Sahel refugee appeal beyond the $35.6 million requested, of which just 41 percent has been received. UNHCR spokesperson Fatoumata Lejeune-Kaba said refugee camps in Burkina Faso and Mauritania will need to be expanded to keep up with the growing numbers.

IRIN looked briefly at the refugee and IDP situation in each affected country.

Mali displaced – unknown numbers

It is difficult to know the exact number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Mali - the UN estimates 107,000, with 75,000 staying in the north, though some observers in the area say as many as half of the population in some regions has left. [ http://ochaonline.un.org/westafrica ] Several aid agencies, including Catholic Relief Services (CRS), are diverting part of their aid response intended for the north to help displaced people who have fled south to Mopti in central Mali, or Bamako, the capital.

WFP plans to support 200,000 IDPs and host families with food aid, but there are fears for the estimated 75,000 in the north. Some NGOs have good access across northern regions, but UNHCR says the situation is still considered too insecure. “We have a real problem accessing IDPs in northern Mali,” said Lejeune-Kaba. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95390/MALI-Negotiating-humanitarian-access-in-the-north ] David Gressly, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel, says agencies have reached 40,000 of the northern displaced, but 35,000 are without any aid.

In Mopti, just south of the area declared as Azawad by National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), CRS is leading the IDP response and says they are seeing approximately 2,500 people pass through each week, most of them moving on to villages and urban centres such as Ségou and Bamako further south. CRS gives hot meals to those in transit and has recently started distributing food and other goods, much of it diverted from the agency’s planned food aid response for the north.

The Mali Red Cross, UNHCR, and other groups are also trying to provide aid to IDPs sheltering in Bamako.

Mauritania - scale-up needed


Malians in Mauritania tell UNHCR that the two main reasons they have left are fear of more violence, or difficulty getting by with minimal aid and breaks in basic services. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95390/MALI-Negotiating-humanitarian-access-in-the-north ]

Most of the 61,000 Malians sheltering in Mbéra camp, near the town of Fassala in southeastern Mauritania, come from Timbuktu, over which Ansar Dine, a jihadist Muslim group, claims control. Others come from the towns of Niaki, Guargandou, Tenekou and Goundam in the Timbuktu region, according to UNHCR, which says it needs $18 million to help the refugees for six months, as long as numbers do not rise significantly.

With hundreds of new arrivals every day, mostly women and children, agencies working in the camps - UNICEF, WFP and NGO Médecins sans Frontières - are having to scale up their activities far beyond the anticipated needs. MSF says camp conditions need to be urgently improved - by mid-April there was just one toilet for every 610 people. The nearest hospital to Mbéra is in Nema, a six-hour drive, so MSF is trying to provide basic services, including maternal health care and nutrition for children. An MSF communiqué notes that many Tuaregs are arriving with respiratory tract infections and diarrhoea.

Niger- the most critical

There have been no recent arrivals of refugees in Niger, leaving the population at 39,000, most of whom are staying in Ouallam camp, 100km from the Niger-Mali border.

However, Niger as a whole is in a very critical situation, with the same number of people facing hunger as in all the neighbouring countries combined. When it comes to getting enough cereals and other basic foods into the country to stem hunger, “Niger is the biggest problem at the moment,” WFP’s Jibidar stressed.

Mariatou Adamou, a nurse at the nutrition treatment centre in Goudel, northern Niger, where many Malians originally arrived, said they were receiving higher numbers of malnourished children than in 2011, and adults were also suffering severely. “The grain banks are empty… so even the parents are malnourished and have nothing at home.” After an initial screening of newly arrived Malian children aged under five, 100 percent were considered malnourished.

UNHCR and WFP are supporting refugee families in Ouallam camp, while NGOs are also trying to include refugee needs in their ongoing responses. NGO Plan International is distributing food, conducting malnutrition screening and setting up drinking water distribution points and latrines for refugees staying outside of camps. They are also making available psychosocial support for people who witnessed violence or experienced devastating losses.

“Bandits came with guns and stole many of our things… in my village they were taking animals [representing the main family assets] away right in front of us… when I left I couldn’t bring anything because I had to bring my children. I didn’t bring any food,” Azahara Naziou, a Malian in Goudel, told Plan International.

Another refugee, Adaoula Harouzen, said more than 20 animals were taken from him. “They have not stolen them… they would tell me, ‘You have to choose your animals or your life.’ You stand there looking at them, helpless. You prefer saving your life, so they take the animals and go.”

Burkina Faso – water critical

More Malians are arriving in Burkina Faso every day, leaving the government’s National Commission for Refugees (CONAREF) overwhelmed, said its coordinator Denis Ouédraogo. The agency has only 13 staff members. “We were expecting refugees, but not to that extent in this context of food deficit in Burkina,” he told IRIN. ‘’The problem is how to respect our commitments towards our populations, who are faced with a food shortage, and to assist refugees at the same time.”

The government is mapping out a response plan for the 60,000 refugees, but Ouedraogo fears it will be “quickly outdated”.

Only half of the government’s $170 million appeal to fund food security and refugee response has been met, said Roger Ebanda, head of the UNHCR in Burkina Faso, and the UN Refugee Agency’s funding is also low, making the response “difficult”. Ebanda and Jean Hereu, head of MSF in Burkina Faso, say water is the urgent need in the camps.

Refugees in camps in Burkina and Mauritania are receiving a maximum of 10 litres of water per day, but agreed minimum standards for disaster response puts rations at double that. [ http://www.sphereproject.org/ ]

Mohamed Ag Mohamed Maloud, 60, a trader from Timbuktu who is now acting as a refugee representative at Somgande camp on the outskirts of Ouagadougou, the Burkina capital, told IRIN he had been forced from his country during the fighting in the 1990s, but this experience is worse. ‘’The problem is that we do not have enough food... these are difficult days, but we try to cope.”

Each refugee is given a ration of 7kg of food for two weeks. “It is just not enough,” he said. The refugees have a money-lending system for those who arrived with none, prioritizing families who are 100 percent dependent on WFP for food. Other agencies are also helping - the Burkina Faso Red Cross is distributing 400 million CFA worth of food vouchers, as well as tents and water.

Health facilities are weak but improving. MSF has set up mobile clinics in Dibisi and Goutoure in the north, where 10,000 refugees are sheltering - before, they had to walk 17km to the nearest health clinic. The World Health Organization’s Burkina Faso representative, Djamila Cabral, said children have been vaccinated against meningitis, measles and polio.

aj/bo/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95410</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205030755480944t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR/OUAGADOUGOU 04 May 2012 (IRIN) -  Sahelian governments and local and international aid groups are struggling to cope with both the continual arrivals of people fleeing the regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal in northern Mali, and the mounting number of hungry people across the region as the lean season gets underway. </td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Negotiating humanitarian access in the north</title><pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205010838450199t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 01 May 2012 (IRIN) - Aid agencies in northern Mali are debating how or whether they should negotiate with newly installed rebel groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine, which is affiliated to Al Qaeda, to reach people in need.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 01 May 2012 (IRIN) - Aid agencies in northern Mali are debating how or whether they should negotiate with newly installed rebel groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine, which is affiliated to Al Qaeda, to reach people in need.

There are layers of complexity. Agencies have divergent approaches to securing humanitarian access - some refuse to use armed escorts under any circumstances, others see them as necessary in extreme situations; some US agencies cannot negotiate with terrorist-affiliated groups, others are already doing so. IRIN spoke to humanitarian agencies operating in the north to find out how they are delivering aid.

Prior to the March 2012 rebel fight for the north, northern Mali had for years been a volatile operating environment, mainly because of kidnapping and banditry. Most agencies leave all non-African and expatriated staff in the capital, Bamako. Some, such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which operates in Gao, work only through local partners. Others, such as the World Food Programme (WFP), have for years used private transport companies to deliver aid.

When rebel groups succeeded in taking power in the north in early April 2012, aid agency operations were made more complicated, initially as each was forced to scramble to rebuild their stocks and equipment after widescale looting of their northern offices. CRS estimates that “several million” dollars, which would have gone into launching a large-scale food security operation from April to June in the region has been lost, and only last week two of their warehouses full of food were pillaged.

Agencies have to establish how they will approach rebel groups now in control, so as not to lose more time. There are some 75,000 people internally displaced in northern Mali; while thousands more were already facing food insecurity due to poor harvests, lack of pasture and high food prices. Alassane Maiga, a teacher at the Yanna Maiga intermediate school in Gao, told IRIN: “People are getting hungry - there are volunteers to provide first aid to the injured, but that’s all.”

Operating modes

Approaches vary when it comes to negotiating with rebels. CRS, which is largely US-funded, will not do so and relies on others in the humanitarian community to deliver aid. The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC) - in some ways the ‘guardian’ of the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality - will, but is taking a thorough, gradual approach said its spokesperson, Stephen Ambrose. This has not stopped them from working - they have been fuelling Gao’s generator to ensure the city’s water supply, and have kept Gao and Timbuktu hospitals supplied with medicines - but nowhere near as much as they would like.

Several aid agency representatives told IRIN that the MNLA are relatively open when it comes to discussing access, but Ansar Dine spokespeople change regularly, making it difficult to rely on agreements already made. They have also officially called for only Malian agencies to work in the north.

A few agencies, including the Malian Red Cross and international medical NGO Doctors of the World (Medecins du Monde or MDM), have already approached all the groups to discuss access. “We give the same information to all but we remain fully independent in the way that we operate,” said Olivier Vandecasteele, coordinator of MDM in Mali, which focuses on health and nutrition work.

“You need to spend a lot of time on the phone, and verify through all of your different contacts how a convoy will pass - so far, we have never had a convoy that was stopped,” he said. MDM staff say so far they have had no major access problems in Kidal or Gao.

Vandecasteele said this is partly because MDM has been in the region a long time, many locals have participated in its activities, and it has widespread acceptance. MDM owns none of its own cars and rents vehicles locally, so it lost none during the looting.

Being absolutely rigid in its approach to independence and impartiality will help the agency operate in the long term if conflict flares up again, which it well could, said Vandecasteele. ECOWAS has announced it will take all measures “including use of force” to ensure the territorial integrity of Mali.  Vandecasteele believes that aid groups might be surprised if they tried to negotiate humanitarian access. “They might just find they get it,” he told IRIN.

The Mali Humanitarian Country Team, made up of UN and some NGO agency heads, is working out an access strategy based on the importance of upholding impartiality, said David Gressly, regional humanitarian coordinator for the Sahel. While some UN agencies are already operational, security concerns mean that UN Refugee Agency UNHCR has very limited access to assess the needs of the displaced, said its spokesperson Fatoumata Lejeune-Kaba.

Armed escorts

One area of contention is the use of armed escorts. Humanitarian agencies generally shun the use of armed escorts or armed protection for their warehouses and other property, so as to avoid affiliation with one side or the other in a conflict. While some agencies - like MDM - will never use them, others - like WFP - will do so in extreme circumstances, said its acting representative, Martine Ohlsen.

“It is partly a question of scale - as the volume goes up, so do the risks,” said Gressly. Vandecasteele told IRIN he recognizes the temptation for some agencies to use armed guards, particularly with highly valuable stock at stake, but that "it sets a dangerous precedent." As one agency head put it, an armed escort can become an active belligerent in a conflict overnight.

Some aid groups have already accepted armed escorts. Hearing of people’s needs in the north, local group Cri du Coeur (Cry of the Heart) collected money and aid donations from Bamako residents and sent a convoy north, accepting MNLA escorts between Douentza in the Mopti region and Gao. “We established contacts with MNLA and Ansar Dine, and they demanded they secure the convoy themselves, and that they supervise the distribution of food,” Tidiane Guindo, the public relations officer of non-profit Cri du Coeur told IRIN. When they arrived, a distribution committee made up of prominent local citizens were in place to distribute he goods, he said.

In Timbuktu, local resident Moulaye Sayah told IRIN, the food and medicines sent there are “distributed under the very close supervision of Ansar Dine." Some say it is better to have aid delivered that way than not at all.

Others however, worry that it has dangerous repercussions, including contributing to a war economy. “They [the guards] don’t do it for free; and then there is their fuel to cover,” said the agency head. “Aid can be delivered through armed convoys, but don’t call it humanitarian.”

aj/sk/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95390</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201205010838450199t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 01 May 2012 (IRIN) - Aid agencies in northern Mali are debating how or whether they should negotiate with newly installed rebel groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine, which is affiliated to Al Qaeda, to reach people in need.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Rebels and their cause</title><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204201412070560t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - After months of fighting in northern Mali, the Mouvement National de Libération de L’Azawad (MNLA) - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad - declared an end to military operations. The rebels refer to the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali as Azawad. However, following international and regional condemnation of the movement’s declaration of independence on 6 April, several factions have emerged, exposing deep divisions between Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamist groups, and Tuareg groups.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - After months of fighting in northern Mali, the Mouvement National de Libération de L’Azawad (MNLA) - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad - declared an end to military operations. The rebels refer to the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali as Azawad. However, following international and regional condemnation of the movement’s declaration of independence on 6 April, several factions have emerged, exposing deep divisions between Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Islamist groups, and Tuareg groups. 

If effective measures are not taken to wrest back power in the north and reassert the position of the Malian authorities, the country could become the “Afghanistan of Africa”, the African Assembly for the Defence of Human Rights has reportedly warned. 

IRIN sought the views of three specialists in Tuareg matters for a greater understanding of the situation and possible next steps. 

The Analysts

Naffet Keita is a professor of Anthropology at the University of Bamako, in the capital of Mali, specializing in the Tuareg. 

Baz Lecocq is a history professor at Ghent University, Belgium, and the author of a book called Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Mali, published in 2010.

Zeidan Ag Sidalamine is a former leader of the Front Populaire de Liberation de l’Azawad, [FPLA or Popular front for the Liberation of Azawad] who knows the current leadership of the MNLA. He has been involved in several peace talks that ended Tuareg rebellions and was a technical adviser to ousted Malian president, Amadou Toumani Touré.

IRIN: What is the current relationship between the MNLA, Ansar Dine, AQMI [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95208/MALI-Holy-wars-and-hostages-Al-Qaeda-in-the-Maghreb ], and MUJWA (the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa?)

NK: The MNLA is a collective of several heterogeneous groups which, from their inception, have had different objectives. The MNLA evolved out of an old political movement known as the Mouvement National de l’Azawad - the Azawad National Movement. It was when its fighters returned from Libya in 2011 that it became the MNLA. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95252/MALI-A-timeline-of-northern-conflict ]

Ansar Dine was formed by Iyad Ag Ghali. At the end of the 1990s he started networking in Pakistan, and in the early 2000s he became an Islamist. Ansar Dine and MUJAO are connected to the international jihadist movement.

Malians had overestimated the MNLA’s military strength in the Mali fighting. Now, we know that the real power lies with Ansar Dine or MUJAO. This realization rushed the MNLA to a premature declaration of independence.

Baz Lecocq (BL) What I deduce from reading MNLA communiqués is that they disagree with Ansar Dine's goals. The MNLA’s stated primary goal is the independence of Azawad. As it expects a Malian army counter-attack, possibly supported by ECOWAS troops, or even US or French troops, they cannot afford to attack Al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique (AQIM) or MUJWA right now, which they have said they want to do, but are refraining from doing at the moment. This is, according to their website, based on demands from the local population.

In another way the presence of the Islamists 'helps' perhaps, but this is speculative reasoning. By stressing that no one has been able to dislodge this nuisance but them, the MNLA might be hoping to forestall outside interference in the conflict and gain international recognition for its independence bid. Therefore, destroying the Islamists before MNLA’s demands to the Malian state are met, would take away a trump card in any future negotiations.

ZS: Each group has different objectives. There are three kinds of movements operating: drug traffickers, Islamic militants and Tuareg rebels. It’s easier to negotiate with the MNLA because [they are nationals] - there is certainly no common ground to negotiate with each of them at the same time.

AQIM and Boko Haram are internationalist entities. The concern is that Boko Haram will recruit non-armed Islamists - that’s the issue. 

IRIN: What have you heard about a gathering of AQMI leaders in northern Mali? What was the purpose?

BL: It has been acknowledged on Toumastpress.com [ http://toumastpress.com/ ] that they met. AQMI’s motives can only be guessed at: Propaganda? Showing they can be there? From blogs like The Moor Next Door [ http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/ ] I can see there are internal disputes within AQMI and MUJWA. Perhaps this was a reconciliatory meeting.

ZS: Their motives are not the same as those of MNLA. AQMI are there primarily for narco-trafficking and to further their Islamist agenda. 

What is the position of international groups in terms of intervention? 

BL: It depends largely on who among ECOWAS's decision-makers support intervention.

It seems that the current situation is everything any politician or military man with interests in AFRICOM, be it in the US or Africa, would dream of. The US government is silent but I can imagine its AFRICOM generals are praying quietly that they will get a call for help.

As for France: statements by French politicians went from no intervention to support, and might go to military assistance.

The abduction of Algerian consular staff in Gao will, no doubt, make that country be taken seriously in the conflict. I am suspicious about this abduction. Before, Algeria was clearly sidetracked in this conflict. It is highly unlikely that the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité - (the Algerian secret service) has not infiltrated AQMI or MUJWA, and that it does not have some influence on their behaviour, and that this influence might account, in part, for this abduction.

ZS: ECOWAS countries need to share their expertise in fighting terrorism and drug trafficking. We will not be able to do it on our own. The MNLA is more of a Malian problem. However, Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and AQIM are all involved in several countries, and there are no solutions without the involvement of all the countries where these groups operate, so, ECOWAS has to be involved. The MNLA will return to negotiate - there is more common ground to strike a bargain with the MNLA. 

NK: France has wanted to use Ibrahim Ag Bahanga [who led an uprising against Mali in 1996] to fight AQIM. France and the Westerners will, at all costs, prefer Mali to negotiate with the MNLA to fight the other emerging groups. However, most people do not believe negotiations will work - over the last 20 years there have been several [failed] agreements. 

An important point is Algeria’s strategy against the GSPC [the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat], now AQIM. Algeria had confined the GSPC to the Sahel so it could fight it better. Algeria no longer wants to fight GSPC on its soil. Amadou Toumani Touré [the recently ousted Malian president] had protested against this strategy, but was ignored. 

IRIN: Who is financing these armed groups?

NK: Ansar Dine and the others get their money from the jihadist movement and from AQIM, which gets money from kidnappings. 

In addition, partly based on the knowledge that former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Senussi, had stayed in northern Mali - - the MNLA must have received money from him and from several funds before Gaddafi's downfall. The MNLA might have received money from Western countries and neighbours to fight AQMI.

Ansar Dine’s leader, Iyad ag Ghali, has been able to fund his war by taking advantage of the Malian government’s largesse for being the point man in negotiations to release several Western hostages. 

BL: Probably part of the money comes from `taxes' on the drugs trade and other smuggling practices. Some of the drugs might have been flown into the Sahara, but the more likely route is that cocaine was brought in via Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, then overland through southern Mali to the Sahara. In the past, part of the resources for the rebellion came from the local population, either voluntarily or otherwise, but given the current crisis I guess this is hardly possible.

ma/aj/oss/he/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95339</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204201412070560t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - After months of fighting in northern Mali, the Mouvement National de Libération de L’Azawad (MNLA) - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad - declared an end to military operations. The rebels refer to the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali as Azawad. However, following international and regional condemnation of the movement’s declaration of independence on 6 April, several factions have emerged, exposing deep divisions between Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamist groups, and Tuareg groups.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>HIV/AIDS: A Rogues&apos; Gallery</title><pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 18 April 2012 (IRIN) - Grantees of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria who allegedly committed fraud or misused funds unwittingly did a lot of damage to the Fund – and, many say, global health - as donors withdrew and the beleaguered organization faced a &quot;crisis of confidence&quot; in recent years. But the Fund has responded and is undergoing an extensive restructuring process. IRIN/PlusNews takes a look at some of the alleged fraudsters and the progress of the investigations.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 18 April 2012 (IRIN) - Grantees of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB) and Malaria who allegedly committed fraud or misused funds unwittingly did a lot of damage to the Fund – and, many say, global health - as donors withdrew and the beleaguered organization faced a "crisis of confidence" in recent years. But the Fund has responded and is undergoing an extensive restructuring process. IRIN/PlusNews takes a look at some of the alleged fraudsters and the progress of the investigations.

2009 Mali [ http://www.scribd.com/doc/83403550 ] 

Alleged culprits: Malian Ministry of Health, National Control Programme against TB, National Council for the Fight Against AIDS, and the National Programme for the Fight Against Malaria. 

Allegations: In December 2010 the Global Fund announced that it had suspended two malaria grants with immediate effect, and had terminated a third TB grant after it found evidence of misappropriation and unjustified expenditure. 

The Fund found that at least US$5.2 million in disbursements related to HIV, TB and malaria had been misappropriated and little money was dedicated to purchasing medicines. Organizations pilfered funds using fraudulent invoices, per diem payments and training events. The Fund’s investigation revealed that organizations often colluded with the Ministry of Health and national TB and malaria control programmes to falsify invoices, signatures, bank statements and official stamps, which were discovered buried in someone's garden. 

By December 2010, the Malian authorities had arrested 15 people in connection with the allegations and the Ministry of Health had repaid $304,000. Due to possible threats against Global Fund staff, the US government provided them with protection. 

The investigation into the mismanagement of HIV funds was still ongoing in July 2011. 

2009 Mauritania [ http://www.scribd.com/doc/83397462 ] 

Culprits: The national AIDS committee, the national TB programme, two NGO networks, ROMATUB and RNLPV, the National Institute for Public Health. 

Allegations: In July 2009 the Global Fund suspended funding to the executive secretariat of the national AIDS committee after finding evidence of fraudulent and unjustified expenditures. The Fund demanded the reimbursement of $1.7 million within three months, and immediate removal of the people identified as being responsible. 

Fake receipts, invoices and companies had been used to defraud the Fund since 2004. According to audits by the Fund's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), various local oversight bodies had failed to bring this to the Global Fund's attention. 

Officials of the national AIDS committee also instituted a kickback scheme that required payments of up to 50 percent of a grant from the NGO sub-recipient as a pre-condition for participation in Global Fund programmes. Sub-recipients were also forced to issue invoices for bogus training or expenses and then return this money to the national AIDS committee. Witnesses said this was a long-running practice at the national body and pre-dated Global Fund support. 

The NGO network, ROMATUB, was an implementing partner in Global Fund tuberculosis programmes. The Fund found that the network charged for work never completed. It submitted photographs of the same people in the same locations as proof of nationwide community outreach work supposedly carried out in different villages. 

The Mauritanian government cooperated in the investigations, refunding $1.7 million and arresting four national AIDS committee officials. The executive director of the national AIDS committee and all employees working on Global Fund grants were removed. 

As of March 2012, the Fund did not know whether those arrested had been brought to trial, as prosecutions had not yet commenced by July 2011. According to the OIG, national law enforcement agents had not communicated with the Fund since 2009. 

The OIG has recommended that any further disbursements to Mauritania be conditional upon the completion of all related criminal inquiries, and those convicted serving sentences. 

Mauritania, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Mali and Papua New Guinea have been placed on an "Additional Safeguards Policy" list. Countries on this list are subjected to closer scrutiny and restrictions on financial transactions relating to grants. [ http://www.theglobalfund.org/es/mediacenter/pressreleases/Global_Fund_suspends_two_malaria_grants,_terminates_TB_grant_to_Mali/ ] 

2009 Zambia [ http://www.plusnews.org/Report/92191/ZAMBIA-Corruption-scandal-rocks-ARV-programme ]

Alleged culprits: Zambian Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance, Zambian National AIDS Network (ZNAN). 

Allegations: After reports by a whistle-blower of fraud in Zambia's Ministry of Health (MoH) in 2009, the Global Fund - with help from Zambia's Office of the Auditor General - found that the ministry had misspent $6.7 million. The Ministry of Finance and National Planning had similarly misspent about $3 million and one of its accountants had defrauded the Global Fund of about $104,000. 

The Fund also allegedly uncovered fraud and misuse in the Zambian National AIDS Network, then headed by former UN Special Envoy for AIDS in Africa Elizabeth Mataka. The Global Fund audit of ZNAN highlighted financial mismanagement that included the purchase of cars for personal use by ZNAN management, exorbitant salaries that were sometimes more than double the local sector standard, and the disbursement of funds to sub-recipients who could not provide auditors with financial records, as in the case of disbursements to the Maureen Mwanawasa Community Initiative, headed by Zambia's former First Lady. 

The Global Fund subsequently suspended grants to all these organizations and stripped the MoH of its Principal Recipient status, transferring this responsibility to the Zambia country office of the UNDP. The change in Principle Recipient led to major delays in the distribution of funds and stock-outs of antiretroviral (ARV) and TB drugs for treating this common co-infection. 

In August 2011 Zambian HIV activists delivered a petition to the national AIDS council, demanding that government seize some of ZNAN's assets in order to repay the money, and that government move to pay back some of the money on the organization's behalf - as it had done for the Ministry of Health. 

2010 Nigeria [ http://www.scribd.com/doc/83398634 ] 

Alleged culprits: Yakubu Gowon Centre for National Unity and International Cooperation, Christian Health Association of Nigeria. 

Allegations: The Global Fund alleges that the Yakubu Gowon Centre misappropriated funds and exchanged $22 million of Global Fund money for Naira, the Nigerian currency, on the black market. At least one party involved in the transactions allegedly had previous links to money laundering, fraud and conflict diamonds. The Christian Health Association of Nigeria also engaged in black market currency trading. 

As a result of the Yakubu Gowon Centre's transactions between 2005 and 2009, about $825,000 in Global Fund money for malaria programming was lost, according to a Global Fund OIG investigation report, which recommended that the Fund immediately terminate the Centre as a Principle Recipient for its grants and bar it from any future participation in Global Fund programmes. 

When asked, the Yakubu Gowon Centre could not account for missing funds. In a written response to the Global Fund's investigation report, the Centre said the allegedly missing funds had gone to operational expenses, management fees, maintenance and salaries. Despite documentation demonstrating the contrary, the centre denied allegations that it had used the black market to exchange currency. 

In June 2011 the Yakubu Gowon Centre was replaced as a Principle Recipient. Accounting firm KMPG, which was supposed to provide in-country financial oversight, was also relieved of its position with the Global Fund. 

llg/kn/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95294</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 18 April 2012 (IRIN) - Grantees of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria who allegedly committed fraud or misused funds unwittingly did a lot of damage to the Fund – and, many say, global health - as donors withdrew and the beleaguered organization faced a &quot;crisis of confidence&quot; in recent years. But the Fund has responded and is undergoing an extensive restructuring process. IRIN/PlusNews takes a look at some of the alleged fraudsters and the progress of the investigations.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Beyond the drought - “Families will disappear”</title><pubDate>Fri, 13 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204121318260207t.jpg" />]]>KAYES 13 April 2012 (IRIN) - “It was the drought that made people move away from here,” Ousmane Touré said in Kayes, 450km northwest of Bamako, the capital of Mali, and a 10-hour bus ride across the scorched scrubland of the western Sahel. “There had been a tradition of emigration, but it was when the harvests failed in the 1970s that we saw a real surge in emigration. There was simply not enough to eat, so people took off for France, Germany and the United States. They knew it was only the way of feeding their families back home in Kayes. The same thing is happening this year.”</description><body><![CDATA[KAYES 13 April 2012 (IRIN) - “It was the drought that made people move away from here,” Ousmane Touré said in Kayes, 450km northwest of Bamako, the capital of Mali, and a 10-hour bus ride across the scorched scrubland of the western Sahel. “There had been a tradition of emigration, but it was when the harvests failed in the 1970s that we saw a real surge in emigration. There was simply not enough to eat, so people took off for France, Germany and the United States. They knew it was only the way of feeding their families back home in Kayes. The same thing is happening this year.” 
 
Touré heads the Association of Returning Migrants of Kayes (AMRK), a welfare organization that tries to provide short-term shelter and counselling to people coming back to this part of the country. The returnees, particularly those from the ethnic Soninké community, which spreads across Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, have played a major role in developing western Mali through their remittances and other cash transfers, giving it a stronger identity and economic base. Many of them are now deportees who have fallen foul of immigration restrictions in France and other countries. 
 
“The emigrants have been well-organized and have always ensured money gets channelled back, building health centres, schools, even roads,” said Touré, but the economic crisis in Europe and tighter immigration controls are having a serious knock-on effect, and impoverished villages can no longer count on the same level of support. 
 
In Mali the three-month rainy season starts in June, with the heaviest falls in July and August. This is the time when everyone participates in the intense agricultural activity of the main cropping season, which provides most of the food for the rest of the year. The lean period occurs in the driest months, just before the next rains come.
 
For Kayes, the capital of Mali’s First Region, which borders Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea, 2012 is a particularly tough year. Besides the effects of political turbulence elsewhere in the country and a rebellion in the north, serious food security problems appeared months ago, after sparse rains. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95252/MALI-A-timeline-of-northern-conflict ] Surveys by the government and international agencies identified Kayes and the surrounding areas as particularly vulnerable, and likely to be exposed to severe food shortages as an already impoverished population experienced the impact of failed harvests.
 
By February, market prices for sorghum, millet, groundnuts and other basic foodstuffs were grossly inflated; food reserves were depleted well ahead of the usual lean season, with alarming shortages of seeds. There were complaints that the government’s emergency food rations had given temporary respite to some villages but had ignored dozens more, as well as serious nutritional concerns, particularly for children. The UN estimated that 1.6 million Malians would be food insecure in 2012. [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3569.pdf ]
 
The events in the capital and the north have overshadowed the food crisis in the west. “A lot of things have been put on standby,” said Abdoulaye Samoura, advocacy officer for NGO Oxfam. “There have been serious delays in getting food distributed.” The dramatic price hikes at local markets in January and February have eased off, but there is no reason for complacency.
 
“What do you do when there is no food and you have to take care of five, 10, 20 people?” Touré asked. The answer is an exodus of men to Bamako, or across the border into Senegal, or to the gold-mining areas 75km to the south.

Mariam Cissoko, who heads the women’s section of the Association des Organisations Professionnelles Paysannes - Association of Professional Peasant Farmers (AOPP) - in Kayes, confirms that 2012 has been markedly worse. “It rained for only month of the usual three (in 2011) and that has meant drought and everything that comes with it,” she said. 
 
“For us, the Bambara people, we don’t have the same tradition of emigration as the Soninké. We are agro-pastoralists. If you work the land, you will also have some livestock. But there is a strong spirit of solidarity here. In normal times, if you have something in reserve, you will give to those who don’t. But times like these, people just don’t have anything to spare.”
 
The priorities are stark. “Feed us and feed our animals,” stressed Cissoko. “If NGOs come and talk to us about education, that is all well and good, but we need food first. Without that, everything falls to pieces. People will get sick. Children won’t go to school. Men may be able to take off and look for opportunities elsewhere, but women and children are stuck where they are.” 
 
Kayes has been described as the second hottest place in Africa after Djibouti. “I grew up here and I remember an abundance of corn. We didn’t have droughts like we get now,” Cissoko told IRIN. “In the hottest months, the temperature normally goes to 42 or 43 degrees Celsius, but last year it was 47 or 48 at times, in the shade. The desert is advancing and the climatic changes are here for everyone to see. It has all come progressively.” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95182/CLIMATE-CHANGE-A-three-degree-warmer-world-by-2050 ]
 
Food aid from the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and others may ease the problem, but Cissoko says rural communities in the Kayes region are exhausted by the cycle of drought and dependency. They need long-term practical help as they confront shrinking pasture and ongoing food deficits.
 
“We need proper cereal banks in villages; we need irrigation systems that protect agriculture; we need a credit system that can work, where people can afford the interest rates,” she told IRIN.
 
Kayes town lies on the banks of the Senegal River. In stark contrast to the dominating barrenness of the western Sahel, the riverbanks are studded with neatly tended plots yielding tomatoes, cucumbers, onions and other crops. This is all part of the maraîchage, or market gardening, that provides women in particular with a livelihood. “When I was a child, people said: ‘You will never get to plant fruit and vegetables here,’” but they were wrong. That was forty years ago. It began timidly, but the gardening has really picked up.”
 
But Cissoko acknowledges that cereal production is critical, and Ousmane Touré is equally blunt in demanding that the state and its international partners step up their efforts to help Kayes cope with the food deficits and the devastating drought. “What do you do when there is no food?” he asked. “People will not stay here. Families will disappear.”
 
cs/aj/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95281</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204121318260207t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAYES 13 April 2012 (IRIN) - “It was the drought that made people move away from here,” Ousmane Touré said in Kayes, 450km northwest of Bamako, the capital of Mali, and a 10-hour bus ride across the scorched scrubland of the western Sahel. “There had been a tradition of emigration, but it was when the harvests failed in the 1970s that we saw a real surge in emigration. There was simply not enough to eat, so people took off for France, Germany and the United States. They knew it was only the way of feeding their families back home in Kayes. The same thing is happening this year.”</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: People trapped, aid stalled, refugees waiting</title><pubDate>Wed, 11 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202241439000822t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO 11 April 2012 (IRIN) - One week after the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali were captured by rebel and Islamist groups, many Malians are trapped and have limited access to food and other basic necessities, while aid operations remain largely suspended.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO 11 April 2012 (IRIN) - One week after the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali were captured by rebel and Islamist groups, many Malians are trapped and have limited access to food and other basic necessities, while aid operations remain largely suspended. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95233/MALI-Looting-halts-aid-work-in-chaotic-north ]

“Everything is running out here - water, electricity, food, medicine. The rebels have continued to loot, now they are breaking into people’s houses to take their animals. We are stuck here. We cannot leave because there is no way out,” said Noumoussa Traoré, who works with an agricultural producers association in Gao. 

“[They]… continued firing in the air and looting for days, terrorizing populations,” Issa Mahamar, a French teacher in Gao, told IRIN.

People in Gao do not feel safe. Most aid agencies have suspended their operations due to insecurity and because in many cases their equipment, vehicles and stocks have been stolen. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95233/MALI-Looting-halts-aid-work-in-chaotic-north ] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) alone lost 14 vehicles. Only Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which recently started working in Mali, is still providing medical care to people who need it. 

Water and electricity supplies were cut off in Gao after the utilities were attacked and equipment was stolen. Adama Tamboura, who works with state energy company Energie du Mali, says there is no gas available to run the turbines. One staff member was shot in the arm and others “were forced to leave town - we had to abandon everything”, he told IRIN. 

Most of the transport networks have stopped operating, Abouba Badiaga said in the Oxfam office in Gao. People who have vehicles are charging passengers US$80-$150 to leave town, said Noumoussa Traoré. 

“In other years when we faced drought, I would take money from my family working in Libya to buy food in the south, where it is cheaper,” said Mohamed Touré, from Kidal. Now it is impossible to go south, he said, and money from Libya has dried up because most of the Malians working there have come back. 

Some residents in Bamako, the capital of Mali, are taking matters into their own hands and Oumar Maiga, 30, has collected money to buy bags of rice and millet to send to northern families. 

Three weeks lost

Timothy Bishop, head of NGO Catholic Relief Services, estimates that aid agencies have lost three weeks in their emergency response to the food crisis that existed in the north well before the most recent political upheaval began. 

MSF head of mission in Mali Johanne Sekkenes said, “Many children will pass from moderate to severe malnutrition in the next few weeks.” Three million Malians are at risk of going hungry this year unless they get help, according to the UN.

Supplies of Plumpy’nut and Plumpy’dose, ready-to-use foodstuffs used to treat malnourished children, lie waiting to be transported in the World Food Programme’s warehouse in Bamako.

It is difficult for aid agencies to plan their next steps, said Ahmed Moussa N’Game, head of NGO Africare, an NGO working on food security and agriculture projects in the Timbuktu region, because of the lack of information coming out of the north and the fluid situation there. “We have very little contact with the field,” he noted.

All agencies say they will resume operations as soon as they can - “You can’t just leave populations living in terror and confusion,” Oxfam’s Badiaga stressed. 

Those who can have fled across the borders into neighbouring countries: 27,950 refugees have registered in Niger; 32,631 in Burkina Faso; and 48,033 in Mauritania, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), while a further 100,000 people have been displaced in and around Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal.

Refugees IRIN spoke to said they had no idea when they would return to their normal lives. 

Ibrahim Ag Abdul, 30, a pastoralist from Anderamboukane, 100km from Ménaka, who is now living in Abala refugee camp in Nigeria, told IRIN, “We had to leave everything. I take care of animals for a programme with a Belgian NGO - we have to leave all of them. I doubt they will be there when we get back... Bandits came to our city - apparently, they have looted all the homes, all the shops. They have taken everything.”

Salama, 18, a student, told IRIN: “I have never seen so much suffering in my life... we just wanted to find refuge in Niger. All the children were crying because they were starving and thirsty... we all want to complete our studies but we have no chance... I just hope there will be peace again so we can return home as soon as possible.”

Many northern Tuaregs are adamant that they do not support the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad, or National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), which claims to have military control of Gao and Kidal. “I absolutely do not agree with the MNLA,” a farmer only known as Ajawa told IRIN from Abala refugee camp in Niger. 

“They say they fight for all the Tuareg people, but many Tuareg people do not support them,” he said. “We all just want to be left in peace. Already Mali is relying on aid from the US, UK and Europe. The conflict is just making more divisions - how can we survive as two countries if we can barely survive as one?”

The UN Security Council issued a statement on 9 April expressing “deep concern” at the increased terrorist threat in northern Mali. The situation there is highly unstable, with several groups vying for power.

Salafist group Ansar Dine, which has close links with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and wants to impose Sharia law in Mali, has declared control over Timbuktu. 

Malian officials have reportedly stated that Boko Haram militants, who are active in northern Nigeria, and want to ban Western education and also impose Sharia law, are partly in control of Gao. An AQIM splinter group, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), has reportedly claimed responsibility for taking seven Algerians hostage in their consulate in Gao. 

There have also been unconfirmed reports of several important AQIM commanders, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar, convening in Timbuktu. 

Leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are discussing the possibility of sending troops to northern Mali, but many members are reluctant. Senior officials from Algeria, Mauritania and Niger will meet in a few days to discuss the situation. 

In southern Mali many hope stability is returning. Dioncounda Traouré will be sworn in as President of the National Assembly on Thursday 12 April after a deal brokered by ECOWAS, in which Junta leader Captain Amadou Sanogo agreed to step down.

mab/sd/aj/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95274</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202241439000822t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO 11 April 2012 (IRIN) - One week after the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali were captured by rebel and Islamist groups, many Malians are trapped and have limited access to food and other basic necessities, while aid operations remain largely suspended.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: A timeline of northern conflict</title><pubDate>Thu, 05 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204031932280113t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 05 April 2012 (IRIN) - After decades of failed Tuareg secessionist rebellions, a separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has declared an end to military operations in northern Mali, having achieved their objective: military control of the three regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, which will form a new state. A separate Islamist group, Ansar Dine, which has different objectives from the MNLA and seeks to impose Sharia law in Mali, also took part in the fight and claims to have wrested control of Timbuktu from the MNLA - high tensions are reported between the two groups.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 05 April 2012 (IRIN) - After decades of failed Tuareg secessionist rebellions, a separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has declared an end to military operations in northern Mali, having achieved their objective: military control of the three regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, which will form a new state. A separate Islamist group, Ansar Dine, which has different objectives from the MNLA and seeks to impose Sharia law in Mali, also took part in the fight and claims to have wrested control of Timbuktu from the MNLA - high tensions are reported between the two groups.  

Below is a chronology of key events.

French colonial occupation of northern Mali

July 1891: Colony of Soudan Français (French Sudan) created, including much of what is today Mali.

December 1893: French troops occupy Timbuktu but encounter strong resistance in the city and surroundings area.

1911: Revolt in Ménaka by KelAtaram people crushed by French military.

1913-14: Severe drought in northern regions aggravates poverty in Tuareg areas and fuels growing grievances.

1914-17: Rebellions against the French led by Firhoun - elected Supreme Chief, or Amenukal, of KelAtaram in Ménaka - and by Kawsanag Kedda, who led siege of Agadez in what is now northern Niger. Both revolts are put down by French with assistance of rival Tuareg confederations and Arabs. Rebels face severe reprisals.

The Alfellaga rebellion

September 1960: Senegal withdraws from the Federation of Mali. The former Sudanese Republic is renamed the Republic of Mali and independence is proclaimed in Bamako, the capital. Modibo Keïta, a school teacher and trade unionist, is appointed President of the Republic. Constitution adopted.

1962-64: First Tuareg rebellion in the north, known as the Alfellaga, is launched from Kidal region and violently repressed. Government troops target Tuareg communities, wipe out livestock and poison wells. The war triggers a major Tuareg exodus to Algeria and other neighbouring countries. Government military clampdown continues in the north.

December 1968: Military coup removes Modibo Keita, who is imprisoned. Army officer Moussa Traoré, leading the Comité Militaire de Libération Nationale (CMLN) - Military Committee of National Liberation - eventually takes over presidency.

1972-73: Mali hit by extreme drought, with devastating impact on the north, forcing a new wave of migration to urban centres and across Mali’s borders. Reports later surface of major misappropriation of food aid by the authorities.

1976: Traoré establishes political party, l’Union démocratique du people malien (UDPM) - Democratic Union of Malian People. Mali adopts a one-party system.

1984-85: The worst drought in over a decade has crippling effect on pastoralist communities and the northern rural economy.

June 1985: Moussa Traoré re-elected unopposed, with 98 percent of the vote. Rebellions in Mali and Niger

1988: Founding in Libya of the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad (MPA) - Popular Movement of Azawad - under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali.

May 1990: Tuaregs in northern Niger attack Tchintabaradene. Fierce military reprisals follow, leaving hundreds of Tuaregs dead.

June 1990: Tuareg rebellion begins with attack on Ménaka, targeting the prison and garrison. Widespread violence triggers a renewed exodus of civilians.

July-August 1990: Army operations in the north, particularly round Gao. Senior parachute commander quoted as saying: “The solution concerning the Tuaregs is their extermination. I have come here to take care of that, and I will not waste my bullets.”  Democracy and the road to Timbuktu

6 January 1991: Peace agreement brokered by Algeria at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria focuses on decentralization of the north and reintegration of Tuareg troops, but violence continues in parts of north.

January-March 1991: Strong crackdown by authorities on protests by students and trade unions in Bamako leaves heavy casualties.

26 March 1991: Overthrow of Traoré and establishment of transitional government, Le Comité Transitoire pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP) - Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People - headed by military officer Amadou Toumani Touré.

July-August 1991: National conference in Bamako draws wide range of delegates as Mali attempts to establish a functioning democracy.

12 January 1992: New constitution overwhelmingly adopted by referendum.

11 April 1992: Signature of Pacte Nationale by government and umbrella grouping of Tuareg rebels. Pact focuses on economic regeneration of north, local reconciliation initiatives, decentralization and integration of Tuaregs into military and civilian structures.

April 1992: Alpha Oumar Konaré, former minister, UN consultant and newspaper and radio owner, wins first multiparty elections. His party, Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (ADEMA) - Alliance for Democracy in Mali - wins parliamentary elections.

December 1993: Coup attempt by Lieutenant-Colonel Oumar Diallo
 
January 1994: Devaluation of CFA franc by 50 percent brings major rise in living costs and leads to protests.
 
May 1994: Despite a series of peace initiatives at grassroots and national level, tensions worsen in the north, particularly between Songhai sedentary communities and Tuaregs and Arabs, resulting in formation of the Songhai-based Malian Patriotic Movement Ganda Koye (MPMGK). (Ganda Koye - “masters of the land” in Songhai).

January 1995: Accords of Bourem signed by MPMGK and mainly Tuareg Front Populaire pour la Libération de l'Azaoud (FPLA) - Tuareg Front for the Liberation of Azawad - marks significant breakthrough in defusing inter-ethnic tensions.

27 March 1996: ‘Flame of Peace’ ceremony at Timbuktu as hundreds of firearms are destroyed and Tuareg armed movements are formally dissolved, along with MPMGK.

May 1997: Konaré re-elected.

June 2002: Amadou Toumani Traoré elected president despite having previously ruled out a political comeback.
 
2005: Mali hit by severe drought. Pastoralist communities are again severely affected.
 
April 2005: Promulgation of decree introducing the Agence de Développement du Nord Mali (ADN) - Agency for the Development of the North - prioritizing investment and development in regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal.

April 2006: Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi is among guests of honour at the Maouloud festival in Timbuktu, commemorating the birth of the Prophet Mohammed. Visit draws criticism from Malians who accuse Gaddafi of sponsoring Tuareg revolts in the past.

May 2006: Attacks on garrisons at Kidal and Ménaka by new rebel movement, the Alliance démocratique pour le changement du 23 mai (ADC) - May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change.

4 July 2006: Accords of Algiers signed by government and ADC, with peace agreement focusing on need to bring security and economic growth to Kidal, Mali’s 8th region and the most remote from the capital.
 
April 2007: Re-election of Touré, but victory contested by other candidates
 
May 2007: Violence continues after Alliance Touareg Niger-Mali (ATNM) - the Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance - rejects Algiers Accords and continues operations in the north, attacking garrisons and kidnapping soldiers under the command of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga.

November 2007: Former Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali joins Malian consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

February 2009: Successful government counter-insurgency in north includes dismantling of rebel military bases, but generates fierce hostility from some Tuareg communities, who complain of being victimized by government troops.

February 2009: Kidal peace ceremony includes surrender of hundreds of weapons by Tuareg rebels and new arrangements for their incorporation into armed forces, but Bahanga’s combatants remain outside peace process.

The next rebellion
 
November 2010: Meeting in Timbuktu, attended mainly by Tuaregs from the north, ends with foundation of Mouvement national de l’Azaoud (MNA) - National Movement of Azawad - which rejects violence but calls for display of solidarity from Azawadians inside Mali and beyond the country’s borders.

February 2011: Speaking at ceremony near Kidal, Touré announces major new programme for the north that “will bring urgent solutions to the re-establishment of peace and security”, and help young people “to find work and be saved from illicit and dangerous activities”. Unimpressed, Tuareg spokesman Hama Ag Sid Ahmed warns, “For two years we have tried to renew dialogue with the central authorities. We see that nothing is advancing on the ground.”

August 2011: Six months on from the Kidal ceremony, Touré launches the Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et la Paix et le développement au Nord-Mali (PSPDN) -Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in the North - with a budget of CFA32 billion (around US$65 million), focusing on security, employment, women and youth projects and income-generation, and backed by the European Union (EU), World Bank, UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other donors. The programme is headed by Mohamed Ag Erlaf, a Tuareg from Kidal.

August 2011: Reports of arrival in Malian territory of heavily armed Tuaregs coming from Libya via Algeria and Niger.

26 August 2011: Death in a car crash of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, leader of ANTM. Bahanga was believed to have been heavily involved in the recruitment of Tuareg combatants from Libya.

16 October 2011: Creation of Mouvement National pour la libération de l'Azaoud (MNLA) - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. The Mouvement national de l’Azaoud (MNA) - National Movement of Azawad (MNA) - fuses with the more hardline ATNM. The new movement defines its main objective as “to free the people of Azawad from illegal occupation of Azawadian territory by Mali.

November 2011: Civil society organization in Gao warn of worsening security problems in the region.
 
January 2012: MNLA accuses the government of military provocation and a series of broken promises, and launches rebellion attacks on Ménaka in far north. The movement says its objective is “winning peace and justice for the Azawad community” and “stability for our region”.  

17-31 January 2012: After initial rebel attacks on Ménaka, further fighting reported in different parts of the north, including Ageul-hoc, Tessalit, Léré, Andéramboukane and Nianfunké. Contradictory reports on military gains and losses from Malian military and MNLA, but government army reported to be losing ground.

Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, condemn government’s handling of the war and use of military helicopters against civilian targets. Reports surface of massacre of government troops at Aguel-hoc after being taken over by MNLA, triggering rumours of MNLA alliance WITH Salafist Muslim extremists. Rebels strongly deny allegations.

1-2 February 2012: Protests in garrison town of Kati, 15km outside Bamako, directed at the Touré government for conduct of the war, and at the local Tuareg community. Political leaders and civil society activists warn against extremists using the situation in the north to stoke inter-ethnic tensions. Amnesty International accuses security forces of doing nothing to prevent attacks on houses and property belonging to Tuaregs, Arabs and Mauritanians.

President Touré broadcasts appeal for calm and unity on national television.

2 February 2012: Talks open in Algiers between government of Mali and representatives of former Tuareg rebel movement, the ADC. They end two days later with appeal for peace, but this is dismissed by MNLA as irrelevant.

3-4 February 2012: Reports from Kidal of attempted rebel push on the town.

7 February 2012: Population abandons Tessalit in far north as rebels reportedly lay siege to the town.

8 February 2012: Rebels take Tinzawaten in the far north.

17 February 2012: The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that 44,000 refugees have fled into Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.
 
Heads of state from the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) meeting in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in Mali, condemning the MNLA rebellion and giving unreserved support to the efforts of Mali to defend its territorial integrity.

18 February 2012: MNLA attacks Hombori, a town on the main road between Mopti and Gao. Rebels deny government accusations of killing a military chief in the area.

21 February 2012: Government commission reports back on Aguel-hoc and confirms the killing of government soldiers by AQIM combatants collaborating with MNLA. The report is strongly denied by MNLA.

24 February 2012: In an interview with Radio France Internationale (RFI), Touré maintains that elections will go ahead and Mali will have a new President on 10 June.

26 February 2012: Collectif des ressortissants du nord Mali - Collective of Nationals from the north of Mali (COREN) - meets in Bamako and adopts action plan on restoring state control of the north, stressing the need for protecting populations under threat.

10 March 2012: Mali’s spiritual leaders issue a joint call for peace and dialogue.
 
10-11 March 2012: MNLA takes control of Tessalit, close to the Algerian frontier, while Malian military talks of ‘strategic withdrawal’.

13 March 2012: Former Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali sends out video claiming that the Ansar Dine movement, first reported on in December 2011, has played a key role in the conflict, but is fighting for imposition of Shariah law and not a separate Azawad.

15 March 2012: In an interview with French daily Le Figaro, Touré blames the rebellion on fall-out from the Libyan conflict and accuses AQIM of supporting the rebellion. Touré says the government is ready for dialogue, but rules out any partition of Mali.

21 March 2012: Soldiers mutiny at Gao and Bamako, protesting against poor leadership of the war and their lack of resources. Mutinous troops converge on the presidential palace and ORTM-TV station headquarters. Sporadic gunfire reported in Bamako.

22 March 2012: In a dawn broadcast, a group of soldiers describing itself as the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and Rule of Law (CNDRE) announces coup, blaming Touré for poor handling of the war. CNDRE declares suspension of the constitution, announces a curfew and closes frontiers. Many shops and businesses remain closed in Bamako. Ousted president Touré’s whereabouts not known, but he is reported to be safe. Several ministers and leading politicians detained.

Coup brings instant condemnation from the United States and the African Union. MNLA restates its objective of securing independence for Azawad.

26 March 2012: UN Security Council condemns seizure of power by CNDRE, and “demands they cease all violence and return to their barracks”. The Security Council calls for ”the restoration of constitutional order, and the holding of elections as previously scheduled”:

29 March 2012: ECOWAS leaders’ mission to Mali cancelled for security reasons. Leaders convene in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, where they issue warning to CNDRE to quit power within 72 hours or face wide-ranging sanctions. Burkina Faso President Blaise Comporé confirmed as ECOWAS mediator.

30 March 2012: Rebels in control of Kidal, capital of Mali’s northernmost region, after clashes at military bases outside the town. Witnesses confirm presence of combatants from both MNLA and Ansar Dine.

31 March 2012: MNLA confirms capture of Gao.

MNLA reports defection to its ranks of Colonel Major Elhadj Ag Gamou, a former rebel commander who has headed government military operations in the north. In MNLA communiqué issued from Kidal, Gamou calls on “all Azawadis to join and strengthen the MNLA in its struggle for independence”.

Muslim and Christian leaders call for peace at a stadium rally attended by 25,000 in Bamako, urging both Malian leaders and regional heads of state to work for dialogue.

1 April: Reports from Timbuktu point to an Ansar Dine takeover from MNLA, and chasing away MNLA combatants.

Reports of widespread looting in Gao as rebels take over.

2 April: ECOWAS leaders impose wide-ranging sanctions on military junta. The ECOWAS Chairman, President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire, confirms that “All diplomatic, economic, financial measures and others are applicable from today and will not be lifted until the re-establishment of constitutional order.” Non-ECOWAS members Algeria and Mauritania back the measures.

Aid operations in the north are largely on hold.

3 April 2012: Military junta leaders ignore ECOWAS demands to immediately exit from power, repeating instead their demand for an open-ended transition to civilian rule and reinstatement of constitutional law.

4 April 2012: Civil society organizations and some 50 political parties refuse to take part in discussions with junta leaders on Mali’s future.

5 April 2012: The UN Security Council calls for a ceasefire in the north and a return to democracy. The MNLA announces an end to military operations in northern Mali, having achieved their objective.

6 April 2012: The MNLA declare independence of the northern region of Azawad, calling for a unilateral ceasefire.

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95252</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204031932280113t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 05 April 2012 (IRIN) - After decades of failed Tuareg secessionist rebellions, a separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has declared an end to military operations in northern Mali, having achieved their objective: military control of the three regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, which will form a new state. A separate Islamist group, Ansar Dine, which has different objectives from the MNLA and seeks to impose Sharia law in Mali, also took part in the fight and claims to have wrested control of Timbuktu from the MNLA - high tensions are reported between the two groups.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Looting halts aid work in chaotic north</title><pubDate>Tue, 03 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204031940210886t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/DAKAR 03 April 2012 (IRIN) - Malians in the northern towns of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu are hiding in their homes in fear following the weekend takeover by rebel groups, during which hospitals, health clinics, government buildings, and most NGO and UN offices and warehouses were looted, and in some cases destroyed, leaving the bulk of humanitarian operations suspended.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/DAKAR 03 April 2012 (IRIN) - Malians in the northern towns of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu are hiding in their homes in fear following the weekend takeover by rebel groups, during which hospitals, health clinics, government buildings, and most NGO and UN offices and warehouses were looted, and in some cases destroyed, leaving the bulk of humanitarian operations suspended.

After decades of failed Tuareg secessionist rebellions, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has suddenly taken over most of northern Mali - with significant help from the Islamist group Ansar Dine [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95186/Briefing-War-and-peace-Mali-repeats-the-cycle ] – a barreling advance that culminated in the capture of Timbuktu on 1 April.  

Issa Mahamar Touré, president of the youth association in Gao, said total chaos reigned after widespread looting of government offices, NGOs, banks and hospitals in his town. “People are hiding at their homes unable to leave…no trucks are arriving with further supplies...what will we do when our stocks run out? The hospital is closed and doctors have fled…It is complete desolation, despair…We can only turn to the international community for help.”  

Ansar Dine has claimed control of Timbuktu where they say they will impose Islamic sharia law, banning alcohol as well as Western clothes and music. Several residents told IRIN they wanted them out.  

“We are against this takeover,” said Amouhani Touré, a teacher who had just fled the town. “These Islamists want to impose their rules on us…we’re in the 21st century, you can’t impose sharia [law] on peaceful citizens. The authorities, if we have any still, must fight these Islamists with all their might…Timbuktu is a holy site, a tourist town; UNESCO-protected, we will say no to all forms of separatism.”  

An under-equipped and demoralized Malian military put up little resistance against the northern rebels, despite a promise by Captain Amadou Sanogo, who led a military coup ousting President Amadou Toumani Touré on 22 March, [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95127/MALI-Rebellion-claims-a-president ] that a reinvigorated army would fight back.  

Humanitarian operations suspended  

Julia McDade, head of the Malian office of Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), told IRIN: “Everyone [in Gao] is in hiding, everyone’s vehicles have been stolen … every single office has been ransacked.” The NGO works with partners on agriculture projects, women’s rights and humanitarian response in Timbuktu and Gao.  

All the aid agencies IRIN spoke to have had their equipment stolen and have been forced to suspend operations, in the middle of a food emergency. Offices of the World Food Programme (WFP), which provides the bulk of food aid in the north were looted, and the organization has halted its activities in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, as well as the central town of Mopti, according to its head, Nancy Walters.  

Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Oxfam, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) all repeated the same story. “Our cars, aid materials, offices and staff residences – were all looted [in Gao],” Jurg Eglin, head of ICRC for Niger and Mali told IRIN. “We are still trying to take stock of what we have lost.”  

Ultimately by looting, the rebels have further punished the drought-hit region, said McDade. “Their relatives are dying in the field, and now we can’t do the paperwork required to distribute the food…the rebels have hurt themselves,” she said, adding they are trying to set up systems with WFP to re-start food distributions once security is clearer.  This puts an already slow emergency response – because of months of conflict, complications related to increasing numbers of displaced, and sluggish donor funding – in further jeopardy, warned the agency heads. 

“We were already late on the food insecurity response, and now things will be even slower,” said McDade.  ICRC has been able to carry out only one major food distribution in Kidal over recent months. Some three million Malians are estimated by the UN to be at risk of hunger this year. [ http://reliefweb.int/disaster/ot-2011-000205-ner ]  

Aid workers need to create some sort of “humanitarian space” in order to operate, but negotiating this is near-impossible at the moment as the situation is changing by the hour, said ICRC’s Eglin. “You speak to one person and the next day someone else gives a different answer. It’s a mess.” 

Reports of rape  

While the rebel takeovers were for the most part free of widespread civilian killings, according to the ICRC, several sources - one of them a staff-member with NCA -reported that rapes have taken place in Timbuktu, while others reported incidents of rape in Gao.  

An NGO trainer in Gao, Adama Konipo, told IRIN he had seen rebels taking women away from the health centre, “to who knows where”, in recent days. After seeing one young woman in tears in the street, family members told him she had been raped by five MNLA soldiers. Others reported two rebels raping a young woman in the market place, firing their guns when anyone dared to approach them.  

“It is impossible for any young women to leave their houses for fear,” Konipo told IRIN.  

“The MNLA is supposed to be liberating its people – not raping them. Ansar Dine are supposed to be religiously correct…some kind of moral law must be applied here,” said NCA’s McDade, adding more investigations are needed to confirm these reports. 

 Mopti  

Many now fear that Mopti – the southernmost town in northern Mali - will be the next to be targeted by the rebel groups, with UN security statements reporting rebel movements in the northernmost parts of Mopti region, and reports of rebel activities in Hombori, Youwarou and Tenen Kou.  

A number of agencies, including CRS, are already shutting down their offices in Mopti and sending staff to the capital, Bamako.  The degree of vandalism that took place has people worried about such opportunism spreading, said McDade.

 “There are opportunists here –not just rebels – and what if they said look, we can do the same thing in the south?”  

Meanwhile, on 2 April, Mali’s neighbours agreed to shut their borders as part of tough sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has also imposed trade and financial embargoes, as part of a set of measures to persuade the military junta to restore constitutional law.  

Coup leader Sanogo has confirmed the junta is ready to discuss a transition of power, but has not set any dates.  Some banks are already running out of cash. Government staff will not be paid from April once sanctions take hold, said Moumini Kamaté, an agent at the national Budget Office, who added that some of the tax offices in Bamako were pillaged in the coup. “If liquidity runs out, the economy will grind to a halt,” he told IRIN.  

This could mean government services collapsing, as well as a complete lack of direction on the humanitarian response, said Stephen Cockburn, West Africa advocacy adviser at Oxfam.  

The looting of some 16 ministries means administrative services have largely stopped already, according to Lamissa Bengaly, Secretary General for the Ministry of Energy and Water, who told IRIN most of their office equipment was looted within 62-hours of the coup. “We can’t do anything because we don’t have any of our work materials. In reality, administrative services have more or less stopped.”  

Some aid agencies such as Oxfam are negotiating deals with their banks to set aside minimum cash flows.  

Bamako-based hospitals are generally continuing to function, while schools were on break when the coup occurred so were not directly hit, said Adama Waigalo, adviser at the Education Ministry, though he is worried they will not be able to re-open following the Easter break.  

The trade embargo and border closures are already causing shortages, and prices – high to begin with – are rising further still, say traders.  

A kilo of rice in Bamako is US$1 versus US 60 cents last week; a litre of oil is $2.40 rather than $2 pre-coup, according to market-seller Ousmane Traoré, who says he has no choice but to up prices as his goods are stuck on the Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire borders and cannot be sold.  

Long queues of cars cluster around most petrol stations, with pump prices shooting up over the past week to $5 a litre from the official price of $1.20.  

Border closures will also affect the movement of people, and “another coping mechanism will be lost”, Cockburn told IRIN. 

aj/sd/oa

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95233</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201204031940210886t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/DAKAR 03 April 2012 (IRIN) - Malians in the northern towns of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu are hiding in their homes in fear following the weekend takeover by rebel groups, during which hospitals, health clinics, government buildings, and most NGO and UN offices and warehouses were looted, and in some cases destroyed, leaving the bulk of humanitarian operations suspended.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>CLIMATE CHANGE: Farmers and forecasts</title><pubDate>Mon, 02 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203301412410080t.jpg" />]]>BINGERVILLE/DAKAR 02 April 2012 (IRIN) - Unpredictable rainfall in parts of Côte d’Ivoire cost some farmers over half of their harvest in 2011 producers told IRIN, but, armed with more knowledge about how to get weather reports and interpret them, they might still have been able to boost their output, say agricultural specialists.</description><body><![CDATA[BINGERVILLE/DAKAR 02 April 2012 (IRIN) - Unpredictable rainfall in parts of Côte d’Ivoire cost some farmers over half of their harvest in 2011 producers told IRIN, but, armed with more knowledge about how to get weather reports and interpret them, they might still have been able to boost their output, say agricultural specialists.
 
Marc Kouamé, a farmer in the north who grows okra, peanuts and cassava, told IRIN that farmers “no longer know where to turn” because of the changing seasons. "I lost half of my peanut production because I didn’t plant it at the right time,” he said. Many farmers feel more and more helpless in the face of such uncertainty.
 
Between 1971 and 2000, rainfall in Côte d’Ivoire dropped by 15 percent, according to Augustin Kouakou Nzue, head of agro-climatic studies in the National Weather Service (Direction Météorologie Nationale), although it has increased slightly since 2000.
 
In southern Côte d’Ivoire, farmers took clearly defined seasons for granted until the 1980s: rains from April to mid-July; a short dry season from mid-July to September; a short rainy season until November; and finally a long dry season from December to March. Now, the rains come later and finish earlier, with longer dry seasons and patchy distribution, says Nzue.
 
Most growers rely on rain-fed production, so the long-term impact of this shift could devastate Ivoirian farmers, who make up 60 percent of the workforce. Cocoa, the country’s main export crop, could also be affected - a September 2011 study by the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture, based in Cali, Colombia, predicts that rising temperatures may make it too hot to grow cocoa by 2050. [ http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/Newsroom/Lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=80 ]
 
Sidiki Cissé, head of the National Agency to Support Rural Development (ANADER) in the commercial capital, Abidjan, is clearly worried. "The desperation of farmers is clear to see," he told IRIN.
 
Poor and erratic rainfall in 2011 and the subsequent poor harvests across the southern Saharan band have thrown 13 million people into a food security crisis in the Sahelian zones of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Mali and Senegal. [ http://reliefweb.int/disaster/ot-2011-000205-net ]
 
Donors and investors are channelling climate adaptation funds into improved weather forecasting and more sophisticated climate science, but few groups are focusing on how climate information can better be used by farmers and communities in disaster-prone areas.
 
“People don’t see this kind of stuff as a critical research priority,” said Amane Tall, who is affiliated to the US-based Johns Hopkins University and the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre in The Netherlands. “They invest in improving the science of climate change – which is great – but how do we make links between the science and the decision-making at all levels?”
 
The various communities working on climate change – scientists, environmentalists, humanitarian NGOs, disaster risk reduction experts – have tended to work separately, in their silos, but now dialogue is needed, said Emma Visman, Futures Group Manager at the Humanitarian Futures Programme (HFP), which tries to prepare the humanitarian community for future disaster scenarios. “Dialogue seems to be the key word,” she said, “but we don’t yet have the resources or space to do it.” [ http://www.humanitarianfutures.org ]
 
A few groups are attempting to bridge the information gap, including various national meteorological agencies, the World Meteorological Organization, the HFP, and some humanitarian and development NGOs such as Christian Aid.
 
Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Mali, Guinea and Togo, among others, are part of the West Africa Metragri programme, co-funded by the World Meteorological Organization and the State Agency for Meteorology (AEMET) in Spain. The plan is to train 200 farmers in Côte d’Ivoire to become more aware of rainfall patterns in their areas, and how to use rain gauges to monitor precipitation. [ http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/agm/roving_seminars/west_africa_fr.html ]
 
Nzue told farmers at a training session in Bingerville, Côte d'Ivoire the best time to sow certain crops is one or two days after the first 20mm of rain has fallen. In 2011 this would have been on 21 March in Bouaké in central Côte d’Ivoire, and on 11 April in San Pedro in the southwest.
 
Farmers are asked to send the rainfall data they collect to the National Weather Service [Direccion Météorologie Nationale), so that agronomy research centres can draw up new crop calendars to help them adapt planting schedules to their particular micro-climate, said Amin Gbo, chief executive officer of ANADER.
 
Sidiki Cissé, head of ANADER, says corn, rice, sorghum and millet are most affected by changing rainfall patterns. In Burkina Faso local corn varieties suffer most because unlike imported varieties, they have not been designed to grow more quickly with less water, said Judith Bienvenue Fanfo, head of the Burkina Faso National Meteorological Office, which also collaborated on a project that has trained 450 farmers since 2007 to use climate and weather information.
 
HFP has worked on pilot studies in the Mbeere district of eastern Kenya and flood-prone Kaffrine in central Senegal to bring together communities, humanitarian partners (Christian Aid Kenya and the Senegalese Red Cross) and National Met offices to determine how to improve the exchange and use of weather information.
 
In Senegal, weather forecasts are broadcast on national radio, in newspapers, on television and via the internet, but these avenues are not readily accessible by local communities, said Visman.
 
The Kenya Meteorological Department (KMD) makes available daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal forecasts, but most people are unable to access the channels it uses to distribute this information and find the format difficult to understand, so they resort to using inaccurate information in uncertified channels instead.
 
Catering to the information preferences of individual groups can be resource-intensive. In one Senegalese village, asked to set up a climate road show women traders wanted a face-to-face information exchange; men wanted to use the mosque, while youths thought it best to share information under “talking trees” where they gather in the late afternoons.
 
After just a few months, the information exchange in Senegal started paying off, said Tall. Families said they kept their children home from school when forecasts predicted strong winds and rain. “There is also a psychological element – people are relieved to have the information and it can be very empowering,” she said. In Kenya the project has run less than 12 months and it is too soon to measure the results.
 
The Met Offices in both countries have signed memorandums of understanding with the humanitarian partner involved to ensure better collaboration.
 
Funding
 
Richard Ewbank, Climate Change Coordinator at Christian Aid, says such projects are likely to remain limited, due to a lack of funding for mitigation and resilience-building. Despite a complex web of climate change adaptation funds – including those of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), money from foundations and multilaterals, and promises by developed countries to mobilize US$100 billion to boost adaptation efforts by 2020 – it took HFP two years to find funding for its 12-month pilot project, before it eventually tapped into the UK Department for International Development’s Climate and Development Knowledge Network. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88070/AID-POLICY-Climate-change-and-adaptation-funding-equally-unpredictable ]
 
Christian Aid has its own church-based funding source. “It’s hard to persuade donors to pre-fund season forecast information – they prefer to fund humanitarian situations when they hit,” Ewbank told IRIN.
 
However, as donors start to see the pay-off from more detailed weather information in the right hands, it may generate more interest. “If climate services get more accurate,” he said, “then clearly our scope to use these tools will also improve.”
 
om/aj/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95214</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203301412410080t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BINGERVILLE/DAKAR 02 April 2012 (IRIN) - Unpredictable rainfall in parts of Côte d’Ivoire cost some farmers over half of their harvest in 2011 producers told IRIN, but, armed with more knowledge about how to get weather reports and interpret them, they might still have been able to boost their output, say agricultural specialists.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Holy wars and hostages – Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb</title><pubDate>Fri, 30 Mar 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203300930320513t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 30 March 2012 (IRIN) - Mopti in central Mali had a thriving tourism industry a few years ago, but Issa Ballo, a private tour operator, says the city built at the confluence of two rivers and often described as the ‘Gateway to the North’ still has everything in terms of “adventure, discovery and culture”.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 30 March 2012 (IRIN) - Mopti in central Mali had a thriving tourism industry a few years ago, but Issa Ballo, a private tour operator, says the city built at the confluence of two rivers and often described as the ‘Gateway to the North’ still has everything in terms of “adventure, discovery and culture”.

The cliff-dwelling Dogon people with their distinctive culture are a few hours’ drive away; Timbuktu, a centuries-old centre of Islamic learning, was receiving a steady stream of visitors. “Now, you can count the tourists on the fingers of one hand”, Ballo complained. “It is only… the really courageous who come here.”

He blames the embassies in Bamako, the capital, for issuing security alerts and declaring “no go zones” for their nationals. He accuses the media of exaggerating the problems in the north, “making out there is a gun pointed at your head everywhere you go.” But his strongest contempt is for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, known as AQMI in French), the radical Muslim group that appears to have a stranglehold over parts of northern Mali and beyond, despite its modest numbers and murky agenda.

“They are bandits, thieves, criminals… murderers”, Ballo says. “Ninety-five percent of people in Mali are Muslims… and we have never read in the Koran that you should take someone’s life to gain money. Al-Qaeda, AQIM, I don’t consider these people to be Muslims - they are just a kind of mafia with very long arms.”

Threat or fake?

AQIM’s military and commercial activities, religious orientation, size, composition and leadership have been the subject of many research papers, newspaper articles and conspiracy theories. Direct media access to AQIM, except for a few interviews with leaders, has been limited, with journalists often dependent on the testimony of released hostages and security sources, occasional amateur footage posted on YouTube by defectors, or leaked police interviews with terror suspects. [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdga_gpStSg ]

Sceptics say the threat has been gravely overplayed by the United States and France for their own strategic reasons, and by countries like Algeria and Mauritania, whose military and political elites are keen to be identified as front-line fighters against international terrorism. One academic observed, AQIM can be seen as a “small shop with a very big sign”, using its Al-Qaeda ‘franchise’ in the Sahara and Sahel to generate headlines and huge cash injections through deftly organized kidnappings, but with limited reach. [ http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/10/28/what-s-happening-in-mali/ ]

Opinions are often sharply divided. The International Crisis Group (ICG) in its March 2005 report, Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction? commented that “Fundamentalist Islam has been present in the Sahel for over 60 years without being linked to anti-Western violence.” The authors warned that “a misconceived and heavy-handed approach could tip the scale the wrong way”. [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/092-islamist-terrorism-in-the-sahel-fact-or-fiction.aspx ]

Others say the presence of an expanding transnational terrorist force could turn parts of the Sahel into a Somalia or even an Afghanistan. They point to a movement that has transcended its Algerian roots, recruiting in the Sahel and further afield, with the possibility of stronger ties in the future with organizations like Boko Haram in Nigeria and the emerging Jamaat Tawhid wa’l-Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa - MOJWA).

The UN mission sent to the Sahel in late 2011 to assess “the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region” hinted at AQIM’s ability to find an accommodation with local communities in the poorest parts of the Sahel, noting reports “that in some areas, the humanitarian vacuum is being filled by AQIM and/or criminal elements who are reportedly providing services and humanitarian assistance in remote areas where State presence is reduced or non-existent”. [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1220863.pdf ]

The mission warned that AQIM could use this situation “to develop recruitment and local support networks for gathering information, supplying arms and ammunition, and other logistics”. It noted that AQIM, like Tuareg combatants leaving Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion in Libya, may also have stocked up weaponry, including Semtex explosives, anti-aircraft artillery, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Out of Algeria

AQMI’s origins are usually traced back to the crisis in Algeria in 1992. As the military authorities annulled elections, depriving the radical Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) of probable victory, a bloody domestic conflict took hold. The future leaders of AQIM first found a niche in the Islamic Armed Group (GIA), but left it to found the Salafist Group for Call/Preaching and Combat (GSPC). [ http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/bulletin85harmon.pdf ] The Salafists hold to a conservative traditional view of Islam.

The Algerian conflict in the 1990s saw atrocities committed by all sides. Human rights activists, academics and others repeatedly questioned the role of Algeria’s intelligence service, the Département du Renseignement de la Sécurité (DRS), and accused it of not only infiltrating armed movements, but controlling key terrorist operatives.

In September 2006, the GSPC announced its formal affiliation to Al-Qaeda and in January 2007 changed its name to AQIM. Much of AQIM’s activity still centres on Algeria. In April 2007, AQIM used car bombs against the prime minister’s office and a police precinct in Algiers, the capital, killing 33 people. A subsequent attack in December 2007 on the Algerian Constitutional Council and the United Nations office in Algiers killed 63 people. There have been repeated attacks on military bases in the north and south of the country.

AQIM’s leadership is overwhelmingly Algerian. The man named in the UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions List in 2007 as the ‘Emir’ of AQIM is Abdelmalek Droukdel, 41, an engineer thought to have combat experience in Afghanistan. Interviewed by The New York Times in July 2008, Droukdel took responsibility for several bombing campaigns and pledged to “liberate the Islamic Maghreb from the sons of France and Spain… and protect it from foreign greed and the Crusaders’ hegemony.”

The ‘Marlboro Man’

In a recent interview with the website Al Wissâl, one of AQIM’s senior brigade commanders, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, aka Khaled Abou Al-Abass, reminded Muslims that “selling or trafficking drugs, even in infidel countries, is outlawed by the laws of Allah, and that is clear and beyond discussion”. AQIM has well-established links with a burgeoning trans-Saharan trade in arms, migrants, narcotics and cigarettes, and Belmokhtar’s interest in the latter earned him the nickname “Marlboro Man”. [ http://alwissal.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/entretien-exclusif-avec-khaled-abou-al-abass-aqmi/ ]

Like Droukdel, both Belmokhtar and Abud al-Hamid Abu Zeid have long been identified as the key figures in AQIM south of Algeria and have been given heavy sentences in absentia by Algerian courts. Both reportedly head significant commercial empires, and both have taken Tuareg wives, seen as an obvious way of securing favours from Tuareg communities.

Abud Zeid’s brigade, or katiba, is reportedly operating in Mali and Niger, while Belmokhtar’s is found in the west of the Maghreb. Mauritania appears to be more of a priority target than Mali. Belmokthar reviles Mali for hosting an Israeli embassy, its close ties with US intelligence services and its tough stance on Islamic militants.

Kidnappings and killings

AQIM’s notoriety, particularly in the Western media, is derived mainly from its involvement in kidnappings. The forerunner GSPC abducted 32 tourists from Algeria in 2003, releasing the 31 survivors several months later. AQIM has targeted smaller groups. The most high-profile abductees were Canadian UN diplomats Robert Fowler and Louis Guay, taken from Niger in December 2008, moved to Mali and released after four months in captivity in April 2009.

Among other abductees have been seven employees of the French company, AREVA, aid workers and tourists. Those executed or who died in captivity include British citizen Edwin Dwyer, one of a group of tourists kidnapped in 2009, and French humanitarian worker Michel Germaneu.

The governments of abductees have given out few details, particularly on the size of ransoms, or AQIM’s precise demands, but have included the withdrawal of French troops from Afghanistan and the release of senior Al-Qaeda prisoners.

Ransoms in millions of dollars and payment have been a source of division among the governments whose nationals have been taken (France, Britain and Italy, for example), and the African governments involved in negotiations. Algeria and Mauritania have been highly critical of Mali for releasing known AQIM operatives in return for hostages.

Mali – the weakest link

Recently ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré had repeatedly rejected accusations that Mali’s public commitment to fighting terrorism was not matched by actions. Touré, a keen defender of US-backed anti-terrorism initiatives, noted the vastness of the country’s 1.24 million square kilometres, and constantly appealed for stronger regional military cooperation.

Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz recently warned: “The north of Mali is a region left open for terrorism,” and said AQIM combatants were stocking up at will on food and fuel in places like Gao and Timbuktu, using easily identifiable vehicles. AQIM has attacked embassies in the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, targeted garrisons and killed tourists. The Mauritanian army has conducted hot pursuit operations inside Mali, and joint Mauritanian-Malian operations have occasionally been conducted.

A senior French official, quoted in the French weekly, L’Express, in November 2011, confirmed: “We are very angry with the Malians. Whether with regard to AQIM cells… their links with the Tuareg, or the trade in Latin American cocaine on its way to Europe, it’s no longer passiveness, but complicity. We have irrefutable proof.” [ http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/indiscrets/le-mali-complice ]

Tuaregs and terrorists – allies or adversaries?

Defenders of Mali’s failure to engage AQIM say the security vacuum in the north is the result of successive peace accords between the government and Tuareg rebel movements, which have forced a scaling-down of bases and troop numbers.

Bamako accuses the Tuaregs of lending support to AQIM by sharing their desert expertise and navigational skills, acting as auxiliaries, opening up their trade networks. It would be impossible for AQIM to operate in northern Mali without some sort of acceptance by the Tuaregs, say Sahel researchers.

There may be little spiritual affinity between AQIM’s Salafists and nomads in the north, but former hostages like Robert Fowler say AQIM’s fighters are respectful of local needs and customs. They also offer important fringe benefits. A Bamako-based peace activist with extensive research in the Kidal region, explained. “What are the alternatives for young [Tuareg] people? It’s not difficult to put yourself in their place, to see the temptations of getting involved in drugs trafficking or some other kind of adventure.”

Tuareg leaders, not least from the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad, or National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), which is fighting to carve out an independent state in the north, have consistently called for the expulsion of AQIM from Malian territory, and accuse the authorities of giving free rein to criminal elements.

Alliances have shifted constantly in the north over the past 20 years, but a recurring figure is veteran Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, founder of the MPLA (Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de l'Azawad, or Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in 1988. He has been used by the government as a mediator and could win over hardliners.

Sent as a diplomat to Saudi Arabia, Iyad famously converted to the Pakistan-based Tablighi Jam’at faith while in Jeddah. He now heads the Ansar dine movement, which has a nominally pacifist orientation. Iyad is thought to have been involved in hostage releases in the past, giving him a wide range of contacts and the opportunity to interact with key individuals in AQMI. In recent statements, MNLA has distanced itself from Iyad, suggesting that Ansar dine is more of an irritant than an ally.

Arguments over Aguelhoc

The government’s contention that there is an MNLA-AQIM link grew stronger after a Commission of Enquiry confirmed reports of a massacre of over 70 government soldiers at Aguelhoc (in Kidal) when it was overrun by rebels in late January, and said this was the work of “Salafist extremists” in cahoots with the MNLA. [ http://www.essor.ml/actualite/article/executions-sommaires-de-aguel-hoc ]

The MNLA accused Malian intelligence services of staging an elaborately fake by rearranging the corpses to make it look as if they had been slaughtered using AQIM methods. An MNLA communiqué warned: “There is no relationship between us and any kind of Islamic movement. Our mission is clear and we don’t intend to be distracted.” [ http://toumastpress.com/actualites/communique/269-communique-presse-mnla-15-02-2012.html ]

cs/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95208</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203300930320513t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 30 March 2012 (IRIN) - Mopti in central Mali had a thriving tourism industry a few years ago, but Issa Ballo, a private tour operator, says the city built at the confluence of two rivers and often described as the ‘Gateway to the North’ still has everything in terms of “adventure, discovery and culture”.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: War and peace – Mali repeats the cycle </title><pubDate>Thu, 29 Mar 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2008/200802113t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO 29 March 2012 (IRIN) - During a visit to Bamako, capital of Mali, on 26 February, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé observed that the Malian government would be best advised to sit down and negotiate with the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad), which is fighting to carve out an independent state in the north.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO 29 March 2012 (IRIN) - During a visit to Bamako, capital of Mali, on 26 February, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé observed that the Malian government would be best advised to sit down and negotiate with the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad), which is fighting to carve out an independent state in the north. [ http://www.ambafrance-ml.org/Visite-du-MAE-Alain-Juppe-au-Mali ]

He faced a barrage of criticism for legitimizing a rebel movement seen by many in the south as sectarian opportunists.  

The French colonial government would not have sued for peace with the Tuareg insurgents, whose sporadic but often effective resistance delayed the conquest of northern Mali and kept the region a military territory. The French established a fortress at Kidal in the Adrar des Ifoghas in 1908, but struggled to win recognition from the more entrenched Tuareg leaders, who resented France’s attempts to take over trans-Saharan trade, impose punitive taxation, and interfere in the Tuaregs’ relations with sedentary communities. There were accusations from Kidal and Gao of the colonialists using divide-and-rule tactics, and exploiting long-standing feuds and territorial disputes between different Tuareg confederations. [ http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cea_0008-0055_1973_num_13_49_2727 ]

Having seen off a small uprising in Ménaka in 1911, the French faced a much more significant insurrection in 1916 - the so-called ‘Kaocen Revolt’, named after its leader, Kaocen Ag Mohamed - when a Tuareg force, strongly influenced by Sufi anti-colonial religious leaders and suffering from the effects of severe drought, occupied large parts of what is now northern Niger before losing ground and being brutally countered by the French military the following year.

In the run-up to independence in 1960, there were hints from Paris that the  Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (or Organization of the Saharan Regions, OCRS), could maintain control of desert areas in Mali and  surrounding states. The OCRS was dissolved,  but the sporadic recurrence of similar proposals has fuelled suspicions in Bamako of French plots to destabilize Mali and work for a mineral-rich, pliant Saharan state, occupied by Tuaregs but controlled by Paris. [ http://astheysawit.com/7563-1961-french-african-community.html ]

The ‘Alfellaga’ – a rebellion crushed

Well before the French withdrawal in 1960,  there were strong signals of discontent from Tuareg leaders about the prospect of integration into a new state. The post-independence administration, led by the fiercely nationalist, Marxist-influenced Modibo Keita, held little appeal for nomadic communities, who encountered unwelcome changes in land ownership rules, a rigid adherence to established boundaries, and new bureaucratic controls. Tuareg trading links were much stronger with Algeria in the north than with Bamako in the south. 

The north was very much a country apart, viewed with suspicion and hostility by many in the south. Sparsely populated, but covering  a vast land mass, it barely featured in Keita’s plans for national development. Civil servants sent to the north reportedly viewed their deployment there as akin to a prison sentence. 

*** The rebellion that broke out in 1962, known as the Alfellaga, was launched from Kidal, and featured a low-intensity campaign of hit-and-run attacks, but triggered an all-out response from Keita’s military. Thousands fled. The well-documented massacres of civilians, poisoning of wells and destruction of livestock have been repeatedly referenced in Tuareg literature and music, and in the manifestoes and programmes of later rebel movements. An Open Letter from Tuareg Women to the European Parliament in 1994 catalogued a series of atrocities from this period, “from the extermination of entire camps to public executions, the burning alive of civilians, and the deaths of women and children in prison”. [ http://membres.multimania.fr/temoust/lettrefemme1.htm ]

Migrating from the margins 

President Modibo Keita (1960-1968) and his successor, Moussa Traoré (1968-1991), were both accused of militarizing the north, starving it of resources and clamping down on all signs of an autonomous Tamasheq cultural identity. The region was also hit by devastating droughts in 1972-73 and 1984-85, which decimated livestock, wrecked pasture and crippled livelihoods. Many Tuaregs switched uneasily to farming and forms of hired work, but the growing impoverishment triggered a huge exodus to urban centres in Mali and North Africa.. 

Many of those leaving were absorbed into the then expanding oil economies in Algeria and Libya, or went further afield to the Middle East. Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, already a self-anointed champion of the Tuareg cause, deployed hundreds of Tuaregs in the failed border war with Chad in 1986. 

Returning with guns

Defeat in Chad and economic downturns in Algeria and Libya helped force a return of Tuareg combatants and ordinary civilians to Niger and Mali in the late 1980s. 

Migrants in Libya, quite possibly with Gaddafi’s backing, had already formed a new Tuareg rebel movement, the Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de l'Azawad (MPLA or Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in 1988, led by Iyad Ag Ghali and later renamed the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad (MPA, or Popular Movement of Azawad).

In what was to become a recurring pattern in Mali and Niger, rival movements, often with different regional bases and support networks, rapidly emerged. 

In Mali the MPLA was joined by the Arab-led Front Islamique Armée de L’Azawad (FIAA, or Islamic Front Army of Azawad), the Front populaire pour la libération de l’Azaoud (FPLA, or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad) and the Armée révolutionnaire pour la libération de l’Azawad (ARLA, or Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad). All these eventually merged into the Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azaouad (MFUA or Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad) - at least for the purpose of signing a peace agreement - but retained their own identities.

The new combatants announced their presence with an attack on both the prison and garrison at Ménaka in June 1990. They had nothing like the arsenal of the next generation in 2011, but enough guns, vehicles and military savoir faire to quickly embarrass a demoralized, poorly paid army, fighting for a regime facing mass protests in the south, and which would be ousted in March 1991. 

The road to Timbuktu – looking for a lasting peace

Algeria brokered a first peace accord in Tamanrasset (in Algeria) in January 1991, but the violence continued. Even after President Traoré’s overthrow and the installation of the Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP or Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People), headed by Amdou Toumani Touré, atrocities continued. For example, over 40 Tuaregs and Arabs were killed by government troops at Léré, near Timbuktu in May 1991. 

The CTSP’s programme of nation-building, typified by the National Conference in Bamako in July-August 1991 and the agreement on a new constitution, included dealing with the north.

The ‘Pacte National’ signed by the government and the MFUA in April 1992, went far beyond a straightforward truce. Its recommendations provided for: integrating former rebels into improvised military structures; an Independent Commission of Enquiry to look at human rights violations; another commission to monitor ceasefire arrangements; a special status, or ‘Statut Particulier’, for the north, taking account of past neglect, giving the region its own Commissariat, and new regional and local assemblies. There would be seats in parliament for formerly displaced people, donor-backed funding for growth and investment, roads and schools. The Malian military would pull back, scaling down troop deployments and bases. [ https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Mali_Peace_Accord-proof.pdf ]

Predictably, the Pact was easier to sign than to implement. An extremely volatile four-year period followed, marked by mutinies, inter-rebel disputes and serious outbreaks of inter-communal violence. Tensions in the north between nomadic and sedentary communities, already worsened by the loss of pasture and the scarcity of water, required careful handling. 

The Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koye (MPGK), formed in 1994 as a self-defence militia, drawn mainly from the Songhai community and led by ex-army officers, was a dangerous development. Ganda Koye quickly gained a reputation for indiscriminate reprisal actions against Tuareg and Arab communities, while rebel movements, particularly Front Islamique Armé de L’Azawad (FIAA) sometimes replied in kind.  

Huge efforts were made to make the Pacte Nationale work. Mali’s new President, Alpha Konaré (1992-2002), preached peace and coexistence in the north. Tuareg movements began to reject unrealistic promises. An emerging civil society worked tirelessly on peace messages and got peace agreements signed at local level in areas like Ménaka and Gao. Outside experts like former French minister Edgar Pisani, philosopher Ahmed Baba Miské of Mauritania, and Norwegian Kare Lode, lent their weight to peace-building at grassroots and national level. [ http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1802.pdf ]

In March 1996, 10,000 people in Timbuktu watched as some 2,700 firearms were destroyed, symbolizing the end of the conflict, and the rebel movements were dissolved. “Truly, this is a story for our times,” said Kalif Keita, former Commander of Mali’s 5th Military Region, the Timbuktu area. [ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub200.pdf ]

Ten years later, a new insurgency was announced on 23 May 2006 with raids on garrisons at Kidal and Ménaka, opening up a new cycle of violence and a weary sense of déjà vu for those who had lived through previous rebellions. 

cs/aj/he/oa


Sources:
Interviews with Norwegian mediator Kare Lode; FPLA leader and peace activist, Zeidan Ag Sidalamine. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College [ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub200.pdf ]; French Consulate, Bamako [ http://www.ambafrance-ml.org/-Le-Consulat-general- ]; Pacte Nationale, original document, April 1992 [ https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Mali_Peace_Accord-proof.pdf ]; Group of Women of Azawad letter [ http://membres.multimania.fr/temoust/lettrefemme1.htm ]; Columbia University study [ http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/sen_mali.pdf ] “That desert is our country: Tuareg rebellions and competing nationalisms in contemporary Mali” (1946-1996), Jean Sebastian Lecocq; “Les révoltes des Touaregs du Niger (1916-1917)” in Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines - 049, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (1973)

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95186</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2008/200802113t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO 29 March 2012 (IRIN) - During a visit to Bamako, capital of Mali, on 26 February, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé observed that the Malian government would be best advised to sit down and negotiate with the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad), which is fighting to carve out an independent state in the north.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SAHEL: Malian refugees risk being “forgotten”</title><pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202290732000936t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 28 March 2012 (IRIN) - Mali is facing its “worst humanitarian crisis for 20 years” due to a combination of food insecurity affecting around three million people, and conflict-induced displacement in the north.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 28 March 2012 (IRIN) - Mali is facing its “worst humanitarian crisis for 20 years” due to a combination of food insecurity affecting around three million people, and conflict-induced displacement in the north. 

The whereabouts and status of some 93,500 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northern Mali is uncertain; in addition, 113,000 refugees have fled the north to neighbouring countries. 

Between 175,000 and 220,000 children will be acutely malnourished this year and access to northern Mali and refugee destinations across the border is problematic. The current problems are compounded by a perennial lack of real interest in the Sahel. 

“Up to now aid agencies have not had great access to these areas… It’s hard to sell this crisis, it’s quite forgotten,” says Helen Caux, West Africa communications head at the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). 

The arrival of so many refugees comes at a difficult time for many of Mali’s neighbouring countries, where nine million people are facing a serious food crisis after a poor harvest in 2011, with severe malnutrition rates in children of more than 15 percent being reported in some areas. 

Malians began to flee the north in January when fighting flared up between the Malian army and the Tuareg rebel group, the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad).  [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95170/Analysis-Warriors-and-websites-a-new-kind-of-rebellion-in-Mali ]

Alongside host governments, the UNHCR is leading the refugee response in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania. It says some 113,000 Malians have fled across the border - 40,000 to Mauritania, 23,000 to Burkina Faso (government statistics), and 19,000 to Niger, as well as other destinations. 

Initial estimates were higher, partly because many migrants were Nigerien returnees fleeing Mali, and because many Malians have since returned to their villages near the border. Thousands may also have also fled fighting in Tessalit and Aguelhoc to Algeria, but the government, which is not very open to outside help, is leading the response, and UNHCR has no official figures. 

Up to 120,000 people in Mali are sheltering with relatives or friends in temporary settlements and host villages in and around areas of conflict such as Ménaka, Kidal - which is currently experiencing hostilities - and Gao, where MNLA rebels are reportedly surrounding the town and shoring up their positions. 

Security in the north 

The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) has serious concerns about accessing the IDPs in more isolated areas of northern Mali, and for the security of its staff. Germain Mwehu, ICRC spokesperson, cited the example of Ménaka, in eastern Mali, which is now held by the MNLA. “Many of those who stayed are living on the periphery of the town. Food and shelter are our priorities and this is in an area very vulnerable to drought,” he told IRIN.

“People in Ménaka are very stressed about not knowing what to do. Should they try to leave for Niger? Should they stay put? Will the conflict resume? Will the government look to stage an offensive?”

Médecins du Monde was forced to scale down its activities in the north due to insecurity, but has since expanded them again. In spite of the insecurity, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) recently opened healthcare programmes around Kidal and Timbuktu. Johanne Sekkenes, head of MSF in the capital, Bamako, said the displaced who are less used to a nomadic existence are the most vulnerable.

The World Food Programme (WFP) is working closely with the ICRC in negotiating and signing agreements with more NGO partners to try to reach the displaced in the north with food aid, said WFP head Nancy Walters. The plan is to try to get aid to 1.2 million Malians, including the displaced - security, funding and access permitting - but thus far WFP has received just 38 percent of its requirements, said Walters. 

Animals in camps

According to WFP in Niger, food is being distributed to all the Malian refugees at different sites, but not yet to the local population. 

“People are arriving [from Mali] exhausted, hungry and in need of the very basics,” said Chris Palusky, food crisis response manager for Mali and Niger with NGO, World Vision. “But Niger is struggling to cope with the influx of refugees, and the extra strain is pushing families to the brink of survival.” 

Most of those who arrived at the three sites near the Niger-Mali border have come from Ménaka, about 50km inside Mali, and many left behind all their possessions, and even their animals. 

Regarding those who brought their livestock - a principal source of livelihood to agro-pastoralist Tuaregs - UNHCR is having to rethink its idea of a refugee camp, said Caux, as animals cannot be cooped up in camps.

Urgent solutions are needed as water is scarce: “Up to now, locals have been sharing their wells, but in the long run this will cause problems,” she told IRIN. Much of the available water is not clean and potable water must be brought in by aid agencies. 

The plan is to try to separate Malians into those with animals - who will be settled in refugee “sites” which are more flexible - and those without. Many northern Malians are semi-nomadic and do not feel comfortable in settled camps. “It is hard for them to adapt to this environment,” said Caux, noting that many would prefer to stay in border villages, despite the greater potential for insecurity.

Thus far, UNHCR has transported 2,000 of the 4,700 refugees who were sheltering in Sinegodar village near the Mali border, to a camp in Abala, 84km away from the border. Other Malians are staying in Mangaize, where a more permanent site may be built if the government approves it, and in the area around Ayorou.

Burkina Faso 

Most of the Malian refugees in Burkina Faso arrived in the Sahelian provinces of Oudalan and Soum in the drought-hit north, where the National Commission for Refugees (CONAREF) and UNHCR are now leading the response after a significantly slow start-up, said observers. 

At a recent press conference, Ousmane Aga Dalla, the head of the government body coordinating assistance to the Malian refugees (CAREM), said there were no major concerns and communities were largely welcoming the refugees, even when there was a temporary interruption the food and emergency funding pipeline.

Despite the myriad problems that agencies face, Caux said she saw some reason for feeling relieved. Although seriously weakened by the journey and having to sleep out in the open air, and facing enormous difficulties in trying to preserve their livelihoods, security and collective future, most of the refugees who arrived were in a relatively decent state of health, said UNHCR and MSF, with no major epidemics having broken out, and few deaths of children en route.

aj/bb/ch/he/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95183</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202290732000936t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 28 March 2012 (IRIN) - Mali is facing its “worst humanitarian crisis for 20 years” due to a combination of food insecurity affecting around three million people, and conflict-induced displacement in the north.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Warriors and websites - a new kind of rebellion in Mali?</title><pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203261849280456t.jpg" />]]>MOPTI 26 March 2012 (IRIN) - In the wake of the coup that deposed Mali’s President Amadou Toumani Touré, military junta leader Captain Amadou Sanogo has stressed a willingness to negotiate with rebel groups reportedly surrounding the northern town of Kidal and reinforcing positions around Gao, 190 km further south.</description><body><![CDATA[MOPTI 26 March 2012 (IRIN) - In the wake of the coup that deposed Mali’s President Amadou Toumani Touré, military junta leader Captain Amadou Sanogo has stressed a willingness to negotiate with rebel groups reportedly surrounding the northern town of Kidal and reinforcing positions around Gao, 190 km further south. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95127/MALI-Rebellion-claims-a-president ]

In a recent BBC interview Captain Sanogo said he was ready to talk: “I want all of them to come to the same table. My door is open. We can talk about and work through the peace process.” 

It will be interesting to see who comes through the door. The latest in a series of rebel movements, the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad), which is fighting to carve out an independent state encompassing the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali, prides itself on its military sophistication. “We don’t just hit once and run off into the bush.”

Senior figures in the MNLA may include Chief of Staff Mohamed Ag Najem, recruited directly from Libya. There is also a strong intellectual fringe: Moussa Ag Assari, a Paris-based writer and author of the memoir, “Il n’y a pas d’embouteillage dans le desert”, [“There isn’t much traffic in the desert”]  is a spokesman. [ http://www.point-fort.com/index.php?2008/03/13/117-y-a-pas-d-embouteillage-dans-le-desert ]

Coup-makers face the flak

It was the “incompetent” handling of the crisis in Mali’s northern regions by the government and military that supposedly pushed Sanogo and his fellow soldiers in the Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’état (CNRDRE) to move against President Amadou Toumani Touré, but establishing a dialogue with Mali’s Tuareg rebels is only one of many priorities facing the coup-makers. 

Sternly criticized by the UN, the African Union, European Union, World Bank, and others, not to mention Mali’s national assembly and an expanding bloc of civil society leaders and opinion-leaders, the CNRDRE presides over an economy in crisis while trying to rein in looters, offer some semblance of coherent leadership, and break out of its own isolation.

Sticking to their guns

The rebel movement that the soldiers in charge are looking to defeat in far-flung locations in the north is also a pariah, except for an impressive network of supportive websites and diaspora groups. 

If the MNLA has backers, they are in the shadows. Its insurgency has been widely denounced as illegitimate, sectarian and against the spirit of African unity, but the movement has remained unabashed by the criticism. Its reaction to the ousting of Touré steered clear of celebrations, simply using the occasion “to reaffirm the objective of its struggle, which remains the independence of Azawad, and to pursue it with determination”. 

Ironically, it was not the MNLA which gained immediate impetus and political capital from the coup, but a rival movement, “Ansar Dine”, nominally led by veteran Tuareg leader Iyd Ag Ghali. Fighting for Sharia [Muslim] law rather than independence, Ansar Dine claimed to have Kidal encircled. The Malian military and the MNLA, which have firmly distanced themselves from Ag Ghali, quickly signalled that this was not true. 

When the MNLA began hostilities with the attack on Ménaka on January 17, it announced its main targets as Kidal, Tombouctou and Gao, the three provincial capitals of the “septentrion”, or far north, all of which would be part of a “liberated Azawad”.

The movement is not above exaggerating its territorial gains, with communiqués often coming from Paris or the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, rather than the frontline, and much of the information, even in the digital age, difficult to verify. 

But the MNLA has given pause for thought even to sceptics, who dismissed it initially as a “flash-in-the-pan”. 

“What happens when they run out of ammunition, when they find they have no supply lines, no sanctuaries, Gaddafi no longer exists, and they need to treat their wounded?” asked El Hadji Baba Haidara, the parliamentary representative for Tombouctou and head of the National Assembly’s Crisis Cell on the North. 

Confidence that the military landscape would change once the national army regrouped and committed more resources to the north was eroding long before the CNRDRE moved against Touré. 

The roots of a rebellion foretold 

A common criticism of Touré, which went well beyond military dissidents, was his apparent failure to see a rebellion coming. It is still not clear how Touré’s government handled the influx of returnees from Libya. 

Reports from northern Mali in late 2011 said two of the returning rebel contingents were seeking accommodation with the authorities and wanted integration into military and civilian structures, while a third wanted no part of this. Critics ask why the threat was not neutralized, and how neighbouring Niger avoided a similar crisis. 

It has become common to portray the arrival of Libya-hardened warriors as the main catalyst for the MNLA’s revolt, emboldening hard-liners and opportunists who would otherwise have confined themselves to marches and manifestos. But there had been mounting pessimism about the prospects for a durable, all-encompassing settlement in the north. 

Ten years after the “Flamme de la Paix” [peace flame] ceremony in Tombouctou, the dissolution of armed rebel movements and the symbolic destruction of hundreds of firearms, much of the optimism and momentum from that time had burned out. 

Coordinated attacks on garrisons in Kidal and Ménaka on 23 May 2006 signalled the start of a new chapter of violence. The raids were claimed by the Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai pour le changement (ADC), whose ranks included senior figures from past insurgencies. Algeria again acted as mediator and the government and ADC signed an agreement in Algiers in July 2006, aimed at tackling insecurity and underdevelopment in Kidal. 

Yet sporadic violence remained the norm in parts of the north, with the government fighting a bloody, draining war with the Alliance Nationale des Touareg du Mali (ANTM), led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, a seasoned senior rebel commander opposed to compromise with Bamako, who fought from bases in caves and hills.

Killed in a mysterious car accident in August 2011, Bahanga is now revered by the MNLA as “a pillar of the Tuareg community”, but the tributes ignore longstanding reports of a major trafficking empire. Bahanga was reportedly instrumental in consolidating ties with fighters in Libya, persuading officers and ordinary soldiers to cross the Sahara. 

The quest for Azawad

Well before Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s demise was being talked about, a meeting of mainly Tuareg representatives finished in Tombouctou on 1 November 2010 with the announcement that the Mouvement National de l’Azawad (MNA) would be formed to fight against the militarization and marginalization of the north. 

The communiqué argued that ‘Azawad’ had become a place of conflict battled over “by those who have an eye on their interests and extremist groups”, a clear reference to mining companies and terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI). [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/90703/Analysis-Fresh-approach-needed-to-quell-terrorism-threat-in-the-Sahel ] The MNA called on “all the sons of Azawad” to come to the side of a population in danger of being reduced to “a useless spectator”. It explicitly rejected all forms of violence and terrorism but warned that the government had to reverse fifty years of neglect and brutalization. 

Less than a year later, the MNA formally merged with the ANTM. The communiqué posted on the internet on 16 October 2011 suggested that the last window of opportunity was closing on the government. The new MNLA defined its main objective as “freeing the people of Azawad from the illegal occupation of their territory by Mali, which has been the cause of decades of insecurity in the region”. 

Many of the MNLA’s main grievances draw on the memories of past atrocities committed by national armies, the failure of peace agreements to deliver security and release from poverty, and the squandering or misappropriation of funds by national and local authorities. Added to this has been a very explicit resentment of the government’s alleged accommodation with AQMI and its attempts to smear Tuaregs as terrorist accomplices. 

What is more novel is the explicit focus on Azawad as a realizable project, a historic homeland for the “Kel Tamasheq”, or Tamasheq-speaking people. While arguing that its own support base extends across all communities in the north, including Songhai, Peuls and Arabs, the MNLA has also presented itself as fighting for the survival of Tamasheq culture in the face of vicious state repression. 

The theme has been taken up by website support groups in North Africa, the United States and Europe. The organizers of a demonstration ‘for Azawad’ in Paris in April, argue that: “fifty years of forced cohabitation with Mali are too much. This cohabitation imposed by colonial France has produced a number of damaging effects in the country…most of all the destruction of values and the Tuareg identity”. 

The MPs go north 

Part of the government’s response to the MNLA’s emergence was to send a delegation of MPs representing northern regions to Tomboctou, Gao, Kidal and elsewhere to find out what was happening. Haidara, the representative from Tombouctou, was on the mission in late 2011. “We went right into the MNLA’s bases and talked to them for two days, trying to work out what they were doing and what was their motivation.” 

Haidara said it was difficult to take the new movement seriously. “For me, this doesn’t count as a proper ‘rebellion’. What you had there were 200 youngsters, mainly from Kidal. They said they represented the whole of the north and wanted self-determination. I realized very quickly that this was a minority phenomenon and they represented nothing. I told them if they wanted independence they should hold a referendum”. Haidara was presented with a flag of Azawad, but was not impressed. “I told them I was from the north of Mali and proud to be so.” 

Zeïdan Ag Sidalamine, once the Secretary-General of the rebel Front populaire pour la libération de l’Azaoud (FPLA), who became heavily involved in peace campaigning and delivered the keynote speech at the Flamme de la Paix ceremony in Tombouctou in March 1996, also believes the quest for an independent Azawad is a pipedream.

“The MNLA is a politico-military movement with its own vocabulary and its own way of looking at things,” Zeïdan said. “But going for separatism or independence cannot work. A country’s diplomacy is dictated by its geography. All of Mali’s seven neighbours have said they will defend the country’s unity and territorial integrity,” he told IRIN.

“I don’t believe in a state that is ‘parachuted in’, a state that has no integrity. I am a citizen of the Republic of Mali, democratic and indivisible.” 

cs/aj/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95170</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203261849280456t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MOPTI 26 March 2012 (IRIN) - In the wake of the coup that deposed Mali’s President Amadou Toumani Touré, military junta leader Captain Amadou Sanogo has stressed a willingness to negotiate with rebel groups reportedly surrounding the northern town of Kidal and reinforcing positions around Gao, 190 km further south.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>WEST AFRICA: Giant anti-polio drive threatened by insecurity</title><pubDate>Fri, 23 Mar 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201311207110246t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 23 March 2012 (IRIN) - Health volunteers, aid agency and health authority staff are trying to immunize 111.1 million children under five across 20 countries in West and Central Africa against polio. The four-day campaign started today, but instability in some of the target countries could hamper the effort.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 23 March 2012 (IRIN) - Health volunteers, aid agency and health authority staff are trying to immunize 111.1 million children under five across 20 countries in West and Central Africa against polio. The four-day campaign started today, but instability in some of the target countries could hamper the effort.
 
Parts of Nigeria are highly unstable due to ongoing attacks by Boko Haram; [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94691/NIGERIA-Timeline-of-Boko-Haram-attacks-and-related-violence ] a rebellion is currently under way in northern Mali, [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95127/MALI-Rebellion-claims-a-president ] while security in the capital Bamako is also precarious with a military junta having ousted the president. 
 
Over half of the children targeted - some 57.7 million, are in Nigeria, which is West Africa’s only polio-endemic country.
 
Meanwhile parts of Niger (for instance Tillabéri in the northwest) are difficult to access, as are parts of eastern Chad, with some aid agencies working only with armed escorts.
 
“Access to children [in some of these places] can be a serious problem,” said UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) regional health specialist Halima Dao. 
 
“Vaccinators’ safety can be compromised, or insecurity means the whole population of a village may flee at a moment’s notice, or there may be far more people than we expected in an area, due to displacement,” she told IRIN. 
 
The conflict in northern Mali has, for instance, led to about 195,000 people being displaced either within the country or when they fled to Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Senegal, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), but these numbers are constantly changing as people return or move from camps to host villages, meaning reaching them could be complicated.
 
Dao admits some children in the Tombouctou  and Kidal regions of northern Mali may not be reached, though they are discussing with NGOs working there, including Médecins Sans Frontières and the Malian Red Cross, to see how to reach as many as they can. “We have to work with authorities and NGOs who are used to accessing these insecure areas,” she said. 
 
For a polio immunization campaign to be effective, 100 percent of the children must be reached, says the World Health Organization (WHO), while the long-term fight against polio will only work if routine immunizations are consistently kept up, for at least 90 percent of children under five, for several years running.
 
Last year, election-related in violence in Côte d’Ivoire hampered efforts to quash a polio outbreak affecting 36 children, according to aid agencies. 
 
Thus far, only Ghana, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Gambia and Togo have achieved the required 90 percent coverage, according to UNICEF.
 
Children in the hardest-to-reach areas are often the most vulnerable, said Dao, as they do not have access to regular health services. Agencies will try to give Vitamin A and de-worming medicine to these children where possible. 
 
Weak health systems
 
Human error and weak health systems also play an important role in sub-optimal immunization reach: In Chad, [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94769/CHAD-Why-polio-is-so-hard-to-eliminate ] for instance, where the health system is broken, just 60 percent of children have been covered, according to UNICEF. 
 
The campaign involves hundreds of thousands of health workers, though it will not lead to eradication in one fell swoop, said Dao. “We hope the exercise will bring us closer to reaching our goal of interrupting wild polio virus transmission in our region in 2012,” said Luis Sambo, West Africa director of WHO in a 22 March communiqué. [ http://www.unicef.org/media/media_62054.html ]
 
Despite a resurgence of the virus in West Africa, the global fight against polio has made progress: since 1988, when the Global Polio Eradication Initiative [ http://www.polioeradication.org/ ] was launched, polio has reduced by over 99 percent. At the time some, 350,000 children were paralysed by polio each year but in 2011 the reported caseload was 650, according to UNICEF.
 
An intense effort to stamp out polio in India led to no new cases being reported in 2011. India alongside Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria is one of the world’s four polio-endemic countries. “If India can do it, then so can these African countries,” said Dao. “We’ve reached 99 percent of the world - we need to reach that final 1 percent; the whole programme is at risk,” she said.
 
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Polio in West Africa
- 62 cases of polio were reported in Nigeria in 2011; thus far 10 have been reported in 2012
- 132 cases of polio were reported in Chad in 2011; while 2 have been reported so far in 2012
- No cases have as yet been reported in other West African countries
Source WHO: [ http://www.polioeradication.org/Dataandmonitoring/Poliothisweek/Wildpolioviruslist.aspx ]

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95145</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201311207110246t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 23 March 2012 (IRIN) - Health volunteers, aid agency and health authority staff are trying to immunize 111.1 million children under five across 20 countries in West and Central Africa against polio. The four-day campaign started today, but instability in some of the target countries could hamper the effort.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Rebellion claims a president</title><pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203220959050813t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO 22 March 2012 (IRIN) - Former Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré, overthrown this morning by mutinous soldiers, said recently that tackling recalcitrant Tuareg rebels in the north is going to be an ongoing task for future governments.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO 22 March 2012 (IRIN) - Former Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré, overthrown this morning by mutinous soldiers, said recently that tackling recalcitrant Tuareg rebels in the north is going to be an ongoing task for future governments.

“The problems of the north have been with us for 50 years now… Our elders dealt with them; we are tackling them, and the younger generation will continue to do the same. This is not going to be over tomorrow,” he told Radio France Internationale.

Touré’s successor government, the Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de la démocratie et la restauration de l’état (CNRDRE), led by army captain Amadou Sango, has dissolved state institutions, suspended the constitution, reportedly arrested several ministers, taken over the state broadcaster, and announced a curfew.

CNRDRE says it has brought an end to “an incompetent regime” and singled out Touré’s “incapacity to manage the crisis in the north of the country… and to fight terrorism”. 

There have been persistent complaints from soldiers of inadequate supplies and military hardware, poor direction and strategic planning and a sense of abandonment for those on the frontline, fighting a war that could and should have been prevented.

Touré, 63, having first taken power aged 42, had planned to retire gracefully, leaving after a second-five year term, as stipulated in the constitution. Until recently, he had been adamant that presidential elections scheduled for the end of April would take place, that there was no question of the military situation forcing an emergency transitional government, and that he was looking forward to retirement and more time with his family.

The current situation has an ironic symmetry. Touré’s first period in office after overthrowing military ruler Moussa Traoré in March 1991 began against a background of revolt in the north and ended in June 1992 just after a Pacte Nationale was signed by the government and representatives of Tuareg resistance movements fighting for a separate territory.

Twenty years later, the long-term solutions put forward in that agreement - decentralization, reconciliation and bringing resources and development to some of the country’s most isolated regions - have not taken hold. 

Many Malians from different communities believe Touré responsible for the current crisis, alleging that the promises did not turn into concrete developments, too many projects were left on the drawing board, and too much of the funding was never accounted for.

Arsenal from Libya

Having dealt messily with an earlier insurgency, signing an inconclusive peace agreement in February 2009, Touré’s beleaguered army found itself up against a much better organized rebel movement, flush with an arsenal taken from Libya.

The new, largely Tuareg force, the Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA), initiated hostilities with an attack on Ménaka in the far east of the country on 17 January, following this up with a series of strikes on small towns spread across a vast expanse of the north: Léré, Niafunké, Aguel-hoc, Tessalit.

While Touré reorganized his senior command, and military communiqués pointed to a rapid recovery of lost territory, there has been little evidence in recent weeks of the national army gaining ground. 

There was a serious warning for the government when widows of soldiers killed in the north demonstrated in the garrison town of Kati, 15km outside the capital, on 1 February, marching with the clear support of sections of the military.

Civil society activists have talked of the need for Malians to come together and draw on a long history of peaceful coexistence, but have warned the situation is much more complex than before, not least because parts of the north now dominated by a flourishing illicit economy that appears strongly linked to Islamist “terrorist” networks, notably Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

“This only confirms what I have believed all along”, said Mohamed Ag Ossade, reacting to the overnight coup in Mali. “All Mali’s children have to come and sit down together. We need to talk to each other now more than ever.” For three years, Ag Ossade has run TAMUST, the Tuareg Cultural Centre in Bamako, the capital. 

TAMUST plays host to curious visitors, but has also been a successful concert venue and the site is dominated by a vast tent housing Tuareg cultural artefacts, swords and jewellery.

Mixing

Ag Ossade is proud of his Tamsheq heritage, but also a firm champion of the concept of `brassage’ (mixing), pointing out that Mali’s ethnic groups have lived together and intermarried for centuries, and that one of the country’s abiding strengths is its diversity. “No culture can thrive in isolation,” Mohamed told IRIN. “People have to know each other.”

He says he has found the events of the past few months distressing and frustrating. “I have friends and family fighting on both sides. They should put an end to this wretched piece of cinema now.”

One of the major fears since even before the conflict began is that revived tensions in the north would lead to inter-ethnic violence in the south. Both Tuareg and Arab communities in the capital have expanded significantly in recent years, partly because of the prevailing poverty and lack of opportunities in the north. Many have fled, Mohamed acknowledged, but stressed that: “nobody has been killed as far as I know and people should be wary of rumours and exaggeration”.

There were ugly demonstrations in early February, particularly in Kati, as anger over government troop casualties spilled over into attacks on prominent Tuaregs. Malians have bitter memories of rebellions in the 1960s and 1990s, and of how easily armed attacks in one location could bring on a cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals in another. 

People watch out for echoes of the mid-1990s when Ganda Koye (“masters of the land”), a self-defence militia drawn mainly from the Songhai community, took up arms, targeting Tuaregs and Arabs. The latest rebellion has not, so far, triggered that kind of confrontation, although there have been hints of an anti-Tuareg backlash in areas like Gao with a past history of inter-ethnic tension.

Politicians from Touré down spoke out against `les amalgams’, or half-truths that can be used by troublemakers to stir up hate campaigns, using the rebellion as a pretext for ethnic pogroms.

Presidential candidate Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, known to Malians as IBK, made sure that his condemnations of the rebellion were combined with appeals for moderation, pointing out that “the overwhelming majority of communities in the north live in peace and want to contribute to the development of the nation”. IBK called for a special conference on the north, a proposal which has been endorsed by other politicians, religious leaders and civil society organizations.

The faith in dialogue is shared by some outsiders. Prior to the events of 21 March, a Western diplomat confidently observed that: “sorting things out, finding a consensus, that’s in Mali’s DNA”.

But there were concerns too about the potential for breakdown.”People often say: “enough is enough, no more peace conferences, we must see this thing through until the end”, said Jean de Dieu Dakouo, Director-General of the Centre Djoliba, in Bamako, which specializes in conflict resolution. “But they don’t think through what they are saying”.

With a curfew in place and the capital in shutdown mode, it is difficult to gauge the impact of the coup. “Our main priority for now is working out what is going on”, a Bamako-based diplomat acknowledged.

Displacement and food insecurity

Watching with particular concern are aid agencies. The coup comes at a critical time in terms of food assistance. The north, west and several other parts of the country are experiencing severe food insecurity due to erratic rains and a poor harvest in 2011.

As the conflict goes into a third month, relief organizations like the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médécins Sans Frontières (MSF) have consistently highlighted the need for food, shelter, water and medical care for the 100,000 who have fled across the borders, while stressing the pressure placed on the regions taking in the influx. Northern Burkina Faso, [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94986/BURKINA-FASO-Government-wants-more-aid-for-Malian-refugees ] southern Mauritania, western Niger [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94971/NIGER-Malian-refugees-flee-to-hunger-zone ] and parts of Senegal [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94826/SENEGAL-Drought-response-slowed-by-election-fever ] are all grappling with serious food insecurity and malnutrition that are likely to escalate in the coming months. 

But there has also been massive internal displacement inside Mali, with 93,500 making it to provincial centres, like Gao, Tomboctou and Kidal, while others remain on the fringes of conflict areas, like Aguel-hoc and Tessalit, according to UNHCR.

Germain Mwehu of the ICRC, speaking to IRIN from Niamey, capital of Niger, Mali’s southern neighbour, cited the example of Ménaka, in eastern Mali, the first target of a rebel attack on 17 January and now held by the MNLA.

“Many people made for the border with Niger,” Mwehu told IRIN. “Many of those who stayed are living on the periphery of the town. Food and shelter are our priorities and this in an area very vulnerable to drought.” The ICRC has serious concerns about access to people in the more isolated areas and for the security of its staff. Mwehu also talked of the psychological burdens facing the target population.

“People in Ménaka are very stressed about not knowing what to do. Should they try to leave for Niger? Should they stay put? Will the conflict resume? Will the government look to stage an offensive?”

Aid agencies

Even before the rebellion, international and national NGOs operating in the north faced security scares and access issues, [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94873/MALI-Aid-gets-into-gear-but-must-navigate-no-go-zones ] sometimes being forced into a temporary suspension of activities or the withdrawal of expatriate staff. 

Médecins du Monde (MDM) was forced to scale down its activities in response to worsening security in February 2012, but was able to resume in early March.

François Fille, MDM’s Security Focal Point, says his organisation, like other NGOs in Mal, is still taking stock of the coup.

“At the moment, our teams in displacement camps in the north are working”, File emphasized. “There has been no harassment. They are able to access our beneficiaries. That is the situation as of now”.

But he said nothing could be taken as guaranteed. "We are very concerned about the situation and what could happen now with the coup in Bamako."

MDM has been able to run its nutritional and medical activities unimpeded, gaining access to populations in both MNLA and government-held areas. "Until now, we haven't noticed extra controls from both sides and hope it won't change in the future".

NGOs often have to prioritize humanitarian operations ahead of development work, and there are longer-term concerns too: how will the costs of military campaigns affect government budgets in a year of huge food security problems? “There are going to be three million people affected by the food security problems in Mali come April [2012],” warned Abdoulaye Samoura, advocacy officer with Oxfam in Bamako. “There is a danger that the government will put all its political, financial and decision-making capacity into sorting out the crisis in the north.”

Numerous small-scale development projects, covering everything from irrigation to governance, operate in isolated, war-affected zones like Kidal. “If there is no security in the north, how can the projects they need there be made to work?” asked Mohamed Ag Ossade. “Resorting to arms will never help a country to develop.”

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95127</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201203220959050813t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO 22 March 2012 (IRIN) - Former Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré, overthrown this morning by mutinous soldiers, said recently that tackling recalcitrant Tuareg rebels in the north is going to be an ongoing task for future governments.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Unrest hinders fight against fistula</title><pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2009/200912180800250430t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 20 March 2012 (IRIN) - The turmoil in northern Mali is thwarting efforts to treat and prevent obstetric fistula, say health experts and local NGO workers.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 20 March 2012 (IRIN) - The turmoil in northern Mali is thwarting efforts to treat and prevent obstetric fistula, say health experts and local NGO workers.
 
It is just one example of the fallout from the latest fighting between Tuareg rebels and the Malian army, triggered when rebels began attacking northern military posts in January. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94944/MALI-Refugee-IDP-numbers-rise-as-fighting-continues-in-north ] Since then, some 195,000 people are estimated to have been displaced by fighting, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
 
Obstetric fistula - a tear in the birth canal caused primarily by prolonged labour, resulting in chronic leakage of urine and/or faeces - is both preventable and treatable, and for years health workers in Mali have been working on both tracks. 
 
The latest instability in the north has had both an immediate and a potential long-term impact on efforts to address fistulas, primarily in nomad communities: Many women in northern areas who were to have operations in early March did not, while prevention and training activities also took a hit. [ http://www.unfpa.org/public/cache/offonce/home/mothers/pid/4386 ]
 
One component of a project backed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in northern Mali is the quarterly “fistula care week”, in which women from northern districts are assisted in coming to the regional hospital in Gao, eastern Mali, for treatment. For the latest campaign running from 25 February to 3 March, about a third of the 30 women scheduled for operations did not show up and could not be reached, health workers said.
 
“We have lost contact with all the women we were following in Ménaka [one of the first areas attacked by rebels],” said Fatimata Touré, head of Gao-based NGO GREFFA whose work includes educating communities about prevention and treatment of fistula. She said fistula prevalence is highest in nomad communities and most of the women GREFFA assists are in Ménaka, a sub-region of Gao populated mostly by nomadic and pastoralist communities. “We don’t know where they are today - people from that area have fled in all directions.” 
 
“Granted, we’re talking about communities who move regularly,” Touré said. “But when things are stable we know exactly where to find them during this or that period of the year.”
 
Ibrahim Oumar Touré, GREFFA’s coordinator for the prevention of early marriage and fistula, told IRIN NGO workers could not transport the women as they normally would because of the security situation.
 
“God alone knows how much these women with fistula suffer, and beyond that now we can’t get to many of them for treatment,” he said. “It pains me just to think about it…. It’s atrocious.”
 
Long-term impact
 
GREFFA, which receives support in reproductive health and other programmes from Norwegian Church Aid, has also lost contact with the local women who collaborated with the NGO in year-round outreach efforts, Mr Touré said.
 
Mali, with the support of several donors and NGOs, has made significant strides in incorporating fistula prevention and care into local and national health structures, and health workers say the conflict threatens to set back some of this progress in northern communities.
 
They noted a number of concerns, including the suspension of education and prevention efforts in some nomad areas, and the loss of contact with women who have had fistula treatment in the past and need close attention especially in childbirth.
 
Demba Traoré, coordinator of the fistula care project at NGO Intrahealth, said prevention is a major component of the work. “We know that early marriage [and thus childbirth] and excision are two major contributors to fistula,” he told IRIN. “We regularly talk with local authorities and traditional and religious leaders, who have a huge role to play in prevention. But with the current security situation we can’t continue this outreach in some areas.”
 
He said there is a concern that the incidence of fistula could rise because health services in some areas have been interrupted. “Even if under normal circumstances many of these women did not go to health centres, we had started to see an improvement there. Fistula is linked to a lack of obstetric care. Now we fear we could see a rise in new cases in these affected communities.”
 
A 2009 Malian Health Ministry strategy on fistulas says while the exact prevalence of the condition is unknown, it is estimated that 600 new cases occur per year. [ http://www.sante.gov.ml/docs/pdf/Strategie.pdf ] For years the aid agency Médecins du Monde has supported fistula care in Mali; it has a programme to support corrective surgery as well as post-operation psychological care in Mopti.

Obstetric fistula is a distinctly difficult condition to bear and to quantify, say experts. Women with fistulas are generally shunned by their families and communities. An indispensable component of any fistula care effort - including in Mali - is helping women post-operation to reintegrate into their communities and re-establish a livelihood.

Outreach in safer areas continues, as does fistula treatment at the Gao regional hospital, Touré of GREFFA said, though all the current patients are from Gao communities not affected by fighting. A principal aim of the fistula care project has been to make treatment available on a regular basis at the hospital, where three trained surgeons are based. “Even as we speak, women are receiving treatment,” he said. 
  
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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=95113</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2009/200912180800250430t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 20 March 2012 (IRIN) - The turmoil in northern Mali is thwarting efforts to treat and prevent obstetric fistula, say health experts and local NGO workers.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Refugee, IDP numbers rise as fighting continues in north</title><pubDate>Fri, 24 Feb 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202241433270905t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 24 February 2012 (IRIN) - Refugee numbers are rising daily in countries bordering Mali as fighting rages between the Malian army and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which is fighting for greater autonomy for the Tuareg.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 24 February 2012 (IRIN) - Refugee numbers are rising daily in countries bordering Mali as fighting rages between the Malian army and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which is fighting for greater autonomy for the Tuareg.
 
There are also tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Mali.

A US$35.6 million appeal is being launched today, said Helene Caux, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) senior regional public information officer on 23 February, to deal with “the Mali displacement”. 

Burkina Faso

The Burkina Faso Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation said that by 21 February there were 16,299 Malian Tuareg refugees in the country. By 23 February that figure had reached 17,499. 

The bulk of arrivals entered the country at Tina-koff, Inabao and Deou in the northern province of Oudalan. The rest are in nine other provinces. They are being hosted by individual families or by communities, and some by families in the capital, Ouagadougou. However, the ministry says, most are in sites in the Sahel Region: at Mentao in Soum Province and Inabao and Gandafabou in Oudalan Province. 

The government has identified two sites in the regions of Goudebo and Ingan to set up refugee camps. 

Initially, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has distributed energy biscuits, kitchen kits and blankets; the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization are providing medicines and water purification; UNHCR has provided 500 tents drawn from stockpiles in Douala, Cameroon, and is coordinating the response. 

Niger

By 23 February, 28,858 refugees had arrived in Niger since the fighting began in January. These include citizens of Niger, some of whom had lived in Mali for several years. Here, too, locals have been helping the refugees. The government has provided food and local NGO PLAN Niger has also been providing support. 

“There has been an initial response from the Niger government that has been quick,” Caux said.

Forty tons of non-food items have arrived from UNHCR’s stockpile in Accra, Ghana. The first distribution took place on 22 February in Ayorou District, Tillaberi Province. UNHCR has made distributions to 302 households at a site in Gaoudel, Ayorou. 

“This is mostly blankets and plastic sheeting because it is cold right now,” Caux said.

On 16 February, UNHCR received 2,000 family tents which will be distributed as soon as the refugees are encamped. Each tent can accommodate six people.

Initial distributions were made at the border. Right now some refugees such as those at Sinegodar village are just 8km from the border. The UNHCR standard is to have people at least 50km from a border. 

Sinegodar hosts some 8,000 refugees, many of whom crossed over from nearby Malian villages. They are housed in makeshift shelters. Mangaize village also hosts refugees, many of whom know it as it is a large cattle market they used to frequent. 

Ayorou and Abala districts are hosting refugees. All these places are in Tillaberi Region. 

The government has indentified a site for the refugees at Ouallam, about 100km north of Niamey, but it will take two weeks to finish setting up the camp. 

“We might need one or two other sites,” Caux said. 

The initial condition of refugees is not bad but the fear is that if the situation lasts, problems could arise because of the makeshift nature of the shelters. Children could suffer from respiratory and other ailments. 

Niger is one of the poorest countries in the region and is, like several Sahel countries, affected by a severe drought. Aid agencies require more for their operations in this region - a fact that is often overlooked. 

“We need funding because the crisis unfolded so quickly. It’s hard to attract funding because we are competing with places like Somalia,” Caux said.

UNCHR will begin registration of refugees today at the border village at Mangaize, and will then move to other areas.

Mauritania, Algeria

Thousands of people fleeing the fighting in Lere, west-central Mali, are being cared for in the Mauritanian centres of Fessala and Hodh el Charghi. A camp at Mbera established for Tuareg refugees in the 1990s is being rehabilitated. UNHCR says the site has several water points and structures designed to serve as schools and health centres. 

Fighting has been reported recently in the northeastern Malian areas of Tessalit and Tinezewadern. Refugees have been reported in Algeria. 

Mali IDPs

The International Committee of the Red Cross [ http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/mali-update-2012-02-17.htm ] says in northern Mali people have abandoned their homes and fields and lost their livestock. Many families are living under trees or out in the open.

At least 61,400 have been displaced from Menaka, Aguelhoc, Tessalit, Inhalid, Niafunke and Lere. Because of the drought in the Sahel, food supplies are limited in markets and prices high.

ICRC says the greatest need for the displaced is access to safe drinking water. There is also a shortage of pasture. In Menaka, in Gao Region, the main activities are animal breeding and farming. 

Fighting

The fighting began on 17 January with battles in Inhalid, Tessalit, Tin-Zaouaten, Aguel Hoc, Menaka, Anderanboukan, Hombori, Nyafunke and Lere - all in the northern half of Mali.

The MNLA says it wants “to free the Azawad people from the illegal occupation of Azawadan territory held by Mali” and hold a referendum [ http://www.mnlamov.net/projet-politique/37-projet-politique/102-consultation-populaire-portant-sur-lauto-determination-de-lazawad.html ] to determine if Azawadians want a separate independent republic. 

The Malian government [ http://www.primature.gov.ml/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8274:executions-sommaires-de-aguelhoc--la-commission-denquete-remet-son-rapport-au-chef-de-letat&catid=5 ] says it is fighting the MNLA and elements of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb to keep its territorial integrity. The MNLA and the Malian government each say atrocities were committed by the other side.

Algeria, France and the USA have called for an end to the fighting. However, at a two-day summit in February the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of which Mali is a member, condemned the MNLA rebellion and expressed full backing for Mali in defending its territorial integrity. 

On the humanitarian front, on 16 February ECOWAS [ http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=022&lang=en&annee=2012 ] and the UN Security Council approved US$3 million for victims of the food crisis and rebel attacks in the Sahel-Sahara region of West Africa.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94944</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202241433270905t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 24 February 2012 (IRIN) - Refugee numbers are rising daily in countries bordering Mali as fighting rages between the Malian army and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which is fighting for greater autonomy for the Tuareg.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>MALI: Aid gets into gear, but must navigate no-go zones</title><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202141015500482t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 15 February 2012 (IRIN) - Aid workers are facing a trio of challenges in northern Mali: extensive drought-induced food insecurity and pasture shortages; conflict between Tuaregs and the Malian army; and the resulting displacement of thousands more Tuaregs, say aid agencies on the ground.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 15 February 2012 (IRIN) - Aid workers are facing a trio of challenges in northern Mali: extensive drought-induced food insecurity and pasture shortages; conflict between Tuaregs and the Malian army; and the resulting displacement of thousands more Tuaregs, say aid agencies on the ground.
 
The country has some three million people who are predicted to be vulnerable to severe food insecurity, and is one of eight Sahelian states facing food insecurity this year due to a mixture of poor 2011 rains, region-wide high food prices, chronic vulnerability and poverty. [ http://ochaonline.un.org/rowca/UrgencesEmergencies/Sahel2012/tabid/7773/language/en-US/Default.aspx ]
 
“All expectations are that the current security crisis will make food insecurity worse,” said Mali country director for Catholic Relief Services, Timothy Bishop.
 
In its latest February Sahel strategy, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in West Africa estimates over 10 million people will be food insecure this year, unless they receive help soon.
 
Among the seven affected areas - Kayes, Kouklikoro, Ségou, Mopti, Sikasso, Timbuktu and Gao - the latter two have seen fighting between Tuareg group Movement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) and the Malian army. 
 
Fighting in and around Ménaka in Gao Region has led to 26,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs); while 4,000 are displaced in villages around Augelhoc, 150km northeast of Kidal; and thousands more are expected to be displaced in Kidal’s Tessalit area, as well as Léré and Niafunké in Timbuktu, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). 
 
Meanwhile, a yet-to-be-confirmed figure of 15,000 Malians have fled across the border to Niger [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94803 ]; some 13,000 to Mauritania, and 8,000 to Burkina Faso, [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94829 ] according to UNHCR. 
 
Most of those who have fled are in very bad shape, and were already suffering from food insecurity, say aid agencies. 
 
Scale-up “complicated”
 
In northern Mali, while most aid agencies are continuing to work, “it is hard to scale up if there is a war situation going on,” said Walters, while Germain Mwehu, a spokesperson with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Niamey, told IRIN: “The situation is very complicated”.
 
NGO Médecins du Mondes pulled out of its Kidal office recently due to insecurity.
 
ICRC is one of the few agencies to operate in northern Mali, with sub-offices in Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. “We already have programmes for the food crisis; now we also have displacements because of the conflict, as well as displacement of people who were drought victims,” said Mwehu, adding that the organization is negotiating with all parties to the conflict to try to maintain humanitarian access. 
 
The Malian Red Cross has been distributing basics to some displaced households.
 
Given there are still many “no-go” areas in the north, agencies have been discussing the possibility of humanitarian corridors there, said Walters, though nothing has yet been identified.
 
For several years insecurity has driven WFP to work only through partners in the north - in this case ICRC and NGO Trans-Sahara. 
 
The previous Tuareg rebellion ended in 2008. The north is also known for its extensive organized crime networks, which traffic drugs, arms and other contraband; and has also become a hub for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 
 
Joint Mali-Mauritania military operations against AQIM in August 2011 increased the risk of conflict and retaliation in northern Mali, say security specialists.
 
Adding to the difficulties in scaling up in the north are “enormous” logistical constraints, including huge distances to cover, low population density, and unpredictable population movements, says Mwehu. 
 
“What is needed is an air service connecting Mopti, Kidal and Gao,” Walters told IRIN. 
 
Cereal stock shortages
 
Despite the myriad challenges, some agencies are starting to scale up their humanitarian response. WFP is starting some distributions through its wider nutrition programme this week, and has medium-term plans to triple caseloads in some areas. 
 
Other agencies are coming in: The French branch of Médecins Sans Frontières, which has in the past held back from launching health and nutrition responses in the north, is now evaluating needs in Timbuktu and Gao said its Niger and Mali head Michel-Olivier Lacharité.
 
CRS is scaling up to distribute food to 125,000 in the Mopti region but this will cover just a small part of Mopti’s overall needs, said Bishop. “There is no doubt that all aid agency interventions are going to be insufficient and the government of Mali will need to step up its reaction,” he said. 
 
The government, which is generally proactive in food security early warning and response, distributed 4,710 tons around the country in December, and set aside additional amounts to respond to food needs in the north. However, the Food Security Commission says it has just under 10,000 tons of food available, while 40,000 tons is needed. 
 
The fear is that without imminent response, already high acute malnutrition rates could rise further, say aid agency staff. Many households have just one or two weeks of cereal stocks remaining, according to a WFP December 2011 assessment.
 
Danger of mixed messages 
 
Thus far a few donors have come forward, but there is not enough to mobilize large-scale responses yet, say aid agency staff. 
 
One of the reasons donors have been slower to mobilize on Mali is because of mixed early warning messages, said Bishop. While some agencies rang the alert in December 2011, others said the harvest would be adequate to cover food insecure regions. Only in mid-January did coherent messaging as to the extent of the crisis [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=90845 ] come out. 
 
It is only with the mounting security and displacement crisis that people have begun to realize Mali is now at equal risk as Niger or Mauritania, said Bishop. 
 
ECHO (the EU humanitarian aid body) has made $7.6 million available, with more projected once it is clearer about which amounts to direct to various Sahelian countries over the coming weeks. WFP confirms it has US$3.5 million to spend on immediate humanitarian needs and it expects a further $5 million in the coming days - against projected needs of $48 million, according to Walters. “This funding is enabling us to go ahead in some small way,” she told IRIN. 
 
The Swedish government has allocated $328,000 to humanitarian needs, [ http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq140212164725rk6mCu7D9M&orderby=Decision_Date&showDetails=1 ] and the ICRC and UN agencies are likely to issue appeals soon.
 
aj/cb

------------------------

Mali in 2012
 
22% of farmers or agro-pastoralists produced a “medium” harvest in 2011, the other 78 percent produced virtually nothing.
 
Acute malnutrition levels are on average at 10.8 percent among under-fives in affected regions.
 
The number of affected communes has risen from 150 to 190, according to January government estimates. 
 
Cereal prices across the country are 50-60% higher overall than the five-year average.
 
60% of pastoralists are already on the move, which is highly unusual at this time of year.
 
Agencies operating in the north include UNICEF, WFP, Africare, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, Islamic Relief, Action against Hunger.
 
Out of a projected US$724 million required for the Sahel, some $140 million has been received thus far.
 
(Sources: Mali Agriculture Ministry, WFP, OCHA, FTS)

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94873</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202141015500482t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 15 February 2012 (IRIN) - Aid workers are facing a trio of challenges in northern Mali: extensive drought-induced food insecurity and pasture shortages; conflict between Tuaregs and the Malian army; and the resulting displacement of thousands more Tuaregs, say aid agencies on the ground.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SAHEL: Thousands of Touaregs flee into Burkina Faso</title><pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2008/200802114t.jpg" />]]>OUAGADOUGOU 10 February 2012 (IRIN) - At least 8,000 Touaregs fleeing fighting in neighbouring Mali have found refuge in Burkina Faso, having arrived “in a dire humanitarian condition”, the government said yesterday.</description><body><![CDATA[OUAGADOUGOU 10 February 2012 (IRIN) - At least 8,000 Touaregs fleeing fighting in neighbouring Mali [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94803 ] have found refuge in Burkina Faso, having arrived “in a dire humanitarian condition”, the government said yesterday.

It said it would set up a coordination committee to bring the refugees - currently spread between the western and Sahelian parts of the country - to a centralized location and provide education and sanitation. 

“The humanitarian situation is alarming because most of them are sleeping in the open air despite the hospitality of their host,” said Modeste Konkobo, humanitarian officer with the Burkina Faso Red Cross.

“With the current bad weather [harmattan winds] this means looming health problems when added to the precarious food, sanitary and drinking water situation for such a huge group,” Konkobo said. 

He said the refugees needed immediate “survival assistance” since they had arrived empty-handed. Other needs included blankets, cooking materials, mats and tents. The Red Cross is deploying some 40 volunteers.

Konkobo said refugees were still arriving in “large numbers” in Inabao and Deou (Oudalan Province), and Mentao (Soum Province). Some 4,000 refugees arrived in the region on 8 February.

“We are afraid this will aggravate the already bad food situation with the deficit we are facing,” said Boureima Yiougo, governor of Sahel Region.

The government said 146 of the country’s 350 communes had experienced much lower rains this year and could face “famine”, and that it would subsidize cereals to lessen the impact on residents of the region.

The National Commission for Refugees and the local UNHCR office are due to conduct a joint assessment mission in Sahel Region, which borders Mali.

“They urgently need shelter since they caught us by surprise. We have only five tents,” said Hima Barke, a UNHCR official in Soum Province. “Just a week ago there were 40 refugees in the province, now there are 1,127.” 

Mali

Meanwhile, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) [ http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/mali-update-2012-02-08.htm ] reported on 9 February that at least 30,000 displaced people in Mali were in a dire condition because of fighting in the north of the country since mid-January.

In Aguelhoc (150km northeast of Kidal in northeastern Mali), it said, fierce fighting had forced some 4,000 people to flee their homes. Most had little food and were living in improvised shelters in the semi-desert region. A few have been sheltered by host families. 

The ICRC said it and the Mali Red Cross were preparing to distribute millet, rice, oil and salt; as well as tarpaulins, blankets, sleeping mats, buckets, kitchen utensils and hygiene items to the displaced. 

“The Mali Red Cross has already made an emergency delivery of food for 600 displaced people whose situation was particularly worrying,” the ICRC said.

In Ménaka, Gao Region, clashes prompted almost 26,000 people to flee their homes in search of safety, both within and outside the town, according to ICRC and Mali Red Cross estimates. The ICRC is also assessing the situation in Tessalit (Kidal Region) and Léré and Niafunké (Timbuktu Region), which have also been affected by fighting in the north of Mali. ICRC quoted “local sources” as saying there could still be 20,000 displaced people in these areas.

The fighting that took place in Ménaka and Andéramboukane [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94803 ] also prompted over 15,000 people to seek refuge in Niger, in the northern Tillabéry Region just across the border from Mali.

bo/oss/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94829</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2008/200802114t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">OUAGADOUGOU 10 February 2012 (IRIN) - At least 8,000 Touaregs fleeing fighting in neighbouring Mali have found refuge in Burkina Faso, having arrived “in a dire humanitarian condition”, the government said yesterday.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SAHEL: Donors learning funding lessons - slowly</title><pubDate>Mon, 06 Feb 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202061151210348t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 06 February 2012 (IRIN) - This year donors are stepping up more quickly to meet Sahel’s humanitarian needs compared to 2010, when they were slow to respond. However, they are still at fault for taking a quick-fix approach rather than addressing long-term disaster prevention and resilience needs, say aid groups.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 06 February 2012 (IRIN) - DAKAR, 3 February 2012 (IRIN) - This year donors are stepping up more quickly to meet Sahel’s humanitarian needs compared to 2010, when they were slow to respond. [ http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?indepthid=81&reportid=89910 ] However, they are still at fault for taking a quick-fix approach rather than addressing long-term disaster prevention and resilience needs, [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94082 ] say aid groups. 

As of now, over US$150 million has been pledged to respond to food insecurity, drought and nutrition needs in the Sahel, whereas at the same point in 2010 donors were doing “almost nothing”, said Amadou Sow in the Africa coordination division of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

As early as December 2011 aid agencies and national governments campaigned for aid, while OCHA released its emergency appeal - whereas in the 2010 crisis this was not released until April, far later in the lean season.

The European Commission (EC) has directed $138 million to the region, according to Cyprien Fabre, head of ECHO (EU aid body) in West Africa, who says there is “great commitment at the EU level”, with the development and humanitarian commissioners working closely together on the Sahel crisis. The EU is also expected to release longer-term funding soon.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) meanwhile, has channeled $67 million to the crisis, $25.5 million of it to the World Food Programme in Niger and Chad; France and the UK Department for International Development have each directed $10 million towards five Sahelian countries without yet specifying what is going where; the UN Central Emergency Response Fund has released $16 million of start-up funding; while Sweden, Germany, Austria and other donors have allotted smaller sums. 

Most of these figures are not yet reflected in the OCHA financial tracking system [ http://reliefweb.int/sahel-food-insecurity2012 ] which currently states that the Chad and Niger appeals are respectively 7 and 15 percent funded. 

While such pledges are welcomed, the EC Humanitarian Commissioner, Kristalina Georgieva, recently said a conservative estimate of the needs over the next six months would be 500 million euros [US$654 million], “so there is clearly a considerable gap to fill,” noted Stephen Cockburn, West Africa campaigns and policy manager at Oxfam. 

Avoid repeat mistakes

Donors may fear repeating the mistakes of the Horn of Africa, where everyone responded too late, and may also want to show that they have learned the lessons from past Sahel crises, say aid workers. 

“Donors are more interested in the Sahel now,” said Fabre. “They probably want to make sure they don’t miss the opportunity to have a correct, coherent, quality response this time.”

However, some fear donors are waiting too long to specifically allocate their aid by country, positing they are waiting for more detailed figures on needs to be published. An OCHA Sahel strategy paper with specific needs in each country will be launched imminently.

Donors must not fund Chad and Niger to the neglect of other affected countries, including Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal, warns OCHA’s Sow.

Longer-term still under-funded

While pledging has been swifter, the long-term aid that Sahel experts have been pushing for for years is still not prioritized, say Sahel experts.  

“The argument [for longer-term resilience-oriented aid] has “not been won yet”, said Fabre. 

A number of aid agencies are involved in longer-term resilience work, such as Oxfam’s project to give people cash transfers or cash-for-work to help vulnerable families cope with high food prices. “Some donors [the European Union and DFID] are beginning to fund this work, but as an approach it remains under-prioritized,” said Oxfam’s Cockburn.

The prevention and treatment of moderate acute malnutrition is one chronically under-funded sector in the Sahel: While over one million children are expected to face severe and life-threatening malnutrition this year, in a “normal” year the figure hovers around 800,000. 

West Africa UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) nutrition specialist Robert Johnston told IRIN: “It is still difficult to ensure funding from government agencies for long-term preventative activities when there are critical life-saving interventions that they can respond to immediately. It’s much easier [for them] to justify life-saving than long-term.” 

Likewise, it can be hard to get national governments on board: “In areas with low levels of education and poor healthcare systems, it is hard to plant the seed of prevention as an idea.”

However, donor attitudes here are slowly changing, he said. UNICEF programmes now come from the point of view that emergency treatment and longer-term prevention of malnutrition are two sides of the same coin. “Everyone is starting to get the message,” he said. 

Aid agencies and donors should see their response to the Sahel drought as an opportunity to change their approach, said Kazimiro Rudolph-Jacondo, head of OCHA’s West Africa office in Dakar. “This is a window of opportunity to build on lessons learned from the past and to resolve these problems over the long term,” he told IRIN. 

aj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94799</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201202061151210348t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 06 February 2012 (IRIN) - This year donors are stepping up more quickly to meet Sahel’s humanitarian needs compared to 2010, when they were slow to respond. However, they are still at fault for taking a quick-fix approach rather than addressing long-term disaster prevention and resilience needs, say aid groups.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SAHEL: Displaced Malians burden food-insecure hosts</title><pubDate>Mon, 06 Feb 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2010/201009200747560203t.jpg" />]]>BAMAKO/DAKAR 06 February 2012 (IRIN) - Some 12,000 Malians have fled fighting in the towns of Ménaka and Anderamboucane in northern Mali and reached already food-insecure villages around Tillabéri in western Niger, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Niger’s capital, Niamey.</description><body><![CDATA[BAMAKO/DAKAR 06 February 2012 (IRIN) - Some 12,000 Malians have fled fighting in the towns of Ménaka and Anderamboucane in northern Mali and reached already food-insecure villages around Tillabéri in western Niger, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Niger’s capital, Niamey. 
 
The Malian refugees are spread across the villages of Mangaizé, Chinégodar, Koutoubou, Yassan and Ayorou in Niger, according to the Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the bulk of them - an estimated 7,000 - in Chinégodar, which is usually home to 1,500, according to Franck Kuwonu at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Niamey.
 
Fighting broke out between Touareg rebels and former soldiers from Libya, and the Malian army in mid-January. Rebel groups and former Libya fighters have reportedly acquired fresh weapons as a result of the Libya conflict and have launched a new movement, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which calls for the creation of an independent state encompassing the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in northern Mali.
 
Niger’s Tillabéri region has been hardest hit by the 2011 drought and poor harvest and many inhabitants are already facing severe food insecurity, according to the government and aid agencies. Though assessments are still under way, the government estimated late last year that just under half of Niger’s population would be short of food this year.
 
“Chinégodar doesn’t even have enough grain to feed its own small population,” said Kuwonu, noting there are three tons of millet in the cereal bank. Millet prices in the area are 24,000 CFA francs (US$50) per 100kg bag, up from 19,000 CFA francs ($40) this time last year.
 
The ICRC and NGO Médecins Sans Frontières have been quickest to respond to refugees’ needs, the former having repaired water pumps in stressed host towns and distributed some blankets, shelter materials and food; the latter sending a nurse with basic medical supplies to help those in need. 
 
However, logistics are slow said Kuwonu, and more food and shelter is needed. The ICRC spokesperson in Niamey, Germain Mwehu, told IRIN there is enough aid to meet immediate needs but not over the long-term.
 
An inter-agency UN mission evaluated the area last week and agency representatives are meeting tomorrow to discuss their response. Oxfam has also assessed the situation. All agencies will closely coordinate with the government on their response, said Kowonu. 
 
Heading for Mauritania, Burkina, Guinea
 
According to PANA Press, [ http://www.maghrebemergent.info/actualite/fil-maghreb/8612-mauritanie-afflux-de-refugies-maliens.html ] some 6,000 Malians have also fled fighting in Léré, Niafunké and Goundam in Mali’s northern Timbuktu region, and are sheltering in Fassala Néré in Mauritania, some 1,260km east of the capital Nouakchott. A number of the children among them are allegedly severely malnourished, according to local NGO Association for Research and Development in Mauritania.
 
The local authorities and UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) are currently assessing the situation in more detail, UNHCR spokesperson Elise Villechalane told IRIN from Nouakchott. An unknown number of Malians have also fled east to Burkina Faso and western Guinea, says the ICRC in Mali. 
 
Meanwhile, an unknown number of Malians are fleeing south to Mopti, some 640km north of the capital Bamako, and to Bamako itself. 
 
Amina Coulibaly, a producer with national radio in Gao, eastern Mali, told IRIN from the capital: “Fighting has not yet broken out in Gao [town] but given that it is one of the places the Touaregs want to make part of their republic, I prefer to leave now.”
 
Mali has been struggling for several years to contain rebel groups in the north, the rising power of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) factions, and widespread contraband traffickers in its northern regions. [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=90703 ]
 
sd/aj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94803</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2010/201009200747560203t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAMAKO/DAKAR 06 February 2012 (IRIN) - Some 12,000 Malians have fled fighting in the towns of Ménaka and Anderamboucane in northern Mali and reached already food-insecure villages around Tillabéri in western Niger, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Niger’s capital, Niamey.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>WEST AFRICA: The downside of foreign land acquisitions</title><pubDate>Thu, 19 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201191450140079t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 19 January 2012 (IRIN) - Population growth and rising consumption by a minority of people around the world are fuelling global land acquisitions and Africa is a “prime target”, says the International Land Coalition.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 19 January 2012 (IRIN) - Population growth and rising consumption by a minority of people around the world are fuelling global land acquisitions and Africa is a “prime target”, says the International Land Coalition. [ http://www.landcoalition.org/ ]
 
“The best land is often being targeted for acquisition. It is often irrigable, with proximity to infrastructure, making conflict with existing land users more likely,” says a 14 December 2011 report. [ http://www.landcoalition.org/cpl/CPL-synthesis-report ]
 
Africa accounts for 134 million hectares of reported land deals. Worldwide, between 2000 and 2010, deals under consideration or negotiation amounted to 203 million hectares, the Coalition says. 
 
The rush for farmland was triggered primarily by the 2007-08 world food price crisis. While agricultural production was the main aim, the Coalition says, mineral extraction, industry, tourism and forest conversion were “significant contributors” to the rush. The Sojourner Project [ http://thesojournerproject.wordpress.com/ ] suggests newly-independent Southern Sudan is the latest addition to the land acquisition list. 
 
In West Africa such acquisitions, which critics describe as land grabbing, are having a telling impact on the River Niger, the subregion’s largest river and the continent’s third largest after the Nile and the Congo.
 
From the Fouta Djallon Massif in Guinea (West Africa’s water tower), the 4,200km river snakes its way through Mali, Niger, Benin and empties into the Nigerian sector of the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem [ http://www.eoearth.org/article/Guinea_Current_large_marine_ecosystem ] in the Atlantic Ocean. Millions of people along its route and tributaries depend on the river for their farms, cattle, fishing and other needs. Yet the River Niger is already overfished, is becoming polluted and is affected by dam construction and oil production.
 
Mali worst affected
 
Of all the countries through which the River Niger flows the segment in Mali is the most negatively affected by land acquisition irrigation deals, which must be authorized by the Office du Niger. [ http://www.office-du-niger.org.ml/internet/ ] Mali accounts for the river’s entire inland delta, an area set for agro-industrial farming. The aim is for the area to become West Africa’s bread basket. 
 
Realizing this potential, Mali and Libya created Malibya, a joint-venture company which has been allotted 100,000 hectares of land for industrial agriculture. The lease is for 30 years. Ibrahim Coulibaly, president of the National Coordination of Peasant Organizations of Mali (CNOP), [ http://www.cnop-mali.org/ ] is a critic of such deals. He said the Office du Niger intended to produce hybrid rice on this land, in collaboration with the China National Hybrid Rice Company, and that the introduction of hybrids would, effectively, “kill” local varieties. Already, he said, the company implementing the project, the China Geo-Engineering Corporation (CGC), [ http://www.chinageo.com.cn/en/about/index.asp ] had built a 40km irrigation canal, and a 40km paved road had been built around Bougouwere at a cost of US$55 million. 
 
Additionally, CGC has already developed 17,000 of the envisaged 25,000 hectares earmarked. The government of Mali feels this outcome justifies its decision to launch this project.
 
"The development will be a great contribution to the Office du Niger in search of integrated development,” Abou Sow, the minister in charge of the Office du Niger, said. “This is a public utility project because the Libyan side has taken all necessary steps to compensate the people who have been affected by the arrangements." 
 
However, international NGO Grain, [ http://www.grain.org/article/entries/187-rice-land-grabs-undermine-food-sovereignty-in-africa ] has questioned the government’s wisdom in handing over such large tracts of land when its stated aims are to help local farmers develop. 
 
The Oakland Institute, in its December 2011 report entitled Land Deal Brief: Land Grabs Leave Africa Thirsty, [ http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/land-deal-brief-land-grabs-leave-africa-thirsty ] is also critical of such deals. Already, it says, farmers in the area have lost their livelihoods. This is because the construction of the canal has closed small irrigation outlets they use. 
 
The siphoning off of water for huge areas of farmland would worsen the already low water levels of the River Niger. The Niger River Basin Authority says a 30cm drop in water level (measured in Mopti, Mali) corresponds to a 50 percent diminution of the delta flood plain’s land area. 
 
Moreover, the river is already experiencing siltation, a condition which scientists say could worsen if there are changes in the flow of water and if pollution increases. Planned dam construction on the upper reaches of the River Niger would alter the flow. This would further reduce already diminishing fish stocks, water availability, and make navigation more difficult to places like Timbuktu.
 
“Fish is becoming increasingly scarce and more difficult to access because of the silting of the banks,” said Saleck Ould Dah, the water and sanitation programme officer at WaterAID [ http://www.wateraid.org/uk/what_we_do/where_we_work/mali/ ] in Mali. “Although irrigation has managed to double rice production, these waters have become increasingly polluted due to soap manufacturing; solvents used for dyeing cloths; and chemicals used by farmers.” 
 
Given that social conflict over resources between farmers and pastoralists has always been a feature of the Niger Basin, the Coalition suggests that large-scale irrigation could heighten tension between local and downstream water users.
 
Food security
 
Critics feel that land acquisitions could imperil the food security of millions of people who depend on the Niger for farming and fishing. Thousands of small farmers would be forced off their land and become farm labourers; pastoralists would have to search for new grazing land or ditch their lifestyle. However, the Office du Niger says this is a misinterpretation of what would happen.
 
“After contributing to the policy of irrigation schemes, this project will certainly be one of the agriculture sector’s economic and social developments," said Amadou Coulibaly, president and chief executive officer of Office Du Niger.
 
Overall, most of the land deals, critics say, would be put under biofuel production and agricultural food exports. With many local small-scale farmers off the land there could be national food shortages. Weak economies cannot afford food imports, and might in fact be forced to receive food aid from countries whose multinationals, ironically, produced that very same food in Africa in the first place. 
 
Although governments might make the case for such land deals, critics of such contracts in Africa say local elites are most likely the only national beneficiaries. 
 
Writing in the International Food Policy Research Institute [ http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/wcaotn01.pdf ] under the title Foreign Direct Investments in Land- and Agriculture-based Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa, Ousman Badiane, the Institute’s Africa director, says: “Foreign investors interact with, and act through, national intermediaries or interlocutors who may operate independently or as government agents. One should, therefore, expect the emergence of secondary markets and derived demand in the form of influential national actors who will seek to gain access to land at the expense of local communities. Anticipation of future demand by foreign investors; this is where real damage can be done.”
 
If local communities are to be protected in these land deals, he says, foreign investors should improve the capacities for local governance; contract negotiating skills; and foster business partnerships between local communities.
 
“Urgent action is needed to bring harmful land transfers to a halt, and to redirect capital into more fruitful forms of investment where possible,” the Coalition says. 
 
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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94680</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201191450140079t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 19 January 2012 (IRIN) - Population growth and rising consumption by a minority of people around the world are fuelling global land acquisitions and Africa is a “prime target”, says the International Land Coalition.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>AFRICA: AU wants peace, security and bigger global role in 2012</title><pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201121410270941t.jpg" />]]>WASHINGTON 12 January 2012 (IRIN) - The African Union (AU) has unveiled an ambitious wish-list of priorities for Africa that would give the continent a stronger global voice, boost democracy and encourage peace and security.</description><body><![CDATA[WASHINGTON 12 January 2012 (IRIN) - The African Union (AU) has unveiled an ambitious wish-list of priorities for Africa that would give the continent a stronger global voice, boost democracy and encourage peace and security.

AU Ambassador to the United States, Amina Ali of Tanzania, presented the list of top priorities at a conference on 11 January held at Washington think-tank, the Brookings Institution.

Among them were the regulars - peace and security, enhanced democracy and good governance – as well as improved regional trade and greater involvement of the continent’s large diaspora in African affairs.

The first priority for Africa was the AU's resolve to review its international partnerships to ensure they bring greater benefits to Africa. 

“We are working to be able to build closer partnerships with our international partners so that Africa can really attain a sustainable economy,” Ali told the conference.

The AU wants Africa to manufacture and export finished products to its trading partners rather than just selling them the raw materials as it does now. She cited China, India, the EU and US and other rising stars in trade with the continent, including Turkey and Latin America, and said the AU had held talks on the new breed of partnerships with some of them.

The AU also wants Africa to have a veto-wielding seat on the UN Security Council, and a place at the G20 negotiating table, Ali said.

The peace and security that have eluded Africa for decades continue to be high on the list of problems that the continent needs to resolve, but she spoke only of conflict in Sudan. “The AU will continue to look into issues for Sudan,” Ali said.
 
A report released at the conference, Foresight Africa, highlighted other tinderboxes and called for “urgent instability and warfare policy reviews” to meet the challenges the continent faces in not only Sudan but also in Somalia and Nigeria. [ http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2012/01_priorities_foresight_africa.aspx ]

The report compares the instability in Africa to the decade-old US-led war in Afghanistan, and warned that if “the current trend continues”, a swathe of Africa, stretching from the Horn to Nigeria, “is likely to experience increasing instability and warfare, while narratives of jihadist revolt and terrorist technologies circulate among its citizens”.

The unrest could affect Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Sudan, Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, the report says. Clearly, the AU has to do more than just supervise goings-on in Sudan and its new neighbour, South Sudan.

The AU also pledged to "review the mechanism for democratic process in Africa" after the wake-up call from the uprisings in the Arab world, including North Africa, a year ago, Ali said.

The AU will press member states to sign a charter ratified by the AU assembly in 2007, which aims to strengthen democracy and good governance in Africa, she said.

The charter was inspired in part by concern that “unconstitutional changes of governments” are a key cause of insecurity and “violent conflict” in Africa, and by a determination to “strengthen good governance through the institutionalization of transparency, accountability and participatory democracy”.

As of November last year, 38 of the AU’s 54 member states had signed the charter, but only 10 had ratified it. It is notable that nearly all the countries in the areas of Africa that are “likely to experience increasing instability and warfare” have signed the charter, with the exception of Somalia and Eritrea in the east and Cameroon in the west.

Food security

The AU will take steps to establish “food reserves” that give areas that face drought a “cushion” against famine, said Ali. She also voiced fears that parts of west Africa could be hit by drought this year, highlighting the need to rapidly establish food reserves – a tough challenge in a time of high food prices and an economic crisis in Europe, which has hit Africa.

Africa also has to “secure access to markets and competitive prices for farmers” or “risk inciting unrest” and food riots, the Foresight Africa report says.

AU officials will push in 2012 to establish a free trade zone that spans the length and breadth of the continent, Ali said. It would boost commerce between countries, a key step towards development.

At present, less than 15 percent of African trade stays on the continent - the rest is sold abroad.

The last item on the AU wish-list is greater involvement of the African diaspora, said to outnumber Africans at home, in the continent’s affairs.

The AU is due to host an African diaspora summit in May, Ali said.

Ali stressed the importance of the diaspora to the continent: remittances represent a larger revenue source for Africa than overseas development aid.

kdz/oa/mw

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94630</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://irinnews.org/images/2012/201201121410270941t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">WASHINGTON 12 January 2012 (IRIN) - The African Union (AU) has unveiled an ambitious wish-list of priorities for Africa that would give the continent a stronger global voice, boost democracy and encourage peace and security.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>
