<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Guinea-Bissau</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 12:31:09 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>Hunger projects stalled in Guinea-Bissau</title><pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208141544380935t.jpg" />]]>BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.</description><body><![CDATA[BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.

The organization needs US$7 million immediately to cover its food security and nutrition programme targeting 278,000 people for 2013; and a further $8 million to extend the project through 2014. The project involves school-feeding, preventing moderate and acute malnutrition, and boosting rice production, and was supposed to start in February this year.

WFP head of programmes Fatimata Sow-Sidibé told IRIN the money is lacking because traditional donors suspended all development cooperation following the April 2012 coup.

“We have some promises [from donors],” said Sow-Sidibé, “but the programme was supposed to start in February and we have no resources to buy the food we need.”

Traditional donors more or less stopped all development funding in Guinea-Bissau following the 12 April 2012 coup d’état, leaving infrastructure projects and basic services at a standstill across the country, but humanitarian funding was supposedly untouched. LINK The problem for WFP is that their project spans development and emergency activities and thus is not just eligible for humanitarian funding.

The African Development Bank also suspended its funding for rural agricultural development projects, following the coup. The cuts “are having a direct impact on food security in Guinea-Bissau, where we already have severe cereal deficits due to inadequate local production,” said a civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture who preferred anonymity.

Food insecurity in Guinea-Bissau is driven mainly by an inability of people to access food because prices are beyond their reach. Most Bissau Guineans rely on imported rice as they grow mainly cash crops (cashews) and not grains.

Food prices have risen year on year since 2008 (imported rice is currently U$1.20 per kg), and the most recent countryside hunger assessment (2011) cited high prices as the biggest barrier for vulnerable households to access food.

The coup put off a planned countrywide food security assessment in 2012 but a rapid assessment in the regions of Biombo, Oio and Quinara in June 2012 revealed one in five people were food insecure (regions in the east were not included in the survey). Some 65 percent of households at the time had under one month’s supply of food stocks and more people were resigned to further indebtedness, selling animals and producing wine from the cashew fruit, to get by.

Cashew crisis

People’s ability to buy food has been severely hampered by a crisis in the cashew industry: 80-95 percent of Bissau-Guineans depend on cashew sales to purchase food as well as meet other household expenses. Terms of trade for cashews have been deteriorating since 2011: In a good year 1kg of rice can be roughly exchanged for 1kg of cashews; this shifted to 1.5kg of cashews to buy 1kg of rice in 2012, and to 2kgs of cashews for 1kg of rice in 2013, according to Ministry of Agriculture and WFP research. “Everything here is linked to cashews,” said Sow-Sidibé.

The poor terms of trade are linked to a poor 2012 cashew crop, and plummeting cashew prices following the coup (from 80 US cents per kg in May 2012 to 50 US cents one month later), and also linked to low fixed prices on international markets.

Cashew farmers are further stymied by exorbitant petrol prices (US$1.50 per litre) which makes it increasingly expensive for them to get their crop to market.

Ongoing projects

WFP continues to run food assistance programmes where it can. In two districts in Gabu, eastern Guinea-Bissau (Mancadndje Dara, Madina Madinga), and in two districts of Bafata (Djabicunda and Sare Biro), the organization helps villagers improve their farming techniques to boost rice production, including giving them improved seeds and helping them rent animals to get their crops to market. It also helps villagers grow market gardens to improve their food diversity and boost household income.

Mutaro Indjai, head of the village committee of rice producers in Saucunda village in Gabu, told IRIN: “This project helped us improve our production to last through four months, whereas before we only produced enough for one month.”

If the project comes to an end, they will continue to use improved techniques of production, but they would lack the seeds needed to plant next year. “We won’t have access to improved seeds, nor to the animals we need to speed up planting and to help us transport our harvest to nearby villages,” he told IRIN.

Nutrition

Nutrition programmes have also been affected. WFP pushes food diversity, given that feeding practices are a key component of high chronic malnutrition levels in Guinea-Bissau.

The organization tries to push a more varied diet (than the starch-dominated fare given to most infants) including fish soup, peas, carrots, tomatoes, and millet-based cereal. They also support local NGOs to make regular visits to health centres and villages on vaccination days to talk about how to prepare nutrient-rich meals for infants made out of corn flour, peanut powder, bean powder, oil and sugar, among others. Programmes target children in their first 1,000 days of life.

Some 17 percent of children under-five are underweight, and 27 percent are stunted due to inadequate nutrition, according to a December 2012 UNICEF-Ministry of Health nutrition survey.

Hunger specialists fear chronic malnutrition levels will rise if prevention is not stepped up.

UNICEF supports the Ministry of Health to set up nutrition treatment centres; provides therapeutic food for severely malnourished children; and helped update the government’s strategy to manage acute malnutrition, in February 2013. “Lack of funding, very few partners in nutrition, and limited human resources trained in nutrition” are the major challenges facing UNICEF, said Victor Suhfube Ngongalah, head of child survival there. UNICEF needs US$750,000 to implement its projects in 2013 and 2014.

Guinea Bissau is ranked 176 out of 187 countries assessed in the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report. Political instability has also marred development. Since 1994 no elected president in Guinea-Bissau has finished his mandate.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98004/Hunger-projects-stalled-in-Guinea-Bissau</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208141544380935t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>African migrants pay high prices to send money home</title><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data [ http://sendmoneyafrica.worldbank.org/ ] from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world. 

While South Asians pay an average of US$6 for every $100 they send home, Africans often pay more than twice that - and in South Africa, which has the highest remittance costs on the continent, nearly 21 percent of money set aside for family members back home is spent on getting it there.

With an estimated 120 million Africans depending on remittances from family members abroad for their survival, health and education, the World Bank argues that high transaction costs are cutting into the impact remittances can have on poverty levels. 

To address this, the Bank is partnering with the African Union Commission and member states to establish the African Institute for Remittances [ http://sendmoneyafrica.worldbank.org/african-institute-remittances-air-project ], which will work towards lowering the transaction costs of remittances to and within Africa. It will also leverage the potential of remittances to influence economic and social development. 

“The World Bank’s approach supports regulatory and policy reforms that promote transparency and market competition and the creation of an enabling environment that promotes innovative payment and remittance products,” said Marco Nicoli, a finance analyst at the Bank who specializes in remittances.

Costly and difficult

Owen Maromo, a 33-year-old farmworker who lives in De Doorns, a grape-growing region in South Africa’s Western Cape Province, told IRIN that his family in Zimbabwe relies on the money he sends home every month. 

“I’ve got a house there and I need to pay rent. I’m also taking care of my youngest brother - since my mum died four years ago - and my wife’s family.

“Almost every Zimbabwean here is budgeting to send money back home,” he added. “If they could, they would send money home on a weekly basis.”

In a 2012 report by the Cape Town-based NGO People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP), interviews with 350 Zimbabwean migrants revealed some of the reasons sending money home from South Africa is both costly and difficult [ http://www.passop.co.za/news/featured/press-statement ].

A key impediment is the stringent regulatory framework that governs cross-border transfers from South Africa. Exchange control legislation, for example, requires money transfer operators (MTOs) to partner with a bank. According to PASSOP, this has had the effect of stifling competition that would likely reduce transaction costs.  

Legislation intending to counter money laundering and terrorist financing requires that customers provide proof of residence and proof of the source of their funds before they can access financial services. This effectively excludes the many migrants living in informal settlements and those who are paid in cash. 

PASSOP found that even among migrants who do have access to banks and MTOs like Western Union and MoneyGram, many lack the financial literacy to make use of them. 

“Some have just come from rural areas in Zimbabwe, so it takes time for them to know about such things,” said Maromo, adding that lack of documentation was another major obstacle. “If you’re undocumented, you can’t go through the banks.”

Three-quarters of the Zimbabwean migrants interviewed by PASSOP relied instead on “informal” remittance channels, such as giving money or goods to bus drivers, friends or agents to send home. This is often not much cheaper than using banks or MTOs, and it is significantly riskier. Of the respondents who used such methods, 84 percent reported negative experiences, including theft of their money, loss or destruction of their goods and long delays in remittances reaching intended recipients. 

Maromo relayed his own experience sending money home through an agent who charged a 15 percent commission to channel the money through his South African bank account before handing it over to Maromo’s relatives in Zimbabwe. “Some time ago, I nearly lost 2,000 rand ($225) because I deposited it in [the agent’s] account and he was saying he didn’t have it and giving excuses. In the end, we got the money, but it cost us nearly 1,000 rand ($113) in airtime calling Zimbabwe,” he said.

“Some are using bus drivers or those people who are going home, and you have to trust them because you’re desperate, but there can be a lot of problems,” he added. “There are a lot of people whose money just disappears. Almost on a daily basis, you hear those stories.”

Lowering transaction fees

Now, Maromo uses a UK-based online transfer service called Mukuru.com, which is popular with many Zimbabweans living overseas. The proof of residence and source of funds requirements are the same as for traditional MTOs, but the site charges 10 percent on transfers from South Africa to Zimbabwe - less than most banks. 

The South African Reserve Bank and the treasury have committed to bringing the cost of remittances down to 5 percent by relaxing regulations for smaller money transfers, negotiating with regulators in the Southern African Development Community on exchange control regulations, and removing the requirement that MTOs partner with banks.

However, at the time of writing, the Reserve Bank has not yet responded to questions from IRIN about how these changes will be implemented and within what timeframe.

Rob Burrell, director of Mukuru.com, said achieving the 5 percent target would be tough considering the numerous costs that MTOs have to cover, including fees paid to the companies that collect and pay out the money, the cost of supporting transactions through a call centre, and licensing and reporting requirements. “We would need everyone pulling together,” he said.

Burrell noted that less stringent laws governing MTOs in the UK mean more competition but much weaker anti-money laundering controls. To operate in South Africa, Mukuru.com has to comply with the regulation that they partner with a local banking license holder.

“In the UK, it’s easier to obtain your license. There are 4,000 [MTOs operating in the UK] compared to 12 in South Africa, but the downside is that it’s very difficult to police them all,” he told IRIN. “My last audit in the UK was four years ago because they can’t handle the volume of licenses.”

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97557/African-migrants-pay-high-prices-to-send-money-home</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Mali a “wake-up call” for drug trafficking, says think tank</title><pubDate>Tue, 05 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201210101110200256t.jpg" />]]>ACCRA 05 February 2013 (IRIN) - At the launch of a Ghana-based Commission on the Impact of Drug-Trafficking on Governance, Security and Development in West Africa, its chair, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, said the situation in Mali should serve as a “wake-up call” to the perils of allowing organized crime to escalate out of control.</description><body><![CDATA[ACCRA 05 February 2013 (IRIN) - At the launch of a Ghana-based Commission on the Impact of Drug-Trafficking on Governance, Security and Development in West Africa, its chair, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, said the situation in Mali should serve as a “wake-up call” to the perils of allowing organized crime to escalate out of control.

He described the country’s north as a “den of drug trafficking, extremism and criminality”.

Several research groups have reported that traffickers have linked up with extremist groups in the Sahel region, who use the profits to purchase weapons and fund radical activities. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has partially funded its activities in northern Mali over the past decade through profits from drug and cigarette trafficking and hostage ransoms, according to a 2012 report by the African Center for Strategic Studies [ http://africacenter.org/acss-publications/security-briefs/ ].

Analysts estimate around 60 tons of cocaine are trafficked through West Africa each year, while the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates 400kg of heroin was trafficked through the region in 2011. The trade [ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/February/executive-director_-west-africa-challenged-by-rapidly-evolving-transnational-threats.html ] brings in an estimated US$900 million per year to criminal networks, says UNODC.

Some 15 percent of the cigarettes smoked in the region are bought on the black market and trafficked through West Africa, according to UNODC. AQIM and to some extent splinter-group Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) have been taxing traffickers in return for safeguarding their passage.

“Organized criminal networks are deeply involved in the trafficking. Experience elsewhere in the world suggests that these groups will try to infiltrate political, security and financial institutions to secure their profits,” former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the audience at the launch of the Commission in Ghana’s capital last week.

Over the last decade many West African states have made gains to consolidate peace and economic growth: the region is set to provide the US with 25 percent of its oil needs in 2015 - but drug-trafficking threatens this progress, said Annan.

Most of the cocaine is transported from South America to Europe, using air and sea routes; while opiates tend to come from Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Drugs are also increasingly being manufactured in the region. The police recently discovered methamphetamine laboratories [ http://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/ATS_West_Africa_final_2012.pdf ] in Nigeria, according to UNODC. 

Growing drug dependency

There are now as many as 2.3 million cocaine users in West and Central Africa, and methamphetamine and heroin use are on the rise, UNODC reported in 2012. “The evidence points to a growing problem of dependency that needs urgent attention in our region,” Obasanjo said.

Annan pointed out: “West Africa initially was seen as a transit point but no country remains a transit point for long. The population begins to use it.”

The 10-member Commission intends to raise awareness of the impact of the drug trade, advise political leaders, and develop policy recommendations to help leaders deal with drug-trafficking.

West Africa is an ideal environment for drug traffickers with its extensive porous borders, weak and easily corruptible institutions, and pre-existing criminal networks. In these poor nations it is easy to buy off low-paid and disenchanted officials and security personnel: “The police are bribed. Now, in a fairly poor African country, US$100 to a police constable is a lot of money. All he has to do is turn his eyes,” said Obasanjo.

He added that criminal networks can easily smuggle goods through the region, buying off officials and security personnel at borders, as they move through remote regions of the Sahel and the Sahara desert.

Fluid networks

Criminal trafficking networks are international and very mobile, which makes it difficult to crack down on them, says the UNODC. Local and foreign criminal networks with access to massive resources work together to transport drugs through the region, adapting their operations in response to law enforcement efforts, according to an April 2012 joint report [ http://kofiannanfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Final%20Report%20of%20WADW%208%20Juin%202012.pdf ] by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Center on International Cooperation, the Kofi Annan Foundation and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. 

“West African organized criminal networks operate cells worldwide to facilitate the supply of goods, with Diaspora communities playing important roles (e.g. Nigerian Diaspora in Brazil). Like criminal groups elsewhere, they infiltrate or threaten political elites and dispirited public servants to protect and expand their business,” the report said.

As the myriad abandoned construction sites in many West African states make clear, traffickers also extensively operate fronts to launder their profits, creating “shell companies” in the construction and mining sectors, as well as rental car companies.

The government and security forces of Guinea-Bissau have already largely been taken over by drug trafficking networks, earning it the moniker of “narco-state.” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/80865/GUINEA-Drug-trade-potentially-more-dangerous-than-Guinea-Bissau ]

AQIM members reportedly met Colombian drug lords in Guinea-Bissau, according to a 2010 report [ http://www.sahel-intelligence.com/2417-article145.html ] by France-based research group Sahel Intelligence. While the trade allegedly continues to flourish in Guinea-Bissau, networks have also gradually moved along the coast and inland through the Sahel, Annan said. “We didn’t act early enough when the problem started in Guinea-Bissau. That was the entry point and it’s now spread along the coast - and through the Sahel to Europe and by ship and by plane,” Annan told reporters. Other initiatives are way to try to quell the impact of drug-trafficking in the region, including an ECOWAS plan to address the challenges of trafficking.  

UNODC recently teamed up with the World Customs Organization to improve communications between police and airports.

The Commission will deliver a report and submit policy recommendations to regional leaders by the end of 2013.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97412/Mali-a-wake-up-call-for-drug-trafficking-says-think-tank</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201210101110200256t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ACCRA 05 February 2013 (IRIN) - At the launch of a Ghana-based Commission on the Impact of Drug-Trafficking on Governance, Security and Development in West Africa, its chair, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, said the situation in Mali should serve as a “wake-up call” to the perils of allowing organized crime to escalate out of control.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In Brief: Staples, not export crops, key to tackling Africa’s poverty – report</title><pubDate>Fri, 18 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202241255060114t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 18 January 2013 (IRIN) - Africa could reduce its poverty levels faster by focusing more on the production of staples rather than export crops, according to a study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 18 January 2013 (IRIN) - Africa could reduce its poverty levels faster by focusing more on the production of staples rather than export crops, according to a study [ http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ib73.pdf ] by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

Authors of the study, conducted in 10 countries south of the Sahara, noted, “One important finding is that producing more staple crops, such as maize, pulses and roots, and more livestock products tends to reduce poverty further than producing more export crops such as coffee or cut flowers.”

According to the study, while more public resources would be required to generate more agricultural growth, “such public investment in staple sectors is probably cost effective”.

The authors argued that growth in the staple sector was more likely to benefit the poor than growth in the agricultural export sector.

Enoch Mwani, an agricultural economist at the University of Nairobi, concurred. “The agricultural export sector is generally associated with large corporations, but the poor rely predominantly on staples to survive.”

Mwani added that growth in staples had the effect of not only reducing poverty but also ensuring food security.

“[Governments that] invest in staples have the opportunity to increase food availability and, at the same time, create wealth for smallholders,” Mwani told IRIN.

To spur development in sub-Saharan Africa, the study’s policy conclusions call for a focus on accelerating agricultural growth; promoting growth in large agricultural subsectors; supporting growth across several agricultural subsectors; and promoting growth in subsectors with strong linkages to the overall economy and the poor.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97278/In-Brief-Staples-not-export-crops-key-to-tackling-Africa-s-poverty-report</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202241255060114t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 18 January 2013 (IRIN) - Africa could reduce its poverty levels faster by focusing more on the production of staples rather than export crops, according to a study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>GUINEA-BISSAU: HIV/AIDS fight hit by Global Fund cuts</title><pubDate>Wed, 12 Dec 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201106271348450544t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR/BISSAU 12 December 2012 (IRIN) - One year after the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, reduced funding to the Guinea-Bissau government body in charge of coordinating HIV prevention and treatment activities, health centres outside the capital are facing medicine shortages, patients are not receiving the treatment they need, and the transport of patients to treatment centres has been cut.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR/BISSAU 12 December 2012 (IRIN) - One year after the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, reduced funding to the Guinea-Bissau government body in charge of coordinating HIV prevention and treatment activities, health centres outside the capital are facing medicine shortages, patients are not receiving the treatment they need, and the transport of patients to treatment centres has been cut.

Patients, support groups and health workers fear the fight against HIV is being hampered.

The Global Fund stopped most of its funding to the Secretriado National de Luta Contra le Sida (SNLS), the government structure in charge of coordinating the HIV response, at the end of 2011, because of poor performance management and a lack of transparent fiduciary controls.

The Fund’s decision to withdraw was strengthened in April 2012 following a coup d’état [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95340/Analysis-Latest-coup-another-setback-for-Guinea-Bissau ] which meant the body charged with programme verification could not carry out its work because of security concerns.

The UN Security Council ceased to recognize the post-coup transitional authorities following the putsch.

The Global Fund continued to supply basic medicines and testing through their Voluntary Pooled Procurement facility, the official procurement body of the Global Fund, which buys and delivers medicines for countries unable to do so themselves, said David Té, director of care at SNLS.

But SNLS, which is in charge of transporting medicines to clinics and hospitals across the country and overseeing medicine storage and stock-taking, has had no money to pay staff salaries for one year, and lacks finances for transport or even electricity.

Only 16 percent of HIV-positive children and 39 percent of HIV-positive men who were eligible for antiretroviral treatment were receiving it at the end of March 2012, according to Alison Jenkins, HIV/AIDS specialist at the UN Children’s Fund, (UNICEF) in Guinea-Bissau.

“The essential medicines for HIV/AIDS that have been arriving are the procurement for 2012. Receiving them late is putting the system at risk,” she told IRIN.

Medicine shortages

Pedro Mandica, president of Rede Nacional das Associações de Pessoas Viventes com Sida - a local association funded by SNLS to transport medicines and patients to treatment centres, told IRIN: “We’re starting to face medicine shortages. Everyone is affected as we can’t even redistribute medicines from regional centres that do have enough, because of lack of transportation.”

In Cumura hospital, 13km from Bissau in Biombo Region, an important HIV treatment centre, the number of new cases has increased since the beginning of 2012, according to Valeria Amato, in charge of hospital administration.

However, 73 percent of HIV positive women in need have still received treatment, largely due to the expansion of the National Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) programme whereby every woman receiving pre-natal care is HIV tested and if infected, put through an antiretroviral treatment programme, according to Jenkins.

Elisabeth Cabral, 30, was hospitalized in Cumura from May 2011 to 2012 and told IRIN she continues to receive free treatment, though she cannot afford the medicines for opportunistic infections.

Lack of money has also hampered patients’ ability to access services and the food assistance they used to receive during treatment. “More patients are dropping-out,” said Mandica.

“Before, especially in rural areas, we used to go to fetch them. But we do not have money to transport them any more,” he told IRIN.

Some 40 percent of patients used to receive food as they were too poor or too weak to feed themselves, but this has also come to a halt, said Té.

Under SNLS management, medicine stocks were not being monitored and medicines were not being correctly distributed based on the number of patients in need in each region, according to health professionals, meaning distribution systems had basically broken down, leading to gaps in provincial health centres.

“To have drugs available when and where they are needed, you need to strengthen national procurement and supply management systems and ideally have a buffer stock of six months,” Jenkins told IRIN.

Ongoing negotiations

Some 5.3 percent of adults aged 15-49 are estimated to have HIV/AIDS in Guinea-Bissau, with women three times more likely to be infected than men, according to a 2010 national seroprevalence study, giving it one of the highest rates in Western and Central Africa, according to Jenkins.

Currently 5,000 patients are registered across 37 health clinics and hospitals in Guinea-Bissau to receive antiretroviral therapy, according to Aneximandro Zilene, director of prevention at the Guinea-Bissau Secretariat to Fight HIV/AIDS.

The Fund told IRIN in a written statement that it is “working with partners in the country to find alternative arrangements for program implementation”. It hopes to resume grant activities, financing essential prevention, treatment and care, once a sound fiduciary agent has been named.

Negotiations between SNLS and the Global Fund are ongoing, but do not appear to be bearing fruit. “The Global Fund has betrayed the SNLS,” João José Silva Monteiro, the SNLS coordinator, told reporters on 4 December.

“The Global Fund should not penalize HIV infected persons,” said Mandica. “While the people responsible for the problem of mismanagement are living well with no worries in their life, the patients pick up the pieces.”

The Global Fund recognizes its moral obligation. “The Global Fund is confident that it is possible to provide help in Guinea Bissau and considers that it is a moral obligation to make every effort to continue providing health services for the people,” the statement said.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97029/GUINEA-BISSAU-HIV-AIDS-fight-hit-by-Global-Fund-cuts</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201106271348450544t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR/BISSAU 12 December 2012 (IRIN) - One year after the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, reduced funding to the Guinea-Bissau government body in charge of coordinating HIV prevention and treatment activities, health centres outside the capital are facing medicine shortages, patients are not receiving the treatment they need, and the transport of patients to treatment centres has been cut.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>IDPs: African IDP Convention comes into force</title><pubDate>Thu, 06 Dec 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200807227t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 06 December 2012 (IRIN) - The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 2009, also known as the Kampala Convention, came into force on 6 December; it is the world’s first legally binding instrument to cater specifically to people displaced within their own countries.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 06 December 2012 (IRIN) - The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 2009, also known as the Kampala Convention, came into force on 6 December; it is the world’s first legally binding instrument to cater specifically to people displaced within their own countries.

Adopted at an AU summit in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, the Convention [ http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2009/october/pa/summit/doc/Convention%20on%20IDPs%20(Eng)%20-%20Final.doc ] required ratification by 15 member countries before it could enter into force; Swaziland became the 15th country to do so on 12 November, joining Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. At least 37 AU members have also signed [ http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/979113CFF0292E97C1257ACB006315D4/$file/map-au-signed-ratified-countries-with-numbers.pdf ] the Convention but have yet to ratify it.

Among other things, the Convention aims to "establish a legal framework for preventing internal displacement, and protecting and assisting internally displaced persons in Africa".

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres hailed the development as "historic" and said in a statement that the Convention "puts Africa in a leading position when it comes to having a legal framework for protecting and helping the internally displaced".

Stephen Oola, a transitional justice and governance analyst at Uganda's Makerere University Refugee Law Project, noted that the most important parts of the Convention were the clauses relating to the prevention of internal displacement. "The principle requiring the prevention of IDPs is absolutely necessary and should be the guiding principle for all state and non-state actors implementing the Convention," he said.

Just the beginning

Oola also stressed the need for the letter of the law to be translated into practice.

"In Uganda, we have had an IDP policy since 2004, but in many cases we find that the government still seems ill-prepared to deal with displacement," he said. "The existence of a law is rarely the conclusion of a policy... It will be important for this continental commitment to be matched by action on the ground for people who, for one reason or another, find themselves displaced," he said.

Africa has 9.7 million IDPs, according to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan collectively have more than five million IDPs.

Noting that the situation of IDPs can affect the stability of states, UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Chakola Beyani said the Convention could "contribute to stabilizing displaced populations through the specific obligations it sets out to states and other actors, such as obligations relating to humanitarian assistance, compensation and assistance in finding lasting solutions to displacement as well as accessing the full range of their human rights".

"The unique 'added value' of this Convention stems from how comprehensive it is and the manner in which it addresses many of the key challenges of our times and, indeed, of Africa," he said in a statement. "If implemented well, it can help states and the African Union address both current and potential future internal displacement related not only to conflict, but also natural disasters and other effects of climate change, development, and even megatrends such as population growth and rapid urbanization."

The International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) [ http://www.internal-displacement.org/kampala-convention ] noted that, while the Convention signalled an important step in addressing the plight of IDPs, many countries were not legally bound by it.

"The countries which have not yet adopted the Convention must do so, as a legal framework is the very basis of ensuring the rights and well-being of people forced to flee inside their home country," Sebastian Albuja, head of IDMC's Africa department, said in a statement.

According to Nuur Sheekh, board member of the Kenya-based Internal Displacement Policy and Advocacy Centre [ http://www.idpacafrica.org/ ], some states expressed reservations about signing the Convention because "the issue of displacement is highly politicized, and some states saw it as a criticism of their human rights and governance records". He noted, however, that the Convention would have an influence, even on those countries that have not signed or ratified it.

"The AU will now also be able to use the Convention for advocacy, to encourage member states - even those who have not ratified it - to implement its principles... Kenya, for instance has not signed it but has developed an IDP policy that borrows heavily from the Kampala Convention," he told IRIN. "States now need to domesticate the Convention and develop IDP policies that reach from the central government to all lower levels of government so that the Convention can work in practice."

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96984/IDPs-African-IDP-Convention-comes-into-force</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/200807227t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 06 December 2012 (IRIN) - The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 2009, also known as the Kampala Convention, came into force on 6 December; it is the world’s first legally binding instrument to cater specifically to people displaced within their own countries.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>HEALTH: Breaking out of the cold chain</title><pubDate>Tue, 20 Nov 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904201848030218t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 20 November 2012 (IRIN) - Health workers currently immunizing thousands of children and young adults against Meningitis A in Benin are currently doing so without having to spend days preparing ice packs and sourcing generators and fridges to load on trucks because the vaccine has now won approval for being kept at up to 40 degrees Celsius for as long as four days.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 20 November 2012 (IRIN) - Health workers currently immunizing thousands of children and young adults against Meningitis A in Benin are currently doing so without having to spend days preparing ice packs and sourcing generators and fridges to load on trucks because the vaccine has now won approval for being kept at up to 40 degrees Celsius for as long as four days.

Before, like almost all vaccines, the Meningitis A vaccine (marketed in Africa as MenAfricVac) was only licensed for use if kept at temperatures of 2-8 degrees Celsius.

The breakthrough follows years of rigorous testing of the effect of heat on the vaccine by the regulator Drugs Controller General of India, Health Canada [ http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/index-eng.php ], and the World Health Organization (WHO) Vaccines pre-qualification programme [ http://apps.who.int/prequal/ ].

As a result, very remote populations will access the vaccine more easily, the logistics of vaccine campaigns will be simpler, and vaccine campaign costs will drop both for partners and for national governments, said Michel Zaffran, coordinator of WHO’s Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) [ http://www.who.int/immunization_delivery/en/ ], and Marie-Pierre Preziosi, director of the meningitis Vaccine Project, a partnership between international NGO PATH [ http://www.path.org/ ] and WHO.

Costs will not drop significantly immediately, but will diminish as more vaccines are relicensed, says WHO. Cost implication studies are under way in northern Benin and Chad. 

While cold chain limitations do not tend to limit coverage, they do overburden health workers, says WHO. 

Even industrialized country vaccine campaigns have trouble sticking to the cold chain, and each year thousands of vaccines are thrown away due to cold chain failure, even if the vaccine might still have been unaffected, according to WHO. 

“This is a breakthrough,” said Zaffran. “It is the first vaccination ever to be licensed for use in a developing country with the flexibility to take us out of the rigid temperature structure. It is a great simplification of logistics. And it opens the door for other manufacturers to follow suit.”

Why so long?

But the vaccine is nothing new - merely the license has changed following analysis of years of data on the vaccine’s stability - that is, how well it can withstand temperature rises and other conditions.

“The potential for some vaccines to remain safely outside the cold chain for short periods of time has been widely known for over 20 years,” said Zaffran in a recent communiqué. “But this is the first time a vaccine intended for use in Africa has been tested and submitted to regulatory review and approved for this type of use.”

It took decades to get here because agencies got stuck in a mindset, said Zaffran. The EPI was set up in the 1970s to immunize as many children against diseases as quickly as possible, and put in place simple rigid rules to avoid risk: one of which was to keep vaccines cold. “It was quite difficult to move away from this mentality,” said Zaffran.

Regulators and manufacturers are “very conservative in order to protect the population,” said Preziosi. “It took a while for all the documentation to be gathered to convince them to go ahead.” 

Strict controls remain: “This is not a “green light to do anything with a vaccine - it still needs to be kept… at no more than 40 degrees, for any more than four days," stressed Zaffran.

Hepatitis B next?

“The momentum is there. I am quite confident that within the next year or two, we’ll have one or two more re-licensed in this way,” he said.

Analysis on the heat stability of Hepatitis B and HPV [ http://www.cdc.gov/hpv/whatishpv.html ] (human papillomavirus) vaccines is under way; next on the list are yellow fever, rotavirus and pneumococcal disease. 

Even the oral polio vaccine - one of the most heat-sensitive vaccines - was shown to be stable when the cold chain broke down in a part of Chad, according to a recent study though WHO was emphatic that rather than licensing the vaccine it will gradually be phased out as progress towards eradication inches along. 

Meningitis progress

The MenAfricVac, which costs just under 50 US cents per dose, was designed for use in the 26 countries that span the African meningitis belt, from Senegal to Ethiopia. 

Some 100 million people aged 1-29 across 10 countries have been vaccinated thus far; a further 16 countries are planned between now and 2016. 

Early results have been very positive: Burkina Faso [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/92985/WEST-AFRICA-Meningitis-cases-dramatically-down ] has had the lowest level of epidemic meningitis in 15 years, and the campaign is achieving “herd immunity” - that is, those either too old or too young to have received the vaccine have also been shown to be clear of the bacteria. 

Meningitis A could be eliminated in the meningitis belt if the mass campaign continues, says Preziosi, and if governments then incorporate it in their routine immunization programmes. 

But more funding beyond the US$160 million from the GAVI Alliance [ http://www.gavialliance.org/ ], and contributions from national governments, will be needed to complete the campaign, she warns. 

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96827/HEALTH-Breaking-out-of-the-cold-chain</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904201848030218t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 20 November 2012 (IRIN) - Health workers currently immunizing thousands of children and young adults against Meningitis A in Benin are currently doing so without having to spend days preparing ice packs and sourcing generators and fridges to load on trucks because the vaccine has now won approval for being kept at up to 40 degrees Celsius for as long as four days.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>GUINEA-BISSAU: Cholera on the rise</title><pubDate>Wed, 14 Nov 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201211131326420939t.jpg" />]]>BISSAU 14 November 2012 (IRIN) - As cholera case rates decline in Guinea and Sierra Leone, they are on the rise in Guinea-Bissau, with 1,500 cases reported and nine deaths as of 11 November, according to the Ministry of Health.</description><body><![CDATA[BISSAU 14 November 2012 (IRIN) - As cholera case rates decline in Guinea and Sierra Leone [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96379/GUINEA-SIERRA-LEONE-Cholera-outbreak-easing ], they are on the rise in Guinea-Bissau, with 1,500 cases reported and nine deaths as of 11 November, according to the Ministry of Health. 

Adelino Gomes, a doctor in charge of cholera treatment at the Simão Mendes national hospital in the capital Bissau, says he has treated 500 cases in recent weeks and believes the epidemic may not yet have reached its peak. 

Guinea-Bissau’s low-lying capital with its minimal to non-existent water and sanitation facilities makes it an ideal breeding ground for cholera.

François Bellet, a water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) specialist with the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in West Africa, says the strain was probably passed on from fishermen [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95837/WEST-AFRICA-Cholera-what-s-working ] in Sierra Leone and Guinea, though this has not yet been confirmed. 

The outbreak has spread across seven of Guinea-Bissau’s nine administrative areas, according to the Ministry of Health. 

Simão Mendes is short on medicines to help victims, said Gomes, adding that Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is helping to treat patients. UNICEF and the World Health Organization are also supporting treatment, as well as helping detect cases and giving public hygiene messages to prevent the spread.

The government spends 6 percent of its budget on water and sanitation, according to the Finance Ministry. WASH facilities are “catastrophic” said one aid worker, but prevention at the household level has improved incrementally since 2009, said Bellet.

A 2008 cholera epidemic [ http://www.epicentre.msf.org/qui-sommes-nous ] in Guinea-Bissau affected 14,222 people and killed 225, according to MSF research wing Epicentre.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96772/GUINEA-BISSAU-Cholera-on-the-rise</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201211131326420939t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BISSAU 14 November 2012 (IRIN) - As cholera case rates decline in Guinea and Sierra Leone, they are on the rise in Guinea-Bissau, with 1,500 cases reported and nine deaths as of 11 November, according to the Ministry of Health.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>GUINEA-BISSAU: Fear amid human rights abuses</title><pubDate>Fri, 09 Nov 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005071410150842t.jpg" />]]>BISSAU 09 November 2012 (IRIN) - A 21 October attack in Guinea-Bissau - when soldiers stormed barracks near Bissau&apos;s main airport, targeting military figures and leaving six people dead - has provoked more fear than the numerous coups and counter-coups of recent years.</description><body><![CDATA[BISSAU 09 November 2012 (IRIN) - A 21 October attack in Guinea-Bissau - when soldiers stormed barracks near Bissau's main airport, targeting military figures and leaving six people dead - has provoked more fear than the numerous coups and counter-coups of recent years.

The transitional government branded the attack a coup attempt, and accused former colonial power Portugal of backing it in an attempt to propel former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior, who is in exile there, back into power. Within days, alleged coup leader Captain Pansau N'Tchama was arrested on the island of Bolama, in the Bijagos archipelago. He is expected to face a military court later in the year.

Although Guinea-Bissau's history is littered with coups, counter-coups and attempted coups, most ordinary Bissau-Guineans have not been involved or directly affected.

However, October's attack has ramped up tensions, largely because it took place during a dedicated transition period [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95483/Analysis-Division-and-stasis-in-Guinea-Bissau ] backed by regional bloc the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and designed to lead Guinea-Bissau towards fresh elections in April 2013.

The attack also raised fears of rising human rights abuses: Two politicians, Yancuba Djola Indjai and Silvestre Alves, were badly beaten by soldiers the day after the coup attempt and a Portuguese journalist was expelled from the country.

On 6 November Luis Ocante da Silva, who was an ally of the ex-army head José Zamora Induta, was abducted from his home by a group of uniformed men, and was today reported to have died from his wounds. 

"The last time I saw this level of fear among activists and commentators was in the build-up to the civil war in the late 1990s," a former diplomat told IRIN on condition of anonymity. "People are really afraid to talk in public about politics or even initiatives," he said. "It has also raised tensions between ethnicities as so many difficult questions rear their heads regarding Bissau's future."

Some Bissau-Guineans say they had been expecting an attack. "If it wasn't last month, it might have been this month," said Alfonso Gomes Vieira, who works as an upholsterer in Bissau. "The transitional period is seen as a cover-up... How could we gloss over all of Guinea-Bissau's problems and pretend things are fine?

Since the April coup several sources say drug trafficking has mounted in Guinea-Bissau. Two planes full of cocaine have allegedly landed on the mainland over the past two weeks: in Gabu, southeast of the capital Bissau on 5 November, and in Catio, southwestern Bissau, the week before. 

Ongoing crisis

"This is another sad episode in Guinea-Bissau's ongoing crisis," said Lorenso, an administrative officer at a radio station in Bissau who gave his first name only. "The path to new elections has been littered. I didn't expect things to run smoothly, but there is an underlying sense that things are getting worse, that this was not an isolated incident… Maybe we'll never be free from this insecurity."

In January, President Malam Bacai Sanha, who was elected in 2009, died of illness in a Paris hospital. His death created a void that was set to be filled during elections scheduled for March and April 2012. But between the first and second rounds, soldiers staged a coup, [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95340/Analysis-Latest-coup-another-setback-for-Guinea-Bissau ] ousting acting President Raimundo Pereira and his prime minister Carlos Gomes Junior, the frontrunner in the second round of the vote.

The coup came as security sector reforms were under way, approved by parliament, backed by the European Union (EU) and the UN, and designed to revamp the armed forces, initiate pension plans for military members of retirement age, and create a force that would work in cooperation with civilian leaders.

Reforms stalled

"Security sector reform is a difficult task," a member of the UN team charged with instigating reforms, told IRIN on condition of anonymity. "There are dozens of army members who are 70 years old or upwards, some of whom are in their nineties. They don't want to change. Their tensions with the government date back to the independence war against Portugal in some cases, and they aren't about to be resolved just because we tell them it's a good idea."

Although the EU has withdrawn programmes and financial backing from Guinea-Bissau in the wake of April's coup, the UN-backed security sector reform programme is ongoing. But those involved say it may as well have ground to a halt.

"We had high hopes," a UN trainer told IRIN in November. "But we're working with people who don't want to change. No matter how strong the reasons for change, it has to come from them and we are seeing a lot of resistance. They do not want to cooperate with whoever is in charge at a civilian level; they want the civilian leaders to cooperate with them.”

Trust levels low

October's events were a setback for human rights in Guinea-Bissau, say rights groups. Several arrests have been made since N'Tchama was caught in late October. At least two journalists have gone into hiding, and - as yet unfounded - rumours of assassinations are circulating.

"Having human rights is one thing, but applying them is something else entirely, Fernando Texeira, coordinator of human rights group Casa dos Direitos in Bissau, told IRIN.

"We're working on outreach projects to inform people that they have human rights, but what kind of rights do they really have right now? We have to ask ourselves whether the future will bring true justice and liberty to Bissau,” said Texeira.

The Casa dos Direitos building, which was once Bissau's main jail, includes a room that is equipped with seats and a projector for talks and debates, he said. "We planned to invite people to come and speak about human rights and politics, but people are afraid… Nobody feels comfortable discussing their political views with people they don't know or trust at the moment."

“Guinea-Bissau is in a state of siege. That’s why people don’t dare speak out,” said Néné da Costa, a housekeeper in Bissau. 

"When I first heard about the transitional government's mandate, I thought, this seems like lending someone a smart jacket to wear for a while. You become warm on the surface, but underneath the same health problems are there," said law student Justino Nhaga. "We need real solutions, not ones that simply look and sound good," he added.
 
Guinea Bissau ranks 176 out of 187 countries on the UN human development index; [ http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/GNB.html ] just over half of the adult population is literate; life expectancy at birth is 48 years.

After months of on-off striking by teachers, schools remain closed despite an agreement having been signed between teachers and the transition government.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96741/GUINEA-BISSAU-Fear-amid-human-rights-abuses</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005071410150842t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BISSAU 09 November 2012 (IRIN) - A 21 October attack in Guinea-Bissau - when soldiers stormed barracks near Bissau&apos;s main airport, targeting military figures and leaving six people dead - has provoked more fear than the numerous coups and counter-coups of recent years.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>GUINEA-BISSAU: Falling cashew exports raise hardship</title><pubDate>Wed, 15 Aug 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201105231003570064t.jpg" />]]>BISSAU 15 August 2012 (IRIN) - Cashew nut farmers and traders in Guinea Bissau have been left holding tonnes of produce after India slashed imports, and the low prices being offered are increasing hardship in the coup-prone West African country.</description><body><![CDATA[BISSAU 15 August 2012 (IRIN) - Cashew nut farmers and traders in Guinea Bissau have been left holding tonnes of produce after India slashed imports, and the low prices being offered are increasing hardship in the coup-prone West African country.

“All of us - the farmers association, cashew nut producers and other operators - are trying to find a solution to this cashew nut export crisis,” said Mama Samba Embalo, the head of the Guinea-Bissau Farmers Association. “If we sell the cashew nuts at low prices, traders will not have the money to repay their bank loans.”

India, the top importer, has increased its domestic production. By July this year, exports reached 60,000 tonnes of cashew nuts compared to more than 100,000 tonnes by the same time in 2011, he said.

The proposed benchmark price of 250 CFA per kilogramme was not respected and prices fell as low as 100 CFA (around 20 US cents). Some 120,000 tonnes of cashew nuts are still stockpiled and awaiting buyers, said trade director Diamantino Cô.

The April 12 coup that overthrew interim Prime Minister and presidential candidate Carols Gomes Jr, and interim President Raimundo Pereira also disrupted cashew trade, increasing insecurity and making buyers reluctant to travel in the country.

The expected fall of world cashew prices due to the European debt crisis will also slow Guinea-Bissau’s economic performance in 2012, with inflation growing as a result of rising prices for imported goods, the African Development Bank (AfDB) said earlier this year. [ http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/guinea-bissau/ ]

Guinea-Bissau is the world’s fourth largest exporter of cashew nuts, which bring in more than $60 million a year. The sector employs over 80 percent of the 1.6 million people and plantations cover nearly half the country.

It is also one of the poorest nations in the world and is ranked at176 out of 187 countries in the 2011 Human Development Index. [ http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/GNB.html ]

The staple food is rice and although Guinea-Bissau produces 40,000 tonnes per year it has to import 80,000 tonnes more to meet domestic demand and is frequently hit by food insecurity. Food costs have already risen. The price of a kilogramme of prime beef steak has risen by 1,000 francs to 3,500 CFA (about $7) and that of rice has almost doubled to 400 CFA from 250 CFA. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88564/AFRICA-Rice-is-nice-but-not-for-long ]

Over the years, the benefit of cashews as a cash crop drew many farmers to convert their fields into cashew orchards and they now depend on the markets for food. Climate change, environmental degradation and an increase in the use of credit during the pre-harvest period are all contributing to a “downward spiral of food insecurity and indebtedness,” said Marina Temudo, an agronomist at the Portugal-based Tropical Research Institute (IICT).

“However, the worst food shortage will occur during next year’s dry season, after farmers have eaten up their harvests. Many cashew merchants have been unable to sell their cashews, so the future of the next purchasing campaign is compromised,” Temudo said.

Cashew farmers, who often buy rice on credit during the pre-harvest period, will have to do so at very high interest rates this time, as cashew prices will likely fall sharply, forcing them to sell part or all of their livestock at low prices, she pointed out.

The rising food costs are also affecting the poorly remunerated civil service, with some workers absconding from duty, taking up a second job, and tolerating corruption and other malpractices to make ends meet, said Heloyso da Cunha, a ministry of agriculture employee. Government workers are paid a minimum salary of 30,000 CFA (around $60) a month.

The World Bank and the AfDB suspended development operations in Guinea-Bissau after the coup in April. The AfDB put on hold the disbursement of some 6,000 euros for the final phase of the Rural Agriculture Rehabilitation Project (PRESAR) which supports improvement in the production of rice vegetables and livestock to enhance food security. [ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/GUINEABISEXTN/0,,menuPK:356675~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:356669,00.html ]

“This will affect food security in Guinea-Bissau, which already suffers chronic cereal shortages due to inadequate local production,” said Caoussou Diombéra, the PRESAR project director.

Guinea-Bissau has been plagued by coups, misrule and political instability. Since its independence from Portugal in 1974, none of its elected leaders has ever completed a full term in office. In the wake of yet another military take-over in April, key lenders have frozen funds.

The junta leaders have come under various sanctions, including travel bans and having their assets frozen. The UN Security Council and the Economic Community of West African States have imposed restrictions on the coup leaders, while the African Union suspended the country from the pan-African bloc.

The country is also a major hub for drug trafficking, especially cocaine smuggled from Latin America to Europe, and several top army officials are alleged to be involved. Last month, the UN Security Council voiced concern over reports of a rise in drug trafficking since the April coup. [ http://allafrica.com/stories/201207310840.html ]

Temudo said food insecurity and debt could easily make farmers more susceptible to political influence, and thus increase instability in the country. She suggested that aid groups change strategy and focus on buying seeds to help farmers diversify.

Farmers could also be helped purchase tractors and other farm implements on credit and later repaid with their cashew harvests.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96106/GUINEA-BISSAU-Falling-cashew-exports-raise-hardship</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201105231003570064t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BISSAU 15 August 2012 (IRIN) - Cashew nut farmers and traders in Guinea Bissau have been left holding tonnes of produce after India slashed imports, and the low prices being offered are increasing hardship in the coup-prone West African country.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SENEGAL: Demining faces slow-down</title><pubDate>Thu, 12 Jul 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100834330375t.jpg" />]]>ZIGUINCHOR 12 July 2012 (IRIN) - Removing the landmines from villages, farms and plantations of Casamance in southern Senegal has taken several years to get up to speed, but now demining teams may be forced to step down, hampering the country’s ability to reach its Ottawa Treaty goal of eliminating anti-personnel mines by 2016.</description><body><![CDATA[ZIGUINCHOR 12 July 2012 (IRIN) - Removing the landmines from villages, farms and plantations of Casamance in southern Senegal has taken several years to get up to speed, but now demining teams may be forced to step down, hampering the country’s ability to reach its Ottawa Treaty goal of eliminating anti-personnel mines by 2016.

Activities started slowly in 2008 and have picked up pace since then. Sixteen villages were re-opened In March 2011, and in mid-June 2012 six more were declared mine-free and ready for habitation.

But hundreds of villages and thousands of hectares of farmland are still mined -  Jean-François Lepetit, Casamance Head of Mission for NGO Handicap International (HI) estimates at least 90 percent of the total mined land is yet to be cleared, most of it in northern Casamance along the Gambian border.

HI supports the National Centre for Mine Action in Senegal (CNAMS) in the three regions of Casamance: Ziguinchor, Sedhiou and Kolda. HI does the demining while CNAMS oversees and coordinates related activities - mine-risk education, victim assistance, and advocating the abandonment of the use of landmines.

While CNAMS will continue in its oversight role, a new partner - a private South African firm - will take over the demining in terms of the initial contract between HI and its funders, which required two separate firms to do the work. Staff worry mining will slow down over the next year, given the new firm will need to find and train deminers and get to know the terrain and political context.

Mines are still being planted in Sindian, 100km north of the capital, Ziguinchor, where fighting continues between the rebel Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and the Senegalese military. Parts of the southern border with Guinea-Bissau also remain mined, said Lepetit. A 2006 Canadian-backed study indicated the presence of mines in the southern Kolda region, but demining has not even begun there, noted Anne-Sophie Trujillo, head of HI in Senegal.

In early July 2012 several MFDC rebels were reportedly killed and two Senegalese military were injured in a skirmish with Senegalese forces near the town of Emaye, 40km west of Ziguinchor, according to the Senegal army.

From hand to machine

Demining requires a steep learning curve, as each context is so different. HI, which has demined areas in Bosnia, Chad, Mozambique, Lebanon and now Libya, among other places, said it took two years to train local teams -  team leaders need 18 months of intensive training – and to properly understand the terrain.

In 2010 the organization discovered that their hand-held metal detectors could not detect a Belgian mine used in at least five locales and turned to mining by hand - a “painstakingly slow” process, said Trujillo. In 2011 they bought a US$440,000 “demining bulldozer,” which can cover 200 times as much ground in a day, does not require lengthy soil preparation, and is safer for the operator. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93932/SENEGAL-Demining-machine-clears-path-for-a-better-future ] “Now, when you look at cost-efficiency, it’s really working,” Trujillo said. “It is the very worst moment for us to leave [Casamance].”

Senegal is a signatory of the Ottawa Treaty - the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction - and has been given an extension until 2016 to eradicate landmines, with further funding from the European Union and others. [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottawa_Treaty ]

The European Union Senegal delegation head, Dominque Dellicour, sounded positive about reaching the 2016 deadline, while pushing the government to put forward its own funding at the village-opening ceremony in June, which was also attended by Foreign Minister Alioune Badara Cissé, and Head of the National Centre for Mine Action in Senegal (CNAMS), Papa Oumar Ndiaye, who called the occasion a “landmark” in mine action activities.

But Trujillo is not convinced. “With one team working at a time, demining will not finish by 2016,” she told IRIN. The director of CNAMS, the Senegalese government, peace-building NGOs such as SOS Casamance, and many residents want HI to stay, but “no one can find the money”, said Lepetit.

HI will still rehabilitate the land and villages even if others are doing the demining. “We have a duty to the people of Casamance… we have earned their confidence in this unstable region,” said Trujillo. HI will continue its peace building and development work in the area, giving psycho-social support to mine survivors and villagers, providing water and sanitation to schools and villages, mine education in schools, and supporting women affected by domestic violence, said Trujillo.

Parties to the conflict committed to stop using mines in the 2004 peace agreement, but have not adhered to this. MFDC rebels have largely supported demining in areas other than near their (mainly northern) bases.

“A new life is beginning"

Diédhiou Ibrahima, president of the rural community of Adéane, one of the newly cleared villages east of Ziguinchor, can finally go back to working his fields and his children will once again attend school. ''Here we are in a school and the area cleared is just metres from the school - access has been forbidden for years… This means so much to us.”

Diamé Fatou, a mother and resident of Gonoumé, told IRIN: “For years, we dared not fetch dead wood or pick fruit. Every year, hundreds of tons of fruit rot in the bush while we live in abject poverty. It's really as if a new life is beginning for us.'

Mines have seriously slowed down socio-economic development in the region, limiting access to farmland and cashew cultivation, and diminishing trade with neighbouring countries, Foreign Affairs Minister Cissé told the audience at the June ceremony. ''Anti-personnel mines are indiscriminately destructive weapons and can render permanent trauma among people whose daily lives risk physical danger,” he said.

Mines were first laid by MFDC rebels and the Senegalese army in 1990 as part of 30-year armed conflict that has kept parts of southern Senegal volatile. Since then, mines have killed more than 800 civilian and military people in Casamance, and displaced tens of thousands.

mad/aj/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95848/SENEGAL-Demining-faces-slow-down</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100834330375t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ZIGUINCHOR 12 July 2012 (IRIN) - Removing the landmines from villages, farms and plantations of Casamance in southern Senegal has taken several years to get up to speed, but now demining teams may be forced to step down, hampering the country’s ability to reach its Ottawa Treaty goal of eliminating anti-personnel mines by 2016.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>WEST AFRICA: Cholera - what&apos;s working?</title><pubDate>Tue, 10 Jul 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201009141728560425t.jpg" />]]>FREETOWN/DAKAR 10 July 2012 (IRIN) - After years of cyclical cholera outbreaks in West Africa, water and sanitation standards are still notoriously low in most of the affected countries, but in some areas the cholera response is working better now than in the past. IRIN spoke to governments and aid agencies about innovations and traditional wisdom for preventing cholera. </description><body><![CDATA[FREETOWN/DAKAR 10 July 2012 (IRIN) - After years of cyclical cholera outbreaks in West Africa, water and sanitation standards are still notoriously low in most of the affected countries, but in some areas the cholera response is working better now than in the past. IRIN spoke to governments and aid agencies about innovations and traditional wisdom for preventing cholera.

By the end of June 2012, cholera had killed nearly 200 people in West Africa and infected 10,330 according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Numbers are continuing to rise, particularly in the Sahel zone, where a recent upsurge has killed 60 people and infected 2,800. On 2 July 34 cases and two deaths - both children - were reported in northern Mali near Gao, on the edge of the Niger River.

Elsewhere in West Africa case numbers are rising, but are lower than this time in 2011, when 82,070 people had contracted cholera, or in 2010 when 60,000 West Africans in the Lake Chad Basin, which includes parts of Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon, were infected.

But West Africa is just at the start of its rainy season – cholera usually peaks between August and December.

Cholera is characterized by diarrhoea and vomiting, and can cause death within hours if it is particularly virulent, or hits weak victims like children.

The victims: children

Francois Bellet, the West Africa water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) programme specialist at UNICEF, worries that people who are hungry or malnourished as a result of the food crisis in the region are particularly vulnerable to infection. UNICEF is particularly concerned about the Sahel, where the spread of cholera is aggravated by a massive displacement of people fleeing the conflict in northern Mali.

In some areas - such as Niger’s regions along the Niger River - the Ministry of Health reports nearly three times as many cholera patients this year as in 2011.

An estimated 400,000 children in Niger are suffering from severe malnutrition this year. “A child below the age of five who has recovered from severe and acute malnutrition will be back for treatment in a matter of days or weeks if he or she is drinking contaminated water,” Guido Borghese, UNICEF’s advisor on Child Survival and Development, said in a communiqué.

The transmitters: fish

Cholera spreads along West Africa’s waterways - coastal regions, rivers and lakes - where busy fishing and trade routes run. The coast is “like a cholera highway”, said Bellet, as are major waterways such as the Niger River, which flows through Guinea, Mali, Niger, Benin and Nigeria.

The bacteria build up under the scales of fish and are often still there if the fish on sale in the markets have not been properly cleaned.

Given the role of women role in cleaning, descaling, smoking and selling fish in most of West Africa, it is they and their children who are particularly vulnerable to infection. Children make up some 80 percent of the cases in Sierra Leone’s Port Loko district, according to UNICEF.

The Guinea-Sierra Leone outbreak started on the island of Yeliboya in Sierra Leone’s Kambia district before spreading to islands off the coast of Guinea and into Forecariah prefecture. Islands in Boffa prefecture are known for their poor sanitation services and high levels of trade - perfect conditions for cholera to spread, said Bellet.

Vaccine: a new approach

The cyclical nature of cholera and the fact that immunity builds after large-scale epidemics are some of the reasons for this year’s lower caseload, said practitioners.

In Chad - which so far has zero cases this year compared to 5,000 in 2011 - widescale prevention efforts have paid off. And in Guinea the response has been much quicker and more coordinated this year.

In addition, a new approach has been tested in Guinea - notably a cholera vaccine used by Médecins Sans Frontières-Switzerland (MSF) for the first time in Africa to stem an epidemic.

The vaccine has had good results so far. In the Boffa and Forecariah prefectures of Guinea, where 77 percent of the population were given the double dose, and 95 percent received a single dose, there have been no cases reported since, said Iza Ciglenecki, innovation coordinator for diarrhoeal diseases at MSF-Switzerland. It is too early to know the full results, she said, but when used in other regions the vaccine has been 65-75 percent effective in stemming the spread of the disease.

This is potentially a huge step forward, but at US$3.70 for two doses the vaccine is expensive. The World Health Organization (WHO) and NGOs are discussing guidelines for when to use it in response to future epidemics. “If we multiply these interventions in the future, we could even create regional stocks to make it cheaper, but it is too early to say - we need to learn more first,” said Francois Verhoustraeten, Guinea programme officer at MSF-Switzerland. 

All responding agencies, including MSF, stressed that the vaccine is not a standalone solution and should be seen as a supplementary activity. “We put a lot of effort into all the strategies at once,” Ciglenecki told IRIN, referring to the need to raise awareness of public hygiene, targeting cholera hot spots, setting up early warning systems, and treating water. Agencies such as MSF, UNICEF and Action contre la faim (ACF) - Action against Hunger - an international NGO, have been implementing these measures for years in West Africa's cholera-prone areas.

Modern medical breakthroughs should not replace important basic hygiene practices: wash your hands after defecating, before cooking or eating, and try to disinfect water that may be dirty, say aid agency staff. Neither should they negate the usefulness of age-old techniques, said Bellet.

Speed

Guinea’s response has been quick this year. People have learned lessons from the 2007 and 2008 outbreaks, the latter of which took one and a half years to clear up, said Grant Laeity head of emergencies for UNICEF in West Africa.

The Sector Chief of Khounyia in Kaback Island, Forecariah, told UNICEF that this year’s cholera strain was particularly virulent (he has witnessed six outbreaks on the island). But the local health clinic managed the cases within a couple of hours, and the next day sent samples for confirmation to Conakry, the capital, 35km away. A full water and sanitation package was sent to the island four days later.

In late June Guinea reported 997 cholera infections and 41 deaths, with about 50 cases in Conakry.

Monitoring has also improved. Six surveillance posts have been set up in high-risk zones across the country to detect potential cases and respond to them immediately, said Beatriz Navarro Rubio, head of ACF in Guinea.

“In Guinea we saw good surveillance plus an early declaration by the authorities, leading to prompt action by all, which was encouraging,” said Laeity “If we could have what we had in Guinea across the region it would mean… when cholera broke out we could go and nip it in the bud.”

Coordination between the responding actors has been “very good” said Rubio. Inter-agency disaster simulation exercises had taken place shortly before the outbreak, so everyone was ready to step into gear when cholera hit.

Guinea’s Ministry of Health has taken a strong lead in bringing the Ministries of Education, and Energy and Water Resources on board to agree on simple countrywide messaging that is spread in schools and on local radio said Guarav Garg, a communications specialist at UNICEF in Sierra Leone. The messages have reached an estimated one million of Guinea’s six million people. “Coordination ebbs and flows, but they [the Health Ministry] are in control,” said Garg.

“Most of the cases have been addressed, which shows that the individual and collective prevention measures that we have taken are starting to work,” said Dr Hawa Touré, national director of the Ministry of Health.

Sierra Leone: slow

In Sierra Leone the response has been less efficient. UNICEF said some 2,742 cases have been reported since February, starting in Kambia and Port Loko in the north, then moving to Pujehun in the south.

A spike in the number of cases in Kambia town in late May “set off alarm bells”, said Garg, as it is just a 2.5 hour drive from the capital, Freetown. “Rains have come early and a lot of people live close to rivers and openly defecate - this is a bad combination,” he noted.

So much untreated sewage has been pumped into Sierra Leone’s rivers and coastal waters that much of the water itself is contaminated with the cholera bacteria, UNICEF said.

The Ministry of Health has tested and chlorinated water points since December 2011, but most people use private wells, so it is not known whether they have been chlorinated or not, Garg told IRIN.

Innovations in cholera prevention here include UNICEF’s community-led approach to improved sanitation - which has vastly improved public hygiene in parts of the six districts where it has been implemented, but Kambia is not among them. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/83127/SIERRA-LEONE-Communities-take-charge-one-latrine-at-a-time ]

Sierra Leone has two things in its favour, said Garg: improving WASH services is a strong pillar in the government’s upcoming poverty reduction strategy, and elections will be held in December. “The last thing you want is a cholera outbreak before the elections - they’re [the government] realizing you can keep on responding, or you can start to prevent,” he commented.

Priorities

As well as improving surveillance, better understanding the region’s cholera hot spots, and speedier government declarations of an outbreak, in a region with high volumes of cross-border trade and people-movement, coordinated prevention and response now needs to be a priority, say aid agencies.

In Côte d’Ivoire for instance, the current outbreak spread from Ghana; in 2011 cholera spread from Nigeria to Chad to Cameroon; cholera regularly passes between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.

The governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea should quell further cross-border spread by quarantining the disease and creating a “protective shield” in the forested area between the countries, says UNICEF. 

And all affected countries need to carry out cross-border simulation exercises – as recently took place in the Lake Chad Basin – so agencies understand their role as soon as an outbreak hits. 

aj/js/he

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95837/WEST-AFRICA-Cholera-what-apos-s-working</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201009141728560425t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">FREETOWN/DAKAR 10 July 2012 (IRIN) - After years of cyclical cholera outbreaks in West Africa, water and sanitation standards are still notoriously low in most of the affected countries, but in some areas the cholera response is working better now than in the past. IRIN spoke to governments and aid agencies about innovations and traditional wisdom for preventing cholera. </td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>AFRICA: Donor fatigue forces WFP to cut refugee rations</title><pubDate>Tue, 19 Jun 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201204161157350475t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 19 June 2012 (IRIN) - The UN World Food Programme (WFP) has halved food rations to refugees living in camps in at least four African countries citing a funding shortfall.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 19 June 2012 (IRIN) - The UN World Food Programme (WFP) has halved food rations to refugees living in camps in at least four African countries citing a funding shortfall.

The cuts have already affected 16,000 refugees in Malawi’s Dzaleka camp who have been on half rations since March, while a further 120,000 refugees in Uganda began receiving half rations of cereals in May. 

According to WFP, another 100,000 refugees in Tanzania saw their maize rations cut by 50 percent starting from last week, and rations for some 54,000 refugees living in Rwanda are expected to be cut in August unless donors come forward with more funding.

“Even the full ration wasn’t enough,” said Sanky Kabeya, a 24-year-old resident of Dzaleka who spoke to IRIN at the end of March. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95259/EDUCATION-Online-learning-inspires-refugees ] “I haven’t taken breakfast this morning and many are in the same situation.”

Gustave Lwaba, another resident of the camp, said the usual monthly ration of 13kg of maize had gone down to 7kg, while rations of cooking oil, pigeon peas, sugar and salt had also been cut by half. "There are people in the camp who rely on relatives who've been resettled," he said. "The rest really starve because the rations can't last a month."

Michelle Carter, country director for the Jesuit Refugee Service in Malawi, which runs a number of educational and other programmes in the camp, said the cuts were “clearly leading to a fair amount of hunger… I know children are coming to school hungry,” she told IRIN. 

“The food is only lasting two weeks and if they’re on their own it’s much worse because they can’t combine rations.”

Noting that only a very small percentage of the refugees had any source of income, she said single mothers, unaccompanied minors and the elderly and disabled had been particularly hard hit by the reduced rations.

A protection officer with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in Malawi, Gavin Lim, said his agency planned to carry out an assessment in the coming months to determine the full impact of the ration cuts but that reports of more women in the camp turning to survival sex were already coming in.

Difficult to become self-reliant

Most countries in southern and eastern Africa have an encampment policy for refugees which restricts their freedom of movement and reduces their chances of becoming self-reliant. Some earn a small income running informal businesses outside the camps but competition with often equally impoverished locals is fierce and has led to outbreaks of violence. 

In May, a number of refugees who were selling goods at a small trading centre outside Dzaleka were assaulted by local traders who accused them of undermining their businesses. According to Carter, the Malawian government plans to withdraw trading licenses for refugees from July.

Many of Dzaleka's residents have lived in the camp for over a decade. Indeed, an increasing proportion of refugees today live in what UNHCR describes as "protracted" exile (in 2011, more than seven million refugees had lived outside their country for more than five years). Donors are increasingly reluctant to shoulder the burden of feeding these long-term refugees.

Commenting on the funding shortfall, WFP spokesperson for east and southern Africa David Orr said: "There is inevitably some donor fatigue regarding longstanding or protracted refugee loads; these funding issues affect more than just food."

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95597/AFRICA-Donor-fatigue-forces-WFP-to-cut-refugee-rations</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201204161157350475t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 19 June 2012 (IRIN) - The UN World Food Programme (WFP) has halved food rations to refugees living in camps in at least four African countries citing a funding shortfall.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>REFUGEES: Moving out of the shadows</title><pubDate>Thu, 31 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904242107480456t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 31 May 2012 (IRIN) - When night falls in the Dadaab refugee complex in eastern Kenya, nearly half a million refugees are plunged into darkness. The lack of light robs schoolchildren of the possibility of studying and provides perfect cover for thieves and rapists.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 31 May 2012 (IRIN) - When night falls in the Dadaab refugee complex in eastern Kenya, nearly half a million refugees are plunged into darkness. The lack of light robs schoolchildren of the possibility of studying and provides perfect cover for thieves and rapists. 

“There are robbers who take advantage of the dark to rob people of their phones,” said Ifo Camp resident and freelance journalist Moulid Hujale. “Even when there’s a full moon, there’s less crime.”

For many households who cannot afford candles or kerosene lamps, let alone a generator, the only source of light is that produced by cooking fires. But firewood is an increasingly scarce and contentious commodity in an arid region where an ever growing refugee population has been competing with locals for dwindling natural resources since the first camp was established there in 1991.

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) trucks in firewood at a cost of US$600,000 a month, but only enough to meet about 30 percent of each household’s monthly needs, forcing refugee women to walk up to 10km outside the camps to gather wood for cooking. These excursions expose them to the risk of violent attacks from resentful locals and even other refugees. 

“The incidents of gender-based violence against them are quite common,” said Njuki Venanzio, an associate environment officer with UNHCR based at Dadaab. “Our protection colleagues document about three cases per week.”

Even inside the camps, levels of sexual and gender-based violence have increased significantly in the past 18 months as the camp’s population has swelled and poor lighting has made new arrivals living on the outskirts of the camp particularly vulnerable. [ http://www.plusnews.org/Report/93682/KENYA-SOMALIA-Refugees-at-risk-of-sexual-violence ] 

Although the scale of Dadaab’s camps have magnified its security and environmental problems, refugee camps all over Africa face similar challenges. Seventy-two percent have no electricity (while only 30 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's general population has electricity) and many are located in fragile environments where wood is in short supply or completely unavailable. 

The area around Dzaleka Camp in Malawi is so heavily deforested that refugees often resort to selling a portion of their monthly food rations to buy firewood or charcoal, while women living in Touloum Camp in Chad say they spend four days a week searching for firewood. 

Eco-friendly technologies

A UNHCR initiative to bring solar-powered lights and fuel-efficient stoves to 920,000 refugees in Africa over the next three years could address many of the security, environmental and education challenges faced by refugees if donors can be persuaded to come up with the necessary $15 million in funding. 

The Light Years Ahead Initiative [ http://www.unhcr.org/4c99fa9e6.pdf ] has already been piloted in seven African countries with good results, according to Amare Egziabher, a senior environmental coordinator with UNHCR in Geneva. 

“We’ve had very positive feedback from the field,” he told IRIN. “Many believe it lowers the incidence of crime, and also gender-based violence for women and girls.” 

The initiative also has the potential to lower drop-out rates at camp schools. Children who lack light to do their homework in the evenings tend to fall behind with their studies, while girls often miss classes while helping their mothers collect firewood.

At Dadaab, the pilot phase of the project has already brought solar-powered lanterns to 140 schoolchildren preparing for exams and street lights to several areas of Hagadera Camp identified by residents as particularly unsafe at night. 

“It has had a major impact on security in those few areas,” said Venanzio. “But we’re talking about a camp with over 120,000 refugees so the coverage has been small.”

Each solar lantern costs $39 while a solar street light that can make a neighbourhood safer for up to 300 refugees costs $1,200. 

“So far we’ve had some promises of funding but nothing concrete yet,” said Venanzio.

Saving fuel, saving the environment

The fuel-efficient stove favoured by UNHCR is called Save80 because it uses up to 80 percent less wood than cooking over a traditional stove, but several NGOs and agencies working at Dadaab are distributing different types of energy-saving stoves. They have so far managed to reach about 48 percent of the refugee population, but as kerosene has been deemed too expensive and ethanol in too short supply, all of the stoves distributed still use firewood.

“We need something more sustainable,” conceded Venanzio. “There is a lot of environmental degradation within a 10km radius of the camps and the Kenyan government is insisting that we look for a viable alternative [to wood] soon.”

Increasing local production of ethanol from sugarcane is one option. Another is finding entrepreneurs willing to produce sufficient quantities of fuel briquettes from agricultural by-products like coffee or risk husks. 

In the meantime, UNHCR’s environmental management programme is distributing free saplings to refugee and host communities in an effort to reforest the area. “But the environment here is very dry so the survival of the trees is a bit challenging,” said Venanzio. 

Awareness-raising campaigns aimed at teaching refugees how to use firewood more economically, recycle garbage and grow vegetables using waste water are also aimed at mitigating the camps’ impact on the local environment but Venanzio said the programme struggled with insufficient funding. “Environmental programmes get a very small budget compared to other sectors that are considered life-saving like water, food, health,” he explained.

Private donors including churches and corporations gave $1.4 million towards the Light Years Ahead Initiative in 2011, but “we still have a long way to go,” admitted Egziabher. “The demand is so high.”

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95558/REFUGEES-Moving-out-of-the-shadows</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904242107480456t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 31 May 2012 (IRIN) - When night falls in the Dadaab refugee complex in eastern Kenya, nearly half a million refugees are plunged into darkness. The lack of light robs schoolchildren of the possibility of studying and provides perfect cover for thieves and rapists.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Peace-making role for West African trade bloc</title><pubDate>Thu, 31 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203300914220488t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 31 May 2012 (IRIN) - With a string of political crises in West Africa over the past few months it has been a busy time for mediators of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has a mandate and history of intervention - which in terms of scale sets it apart from other trading blocs in Africa.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 31 May 2012 (IRIN) - With a string of political crises in West Africa over the past few months it has been a busy time for mediators of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has a mandate and history of intervention which in terms of scale sets it apart from other trading blocs in Africa. 

ECOWAS was formed in 1975 with the goal of economic integration of its 15 member states. But the Liberian civil war in 1989 proved a watershed, with a group of key countries led by Nigeria committed to military intervention. That muscular approach was formalized by a 1999 protocol on conflict prevention which explicitly linked economic development to peace, and a 2001 protocol on good governance which ruled "every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections”. 

ECOWAS uses, among other instruments, fact-finding and election observer missions, the appointment of special representatives, mediators, sanctions and the formation of international contact groups to resolve or prevent conflicts. IRIN looks at some of the measures it has taken to try to resolve the region's recent crises. 

Mali 

Following the toppling of Amandou Toumani Touré in a coup on 22 March by Capt Amadou Sanogo, ECOWAS has used both stick and carrot to help Mali back to constitutional rule. It has crafted a deal which will allow a civilian head of state to take office and run the country until elections next year, and has signalled its support to roll back a Tuareg rebellion in the north, where the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has taken advantage of the confusion to unilaterally declare an independent state. 

ECOWAS has an array of punitive measures it can deploy against recalcitrant juntas. At an Extraordinary Summit on 29 March, it imposed comprehensive sanctions against Sanogo and his National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy, and suspended Mali from the regional body. 

Ambassadors from ECOWAS countries were recalled, borders closed, and a travel ban on the coup leaders was imposed. More severely still, Mali's assets with the Central Bank of West Africa (BCEAO) were frozen, and all financial assistance to Mali from the West African Bank for Development (BOAD) and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) was suspended. 

A Framework Agreement signed on 6 April demands power be handed to Djouncounda Traoré, the former speaker of parliament, for 40 days. Thereafter, an interim civilian president will run Mali until elections are held within 12 months. Sanogo and his men have been granted amnesty, but also warned that any statements seen as undermining the agreement would lead to the reinstatement of targeted sanctions against them. 

What seemed fine on paper was complicated by the flight to France on 23 May by Traoré, after he was beaten by an irate crowd of Sanogo supporters who stormed his office, throwing the deal into confusion. 

ECOWAS has appeared resolute over the north, where the MNLA and Islamist groups have seized control. It has condemned the separatists and has reportedly made plans for 3,000 troops to be deployed to the contested region to help restore Mali's territorial integrity. 

Cape Town-based Petrus de Kock, a senior researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs, told IRIN the quick response by ECOWAS to Mali sent a message that it would not tolerate coups and unconstitutional changes of government. The immediate dispatch of the region's "top brass to the country had a huge impact… But ECOWAS will have to be careful with military threats and must be able to follow up with a credible threat of force [against the MNLA] and deal with an insurgency that threatens regional instability… But you do not want to put it [military force] at the forefront and play a brinkmanship role… ECOWAS's role is to build trust between the parties and design a political vision." 

Guinea-Bissau 

Guinea-Bissau has a long history of political violence and instability [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95341/GUINEA-BISSAU-Chronology-of-instability ]. ECOWAS is mediating a solution to a 12 April coup which halted the second round of elections that Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior - a strong proponent of security sector reform - seemed set to win. ECOWAS immediately announced its intention to deploy a 629-strong standby force to stabilize the country. 

The first wave of 70 Burkina Faso paramilitary police - out of a complement of 140 - arrived on 17 May; Nigeria has made a commitment to deploy 300 security personnel (140 police and 160 soldiers); Senegal would make up the rest. 

On 22 May the coup leaders handed power to interim President Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo and Prime Minister Rui Duarte Barros. The 28-member cabinet is said to include two army officers, including a coup participant, Col Celestino Carvalho. 

ECOWAS is expected to be heavily involved in arranging free, fair and transparent elections scheduled within the next 12 months as part of the post-coup deal. The withdrawal of the 200 strong Angolan technical-military cooperation mission (MISSANG) - deployed in March 2011 to support security sector reform - was announced ahead of the coup. The coup leaders had claimed MISSANG’s intention was to annihilate the army. 

Guinea-Bissau has been a perennial concern for the regional body. It stepped in during a 2004 army mutiny - triggered by the non-payment of salaries - providing a US$500,000 grant to assist in wage payments. In 2008 an audit by the army found more than the half 4,458 soldiers were either senior officers or non-commissioned officers. 

Following the 2 March 2009 assassinations of President Joao Bernardo Vieira and his armed forces chief of staff Gen Batista Tagme Na Wai, ECOWAS convened its 19 March 2009 Mediation and Security Council meeting in the capital Bissau, as a show of solidarity, and recommended a joint initiative with the UN to deploy a combined force of army and police to protect state institutions. This recommendation was not supported by the government of the interim president Raimundo Pereira, however. 

An ECOWAS meeting in Cape Verde, in April 2009, in collaboration with representatives from 29 other countries and international organizations, provided a $13.5 million grant for security sector reforms, such as pensions schemes and the building of a police academy, and came on the back a $2 million reintegration project established by the regional bloc in May 2007 for about 30 senior Guinea Bissau officers to be trained in agriculture in Brazil. 

David Zounmenou, a senior researcher for democracy, armed conflict and human security at the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies, told IRIN ECOWAS's response to the Guinea Bissau coup "raised some concerns" as putschists had been included in the transitional government and this conflicted with the organization’s 2001 supplementary protocols, as "the military are imposing who should be part of the transition," which excluded Gomes and was in contravention of the country's Constitution. "Because of this the UN has distanced itself from ECOWAS [in its response to the coup]." [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95483/Analysis-Division-and-stasis-in-Guinea-Bissau ] 

Niger 

When in 2001 former Niger president Mamadou Tandja began tampering with electoral laws to extend his term in office, and dissolved parliament and the Constitutional Court which opposed his moves, ECOWAS suspended Niger's membership. 

Tandja's new constitution concentrated power in his hands. ECOWAS responded with the dispatch of a mediation team led by former Nigerian president Gen Abdulsalami Abubakar. Tandja rejected ECOWAS proposals for the appointment of an opposition member to the post of prime minister and a 12 month window for the drawing-up of a new constitution and elections. 

Niger was suspended from the African Union after a coup in February 2010 toppled Tandja. But ECOWAS adopted a softly-softly approach to the new military rulers after they immediately dissolved Tandja's new constitution and appointed Mahamadou Danda as prime minister. ECOWAS took a back-seat in the transition and trusted coup leader Salou Djibo's declared intention to return to pre-Tandja constitutional rule - with the proviso of an amnesty for the mutineers [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94306/Analysis-Niger-Delta-still-unstable-despite-amnesty ]. Mahamadou Issoufou was elected president in March 2011. 

De Kock said ECOWAS’s response to the Niger crisis was "to reshape and get more influence over the situation. It was a hands-off approach. ECOWAS was there. It just had to deal at a different level and it was more about diplomacy." 

Côte d'Ivoire 

Once seen as the epitome of stability, Côte d'Ivoire presented a different challenge to ECOWAS. After a more than decade-long crisis, beginning with the 1999 coup d'etat and ending with a contested election taking the country to the brink of a renewed civil war, ECOWAS was to wear two hats - playing both peacekeeper and facilitator for the electoral process. 

The regional body was the first to deploy a stabilization force to protect state institutions after the start of the 2002 civil war, which was to last for five years. The ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) paved the way for the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) in May 2003, which was succeeded in April 2004 by the UN Peace Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which replaced both MINUCI and ECOMICI. 

Côte d'Ivoire was divided between north and south, and ECOWAS, the former colonial power France, South Africa and the Africa Union (AU) became involved in negotiations to end the conflict. A 2007 power-sharing deal mediated by ECOWAS member Burkina Faso saw New Forces leader Guillaume Soro appointed as prime minister. 

The first round of the presidential polls was held on 31 October 2010 and ECOWAS and other international bodies declared the results free and fair. The second round in December 2010 was mired in controversy, but ECOWAS quickly accepted the results, although the former South African president and AU mediator Thabo Mbeki accused the body of being too hasty in accepting the outcome of Alassane Ouattara's narrow victory. The AU backed ECOWAS’s endorsement and this was confirmed following the AU ad-hoc investigation by five African heads of states. 

The UN Security Council, at the request of ECOWAS, passed Resolution 1975 of 2011 providing MINUCI with the mandate to protect civilians during the post-electoral crisis, after the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to accept the results and a stand-off ensued threatening to engulf the country in a renewed civil war. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94353/Analysis-Côte-d-Ivoire-one-year-on ] 

ECOWAS at an extraordinary session on 24 December declared that if Gbagbo did not accept the results it would have “no other option but to take all the necessary measures, including the use of legitimate force, to realize the aspirations of the Ivorian people." It was a high-risk strategy: Apart from the difficulty of conducting a full-scale military intervention, there was the real threat of a nationalist backlash against West African nationals in Abidjan, and some ECOWAS members such as Ghana argued against military force. 

The stand-off was resolved when in April 2011 Ouattara's forces, with the assistance of French troops, captured Gbagbo, who was handed over to The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93886/COTE-D-IVOIRE-Rebranding-the-army ] 

Zounmenou said the links established by ECOWAS with the AU, European Union and UN meant there was a very quick response to complex issues during the crisis. 

"ECOWAS played a principled, consistent and fair role in resolving it, as it had been there since 1999. ECOWAS defined the negotiation process and monitored the implementation of the Ouagadougou peace agreement. No other organization in Africa would have been able to deal with the complex situation… and that's because ECOWAS had the experience of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea Bissau. My only problem was ECOWAS allowed French troops to take the military option," he said. 

Sources: 

The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict [ http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/07448.pdf ] 
Confronting complex political crises in West Africa [ http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/Paper230.pdf ] 
Journal of African Elections - West Africa [ http://www.eisa.org.za/EISA/publications/jaec.htm ] 
Chronology of instability [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95341/GUINEA-BISSAU-Chronology-of-instability ] 

go/oa/cb 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95557/Briefing-Peace-making-role-for-West-African-trade-bloc</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203300914220488t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 31 May 2012 (IRIN) - With a string of political crises in West Africa over the past few months it has been a busy time for mediators of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has a mandate and history of intervention - which in terms of scale sets it apart from other trading blocs in Africa.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Division and stasis in Guinea-Bissau</title><pubDate>Fri, 18 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201205181414330877t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR/BISSAU 18 May 2012 (IRIN) - On 16 May a transition pact brokered by the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and signed by all parties except the majority PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde] - officially nominated Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo as Interim President of Guinea-Bissau for one year. The decision was made after weeks of political wrangling following a military coup on 12 April that interrupted presidential elections, in which ex- Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior from the PAIGC party was the clear front-runner. While many fear the decision to install Nhamadjo will lead to yet more division in the politically polarized nation, others just want the country to get back on track economically, since markets and basic services have more or less been at a standstill since the latest coup.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR/BISSAU 18 May 2012 (IRIN) - On 16 May a transition pact brokered by the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and signed by all parties except the majority PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde] - officially nominated Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo as Interim President of Guinea-Bissau for one year. The decision was made after weeks of political wrangling following a military coup on 12 April that interrupted presidential elections, in which ex- Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior from the PAIGC party was the clear front-runner. While many fear the decision to install Nhamadjo will lead to yet more division in the politically polarized nation, others just want the country to get back on track economically, since markets and basic services have more or less been at a standstill since the latest coup. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95340/Analysis-Latest-coup-another-setback-for-Guinea-Bissau ]

Nhamadjo, who ranked third in the first round of the presidential elections became head of the National Assembly when Interim President Raimundo Pereira - who was put in place after the death of President Malam Bacai Sanha - was deposed by military junta leaders.

Nhamadjo nominated ex-economist Rui Duarte Barros as Prime Minister after talks with all political parties except the PAIGC - the party of ex-Prime Minister Carlos Junior - which is boycotting the talks as they believe the decision to install Nhamadjo is unconstitutional.

Carlos Junior has said he will not recognize the ECOWAS decision, and calls for a return to constitutional order, saying on 16 May from the Portuguese capital, Lisbon, “I am the legitimately elected Prime Minister.” Junior and ex-Interim President Raimundo Pereira are currently being received by the Portuguese Prime Minister and President in Lisbon. Guinea-Bissau gained independence from Portugal in 1973.

Previously condemned

When the military junta initially decided on 21 April to appoint failed presidential candidate Nhamadjo as president of a proposed two-year transitional government, having deposed Pereira and Gomes Junior, ECOWAS deemed the move “illegal”. The UN Security Council, the African Union (AU) and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) also condemned it.

The ECOWAS-supported decision to appoint Nhamadjo as interim leader has angered supporters of Gomes Junior, who see him as the candidate of the military junta. ECOWAS “did not consider national interest and principles of the rule of law” in its decision, declared a statement on 14 May by the Civil Society Movement for Peace and Democracy.

PAIGC, which led the country to independence from Portugal, controls 67 of the 100 seats in the National Assembly and “has the legitimacy of a popular mandate”, said Vincent Foucher, a Guinea-Bissau analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG), a conflict resolution think-tank. According to official results from the first round of the presidential election, when interrupted by the coup, Gomes Junior held 49 percent of the votes, while Nhamadjo came third with 16 percent.

PAIGC is split into factions and some observers surmise that some groups may rally behind Nhamadjo (who also belongs to the party) in order to buoy their role in the transitional government, but Gomes Junior retains majority support in the PAIGC.

Compromise

While some Bissau-Guineans, particularly the educated middle classes, favour a return to the electoral process, others will go with any solution that brings the country back to a semblance of normality, said a Western academic after recently visiting the capital, Bissau.

Younoussa Seydi, 30, a mechanic living in the capital, told IRIN: “Guineans [Bissau-Guineans] have to prioritize dialogue to find a solution… If Carlos Gomes Junior comes back, there will be a war, so it is better he stays away for a long time. PAIGC has to demonstrate flexibility and accept dialogue.”

The first 70 of the intended 650 ECOWAS troops to be deployed to Guinea-Bissau arrived on 18 May. The mission has a 12-month mandate to support security sector reforms, secure the withdrawal of the Angolan Technical Assistance Group (a bilateral military mission put in place to aid security sector reform), and to ensure security during the transition period.

Opportunism?

While some analysts say ECOWAS is taking a pragmatic approach, there are concerns that several countries in the ECOWAS bloc may be using the current situation as an opportunity to diminish Angola’s presence in Guinea-Bissau. Angola has stepped up aid and technical and military assistance to the country in recent years.

One theory is that ECOWAS used the threat of military intervention by the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), which is led by Angola and Portugal, to push in its own troops instead.

Following the coup, the CPLP called for “the immediate restoration of the constitutional order, the reinstatement of the legitimate government of Guinea-Bissau, and the conclusion of the electoral process,” a position reiterated by the Angolan ambassador in a statement to the UN Security Council on 7 May.

The international power play has allowed the military in Guinea-Bissau to obtain ECOWAS support for their nominee, Nhamadjo, said ICG’s Foucher.

“It is important that the broader international community gets on board and pushes ECOWAS to obtain significant concessions from the Guinean military, to make sure the transition leads to an effective and credible return to democracy,” he noted.

Economy “from bad to worse”

Democracy looks a long way off to many Bissau-Guineans, but many are currently more concerned with economic over political order. The human rights situation has been more or less stable since the coup, said Amnesty International’s Guinea-Bissau expert, Marise Castro, though some officials close to Pereira and Gomes Junior have been receiving threats and are still in hiding.

Demonstrations have been forbidden and the local press is under heavy scrutiny. “There is no real government. Nobody is taking decisions, and everything is paralyzed… but the general population has largely been left untouched, and soldiers are careful not to interfere with the people,” Castro said.

The priority is to get the economy working again. “The economy is going from bad to worse. Civil servants have not been paid since 12 April, the price of food has increased considerably and families have barely enough to eat,” Almamy Sanha, 40, a Bissau-based schoolteacher, told IRIN.

Markets are scarcely functioning. “People have no money, so they do not buy anything” said Vladimir Monteiro, spokesperson at the UN Peace-building mission in Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS.

A rapid assessment by the World Food Programme (WFP) on 2 May reported “a gradual deterioration of citizens’ food security due to their low purchasing power and shortages of basic consumer goods in the markets” by the end of April.

Civil servant Luis Mança, 55, told IRIN that since he had received no salary, “I only spend 1,000FCFA (US$2) a day instead of 2,000 and there is no breakfast or dinner for my children.”

In the countryside “the situation is worrying”, said a report from a food security meeting on 23 April. People have been consuming local products but they lack grain because of a poor harvest in 2010, and rural households have been swollen by the 12,000 people who fled the capital during the coup.

The demand for cashew nuts - the country’s principal export and farmers’ main source of cash - has plummeted said Barbara Weber, the World Bank Senior Operations Officer in charge of Guinea-Bissau. “Traders’ demand for raw cashews fell significantly and prices are 70 percent lower than this time last year.” This could have an “enormous effect on poverty reduction”.

Schools closed

With civil servants unpaid and on strike, all public services are closed. “The paralysis of state schools, but more generally of educational institutions, has worsened as a result of the coup. It seriously calls into question the completion of the current school year and may lead to its cancellation,” warned a manifesto published on 9 May by a group of Guinea-Bissau NGOs.

Just 23 percent of children in Guinea-Bissau attend secondary school, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). [ http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/guineabissau_statistics.html ]

Access to healthcare services - already low in Guinea-Bissau- has also worsened. “Hospitals, which at first shut down, are now still disrupted. In the countryside, medicines are paid for by NGOs, but not staff salaries,” said Tomas Serna, who heads the Bissau office of SNV, a Dutch development organization. “Staff lack motivation, and when they work they face threats from the unions, which have called for a strike.” [ http://www.snvworld.org/ ]

The epidemic diseases warning system - critical to spotting and preventing the cholera outbreaks that regularly hit Guinea-Bissau - has stopped working, which is worrying, said Serna. The European Union is helping to run the generators that can provide water to Bissau residents for a two-week period, but he also worries because no one has any answers for the longer-term. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/86592/GUINEA-GUINEA-BISSAU-Driving-home-the-cholera-message ]

The non-payment of salaries could also affect the armed forces, which are a chronic source of instability in Guinea-Bissau. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/89061/GUINEA-BISSAU-Security-sector-reform-hangs-in-the-balance ] There are rumours of discontent among the rank-and-file

An NGO worker, who declined to be named, said the military hierarchy dispatched emissaries to the barracks to explain the coup and call soldiers to loyalty. In the long run, disagreements within the army could be dangerous, warned the ICG’s Foucher: “So far, the military have managed internal tensions well, despite the ethnic and factional cleavages, but it is hard to know how long this will last.”

In an attempt to finance themselves and ease tensions in the armed forces, diplomatic sources say military junta officials allegedly arranged new landings of cocaine for Latin America.

Guinea-Bissau has long been a transit country for large volumes of drugs on the way to Europe. Foucher noted that “According to various security and diplomatic sources, drug shipments are back.”

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95483/Analysis-Division-and-stasis-in-Guinea-Bissau</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201205181414330877t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR/BISSAU 18 May 2012 (IRIN) - On 16 May a transition pact brokered by the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and signed by all parties except the majority PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde] - officially nominated Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo as Interim President of Guinea-Bissau for one year. The decision was made after weeks of political wrangling following a military coup on 12 April that interrupted presidential elections, in which ex- Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior from the PAIGC party was the clear front-runner. While many fear the decision to install Nhamadjo will lead to yet more division in the politically polarized nation, others just want the country to get back on track economically, since markets and basic services have more or less been at a standstill since the latest coup.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>FOOD: Power to the people!</title><pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201104051041120547t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 15 May 2012 (IRIN) - The UN Development Programme (UNDP) launched its first Africa Human Development Report today, stressing food security as a means to a better quality of life for all.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 15 May 2012 (IRIN) - The UN Development Programme (UNDP) launched its first Africa Human Development Report [http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/africa-human-development-report-2012/ ] today, stressing food security as a means to a better quality of life for all.  

The argument is straightforward: Most people in Africa depend on agriculture, and better nutrition is good for human development. More food production means more food and income in people’s pockets, which has spin-offs which are beneficial for health and education. 

The report is not another exhortation to farmers to grow more food. Pedro Conceicao, chief economist with the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, explained that exclusively looking at linkages between small-scale farmers and agriculture or gender empowerment and agriculture were “piecemeal approaches” and not helpful. “We have to move beyond silver bullet obsessions [such as agricultural subsidies] or attention-grabbing headlines.” 

He reasoned that high economic growth rates in Africa had not necessarily resulted in a reduction in poverty and food insecurity - which points to accessibility to food and purchasing power as key factors. The report emphasizes “empowerment” and participation as important levers for change. 

It argues that countries need to implement a more strategic vision of food security. An approach to emulate would be what Ethiopia had done to beef up its agriculture sector by setting up a separate Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) [ http://www.ata.gov.et/about/our-mandate/ ] right next to the prime minister’s office. It is modelled on similar initiatives in Asia which helped accelerate economic growth in South Korea and Malaysia, for instance. ATA addresses bottlenecks in areas such as soil management, research and extension services. 

The report calls for new approaches covering multiple sectors - from rural infrastructure to health services, to new forms of social protection and empowering local communities. It calls for action in four critical areas: 

1. Increasing agricultural production: It acknowledges that boosting production would be integral to any approach to becoming food secure, and calls for investment in research, infrastructure and inputs and a Green Revolution in Africa; 

2. More effective nutrition: Develop coordinated interventions which boost nutrition while expanding access to health services, education, sanitation, and clean water; 

3. Building resilience: Investment in crop insurance, employment guarantee schemes, and cash transfers to shield people from risks and make them less vulnerable to shocks; 

4. Empowerment and social justice: Gender empowerment, access to land, technology and information are important to make people food secure. 

IRIN interviewed two leading experts on the issues. 

Steven Wiggins, research fellow with the UK’s Overseas Development Institute, who has been studying agriculture and rural development in Africa since 1972: 

Africa is not one unitary entity: “There are 56 countries in Africa... When Africa is considered as a single unit, there is a great danger that it is compared to other similar units, above all Asia, leading to analyses that suggest that if only Africa were more like Asia, then things would improve. Well, I’m not sure that Botswana has very much to learn from, say, Afghanistan, thank you very much. Hyperbole aside, the point is this: in Africa we have several, if not many, cases of admirable progress in food and nutrition security, but we overlook this.” 

Real progress takes time: “A longstanding issue in African policy debates is the search not only for growth, but for growth that is `transformative’. Even when an African economy grows, the pessimists say `yes, but where is the transformation?’ usually noting that in Asia growth is transformative. Well, yes, where that has apparently happened in Asia... it is the result of 30 or 40 years of sustained progress. Yet damning judgments are made about African countries after less than 10 years of sustained and high economic growth." 

Too complicated and demanding: It would have been better had it [the overview of the report] stuck to a few fundamental propositions that are well supported by the evidence, namely: smallholder development plus primary health plus clean water will almost always reduce child malnutrition. Yes, let’s add girls in secondary school to the list: that will strengthen these links. But it’s that simple. 

Peter Gubbels, the West Africa co-coordinator for Groundswell International, a global partnership of local farming communities, has 30 years of experience in rural development, including 20 years living and working in West Africa. He is based in Ghana. He says: 

Move beyond the Green Revolution: “The report… seems to embrace the Green Revolution approach to agricultural improvement, citing... the results... in Asia, and seeking to now apply those lessons to Africa. The report suggests implicitly, that one reason Africa still has hunger is because Africa has not benefited from `science-based, input-intensive’ support. This is highly misleading. There have been many efforts to promote Green Revolution in Africa. Almost all have failed.” 

Missing bits: “There is no mention of Conservation Agriculture, or of the Brown Revolution [to promote soil fertility and conserve water].” 

Under-funding in agricultural research: “This is true but is also misleading. There has been a great amount of funding in the CGIAR [Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research] system in Africa, including IITA [International Institute of Tropical Agriculture] in Nigeria, from the 1970s onwards. One reason donors reduced funding in the 1990s was because it was not generating good production results. 

“But this report seems to assume that investing in new seeds, fertilizers, tractors, irrigation and training is what is needed... And how many very poor small-scale farmers can afford tractors?” 

Understanding resilience: “Equally disturbing is the suggestion that long-term resilience measures can enable risk averse, poor small-scale farmers to adopt riskier, but more productive, agricultural technologies. This is twisting my understanding of resilience. The aim is to reduce (or at least manage risk), using low external inputs and local ecological systems, not to increase risk by creating dependence on external expensive inputs (insurance, etc) for poor, vulnerable farm families working in marginal conditions. The way forward would be to develop crops and technologies that both increase food production and reduce risk by conservation agricultural techniques.” 

"Subsuming” nutrition into food security: “There is not just food insecurity in Africa. There is both food insecurity and nutrition insecurity. Currently in the Sahel, there is both a food crisis and a nutrition crisis. They may be linked, but the causes are quite different, and the solutions that are [rooted] in food security are almost always inadequate. 

“Just as we need to change the strong association of agriculture with food security, we also need to move nutrition out of the confines of food security. There is still a very strong tendency to believe that food aid, and increasing food production, solves most of malnutrition. It does not. It only helps prevent major spikes in the already existing emergency level of chronic and acute malnutrition.” 

Controversial issues side-stepped: “The report also almost completely sidesteps... genetically modified seeds... the role of agribusiness in land-grabbing, control of seeds, pushing pesticides and herbicides.” 

jk/oa/cb 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95459/FOOD-Power-to-the-people</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201104051041120547t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 15 May 2012 (IRIN) - The UN Development Programme (UNDP) launched its first Africa Human Development Report today, stressing food security as a means to a better quality of life for all.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>SECURITY: A quick reaction force moulded by Africa&apos;s circumstances</title><pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201109090734440184t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 09 May 2012 (IRIN) - Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) - a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 09 May 2012 (IRIN) - Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) - a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention. 

Originally intended to become operational in 2010, the deadline for the ASF has been reset for 2015; but despite the delay, the ASF is becoming increasingly woven into the operating procedures of current AU security operations. 

The ASF “is very much a work in progress”, African Union Commissioner of Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra told IRIN, but “at the political level there is a strong support for it under the guiding principle of bringing about African solutions to African problems.” 

Once up and running, the ASF will be based on five regional blocs each supplying about 5,000 troops: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) force (SADCBRIG), the Eastern Africa Standby force (EASBRIG), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force (ECOBRIG), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) force (ECCASBRIG), also known as the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC). 

The regional forces are not a standing army like national forces. As the AU Peace and Security Council protocol of the ASF stipulates, they “shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.” 

The ASF is the legacy and logic of the Constitutive Act of the AU adopted in 2000, the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In a complete break from the OAU, which had advocated non-interference in member states, the Act gave the AU both the right to intervene in a crisis, and an obligation to do so “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. 

Lamamra said the ASF “Implies the immediate availability of the instruments [of intervention and prevention] to be translated into concrete deeds... when they relate to some kind of enforcing decisions of the legitimate organs of African Union, such as cases of unconstitutional changes of government… or armed rebellion, such as the terrorist situation in northern Mali.” 

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was held up as an example of what the ASF could be. “I believe the learning curve for the standby force is AMISOM. We have to deliver on the lessons learned in the AMISOM process - five years of effective presence on the ground under quite challenging circumstances,” Lamamra said. 

“The lesson of AMISOM is that Africans should be ready to make sacrifices, and Uganda has wonderfully shown that they are ready to make sacrifices for the common good of Africa.” Uganda has supplied most of the AU troops supporting the Somali government against jihadist rebels. 

The AU has deployed 14 staff officers to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, “in the first ever deployment of ASF elements,” El Gassim Wane, AU Commission director of peace and security, told IRIN. 

A field exercise - Amani II, following the Amani I mapping exercise in 2010 - is being planned for 2014 and three of the five brigades are expected to take participate. 

Article 4 (h) 

Lamamra was confident that by 2015 all of the ASF’s regional brigades - with the probable exception of NARC, owing to the disruptions of the Arab Spring - would be operational and able to fulfil all the criteria of AU’s Article 4 (h), which influenced the international development of the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. 

There are six scenarios in Article 4 (h). The lowest rung is the attachment of a regional military advisor to a political mission; then an AU regional observer deployed within a UN mission; followed by a stand-alone AU regional observer mission; and deployment of a regional peacekeeping force under the auspices of a Chapter VI mandate, all within a timeframe of 30 days or less. Scenario five is a multidimensional AU peacekeeping force deployed within 90 days, and scenario six relates to “grave circumstances”, such as genocide, and deployment within 14 days. 

Lamamra said the timeline of 14 days for level-six intervention should be reassessed to about seven days. “For instance, resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council was adopted on 17 March and the actual military operation started on 19th March - 14 days would have been too much in terms of protecting civilians.” 

In a 2010 paper, The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture, [ http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/209.pdf ] Solomon Dersso, a senior researcher at the Addis Ababa office of the Institute for Security Studies, a Pretoria-based think-tank, notes that “Article 4 (h) not only creates the legal basis for intervention but also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene to prevent or stop the perpetration of such heinous international crimes anywhere on the continent.” 

However, implementation of R2P rests with the Security Council, while the imposition of Article 4 (h) resides with the AU and does not require the Security Council’s blessing. 

Scenario six of Article 4 (h) has yet to be used by the AU and Dersso told IRIN he “sincerely doubted” the article would be invoked in the short term against member states, as “it would deprive the AU of any leverage it has over a target government,” and the AU has already “shied away” from implementing the article in Darfur. 

He expected the ASF to be close to being able to comply with Article 4 (h) level-five scenarios by 2015, but the development of regional forces was proceeding at different paces. 

The two-speed progress of the regional brigades - in which ECOWAS and SADC are recognised as the furthest along the path - is not just a consequence of the two regional blocs housing the continent’s economic power houses of Nigeria and South Africa, AU Commission director of peace and security El Gassim Wane told IRIN. 

“ECOWAS and SADC have made tremendous progress, EAS Brigade too, while NARC in the north was lagging behind, but then started speeding up, but the Libyan crisis meant progress had to stop,” he said. “Money may play a role, but money alone cannot explain that. ECOWAS and SADC focused early on conflict and security issues, so had a competitive advantage in the very beginning. Experience, length of involvement in peace and security issues, have certainly played a key role.” 

Alex de Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation, told IRIN the availability of a standby force could cloud judgment. 

“Intrinsically, in most of these situations what is needed is a political response, and there is a temptation that if you have a standby force to use it because you have a military capacity… And my concern over something like Mali would be that the military option runs the danger of getting the AU into a Somalia-type situation, where the use of military force five or six years ago by the US and Ethiopia very seriously rebounded. But having said that - yes, in a situation where there is a need for some sort of peacekeeping deployment in the context of a political initiative, it makes sense.” 

Alternatives to the ASF? 

Analysts have questioned whether 30,000 troops would be sufficient to deal with the continent’s crises, and 2012 has illustrated that such concerns are valid. A range of crises this year erupted within the space of a few weeks, from the uneasy relationship between South Sudan and Sudan deteriorating into skirmishing, to coup d’etats in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. 

Wane said the establishment of the ASF did not necessarily mean it would be the only security option at the AU’s disposal, and the four-country operation against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, (LRA) a rebel movement that started in northern Uganda, could be considered as a useful model for the future. 

“It’s not an ASF operation per se, as ASF has its own processes, and it was not really conceived as an ASF operation - it was conceived as an ad hoc, very flexible arrangement to enhance effectiveness to deal with the LRA once and for all. It’s a very flexible and creative way of dealing with a specific security issue… Who knows? We may replicate it elsewhere, where there is a security problem,” he said. 

The force ranged against the LRA - comprising soldiers from the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Uganda - has fought against the LRA in past, but is set apart, as it operates under the aegis of the AU. 

Abou Moussa, the Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), based in Libreville, Gabon, told IRIN: “The specific nature of this deployment [against the LRA] is termed ‘authorised’ as compared to ‘mandated’.” 

“Under authorised deployment, each country provides for the needs and requirements of their respective troops without the AU's contribution. This is extremely important, as this can be considered as their own contribution towards the determination to put an end to Kony's actions. It is very costly. However, the AU covers the needs of staff officers - some 30 of them posted to the various coordinating centres.” 

The AU task force has three operational centres, located in Dungu, DRC, at Obo in CAR, and Nzara in South Sudan, with its headquarters in Yambio, South Sudan. 

“The Regional Coordination Initiative means more subtle changes in the way the operation is run, with representatives of all four countries involved in the command structure in Yambio,” which sidesteps the politically sensitive issue of the DRC’s refusal to host Ugandan forces on its soil, Ned Dalby, a central Africa analyst for the International Crisis Group, a conflict resolution NGO, told IRIN. 

In July 2005, the International Criminal Court indicted Kony and four of his commanders, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Raska Lukwiya and Vincent Otti, for a variety of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Lukwiya and Otti have subsequently been killed, but the arrest warrants for the remaining three remain outstanding. The LRA has not been active in Uganda since 2006. 

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95426/SECURITY-A-quick-reaction-force-moulded-by-Africa-apos-s-circumstances</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201109090734440184t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 09 May 2012 (IRIN) - Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) - a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Latest coup another setback for Guinea-Bissau</title><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005071410150842t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR-BISSAU 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - Development, democracy and stability gains in Guinea-Bissau have suffered a major setback following the military takeover in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR-BISSAU 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - Development, democracy and stability gains in Guinea-Bissau have suffered a major setback following the military takeover in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April. 

The UN Security Council has threatened sanctions; and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLC) has proposed sending “peacekeepers” to the country. 

On 12 April military leaders detained Prime Minister and presidential candidate Carols Gomes Jr (known as Cadogo) and interim President Raimundo Pereira, going on to appoint failed presidential candidate Manuel Serifo Nhamajo as president of a proposed two-year transitional government in a move which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deemed “illegal” and which has also been strongly condemned by the UN Security Council, European Union, African Union and CPLC. 

Since 1994 no elected president in Guinea-Bissau has finished his mandate. 

Sanctions 

The UN Security Council on 21 April threatened to impose sanctions against coup-leaders. Following this announcement, the Junta allegedly shifted its hardline stance, telling a reporter the two-year transition government was just a proposal, according to one international press report. ECOWAS [ http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=109&lang=en&annee=2012 ] communications director Sonny Ugoh announced on 19 April that it was “completely taken aback” by the transition proposal. 

The CPLC has taken a more hardline approach from the start, pushing for a peacekeeping intervention force. Following a 19 April meeting of the UN Security Council, Guinea-Bissau Foreign Minister Mamadu Saliu Djalo praised the idea of sending a peacekeeping force to the country. But no final decision has been made. 

Several Bissau residents IRIN spoke to welcomed the notion of foreign intervention. Deolinda Tavares, a 65-year-old market-seller, told IRIN: “We have tarnished our image and our credibility is forever lost to the world.” 

Alimatou Touré, a 50-year-old housewife is outraged and fed up. "This is not a normal situation in which we live... Democracy is the only way that people can follow to be free and sovereign.” 

However, Guinea-Bissau expert Vincent Foucher of the International Crisis Group fears an international intervention against the junta, which has no consent from the army, could lead to bloodshed in a situation which has thus far been death-free; and could radicalize, criminalize, and factionalize the military junta leaders. “In this case, while it is essential to have it in the toolkit to demonstrate that the international community means business, it is far too early to use it - negotiation is what is needed now,” he told IRIN. 

Climate of fear 

Even with no deaths, a climate of fear and uncertainty pervades the capital, Bissau, with repressive measures being employed by the military, according to observers and rights groups [ http://www.amnesty.fr/AI-en-action/Violences/Armes-et-conflits-armes/Actualites/Les-droits-humains-en-danger-en-Guinee-Buissau-5220 ]. Road-blocks have been set up throughout the capital, with cars routinely stopped and searched. 

In some areas MPs and other officials of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) - the party of President Gomes Jr - have reportedly been targeted and arrested. 

Many Bissau-Guineans have reportedly travelled to the countryside or to neighbouring Gambia and nearby Senegal to ride out the instability. 

The coup has disrupted life in the capital with schools still closed as of 13 April; market sellers report vastly reduced trade; unions associated with PAIGC went on strike on 16 April, leading major banks to close down. 

Many Bissau residents say they are running out of money. “My husband has not worked for a week and all the banks are closed, so all we have left is 1,000 CFA francs (US$2) and we’re down to eating one meal a day,” Alimatou Touré, a 50-year-old housewife, told IRIN. 

Development stalled 
 
The economic progress achieved under Gomes Jr’s rule - including economic growth rates of 5.3 percent; increased revenue from the cashew crop due to a restructuring of its marketing; a major re-organization of state expenditure; improved electricity supply and rehabilitation of major roads - will be stalled, say observers. Guinea-Bissau has been suspended by the African Union, while the World Bank and African Development Bank have stopped development aid. 

“One thing is certain: our level of development is already very low, and things are going to get worse,” said a Guinean academic in Bissau. 

If sanctions go through, the government (the country’s biggest employer), will not be able to pay salaries next month, a civil servant told IRIN. 

Context of coup 

The self-declared military command, which emerged as the moving force behind the coup, declared in a 13 April communiqué that they had taken action because of an alleged secret agreement between Carlos Gomes Jr and the Angolan government to “annihilate Guinea-Bissau's armed forces”. To back their claims, the junta published a letter sent on 9 April by the prime minister to the UN Secretary-General asking for UN military intervention. 

The 200-strong Angolan technical-military mission in Guinea Bissau (MISSANG) - in place since March 2011 to train and support Guinea-Bissau’s military - has been of concern to many army chiefs, say analysts, as the foreign troops were seen by them to side with the prime minister and act as his private security force. 

Other factors that may have contributed to the coup include unconfirmed rumours at the end of March 2012 about the entry of heavy weapons sent by Angola to reinforce MISSANG, and poor relations with Guinea-Bissau’s military heads and the Angolan ambassador, according to Vincent Foucher, Guinea-Bissau specialist with the International Crisis Group in Dakar. 

Faced with growing opposition from the Guinea army, Angola announced on the 10 April that it would withdraw its mission. 

The Angolans have just become the latest scapegoat, a Bissau-Guinean scholar in the capital told IRIN. “Maybe because of our history, it is often the case in Guinea-Bissau that political contradictions are transformed and resolved into the fight for national sovereignty against one common enemy. Now the enemy is Angola.” 

Tensions had also built between the military and the prime minister because of Carlos Gomes's official support for a long-overdue reform of the security sector, which would involve reducing the size of the armed forces; retiring older soldiers; and building up the civilian police force, say many observers. 

Some international officials say certain military leaders do not wish to be retired, fearing they will no longer benefit from their privileged position in the drug trafficking economy, which continues to flourish in the country.

“Divisive figure” 

The coup put an end to the electoral process that many believe would have led to the election of Carlos Gomes Jr as president. On 18 March he won the first round with 49 percent of the votes. His opponents contested the fairness of the process and refused to run in a second round. 

Gomes Jr is seen as a “divisive figure”, according to Foucher, as he lacks the diplomacy and tact required to impose civilian rule on distrustful military heads. 

The prime minister’s “overwhelming hegemony fed opponents’ frustrations”, warned Foucher in an editorial [ http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/2012/04/02/a-nouveau-tentee-par-le-gouffre-la-guinee-bissau-entre-deux-tours/ ] two weeks before the coup. “This frustration is dangerous because it is shared by part of the army and is leading to the possibility of yet more military intervention in political life,” he wrote. 

Several high-profile murders [ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/guineabissau/4933580/Guinea-Bissau-president-beaten-before-assassination.html ], including those of ex-president Joao Bernardo Vieira in 2009, a chief of staff of the armed forces, and a candidate at the 2009 presidential elections, occurred under Carlos Gomes’ rule and have yet to be clarified.

Speculation 

Some say opposition politicians pushed the military into taking action before Gomes Jr’s anticipated victory. A Guinean academic called a declaration (that there would be no campaign) by opposition leader Kumba Yala just before the coup, a “troubling coincidence”. 

As a member of the Balante, a strong ethnic group which dominates the army, and a long-time supporter of the military, Kumba Yala is a prime suspect. Despite having condemned the military’s actions, he signed the 18 April declaration of opposition leaders and military commanders calling for the dissolution of government institutions and the implementation of the two-year transitional rule proposal. 

cb/ad/aj/cb 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95340/Analysis-Latest-coup-another-setback-for-Guinea-Bissau</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005071410150842t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR-BISSAU 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - Development, democracy and stability gains in Guinea-Bissau have suffered a major setback following the military takeover in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>GUINEA-BISSAU: Chronology of instability</title><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201204231824020308t.jpg" />]]>BISSAU 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - Rather than shoring up democratic institutions, Guinea-Bissau’s presidential elections in March widened divisions between civilian and military leaders, culminating in a 12 April coup. It was the fifth successful putsch the country has experienced since independence in 1974.</description><body><![CDATA[BISSAU 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - Rather than shoring up democratic institutions, Guinea-Bissau’s presidential elections in March widened divisions between civilian and military leaders, culminating in a 12 April coup [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95340/ANALYSIS-Development-setback-after-latest-Guinea-Bissau-coup ]. It was the fifth successful putsch the country has experienced since independence in 1974. 

Below is a chronology of the decades of political turmoil. 

1956: Amilcar Cabral establishes PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde). 

1963-74: PAIGC launches war of independence. 

1973: PAIGC declares Guinea-Bissau independent of Portugal. Amilcar Cabral, nationalist politician and head of the independence movement of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, is assassinated. 

1974 Portugal grants Guinea-Bissau independence with Luis Cabral, brother of Amilcar, as president. 

1980: Luis Cabral is ousted in military coup orchestrated by João Bernardo Vieira. 

1992: Koumba Yala founds the PRS (Party for Social Reform). 

1994 The first free elections are held electing João Bernardo Vieira as president. From this point on, PAIGC dominates politics until the present day. 

1998: Vieira sacks army chief of staff, Gen Ansumane Mané, leading to an army mutiny. A military junta led by Mané starts a civil war. 

1999: A military junta takes control of Bissau, the capital, and President Vieira seeks asylum in Portugal. Malai Bacam Sanha of PAIGC becomes president in May 1999. 

November 1999 The transitional government organizes elections in which PAIGC loses control over the National Assembly for the first time. PRS, under Koumba Yala, receives 38 seats and becomes the dominant party in the assembly. 

January 2000: Presidential elections are held pitting Koumba Yala of the PRS against Malam Bacai Sanha of the PAIGC, a fierce opponent of Vieira. Yala wins with 72 percent of the vote and his victory is seen as progress for the Balante ethnic group as he is the first Balante to lead the country. Yala goes on to appoint many Balante to positions of power. Under his rule many members of the armed forces are promoted to become generals. 

2000: Gen Anusmane Mané does not take up posts offered to him under President Koumba Yala's government, including adviser to the head-of-state, preferring to stay independent. In November he is killed by Koumba Yala's men 

2001: President Yala's rule is characterized by chronic political instability as he constantly sacks ministers and reshuffles his government. Between 2001 and 2003 four prime ministers are nominated and sacked. Political crisis sets in. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank suspend aid due to poor financial accounting by government. 

2002: President Koumba Yala dissolves parliament and calls for legislative elections but these do not take place and the country remains without a government for several months. Supreme Court judges are also sacked. 

September 2003: A military coup led by Gen Verissimo Correia Seabra ousts President Yala, a move that is welcomed by the population. A transition government is put in place to prepare for elections and in the interim, Henrique Rosa is appointed president, and Artur Sanha, once secretary-general of the PRS, is nominated prime minister. 

March 2004: Legislative elections are held as planned and PAIGC retakes most parliamentary seats. A new government is formed under the leadership of Carlos Gomes Junior as prime minister. 

October 2004: A group of soldiers led by Baoute Yanta Na Man attempt a failed coup. Gen Seabra, now chief of staff of the army, is killed by a group of military rebels who are protesting against salary arrears and the corruption of the military hierarchy, and Gen Tagme Na Waie, an ethnic Balante, is appointed in his place. 

2005: João Bernardo Vieira returns from exile in Portugal to participate in presidential elections, with financial backing from Guinea-Conakry and Senegal, and support from the military. In the June elections PAIGC’s Malam Bacai Sanha presents himself opposite Koumba Yala and for the first time against João Vieira who participates as an independent candidate. Bacai receives the largest number of votes but not enough to avoid a second round. Yala, who came third in the first round, goes on to support Vieira and Vieira becomes president for the second time. International observers deem the elections fair and transparent. 

The military, under chief-of-staff Tagme Na Waie, ensures President Vieira understands they are a powerful political force and that Vieira requires their support to retain his hold. 

October 2005: President Vieira sacks PAIGC Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior who was nominated by the assembly, citing “personal reasons”. After announcing on the radio that the president ordered the assassination of old members of the military junta that deposed him in 1999, Junior flees to the offices of the UN Peacebuilding Office until President Vieira can guarantee him his security. 

November 2005: President Vieira appoints Aristides Gomes, former PAIGC deputy chairman, as prime minister. 

November 2006: Koumba Yala is elected head of the PRS. 

January 2007: Adml Mohamed Lamine Sanha, chief-of-staff of the navy, is killed. Sanha, an ally of Ansumane Mané who led a military rebellion against President Vieira in the 1998 civil war, was implicated in several coups against the government. 

March 2007: Parliamentarians form a majority coalition and the three major parties, PAIGC, PRS and the United Social Democrat Party (PUSD) sign a pact meant to create political stability. The pact gives them the right to force the departure of Prime Minister Aristides Gomes who was nominated by Vieira after the sacking of Carlos Junior, and to vote in a new prime minister, Marthinho Ndafa Cabi. Donors welcome the pact and start to re-engage in the country after a period of relative isolation. 

July 2007: A tribunal declares the resolution making former Guinea-Bissau President Koumba Yala head of the PRS "null and void". 

February 2008: PAIGC withdraws backing from Prime Minister Martinho Ndafa Cabi, ostensibly to avoid acts of indiscipline threatening cohesion and unity in the party. 

March 2008: Legislative elections are postponed. 

April 2008: The mandate of the legislature ended on 21 April but President Vieira passes a temporary constitutional amendment to allow the continuation of parliament until elections take place later in the year. The president also grants amnesty to individuals in the military and civilians who allegedly committed crimes from 1980 to 2004. 

July 2008: PAIGC leaves the “Pact of Stability” coalition government. 

March 2009: President João Bernardo Vieira is shot dead by soldiers several hours after a bomb attack kills army chief-of-staff Gen Tagme Na Waie. 

June 2009: Three senior politicians are killed by military police in what authorities call a failed coup attempt. 

July 2009: Malam Bacai Sanha elected president. 

April 2010: Carlos Gomes Junior is held for many hours by military officers. Adml José Zamora Induta is arrested and imprisoned, as is Col Samba Diallo, communications chief for the armed forces. 

December 2010: Guinea-Bissau and Angola sign an agreement for the deployment of 200 soldiers as part of an Angolan technical-military cooperation mission (MISSANG) to support security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau. 

March 2011: Angolan troops are deployed in Bissau. 

November 2011: President Malam Bacai Sanha is evacuated to Val de Grâce Hospital in France. 

15 December 2011: A plane full of cocaine lands in Amdalai, 55km from Bissau. 

26 December 2011: Rear Adml Américo Bubo na Tchuto is arrested. Gen Buota Nan Batcha is wounded and arrested. 

9 January 2012: President Malam Bacai Sanha dies in France. Raimundo Pereira, speaker of parliament, is made acting president in line with the constitution. 

18 March 2012: Presidential elections take place. Former military intelligence chief Col Samba Diallo is assassinated by a group of soldiers just hours after voting opens. 

23 March 2012: Carlos Gomes Junior, prime minister until February 2012 and the PAIGC’s candidate, obtains 49 percent of the votes cast; Koumba Yala, the PRS candidate, obtains 23 percent; independent candidate Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo is third with 15 percent of the votes. 

12 April 2012: Carlos Gomes Junior and Raimundo Pereira, speaker of parliament and acting president for the transitional period, are arrested. 

16 April 2012: Military and opposition leaders announce a two-year Transitional National Council, a move denounced as illegal by ECOWAS and condemned by the UN Security Council, African Union, European Union, Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, and other international bodies. 

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95341/GUINEA-BISSAU-Chronology-of-instability</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201204231824020308t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BISSAU 23 April 2012 (IRIN) - Rather than shoring up democratic institutions, Guinea-Bissau’s presidential elections in March widened divisions between civilian and military leaders, culminating in a 12 April coup. It was the fifth successful putsch the country has experienced since independence in 1974.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>CLIMATE CHANGE: Farmers and forecasts</title><pubDate>Mon, 02 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203301412410080t.jpg" />]]>BINGERVILLE/DAKAR 02 April 2012 (IRIN) - Unpredictable rainfall in parts of Côte d’Ivoire cost some farmers over half of their harvest in 2011 producers told IRIN, but, armed with more knowledge about how to get weather reports and interpret them, they might still have been able to boost their output, say agricultural specialists.</description><body><![CDATA[BINGERVILLE/DAKAR 02 April 2012 (IRIN) - Unpredictable rainfall in parts of Côte d’Ivoire cost some farmers over half of their harvest in 2011 producers told IRIN, but, armed with more knowledge about how to get weather reports and interpret them, they might still have been able to boost their output, say agricultural specialists.
 
Marc Kouamé, a farmer in the north who grows okra, peanuts and cassava, told IRIN that farmers “no longer know where to turn” because of the changing seasons. "I lost half of my peanut production because I didn’t plant it at the right time,” he said. Many farmers feel more and more helpless in the face of such uncertainty.
 
Between 1971 and 2000, rainfall in Côte d’Ivoire dropped by 15 percent, according to Augustin Kouakou Nzue, head of agro-climatic studies in the National Weather Service (Direction Météorologie Nationale), although it has increased slightly since 2000.
 
In southern Côte d’Ivoire, farmers took clearly defined seasons for granted until the 1980s: rains from April to mid-July; a short dry season from mid-July to September; a short rainy season until November; and finally a long dry season from December to March. Now, the rains come later and finish earlier, with longer dry seasons and patchy distribution, says Nzue.
 
Most growers rely on rain-fed production, so the long-term impact of this shift could devastate Ivoirian farmers, who make up 60 percent of the workforce. Cocoa, the country’s main export crop, could also be affected - a September 2011 study by the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture, based in Cali, Colombia, predicts that rising temperatures may make it too hot to grow cocoa by 2050. [ http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/Newsroom/Lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=80 ]
 
Sidiki Cissé, head of the National Agency to Support Rural Development (ANADER) in the commercial capital, Abidjan, is clearly worried. "The desperation of farmers is clear to see," he told IRIN.
 
Poor and erratic rainfall in 2011 and the subsequent poor harvests across the southern Saharan band have thrown 13 million people into a food security crisis in the Sahelian zones of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Mali and Senegal. [ http://reliefweb.int/disaster/ot-2011-000205-net ]
 
Donors and investors are channelling climate adaptation funds into improved weather forecasting and more sophisticated climate science, but few groups are focusing on how climate information can better be used by farmers and communities in disaster-prone areas.
 
“People don’t see this kind of stuff as a critical research priority,” said Amane Tall, who is affiliated to the US-based Johns Hopkins University and the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre in The Netherlands. “They invest in improving the science of climate change – which is great – but how do we make links between the science and the decision-making at all levels?”
 
The various communities working on climate change – scientists, environmentalists, humanitarian NGOs, disaster risk reduction experts – have tended to work separately, in their silos, but now dialogue is needed, said Emma Visman, Futures Group Manager at the Humanitarian Futures Programme (HFP), which tries to prepare the humanitarian community for future disaster scenarios. “Dialogue seems to be the key word,” she said, “but we don’t yet have the resources or space to do it.” [ http://www.humanitarianfutures.org ]
 
A few groups are attempting to bridge the information gap, including various national meteorological agencies, the World Meteorological Organization, the HFP, and some humanitarian and development NGOs such as Christian Aid.
 
Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Mali, Guinea and Togo, among others, are part of the West Africa Metragri programme, co-funded by the World Meteorological Organization and the State Agency for Meteorology (AEMET) in Spain. The plan is to train 200 farmers in Côte d’Ivoire to become more aware of rainfall patterns in their areas, and how to use rain gauges to monitor precipitation. [ http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/agm/roving_seminars/west_africa_fr.html ]
 
Nzue told farmers at a training session in Bingerville, Côte d'Ivoire the best time to sow certain crops is one or two days after the first 20mm of rain has fallen. In 2011 this would have been on 21 March in Bouaké in central Côte d’Ivoire, and on 11 April in San Pedro in the southwest.
 
Farmers are asked to send the rainfall data they collect to the National Weather Service [Direccion Météorologie Nationale), so that agronomy research centres can draw up new crop calendars to help them adapt planting schedules to their particular micro-climate, said Amin Gbo, chief executive officer of ANADER.
 
Sidiki Cissé, head of ANADER, says corn, rice, sorghum and millet are most affected by changing rainfall patterns. In Burkina Faso local corn varieties suffer most because unlike imported varieties, they have not been designed to grow more quickly with less water, said Judith Bienvenue Fanfo, head of the Burkina Faso National Meteorological Office, which also collaborated on a project that has trained 450 farmers since 2007 to use climate and weather information.
 
HFP has worked on pilot studies in the Mbeere district of eastern Kenya and flood-prone Kaffrine in central Senegal to bring together communities, humanitarian partners (Christian Aid Kenya and the Senegalese Red Cross) and National Met offices to determine how to improve the exchange and use of weather information.
 
In Senegal, weather forecasts are broadcast on national radio, in newspapers, on television and via the internet, but these avenues are not readily accessible by local communities, said Visman.
 
The Kenya Meteorological Department (KMD) makes available daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal forecasts, but most people are unable to access the channels it uses to distribute this information and find the format difficult to understand, so they resort to using inaccurate information in uncertified channels instead.
 
Catering to the information preferences of individual groups can be resource-intensive. In one Senegalese village, asked to set up a climate road show women traders wanted a face-to-face information exchange; men wanted to use the mosque, while youths thought it best to share information under “talking trees” where they gather in the late afternoons.
 
After just a few months, the information exchange in Senegal started paying off, said Tall. Families said they kept their children home from school when forecasts predicted strong winds and rain. “There is also a psychological element – people are relieved to have the information and it can be very empowering,” she said. In Kenya the project has run less than 12 months and it is too soon to measure the results.
 
The Met Offices in both countries have signed memorandums of understanding with the humanitarian partner involved to ensure better collaboration.
 
Funding
 
Richard Ewbank, Climate Change Coordinator at Christian Aid, says such projects are likely to remain limited, due to a lack of funding for mitigation and resilience-building. Despite a complex web of climate change adaptation funds – including those of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), money from foundations and multilaterals, and promises by developed countries to mobilize US$100 billion to boost adaptation efforts by 2020 – it took HFP two years to find funding for its 12-month pilot project, before it eventually tapped into the UK Department for International Development’s Climate and Development Knowledge Network. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88070/AID-POLICY-Climate-change-and-adaptation-funding-equally-unpredictable ]
 
Christian Aid has its own church-based funding source. “It’s hard to persuade donors to pre-fund season forecast information – they prefer to fund humanitarian situations when they hit,” Ewbank told IRIN.
 
However, as donors start to see the pay-off from more detailed weather information in the right hands, it may generate more interest. “If climate services get more accurate,” he said, “then clearly our scope to use these tools will also improve.”
 
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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95214/CLIMATE-CHANGE-Farmers-and-forecasts</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203301412410080t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BINGERVILLE/DAKAR 02 April 2012 (IRIN) - Unpredictable rainfall in parts of Côte d’Ivoire cost some farmers over half of their harvest in 2011 producers told IRIN, but, armed with more knowledge about how to get weather reports and interpret them, they might still have been able to boost their output, say agricultural specialists.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>GUINEA-BISSAU: Possibilities and pitfalls following president’s death</title><pubDate>Fri, 20 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005071410150842t.jpg" />]]>BISSAU 20 January 2012 (IRIN) - The death of Guinea-Bissau President Malam Bacai Sanha on 9 January from health complications could either perpetuate the instability that has long plagued the country, or provide an opportunity for political parties to negotiate a smooth, constitutional transfer of power which could in turn help shore up the country’s development, say analysts and diplomats.</description><body><![CDATA[BISSAU 20 January 2012 (IRIN) - The death of Guinea-Bissau President Malam Bacai Sanha on 9 January from health complications could either perpetuate the instability that has long plagued the country, or provide an opportunity for political parties to negotiate a smooth, constitutional transfer of power which could in turn help shore up the country’s development, say analysts and diplomats.

Two weeks prior to the president’s death, on 26 December, Navy Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto was arrested alongside 29 military staff, following a fight between different military factions. 

While described by some as a coup attempt, it is more likely the fighting was a standoff between Tchuto and his long-time rival Army Chief of Staff General Antonio Indjai, who have family and clan rivalries as well as overlapping interests in the lucrative drug transit trade, analysts told IRIN.

Against this backdrop, National Assembly speaker Raimundo Pereira is acting as interim president and has 60 days to organize presidential elections.

This presents an opportunity for the opposition and government - dominated by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), with 67 out of 100 parliamentary seats - to work together for higher goals, said a Western diplomat in Dakar who preferred anonymity. “Guinea-Bissau has an opportunity here. The opposition and government could act responsibility, and the government could reach out to the opposition to be part of the process.”

Initially the leading opposition party, the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), opposed Pereira - who is seen as being close to Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior, as interim leader.

Time pressure

The 60-day time limit puts pressure on the government to prepare for elections, but most agree if the country is to abide by electoral rules - which include holding a census before a new election - this time-frame is impossible to meet. 

Following the assassination of President Jaoao Vieira in March 2009, it took the country four to five months to organize and hold presidential elections. [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=83239 ]

Post-60 days, if no clear constitutional parameters are set, opposition figures could make things difficult “and if disgruntled, could try to make arrangements with the army - which is always the recipe [for insecurity] here,” said a political adviser in the capital Bissau, who also preferred anonymity. 

Finances may also complicate issues: presidential elections should cost around US$4.5 million, which “is a lot to raise in two months”, said the adviser, while further funds will need to be leveraged for legislative elections planned towards the end of this year.

Head of the National Assembly Cabinet Carlos Fonsecka Rodriguez told IRIN he has high hopes. Brandishing a copy of the constitution, he said: “It is up to us to be mature and sensible and to follow what we have put in the constitution. It is necessary that we Guineans know how to show the world that we are capable of respecting what is written.”

Guinea-Bissau ranks 176 out of 187 countries on the UN’s 2011 Human Development Index [ http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/GNB.html ] - lower than the regional average. Life expectancy is just 48 years, partly due to very high infant mortality rates: Roughly one in 10 infants die before they reach age five. While primary school enrolment has risen over the past five years, just half of the adult population is literate.

Hegemony

In a political setting characterized by “opportunistic political alliances” as the diplomat put it, the alliances of ex-President Sanha and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior balanced each other out, keeping an “uneasy peace”.

Some sawy Sanha as a unifier. Ansoumane Sagna, legal adviser to interim President Pereira told IRIN, “Sanha listened, he understood… He was a true unifier... He always tried to improve Guinea-Bissau.”

Now the balance has tipped, leading to a “mounting hegemony” of the PAIGC, which could see a shoring up of power between Prime Minister Junior and Army Chief Indjai, says International Crisis Group’s Guinea-Bissau researcher, Vincent Foucher. 

But PAIGC is deeply divided, said the Bissau-based political adviser, and before that, there is likely to be a scramble for power within the party, which could lead to an “element of political instability”. 

Drugs and the military

Other destabilizing factors in the country have not changed: the bloated military and its strong influence on politics and the transit of large amounts of cocaine from South America to Europe.

International police observers have linked both the army and navy chiefs of staff to the drugs trade. Either one or both were allegedly implicated in two recent mainland arrivals of drug-loaded planes - one of them in Mansoa, just 50km northeast of Bissau. 

Some have alleged that by locking up Tchuto, the army is left to take over his side of the network, but in doing so, he also risks becoming a “Balanta martyr”, said the diplomat, referring to Guinea-Bissau’s largest ethnic group which has traditionally dominated the military.

When it comes to reforming the security sector [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=89061 ] - that is, downsizing and professionalizing the army and police among other reforms - some progress has been made. All the necessary reform-related laws have been passed; the Angolan government and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have provided funding for this to the tune of US$38million; and the Guinea-Bissau government, in a show of good will and ownership, has set aside $500,000. 

Law enforcement procedures and the judiciary have been “incrementally” strengthened, said the diplomat, though when it comes to “putting people on trial and sending them to jail” there haven’t been many returns.

But one of the first concrete steps - to retire and put on pensions some 400 military officers and generals by the end of January 2012 - is off-track. An announcement was due out on this next week but will not be made, said the political analyst. 

While Army Chief Indjai is outwardly supportive of security sector reform, the process continues to threaten many in the military and must be carefully handled, say observers. However, many say the above delay is necessary as the constitutional question is more pressing.

Most civilians IRIN spoke to in the capital Bissau, are ready to see action taken. Richard Antwi, a pastor in the capital Bissau, told IRIN: “They [the military] need to be trained to know that their job is to stay in their barracks and to have nothing to do with the political system - yes to protect and defend the country, but not to intervene and take power.”

Herein also lies an opportunity, said the Western diplomat. “He [Indjai] has the opportunity to be the head of a groundbreaking, professional Bissau-Guinean military… Nothing more could help the country’s economic growth prospects than this,” he told IRIN.

Peace dividend

The recent stint of relative peace has already brought the country development advantages. In December 2010 the World Bank and International Monetary Fund forgave the country US$1.2 billion worth of incurred debt under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries package. As a result, the government no longer has to spend the bulk of its budget on interest payments but can move on to invest in infrastructure and social services, and can more powerfully attract international investment to do so.

Several “non-traditional” donors [ http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?indepthid=91&reportid=94004 ] have started to show an interest in Guinea-Bissau - with Angola and Brazil - each keen to show their leadership capacity in the lusophone community (and the former with a keen interest in the country’s bauxite reserves) - investing significant amounts in the country. China is rebuilding the presidential palace; Brazil has invested in police training; and the African Development Bank has invested in road rehabilitation.

In the last year in Bissau - renowned for its lack of electricity, unpaved roads and deteriorating water and sanitation services - solar-powered street-lamps and traffic lights have been erected on main streets and pedestrian overpasses have been built on crowded thoroughfares. “There has been a marked improvement in living standards in the capital over recent years,” said the diplomat, who gave much of the credit for proactively attracting foreign investment, to Prime Minister Junior. [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=83723 ]

Most hope that the events of 26 December were not the beginning of a pattern of unrest, and that the country can continue to move on. As businessman Joao Gomes in Bissau, put it: “We are tired of not having peace.”

aj/jl/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94693/GUINEA-BISSAU-Possibilities-and-pitfalls-following-president-s-death</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005071410150842t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BISSAU 20 January 2012 (IRIN) - The death of Guinea-Bissau President Malam Bacai Sanha on 9 January from health complications could either perpetuate the instability that has long plagued the country, or provide an opportunity for political parties to negotiate a smooth, constitutional transfer of power which could in turn help shore up the country’s development, say analysts and diplomats.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>WEST AFRICA: Sahel the danger zone for food insecurity</title><pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201109241342030732t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 27 October 2011 (IRIN) - Erratic rains and high imported rice and wheat prices against a backdrop of chronic food insecurity and malnutrition in parts of the Sahel, will leave millions of people at risk of food insecurity, according to the latest crop assessments.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 27 October 2011 (IRIN) - Erratic rains and high imported rice and wheat prices against a backdrop of chronic food insecurity and malnutrition in parts of the Sahel, will leave millions of people at risk of food insecurity, according to the latest crop assessments.
 
“We are definitely going to have a difficult year,” said Patricia Hoorelbeke, West Africa head of NGO Action Against Hunger (ACF), adding that the NGO is considering expanding its food and nutrition programmes in the region.
 
Food production
 
Food production is expected to be lower than usual in parts of western Niger, Chad’s Sahelian zone, southern Mauritania, western Mali, eastern Burkina Faso, northern Senegal and Nigeria, according to a report by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and a separate assessment by USAID’s food security monitor FEWS NET. [ http://www.fews.net/Pages/region.aspx?gb=r1&l=en ]
 
Tahoua and Tillabéry in central and northwestern Niger respectively are expected to see significantly reduced outputs, according to FEWS NET.
 
In most of the above-affected areas the rains either started too late or too early, or were unevenly distributed.
 
Cereal production is expected to reach 43-52 million tons for the region, near the 2009 average, according to FEWS NET. More precise figures will be known in mid-November once the harvest is collected.
 
Pastoralists
 
Pastoralists are expected to fare better than they did last year, when hit by drought in the Sahel, but in some agro-pastoralist zones, rains have been delayed, which could lead to poor pasture levels, according to the WFP/FAO report. 
 
“We are worried because these irregular rainfalls have occurred in very vulnerable areas where people’s resilience is already very weakened,” said livelihoods specialist at WFP Jean-Martin Bauer. Many Sahelian households live in a state of chronic food insecurity, he said. “They are the ones with no access to land, lost livestock, without able-bodied men who can find work in cities - they are particularly affected by a decrease in production.” 
 
A government-NGO April 2011 study in 14 agro-pastoral departments of Niger noted that pastoralists with small herds lost on average 90 percent of their livestock in the 2009-2010 drought, while those with large herds lost one quarter. Those who had lost the bulk of their assets have already reduced the quality and quantity of food they are consuming. 
 
The Niger government and partners are currently studying the food insecurity situation, so more will be known soon, he said, adding that it is clear the government will need to carry out some kind of emergency food distributions and food subsidies imminently. 
 
Nutrition
 
Parts of the Sahel year-on-year experience global acute malnutrition rates that surpass emergency thresholds. A third of the population of Chad is chronically undernourished, regardless of the rains or size of the harvest; and more than 50 percent of the population in Niger suffers from food insecurity, with 22 percent extremely food insecure, according to the World Bank in 2009.
 
Global acute malnutrition [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=93701 ] in parts of the Sahelian zone of Chad was on average 15-20 percent over the past five years, and could reach 25 percent this year, according to ACF’s Hoorelbeke.
 
Returnees from Libya
 
The return to Niger and Chad of migrants from Libya who previously sent money home to help mitigate crop deficit is already pushing some families into further food insecurity, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). “These returns have aggravated extreme poverty and hunger which is affecting more than half of Niger's 2.5 million people threatened with food insecurity this year,” said IOM.
 
While international attention and government involvement has been relatively high in Niger compared to the devastating drought of 2005, Oumarou Lalo Keita, principal adviser to the prime minister, said international agencies have been slow to respond to government appeals for increased aid over recent months as a result of the return of some 90,000 migrants from Libya. “There is clearly cause for concern,” he said. Following the 2009-2010 drought, the country does not have sufficient emergency food stocks, he said. “We experience difficulties year-on-year, and there is still a gap between needs and the support we receive.”
 
While governments and aid agencies in West Africa are for the most part well-versed in responding to food insecurity, readiness and capacity is still low in some areas. 
 
Part of the Chadian Sahel and eastern Burkina Faso are not receiving as much international attention, said ACF’s Hoorelbeke. “Chadian Sahel is hardly covered - there are not enough agencies there… If there is a situation that we hear very little about, it is eastern Burkina Faso, where we are likely to see a real problem this year,” she told IRIN. 
 
However, even were more money available, many Sahelian governments lack the capacity to absorb it, notes a report just out by the Sahel Working Group entitled Escaping the Hunger Cycle: Pathways to Resilience in the Sahel. [ http://www.groundswellinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/Pathways-to-Resilience-in-the-Sahel.pdf ]
 
Some Sahelian countries, such as Mali, have built up decent emergency buffer stocks following a good 2010 harvest, according to food security analysts. But region-wide, more food security stocks are needed as promised in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agricultural policy, says the Sahel Working Group.
 
Some governments, such as Senegal, are trying to reduce dependency on international rice markets by boosting their own self-sufficiency. However, boosting agricultural production is only one of many interventions required to boost food-security. Intervening to improve access to food, is equally important, particularly for those who do not work in agriculture - the very poor, pastoralists, urban dwellers and others.
 
Costly food imports
 
Some 40 percent of West Africa’s rice consumption is imported, according to WFP’s Bauer. The Thai government’s recently-issued policy to raise the minimum price guaranteed to farmers has produced tensions on the international rice market. One ton of top quality Thai rice, which is a reference on the food market, has already gone up from US$380 dollars in September 2010 to $495 in September 2011. With the terrible floods currently affecting Thailand, prices should continue to rise, say experts. [ http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94021 ]
 
Most likely to be affected in West Africa are Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and other coastal states. 
 
International wheat prices have also risen since June 2011 because of poor wheat prospects in the USA. The cost of US wheat was up 24 percent in August 2011 from its August 2010 level, according to FAO’s September Global Food Price Monitor. [ http://www.fao.org/giews/english/gfpm/ ]
 
Imported wheat counts for two-thirds of grain consumption in Mauritania: in the capital, Nouakchott, prices have risen by 50 percent since this time last year; while in the desert town of Ouadane in the central-north, wheat prices are at record highs. Even before wheat prices shot up, one in five households was food-insecure in the south, according to the Commission for Food Security and humanitarian partners, and 8 percent had already reduced the amount of food they were eating.
 
Regional markets also require close monitoring, say market analysts. High rice prices in Guinea this year, for instance, drew many of Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s rice producers to export there, leaving significant grain deficits in Liberia, and a 38 percent price rice since 2010 in urban areas. 
 
The Niger government is working hard to ensure that its local harvest stays predominantly in-country so as not to repeat the problems faced in 2005 when the strength of the Nigerian currency (the naira) against the CFA franc meant Niger and Chad sold more cereals to Nigeria. The naira rose against the CFA in September. However, government interventions to protect markets are also a “double-edged sword”, said adviser to Niger’s prime minister Keita, as it encouraged neighbouring states to do the same, stagnating the market. 
 
Existing safety nets and food aid are inadequate to cope with the spikes in food prices caused by droughts or international markets that the region has experienced in recent months, says the Sahel Working Group. A far more robust regulatory framework is needed to help protect food security, despite market volatility.
 
cb/aj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94081/WEST-AFRICA-Sahel-the-danger-zone-for-food-insecurity</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201109241342030732t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 27 October 2011 (IRIN) - Erratic rains and high imported rice and wheat prices against a backdrop of chronic food insecurity and malnutrition in parts of the Sahel, will leave millions of people at risk of food insecurity, according to the latest crop assessments.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>FOOD: Rumpus over GM food aid</title><pubDate>Tue, 18 Oct 2011 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108011245250824t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 18 October 2011 (IRIN) - Genetically modified (GM) food aid bound for Africa has long been a bone of contention among governments, scientists, activists, consumers and aid workers.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 18 October 2011 (IRIN) - Genetically modified (GM) food aid bound for Africa has long been a bone of contention among governments, scientists, activists, consumers and aid workers. 
 
 On 18 August a drought-affected Kenyan government fired the head of its National Biosafety Authority for expediting the process to import milled food aid which might have contained genetically modified organisms (GMO). In the weeks preceding and after the incident, public debate on the issue was distorted by extreme positions either for or against GM food. 
 
 “When you have people starving in your country you don’t simply turn your back on food at your door-step just because it is labelled GM - it is expected that biosafety risk assessments should have been conducted before the importation of the food to see whether it does indeed pose a threat before taking a decision. Taking this decision so late in the day could have serious consequences for the suffering people,” says Diran Makinde, director of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD’s) African Biosafety Network of Expertise (ABNE), a pool of scientific experts set up by the African Union. 
 
 There have been different degrees of resistance to GM food and GM food aid in Africa. 
 
 In 2002 Zambia announced it would not accept GM food aid in any form. Positions were polarized to a great extent after a quote from a US state department official, “Beggars can’t be choosers”, hit the headlines. It prompted the then president, Levy Mwanawasa, to say hunger was no reason for feeding his people “poison”. Since then Zambia has become a poster-child for the anti-GM lobby. 
[ http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/28948/1/African%20perspectives%20on%20genetically%20modified%20crops.pdf?1 ]
 
 Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique said they could allow imports of GM food aid in its milled form as this eliminated the risk of the germination of whole grains and limited possible contamination of local varieties. [ http://www.eoearth.org/article/Genetically_modified_crops_in_Africa ]
 
 Lesotho and Swaziland allowed the distribution of non-milled GM food/grains, but warned people that it was for consumption not cultivation. 
 
 In 2004, Angola and Sudan announced restrictions on GM food aid. 
 
 Cautious approach 
 
 Most African countries approach GM technology applied to crops with caution. 
 
 “Why shouldn’t we be wary of this technology and its possible long-term health impacts, if the EU [European Union] is. If it is not good for them, why should it be good for us?” said Tewolde Egziabher, Ethiopia’s director of the Environmental Protection Agency. 
 
 Egziabher was one of the main architects of the Cartagena Protocol, the international law on biosafety which came into effect in 2003 and which allows countries to impose bans on foods containing GM. 
 
 The Protocol’s cornerstone is “precaution”, notes a UN Environment Programme briefing. [ http://www.eoearth.org/article/Responses_to_genetically_modified_crop_use_in_Africa ]
  
 It gives governments the discretion to impose bans even where there is insufficient scientific evidence about the potential adverse effects of GM crops. The USA has yet to ratify the Protocol. 
 
 GM technology injects foreign genes into a crop that can improve its appearance, taste, nutritional quality, drought tolerance, and insect and disease resistance. There has been cautious optimism about the new technology in some quarters. 
 
 “As crop yields drop because of weather shocks, GM technology is not the panacea, as Africa will feel the impact of climate change in the long-term. But it is potentially yet another tool in our fight to improve production,” said Per Pinstrup-Andersen, 2001 World Food Prize laureate and the author of a book on the politics of GM food. 
 
 Most critics of GM food, however, argue that foreign genes can produce toxic proteins and allergens, even possibly transfer the genes to bacteria in the human gut; or transfer these traits to other crops with unknown consequences. 
 
 Global divide 
 
 A deep mistrust also prevails in Africa, given the fact that two power blocs - the EU and the USA remain divided over GM. 
 
 Only one strain of GM maize, Monsanto 810, and one modified potato, have been approved in the EU, and most countries grow neither commercially. Spain accounts for about 80 percent of GMO grown in the EU in terms of land under cultivation, but Austria, France, Greece, Hungary, Germany and Luxembourg have banned all GMO cultivation. [ http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/07/eu_parliament_votes_to_allow_r.html ]
 
 On the other hand, in the USA, where 70 percent of maize is GM, GM food need not be labelled. Some food experts say both the EU and the USA have vested interests in promoting their respective views in Africa, which is seen as a potential market and supplier of either GM or non-GM products. 
 
 In Africa, the production of GM food is still in its infancy. South Africa (70-80 percent of its maize, soya and cotton production), Egypt (maize) and Burkina Faso (cotton) are the only African countries commercially producing GM crops, according to ABNE. 
 
 Traditionally the USA has been the biggest donor in kind to the World Food Programme (WFP). But the aid agency is trying to broaden its source of food aid. In 2010, WFP said 36 percent of its food aid, or two million out of 5.7 million tons disbursed globally, was procured in developing countries. [ http://www.wfp.org/content/food-aid-flows-2010-report ]
 
 While wheat accounts for more than 50 percent of WFP’s global cereal component, GM wheat does not figure as it is not grown commercially. According to data from 2006, at least 38 percent of cereal food aid to Africa was wheat and wheat flour, said Christopher Barrett, a food aid expert. Though wheat tends to be a less important part of the African diet than maize, aid agencies sometimes offer wheat instead of GM maize in emergencies. [ http://faostat.fao.org/site/485/default.aspx#ancor ]
 
 Possible solutions 
 
 Milling the grain is an obvious solution, said Julia Steets, an aid policy expert at the Global Public Policy Institute. "Milling either at source or in the port of arrival or in the prepositioning warehouses - it would of course also help to know in advance which governments take what positions on that, so that the food aid agencies are prepared." 
 
 The stance of recipient countries has to be respected. When a country prohibits GMO, sourcing alternative commodities and routes can “obviously impact delivery times and costs but those are the parameters in which we work,” said David Orr, WFP spokesman. “We always abide by the laws and regulations of recipient countries.” 
 
 If a country is not receptive to GM food - “give the country the money for procurement of the food from an African country with a surplus (local procurement is better than shipping food all the way from the US any way),” said Pinstrup-Andersen. 
 
 Food aid agencies in Africa usually turn to South Africa for surplus maize. The country has systems in place to segregate non-GM from GM, says Thom Jayne, professor of international development at Michigan State University. 
 
 Farmers in South Africa certify non-GM content by conducting a basic test, which detects specific proteins produced by a GM plant. The non-GM grain is separated from the rest before being shipped. 
 
 Another way of separating GM from non-GM crops involves contract-farming schemes first set up in 2004-2005. The process involves the purchaser identifying farmers who buy non-GM seed. Tests are conducted on their field for any traces of GM before they are offered a contract. 
 
 But all these measures involve extra costs. 
 
 Legislation 
 
 In 2001 the African Union drafted the African Biosafety Model Law but taking an even more cautious approach than the Protocol, allowing countries to adopt more stringent measures to assess the safety of GM food. 
 
 National biosafety laws exist in 17 of the 54 African countries. In most countries, the legislation is a work-in-progress. 
 
 Labelling and verifying the content of a crop on a day-to day basis is an outstanding issue. South Africa, the first country in Africa to put biosafety laws in place (in 1997), has yet to develop a labelling process. 
 
 More public education and debate around GM food needs to happen, said Pinstrup-Andersen. “Almost all GM-food varieties have been through stringent testing for health safety, which non-GM food has not undergone ever. People need to engage with the science and not the politics.” 
 
 jk/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93991/FOOD-Rumpus-over-GM-food-aid</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108011245250824t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 18 October 2011 (IRIN) - Genetically modified (GM) food aid bound for Africa has long been a bone of contention among governments, scientists, activists, consumers and aid workers.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA: Cholera thriving two years on</title><pubDate>Wed, 12 Oct 2011 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201101191305510629t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 12 October 2011 (IRIN) - Three simultaneous cholera epidemics have affected 24 countries in West and Central Africa, with 85,000 infections and 2,466 deaths since the beginning of 2011, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 12 October 2011 (IRIN) - Three simultaneous cholera epidemics have affected 24 countries in West and Central Africa, with 85,000 infections and 2,466 deaths since the beginning of 2011, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 
 
Three multi-country epidemics are ongoing – each with separate strains - : the Lake Chad Basin, affecting Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger; the West Congo Basin, with impacts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic; and Lake Tanganyika - which encompasses DRC and Burundi. In Chad and Nigeria, the epidemic started in 2010. 
 
Why so persistent?
 
“If something is not working, you have to question if the response is appropriate,” said David Delienne, water and sanitation adviser at UNICEF’s West Africa office. “To stamp out cholera you need good surveillance systems to identify the epicentres of the disease - these do exist but it in some places surveillance is not systematic enough.” 
 
Surveillance systems along the (very long) Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad borders are generally quite patchy, said Grant Laeity, emergency head for UNICEF, as the areas are so remote, with few health facilities, and tend to be far from the nearest administrative capitals (Abuja, Yaoundé and N’djamena, respectively). Some remote areas, such as north and northwest Cameroon, have very high case fatality rates of up to 22 percent, according to the World Health Organization (WHO).
 
Chad
 
According to WHO, five countries - Ghana, DRC, Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad -account for around 90 percent of the total number of cases and deaths.
 
The epidemic is the worst in Chad’s history, with 16,000 cases and 433 deaths. The country’s vast territory, and large-scale population movements, makes it hard to respond to each and every case, said Michel-Olivier Lacharité, programme director for Chad at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) France. 
 
In remote health districts where there are only two or three cases, MSF, which alongside the government has treated 11,000 people thus far, may have to forgo treating them, prioritizing higher-density caseloads. 
 
But even a small number of cases can cause the disease to spread further. “If it were a camp for displaced people, where no one was going anywhere, it would be a lot easier to contain,” Lacharité pointed out.
 
Over half of Chad’s health districts have been affected thus far. 
 
Paradox
 
“This disease is a paradox,” said Lacharité, “as it is very easy to treat with generic antibiotics and rehydration fluids.” But equally, it is very easy to spread, particularly since carriers often do not know they are infected, he said. 
 
In northeastern Nigeria containing the disease has been hampered by high population density, and by sporadic conflict which has left health clinics empty in some districts, according to Laeity.
 
All of the affected countries have poor water and sanitation facilities, and none are on track to meet the Millennium Development Goal for basic sanitation. While there is more awareness of the need for better water and sanitation in the region, it has not necessarily led to changes in funding and behaviour, said Delienne. “Ghana, Mali have made some efforts…but overall, it [progress] needs to accelerate.” 
 
Cross-border prevention
 
Preventing cholera from spreading does not have to be complicated: setting up systematic information-sharing systems across borders to identify cholera “hotspots” is effective; as are practical measures such as encouraging hand-washing at borders, or disinfecting boats crossing to and from DRC capital Kinshasa to Congo-Brazzaville capital Brazzaville. 
 
The governments of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau eventually set up effective information-sharing at the border, and encouraged those crossing to wash their hands, acts which contributed to the eventual decline in caseload. 
 
But setting up a sanitation-police system at the border does not really make sense, said MSF’s Lacharité, partly because it would be so hard to administer. 
 
Questions authorities need to ask include: “Is there enough water treatment going on in cholera hotspots? Is there adequate separation of drinking water from sewage systems? What kind of border checks are set up?” said Laeity. 
 
In late 2010 UNICEF undertook a study to identify the key cholera hotspots and how the infection was spreading across borders; it is now working on how to implement the findings.
 
Health experts in Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad met in late September to discuss how to work more closely together to try to stem the spread of the disease, said WHO spokesperson Tarek Jasarevic. WHO is supporting health ministries in all of the countries involved, to improve disease surveillance and identify new cases; as well as sending out rapid response teams.
 
Third year running?
 
It is still “too early” to say whether each outbreak has reached its peak, said Laeity. While fewer cases have been reported in Chad and Cameroon over the past month, in Kinshasa and in Brazzaville, heavy rains are just starting, so transmission could well rise. 
 
Health authorities in the Central African Republic declared an outbreak just two weeks ago - tests are under way to determine if it is the same strain as in a previous epidemic.
 
In Chad, the disease could well continue until 2012, said Lacharité. “It should continue to diminish now the rainy season has ended, but could easily stick around and climb again in next year’s rains.”
 
aj/cb

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93949/WEST-AND-CENTRAL-AFRICA-Cholera-thriving-two-years-on</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201101191305510629t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 12 October 2011 (IRIN) - Three simultaneous cholera epidemics have affected 24 countries in West and Central Africa, with 85,000 infections and 2,466 deaths since the beginning of 2011, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>