<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Horn of Africa</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 15:30:50 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>Pastoralism’s economic contributions are significant but overlooked</title><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108010808430012t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Pastoralism is often regarded as an antiquated practice ill-suited to the modern economy, yet trade between pastoral communities in Africa - much of it informal and illegal - generates an estimated US$1 billion each year, according to a new book published by the Futures Agriculture Consortium.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Pastoralism is often regarded as an antiquated practice ill-suited to the modern economy, yet trade between pastoral communities in Africa - much of it informal and illegal - generates an estimated US$1 billion each year, according to a new book [ http://www.future-agricultures.org/pastoralism/7666-book-pastoralism-and-development-in-africa ] published by the Futures Agriculture Consortium. 

“If we shift our gaze from the capital cities, where the development and policy elite congregate, to the regional centers and their hinterlands where pastoralists live, then a very different perspective emerges. Here we see the growth of a booming livestock export trade, the flourishing of the private sector, the expansion of towns with the inflow of investment, and the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs commanding a profitable market, and generating employment and other business opportunities; and all of this driven without a reliance on external development aid,” said the authors of the study. 

Pastoralism contributes between 10 and 44 percent of the GDP of African countries. An estimated 1.3 billion people benefit from livestock value chain, according to the International Livestock Research Institute. 

“Pastoralism contributes to the livelihoods of millions of people across Africa, in some of the poorest and most deprived areas. It is a critical source of economic activity in dryland areas, where other forms of agriculture are impossible,” Ian Scoones, from the Institute of Development Studies [ http://www.ids.ac.uk/ ], told IRIN. 

Ced Hesse, a researcher at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), told IRIN that in East Africa alone, “pastoralism directly supports an estimated 20 million people” and produces “80 percent of the total annual milk supply in Ethiopia, provides 90 percent of the meat consumed in East Africa, and contributes 19 percent, 13 percent and 8 percent of GDP in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, respectively”. 

He continued, “This is an enormous contribution to the regional economy, but often is unrecognized.” 

Invisible 

IIED’s Hesse explains why little attention is paid to pastoralists’ contributions: “The benefits that pastoralism brings are invisible to most governments because the methodologies they use for assessing economic activity and growth, the most popular being GDP, are not adapted to pastoralism.” 

“A ‘total economic valuation’ framework is needed. When Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, used this methodology to calculate the contribution of livestock to the Kenyan economy, they found livestock’s contribution to agricultural GDP is about two and half times greater than official estimates,” Hesse said. 

“Kenya’s livestock were under appreciated and no attempt to enumerate it had been made for decades,” the IGAD report said. 

Experts like Scoones say the rapid urbanization in Africa will continue to provide increased market opportunities for pastoralists. Not all will benefit from the direct sale of livestock, but there are opportunities for diversification. 

“There are spin-off benefits from such trade, including opportunities for engaging in diversified activities, including processing animal products, providing transport, fodder and marketing support, and offering services in the growing small towns in pastoral areas,”  said Scoones. 

“Not all those in pastoralist areas can be involved directly in the growing, vibrant livestock trade that feeds the burgeoning cities across Africa,” Scoones added. 

Bad press 

Yet other than reports of pastoralists suffering from poverty and climate-related shocks, pastoralism receives little attention from national governments or the media. 

Of the reporting that does exist, much is negative, according to Media perceptions and portrayals of Pastoralists in Kenya, India and China [ http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/14623IIED.pdf ], an April 2013 IIED report. 

In Kenya for instance, 93 percent of news articles on pastoralist analyzed by the authors were about drought and conflict. Fifty-one percent of articles mentioning conflict presented pastoralist as the cause of the problems rather than the victims of conflict. 

In India, on the other hand, 60 percent of articles reviewed portrayed pastoralists as victims “who have lost access to grazing land because of the growth of industrial agriculture, the dominance of more powerful social groups, and limits to grazing in forested land, among others.” 

The bad press has generated calls for pastoralist communities to change their lifestyles. 

Media reports also fail to mention the environmental benefits of pastoralism, which can contribute to biodiversity conservation [ http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/pdf/2041-7136-2-14.pdf ], and the role it plays in making food systems resilient by, for example, preventing overreliance on drought- and flood-vulnerable crops. 

“The media tends to portray pastoralists as a source of problem or as lost causes, yet most media articles about pastoralists do not even quote the pastoralists themselves. The media portrayals paint a partial picture, one that rarely mentions the important economic and environmental benefits of pastoralism, or the way that herder mobility helps increase the resilience of food systems in a changing climate, so that even distant consumers in cities benefit,” Mike Shanahan, communication specialist and author of the study, told IRIN. 

Minorities Rights Group International observed in its 2012 State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples [ http://www.minorityrights.org/11374/state-of-the-worlds-minorities/state-of-the-worlds-minorities-and-indigenous-peoples-2012.html ] report that pastoralists are being forced to abandon their livelihoods by national governments. Experts see an increase in the phenomenon of land grabs, in which pastoralists and minority groups are driven out of their lands to pave the way for development projects considered more “viable”, such as large-scale irrigation projects [ http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2011.652620 ]. 

Some experts, like IIED’s Hesse, say there is a case for modernizing pastoralism - not in the “sense of settling them or turning them into ranchers”, but by focusing on the “logic of pastoralism’s production strategies that allow it to produce the benefits in arid and semi-arid environments characterized by rainfall variability.” 

ko/rz   

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98052/Pastoralism-s-economic-contributions-are-significant-but-overlooked</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108010808430012t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Pastoralism is often regarded as an antiquated practice ill-suited to the modern economy, yet trade between pastoral communities in Africa - much of it informal and illegal - generates an estimated US$1 billion each year, according to a new book published by the Futures Agriculture Consortium.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Somali security sector reform</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305131455010122t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - At Gashandiga barracks in Mogadishu, Somalia, Pvt Mohamed Sheikh Issak pulled back his military fatigues to show his scarred right shoulder. “I was shot by Al-Shabab when they still controlled half of Mogadishu,” he told IRIN. “I was at home, but they knew I was a soldier.”</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - At Gashandiga barracks in Mogadishu, Somalia, Pvt Mohamed Sheikh Issak pulled back his military fatigues to show his scarred right shoulder. “I was shot by Al-Shabab when they still controlled half of Mogadishu,” he told IRIN. “I was at home, but they knew I was a soldier.” 

Issak joined the army over two years ago; he proudly recalled his role in the battles for Afgoye and Jowhar. With him were new recruits - young, inexperienced and ill-equipped, but determined to fight Al-Shabab; the militant group was ousted from the capital in 2011, but still controls large swaths of the country. 

“I want to defend my country,” 20-year-old Efrah Ibrahim told IRIN. She joined the army as a frontline paramedic after hearing a recruitment appeal on the radio. “Mogadishu was like another country before. It was very dangerous.” 

At the Somalia Conference held in London last week, British Prime Minister David Cameron pledged over US$50 million to help rebuild Somalia’s armed forces, police and judiciary. Other nations also committed funding, including nearly $60 million from the European Union. The hope is that young recruits like Issak and Ibrahim will soon take the lead in maintaining peace in Mogadishu, and one day throughout all of Somalia. 

Ambitious plans 

Many recent security gains in south-central Somalia have been the result of gruelling efforts by a 17,700-strong African Union force (AMISOM) supported by their Somali counterparts. More recently, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces have pushed back Al-Shabab in southern and western Somalia, respectively. 

But Somalia’s government has stressed that it wants to take control of the country’s security. An ambitious National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), adopted last August, outlines plans to rebuild Somalia’s armed forces and national security programme, reform the police and judiciary, and roll out a modern coastguard. Leaders hope to build a professional army of 28,000 within three years, at a cost of some $160 million, while also doubling police numbers to 12,000. 

“It is very important to rebuild the Somali forces and defeat the terrorist organizations and pirates that are threatening the security in our country,” Brig-Gen Mohamed Abdi Mammow, Somali National Army liaison officer, told IRIN. 

After two decades of war and the near-complete collapse of state institutions, Somalia faces profound challenges reforming its security sector. Issues include an underdeveloped national command and control system, competing clan-based loyalties, limited equipment and resources, and discipline concerns. 

Additionally, the Somali security forces, alongside their AMISOM counterparts, are fighting a violent insurgency. Recent attacks on the capital - including a suicide car bomb that left 11 dead just two days before the London conference - have underscored the significant demands on the security sector. 

“There is a real tension trying to train these forces when they are at war,” said Col Anthony Howie, senior military advisor to the UN Political Office for Somalia. “No one has the luxury of pulling them out; they are essential in the fight against Al-Shabab.” 

Analysts also point out that the security forces’ success depends on the government’s reach. “The security forces can only operate effectively where the government has earned local legitimacy,” said Matt Bryden, director of Horn of Africa think tank Sahan Research. 

From militias to military 

Somalia’s armed forces comprise some 20,000 soldiers, defined as those fighting Al-Shabab, including militias not formally integrated into the military. But only around 13,000 soldiers receive regular financial payments, most of which are paid by the international community. Pay is critical - soldiers who get paid receive a $100 monthly stipend - and resentment over salaries threatens loyalties to a national command structure. 

“Outside Mogadishu, in the near-term, the government has little choice but to negotiate command and control arrangements with local forces, providing them with logistical support, financial support and legitimacy in exchange for a degree of loyalty. Paying salaries will ultimately be much more important in building a professional force than obtaining new weapons and equipment,” said Bryden. 

Al-Shabab deserters and defectors are also being integrated [ http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/giving-extremists-a-second-chance/ ] into the security forces, but the process is not straightforward. The threat of infiltration by Al-Shabab underscores the need for improved counter-intelligence by the Somali government. Meanwhile, some pro-government militias are resisting joining the national command, and concerns remain about the loyalties of fighters in clan-based units. 

“Loyalty challenges are surmountable with better training - not only physical, but rigorous training on nationalism, human rights and rule of law,” said Abdi Aynte, director of Somalia’s first think tank, the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. 

The Somali military now follows an annual training programme. The Uganda-based EU Training Mission has trained over 3,000 soldiers, with much of the training expected to move to Somali soil this year. AMISOM has also supplied a training team, while Turkey is expected to play a significant role in both military and police training. 

But training alone is not enough. “They are also woefully underequipped and under-resourced to fight a violent insurgency,” said Col Howie. 

This was evident at the Gashandiga barracks. Despite enthusiastic weapons drills by the young soldiers, Col Kassim Ahmed Roble revealed the base has just 100 AK-47s for 600 soldiers. 

“The army needs some more time,” he told IRIN. “We need more weapons as well as financial support from the international community.” 

The UN Security Council relaxed a two-decade arms embargo against the country in March, permitting the Somali government to buy light weapons for its forces. But Defence Minister Abdihakim Fiqi said last week in London that not “a single bullet” or gun had been received since the lifting of the embargo due to a “lack of resources”. 

From the streets to the courts 

Somali’s police force was also incapacitated by the conflict. Funding pledges in London included money earmarked to help double police numbers and to rebuild Mogadishu’s central prison. But the police face challenges similar to those confronting the military: recruits cite low pay and significant risk to themselves and their families. 

“We cannot increase police numbers without knowing exactly what budget we have to pay them,” Gen Mohamed Hassan Ismael, Somali Police Force liaison officer, told IRIN. “We also need professional judges. As police, we are in the hands of the judiciary. There are high levels of corruption in the judiciary - sometimes criminals pay their way out. There needs to be scrutiny from top to bottom.” 

The majority of Somaila’s 6,000 police officers are based in Mogadishu. Some served pre-1991 and were vetted before being allowed to rejoin the force; around 3,500 have been recruited since 2005. Their stipends are paid by the international community, on the condition that officers have completed basic training. 

“After 20 years of war, people don't always understand policing,” Cpl Ahmadu Sule Singer, a Nigerian police trainer with AMISOM, told IRIN. “Some people here have grown up using a weapon, but I teach them basic police work with civilians. I find it so difficult to control them at the beginning of the course.” 

On a joint night patrol, Somali police officers man a checkpoint in Hodan District, searching cars as their Nigerian counterparts secure the area. “I correct them if they do something that isn’t good - I tell them to talk gently rather than cock their rifle,” added Singer. 

Local residents selling khat and cigarettes at a busy junction are relaxed about the police’s presence. “I don’t mind the police. They are doing a good job,” taxi driver Abdirahman Aden Hussein said as his car was being searched. “Before, you couldn’t stand out here at night.” 

Discipline and human rights 

Punishing security forces who commit offences is also a major concern. 

“The Somali security forces and their allied militias have committed serious abuses. I have spoken to displaced women raped by the security forces and individuals fleeing fighting who have had all their possessions looted along the way by government militia,” Laetitia Bader, a Human Rights Watch researcher, told IRIN. 

Earlier this year, a woman who alleged she had been raped by security forces and a journalist who interviewed her were arrested and charged with insulting national institutions, prompting international outrage. Although the verdicts were eventually overturned, the Somali government faced difficult questions about its commitment to cracking down on rape committed by security forces. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has since acknowledged that some security forces have committed rape and said that they must be “defeated just like Shabab”. 

The president also stressed that crimes by members of the army would not be tolerated. Mobile military courts, which follow troops to the frontline, are used to try suspected offenders. According to Col Howie, these are some of the most active courts in Somalia: “They have wide-ranging powers to administer discipline, and they take that very seriously.” 

While the military and police are trained in human rights and civilian protection, Human Rights Watch stresses that proper vetting is also critical. “There has to be a concerted effort to sideline abusers - both from within existing forces and during any integration process of militias,” said Bader. 

Somalia’s security forces have a long road to travel before they can take charge of the country’s security, but with the commitment to change and the significant funding pledged, they may be marching in the right direction.  

zf/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98028/Analysis-Somali-security-sector-reform</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305131455010122t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - At Gashandiga barracks in Mogadishu, Somalia, Pvt Mohamed Sheikh Issak pulled back his military fatigues to show his scarred right shoulder. “I was shot by Al-Shabab when they still controlled half of Mogadishu,” he told IRIN. “I was at home, but they knew I was a soldier.”</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: The UN’s integrated mission in Somalia</title><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208151439550143t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Following the unanimous adoption of a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution setting up an integrated mission in Somalia, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) will be set up for an initial one-year period beginning on 3 June; it will be based in the capital Mogadishu.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Following the unanimous adoption of a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution setting up an integrated mission in Somalia [ http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10944.doc.htm ], the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) will be set up for an initial one-year period beginning on 3 June; it will be based in the capital Mogadishu. 

The UN defines an integrated mission as one in which there is a shared vision among all the UN actors at country level.

“This strategic objective is the result of a deliberate effort by all elements of the UN system to achieve a shared understanding of the mandates and functions of the various elements of the UN presence at country level and to use this understanding to maximize UN effectiveness, efficiency, and impact in all aspects of its work,” say the Integrated Mission Planning Guidelines [ http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/Multidimensional%20and%20Integrated/06_DPKO_IMPP_final_.pdf ] endorsed in 2006 by the Secretary-General.

According to the resolution, the mission is intended to help Somalia build on the political gains made over the past year; assist the country to develop a federal system of government; review its constitution and hold a constitutional referendum; and facilitate preparations for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2016.

In addition, UNSOM will “promote respect for human rights and women's empowerment, promote child protection, prevent conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice institutions.” 

UN agencies working in Somalia are expected to move there. Many are currently based in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. 

In this briefing, IRIN looks at what an integrated approach means for Somalia.

What is the political, humanitarian situation in Somalia?

Somalia has recently made progress towards stability. In 2012, the country set up a functioning federal government under the leadership of President Sheikh Hassan Mohamud, the first such administration since 1990.

However, there continue to be huge political and humanitarian challenges. Insurgents, who still control parts of the country, continue to launch deadly attacks regularly, while more than one million Somalis are displaced due to conflict and drought. One million more have crossed into neighbouring countries, mainly Kenya and Ethiopia.

A 2013 report [ http://www.fsnau.org/in-focus/technical-release-study-suggests-258000-somalis-died-due-severe-food-insecurity-and-famine ] published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) revealed that over 250,000 Somalis, many of them children under five, died as a result of famine between October 2010 and April 2012. They were unable to receive any humanitarian assistance, in part, due to insecurity.

What is UNSOM’s role?

On 6 March 2013 the Security Council had, while partially lifting a 20-year-old arms embargo [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97703/Briefing-The-risks-and-rewards-of-easing-Somalia-s-arms-embargo ] on Somalia and extending the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), for another year, agreed with the UN Secretary-General that the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) had “fulfilled its obligation” and needed to be replaced by an integrated mission to give the Somali administration “a single door to knock on”.

The new mission, to be headed by a special representative of the Secretary-General would include, “the provision of policy advice to the Federal Government and AMISOM on peace-building and state-building in the areas of governance, security sector reform and rule of law (including the disengagement of combatants); development of a federal system (including preparations for elections in 2016); and coordination of international donor support.”

All the UN country teams, both political and humanitarian in Somalia, would be expected, with immediate effect, to coordinate all their activities with the head of the newly established mission. 

The office of the UN humanitarian coordinator for Somalia is expected to fall under the office of the special representative from the beginning January 2014.

What now for UNPOS and AMISOM?

With the creation of an integrated mission, UNPOS ceases to exist. Established in 1995 and headed by a special representative of the Secretary-General, UNPOS’s role was mainly political, facilitating political dialogue and peace-building activities. In his letter [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/239 ] to the UNSC seeking the establishment of an integrated mission in Somalia, the Secretary-General said UNPOS had fulfilled its mandate and should “be dissolved and replaced by a new expanded special political mission as soon as possible”.

The Somalia Federal Government is largely propped up by the 18,000-strong AMISOM force.

A technical assistance mission to Somalia by the Secretary-General recommended in its report [ http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_239.pdf ] “use of local UN-contracted and trained security guards, the impending deployment of an AMISOM guard force in Mogadishu, and reliance on Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). If these are deemed insufficient, UN Guard Units or international private security companies could be utilized.”

AMISOM has always been involved in limited humanitarian assistance [ http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/humanitarian-work/ ] but it is not clear if this will continue with UNSOM.

The UNSC in its resolution, urges the newly appointed special representative to align closely with other stakeholders in Somalia, including UN country teams, the federal government, AMISOM, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the European Union and “other regional, bilateral and multilateral partners”.

Experts, say the success of UNSOM will depend on whether it aligns its operations with the different actors in Somalia, some of whom may have qualms about sharing their areas of expertise and/or influence.

“The number of pivotal actors dealing with Somalia has increased as of late, not least as new donors have come in and stepped up their support. Hence, if the international community is serious about UNSOM and would like to see it fulfil its mandate, actors need to be aligned behind UNSOM,” Dominik Balthasar, an expert on Somalia at Chatham House, told IRIN. “Yet, this might possibly be a hard bullet to bite for other actors such as AMISOM or IGAD, as the participation of UNSOM is likely to restrict the roles they have played thus far.”

Abdi Aynte, executive director of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) [ http://heritageinstitute.org ], a Mogadishu-based think tank, said: “With respect to its relations with AMISOM, the hope is that they become mutually reinforcing [and] not mutually exclusive [since] AMISOM is widely viewed positively.”

What are the merits of UNSOM? 

UNSOM will merge the UN’s humanitarian and political operations in Somalia, providing an opportunity to harness the operational capacities of the many agencies into a single mission. 

“It looks like an ambitious plan and is probably the most significant engagement in Somalia by the UN in decades,” Cedric Barnes, director, Horn of Africa programmes at the International Crisis Group, told IRIN.

HIPS’s Aynte said the integrated mission will provide a single international community narrative on Somalia, something he says the Somalis have wanted for a long time.

A unification of the development and humanitarian pillars in Somalia, others have argued, would help marshal the much-needed international funding to remedy the situation in Somalia while also “creating coherence and unifying strategies”.

Elmi Ahmed Duale, Somalia’s ambassador to the UN, described the resolution as important and said it had ensured “there was only “one door” to knock on, “as opposed to fragmented approaches in coordinating assistance”. 

According to ICG’s Barnes, this will be dependent on how much the government is willing to cede in the new engagement.

“It would be interesting to see how this will play out with a government that might want to assert authority while at the same time fronting the issue of sovereignty,” Barnes added.

The fact that Al Shabab is listed as a terrorist group has made it difficult for many humanitarian agencies to have an engagement with it, at least for the purposes of offering humanitarian assistance in areas still under the group’s control.

Why the dissenting voices against UNSOM?

Humanitarians have voiced their concerns against merging humanitarian operations with political and military activities, arguing it would make their work in Somalia difficult as it runs the risk of delegitimizing humanitarian actors.

“As many Somalis continue to struggle to obtain the basic necessities for survival, such as food, health care, and protection from violence, humanitarian assistance must remain a priority and it must remain completely independent of any political agenda,” Jerome Oberreit, secretary-general of Médecins Sans Frontières, said in a statement [ http://www.msf.org.uk/article/somalia-humanitarian-aid-must-not-be-co-opted ].

“The humanitarian aid system must not be co-opted as an implementing partner of counter-insurgency or stabilization efforts in Somalia,” he added. 

In March, InterAction, The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), said in a joint statement [ http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/131669840?access_key=key-axjqq1wp5tlwu7r4viw ] that the decision risked jeopardizing the delivery of impartial humanitarian assistance in the country: “By requiring UN humanitarian coordination to fall under the political mandate of the new UN peace-building mission in Somalia, the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action will be compromised.” 

Russel Geekie, public information officer at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Somalia office, said: “The integration should not hamper the delivery of aid. In its most recent resolution on Somalia (SC resolution 2102, which follows up on 2093), the Security Council reiterated that impartial, neutral and independent humanitarian assistance must be ensured, wherever those in need are.” 

According Chatham House’s Balthasar, integrating humanitarian operations into the broader politico-military stabilization plans “runs the risk of constraining humanitarian space, but that this does not necessarily need to be the case. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that humanitarian aid has always been political and that it has frequently been instrumentalized by a wide variety of actors - not least by those who oppose the government.” With an eye towards the dynamics surrounding humanitarian space in Somalia, he added that ever since Al Shabab had been put on the back foot, humanitarian actors who had become accustomed to negotiating with the insurgents to deliver humanitarian aid lacked clarity over who was in control and how to safely deliver aid. 

“Basically, the political situation on the ground appears to have become more, rather than less, complicated. In this situation, devising an integrated mission might not be the worst of all options for the sake of prioritizing stability and the establishment of functioning structures of governance,” he added. 

ko/kr/oa/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98015/Briefing-The-UN-s-integrated-mission-in-Somalia</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208151439550143t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Following the unanimous adoption of a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution setting up an integrated mission in Somalia, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) will be set up for an initial one-year period beginning on 3 June; it will be based in the capital Mogadishu.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: The plight of LGBTI asylum seekers, refugees</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305070711300235t.jpg" />]]>KATHMANDU 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Refugees and asylum seekers face a host of challenges when crossing borders, but the obstacles are particularly pronounced for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) persons, say experts.</description><body><![CDATA[KATHMANDU 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Refugees and asylum seekers face a host of challenges when crossing borders, but the obstacles are particularly pronounced for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) persons, say experts.

“LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees face a range of threats, risks and vulnerabilities throughout the displacement cycle,” Volker Türk, director of international protection at the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), told IRIN from Geneva.

“And while the world has come a long way since first recognizing asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity in the 1980s, residual factors ranging from criminalization to disbelief result in LGBTI people suffering at the hands of a variety of actors as they flee oppression and seek safety,” he said.

A new edition of the Forced Migration Review (FMR) released on 29 April [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/ ] highlights many of the remaining challenges for LGBTI migrants and asylum seekers.

According to UNHCR, targeting people based on real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity for persecution, discrimination, and harassment can stem from the belief that they are encouraging unwanted or unnatural social change [ http://www.unhcr.org/505c18af9.html ].

LGBTI people leave home for the same reasons as everyone else: to flee war, persecution, and oppression; to seek stability, education, employment, and freedom. In situations of upheaval or conflict, sexual and gender minorities have become targets for scapegoating [ http://www.hias.org/uploaded/file/Invisible-in-the-City_full-report.pdf ] or “moral cleansing” campaigns [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/01/11/nepal-police-sexual-cleansing-drive ], compounding the inherent vulnerability created by unrest, activists say.

LGBTI persecution

LGBTI people experience torture, violence, discrimination, and persecution in countries around the world, sometimes deliberately carried out by the state and often conducted with impunity.

Homosexual acts are punishable with the death penalty in five countries (Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen), as well as some parts of Nigeria and Somalia, the International Lesbian and Gay Association [ http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2012.pdf ], the oldest and only membership-based LGBTI organization in the world, reported in 2012.

According to research by Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/12/15/we-are-buried-generation ], gay Iranians [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/25296/IRAN-IRAN-Activists-condemn-execution-of-gay-teens ] are fleeing, frequently to Turkey, due to the state-sponsored persecution they face at home, while thousands of LGBTI people have sought international protection in Europe in recent years on the basis of their sexual orientation and gender identity [ http://www.rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf ].

And while few countries keep LGBTI-specific data, Norway and Belgium [ http://www.rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf ], which both track asylum decisions based on sexual orientation and gender identity, have shown a steady uptick in recent years.

From 2008-2010, LGBTI asylum decisions in Belgium increased from 226-522. During the same period in Norway they increased from 3-26.

But information about abuses against LGBTI people - called “Country of Origin Information” (COI) in the asylum process - can be scant in hostile countries, argued Christian Pangilinan, a Tanzania-based refugee lawyer cited in the Forced Migration Review [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/pangilinan ].

For transgender people, COI can mislead agencies, such as in Iran where authorities “allow transsexual surgery as a forced method of preventing homosexuality rather than supporting trans identities,” according to a gender expert’s FMR chapter [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/bach ].

Crossing borders of geography and identity

The multiple document checks migrants might encounter can be particularly difficult for transgender or gender-variant people. While international standards for travel documents officially recognize three genders - marked M, F, or X - [ http://www.icao.int/Security/mrtd/Pages/default.aspx ] only a handful of countries have incorporated the third category [ http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/eilr/26/26.1/Bochenek_Knight.pdf ], meaning that high-security travel environments, such as airports or emergency residential camps, can threaten humiliation or exclusion to people whose gender identity or expression is different from what is indicated by their documents [ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1926681 ] [ http://www.worldwewant2015.org/node/283239 ].

Sexuality and gender are nuanced personal matters. According to research by psychologists [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/shidlo-ahola ], some individuals may have had limited experience expressing or experiencing his or her deeply-felt sexual orientation or gender identity, and may outwardly appear very different than how he or she feels - to the extent of even being in a heterosexual relationship.

With the asylum process taking increasingly extended periods of time [ http://www.unhcr.org/4381c5832.pdf ], some may start the migration or asylum process with one identity, and change over time, complicating the matter both personally and administratively and exposing the individual to further discrimination or ill-treatment [ http://www.rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf ].

UNHCR’s guidelines for claims to refugee status based on sexual orientation and gender identity take the progressive step of acknowledging that “sexual orientation and gender identity are broad concepts which create space for self-identification” which may“continue to evolve across a person’s lifetime” [ http://www.refworld.org/docid/50348afc2.html ]. Nonetheless, according to UN Office of Drugs and Crime guidelines, discriminatory attitudes regarding sexual orientation and gender identity can mean the credibility of LGBTI people is dismissed by authorities [ http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Prisoners-with-special-needs.pdf ].

"That no one should be compelled to hide, change or renounce his or her identity in order to avoid persecution is a central tenet of refugee law, and this applies to sexual orientation and gender identity on equal footing with other claims,” UNHCR’s Türk told IRIN.

“There is no space for decision-makers determining refugee status to expect them to conceal who they are."

Safety and security

“There is harassment in the camp against us, sometimes beatings,”said Yoman Rai, a 19-year-old Bhutanese refugee living in a camp in Nepal. “We have a protection unit and complaint mechanism, but we are still facing problems,” he said, adding that just last month a transgender woman was beaten by other people in the camp.

Security in refugee camps is complicated and contingent on numerous, unpredictable factors. For members of the LGBTI community, vulnerabilities are exacerbated. Sexual abuse is common, but often goes unreported because the right questions are not being asked, and because survivors of sexual violence are reluctant to report [ http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=5006aa262 ] events that will “out” them to legal authorities.

Explained Rai: “Many Bhutanese are not `out’ to anyone except for the outreach workers because they still believe being LGBTI will put them in danger and negatively affect their resettlement process,” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91459/NEPAL-Resettlement-of-Bhutanese-refugees-gathers-momentum ] adding that the outreach educators’ network was operated by a Nepalese LGBTI rights NGO.

Emergency shelter settings -such as relief camps or refugee housing- pose specific challenges for transgender people. Access to male-female gender-segregated facilities, such as dormitories or bathrooms, can be perilous [ http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-55/making-disaster-risk-reduction-and-relief-programmes-lgbtiinclusive-examples-from-nepal ]. New research is exploring how immigration detention centres can respect and protect LGBTI residents, a US-based prisons expert explained in FMR [ http://www.fmreview.org/sogi/fialho ].

For LGBTI migrants who end up in urban areas, research has shown that cities can be unwelcoming and unfamiliar and access to basic social services limited by scant local resources, exclusion of foreigners, or limitations to access including finances, language, and cultural barriers. [ http://www.hias.org/uploaded/file/Invisible-in-the-City_full-report.pdf ]

“The single most threatening factor for these migrants is isolation,”said Neil Grungras, executive director of the Organization for Refugee Asylum and Migration (ORAM) [ http://www.oraminternational.org/ ], a leading advocacy group for refugees fleeing persecution due to sexual orientation or gender identity.

With UNHCR data showing the average major refugee situation lasting 17 years, these circumstances can impinge on a significant portion of an individual’s life [ http://www.unhcr.org/4444afcb0.pdf ].

Migrant populations are generally more at-risk for HIV due to disruption and displacement [ http://www.unhcr.org/4ef3056d9.html ], and according to UNAIDS are often overlooked in host-country HIV policies [ http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/briefingnote/2007/policy_brief_refugees.pdf ].

“It is critical that refugee organizations identify what the best ways of offering protection are, such as providing access to safe shelter, requesting expedited resettlement, and, if possible, working with the police and refugee communities to address specific threats of violence,” said Duncan Breen, a senior associate in the refugee protection programme at Human Rights First.

Evolving frameworks

Recent UN reports [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40743#.UX8oC7Xkvzw ] and statements [ http://www.iglhrc.org/content/un-ban-ki-moon-condemns-homophobic-laws ] demonstrate increased international attention to the human rights of LGBTI people.

On the programme level, agencies have begun to adjust to include considerations of sexual orientation and gender identity.

For example, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is implementing a “safe space” project for refugees at its four US Refugee Admissions Program Resettlement Support Centers.

Jennifer Rumbach, IOM resettlement support centre manager for South Asia, told IRIN the programme is designed to help LGBTI refugees at “every step along the way - whether during counselling, interviews, orientations, travel, or post-arrival…

“Disclosing sexual orientation and gender identity overseas works to the refugees’ benefit because it ensures we can provide appropriate and respectful services, ask questions that are critical to their resettlement experience, and try to get them any special help they need while they wait to be resettled,” she explained.

But ORAM’s Grungras warned:“We have to be extra careful to talk with refugees and migrants on their own terms - to understand them as they understand themselves, and not label them as“LGBTI” just because it fits our programmes.”

In spite of challenges such as a dearth of respectful terms used in some languages referring to sexual and gender minorities, IOM’s programmes also attempt to engage with local terminology.

“While it's important for staff to understand sexual orientation and gender identity terms used by the international community, we make special efforts to use relevant and respectful local terminology in our signs, handouts and interview and counselling scripts,” said Rumbach.

Supporting and protecting LGBTI people as they migrate requires nuance, sensitivity, and an appreciation of evolving identities, legal frameworks, and programmatic potential.

kk/ds/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97989/Analysis-The-plight-of-LGBTI-asylum-seekers-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305070711300235t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KATHMANDU 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Refugees and asylum seekers face a host of challenges when crossing borders, but the obstacles are particularly pronounced for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) persons, say experts.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Countering the radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth</title><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031222150686t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya's youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.

Youth unemployment is extremely high, as are levels of political disenchantment. An estimated 75 percent of out-of-school youths are unemployed, according to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) [ http://kenya.usaid.gov/programs/education-and-youth/51 ]. 

"The unemployment crisis is a ticking bomb. Over 60 percent of the population is under 25. You cannot ignore that," said Yusuf Hassan, the Member of Parliament for Nairobi’s Kamukunji Constituency, which has a large Muslim population. "A huge and significant population is restless. And the gap between the rich and poor is getting wider."

"When access to resources is based on ethnic, cultural or religious characteristics or there is a growing divide between the 'haves' and 'have nots' in countries and communities, economic conditions further contribute to instability," says a new report by the Institute for Security Studies in Africa (ISS) [ http://www.issafrica.org/assessing-the-vulnerability-of-kenyan-youths-to-radicalisation-and-extremism ]. "Countries confronted by large differences between 'haves' and 'have nots' are additionally vulnerable to conflict, which may include resorting to acts of terrorism."

Marginalized and radicalized

A string of grenade attacks - some allegedly by Somali Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabab or their sympathizers - have occurred in the Kenyan towns of Garissa, Mombasa and the capital, Nairobi, since Kenya began its military incursion in Somalia in October 2011 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94018/KENYA-SOMALIA-A-risky-intervention ].

But Islamic radicalization is not new to Kenya. Kenyans were involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and the Tanzania city of Dar es Salaam; the coordinated attacks, which killed more than 220 people, were Africa's first suicide bombings by Al-Qaeda's East Africa cell. In a 2002 dual car-bomb and suicide attack on a hotel and plane in Mombasa, at least one of the suspects was Kenyan.

Muslims make up an estimated 11 percent [ http://www.knbs.or.ke/docs/PresentationbyMinisterforPlanningrevised.pdf ] of Kenya’s population; large Muslim communities can be found in the country’s northeast and in the coastal region. Traditionally, Kenya’s Muslims are moderate, with the community peacefully seeking participation in politics. But ISS pointed to the historical political marginalization of Muslims - right from negotiations for Kenya’s independence, in which ethnic Somalis, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, were not represented - as a contributor to the radicalization of young people. 

“Although Kenya is a secular state, it is essentially a Christian country because of the dominant Christian population… There is the perception that Islam is ‘alien’, despite the fact that it came to Kenya before Christianity,” the report notes.

The report also found that some young Kenyan Muslims have been influenced by radical preaching, which leads them to believe that wars being fought against Muslims abroad - for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq - are part of “a global campaign against Islam”.

According to a 2011 report [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 ] by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, non-Somali Kenyan nationals constituted the largest and most organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabab.

Taking advantage of vulnerable youth 

"We've already seen the rumblings of 'Pwani si Kenya' [Coast is not Kenya, the slogan of a separatist group in Kenya’s Coast Province] [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrs ] - radicalized, marginalized, poverty-stricken young people are saying, ‘we don't belong to Kenya’," said Hassan, who was seriously injured in a 2012 grenade attack in his constituency. 

The ISS report found that Islamist militants were exploiting sub-standard socioeconomic conditions, and the government's inability to provide basic services, by positioning themselves as providers of assistance. "Creating or infiltrating bona fide charity organizations... is a sure way to win the general support of ordinary people," the report said. 

The report points to the growing influence of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), a Kenyan group whose objectives include promoting community health and social welfare, but which also advocates "an extreme interpretation of Islam and prepares members to travel to Somalia for 'jihad' [holy war], thus attracting the attention of security agencies in Kenya and abroad." According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544 ], Al-Shabab announced a merger with MYC in 2012.

Hassan Sheikh, a cleric in the northeastern town of Garissa, said extremist groups have taken control of many mosques and Islamic schools, setup orphanages, and employed teachers and imams.

"North Kenya is a hub for mercenaries. You can easily get [attract] them - it’s out of poverty,” said Khalif Aabdulla, a civil rights activist from Wajir, also northeastern Kenya.
NGOs and government officials in Kenya acknowledge an urgent need to develop a counter-radicalization policy to prevent young people from turning to violent groups, and some say Kenya’s newly elected government may be an opportunity to tackle the issue. NGOs say the government must do more than promote economic empowerment among marginalized communities; it must also foster a sense of belonging.

"There are some efforts to use the Council of Imams or Islamic Preachers' Association to talk to the youths," said Mwalimu Mati, CEO of governance watchdog Mars Group Kenya. "The moderates are trying to assist the government, but I can't say it's a complete success." 

Counter-productive counter-terrorism

"The problem is exacerbated by counter-terrorism programmes by the Kenya police who carry out mass raids rather than targeted arrests. It keeps the youths feeling repressed generally. They then identify that as oppression based on religion," Mati said. He says the problem is primarily in North Eastern District, Eastleigh and Coast Province. 

The ISS report describes the current approach as "collective punishment based on perceptions".

"Most perceptions are completely wrong, especially that Somali nationals are responsible for attacks in Kenya or that Kenya is an innocent bystander when acts of terrorism are committed on its soil," it stated. 

Following attacks in Nairobi, ethnic Somalis - both Kenyan and foreign nationals - said they experienced xenophobia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94090/KENYA-Xenophobia-fear-follow-Nairobi-blasts ] and lived in constant fear of arrest.

Under the government of former president Mwai Kibaki, both the Ministry for Peace-building and Conflict Management and the Ministry for Education told IRIN that they had no programmes to address radicalization.

The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport said they ran "empowerment programmes" in conjunction with the formal education system. But as Leah Rotitch, a director in the education ministry, said, "The people Al-Shabab target are normally young people who are out of school."

The persecution felt by ethnic Somalis and other Muslim communities has only increased [ http://www.kenya-today.com/news/kenyan-muslims-fear-the-worst-over-proposals-to-boost-police-powers ] in recent years, with police allegedly engaging in extrajudicial use of force and even killings of terror suspects; the police deny these claims.

"Since the passing of the new anti-terror bill, we have seen a huge spike in extrajudicial killings. And terrorism has become an easy label," said Horn of Africa analyst Abdullahi Halakhe. "Such efforts only succeed in alienating the local population, who usually have critical human intelligence. They are turning the Islamic radicalization of young people into a matter of national security, making those young people their enemies, thus making it worse."

The ISS report calls for "introspection on the part of the police officer stopping and searching a person because he looks Somali".

Reaching the young

Tom Mboya, who established the Inuka Kenya Trust in response to the role young people played in perpetrating the post-election violence of 2007-2008, says now is an opportunity to engage the youth. "They're what should be the engine of this country," he told IRIN.

"Devolution is positive," he says, referring to the process of decentralizing power from Nairobi [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97726/Briefing-Devolution-to-transform-Kenya ], which was set in motion by Kenya's new constitution. Mboya believes this process will create opportunities for young people. But, he says, "in parts of the country more prone to violent extremism, there needs to be policy in place. The leadership will have to be more alive to that problem".

A focus on young people formed a key part of new President Uhuru Kenyatta's election campaign - his government will now have to work out an acceptable and effective approach in tackling the issue of violent extremism. 

Mars Group's Mati says using moderate imams to neutralize potentially radical youths does not work because young people no longer regard them as credible. "It's a generation gap - control over youths has somehow become difficult. In the old days, what an imam said went. The radical preachers are young," he said.

Hadley Muchela, programmes manager for Kenyan rights group Independent Medico-legal Unit, says targeting violent extremism will require sensitivity because, thanks to the way the issue has been handled in the past, it is often seen as an indictment against all of Islam. "You find very few Kenyans willing to go into it," he said. 

Abdikadir Sheikh, who works with the Sustainable Support and Advocacy Programme, a local NGO, said the group has set up a pilot project to dissuade youth in the northeastern towns of Dadaab and Garissa from joining extremist groups. 

"We are very careful or [we could] lose our lives; you can’t confront radicalization directly - you need different approaches," he told IRIN. "We have established a strong team of more than 600 youths… some have so far joined colleges. We plan to work with the county governments.” 
The ISS report warns that "there is no quick fix for the level of radicalization seen in Kenya".

"The biggest threat to stability in Kenya will be if extremists succeed in dividing Kenya between Muslim and non-Muslim," the report said. 

jh/na/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97982/Countering-the-radicalization-of-Kenya-apos-s-youth</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031222150686t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In Brief: Raids free enslaved migrants/refugees in Yemen</title><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201111081458460657t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - The army in Yemen has started a crackdown on illegal smuggling hideouts in the north where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa are frequently held against their will and tortured by criminal gangs looking for ransom money.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - The army in Yemen has started a crackdown on illegal smuggling hideouts in the north where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa are frequently held against their will and tortured by criminal gangs looking for ransom money.

In the last four weeks, 1,620 migrants, including women and children, have been freed in army raids around the northern town of Haradh close to the border with Saudi Arabia, according to information from the International medical NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) [ http://www.msf.org/article/yemen-msf-assists-migrants-freed-clutches-human-traffickers ]. It says most of the released migrants it treated at the MSF-run Al-Mazraq hospital had been victims of human trafficking, forced labour and slavery.

“There are clear signs of extreme violence. Fingernails have been pulled out and many are badly beaten. We welcome this clampdown, but there are almost certainly thousands more migrants in captivity, and for those released, welcome centres and humanitarian NGOs are seriously overstretched,” Tarek Daher, MSF’s head of mission in Yemen, told IRIN.

Migrants recently told IRIN horrific stories [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97826/Migrant-voices-Ethiopians-in-Yemen-describe-kidnapping-and-torture ] of the kidnapping and torture they had experienced after landing in Yemen. Around a 107,000 crossed from the Horn of Africa into Yemen in 2012, most originally from Ethiopia, according to UNHCR [ http://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/arrivals-yemen-2010-2013-31-january-2013 ], and at least 30,000 have made the journey so far this year [ http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/over-30000-refugees-and-migrants-arrive-yemen-so-far-year ].

See previous IRIN reporting on migration in Yemen here:

Migrant voices - Ethiopians in Yemen describe kidnapping and torture
[ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97826/Migrant-voices-Ethiopians-in-Yemen-describe-kidnapping-and-torture ]

DJIBOUTI-ETHIOPIA: Irregular migration continues unabated
[ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97097/DJIBOUTI-ETHIOPIA-Irregular-migration-continues-unabated ]

ETHIOPIA-YEMEN: Jemmal Ahmed, “I survived a deadly trip to Yemen"
[ http://www.irinnews.org/HOV/97104/ETHIOPIA-YEMEN-Jemmal-Ahmed-I-survived-a-deadly-trip-to-Yemen ]

YEMEN: Tortured for ransom
[ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95051/YEMEN-Tortured-for-ransom ]

jj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97961/In-Brief-Raids-free-enslaved-migrants-refugees-in-Yemen</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201111081458460657t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - The army in Yemen has started a crackdown on illegal smuggling hideouts in the north where migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa are frequently held against their will and tortured by criminal gangs looking for ransom money.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Arab cities aim to build resilience to natural disasters</title><pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201008101236340196t.jpg" />]]>AQABA 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Prevention may be better than a cure, but for the authorities in Arab cities and towns, natural disasters up to now have been largely about coping with them after they have taken place.</description><body><![CDATA[AQABA 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Prevention may be better than a cure, but for the authorities in Arab cities and towns, natural disasters up to now have been largely about coping with them after they have taken place.

“We react to disasters without any planning; we just go for the response, and you know that without any planning you can’t do the proper things,” Abdulmalek Al-Jolahy, first deputy minister at Yemen’s Ministry of Public Works and Highways, told IRIN.

But disaster prevention experts say the region took a step in the right direction this month, with the official finalization of the Aqaba Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction in Cities. [ http://www.preventionweb.net/files/31093_aqabadeclarationenglishfinaldraft.pdf ]

“We want some modest, achievable targets for improving DRR [disaster risk reduction] in Arab cities,” said Zubair Murshed, a DRR regional adviser with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Cairo, speaking at last month’s first ever regional conference [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97685/Disaster-Risk-Reduction-in-the-Arab-world ] on the subject in Aqaba, Jordan.

City mayors and representatives from some 40 cities and towns in the region, including Aqaba, Gaza, Mogadishu and Tunis, drew up a provisional agreement on non-binding commitments over the next five years at March’s Aqaba conference, a document which this month became final following further consultations.

The targets include devoting at least 1 percent of cities’ annual budgets to DRR, preparing a risk assessment report to guide urban development planning, and implementing at least one law to improve safety.

The Arab officials agreed to meet in 2015 to review their performance, though otherwise there is no formal mechanism to monitor progress.

If officials follow through on their agreement it would be an important step in reducing risk - including from flash floods, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis, droughts, sandstorms and tropical cyclones - for the region’s inhabitants, over 55 percent of whom live in urban areas.

Rapid urban growth

Population growth in the Arab region is among the highest in the world, with the urban population more than quadrupling since 1970 and expected to double again by 2050, according to UN-Habitat’s State of Arab Cities 2012 report. [ http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=3320 ]

“The region’s environment and wealth are increasingly concentrated in a small number of highly vulnerable cities and many such communities are at risk from multiple hazards,” said Djillali Benouar, director of the Built Environment Research Laboratory at the University of Science and Technology Houari Boumediene in Algeria.

“Many recent disasters in the last decades had their main impact in urban areas where there is a large concentration of people with a heavy dependency on infrastructure and services.”

The problem has been exacerbated by the influx of people displaced by conflict who often settle on sub-prime land - either flood prone lowlands or unstable hills, and with 87 percent of the region classed as desert, urban centres play a vital role in the economy - making any disaster in a major city a national catastrophe.

“Many of these cities are almost equal to the country - Djibouti for example. Take Cairo and Beirut as well. You only have one major civil airport in Lebanon and it’s in Beirut,” said UNDP’s Murshed, adding that many of these Arab cities were sitting on major seismic fault lines.

The past destruction of cities like Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut, Algiers and Alexandria is an indication of the potential threat from earthquakes alone.

Disaster risk experts say the Arab region has been relatively lucky in the last century, but even so, there have been more than 270 disasters, [ http://www.emdat.be/ ] and at least 150,000 deaths in the past three decades.

Natural hazards may be impossible to avoid, but good DRR can make the difference between an event that destroys growth for many years to come, or simply knocks the city back for a few months.

“If cities and local governments decide to tackle these issues then they will really reduce global risk,” said Margareta Wahlstrom, special representative of the UN Secretary-General for DRR.

The motto: Be prepared

Natural hazards become disasters especially when they hit ill-prepared vulnerable communities, but cities can do more to be better prepared - from setting up early warning systems, building the institutions and infrastructure to better handle disasters, to gathering an accurate picture of the risks they face.

The Jordanian port city of Aqaba was recognized last month as the UN’s first “role model city for DRR” and has implemented a number of measures to reduce risk.

In a corner of the Aqaba Secondary School for Boys a shipping container provides a base for the city’s Neighbourhoods Disaster Volunteers. Inside shelves are lined with first aid kits, pick axes, power tools, reflective jackets, among other things, all regularly inspected by the volunteers.

“In this team, we have to be prepared 24 hours a day to help people and reduce the effects of disasters. By being prepared, we can manage any disaster,” said Nouh Al Khattab, one of the volunteers.

They perform regular drills to practice disaster response, says Khaled Abu Aisha, head of the DRR unit at the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA).

“The volunteers are normal people just like you and I - living in the neighbourhood; women, men, young, small, normal employees. We meet twice a month.”

Jordan’s three main cities (Amman, Zarqa and Irbid) - with more than 70 percent of the population - are 30km or less from the Dead Sea Transform fault line which divides the African and Arabian tectonic plates.

Aqaba sits close to the fault line as well, and a 7.3 earthquake in 1995 killed at least eight people and damaged buildings throughout the city. Over the last 2,500 years, the area has seen some 50 serious earthquakes.

In 2006-7 UNDP helped ASEZA carry out a seismic risk assessment of the city to determine vulnerabilities.

While earthquakes may be a natural phenomenon unlinked to human activity, construction norms can make a big difference to the scale of the disaster. As Jalal Al Dabeek, director of the Urban Planning and DRR Centre at An Najah National University, Palestine, says, “Buildings kill people, not earthquakes.”

“Until now the problem is that the minimum requirements are not there yet. We are facing an Arab reality that construction in the Arab world is a long way from the minimum requirements.”

Engineers and officials are drawing up a regional Arab building code, but even when it is agreed, the regulations will need implementing and enforcing in practice.

Meanwhile, risk experts fear most Arab cities continue to be almost completely unprepared.

“We are definitely worried. Many cities like Aqaba are prepared but at the same time there are others which are not really prepared, and this is a worrying thing,” Shahira Wahbi, head of Sustainable Development and International Cooperation at the League of Arab States, told IRIN.

Flash floods

The danger of uncontrolled construction on wadis was highlighted during the 2009 floods in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, when more than 150 people were killed after a sudden downpour (90mm of rainfall in four hours - twice the average yearly rainfall).

Many of those who died in Jeddah were migrant workers living in slums build in the wadis. A highway junction built in one of the wadis was also submerged killing drivers and creating widespread destruction.

The Al-Shallalah community in Aqaba, built near a dry wadi, was hit by flash floods in 2010 causing several deaths. ASEZA decided to move the 5,000 residents from the area: 700 families went to a new development in Al-Karamah, while the rest were given vacant land and compensation.

Flooding prevention can often require major expenditure. In Al Mukalla, the capital of Yemen’s Hadhramaut Governorate, three river valleys converge on the port city creating frequent floods. Residents dug a 600-metre channel through the city centre to allow the waters to flow unhindered into the ocean.

Resilient cities

To encourage cities to better prepare, the UN Office for DRR (UNISDR) [ http://www.unisdr.org/ ] in 2010 launched the Making Cities Resilient campaign, encouraging local municipalities to establish DRR programmes.

Of the 1,419 cities and towns that have joined the scheme, around 270 are in the Arab world, almost all of them in Lebanon where 87 percent of the population lives in urban areas. In February, Nablus became the first Palestinian city to join the resilience campaign.

But overall, DRR experts say most Arab cities continue to prioritize other more palpable issues like water shortages and security, and are almost completely unprepared for major disasters like earthquakes, despite the devastating impact they can have.

“The people are not prepared. Nobody talks about that. It will be panic. People will be killed, not just by the earthquake and things falling down, but from the panic because they don’t know what to do,” Benouar from the university of Science and Technology Houari Boumediene in Algeria, told IRIN.

jj/cb


]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97941/Arab-cities-aim-to-build-resilience-to-natural-disasters</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201008101236340196t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">AQABA 29 April 2013 (IRIN) - Prevention may be better than a cure, but for the authorities in Arab cities and towns, natural disasters up to now have been largely about coping with them after they have taken place.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Building health systems from scratch in Somalia</title><pubDate>Fri, 26 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208011414180678t.jpg" />]]>MOGADISHU 26 April 2013 (IRIN) - Lul Mohamed, director of the paediatric ward at Banadir Hospital in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, treated five children after two bomb attacks killed 30 people on 14 April. &quot;And they were shooting last night. One died, a bullet in his liver,&quot; she said of an eight-year-old boy.</description><body><![CDATA[MOGADISHU 26 April 2013 (IRIN) - Lul Mohamed, director of the paediatric ward at Banadir Hospital in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, treated five children after two bomb attacks killed 30 people on 14 April. "And they were shooting last night. One died, a bullet in his liver," she said of an eight-year-old boy.  

Yet these are conditions of relative peace in Mogadishu. While the conflict is not over, insecurity has diminished since the withdrawal of insurgent group Al-Shabab in 2011. This relative security is allowing Mohamed to focus on preventative healthcare, a luxury she did not have two years ago. 

In March 2013, she admitted 26 cases with measles, 19 with tuberculosis, 14 with tetanus and nine with meningitis. She is frustrated because all of these diseases are immunizable. Six of the children admitted that month died.  

Mohamed hopes this year to immunize 1,000 children per month in the hospital's tiny but brightly painted vaccination room. Two volunteers sit at a desk, another monitors those coming in and out. They say they became volunteers when donors pulled out and staff were let go. By 1pm that day, they had vaccinated 28 children.  

"A huge improvement in a short time - if peace holds," Mohamed said. 

Vaccination 

Coinciding with World Immunization Week, the Somali government announced on 24 April its intention to vaccinate all children under the age of one with a new five-in-one vaccine, known as a pentavalent  vaccine [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97873/In-Brief-Major-price-cut-for-five-in-one-vaccine ], funded by the GAVI Alliance, with the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the UN World Health Organization (WHO) as implementing partners. 

"Children in Somalia are dying of diseases that are prevented in the rest of the world," said Maryam Qasim, the Minister of Development and Social Affairs, speaking at the vaccine’s launch. "Introducing this vaccine is a milestone in history."  

President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud also presided over the launch, showing unprecedented support for improving child and maternal health in Somalia, two of the eight UN Millennium Development Goals. He also announced that his government would consider co-financing the vaccination programme, as other countries do, in the future.  

Currently, fewer than half of children in Somalia have received the mandatory diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (DTP) vaccine, a rate that Anne Zeindl-Cronin, senior programme manager at the GAVI Alliance, describes as "incredibly low". Only 7 percent of children in Puntland and 11 percent of children in Somaliland receive the required three doses by their first birthday, according to a joint UNICEF and government survey.  

The pentavalent will protect immunized children against these three diseases, as well as heptatitis B and Haemophilius influenzae type b. 

Health system strengthening 

"Coming from such a low base, if we have system strengthening, we should see a huge improvement in a short time - if peace holds," Zeindl-Cronin said. 

Eighteen months passed between country's decision to use the pentavalent and implementation of the programme, and Zeindl-Cronin recognizes that difficult tasks still lie ahead for GAVI's implementing partners. "It's easy to come here and put [the vaccines] in [a] fridge. It's getting them into the children that's the challenge." 

There is not a great deal of infrastructure to rely on. Somalia has suffered close to 25 years of civil war. Its health system is fragmented, supported by an unregulated pharmaceutical industry and dominated by private practitioners who offer help only to those who can afford it. Private doctors in Somalia are earning up to US$10,000 per month. 

A legal framework for healthcare is absent, and the federal state, which includes the semi-autonomous regions Somaliland and Puntland, raises questions about how any system might be structured. 

"Normally, there is one food and drug administration. But where? Is it in Mogadishu? Or in each of the zones [south-central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland]?" said Marthe Everard, WHO's representative for Somalia.  

In addition to the systemic and infrastructural challenges of delivering healthcare in Somalia, large areas of the country are still controlled by Al-Shabab; others are inaccessible due to armed groups that have filled the vacuum left by Al-Shabab. Omar Saleh of WHO estimates that 30-40 percent of southern Somalia is accessible to external healthcare providers at any one time.  

Risk persists 

In his speech at the pentavalent launch, President Mohamud condemned Al-Shabab for blocking access: "In the certain areas they control, there have been no vaccinations at all in the past few years. Al-Shabab needs to understand that they are not only killing people through explosions, but every child that misses vaccinations they have practically killed." 

The pentavalent vaccine launch is being accompanied by an awareness-raising campaign. Sikander Khan, UNICEF Somalia Representative, hopes that, once demand is created, the vaccine will reach women even in areas that Al-Shabab controls. "There is no parent in the world who doesn't care about the well-being of their child," he said.  

Farhiyo Mohamed, who has six children, brought her youngest to an outpatient clinic in Benadir, Mogadishu, to receive the pentavalent at no cost. The mother says she visited the clinic when Al-Shabab was still in the city, but that it was dangerous to do so. "Al-Shabab would question you when you came back. Today, we are happy," she said.  

While prospects are improving, inequitable access remains a major challenge. Paediatrician Mohamed, at Benadir Hospital, calls for a three-pronged commitment, not only from the government, but also the community and health workers. She says motivating and engaging private and public sector workers is critical to improving the reach of healthcare, and the reach of vaccines in particular. 

jh/kr/rz
]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97927/Building-health-systems-from-scratch-in-Somalia</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208011414180678t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MOGADISHU 26 April 2013 (IRIN) - Lul Mohamed, director of the paediatric ward at Banadir Hospital in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, treated five children after two bomb attacks killed 30 people on 14 April. &quot;And they were shooting last night. One died, a bullet in his liver,&quot; she said of an eight-year-old boy.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Uganda pilots mobile courts for refugees</title><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203281125310596t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Uganda&apos;s government and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have launched a pilot mobile court system to improve access to justice for victims of crimes in Nakivale, the country&apos;s oldest and largest refugee settlement.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Uganda's government and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have launched a pilot mobile court [ http://www.unhcr.org/516d29359.html ] system to improve access to justice for victims of crimes in Nakivale, the country's oldest and largest refugee settlement.

The magistrate's court, whose first session began on 15 April, will hear cases of robbery, land disputes, child rape, sexual and gender-based violence, attempted murder, and murder. The project - a collaboration of the Uganda government, UNHCR, Makerere University's Refugee Law Project (RLP) and the Uganda Human Rights Council - aims to benefit some 68,000 refugees and 35,000 Ugandan nationals in the settlement.

“With the nearest law court currently 50km away in Kabingo, Isingiro, access to justice has been a real problem for refugees and locals alike. As a result many fail to report crimes and are forced to wait for long periods before their cases are heard in court,” said a UNHCR briefing on the programme.

The mobile court will hold three sessions a year. Each session will last 15 to 30 days and hear up to 30 cases. Officials hope to extend the project to other refugee settlements in Uganda to enable more refugees to access speedier justice.

"Most of the courts are far away from the settlements, and refugee complainants faced challenges of transportation for themselves and witnesses," Charity Ahumuza, programme manager for access to justice at RLP, told IRIN. "With the courts brought to them, the cost of seeking justice is reduced. The courts will also reduce the backlog of cases that exist of cases that arise in the settlements."

"Refugees have welcomed this initiative since it is about bringing justice closer to them," John Kilowok, UNHCR Protection Officer in Uganda, told IRIN.

Operational challenges

Experts say the project could face a number of operational challenges, including a need for funding and a shortage of trained court interpreters. Uganda has over 165,000 refugees from the Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia and South Sudan.

"The settlements are far away, and distance in accessing the court is likely to become a challenge. Language, too, will be a problem. The service providers through UNHCR are conducting training for interpreters to help in this issue," said RLP's Ahumuza. "The sustainability of the courts, I believe, will depend on availability of finances. However, the judiciary continues to face financial constraints."

Angelo Izama, a Ugandan fellow at the Open Society Institute, says the shortage of justice in the refugee settlements is a reflection of poor access to justice across the country, a situation that needs to be addressed.

"Improving the delivery of justice helps tremendously given that, ordinarily, the severe case backlog makes matters worse for nationals - let alone foreigners. The real crisis now is not providing refugees and nationals in western Ugandan fast relief but filling the many vacancies in the judiciary so that, nationally, justice is expedited," he said. "While justice processes improved on our side can help communities - both Ugandan and foreign - live better governed lives, the ultimate investment would be in improving governance across the border."

"There is need for a holistic approach to look at the refugee issues in Uganda. We have to look at policy, immigration and defence lawyers for fair trials. Will the suspects have access to defence lawyers, or will they be accorded with lawyers to defend them in court?" asked Nicholas Opiyo, a constitutional and human rights lawyer in Kampala, Uganda’s capital. "Sustainability is a very crucial element in this court... If they don't put good and proper systems to support this court, it will be a waste of time and money."

so/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97903/Uganda-pilots-mobile-courts-for-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203281125310596t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Uganda&apos;s government and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have launched a pilot mobile court system to improve access to justice for victims of crimes in Nakivale, the country&apos;s oldest and largest refugee settlement.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Uneven progress on child stunting in East and Central Africa</title><pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202150719060014t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Improvements in nutrition and stronger government policies have led to a decline in childhood stunting, according to a new report on child nutrition. However, the condition continues to affect some 165 million children under the age of five globally.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Improvements in nutrition and stronger government policies have led to a decline in childhood stunting, according to a new report on child nutrition [ http://www.unicef.org/media/files/nutrition_report_2013.pdf ] by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). However, the condition continues to affect some 165 million children under the age of five globally.

Stunting can lead to irreversible brain and body damage in children, making them more susceptible to illness and more likely to fall behind in school. Based on UNICEF’s report, IRIN has put together a round-up of the nutrition situations in six East and Central African countries that are among 24 countries with the largest burden and highest prevalence of stunting.

Burundi: Under-five mortality in this small central African country dropped from 183 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 139 per 1,000 live births in 2012. This is far short of the 63 deaths per 1,000 live births necessary for the country to achieve UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) [ http://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/child_mortality/en/ ] 4, which aims to reduce child mortality by two-thirds by 2015. An estimated 58 percent of children under age five are stunted, compared with 56 percent in 1987, according to demographic and health surveys from those years.

According to the UNICEF report, Burundi has made “no progress” on MDG 1 [ http://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/hunger/en/ ], which aims to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.

Central African Republic (CAR): An estimated 28 percent of under-five deaths in CAR occur within the first month of a child’s life; the biggest killers of children under five are malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia. The percentage of children under age five who are stunted has changed little since 1995, standing at 41 percent in 2010, as has the percentage of children who are underweight, which has remained at about 24 percent for the last 18 years.

There has, however, been significant progress in the number of mothers exclusively breastfeeding their infants. In 2010, 34 percent of infants under six months old were breastfed, compared to just 3 percent in 1995. According to UNICEF, infants who are not breastfed in the first six months of life are “more than 14 times more likely to die from all causes than an exclusively breastfed infant”.

Democratic Republic of Congo: Africa’s second-largest country bears 3 percent of the global stunting burden, with 43 percent of children under age five suffering from stunting and 24 percent being underweight. Stunting is significantly higher (47 percent) in rural areas than it is in urban areas (34 percent).

The percentage of children who are underweight dropped from 34 percent in 2001 to 24 percent in 2010. DRC’s progress towards MDG 1 is described as “insufficient”.

Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa nation, which bears 3 percent of the global stunting burden, has seen a steep drop in stunting levels, from an estimated 57 percent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2011. The percentage of underweight under-fives has also dropped significantly, from 42 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2011. Between 2000 and 2011, under-five mortality was cut from 139 deaths per 1,000 live births to 77 per 1,000 live births - within striking distance of its MDG 4 target of 66 per 1,000.

A national nutrition programme launched in 2008 has been key to reducing national food insecurity, a major cause of stunting. The country’s health service extension programme [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/72371/ETHIOPIA-New-programme-boosts-village-health-service-delivery ] has also played a role in bringing nutritional interventions to villages.

Rwanda: Community interventions - such as kitchen gardens and increasing the availability of livestock, as well as measures to boost healthy infant feeding practices like exclusive breastfeeding and the provision of nutritional supplements - saw the percentage of underweight under-fives in Rwanda drop from 20 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2010. Enhanced data collection and analysis has also enabled the government to improve its planning and monitoring of child malnutrition.

The report describes the country as “on track” to meet MDG 1.

Tanzania: Bearing 2 percent of the world’s stunting burden, Tanzania has made significant strides in improving child nutrition. An estimated 50 percent of infants under six months old were breastfed in 2010, compared to 23 percent in 1992. The country has also brought under-five stunting levels down from 50 percent in 1992 to 42 percent in 2010, but continues to suffer significantly higher stunting in rural children (45 percent) compared to urban children (39 percent).

Tanzania’s under-five mortality rate dropped from 158 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 68 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010, putting it close to its MDG 4 target of 53 deaths per 1,000 live births. UNICEF’s report says the country is “on track” to meet its MDG 1 targets.

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97853/Uneven-progress-on-child-stunting-in-East-and-Central-Africa</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202150719060014t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Improvements in nutrition and stronger government policies have led to a decline in childhood stunting, according to a new report on child nutrition. However, the condition continues to affect some 165 million children under the age of five globally.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Somalia, federalism and Jubaland</title><pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304161357460972t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Moves to bring three regions in the deep south of Somalia together into the state of Jubaland have turned into a tussle with the central government, with regional powerhouses Kenya and Ethiopia playing important roles.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Moves to bring three regions in the deep south of Somalia together into the state of Jubaland have turned into a tussle with the central government, with regional powerhouses Kenya and Ethiopia playing important roles.

After more than two decades of civil war and inter-clan conflict, Somalia is undertaking an ambitious programme of national reconciliation and development, with federalism is a pillar of its plan. The national administration, in place since 2012, is called the Somali Federal Government (SFG), and the country’s basic law is the Provisional Federal Constitution. Both embrace the principle of power-sharing between central and regional authorities.

But the so-called “Jubaland Initiative” is exposing stark disagreements over how federalism should be implemented and over who should drive the process: the central government and parliament, or the regions themselves.

Who, what, where?

The regions involved are Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo, which are adjacent to Kenya and Ethiopia.

They cover a combined area of 87,000sqkm and have a total population of around 1.3 million. This includes numerous clans, such as the Ogaden-Darod, Maheran-Darod, Sheekhaal, Coormale, Biimaal, Gaaljecel, Raxanweyn , Dir, Gawaaweyn, Murile, Bejuni Boni and various Bantu groups.

“Due to its natural resources and location, Jubaland has the potential to be one of Somalia’s richest regions, but conflict has kept it chronically unstable for over two decades,” according to the Rift Valley Institute.

The regions include some of the most remote and marginalized areas of the country, some of which are entirely cut off during the rainy season for months at a time.

The most important city is the port of Kismayo, a lucrative prize for various warlords who battled for control of it following the 1991 fall of president Mohamed Siad Barre.

Al-Shabab insurgents held Kismayo from 2006 to September 2012, when they were ousted by Kenyan troops and forces of the Ras Kamboni militia. In that time, they earned tens of millions of dollars a year in tax revenue, mainly from charcoal exports.

Al-Shabab still maintains a significant presence in areas outside Kismayo. Kenyan troops, who are largely integrated into the African Union’s military mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continue to be deployed in the three regions.

What is the humanitarian situation?

Like much of South and Central Somalia, Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba suffered extensive infrastructural damage during the civil war. Most public buildings, such as schools and clinics, have yet to be rehabilitated. Road networks are in equally poor shape.

Current risk factors include limited access to humanitarian services, coupled with outbreaks of measles, acute watery diarrhoea, malaria, water-borne diseases and conflict-related injuries.

Aid agencies are able to access Kismayo and the city of Luuq. In January 2013, for the first time in four years, the World Food Programme (WFP) resumed operations in Kismayo, where almost half the households it surveyed were found to be food insecure, and almost a quarter of children under five malnourished. WFP has initiated a nutrition programme and provides hot meals to up to 15,000 people.

Insecurity persists, with many areas still controlled by Al-Shabab. “Even where Al-Shabab has left, the vacuum has been filled with local militias, competing warlords and rival clans,” said Mark Yarnell of Refugees International. Many NGOs are still forced to take AMISOM escorts, and negotiating with militias or insurgents is sometimes unavoidable.

What would a federal state look like?

This has yet to be determined. The constitution provides for the establishment of federal states, saying: “Based on a voluntary decision, two or more regions may merge to form a Federal Member State.”

But the constitution also holds that issues relating to new federal states should be sorted out by the lower house of parliament and a “national commission” that has yet to be set up.

Meanwhile, Somalia’s current regional structures are matters of great political sensitivity. Many regions exist largely as geographical entities, with little in the way of local government or administration. Somaliland, in the north, is a self-declared independent republic, and Puntland, east of Somaliland, is what the UN calls a “self-declared autonomous state” within Somalia.

What steps have been taken towards establishing Jubaland?

Current efforts to form a regional, secular administration began in 2010, some two years before the SFG came into being.

Kenya, keen to create a buffer zone to protect its territory form Al-Shabab incursions, played an important role in process, hosting talks among stakeholders and backing former defence minister Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (Gandhi) as the “president” of an entity then called “Azania”. Since the establishment of the SFG, these conversations have continued in the form of the Jubaland Initiative.

Neighbouring Ethiopia has also been keen to see a buffer zone in southern Somalia - so long as its leadership is not sympathetic to the Ogaden National Liberation Front, an Ethiopian rebel group. And the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which comprises several states in the region, has also supported the Jubaland Initiative.

After Al-Shabab was pushed out of Kismayo in September 2012, discussions moved to the port city itself. In late February 2013, hundreds of delegates gathered for a formal Jubaland conference to push the process forward. A flag and three-year constitution were adopted.

News of this development prompted a huge celebration in Kenya’s Dadaab refugee complex, which is home to almost half a million Somalis, many of whom had fled southern parts of that country over the past 20 years.

The Kismayo talks were led by Ras Kamboni leader and former Kismayo governor  Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, who is said to enjoy support from sections of both the Kenyan and Ethiopian administrations.

The Jubaland process also enjoys significant support from the leaders of Puntland, who favour a decentralized form of federalism.

Is there opposition to the initiative?

Yes. The SFG, while agreeing in principle that the three regions have the right to form a federal state, says the Jubaland Initiative in its current form violates constitutional provisions about the formation of such states.

From Mogadishu’s perspective, Jubaland is being imposed on local inhabitants by their leaders, rather than emerging from a “bottom-up” process in which local administrations are formed before deciding to merge. Mogadishu officials, as well as politicians in the Juba and Gedo regions, have expressed concern that the emerging Jubaland leadership will not be fully representative of the various clans that live there.

Prime Minister Prime Abdi Farah Shirdon recently warned that the Kismayo conference would “jeopardize the efforts of reconciliation, peace-building and state-building, create tribal divisions and also undermines the fight against extremism in the region.”

Divisions have also appeared among members of the federal parliament over whether to support the Jubaland process.

Many Somalis have long accused Kenya and Ethiopia of having a destabilizing effect on Somalia; they see Kenyan and Ethiopian involvement in the Jubaland process as a self-interested attempt to establish proxies there.

Why does this dispute matter?

This row over who should be in control of setting up new federal states threatens Somalia’s internal stability and its external relations. It places the government in Mogadishu at odds with new leaders in Kismayo and established ones in Puntland, and potentially with Ethiopia, Kenya and IGAD.

The Jubaland affair is an important test case for the fledgling SFG, whose credibility depends in part on its ability to stand up to other centres of power in the country.

“Unless these tensions are managed effectively, Jubaland easily could unravel and eventually break up into areas that are controlled by smaller rival factions. This is an opportunity that a group like Al-Shabab would love to exploit,” according to one recent analysis [ http://somalianewsroom.com/2013/01/10/jubaland-close-to-becoming-somalias-next-state/ ].

For Andrews Atta-Asamoah of the Institute for Security Studies, the row “has become a bone of contention capable of derailing the progress achieved thus far” in ridding Somalia of Al-Shabab’s influence [ http://allafrica.com/stories/201304100027.html?viewall=1 ].

Al-Shabab fighters quickly filled the gap left by the recent withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from the town Huddur, just north of Jubaland, demonstrating the group’s ability “to act swiftly when it spots weakness”, Atta-Asamoah said.

Additionally, the longer political uncertainty about Jubaland’s governance continues, the harder it is for humanitarian agencies to scale up their activities there.

What next?

There is now a “full-fledged” showdown between Mogadishu and leaders of the Jubaland Initiative, according to Michael Weinstein, professor of political science at Chicago’s Purdue University [ http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_The_Show-Down_in_Jubaland_Begins.shtml ].

He pointed to the absence of a credible judicial system to resolve the constitutional row and warned that lack of clarity in the constitution itself was “an invitation to endless legal contretemps.”

There are also concerns about whether Jubaland is cohesive enough to ensure a viable state. Its constituent regions lack decent road links or any history of shared administration. “Geddo in the north links to Mogadishu, the south links to [the Kenyan town of] Garissa. But Middle and Lower Jubba roads are often impassable because of rains. There is no easy prospect of people and goods moving throughout,” said Ken Menkhaus of Davidson College.

 “Whatever solution emerges,” Matt Bryden, the director of Sahan Research, told a recent seminar in Nairobi, “Jubaland is going to have to deal with the kinds of issues we’ve heard about [for years]: sharing and management of resources and the perception among various clans that there is some kind of equitable distribution.”

jh-am/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97860/Briefing-Somalia-federalism-and-Jubaland</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304161357460972t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Moves to bring three regions in the deep south of Somalia together into the state of Jubaland have turned into a tussle with the central government, with regional powerhouses Kenya and Ethiopia playing important roles.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Migrant voices - Ethiopians in Yemen describe kidnapping and torture</title><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201212210922050570t.jpg" />]]>SANA’A 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - Record numbers of migrants from the Horn of Africa are crossing into Yemen, most of them on their way to find better opportunities in Saudi Arabia and other rich Gulf countries. But many do not make it any further. Seeking a new life, they end up unwitting victims of a smuggling racket designed to exploit the migrants at each juncture of their journey.</description><body><![CDATA[SANA’A 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - Record numbers of migrants from the Horn of Africa are crossing into Yemen, most of them on their way to find better opportunities in Saudi Arabia and other rich Gulf countries. But many do not make it any further. Seeking a new life, they end up unwitting victims of a smuggling racket designed [ http://www.irinnews.org/HOV/97104/ETHIOPIA-YEMEN-Jemmal-Ahmed-I-survived-a-deadly-trip-to-Yemen ] to exploit the migrants at each juncture of their journey.

Recent years have seen Ethiopians make up the majority of these migrants: Of the 107,000 recorded migrants crossing the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden into Yemen in 2012, around 80,000 were from Ethiopia.

Four irregular migrants with diverse backgrounds, all from Ethiopia, told IRIN about their journeys to Yemen.* While their stories differ in details, they all share a similar set of experiences: brutality, broken promises and extortion.

Marta, mid-30s, from Dire Dawa, eastern Ethiopia:

Marta says she fled Ethiopia in 2010 when she and her family were accused of supporting the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a state-designated terrorist group. “The government said, ‘You are with the party of OLF,’ and chased us out of country. I don’t know where my family ended up.”

“I spent a year and a half in Djibouti, where I gave birth to my daughter. After her father disappeared, we left for Yemen. I paid a broker 10,000 Djiboutian francs [about US$55] to ride in a boat with 15 others from Djibouti to Yemen.

“Our night-time crossing of the Red Sea was calm until the end. As we neared the Yemeni coast, the owner of the boat, who was part of the smuggling operation, threw us into the sea. No one knew how to swim because in Ethiopia, we don’t have a sea, just lakes. The brokers and their thugs were waiting for us as we came ashore. They raped me and the other women. I’m 9 months pregnant with a child from that night.

“When I arrived to Sana’a, I was tired and decided to stay. For seven months, I was a house maid, but now I can’t work because of the pregnancy, so I have no income. [Ethiopian] migrants from the community in Sana’a are supporting me.

“I’m interested in tackling my problems, but at the moment I am pregnant and I am tired. All my money goes to my daughter, so this makes me tired. One day I will win.”

Alima, 18, from Miesso, eastern Ethiopia:

Alima fled to Dijoubti after being accused of being a member of the OLF. “I worked for one year in Djibouti City, where life was not good but not bad, until gangs started robbing us near where we collected our salaries. That’s when I decided to go to Yemen, where I’ve been for five months.

“I paid a broker 20,000 Djiboutian francs [about $110] to take me to the island of Haiyoo, where we would take a boat to Yemen. Thugs captured us and demanded more money when we arrived to Haiyoo. Because I had no money, they raped me. Men who did not have money were beaten, and the women were raped. Eventually, I contacted family and convinced them to send $200.

“We arrived to Yemen, north of Bab al-Mandab [the Mandab Strait], in a 120-person boat, and were transferred to the Yemeni smugglers who control that part of the country. The gangsters raped most of the women and tortured and beat the men to extort more money.

“They sell women who can’t find more money to other brokers, who send them to work as maids in Yemeni households. A broker bought me and sent me to Radaa, where I worked for three months cleaning houses.

“One man who loved me paid for my release and married me. He was also in Radaa, working on a qat farm and raising livestock. We moved to Sana’a two months ago. He cleans in a restaurant and I’m a maid.

“If an opportunity arises, or if I make money, or if the situation in Yemen gets worse, I’m interested in going to a better country.”

Mesfin, 38, from Dese, north-central Ethiopia:

“I was born an orphan in Ethiopia, and grew up there. I had no family, and no one was helping me. Life was boring, so I decided to explore.

“I travelled five days on buses, trains and hiding out on heavy trucks before arriving at the border with Djibouti. I could have cut straight across the Welo desert to the Red Sea, but it was too dangerous. Most people spend their lives there.

“I paid brokers 1,000 Ethiopian birr [about $50]. That was supposed to cover the entire trip from Ethiopia to Yemen, but I was forced to pay 400 Ethiopian birr [$20] extra at Haiyoo.

“We crossed the Red Sea in a small fishing boat loaded with about 80 people. While we were boarding, I heard the brokers contact Abd al-Qawi’s* people, who said they were prepared to receive them near Mokha. About five hours later, we hit land, and Abd al-Qawi’s gangsters started beating the men trying to escape and raping most of the women right there on the beach.

“They took me and some of the men and women to a detention centre, where they tortured them until money was transferred. The building was like a jail; people are not helped until someone sends them money. The women were raped there. I was detained and tortured for five days. On the fifth night, they untied me because I was in charge of feeding the others, and I managed to escape.

“I ended up in the main street of Mokha and caught a ride to Taiz in a day. An Ethiopian migrant paid for me to come to Sana’a, where I’ve been for five days. I want to work here, make some money, then return to Ethiopia to search for relatives.”

Yassin, 23, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia:

“I had no political issues - not many - in Ethiopia, but I had economic problems. I am from a poor family in Addis Ababa: no father, only my mother, and I have many sisters and brothers. I went to Yemen imagining living a better life because my mother couldn’t provide for us.

“I stowed away on a train from Addis to the Djibouti border, and from there to Haiyoo we travelled in a Land Cruiser. I paid a broker 1,000 Ethiopian birr [about $50] for the whole trip.

“After a week of waiting in Djibouti, we took a fishing boat filled with 45 people to Yemen. Before pushing off on our four-and-a-half-hour journey, another boat left ahead of us, which was built to hold 25 people but 50 piled in. The boat split in half and sunk not long after its departure. We could hear their screams as they drowned in the night. When the bodies washed ashore, we buried them before leaving. During the pitch-black crossing, we encountered a ship which seemed like an island it was so big. The waves filled our boat with water, and we almost capsized. We arrived near Bab al-Mandab.

“The landing wasn’t very scary because we were dropped so close to shore. But as we waded to the beach, Abd al-Qawi’s thugs started shooting guns into the air to scare those who tried running away. They loaded us into trucks and took us to detention centres to extract money. Because I know different dialects, I acted as translator and was released with those who paid. I saw them rape women, hang men by their hands and beat them with metal rods and red-hot poles; they shot off fingers and toes, poked hot shards of metal into their eyes and poured boiling plastic on their bodies.

“I travelled one day by Hilux to Haradh along the Saudi border. I saw the same beatings and rapes for extortion in Haradh throughout my six months there. As you see in Yemen, there is no work, so I have plans to leave to anywhere by any means.”

*Full names withheld
*Most migrants referred to Abd al-Qawi as the name of the Yemeni gangs who carried out the abuses, though the origin of this name is not clear.

cc/jj/rz

For more information see:
Desperate Choices - conditions, risks and protection failures affecting Ethiopian migrants in Yemen
http://www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/featured%20articles/RMMSbooklet.pdf

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97826/Migrant-voices-Ethiopians-in-Yemen-describe-kidnapping-and-torture</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201212210922050570t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">SANA’A 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - Record numbers of migrants from the Horn of Africa are crossing into Yemen, most of them on their way to find better opportunities in Saudi Arabia and other rich Gulf countries. But many do not make it any further. Seeking a new life, they end up unwitting victims of a smuggling racket designed to exploit the migrants at each juncture of their journey.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In East Africa, heavy rains test emergency preparedness</title><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304040922550914t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - Unusually heavy rains have caused havoc across much of east Africa, displacing thousands of people and damaging important infrastructure.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - Unusually heavy rains have caused havoc across much of east Africa, displacing thousands of people and damaging important infrastructure.

“Above-normal rains have occurred in several areas, including northern and western Tanzania; Rwanda; Burundi; the Lake Victoria Basin; western, southern and northeastern Kenya; southern and central Somalia; and eastern and south-eastern Ethiopia,” states an update by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/East%20Africa%20Seasonal%20Monitor%20April%208%202013.pdf ].

Even normal rains can cause flooding and damage in areas with poor drainage; this year’s heavy rains are already beginning to test the emergency responses in many flood and disaster-prone areas.

The rains, which have “caused significant flooding in the Lake Victoria basin in Uganda and Kenya, the southern Maasai rangelands in Kenya, and along the Wabi Shabelle in Ethiopia in late March and early April”, according to the update, started between mid-March and early April and are likely to continue through May.

Kenya 

In Kenya, at least 18,633 people have been displaced by flooding since the onset of the rains, according to the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) [ https://www.kenyaredcross.org/PDF/REPORTED%20sitrep%202013%20FLOODS%209th%20April%202013-1.pdf ]. Some 32 deaths have also been recorded, with others being injured.

The number of people displaced could rise to about 30,000 before the rainy season ends, said Nelly Muluka, the KRCS communications manager. 

“We are also working on searching for the unaccounted people and sensitizing communities on the need to move to safer areas,” said Muluka. KRCS is distributing food and non-food items to affected families, but there is a need for medical care and additional food and shelter.

Ahead of the rains, Kenya’s meteorological department had warned of generally enhanced rainfall over the western highlands, Lake Basin, central Rift Valley and the central highlands, including Nairobi, in March and April. 

“We expected floods in areas like Nairobi, Central, Coastal and Western Kenya, and have already put aside food and non-food items for potential victims,” Andrew Mondoh, the permanent secretary in the Special Programmes Ministry, told IRIN. 

In the coastal area of Tana River, hundreds of families marooned by floods have been rescued by helicopter and moved to safer areas, added Mondo. 

The rains have also destroyed roads in the Rift Valley areas of Kajiado and Narok and in the western area of Kisumu. 

In northeastern Kenya’s Dadaab refugee complex, home to about 463,000 mainly Somali refugees, the rains have displaced some families and affected commodity prices. 

Parts of a 90km road, linking the main region of Garissa to the Dadaab refugee complex, have been rendered impassable, affecting transport and commerce. 

Movement within the Ifo-1 and Ifo-2 camps becomes especially difficult during the rainy season due to flooding, which makes aid delivery difficult.

“It is a mixture of sad[ness] and happiness during the rainy season in Dadaab; we really need the rain because it is always very hot and we get more milk from the neighbouring locations, but we have no proper shelter and the prices of some foodstuffs become higher,” said Muhubo Aden Kusow, who runs a grocery store at one of the Ifo camps. 

The heavy rains are expected to continue over the next two weeks, according to Ayub Shaka, the deputy director of Kenya’s Department of Meteorological Services. “It is difficult to say where floods will occur in the next two weeks for example, but the best we can do is to ask people living in flood-prone areas to stay alert and safe,” said Shaka.

Somalia 

In neighbouring Somalia, heavy rains were recorded in the first week of April.

“Robust precipitation accumulations (>75mm) were again observed over central and southern Somalia,” states an Africa Hazards Outlook report for 11-17 April [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afr_Apr11_2013.pdf ]. 

“Many local areas have already experienced more than three times their normal rainfall accumulation since the beginning of April, sustaining the risk for localized flash flooding and downstream river inundation over the Jubba and Shabelle River basins in eastern Ethiopia and southern Somalia.”

The Shabelle has already burst its banks in some places, according to a 10 April Shabelle River flood update by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization [ http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/flood-update-shabelle-river-10042013 ]. 

“SWALIM [Somalia Water and Land Information Management] field reports in the last two days indicate river breakages at Hurway (about 8m wide), Eji (about 6m wide) and Maadheere (about 14m wide) villages all in Middle Shabelle Region. This has led to inundation of large areas, causing destruction of cropped area[s] of unconfirmed acreage, and displacement of several families.”

Ethiopia 

The southern and eastern regions of Ethiopia have also received “heavy and well-distributed precipitation totals”, according to the Africa Hazards Outlook, “with lesser amounts observed in the west and higher elevations of the country.” 

“This has already negatively affected cropping activities, with a reduction of planting over many local Belg [February-May rains]-producing areas of Ethiopia,” it says.

With the rains expected to continue, efforts are underway to mitigate their adverse effects.

Uganda 

According to Uganda’s chief weather forecaster, Deus Bamanya, there is an increased likelihood of near-normal to above-normal rainfall over most parts of Uganda, with the rains peaking between mid-April and early-May. Flash flooding could also occur in areas expected to receive below-normal rainfall due to sporadic heavy downpours.

“The expected impacts include increased lightning, hailstorms, floods and landslides,” Bamanya told IRIN.

The government plans to relocate vulnerable populations living in the eastern Mount Elgon region, which is prone to flooding and landslides [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88283/UGANDA-300-feared-dead-as-landslides-bury-villages-in-the-east ]. 

“We are worried [about] landslides, mudslides and flooding. There are already signs in the low-lying and hilly and mountainous areas,” Musa Ecweru, Uganda’s state minister for relief, disaster preparedness and refugees, told IRIN.

“The effects of the heavy rains last year were very devastating. We don’t want [a]repeat. We are going to relocate people in these vulnerable areas. We are only waiting for resources from our development partners to start the relocation exercise,” said Ecweru. The Ugandan government requires some 35 billion shillings (about US$13.5 million) for the exercise.

“We are going to de-gazette some government land to relocate these vulnerable populations. We are negotiating with [the] Uganda Wildlife Authority to have this done immediately. We must [re]settle these people as quick[ly] as possible,” he added. 

The districts of Mbale, Tororo, Kalangala, Bundibugyo and Masaka are among those most affected by hailstorms, according to Catherine Ntabadde-Makumbi, the Uganda Red Cross Society assistant communications director, who added that at least 8,362 people remain without assistance, with 5,681 of them displaced. The displaced are in urgent need of shelter kits, household items and water purifying tablets. 

Burundi 

In Burundi, flood-affected areas include the northwestern region of Bubanza, Bujumbura City and the plains of Imbo along the shores of Lake Tanganyika. 

"We have a problem with rain in the town of Gihanga [in Bubanza]. Houses and plantations were destroyed, causing the displacement of people and stopping work in the fields," Anselme Wakana, governor of Bubanza Province, told IRIN. 

At least 1,000 hectares of rice has been damaged there, raising food security fears. "We are harvesting rice that was not yet mature due to fear of flooding," said farmer Olive Ngayimpenda. 

Several homes have been destroyed in the areas of Gihanga.

According to Mbonerane Albert, the president of the local NGO Green Belt Action, the situation could worsen due to environmental degradation: deforestation in Bubanza has increased surface runoff, increasing the risk of flooding. 

Rwanda 

In neighbouring Rwanda, authorities have issued disaster warnings to those living in risk-prone areas.

"High-risk-zone dwellers have [been] given [a] new eviction ultimatum to relocate since we noticed that expected heavy rainfall could affect the vulnerable populations," Antoine Ruvebana, the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Refugees Affairs and Disaster Management, told IRIN. 

Rwanda, due its hilly terrain, is susceptible to erosion, flooding and landslides. 

According to the Rwandan meteorological services department, several western parts of the country could get ''above-normal rainfall'' during the mid-April to May 2013 period. 

rk-mh-dn-at-so/aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97830/In-East-Africa-heavy-rains-test-emergency-preparedness</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304040922550914t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - Unusually heavy rains have caused havoc across much of east Africa, displacing thousands of people and damaging important infrastructure.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Somali music festival takes aim at Al-Shabab</title><pubDate>Wed, 10 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304101226120633t.jpg" />]]>MOGADISHU 10 April 2013 (IRIN) - Organizers of the Mogadishu Music Festival, a string of events held last week in the Somali capital, hoped to inaugurate a new era of openness and development in the war-scarred country, and to lure impressionable youths away from radicalism.</description><body><![CDATA[MOGADISHU 10 April 2013 (IRIN) - Organizers of the Mogadishu Music Festival, a string of events held last week in the Somali capital, hoped to inaugurate a new era of openness and development in the war-scarred country, and to lure impressionable youths away from radicalism.

The festival was Mogadishu’s first major public music event since civil war erupted two decades ago. The war had culminated in the rise of Al-Shabab, an Islamic militant group that outlawed music entirely.

Although Al-Shabab was driven from Mogadishu in 2011, they remain an active threat, claiming responsibility for recent bombing attacks in the capital [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97734/Briefing-In-Somalia-relative-peace-belies-rocky-road-ahead ].

“There are two types of threat from Al-Shabab: one is real, one is psychological,” said Farah Abdullahi, the general manager of Kau Media Corporation, which filmed one of the festival’s concerts for national broadcast. “Sometimes they’re not doing anything, but everyone is scared.”

For Abdullahi, broadcasting the event was an important signal to the country: “Eventually people will realize they’re scared of something that’s not a reality. Then they will be confident enough to stand up to them. I want to show Shabab and the people who believe in them that they’re defeated.”

Promoting development

The festival, funded by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the US State Department, brought in musicians from seven countries. According to organizers, some 2,000 young men and women attended the event, and Abdullahi’s live broadcast reached a national and international audience of 300,000.

The festival’s logistical challenges were compounded by the absence of a local music industry - all equipment had to be brought in from Somaliland, the self-declared republic to the north - and the continued influence of Al-Shabab.

“Al-Shabab knows where this is. They’re still part of the system, part of the community,” Abdullahi said.

Abdullahi is one of many Somali businessmen to return from abroad, breathing life into the economy [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95480/SOMALIA-Mogadishu-on-the-up ]. He spent much of his life in the UK, but is now based in Hargeisa.

Abdullahi hopes events such as this will help Somalia redevelop its once-thriving private sector.

“It was one of the best cites in the world,” he said of Mogadishu in the 1960s. “Very cheap, very peaceful, the best nightclubs in the world, beaches and drinks.”

Reaching youths

“If Al-Qaeda and terror networks around the world can find ways of uniting Somali, Afghan, Sudani, Chechen, Arab, and other youth around extremism, killing and hate, why can’t we do better by uniting youth around moderation, reconciliation and love through music and arts?” asked Daniel Gerstle, founder of the Humanitarian Bazaar, which co-produced the festival.

Gerstle is sceptical of “human rights” concerts - such as those popularized by Bob Geldof and Peter Gabriel in the 1980s and 1990s - that reach only Western audiences. Instead, these initiatives should target the young men most at risk of violent extremism, he says.

“Who sits down with them - the boys who are the participants, the fuel for continuing this conflict? The extremists,” Gerstle said.

The Mogadishu Music Festival aimed its message directly at Somali youth.

Headlining the event was Somali hip-hop collective Waayaha Cusub, whose lyrics are known to address the country’s issues head-on: one of their albums is titled “No to Al-Shabab”.

“We’re here to spread the peace message,” said Kombo Chokwe of Afro-Simba, a Kenyan band at the festival.

As part of the event, former Al-Shabab fighters and child soldiers took part in a “reconciliation concert” organized with the Federal Government.

“[It was a] 400 [person] live audience of former fighters who defected or were captured and are in demobilization before reintegration,” Gerstle said.

Peace dividend

One of the festival’s managers, Bill Brookman, calls such arts initiatives “the peace dividend”.

These programmes can promote post-conflict recovery in a variety of ways. For example, in 2005, Brookman helped implement street-theatre in Sierra Leone sensitizing the public to the dangers of explosive remnants of war.

The same year, his organization, the Bill Brookman Foundation, created Caravane de la Paix, an initiative designed to gain access to violent areas of Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

“Three brightly painted vehicles, [with] actors, musicians and artists entered the most hotly contested slum areas where gangs ruled,” said a report of the foundation. The artists’ presence helped initiate negotiations with gang leaders, it said [ http://www.billbrookman.co.uk/foundation/documents/armed_criminal_gangs/Rapport_Naratif_ILLUSTRE_CDLP_080508_general_audience_Eng_sans_annexe.pdf ].
But these efforts carry enormous risks.

Organizers of the Mogadishu festival are now closely monitoring the safety of fixers, drivers and producers associated with the event, out of concern they may become targets for Al-Shabab. One man, who has received threats, says he is prepared to leave the country should the need arise.

“I thought, ‘Is it a bit premature to do an event like this?’” said a Mogadishu resident, who asked not to be named. “It’s do or die. Either they’ll do something that’ll break the mould, or they’ll put us back by five years.”

jh/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97818/Somali-music-festival-takes-aim-at-Al-Shabab</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304101226120633t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MOGADISHU 10 April 2013 (IRIN) - Organizers of the Mogadishu Music Festival, a string of events held last week in the Somali capital, hoped to inaugurate a new era of openness and development in the war-scarred country, and to lure impressionable youths away from radicalism.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Will Somalia get enough rain this year?</title><pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108251054490156t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 28 March 2013 (IRIN) - Parts of southern Somalia are yet to recover from the battering they took in 2010-2011, when severe drought followed excessive rain, and now the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) says insufficient rain may fall in the coming months. &quot;We are concerned - our forecast shows that there is 80 percent probability that rains could trend from normal to below normal across Somalia,&quot; said Gideon Galu, a regional FEWS NET scientist based in Africa.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 28 March 2013 (IRIN) - Parts of southern Somalia are yet to recover from the battering they took in 2010-2011, when severe drought followed excessive rain, and now the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) says insufficient rain may fall in the coming months. "We are concerned - our forecast shows that there is 80 percent probability that rains could trend from normal to below normal across Somalia," said Gideon Galu, a regional FEWS NET scientist based in Africa.

The situation appears to be particularly bleak in southern Somalia, where rains during June/July are likely to be inadequate. 

Hussein Gadain, chief technical advisor at the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) said, "This is a seasonal climate forecast which will depend very much on the spatial and temporal distribution of the rains during the season," said . "In fact, we expect some areas might even be flooded, especially along the Shabelle River, where farmers cut the… [banks] for irrigation."

Accurately predicting the weather and its possible impact is tricky, and even more so in a year marked by the absence of strong climatic signals from the oceans. Phenomena like La Niña, when sea surface temperatures are cooler, or El Niño, when they are warmer, are part of the normal climate cycle in the Pacific Ocean and occur once every four to seven years. They can also provide clues as to how the weather may behave.

Somalia has two distinct rainy seasons. The first is 'Gu', the long rains from March to June that support the main cropping season. The second is 'Deyr', the short rains, which occur at different times across the country but usually from October to November, according to FAO.

"Normally, the climatic conditions in the Equatorial Pacific Ocean (El Nino and La Nina) tend to affect the Deyr rains more than the Gu rains, which are affected by the Somali Jet [a narrow wind-stream running north along the east African coast] and the conditions in the western Indian Ocean,” Gadain noted.

Galu said FEWS-NET uses an analogue year - when a similar forecast has been made - to build a picture of the likely impact on agriculture. "The year we used as a reference especially 2002 (the most likely scenario), indicates that rainfall distribution during the coming months is also expected to be erratic in both space and time," but he added that no two seasons/years can be exactly the same.

Some parts of southern Somalia received good Deyr rains between October and December in 2012, and farmers have managed to harvest an almost average crop of sorghum, but FAO noted that the agro-pastoral areas of Gedo, in the southwest, as well as Lower and Middle Juba, the country’s southernmost regions, received inadequate rainfall.

The severe drought in the Horn of Africa in 2010/11 displaced millions of people and left tens of thousands dead, and led the United Nations to declare a famine in parts of southern Somalia.

"We are particularly concerned, as the same communities - who have not really had sufficient time to recover - could be affected by insufficient rains," said Galu. "Crop yield prospects in southern Somalia, particularly for the rainfed cropping areas, are likely to be reduced in [the] case of below-normal rainfall amounts and erratic distribution during the season."

jk/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97744/Will-Somalia-get-enough-rain-this-year</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108251054490156t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 28 March 2013 (IRIN) - Parts of southern Somalia are yet to recover from the battering they took in 2010-2011, when severe drought followed excessive rain, and now the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) says insufficient rain may fall in the coming months. &quot;We are concerned - our forecast shows that there is 80 percent probability that rains could trend from normal to below normal across Somalia,&quot; said Gideon Galu, a regional FEWS NET scientist based in Africa.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: In Somalia, relative peace belies rocky road ahead</title><pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303261138190439t.jpg" />]]>MOGADISHU 26 March 2013 (IRIN) - Since the August 2011 withdrawal of Al-Shabab insurgents from the Somali capital, Mogadishu, security has improved, allowing for the gradual resumption of government functions. But sporadic suicide attacks, conflict-related population displacement and socio-economic problems persist, exemplifying some of the daunting challenges still ahead.</description><body><![CDATA[MOGADISHU 26 March 2013 (IRIN) - Since the August 2011 withdrawal of Al-Shabab insurgents from the Somali capital, Mogadishu, security has improved, allowing for the gradual resumption of government functions. But sporadic suicide attacks, conflict-related population displacement and socio-economic problems persist, exemplifying some of the daunting challenges still ahead. 

On 18 March, for example, a car bomb in Mogadishu left several people dead.

Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud responded in a statement: "We can only presume at this stage that this cowardly attack is the work of Al-Shabab. They have been severely weakened and now resort to terrorism and murder of innocent Somali citizens. Al-Shabab/Al-Qaeda forces have no place in this world, and we will not allow them to have [a] place in Somalia."

Al-Shabab has since claimed responsibility for the attack.

Below, IRIN provides an overview of Somalia's recent progress and the many challenges that remain.

What does relative stability look like in Somalia?

Recent gains by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces against the Al-Shabab insurgents have given the government some breathing space. Members of the Somali diaspora are now returning [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95886/SOMALIA-One-million-return-to-Mogadishu ] due to the increased stability [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95480/SOMALIA-Mogadishu-on-the-up ].

"We are no longer scared of the heavy shelling exchanged by Al-Shabab and African Union forces," Abdullahi, a businessman in the Bakara Market, told IRIN. The market was previously an Al-Shabab stronghold. 

"More children are going to school, businesses are opening, and there been a construction boom," added another Mogadishu resident. "There has been a really big change."

According to the mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Ahmed Nur Tarsan, there has been a significant improvement in the security situation there. 

"When Al-Shabab was ruling parts of Mogadishu, all government MPs [members of parliament] and politicians could not rent houses but were all caged in the presidential palace. Now, they live in various neighbourhoods of Mogadishu," he said.

The lighting up of two arterial roads in Mogadishu has allowed businesses there to remain open after dark; children can also be seen playing in the streets. "I am playing football with my friends until late at night," Mohamed Hassan, 12, told IRIN in the Mogadishu district of Howlwadag.

There are plans to gradually light up other major roads in Mogadishu in a bid to boost business.

What are the remaining security threats? 

But "insecurity remained a key challenge throughout the country in February," according to an update [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia%20Humanitarian%20Snapshot%20February%202013%20Issued%20on%206%20March%202013%20-%20Info%20graphic.pdf ] by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), issued on 6 March.

"An explosion occurred in Mogadishu's Abdiaziz District. The vehicle-borne improvized explosive device [VBIED] attack was carried out by a suicide bomber. One person was confirmed dead and three others were injured.

"In Kismayo, 11 people were killed in clashes between rival pro-government and clan-based militias. The clashes may be related to the long political tension in the Juba region over the formation of a regional state," the update said, adding that a suicide attack on 11 February in Gaalkayo had killed one person and wounded 27 others.

Dozens of households also fled areas in the Bay and Bakool regions to the town of Luuq, and others fled to Dollo Ado refugee camp in Ethiopia, fearing armed clashes in Diinsoor and the onset of the lean season, it said. 

Meanwhile, an Al-Shabab blockade in Bakool has led to a rise in the cost of basic foodstuffs. 

"The cost of 50kg of rice was 400,000 Somali shillings (US$24) a year ago, and it is 800,000 Somali shillings ($48) today," Osman Ali, a father of eight, told IRIN by telephone. "I have spent all I had. Now, I am almost about to sell my houses to get food for my children." 

Mohamed Moalin, the commissioner of Bakool's regional capital of Hudur, said that Al-Shabab is preventing food from reaching the town.

"Al-Shabab controls the main roads that lead to Hudur, and they would not allow vehicles carrying food to enter the [areas] we control, and this has resulted [in] hardships for the people." Residents there now rely on food brought in by donkey carts.

In a 21 March press release, following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Hudur, AMISOM sought to reassure residents, stating it "is working closely with the Federal Government of Somalia in their efforts to re-establish a security presence in the area."

AMISOM Force Commander General Gutti said, "We have in place contingent measures to ensure that areas in Bay and Bakool remain stable and secure in the event of further Ethiopian troop withdrawals."

The Somali government is also grappling with acts of criminality by its armed forces. 

Several hours after the execution of three soldiers for killing civilians, the chairman of Somalia's Supreme Military Court, Hassan Mohamed Hussein Mungab, told IRIN: "We will not tolerate killers and rapists within the armed forces. We will kill them because they denied the very people they were supposed to protect the right to life."

Armed, uniformed men have also been accused of robbery. "I have had my mobile phone forcibly taken by two uniformed men," Abdikafi Mohamed, a resident of Mogadishu, said.

International focus on the security sector was reflected in the March partial lifting of a UN arms embargo [ http://irinnews.org/Report/97703/Briefing-The-risks-and-rewards-of-easing-Somalia-s-arms-embargo ] on Somalia, which will  allow the government to continue to train and equip its armed forces.

How have development efforts fared?

The Somalia government also struggles to ensure access to health [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97709/New-plan-to-ensure-universal-healthcare-in-Somalia ] and education. 

The lack of experienced health professionals and supplies is a challenge, said Mohamud Moallim Yahye, the deputy minister for development and social services. 

"Most of our doctors are junior and they do not have access to the right equipment to carry out their work. With the help of our Turkish brothers [through Turkish NGOs], we want to rebuild the country's health institutions and gradually get free public hospitals," Yahye told IRIN, adding that the ministry hopes to engage more with development partners. 

"Donors and aid organizations used to engage with local NGO and private individuals while providing services, but now things are changing - health interventions across the country will be conducted through the Ministry of Social Services [and] Development."

An estimated four million Somali children are also missing out on schooling, according to the social services ministry. The ministry hopes to send at least one million children to school in 2013, even as former government schools are currently housing hundreds of internally displaced persons. 

A standard syllabus must also be developed. "There are various syllabuses in use in the country which impart different cultures and values among Somalis, so developing a standard curriculum is a challenge," said Yahye. 

Has peace affected the economy?

Financial issues remain paramount. The Somali shilling has been strengthening against the US dollar over the last couple of months, with adverse effects. 

At present, $100 is being exchanged for 1.7 million Somali shillings, compared to 2.2 million in the recent past.

"My brother in Britain sends me $100, but it buys less shillings than before, which means I can buy less goods or services. It's good to have our money strengthened, but it does not have increased purchasing power," said Liban Galad, a student in Mogadishu.

"We used to eat three times a day, but we have reduced [this to] two," Fatima Rashid, a mother of five, told IRIN.

Somalia does not have a functioning central bank to regulate the supply and demand of currencies.

"For the last two decades, no legal sufficient money has been printed, so there [are] less shillings in Somalia, and the rise in demand for the shilling has devalued the dollar," Mohamed Sheikh Ahmed, an economics lecturer at the SIMAD University, told IRIN.

Investors and returnees have also flooded the market with dollars. "Somali investors are coming home with dollars. All salaries are paid in dollars. Tax is paid in dollars. And agencies, especially [the] Turkish, are paying in dollars - huge amount[s] of dollars," he added.

Some business people could also be hoarding Somali shillings leading to a higher demand.

To help to stabilize the fluctuating exchange rate, Ahmed suggests printing more 1,000 shilling notes, but says longer-term measures are needed. "The most practical [solution] in the long term is the printing of new money with [a] strong central bank, which can control the demand and the supply [of currency]," he said, adding that the government should also start paying salaries and collecting taxes in Somali shillings.

amd/aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97734/Briefing-In-Somalia-relative-peace-belies-rocky-road-ahead</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303261138190439t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MOGADISHU 26 March 2013 (IRIN) - Since the August 2011 withdrawal of Al-Shabab insurgents from the Somali capital, Mogadishu, security has improved, allowing for the gradual resumption of government functions. But sporadic suicide attacks, conflict-related population displacement and socio-economic problems persist, exemplifying some of the daunting challenges still ahead.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>New plan to ensure universal healthcare in Somalia</title><pubDate>Fri, 22 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201105190706280955t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 22 March 2013 (IRIN) - Every Somali citizen will have access to basic healthcare by 2016 if a new, government-led strategic plan achieves its aims.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 22 March 2013 (IRIN) - Every Somali citizen will have access to basic healthcare by 2016 if a new, government-led strategic plan achieves its aims.

The launch on 21 March of new Health Sector Strategic Plans (HSSPs) for Somalia’s three zones - south-central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland - indicates a move away from the emergency-level health provision that has been the norm in the country for over 20 years and towards more mainstream, national health systems.

“The strategic planning process leading to this result is a clear indication of the beginning of a new time, a time of good governance and re-building of systems,” Mariam Qasim, Somalia’s Minister for of Human Development and Public Services, said at the launch, adding that the implementation of the plan would be a “litmus test” of the government’s ability to provide services to its population.

Somalia has some of the highest rates [ http://www.unicef.org/somalia/health.html ] of maternal mortality in the world, and thousands of infants and children succumb annually to easily preventable and treatable conditions such as pneumonia, diarrhoea, malnutrition and measles. 

Starting anew

The country’s health system was virtually destroyed by more than 20 years of conflict, during which time there was no legitimate government; during the war, NGOs, the UN and private sector practitioners managed healthcare.

“The major change is government ownership of the HSSP,” said Marina Madeo, the coordinator of the Somali health sector. “By 2016, we hope that in every part of the country, health centres will be equipped with drugs, equipment and health workers.”

She noted that for now, as the government continued to build its ability to handle healthcare, large parallel health programmes such as immunization would continue to be handled by UN agencies. The government and its partners will also seek public-private partnerships with the country’s vibrant private health sector.

The HSSPs are expected to make improvements to health financing, human resources for health, drugs and the country’s health infrastructure, among other things. The four-year strategies are expected to cost US$350 million, 70 to 75 percent of which will be spent on actual health services. Some $50 million has already been raised; key donors include the Australian, Swedish, UK and US governments.

Marthe Everard, UN World Health Organization representative for Somalia, stressed that “all national and international investments in the health sector should be guided by these plans, which provide the basis for cooperation, harmonization and alignment of all support to the Somali health sector”.

Security

Although much of Somalia is now secure, Islamist insurgents still control parts of south-central Somalia. Qasim said she hoped security would continue to improve, and that in the interim “there are always ways” to work in Al-Shabab-controlled areas. 

“We can’t wait for everything to be in place [to] secure to start working,” said Madeo. 

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97709/New-plan-to-ensure-universal-healthcare-in-Somalia</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201105190706280955t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 22 March 2013 (IRIN) - Every Somali citizen will have access to basic healthcare by 2016 if a new, government-led strategic plan achieves its aims.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: The risks and rewards of easing Somalia&apos;s arms embargo</title><pubDate>Thu, 21 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303211500440469t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 21 March 2013 (IRIN) - Does Somalia, which has been beset by civil war and insurgency for more than two decades, need more weapons? Earlier this month the Security Council eased a long-standing arms embargo, allowing a newly-installed and internationally-recognized government to import light arms for a period of 12 months. The move, according to proponents, will give poorly-equipped security forces a much-needed edge over the Islamist Al-Shabab group, but critics warn that the new imports could end up in the hands of insurgency and increase the risk of human rights abuses. This briefing explores the pros and cons of the Security Council resolution. </description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 21 March 2013 (IRIN) - The UN Security Council earlier this month relaxed a long-standing arms embargo on Somalia, allowing the government to purchase light weapons for 12 months.

“On the arms embargo, originally imposed in 1992, the Council decided that it would not apply to arms or equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the government’s security forces, but it kept its restrictions in place on heavy weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles,” UN Security Council Resolution 2093 [ http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/sc10931.doc.htm ], adopted on 6 March, said.

The government - or member states delivering weapons - are required to notify the Council’s sanctions committee of any such deliveries.

Below, IRIN has put together a briefing on the implications of easing the embargo.

Why ease the embargo?

For more than two decades after the fall of Siyad Barre in 1991, Somalia experienced widespread gun violence in the form of clan conflict and, more recently, conflict involving the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)-supported government and Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabab.

According to the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea, between May 2004 and July 2011, some 445 instances of arms transfers or seizures, involving almost 50,000 small arms and light weapons [ http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2012/eng/Small-Arms-Survey-2012-Chapter-10-EN.pdf ], took place in Somalia. Also in violation of the embargo, arms continued to flow into Somalia by land, air and sea from countries like Eritrea, Ethiopia and Yemen.

But following more than a year of relative stability in Mogadishu and many other parts of south-central Somalia, some analysts expressed a desire to see the UN relax the embargo. In February, the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), a Mogadishu-based think tank, urged the US [ http://www.heritageinstitute.org/images/us_recognition_of_somalia_hips_briefing.pdf ] to “lobby for a gradual end to the arms embargo on Somalia… so that the Federal Government can take a qualitative monopoly on the instruments of legitimate violence”.

Easing the arms embargo would, according to HIPS director Abdi Aynte, “gradually give the Somali National Army [SNA] the qualitative edge over their principal adversaries, such as Al-Shabab”.

“At the moment, the SNA is battling Al-Shabab using the same [old] AK47s. They'd have to change, especially if we want the SNA to ultimately defeat Al-Shabab,” he told IRIN. “It would allow the Somali government to gradually monopolize the use of legitimate force. Currently, all actors are armed to the teeth, and that won't change for some time, but it could be reversed over time.”

In a statement, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud welcomed the decision to lift the embargo as a reflection of “a new and steadily improving political situation in Somalia”.

“Thousands of Somali National Army recruits, trained by our international partners, have returned to Somalia but have been unable to perform their security duties effectively alongside AMISOM troops because the government was unable to access the equipment they needed,” he added. “Lifting the arms embargo was the missing element, and now the gap has been filled.”

Abdullahi Boru Halakhe, a Horn of Africa analyst, said the resolution made necessary compromises between the need for legitimate weapons and the fear of illegal ones. “The way the resolution was crafted struck a balance between the concerns of those who feel the country is still [too] awash with weapons for the embargo to be lifted, and those who consider the government needs to be able to purchase weapons to provide security for its people,” he said.

What are the risks?

Halakhe warned, however, that “even the best laid plans can go awry”.

“The immediate danger is if the weapons find their way in the hands of groups like Al-Shabab through corrupt government officials/security officers,” which could lead to “an incredibly difficult situation, where these weapons could fuel further conflict”.

Two days before the embargo was lifted, rights group Amnesty International [ http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/somalia-un-arms-embargo-must-stay-place-2013-03-04 ] called on the UN Security Council to keep the embargo in place, and even strengthen it, citing the possibility of groups like Al-Shabab becoming better armed.

“For several years, the arms embargo on Somalia has been continuously violated, with arms supplied to armed groups on all sides of the conflict. The flow of arms to Somalia has fuelled serious human rights abuses,” Gemma Davies, Amnesty International’s Somalia researcher, said in a statement that stressed the risks of “removing existing mechanisms of transparency and accountability”.

“Without adequate safeguards, arms transfers may expose Somali civilians to even greater risk and worsen the humanitarian situation,” she added.

Countries within the region are wary of the easing of the embargo, fearing that it could, if managed poorly, allow illegal weapons to flow out of Somalia and into the region, where they could be used to create instability.

“As a sovereign state, Somalia is entitled to strengthen its security and defence. The present situation in Somalia, however, is still fragile… The institutions that control and manage small arms are not yet stable, with the AU still the factor holding the peace and return to stability. Already, there are so many illegal guns within Somalia and these are yet to be properly accounted for, managed and effectively controlled,” said Joe Burua, of Uganda’s National Focal Point on Small Arms.

“Letting more arms into Somalia will only give credence to the illegal ones [as] trade commodities, basically supporting illegal trade in firearms as security tightens.”

He noted that while experts believe few guns have so far left Somalia for other countries in the region, “the fear is, like the Cold War era of the West and Eastern bloc countries, when the war is concluded, unscrupulous characters will seize the opportunity to engage in illegal trade in firearms”.

What safeguards are needed?

According to Burua, if the lifting of the embargo is to work, Somalia’s government will need to, among other things: strengthen internal measures for the safe storage of firearms; sensitize armed communities about the dangers of possessing illegal firearms; conduct a robust demobilization and disarmament programme; enact an amnesty for armed communities that voluntarily surrender their firearms; strengthen the capacity of the law enforcement agencies to manage firearms; strengthen laws and regulations on firearms; and partner with neighbouring states to strengthen border points and curtail illegal cross-border transfers.

“At this current juncture during the problematic early stages of the Somali Federal Government, the initial issue before armament should be country-wide disarmament,” Kainan Abdullahi Mohamed said in a recent opinion piece for the Somali new service, Garoowe Online [ http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Opinion_20/Disarmament_compulsory_for_a_gun_country_at_a_crossroads.shtml ]. “Firstly and foremost in the capital, where guns are found as easily as any other product such as soap and groceries.”

He further argued that there would be a need to harmonize and reform the army if the easing of the embargo was to work.

Al Jazeera correspondent Peter Greste notes in a 21 March blog [ http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/africa/somalia-where-un-arms-embargo-failed ] that beyond guns, there is a need for ongoing negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty [ http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-arms-treaty-un-idUSBRE92H0TR20130318 ] to impose strict controls on not just weapons, but ammunition as well.

“As it stands, the treaty places trade in weapons themselves under encouragingly tight controls,” he said. “But the treaty shunts ammunition and spare parts to an annex with far loser restrictions. If those restrictions continue to allow a black market to flourish, the treaty fails, especially in places like Somalia.”

Amnesty International has also made the case for stronger controls [ http://livewire.amnesty.org/2013/03/20/biting-the-bullet-why-the-arms-trade-treaty-must-regulate-ammunition ] on ammunition.

Somalia has attempted disarmament several times in the past. The Islamic Courts Union’s disarmament efforts in 2006 were met with stiff resistance by warlords. In 2007, the prime minister of the Transitional Federal Government extended an amnesty to Islamists and established collection points for arms around Mogadishu. This, too, was met with resistance.

There is also the issue of how much of a role AMISOM should play in supporting the purchase or monitoring of weapons. HIPS’s Aynte says that while AMISOM should not, in the long term, be an intermediary in the procurement of weapons, the Somali government needs to first put in place “verifiable mechanisms for purchasing, accounting and accountability before going on an arms shopping spree”.

“There are groups and communities in Somalia and abroad that are legitimately concerned about the capacity of the SNA to buy arms… The government must allay these fears by reforming the SNF and making it more competent, credible, inclusive and, above all, accountable to a strong and transparent judicial system,” he added.

President Mohamud’s statement made it clear that the Somali army would continue to work with AMISOM to execute its duties. The SNA and the country’s police force are undergoing a process of reform with the support of AMISOM, the UN and neighbouring countries like Uganda.

Halakhe, the analyst, said, “I hope besides providing security, the AU forces will able to monitor that these weapons do not find their way into the hands of Al-Shabab and other similar destabilizing forces… We need to move slowly.”

kr /rz 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97703/Briefing-The-risks-and-rewards-of-easing-Somalia-apos-s-arms-embargo</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303211500440469t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 21 March 2013 (IRIN) - Does Somalia, which has been beset by civil war and insurgency for more than two decades, need more weapons? Earlier this month the Security Council eased a long-standing arms embargo, allowing a newly-installed and internationally-recognized government to import light arms for a period of 12 months. The move, according to proponents, will give poorly-equipped security forces a much-needed edge over the Islamist Al-Shabab group, but critics warn that the new imports could end up in the hands of insurgency and increase the risk of human rights abuses. This briefing explores the pros and cons of the Security Council resolution. </td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Water scarcity affects Somaliland households</title><pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201212140723350117t.jpg" />]]>HARGEISA 19 March 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of households in the disputed Sool area of the self-declared republic of Somaliland are facing a water shortage following poor rains, say officials.</description><body><![CDATA[HARGEISA 19 March 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of households in the disputed Sool area of the self-declared republic of Somaliland are facing a water shortage following poor rains, say officials.

Both Somaliland and the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland claim the Sool and Sanaag regions.

"We believe an estimated 3,000 households are facing water shortages in [the] Sool Region," Mohamed Mousa Awale, chairman of Somaliland's National Environment Research and Disaster Preparedness and Management Authority (NERAD), told IRIN.

Awale added that some drought-affected rural families had migrated to neighbouring areas, such as Togdheer and Buhotle, which had received good 'Deyr' rains - the rains typical from October to December. Others moved further south in search water and pasture.

"But we are worried [about] the old people and the people who had no ability to move from the villages. [They] are in a serious situation and need water and food," he said.

Commenting on the number of those affected, Sool Deputy Governor Mohamed Abdi Dhimbil said, "There is no accurate estimation, but I can only tell that the water shortage has affected the whole region. The nearest water source is 94km away, inside Ethiopia, and we believe that about 200 pastoralist families [are in] search of water and pasture in Somalia's Mudug Region."

Increasing prices

The price of water in Las-Anod, Sool's capital, has sharply increased since mid-February. A 200L barrel of ‘durdur’, or spring water, now costs $1.50, up from to $1 a month ago. A barrel of rainwater from the ‘berkads’, or water pans, has risen from $2.48 to $5.

"The durdurs [springs] near Las-Anod have run out of water for the first time in history, and prices [have] increased," said Faisal Jama, a journalist based in Las-Anod.

"The water price increase has [a] negative impact [on] our livelihoods. If someone's income is $150 per month, he/she needs $45 for water compared, to $22.38 a month [ago], and the remaining [money] is not enough to cover his/her livelihood needs," said Mohamed ABdillahi, a father of five.

As the dry January-to-March ‘Jilaal’ season progresses, more water sources could be depleted, according to a post-Deyr outlook [
http://www.fsnau.org/downloads/Somalia-Post-Deyr-12-13-Food-Security-and-Nutrition-Outlook.pdf ] by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU).

"In the areas where the October-to-December Deyr 2012 rains were poor, including the Sool Plateau and parts of Nugal Valley, the dry January-to-March Jilaal will likely lead to rapid depletion of water resources, especially since many berkads did not get replenished during this Deyr. Long distances to water points for livestock are likely to be observed owing to more limited water access due to the high cost of water trucking," states the FSNAU report.

The situation there could worsen with associated declines in food security, adds FSNAU.

Some parts of Somaliland have started to receive some ‘Gu’ rains - the rains from March to May. But early forecasts by FSNAU indicate that the rains in Somalia will be normal to below normal in terms of total rainfall.

maj/aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97678/Water-scarcity-affects-Somaliland-households</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201212140723350117t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">HARGEISA 19 March 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of households in the disputed Sool area of the self-declared republic of Somaliland are facing a water shortage following poor rains, say officials.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Keeping pastoralist children in school in Ethiopia</title><pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201111181336170109t.jpg" />]]>ADDIS ABABA 15 March 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of children in the pastoral regions of Ethiopia are dropping out of school despite government and donor efforts to bring schools closer to them. Recurrent natural disasters such as drought and flooding, as well as inter-ethnic clashes, are major factors in school dropouts.</description><body><![CDATA[ADDIS ABABA 15 March 2013 (IRIN) - Keeping pastoralist children in school in Ethiopia

ADDIS ABABA, 14 March 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of children in the pastoral regions of Ethiopia are dropping out of school despite government and donor efforts to bring schools closer to them. Recurrent natural disasters such as drought and flooding, as well as inter-ethnic clashes, are major factors in school dropouts.

In February, at least 17,000 primary school children in Ethiopia were reported [ http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-weekly-humanitarian-bulletin-11-february-2013 ] to have dropped out since the beginning of the 2012-2013 school year, mainly due to drought-related migration.

In the northeastern Afar Region, some 15 schools have closed down due to a lack of water during the current dry season, affecting some 1,899 children, 29 percent of whom are girls, according to an 11 March update [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Humanitarian%20Bulletin_11%20March%202013.pdf ] by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Ongoing conflict between the Oromo and Somali communities is also affecting education. “In conflict-affected areas of Oromia’s East Hararghe zone, some 10,600 children (40 percent girls) from 35 primary schools in Kumbi, Gursum, Meyumuluke and Chenasken [districts have remained] without schooling for over three months,” the update said.

In the southeastern Somali Region, seasonal flooding, ethnic conflict between residents in border areas, and even internal conflicts within the Somali ethnic group often adversely affect schooling, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

In 2012, for example, a flood emergency in the region severely affected schools in several districts. “During the flooding emergency that occurred in June 2012, around 3,196 girls dropped out of school. Most of the schools located in the seven woredas [districts] were flooded, with eventual destruction of all educational materials and school infrastructure,” said UNICEF.

During the emergency, UNICEF supported the creation of temporary learning spaces for the affected children.

Alternative schools

Children in pastoral regions often seasonally migrate with their families due to adverse weather or insecurity.

The Ethiopian government, through its Alternative Basic Education Center (ABEC) programme, has been taking schools closer to such children.

“It is to include the under-developed pastoralist regions that we needed to devise an inclusive and comprehensive strategy specifically for the areas. The regions and way of life there needed a different approach. We had to take the schools to the children, not the other way around,” Mohammed Abubeker, head of the special support and inclusive education department at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Education, told IRIN.

“And now, after years of efforts, we have in the regions… formal and non-formal schools. A student would find at least one informal school in every kebele [an administrative unit under the district].”

The ABEC programme has helped at least a quarter of a million rural Ethiopians living beyond the reach of the formal education system to access basic schooling, according to a statement [ http://transition.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_may12/FL_may12_ETH_EDU.html ] by the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

But the alternative education ends at the fourth grade, and in some areas, children must walk two hours to the formal school to continue learning, notes USAID. “Not surprisingly, some still drop out, mainly for poverty-related reasons, including the families’ need for their children’s labour or their inability to pay for room and board near the schools.”

Pastoralists’ seasonal migration also means that, “learning spaces are closed, which results in [the] closure of more Alternative Basic Education Centres,” notes UNICEF.

‘Migrating’ education

In response to the pastoralists’ movements, education officials are seeking ways to ensure learning continues.

“In the pastoralist regions, people there often move either by choice or [are] forced due to conflicts or drought,” said Mohammed of the education ministry. “In such situations, we use mobile schools, which are really doing well. The teachers and education materials are made to move with the pastoralist[s], so the kids will continue to learn.”

“Also, we have recently started networking the schools so when kids leave one area, we alert schools in the areas they [are migrating to] so that they can take them in,” he added.

Jointly with the UN World Food Programme (WFP), the education ministry is also running a school feeding system programme that is helping to attract pupils to schools.

UNICEF is also trucking water to drought-affected areas. “If kebeles are benefitting from water trucking, schools will not be closed since the communities are getting water,” notes UNICEF.

Despite the challenges, some success has been seen in educating children in pastoral regions, Mohammed told IRIN, adding that the Afar and Somali regions had gross enrolment rates of 75 and 83 percent, respectively.

“We have been doing well…but there are still many problems we need to solve. Our wish is that not a single child drops out permanently. Unfortunately, we are not there yet.”

kt/aw/rz

 ]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97662/Keeping-pastoralist-children-in-school-in-Ethiopia</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201111181336170109t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ADDIS ABABA 15 March 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of children in the pastoral regions of Ethiopia are dropping out of school despite government and donor efforts to bring schools closer to them. Recurrent natural disasters such as drought and flooding, as well as inter-ethnic clashes, are major factors in school dropouts.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Imprisoned Eritreans complain of being forced to leave Israel</title><pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/2007081431t.jpg" />]]>TEL AVIV 11 March 2013 (IRIN) - Testimonies of jailed Eritrean migrants and asylum seekers (collected by a local NGO) say officials at Saharonim prison in Israel’s Southern Negev desert are coercing them to sign “voluntary repatriation” forms.</description><body><![CDATA[TEL AVIV 11 March 2013 (IRIN) - Testimonies of jailed Eritrean migrants and asylum seekers (collected by a local NGO) say officials at Saharonim prison in Israel’s Southern Negev desert are coercing them to sign “voluntary repatriation” forms.

In one of the many testimonies a 28-year-old Eritrean detainee reported being repeatedly visited by a translator telling her to accept deportation to a third country (Uganda).

“He said we would not be free from the prison and we can only go to Uganda or Eritrea. I was frustrated and depressed. I do not want to go to Uganda. Today they called me and gave me a handwritten form in Tigrinya which said: `I came from Eritrea to Israel illegally and now I want to go to Uganda voluntarily. To do this I would like the Eritrean embassy to issue me a passport and all the necessary documents.’ They asked me to sign it and wanted to take my picture on video. I refused.”

Israel is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention but does not recognize Eritreans as refugees, although it does not officially deport Eritreans and allows them to stay in Israel under a group defence (temporary group protection).

Staff at the Hotline for Migrant Workers [ http://www.hotline.org.il/en_drupal/english/about.htm ], who collected the testimonies, say the government is forcibly trying to repatriate Eritreans: “These people have no access to a refugee status determination process, they are detained under the new amendment to the infiltration law that came into effect in June 2012, which allows detention of `infiltrators’ for an unlimited amount of time; now they are told they will never be allowed to leave the prison and their only option is to go back to Uganda/Eritrea. How can this be considered voluntary?” one staff member told IRIN.

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) representative in Israel, William Tall, told IRIN the Ministry of Interior made an attempt to offer relocation to some 23 Eritreans to Uganda but without any result so far.

At the end of February he told Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz there was nothing voluntary about this process [ http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/un-refugee-official-slams-israel-over-eritrean-repatriation.premium-1.505563 ].

One Eritrean, Tesfamihret Habtemariam, was reportedly deported from Israel earlier this month and is now in detention at Cairo airport after five years in Israel, and may be returned to Eritrea.

UNHCR advises against repatriating Eritrean nationals because of the likelihood of their being punished on return to their country.

Israel’s stance

Under an updated Anti-Infiltration law passed in January 2012, all illegal border crossers are labelled “infiltrators” and can be detained for up to three years.

The Eritreans being held in detention camps in the south are generally not notified about their right to claim asylum or given the application forms needed to do this, report NGOs.

On 18 February, official documents from the Israeli assembly, the Knesset, quote Interior Minister Eli Yishai saying deportations (by definition forced) were not yet taking place.

He said more than a 1,000 nationals of northern Sudan and Eritrea had already left voluntarily and said he hoped a lot more would decide to leave.

“And if it won't be voluntary leave, it will be involuntary - to their country or to a different third country, and there is still no third country to sign an agreement with, but I hope we do find other third countries that we'll have an agreement with, and we can transfer the infiltrators from here, from the Land of Israel, to their country or to another country, whether it is done willingly or not.”

Last week the Israel’s Attorney-General Yehuda Weinstein sent a letter widely reported in the local press to the director of the Interior Ministry’s Population, Immigration and Border Authority, Amnon Ben Ami, saying that under no circumstances should Eritrean nationals in Israeli custody be sent “to any destination outside Israel’s borders” until he (Weinstein) further clarifies these legal issues.

td/jj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97623/Imprisoned-Eritreans-complain-of-being-forced-to-leave-Israel</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/2007081431t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">TEL AVIV 11 March 2013 (IRIN) - Testimonies of jailed Eritrean migrants and asylum seekers (collected by a local NGO) say officials at Saharonim prison in Israel’s Southern Negev desert are coercing them to sign “voluntary repatriation” forms.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Egypt&apos;s turmoil makes life tougher for refugees</title><pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2005112116t.jpg" />]]>CAIRO 28 February 2013 (IRIN) - Osman Sheshy*, a 26-year-old refugee from Eritrea living in the Egyptian capital, remembers fondly the day three months ago when a wealthy Egyptian man asked him to clean his villa for 50 Egyptian pounds (US$7.3).</description><body><![CDATA[CAIRO 28 February 2013 (IRIN) - Osman Sheshy*, a 26-year-old refugee from Eritrea living in the Egyptian capital, remembers fondly the day three months ago when a wealthy Egyptian man asked him to clean his villa for 50 Egyptian pounds (US$7.3).

He has not worked since, though not for want of trying: He spends his days knocking on the doors of houses, firms, factories and workshops to beg for work.

“I urgently need work to feed my family, but this work has become impossible to find here,” the father of two told IRIN. “We stick to buying the basics, but these basics become harder to get each day.”

The political turmoil and deep economic crisis [ http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2013/0225/Egypt-s-economy-is-collapsing-and-no-one-is-stopping-it ] in Egypt, which has been hit by a slump in tourism, low investment and rising food prices, is hurting the country’s most vulnerable communities [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97118/Egypt-s-poor-hit-hardest-as-political-tensions-persist ].

Monthly inflation in January was up 1.7 percent according to the Central Bank of Egypt [ http://www.cbe.org.eg/NR/rdonlyres/C4D84EEF-2169-47C7-AAAD-A94BDCFBE868/1726/Monthly_Inflation_January2013.pdf ]. The current annual inflation rate is 6.3 percent.

African refugee rights’ groups say refugees and migrants are frequently the victims of unprovoked arrests [ http://www.efrr-eg.com/1en.html ] and disappearances, while also struggling to feed themselves and pay rent. 

“Life in Egypt for refugees has moved from bad to worse after the revolution,” said Aly Mahmud, a Sudanese refugee and the founder of the Makarem African Society, an NGO that tries to help refugees find jobs.

“As Egypt's economy shrinks, the refugees find it more difficult to earn a living or even lead a dignified life.”

As of January 2013, the number of African refugees officially registered in Egypt was 35,180, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

African refugees and economic migrants generally live in Cairo's toughest neighbourhoods, sharing dirty toilets and stinking alleyways with Egypt’s poorest citizens.

“The refugees have been affected in the same way that Egyptians have been affected,” Elizabeth Tan, deputy regional representative of UNHCR, told IRIN. “Refugees often complain about an increase in crime and the increase in the cost of living.” 

No money

Abdullah Hanzal, director of refugee NGO Sudan Centre for Contemporary Studies, said research they had conducted in January found that most African refugees in Egypt had lost their jobs since the revolution. 

“Refugees who sell on the streets said they had to stay on the streets longer to sell their wares,” Hanzal said. “And when these refugees sell everything, the money is not nearly enough to buy food for their families.”

Aly Mahmud, the founder of the Makarem African Society, has three friends who could not pay 200 Egyptian pounds (US$29) to rent a shared room in the poor Giza Governorate neighbourhood of Ard Al Liwa and were kicked out as a result.

“They spend the nights at coffee shops and the days in public gardens,” Mahmud said. “My three friends are single, but the situation is even more difficult for refugee families that fail to pay the rent.”

Local aid groups are also feeling the pinch, said Tareg Nour, executive director of Tadamon, an NGO that works to promote the welfare of marginalized refugees. “Funding no longer comes, because donors do not want to give money to organizations in countries where there is all this turmoil.”

UNHCR says applications for financial support from refugees increased substantially after the revolution. UNHCR is able to give financial support to only 25 percent of the 35,180 African refugees.

“Unfortunately, UNHCR's budget has not increased to take into consideration the increase in the cost of living,” Tan said. “But the office will be supporting grassroots and community-based initiatives in order to enhance self-reliance and income generation efforts to be implemented by the refugees.”

Organ theft risk

Hanzel says African refugees and economic migrants are prone to the most brutal forms of exploitation, including organ theft.

“A marked increase - spearheaded by traders who exploit Egypt's bad security conditions - in organ theft cases has happened after the revolution,” said Bashir Suleiman, a reporter for Coalition for Organ Failure Solutions [ http://cofs.org/home/ ] (COFS), an international NGO that identifies survivors of organ trafficking and tries to provide long-term support.

“Most refugees are deceived by organ trafficking gangs who hang out among refugees,” he told IRIN. 

Tan said UNHCR is aware of reports of organ trafficking in Egypt and has been in dialogue with the government. “The refugees are particularly vulnerable to this kind of exploitation,” she said. 

“Unfortunately, a large number of the refugees who come to us were subject to organ theft, even without knowing it,” Suleiman said. “Refugee kidneys, tissues, uteruses, ovaries and other organs are high on the list of stolen organs.”

*not his real name

ae/jj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97562/Egypt-apos-s-turmoil-makes-life-tougher-for-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2005112116t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">CAIRO 28 February 2013 (IRIN) - Osman Sheshy*, a 26-year-old refugee from Eritrea living in the Egyptian capital, remembers fondly the day three months ago when a wealthy Egyptian man asked him to clean his villa for 50 Egyptian pounds (US$7.3).</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Somali government to relocate IDPs, welcome returning refugees</title><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202281303480107t.jpg" />]]>MOGADISHU/NAIROBI 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - The Somali government plans to relocate thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently living in Mogadishu to camps on the outskirts of the city, but there are concerns over inadequate government capacity as well as security and access to services in the proposed relocation areas.</description><body><![CDATA[MOGADISHU/NAIROBI 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - The Somali government plans to relocate thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently living in Mogadishu to camps on the outskirts of the city, but there are concerns over inadequate government capacity as well as security and access to services in the proposed relocation areas.

There are an estimated 369,000 IDPs or people living like IDPs in Mogadishu, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Of these, about 270,000 could be relocated to three camps on the outskirts of the capital, helping to decongest the city, according to Mohamed Ahmed Nur Tarsan, Mogadishu’s mayor.

“Honestly, no mayor in the world would tolerate IDPs form[ing] shanty shelters in the capital city. This issue touches [on] the security of the city and remains a threat to the sanitation of the city,” Tarsan said, adding that there are no security problems on the outskirts of Mogadishu.

“I am not saying that we should put these people in faraway isolated places, but what I am saying is that we should get better places for them since these people are currently living in appalling conditions.”

IDPs in Mogadishu live in difficult conditions [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96686/SOMALIA-Mogadishu-IDPs-suffer-extortion-eviction ], under threat of extortion and eviction. Providing aid to them has also been difficult in the past due to security constraints.

But in reaction to the relocation plan, IDPs expressed concerns about security and the availability of basic services.

“If we are provided with security and health services, we will obey the government plans. But if we do not feel safe, we will just wait [for] our God here,” Abdullahu Olow Dhere, an IDP in Mogadishu’s Darwish camp, located next to Somalia's parliament, told IRIN.

Another concern is the distance of the proposed relocation sites from livelihood opportunities.

Voluntary relocation key

Some of the IDPs may be unwilling to relocate from Mogadishu or to return to their original homes. Somalia has a relatively youthful population, meaning that, for some, Mogadishu is the only home they have known. “Those who may be unwilling to return to their previous locations should be relocated to camps on the outskirts of Mogadishu,” said Tarsan.

IDPs in Mogadishu grapple with insecurity, including rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, raising concerns that violence will be a problem in the proposed new locations as well. “If we just simply resettle people from one location to another, I don’t think we should expect any improvement in the security [or] protection of those people, especially the single-female [headed] households. Unless we put in place the conditions for success, success is not assured at all,” Justin Brady, the head of the OCHA office in Somalia, told Radio Ergo in a recent interview.

But according to Tarsan, “Rapists will be killed, as the President said, and we anticipate Mogadishu to [have] zero rape within the coming three months.”

He added, “We are providing security as well as the land, and it is the responsibility of aid organizations to provide services like health and water.”

Aid agencies are getting ready.

“What we are looking at is how the government plan can be assisted by the partners… to make this as ethical and humane a resettlement - and voluntary, that being the key part for the IDPs - going forward,” Brady told Radio Ergo.

“We need to review exactly what is required… It is not simply a shelter issue or a protection issue, but all of the service providers across the spectrum of clusters [ http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination ] need to be involved.”

According to Brady, the Somali government hopes much of the relocation will happen this year. “The government’s plan has a very ambitious timeline. They wish to see a good portion of it done by the 20th of August, which is obviously a very symbolic date in Somalia. We will be engaging with them to see… the key points where effort needs to be put in to ensure that the conditions are right for resettlement.”

On 20 August 2012, the mandate of Somalia's transitional government ended, paving way for a new parliament and the subsequent presidential election, the first in more than two decades. The successful election led to growing optimism about the future of Somalia, prompting thousands of people to return to Mogadishu [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95886/SOMALIA-Return-to-Mogadishu ].

Refugees returning

Some refugees are also returning from the Dadaab refugee complex [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95456/KENYA-SOMALIA-Life-on-the-margins-of-Dadaab ] in northeastern Kenya, which is home to close to half a million refugees.

The returns have been, in part, driven by growing pressure by the Kenyan government on Somali refugees to return to Somalia [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96116/KENYA-SOMALIA-Repatriating-Dadaab-refugees-unrealistic ].

“Almost 20,000 Somali refugees have voluntarily left Kenya since repatriation calls started,” states Hasty Repatriation: Kenya’s attempt to send Somali refugees home [ http://heritageinstitute.org/images/Hasty%20Repatriation%20Report.pdf ], a recent report by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, a Somali-based think-tank.

“Vacancy rates of houses and apartments in Eastleigh [a heavily Somali district in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi] have rocketed and, subsequently, rent rates have plummeted… Schools in the area have reported considerably reduced student numbers.”

Speaking at the launch of the report, the Somalia ambassador to Kenya, Mohamed Ali Nur,  said that while the Somali government is willing to welcome back the refugees, “and we want them to come back to help in rebuilding the country, we want the refugees to go back in a coordinated manner.”

According to the report, the Somali government is not prepared to accommodate the almost 600,000 Somali refugees living mainly in Kenya and Ethiopia. Still, “the Somali government is devising an ambitious plan to establish large camps inside Somalia, near the Kenyan border. It hopes to move hundreds of thousands of refugees to the new camps before the end of 2013. Not only is the implementation of this plan unrealistic, but it could also expose vulnerable refugees to dangerous conditions.”

The report’s author, Anab Nur, said, “To send such a large number of refugees back at this time, I think, will be destabilizing. They are already dealing with an IDP issue.”

The report recommends that Kenya and Somalia work closely through their Joint Cooperation Committee to find a satisfactory solution, and for the Somali government to “capitalize on recent security gains by establishing state institutions that can absorb the influx of refugees”.

“Key to this,” it states, “is addressing the emotive issue of land in Somalia. Unresolved land disputes will likely lead to a re-eruption of violence in southern Somalia. An orderly, well-timed return of refugees would, however, solidify recent gains made and lay the foundations for a stable Somalia.”

amd-aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97552/Somali-government-to-relocate-IDPs-welcome-returning-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202281303480107t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MOGADISHU/NAIROBI 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - The Somali government plans to relocate thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently living in Mogadishu to camps on the outskirts of the city, but there are concerns over inadequate government capacity as well as security and access to services in the proposed relocation areas.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>African migrants pay high prices to send money home</title><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data [ http://sendmoneyafrica.worldbank.org/ ] from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world. 

While South Asians pay an average of US$6 for every $100 they send home, Africans often pay more than twice that - and in South Africa, which has the highest remittance costs on the continent, nearly 21 percent of money set aside for family members back home is spent on getting it there.

With an estimated 120 million Africans depending on remittances from family members abroad for their survival, health and education, the World Bank argues that high transaction costs are cutting into the impact remittances can have on poverty levels. 

To address this, the Bank is partnering with the African Union Commission and member states to establish the African Institute for Remittances [ http://sendmoneyafrica.worldbank.org/african-institute-remittances-air-project ], which will work towards lowering the transaction costs of remittances to and within Africa. It will also leverage the potential of remittances to influence economic and social development. 

“The World Bank’s approach supports regulatory and policy reforms that promote transparency and market competition and the creation of an enabling environment that promotes innovative payment and remittance products,” said Marco Nicoli, a finance analyst at the Bank who specializes in remittances.

Costly and difficult

Owen Maromo, a 33-year-old farmworker who lives in De Doorns, a grape-growing region in South Africa’s Western Cape Province, told IRIN that his family in Zimbabwe relies on the money he sends home every month. 

“I’ve got a house there and I need to pay rent. I’m also taking care of my youngest brother - since my mum died four years ago - and my wife’s family.

“Almost every Zimbabwean here is budgeting to send money back home,” he added. “If they could, they would send money home on a weekly basis.”

In a 2012 report by the Cape Town-based NGO People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP), interviews with 350 Zimbabwean migrants revealed some of the reasons sending money home from South Africa is both costly and difficult [ http://www.passop.co.za/news/featured/press-statement ].

A key impediment is the stringent regulatory framework that governs cross-border transfers from South Africa. Exchange control legislation, for example, requires money transfer operators (MTOs) to partner with a bank. According to PASSOP, this has had the effect of stifling competition that would likely reduce transaction costs.  

Legislation intending to counter money laundering and terrorist financing requires that customers provide proof of residence and proof of the source of their funds before they can access financial services. This effectively excludes the many migrants living in informal settlements and those who are paid in cash. 

PASSOP found that even among migrants who do have access to banks and MTOs like Western Union and MoneyGram, many lack the financial literacy to make use of them. 

“Some have just come from rural areas in Zimbabwe, so it takes time for them to know about such things,” said Maromo, adding that lack of documentation was another major obstacle. “If you’re undocumented, you can’t go through the banks.”

Three-quarters of the Zimbabwean migrants interviewed by PASSOP relied instead on “informal” remittance channels, such as giving money or goods to bus drivers, friends or agents to send home. This is often not much cheaper than using banks or MTOs, and it is significantly riskier. Of the respondents who used such methods, 84 percent reported negative experiences, including theft of their money, loss or destruction of their goods and long delays in remittances reaching intended recipients. 

Maromo relayed his own experience sending money home through an agent who charged a 15 percent commission to channel the money through his South African bank account before handing it over to Maromo’s relatives in Zimbabwe. “Some time ago, I nearly lost 2,000 rand ($225) because I deposited it in [the agent’s] account and he was saying he didn’t have it and giving excuses. In the end, we got the money, but it cost us nearly 1,000 rand ($113) in airtime calling Zimbabwe,” he said.

“Some are using bus drivers or those people who are going home, and you have to trust them because you’re desperate, but there can be a lot of problems,” he added. “There are a lot of people whose money just disappears. Almost on a daily basis, you hear those stories.”

Lowering transaction fees

Now, Maromo uses a UK-based online transfer service called Mukuru.com, which is popular with many Zimbabweans living overseas. The proof of residence and source of funds requirements are the same as for traditional MTOs, but the site charges 10 percent on transfers from South Africa to Zimbabwe - less than most banks. 

The South African Reserve Bank and the treasury have committed to bringing the cost of remittances down to 5 percent by relaxing regulations for smaller money transfers, negotiating with regulators in the Southern African Development Community on exchange control regulations, and removing the requirement that MTOs partner with banks.

However, at the time of writing, the Reserve Bank has not yet responded to questions from IRIN about how these changes will be implemented and within what timeframe.

Rob Burrell, director of Mukuru.com, said achieving the 5 percent target would be tough considering the numerous costs that MTOs have to cover, including fees paid to the companies that collect and pay out the money, the cost of supporting transactions through a call centre, and licensing and reporting requirements. “We would need everyone pulling together,” he said.

Burrell noted that less stringent laws governing MTOs in the UK mean more competition but much weaker anti-money laundering controls. To operate in South Africa, Mukuru.com has to comply with the regulation that they partner with a local banking license holder.

“In the UK, it’s easier to obtain your license. There are 4,000 [MTOs operating in the UK] compared to 12 in South Africa, but the downside is that it’s very difficult to police them all,” he told IRIN. “My last audit in the UK was four years ago because they can’t handle the volume of licenses.”

ks/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97557/African-migrants-pay-high-prices-to-send-money-home</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Girl child soldiers face new battles in civilian life</title><pubDate>Tue, 12 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201009271253370112t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 12 February 2013 (IRIN) - Girl child soldiers are often thought of only as “sex slaves”, a term that glosses over the complex roles many play within armed groups and in some national armies. This thinking contributes to their subsequent invisibility in the demobilization processes - in fact, girls are frequently the most challenging child soldiers to rehabilitate.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 12 February 2013 (IRIN) - Girl child soldiers are often thought of only as “sex slaves”, a term that glosses over the complex roles many play within armed groups and in some national armies. This thinking contributes to their subsequent invisibility in the demobilization processes - in fact, girls are frequently the most challenging child soldiers to rehabilitate. 

The broad categorization of girl soldiers as victims of sexual abuse obscures the fact that they are often highly valued militarily. While sexual abuse is believed to be widespread, girls’ vulnerability may vary, as attitudes toward women differ extensively across militias: In Colombia, the Marxist-leaning groups the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) treated female soldiers as equal to males, while right-wing paramilitary groups were known to embrace gender stereotypes. 

Some have argued that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR) are ill-equipped to address the needs of girls. DDR was designed for adult male combatants, and over the years has incorporated female combatants, followed by boy soldiers and then girls. 

A January 2013 World Bank briefing, Children in Emergency and Crisis Situations, says: “The use of girls [by armed forces] has been confirmed in Colombia, DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo], East Timor, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda and West Africa. There are some 12,500 in DRC. However, girls are generally less visible and up to now have hardly benefited from demobilization and reintegration programmes for child soldiers.” 

“No one knows what has happened after a DDR process to the large majority of girls associated with the armed groups,” the briefing said. 

About 40 percent of the hundreds of thousands of child soldiers scattered across the world’s conflicts today are thought to be girls, but the numbers of girls enrolling in child soldier DDR programmes dwindles to five percent or less. 

Girls often conceal their association with armed groups, Richard Clarke, director of Child Soldiers International [ http://www.child-soldiers.org ], told IRIN. In traditional societies, enrolling in DDR could confirm a past that imperils their future: “In contexts of entrenched gender discrimination, and in situations where a girl’s ‘value’ is defined in terms of her purity and marriageability, the stigma attached to involvement in sexual activity, whether real or imputed, can result in exclusion and acute impoverishment,” he said. 

Seeking gender equality 

Then there is the uncomfortable reality that some conflicts may actually fast-track gender emancipation. 

A 2012 report [ http://uit.no/Content/307291/Post_War_Processes_Report_Final.pdf ] by Tone Bleie of the University of Tromsø’s Centre for Peace Studies (CPS) explores this issue. During Nepal’s civil war, when Maoists conscripted “one member per house”, some parents offered their daughters to spare “sons whom they considered as their life insurance.” Of the Maoists’ 23,610 combatants at the cessation of hostilities, 5,033 were believed to be female, and of them 988 were girls. 

“Female combatants developed a new sense of pride and dignity due to personal sacrifices, military courage, feats in the battlefield and prospects of promotion in the ranks,” the report says. 

In the wake of Nepal’s 2006 ceasefire, during the cantonment of Maoists rebels and the subsequent reintegration process, girls and women were returned “to [the] very low position of women in traditional Nepalese feudal society,” Desmond Molloy, a panellist at the International Research Group on Reintegration at the CPS, told IRIN. 

“Inter-cast marriage, and marriage in general, was encouraged in the cantonment. This is taboo in Nepali society and proved a major obstacle for reintegration of young girls back into society, especially when they have children, as many do. Further there is in [Nepal’s] society a perception of a promiscuous environment in the cantonment. So many young girls were viewed with suspicion by their families, rejected by their new in-laws or ostracized by the community,” Molloy said. 

Abdul Hameed Omar, programme manager for the UN Development Programme’s Interagency Rehabilitation Programme, told IRIN that acceptance of inter-cast marriages was particularly problematic. “Children have been denied birth certificates, and women have been denied their citizenship certificates. When the community knows that a woman has been part of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army], these women sometimes face a stigma,” he said. 

He said attitudes of male Maoist ex-combatants “vary widely” but that “many voiced opinions that were not in line with their previous [gender equality] beliefs during the conflict. Other male ex-combatants who played traditionally female roles during the conflict, i.e., cooking or childcare, no longer feel that these are appropriate roles for men outside of the PLA.” 

Loss of power 

Many Colombian girl soldiers, who fought as equals to their male counterparts, struggled with the double standards of civilian life. 

“For some girls, belonging to an illegal armed group gives them a sense of power and control that they may not otherwise experience living in a relatively conservative, ‘machista’ [chauvinist] society,” said Overcoming Lost Childhoods, a Care International report about rehabilitating Colombian child soldiers [ http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000760.pdf ].

By the end of Eritrea’s 30-year-long liberation war, in 1991, females comprised between 25 and 30 percent of combatants. The gender-equality ideals espoused by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s (EPLF) had proved an attractive lure for female recruits, including some who were teenagers or younger. 

But “many Eritrean female ex-fighters experienced the years of war as preferable to the time that came afterwards… They had felt respected, equal and empowered, but this was all lost after the war when women were pushed towards traditional gender roles,” said the 2008 report Young Female Fighters in African Wars, Conflict and Its Consequences [ http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=3543 ].

Eritrea’s DDR programmes initially tailored economic opportunities for women to traditional gender roles - basket weaving, typing and embroidery - but this did not provide a sustainable livelihood. Training women in traditionally male trades also proved fruitless because society’s norms ultimately dictated who could get which jobs. 

“Furthermore, female ex-fighters had a hard time getting married after the war as men usually claimed that these women had lost their femininity during the war. Many male ex-fighters also divorced their fighter wives for this reason and married civilian women,” the report said. 

Duality 

Girl soldiers’ versatility - they serve as combatants, spies, domestics, porters and “bush wives” - makes them highly valued among armed groups, which can also increase their difficulty reintegrating into civilian life. 

Despite this, punishments for girls in northern Uganda, such as whipping or caning, were meted out for the smallest infractions, Linda Dale, director of Children/Youth as Peacebuilders (CAP) [ http://www.childrenyouthaspeacebuilders.ca/About%20Us/contact.html ], told IRIN. 

“There is a strong tendency to force a kind of passivity on girls while at the same time they are expected to be combatants. This duality, as well as the effect of sexual violence, makes their rehabilitation more complicated, in my view,” she said. 

The length of captivity also differed between the sexes; average internment period for girls in northern Uganda was six to seven years, while boys faced about three years, Dale said. “Because of that, the effects of the experience, and therefore the need for more assistance in re-integration, will be higher. For example, many girl returnees are illiterate because they have been out of school so long.” 

Shelly Whitman, executive director of the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative [ http://www.childsoldiers.org/ ], told IRIN that some girls can be seen as suffering from Stockholm syndrome, where captives develop a sympathetic association with their abusers. 

“Girls were raped but then given to or chosen by a commander to be a ‘wife’. They are confused about their experiences, their guilt, their families’ expectations and religious beliefs. Additionally, many have children fathered by their captors. They are often rejected when they return home and viewed as non-marriageable material, damaged goods. With this kind of a homecoming, it creates confusion about your identity and your self-worth,” she said. 

Invisibility 

The assumptions and expectations of people operating DDR programmes may also affect girls’ reintegration. 

Girl soldiers are often assumed to be “‘following along’, rather than girls who have been recruited and used, however informally, for military purposes… These assumptions have resulted in tens of thousands of girls being literally ‘invisible’ to DDR programmers, although the situation has improved somewhat in recent years,” said Clarke of Child Soldiers International. 

Phillip Lancaster, former head of the DDR programme for the UN Organization Mission in DRC, told IRIN, “Boys with guns are easier to see and easier to fear.” DDR programmes might “ignore girls on the assumption that they don't present the same threat.” 

“My own experience is that girls are often invisible to DDR programmes that draw narrow categories around the notion of combat,” he said. “It's tricky to avoid getting caught up in categories as soon as one starts trying to define parameters of qualification for DDR programmes, and most of the decisions tend to have a somewhat arbitrary flavour simply because of the complexity of the subject matter. 

“Most of the Congolese armed groups… draw on local community resources… The definition of girl child soldier in this setting could, in theory, extend over all the young females in a community who were supporting, supplying, informing or directly fighting with a relevant armed group.” 

go/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97463/Analysis-Girl-child-soldiers-face-new-battles-in-civilian-life</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201009271253370112t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 12 February 2013 (IRIN) - Girl child soldiers are often thought of only as “sex slaves”, a term that glosses over the complex roles many play within armed groups and in some national armies. This thinking contributes to their subsequent invisibility in the demobilization processes - in fact, girls are frequently the most challenging child soldiers to rehabilitate.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>