<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Great Lakes</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 14:30:48 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>Malaria overstretching healthcare in DRC</title><pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201101050950250805t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - Gaps in the healthcare system in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are hampering the fight against malaria, a leading killer of children, say experts.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - Gaps in the healthcare system in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are hampering the fight against malaria, a leading killer of children, say experts.

Malaria accounts for about a third of outpatient consultations in DRC clinics, Leonard Kouadio, a UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) health specialist, told IRIN. He added, “It is the leading cause of death among children under five years and is responsible for a significant proportion of deaths among older children and adults.”

Kouadio continued: “Recent retrospective mortality surveys have revealed that in all regions of the country, the fever is associated with 40 percent of [deaths of] children under five.”

Malaria is also a leading cause of school absenteeism in DRC, and it may have other adverse effects. “In cases of severe malaria, children who survive face serious health problems such as epilepsy, impaired vision or speech,” he said.

According to UN World Health Organization (WHO) estimates [ http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs094/en/index.html ], out of about 660,000 malaria deaths globally in 2010, at least 40 percent occurred in DRC and Nigeria. 

In DRC, malaria accounts for about half of all hospital consultations and admissions in children younger than five, according to the government’s National Programme for the Fight against Malaria (NMCP). On average, Congolese children under five years old suffer six to 10 episodes of malaria per year, according to UNICEF’s Kouadio.

Other leading causes of death among under-five Congolese children include acute respiratory infections, diarrhoeal diseases and malnutrition, according to UNICEF’s 2013-2017 DRC Country Programme Document. 

A deficient health system 

“It is apparent that major deficiencies in the health system have contributed to the severity of recurrent outbreaks [of malaria],” Jan Peter Stellema, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) operational manager, told IRIN via email. 

“Mosquito nets are not being sent to vulnerable areas, and there are shortages of rapid diagnostic test [kits and] drugs and the equipment for carrying out blood transfusions vital for children suffering from anaemia caused by malaria.” 

Other problems include costly care and management challenges.

For example, the treatment of an uncomplicated bout of malaria ranges from about US$22 to $35, and treatment for severe cases can cost $75 to $100, according to NMCP. Such costs are prohibitive for a large number of people, many of whom live on about one dollar a day.

“In DRC, the absence of other healthcare providers and overstretched health systems leave people vulnerable to contracting malaria. Too many health centres lack the supplies necessary for coping with a new outbreak, and as a result children are dying because they did not receive care for malaria,” MSF’s Stellema said.

According to the DRC Country Programme Document, “Governance, management and coordination problems plague the [health] system at the national, provincial and local levels, thereby undermining political commitment, planning, budgetary expenditure, coordination and alignment of partnerships, the accountability and transparency of service providers, and the participation of the population in management of the services.” 

It adds, “Combined with extreme poverty, these factors create financial barriers hampering families’ access to nutrition and services, and weaken the social standards that are essential for keeping families together and maintaining a protective environment for children.”

Investment in healthcare needed

“The absence of government investment and the fragmentation of public assistance have eroded the capacity of civil society and of functional public facilities to maintain quality services,” adds the DRC Country Programme Document.

“The re-mergence and expansion of certain epidemics (polio [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91200/DRC-Polio-cases-on-the-rise ], measles [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94516/DRC-Measles-immunization-campaign-targets-1-7-million-children ] and cholera [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94028/DRC-Fighting-cholera ]) are proof of that. In addition, little has been done to modernize infrastructure. Essential supply systems, such as the cold chain, have not been put in place,” it states.

There is an urgent need to address the struggling health system to fight malaria, experts say.

“The fight against this scourge must remain a top priority of the country, despite the lack of financial resources,” said UNICEF’s Kouadio. “The government and its partners should increase the funding for the fight against malaria in the DRC, in particular, acquisition and universal distribution of mosquito nets to households, provision of essential drugs and rapid diagnostic test [kits], and dissemination of environmental sanitation measures.”

Malaria occurs almost year-round in DRC due its tropical climate and its river and lake system. The country has some 30 large rivers totalling at least 20,000km of shoreline, and 15 lakes totalling about 180,000km, which offer environments conducive to the proliferation of diseases and disease vectors, including the Anopheles mosquito, which spreads malaria. 

According to MSF’s Stellema, the DRC government and national and international health actors need to take rapid and sustainable measures to prevent and treat malaria in order to avoid unnecessary child deaths. In 2012, MSF treated half a million Congolese for malaria, many of them children under five.

“MSF's emergency response is saving lives in the short term. But in the longer term, the organization cannot address the [malaria] crisis alone,” said Stellema.

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]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98069/Malaria-overstretching-healthcare-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201101050950250805t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - Gaps in the healthcare system in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are hampering the fight against malaria, a leading killer of children, say experts.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Call for oil revenues to improve living standards in Congo</title><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203071330530657t.jpg" />]]>BRAZZAVILLE 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - Congo, which is heavily dependent on revenue from the oil industry, has been declared as “conforming to” a global standard that aims to ensure transparency of payments for natural resources; NGOs hope the announcement will improve the lives of the poor.</description><body><![CDATA[BRAZZAVILLE 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - Congo, which is heavily dependent on revenue from the oil industry, has been declared as “conforming to” a global standard that aims to ensure transparency of payments for natural resources; NGOs hope the announcement will improve the lives of the poor. 

More than half the country’s 3.6 million people live below the poverty line. 

The Initiative for Transparency in the Extractive Industries (EITI) [ http://eiti.org/ ], adopted by G8 countries in 2003, aims to improve the transparency of the management of mineral resources. It brings together, in a single structure, governments, oil companies, international financial institutions and NGOs. 

"Being validated and found to comply with the EITI means Congo ticked 21 boxes, including membership of EITI, implying a commitment to publish all necessary information relating to the management of our industries, especially oil, our primary export resource," Florent Michel Okoko, coordinator of EITI in Congo, told IRIN. 

Oil accounts for 80 to 90 percent of Congo’s exports and budget revenues. 

EITI covers both solid and liquid mines. However "at this stage, we are focusing on the oil industry because, in terms of solid mines [iron ore mining in the southwest], we are still at the stage of prospecting. In the relatively near future, we will also integrate solid mines," said Okoko. 

Congo’s achievement of compliance has not come overnight: The country became associated with EITI in 2004, but oil has remained a sticking point. 

“However, since 2011 the government seems to have made an effort because from then on, there is an 80 to 90 percent overlap between revenues that were reported by oil companies and those said to have been seen by the Treasury,” Christian Mounzéo, of the Congolese organization Publish What You Pay (PWYP), told IRIN. 

Much-needed revenues 

Congolese civil society groups insist that such revenue should benefit the lives of all Congolese citizens. 

"Being consistent with EITI is not an end in itself. Instead, the government should mandate the equitable distribution of [revenue from] petroleum, mining and gas products. The Congolese want to touch and taste the income of its oil daily,” Brice Mackosso, secretary-general of the Diocesan Commission for Justice and Peace (CJP), told IRIN. 

Officially, annual income from oil exports is around US$6 billion. 

"These oil revenues are currently very, very important, so it is time for the average Congolese to feel them in terms of better access to education, water, electricity and health," said Mackosso. 

According to the most recent Demographic Health Survey (2007), 47 percent of the population had access to water in urban areas, and 11 percent in rural areas. The figures for electricity were 45 and 6 percent respectively. 

Literacy rates, which used to be around 100 percent in the 1980s, dropped to 80 percent in 2010 due to the civil war, according to the UN Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP’s Human Development Index says life expectancy is 55. 

Officially 24 to 30 percent of the population under 30 is unemployed, according to 2011 World Bank estimates. 

Between February and April 2013, at least 9,500 state school teachers went on strike to demand a 60 percent pay increase. "Teachers have expressed aloud what all Congolese think to themselves. In any case the oil money is not kept in Congo, but in tax havens," Elo Dacy, a member of the opposition Patriotic Union for National Renewal (UPRN), told IRIN. 

lmm/cb/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98044/Call-for-oil-revenues-to-improve-living-standards-in-Congo</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203071330530657t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BRAZZAVILLE 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - Congo, which is heavily dependent on revenue from the oil industry, has been declared as “conforming to” a global standard that aims to ensure transparency of payments for natural resources; NGOs hope the announcement will improve the lives of the poor.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Towards internal solutions to the DRC crisis</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97999/Is-more-force-in-the-DRC-more-of-the-same ] will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there. 

The over-3,000-strong military force will work alongside the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) to carry out targeted offensives against militia groups, which have caused numerous civilian deaths and massive population displacements. 

While some welcome the forthcoming military intervention, many analysts are advocating for Kinshasa-led initiatives - such as reforming key institutions - as necessary, if not alternative, solutions. 

In this briefing, IRIN highlights some of the key issues that the DRC government needs to address to secure its restive east.  

How can the security sector be reformed? 

An effective security sector is key to resolving most of DRC’s problems, according to analysts. 

“The Congolese government’s inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else,” according to The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, a 2012 report by a group of Congolese and international civil society organizations [ http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/drc-ssr-report-20120416-1.pdf ]. 

“An effective security sector - organized, resourced, trained and vetted - is essential to solving problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals,” the report says. 

But little money is being directly spent on security sector reform (SSR), it notes.  For example, while official development assistance to DRC post-2006 has amounted to at least US$14 billion, just over one percent, or about $84.79 million, has gone to SSR. 

The report blamed the international community for being “politically incoherent and poorly coordinated” with regard to SSR. It also blamed the DRC government’s lack of political will to take on SSR, attributed to its endemic corruption.  

According to Naomi Kok, a research consultant with the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), “SSR is a long-term project for the DRC, and Kinshasa should take most of the responsibility for completing this successfully.” 

But DRC’s government needs to take charge first. “The problem of the DRC is a weak, and some may argue an illegitimate, government, unable to take full control and charge of its vast territory,” Nicholas Opiyo, a Kampala-based lawyer with the Akijul consultancy [ http://www.akijul.org/index.php ], told IRIN. 

He added:  “The weakness or division in the Congolese army is only... a manifestation of the broader breakdown in the governance infrastructure of the country. As a result, everyone finds resort in a patchy solution, taking control of the instruments of violence.” 

How can the army be reined in? 

Acts of violence against civilians in eastern DRC are rampant, with the DRC army (FARDC) and dozens of militia groups culpable. 

FARDC troops are accused of violating human rights around the town of Minova, in South Kivu Province, last year while retreating from North Kivu Province  after the city of Goma fell to the M23 militia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96833/DRC-Fall-of-Goma-puts-200-000-children-at-risk ], according to  a  May UN Joint Human Rights Office report [ http://monusco.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Pj7jOWjAxWo%3d&tabid=10662&language=en-US ]. 

“In this context, at least 102 women and 33 girls were victims of rape or other acts of sexual violence perpetrated by FARDC soldiers,” says the report, which noted the soldiers had arbitrarily executed at least two people, used forced labour and looted from villages. 

FARDC is often regarded as weak, with poorly organized, unmotivated troops. The M23 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] mutiny in eastern DRC in 2012 by ethnic Tutsi FARDC officers, for example, was in part fuelled by grievances over pay and living conditions. 

Training alone will not address FARDC’s problems, which are structural, say experts. 

“There is an overestimation about what training can achieve. Foreign partners (Belgium, USA, France, Angola, South African and China) have now been training the Congolese army since 2006, and the results are very poor,” Thierry Vircoulon, an International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst, told IRIN in an e-mail. 

“Training is only good when it can be applied but, given the state of the Congolese army, the trained soldiers are sent back to a dysfunctional organization without decent pay and working conditions. Training will not solve the structural problems of the Congolese army.” 

FARDC has also been plagued by ethnic divisions, with some troops still loyal to militia groups. 

“The so-called Congolese army is a patchwork of fighters with various backgrounds - former Mobutu military personnel, militiamen from the MLC [Mouvement de liberation du Congo] of Jean-Pierre Bemba, Mai Mai, AFDL [Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo] fighters, etc. And there was not a process to unite these groups, and some of them managed to stay in their territories of origin - CNDP [Congrès national pour la défense du people]/M23 in North Kivu,” noted Vircoulon. 

“Therefore, ethnic and past affiliations remain and are stronger than the military discipline and command. The Congolese army is not an institution; it is a patchwork of undisciplined and untrained groups of fighters.” 

What about demobilization? 

The process of integrating ex-combatants into the Congolese army, part of the government’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, is also mired in challenges. 

“Currently, the national military is in a shambles, and there are various armed groups that are in various stages of DDR. This situation is aggravated by domestic and regional political manipulation,” ISS’s Kok told IRIN.  

Another challenge is the failure to address the causes of armed rebellion, making disarmament often short-lived.  In 2009, for example, the DRC government signed a deal with members of the CNDP, but failure to fully implement the deal led to the 2012 mutiny that gave rise to M23. 

“[When] the M23 were integrated into the FARDC in 2009… their command and control structures [were] more or less intact. Thus, when the time came for them to defect and form a new rebellion, they were ready to do so,” explained Kok.   

The absence of a vetting process for ex-combatants is also a problem. 

“A strategy of integrating abusive warlords and their fighters into the Congolese army - in often short-lived deals with little or no vetting or training before former combatants are redeployed as Congolese army soldiers - have fuelled the cycles of violence and horrific human rights abuses in eastern Congo,” Ida Sawyer, a researcher and advocate with Human Rights Watch (HRW), told IRIN.  

Reforming the judiciary   

Inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms further enable impunity for abuses. 

Between 15 November and 2 December 2012, at least 58 cases of rape were reported during M23’s occupation of Goma, according to the May UN Joint Human Rights Office report. M23 also executed 11 civilians, recruited and used child soldiers, and engaged in forced labour and looting. 

Only a few DRC militia leaders have been arrested and convicted, among them Thomas Lubanga , who in, March 2012 was found guilty [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95073/DRC-Lubanga-verdict-a-first-step ] of conscripting child soldiers in the northeastern  Ituri  region by the International Criminal Court (ICC).  In March, former M23 commander Bosco Ntaganda surrendered to the ICC.   

Experts are calling for the establishment of specialized courts within DRC to try human rights crimes outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. 

“Together with Congolese civil society organizations, we have also called for the establishment of specialized mixed chambers or a specialized mixed court within the Congolese justice system, with the involvement of international prosecutors, judges and other personnel to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Congo since 1990,” said HRW’s Sawyer.  

“The need to hold to account those responsible for perpetuating grave crimes (government troops, rebels and militia) must not be short-changed for any short-term gains,” added  analyst Opiyo. 

According to ICG’s Vircoulon, “The blocking of justice reform is the reason why impunity is rife in the DRC.” 

What about negotiating local solutions? 

Peace talks  between M23 and the DRC government are ongoing in Kampala, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), an approach favoured by analysts sceptical of the military intervention force [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44523&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo ].   

“It all depends on the effectiveness of the UN intervention brigade, but from the point of the organization [ICGLR], we don’t believe the intervention brigade is the final solution to the conflict,” Stephen Mwachofi Singo, an ICGLR programme officer, told IRIN. 

“Already, through [the] ICGLR process, there is a political process ongoing in Kampala. Such a process should be supported to its logical conclusion,” added Singo. 

Tackling ethnic tensions is key to pacifying conflict areas. 

“DRC is a vast, multi-ethnic country, with some of the ethnic groups spanning the borders of neighbouring countries such as Angola and Rwanda. Unfortunately, past and the current DRC government[s] have used this multiplicity of ethnic groups against each other and for political connivance. This has brewed a sense of favour and disfavour,” said analyst Opiyo. 

“In order for the ethnic-based tensions to ease, there is need for not just a nationalistic army but a representative government. A centralized rather than devolved administration would provide a platform for a national, rather than an ethnic, outlook among the Congolese people.” 

According to Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, a political scientist at Makerere University, “Lasting peace in the DRC cannot come out of the deployment of aggressive foreign forces.” 

“The causes of violence in that country [DRC] are internal. The solution therefore lies in resolving the internal problems that fuel the fighting. Only [the] Congolese can solve their problems in a sustainable way. Foreigners will not do it for them.” 

so/aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98036/Briefing-Towards-internal-solutions-to-the-DRC-crisis</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Trading conflict for coffee in DRC</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081446130806t.jpg" />]]>GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.</description><body><![CDATA[GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.

"You should tell the population to grow coffee, as it's the best way for them to make money," he told a militia member during a recent visit to the town of Kalonge, where he and his fellow cooperative members have planted a nursery for coffee seedlings.

The Kivu Cooperative of Coffee Planters and Traders (CPNCK), which Makelele founded five years ago, has planted six of these nurseries in the Kalonge-Pinga-Mweso triangle, a hotbed of militia activity.

"If the young men in this area knew how much they could earn with coffee, they would not be interested in joining militias," Makelele told IRIN.

“A paradise for coffee”

Coffee, a traditional export crop, was virtually abandoned across much of North Kivu in the past 30 years. DRC’s production shrank from 110,000 metric tons in the late 1980s to about 50,000 metric tons in 2009, according to the DRC’s national coffee office.

CPNCK says it is giving away half a million arabica seedlings to help relaunch coffee’s cultivation.

Many people in the Kalonge area, including members of armed groups, appear to be interested in planting coffee. The militiaman told IRIN he would like to plant the crop on his ancestral land of more than 100 hectares, but that he would first have to raise US$1,000 to pay the land registry for title deeds.

Uncertainty about land titles and the involvement of Congolese and foreign armed groups are just some of the problems local farmers will face if they decide to take Makelele’s advice.  Planting coffee is a long-term investment, prices have been volatile and the market is not as reliable as that for food crops.

Nevertheless, the crop has paid off for neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda, which have increased their production in recent years. The crop is Uganda’s single most important export, and coffee and tea together account for nearly half of Rwanda’s exports.

The recent history of coffee prices could also deter would-be planters: The New York market price for mild arabica, currently slightly above the inflation-adjusted average for the past decade, has fluctuated by more than 300 percent since 2003, and has trended downwards since the late 1970s.

But coffee’s promoters argue that increasing demand in middle-income countries, plus the possibility that climate change could lead to the spread of diseases in coffee plants, point to higher prices in future - and bright prospects for Kivu coffee.

Additionally, the temperate climate in the Kivu region’s hills is thought to be protection against coffee rust, the most devastating disease affecting arabica. Partly for this reason, World Coffee Research describes the area as “a paradise for coffee”.

This optimism has helped to persuade several NGOs - including Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Oxfam, the Eastern Congo Initiative and the Fairtrade organization Twin - to launch coffee projects in the Kivu provinces.

Twin has helped a South Kivu co-operative, Sopacdi, replant coffee and improve yields, quality and post-harvest processing, enabling its 3,500 members to become the first producers in Kivu to achieve organic and Fairtrade certification.

Income potential

Sopacdi has publicized the job opportunities it has provided to ex-combatants. A number of them work at a mechanized washing centre - paid for by Twin and employing 161 people - where the coffee berries are depulped and dried.

One of the staff at the washing centre, former rebel Habamungu Engavashapa, told IRIN he was happy with civilian life because he was able to spend nights in a house rather than in the forest.

Another ex-combatant, Abdul Mahagi, said Sopacdi had trained him as a machinist and given him a contract; he said he was beginning to see a way to organize his life.

Other workers at the washing centre, however, complained that their salaries, about $60 a month, were barely enough to live on.

The main opportunities that coffee co-operatives are likely to provide for ex-combatants in the short term would be to clear land and plant seedlings.

CPNCK has been employing 50 ex-combatants on these tasks at a rate of $1 a day, much less than they would earn in artisanal mining, but not insignificant in most of the villages, says Jean-Baptiste Musbyimana, an agricultural journalist based in Goma.

The returns could be more enticing for ex-combatants and smallholder farmers who are able to grow coffee for themselves.

For information on the profitability of coffee versus that of alternative crops, IRIN consulted Franck Muke, an agronomist who has studied coffee production in DRC and in Brazil; Xavier Phemba, CRS’s agricultural project co-ordinator in Goma; and Sandra Kavira, an agronomist working for the International Fertilizer Development Centre.

Their data suggest returns from a hectare of 2,500 coffee trees could be two to three times as high as the returns from a hectare of maize or beans, assuming an absence of mineral fertilizers and only limited use of organic fertilizers.

Jean-Baptiste Musabyimana, of the Federation of Agricultural Producer Organizations of Congo (FOPAC), which does not promote coffee, said coffee is regarded as having several advantages over other crops, including the potential for intercropping with bananas, beans or legumes, which provide organic waste and additional profits from the same acreage.

Once the trees have been planted, coffee also requires less labour than annual crops and is less likely to be stolen.

"Armed groups won't cut off the berries and eat them," coffee plantation owner Eric Kulage told IRIN. "And the workers don't want the berries either, whereas when they are harvesting maize they always solicit some bags."

Coffee’s major disadvantage is the cost of planting and the fact that the trees cannot be harvested for the first three years and do not reach their full potential for five to eight years. Muke estimated costs of planting 2,500 trees per hectare, and pruning for three non-productive years, at $850 to $950. These costs, and the risks involved, limit the acreage farmers will be willing to devote to the crop.

Helping DRC compete

A significant limitation to DRC’s coffee industry is the lack of mechanized washing stations, which cut down on waste and help maintain product consistency. Washing stations are the norm in Uganda and Rwanda, but there are hardly any in Kivu, where producers depulp the berries by hand or sell the wet berries to merchants from Uganda and Rwanda.

Aid agencies are planning to install several washing stations at sites close to large population centres and to Lake Kivu. But Muke says this could be a mistake, as the lakeside areas have higher humidity, which is thought to promote coffee rust.

There could be social advantages to promoting a perennial crop in areas further from Lake Kivu, like Kalonge Pinga and Mweso, where many young men see joining an armed group as their most viable livelihood option.

“If they have a perennial crop to look after, they will want to settle down,” suggested CPNCK’s Makelele.

But a major obstacle to promoting agriculture in areas where militias recruit is, of course, insecurity. Although armed groups are unlikely to steal coffee berries, they might try to steal bulk loads of dried coffee from washing stations.

Plantation owner Kulage commented that, in his experience, armed groups had not succeeded in stealing and marketing large coffee harvests in recent years. He suggested that security forces might be deployed to protect washing stations during the limited periods when bulk loads of dried coffee are left there.

Oxfam’s co-ordinator for North Kivu, Tariq Riebl, doubted whether any donor would accept the risk of building a washing station in a place like Kalonge. He noted that 90,000 seedlings had recently been stolen from a CPNCK nursery near Kalonge.

“If you mention that to donors, they won’t want to hear anything more,” he said.

But Makelele argues that the theft was not a problem because the co-op was going to give the seedlings away anyway.

“I am very happy about it,” he told IRIN. “It shows that people want to plant coffee.”

nl/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97998/Trading-conflict-for-coffee-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081446130806t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Is more force in the DRC more of the same?</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081532470009t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters. 

The deployment of this “international brigade” made up of troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania will complement the existing UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and is designed to help quell M23 [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] and other rebel militias. 

When an intervention force was first mooted by the African Union (AU) last year, Sivuyile Bam, AU head of Peace and Support Operations Division (PSOD), told IRIN the plan was to “deal specifically with M23, and when M23 go away, they [the intervention force] go away”. That has since evolved into preventing the expansion of all armed groups, and neutralizing and disarming them by deploying an “offensive” military force, said a UN Security Council resolution [ http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10964.doc.htm ].

Pretoria-based think tank the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) [ http://issafrica.org/ ] estimates there are more than 33 armed groups currently operating in eastern DRC. They are variously involved in mineral extraction and self-defence through to acting as proxies for the strategic interests of neighbouring states. 

The intervention force, known as SADCBrig (Southern African Development Community Brigade), will “carry out targeted offensive operations… either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC [DRC national army], in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law,” says UN resolution 2098 [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098%282013%29 ].

It will consist “inter alia of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company with headquarters in Goma,” the UN resolution adds. 

Since the first deployment of “blue helmets” to the DRC in 1999, first as the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and then as MONUSCO, troop numbers have increased more than three-fold from the original 5,000-odd uniformed soldiers. There have been supplementary ad hoc military missions, such as the 2003 European Union (EU) military intervention in Bunia during the Ituri ethnic-based conflict dubbed Operation Artemis [ http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/book1/book%20vol1_part2_chapter12_operation%20artemis%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo_kees%20homan.pdf ], and the 2009 operations Umoja Wetu (Our Unity) and Kimia II, a joint military offensive of DRC and Rwandan security forces against the armed group Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération de Rwanda (FDLR). 

A military analyst serving with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), who declined to be identified, said the Security Council resolution was “a massive expansion of the task” first envisaged by the AU, but the mandate had to be “wider than M23” if the ambition was to protect civilians. 

Zuma doctrine 

The analyst told IRIN the intervention force was expected “to have initial capability by end of May and operational capability by end of June [2013]”. 

The deployment of South African troops in CAR and their participation in SADCBrig is being viewed by analysts as a departure from South Africa’s previous military ventures, with a more aggressive stance towards resolving the continent’s conflicts. It has been dubbed the [President Jacob] Zuma doctrine by analysts. 

South African Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane told a media briefing on 29 April 2013 her country was in favour of “preventative diplomacy, intervening when there are situations of strife. When we are called upon to do that, we will always be there, we will never say no.” 

In a statement adjoining the UN resolution, Rwanda’s Eugene-Richard Gasana hoped the force would tackle the “FDLR, which had sparked the 1994 [Rwandan] genocide”. Rwanda, which is suspected of supporting M23, sees it as a bulwark against the FDLR. 

The military analyst said MONUSCO had been “hesitant” to use force beyond self-defence - something for which the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation was roundly condemned when M23 walked into Goma unopposed, despite the presence of more than 1,500 armed peacekeepers in the town and nearly 6,000 in North Kivu Province. 

Ahead of the deployment of SADCBrig, and in the wake of 13 South African soldiers having been killed recently in the Central African Republic trying to prevent the rebel coup by the Séléka alliance, M23 taunted SANDF on social media saying it was “corrupt” and “old” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94597/Analysis-South-Africa-paper-tiger-of-African-peacekeeping-operations ].

Critiques 

Meanwhile, some doubt the new force can achieve its objective. 

“Armed (DRC) groups are seen as a military threat but most of them are not. The military option against the armed groups has failed repeatedly and some [armed groups] deserve a small dose of military pressure but [also] a lot of police work in order to be neutralized. The intervention brigade in particular and the UN [MONUSCO] in general are not equipped for this,” International Crisis Group (ICG) [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/ ] analyst Thierry Vircoulon told IRIN. 

He said SADCBrig deployment was “security by substitution”, and would delay reforms of the DRC national army (FARDC), which has been accused of being a serial human rights abuser by rights organizations. SADCBrig’s more offensive posture would lead to “retaliations against civilians [by armed groups] and worsening of the humanitarian situation”, unless stringent measures were put in place to protect civilians in the areas of operation. 

Liam Mahony, author of a recent report commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) entitled Non-military strategies for civilian protection in the DRC [ http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/fv-publications/Non-military_protection_in_the_DRC.pdf ], said: “The international community continues to believe that military protection of civilians in the DRC may succeed, if there are only enough soldiers or a sufficiently strong mandate. 

“However, there is little if any empirical evidence for this. Faith in military solutions is exaggerated by the mistaken belief that violence can only be met with more violence… 

“The humanitarian service machinery has become a virtually permanent fixture in the region, serving victims of multiple displacements and repeating cycles of violence for two decades, while efforts to change the underlying dynamics of conflict have been insufficient and ineffective.” 

He told IRIN the approach by policymakers to armed groups in the DRC was “one size fits all… People tend to oversimplify or choose extreme interpretations of armed groups… People assume they are unreasonable and not open to negotiation and communication… This is not specific to DRC. It is true everywhere.” 

“I would not categorically dismiss the possibility that there may be armed groups with whom such approaches would fail, and there may be armed groups who would be more deterred from human rights abuse by an effective military counter-force. It is conceivable, but it must be the result of a very specific detailed analysis, not a generic knee-jerk approach.” 

Operational difficulties 

Andre Roux, author of a recent ISS briefing [ http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1605 ] on SADCBrig’s deployment, said: “The realities of conducting operations in this remote and complex environment have been underestimated in the rush to put solutions on the table.” 

Roux said the capabilities of SADCBrig “to effectively conduct `war fighting’ operations in an integrated manner, are questionable. With different operational doctrines, a variety of tactical deployment techniques and military equipment that is often not interoperable, the battalions can fight as individual units, but questions arise about whether they can or must fight as a cohesive brigade.” 

SANDF is expected to transfer its troops serving with MONUSCO to SADCBrig, which is supposed to operate in conjunction with FARDC, though past experiences of cooperation between SANDF and FARDC appear to have been problematical. “Members of the local army [FARDC] did not share information and they would steal anything without blinking an eye,” said a June 2012 ISS report on relations between the two [ http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=31642 ].

Roux noted that apart from the challenges of integrating military “tactics and doctrines”, there was also the risk of “a protracted counter-insurgency-type scenario characterized by atrocities in which entire villages are wiped out by rebel forces in order to divert the attention of the brigade into a defensive mind-set focused on the difficult task of protecting civilians rather than neutralizing illegal armed groups… 

“Is this again a peacekeeping band-aid that will struggle to meet the high expectations that do not consider the difficult realities of the situation?” he asks. 

go/cb 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97999/Is-more-force-in-the-DRC-more-of-the-same</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081532470009t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Conflict cuts off civilians in DRC&apos;s Katanga</title><pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201010210751260211t.jpg" />]]>KATANGA 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of displaced people in the Democratic Republic of Congo&apos;s (DRC) Katanga Province have received little or no humanitarian aid in the months since having fled ongoing conflict.</description><body><![CDATA[KATANGA 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of displaced people in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) Katanga Province have received little or no humanitarian aid in the months since having fled ongoing conflict.

In one territory, Malemba Nkulu, the number of displaced is estimated to have risen from 12,000 to 42,000 between December 2012 and January 2013, and no food distribution has yet been organized. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) says, "The global acute malnutrition rate is above 19 percent, and the severely malnourished need treatment.”

"Nineteen percent global acute malnutrition is nearly twice the emergency threshold level," Quoc Nguyen, head of operations for the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Katanga, told IRIN, adding that seven territories in Katanga have acute malnutrition rates above the 10 percent level.

UNICEF is assisting children and pregnant and lactating women suffering from acute malnutrition in several territories, including Pweto and Manono, where the rate is also above 19 percent; however this treatment is still not available in Malemba Nkulu. "There's no programme in Malemba Nkulu because of lack of funding, lack of access, insecurity and a lack of partners who can implement a programme," said Nguyen.

Malnutrition is a major contributor to the under-five mortality rate in the province, which UNICEF's latest survey put at 188 per 1,000. In its 16 April bulletin for DRC, OCHA said that in Malemba Nkulu "no humanitarian intervention has been implemented mainly because of difficulties of access and lack of funding".

Displaced people in the neighbouring territory of Manono - recently estimated to number 31,000 - have not had a food distribution since September, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) told IRIN this week, although a convoy of food trucks has just been sent there. WFP has distributed food in the past month at or near most of the other major population centres in Katanga where large numbers of displaced people have gathered.

But of 17,000 people who were displaced this year in the territories of Kalemie, Moba and Manono, most have not yet received any aid, nor have the 747 families living on the route from Mitwaba to Kisele, OCHA reported on 23 April.

Continued displacement

The total number of displaced in Katanga is estimated by the Commission on Population Movements (CMP) - an official body which collects data from aid workers - to have risen from 64,082 in December 2011 to 353,931 currently. 

"Needs are… enormous both among the displaced and the host population," OCHA said in a report published on April 10 [ http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo%E2%80%99s-neglected-%E2%80%9Ctriangle-death%E2%80%9D-challenges-protection ]. "Many IDPs have become more vulnerable due to repeated displacements, often across vast distances."

An upsurge in violence by Mai-Mai militia groups has been causing waves of displacement since late 2011. WFP's head of operations in Katanga, Amadou Samake, said the so-called 'triangle of death' between Mitwaba, Manono and Pweto had been emptied of most of its population - 75,000 households - by April 2012. By the end of last year, the displaced already numbered more than 300,000. 

The flow outwards from conflict zones has continued, and Mai-Mai violence has spread west and south, to Malemba Nkulu, Lubudi and Kambove territories.

On 17 February, a gang from the newly created Mai-Mai militia known as Kata Katanga (meaning 'cut off Katanga') killed three officials and drove out the population at Kinsevere, only 40km from Lubumbashi, the provincial capital. 

On 23 March, some 400 lightly armed Kata Katanga members marched from the bush to the centre of Lubumbashi, unopposed, before they were forced to surrender after a shootout with the elite Republican Guard. 

Amid the persistent insecurity, fewer than the 10 percent of the displaced have returned to their villages, Samake estimates. 

WFP assisted 250,000 people in Katanga last year, he said, but has not had the resources to guarantee the displaced three months of rations, the standard the agency aims for in North Kivu. Currently, he said, the agency has 5,915 tons in stock or en route and would need an additional 10,383 tons to feed 320,000 displaced people in Katanga through the second quarter of 2013.

If the displaced do not soon return to their villages, Samake added, another year of missed harvests will worsen food security across the province. 

UNICEF's Nguyen commented that much of Katanga was already in the grip of a food security crisis before the Mai-Mai’s resurgence in 2011. "There is a lack of basic services in every sector - health, water, nutrition and agriculture - and the conflict and displacement make an already bad situation much worse," he said.

Deteriorating security

OCHA reports the security situation worsened in April in Pweto, Manono and Mitwaba territories, with attacks by Mai-Mai groups on a dozen villages. 

The national army, FARDC, recently retook the town of Shamwana, at the centre of 'the triangle of death', but International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Thierry Vircoulon says the military seems to be having little success in suppressing the Mai-Mai. At the start of 2013, the army had only 1,000 men available in Katanga, but their number is now up to 2,500, UN sources told IRIN. 

Central Katanga has been unstable since Mai-Mai commander Gedeon Mtanga escaped from prison in September 2011. He and more than 1,000 of his followers were freed from Lubumbashi's central jail by eight armed men in broad daylight; there was speculation that the jail break was arranged by local power holders. Gedeon had led a Mai-Mai group known for its brutality and attacks on civilians from 2002 to 2007. Africa Confidential reported on 1 March that "his ambition is to root out the old order" and "his men have killed at least 15 traditional chiefs in Nord Mitwaba alone".

According to OCHA, the other main driver of instability in the province is Kata Katanga, which has also been fighting FARDC.

Like the brutal Mai-Mai group Morgan [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97314/Rainforest-riches-a-curse-for-civilians-in-northeast-DRC ], in DRC's Orientale Province, the Kata Katanga and Gedeon Mai-Mai seem to get much of their income from poaching, rather than minerals or agriculture. Therefore, they may not need much support from the local population.

There are no recent figures for the Mai-Mai in Katanga, but ICG estimated they might have numbered 5,000 to 8,000 in 2005 [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/103-katanga-the-congos-forgotten-crisis.aspx?alt_lang=fr ].

Following the bloody suppression of a Kata Katanga rally in Lubumbashi on 23 March, a report by local civil society activists accused senior members of the regime of providing the group with arms and funding. 

ICG's Vircoulon told IRIN he believes that several local “barons” are behind the Kata Katanga. 

The DRC's former police chief General John Numbi - a native of Malemba Nkulu who built his career as a political organizer among the Balubakat, President Joseph Kabila's ethnic group - may have held the key to security in the province. ICG reports that Numbi was supplying Gedeon with arms from 2002 to 2004. Later, he organized the manhunt that led to the Mai-Mai leader's capture. 

In 2010, Numbi was suspended as police chief following allegations that he was responsible for the murder of human rights defender Floribert Chebeya. 

Significantly, Gedeon and many of his followers were captured in 2007, after Kabila had won elections with support from a broad coalition in Katanga and elsewhere in the country. That coalition is now crumbling, allowing armed groups to be reactivated in many areas of eastern DRC. 

Protection needs

An April report [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Final%20version%20Protection%20Report%20Katanga%2011.04.pdf ] by OCHA in Katanga concludes: "Given the duration of the current conflict, humanitarian actors do not expect to see any improvements in terms of displacement numbers or humanitarian needs in the coming months."

The report highlights alleged abuses by the army as well the Mai-Mai, including allegations that 50 women and 20 girls were detained for two days and repeatedly raped by soldiers in February 2012. 

"Without an increased presence" of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), says OCHA, "such abuses will continue and may even increase, as will further displacements". 

Currently there are 450 blue helmets in Katanga, an area the size of France.

The report also calls for a political solution to the conflict in Katanga, for the government to reinitiate its programme to disarm, demobilize and re-integrate the Mai-Mai, and for humanitarian actors to establish contact with Mai-Mai groups so as to facilitate humanitarian access and sensitize the combatants on international humanitarian law.

nl/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97963/Conflict-cuts-off-civilians-in-DRC-apos-s-Katanga</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201010210751260211t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KATANGA 02 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of displaced people in the Democratic Republic of Congo&apos;s (DRC) Katanga Province have received little or no humanitarian aid in the months since having fled ongoing conflict.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Children bear brunt of CAR crisis</title><pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301301830240086t.jpg" />]]>BANGUI 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - Sporadic armed clashes, looting of orphanages, recruitment into armed groups, and widespread school closures have made life perilous for children in the Central African Republic (CAR) in the wake of a 24 March rebel coup by the Séléka alliance.</description><body><![CDATA[BANGUI 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - Sporadic armed clashes, looting of orphanages, recruitment into armed groups, and widespread school closures have made life perilous for children in the Central African Republic (CAR) in the wake of a 24 March rebel coup [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97721/CAR-coup-comes-amid-deepening-humanitarian-crisis ] by the Séléka alliance.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), some 2.3 million children are directly affected by the breakdown of law and order and the interruption of basic services.

On 12 April, 14 children were wounded in the capital, Bangui, when a rocket-propelled grenade fell on a playing field. Two days later, a rocket landed on a church, killing seven people, including three infants, and wounding 11 children - three of whom had to have their legs amputated.

“It’s scandalous that children are being caught in crossfire as they go about their daily lives, playing football or going to church,” said Souleymane Diabaté, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) representative in CAR.

“Children who fall sick with basic diseases” such as malaria are also in need of medical attention, said Ellen Van Der Velden, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) head of mission in CAR.

Yet healthcare provision outside of main hospitals has been unpredictable. “In some areas [of Bangui] the health centres are functional, in others they are closed, again in others minimal services are being delivered. The situation may change quite quickly. One day a [health] centre could be operational, the next it can be closed,” said Van Der Velden.

Children’s homes targeted

A Bangui centre for street children, run by the Voix du Coeur (Voice of the Heart) Foundation, “suffered a lot during these recent events,” according to its director, Ange Ngassenemo.

“Two children died and several were injured during the looting. We were also visited by Séléka, on the pretext of looking for young thieves, and they also looted what little the children had,” added Ngassenemo.

“We unfortunately don’t have the necessary means. This situation is becoming harder and harder as more and more children come here, and taking care of them becomes a crushing burden for our little organization,” he said.

“We call on the state to help us. Couldn’t they get us running water for the children, who need to wash themselves and their clothes… We estimate there are about 6,000 street children in Bangui. If they come to us and we send them away, it becomes dangerous and is not a viable solution. It would be better to help us help them,” he added.

On April 13, armed men thought to be part of Séléka looted a Bangui orphanage run by SOS Children’s Villages, after letting off their weapons to intimidate staff members.

“The children were hiding under their beds. Staff members were in tears when they spoke to me,” said the city’s archbishop, Dieudonné Nzapalainga.

“There are no guns in these houses. There are just children. What’s happening? This was no weapons search, it was looting. Shooting in the air, scaring people to death… I am outraged by this situation,” he said on Radio France Internationale.

Recruited by all sides

Various armed groups continue to recruit children, according to UNICEF, which warned in a 12 April statement [ http://www.unicef.org/media/media_68681.html ] that such practices violated international law.

More than 2,000 children, both boys and girls, were associated with armed groups and self-defence organisations before conflict resumed in December 2012, the agency said, adding that the practice continued after the fall of Bangui.

“Recruiting children is both morally unacceptable and forbidden under international law,” said UNICEF’s Diabaté. 

“We have called on the new leadership in CAR [Séléka ] to ensure that all children associated with armed groups should be released immediately and protected from further violations [of law],” he said in the statement, adding that those now in power had demonstrated their intention to do just that.

“UNICEF is committed to working with them to ensure that there is an immediate halt to new recruitments and support a process of identification, verification and reintegration of children.”

According to Amy Martin, who heads OCHA’s Bangui branch, “The presence of child soldiers is evident amongst the ranks of Séléka.”

“Recruitment into the national army was ongoing a few weeks ago but is less evident now,” added Martin.

Out of school

Insecurity has forced thousands of children and teachers from schools in Bangui, and has interrupted educations in regions in the east and north of the country. 

“Schools have remained closed in Bangui and elsewhere since March. There is vacation soon, so families who can afford to hire tutors for catch-up courses will do so over vacation. [But] not everyone can afford this,” said Martin.

The education ministry remains sceptical about the re-opening of schools with insecurity still rife. “The children are understandably at home because the security situation demands it,” said Education Minister Marcel Loudegue. 

Schools are also among the properties that have been looted since the rebel takeover, with teachers, like civil servants, remaining unpaid.

In a 23 April statement, UNICEF warned [ http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/children%E2%80%99s-education-central-africa-republic-devastated-conflict-un ] that hundreds of thousands of students are at risk of missing out on the entire school year, “with half the country’s schools shuttered.”

UNICEF’s Diabaté said: “The new government must prioritize protection of and investment in the country’s education system, in order to respect and fulfil children’s basic right to education and to provide this generation of children with hope for a healthy future.” 

Literacy levels are low in the CAR, with over one million children out of school in total, according to UNICEF.

cd-k/am-aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97921/Children-bear-brunt-of-CAR-crisis</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301301830240086t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BANGUI 25 April 2013 (IRIN) - Sporadic armed clashes, looting of orphanages, recruitment into armed groups, and widespread school closures have made life perilous for children in the Central African Republic (CAR) in the wake of a 24 March rebel coup by the Séléka alliance.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Uganda pilots mobile courts for refugees</title><pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203281125310596t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Uganda&apos;s government and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have launched a pilot mobile court system to improve access to justice for victims of crimes in Nakivale, the country&apos;s oldest and largest refugee settlement.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Uganda's government and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have launched a pilot mobile court [ http://www.unhcr.org/516d29359.html ] system to improve access to justice for victims of crimes in Nakivale, the country's oldest and largest refugee settlement.

The magistrate's court, whose first session began on 15 April, will hear cases of robbery, land disputes, child rape, sexual and gender-based violence, attempted murder, and murder. The project - a collaboration of the Uganda government, UNHCR, Makerere University's Refugee Law Project (RLP) and the Uganda Human Rights Council - aims to benefit some 68,000 refugees and 35,000 Ugandan nationals in the settlement.

“With the nearest law court currently 50km away in Kabingo, Isingiro, access to justice has been a real problem for refugees and locals alike. As a result many fail to report crimes and are forced to wait for long periods before their cases are heard in court,” said a UNHCR briefing on the programme.

The mobile court will hold three sessions a year. Each session will last 15 to 30 days and hear up to 30 cases. Officials hope to extend the project to other refugee settlements in Uganda to enable more refugees to access speedier justice.

"Most of the courts are far away from the settlements, and refugee complainants faced challenges of transportation for themselves and witnesses," Charity Ahumuza, programme manager for access to justice at RLP, told IRIN. "With the courts brought to them, the cost of seeking justice is reduced. The courts will also reduce the backlog of cases that exist of cases that arise in the settlements."

"Refugees have welcomed this initiative since it is about bringing justice closer to them," John Kilowok, UNHCR Protection Officer in Uganda, told IRIN.

Operational challenges

Experts say the project could face a number of operational challenges, including a need for funding and a shortage of trained court interpreters. Uganda has over 165,000 refugees from the Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia and South Sudan.

"The settlements are far away, and distance in accessing the court is likely to become a challenge. Language, too, will be a problem. The service providers through UNHCR are conducting training for interpreters to help in this issue," said RLP's Ahumuza. "The sustainability of the courts, I believe, will depend on availability of finances. However, the judiciary continues to face financial constraints."

Angelo Izama, a Ugandan fellow at the Open Society Institute, says the shortage of justice in the refugee settlements is a reflection of poor access to justice across the country, a situation that needs to be addressed.

"Improving the delivery of justice helps tremendously given that, ordinarily, the severe case backlog makes matters worse for nationals - let alone foreigners. The real crisis now is not providing refugees and nationals in western Ugandan fast relief but filling the many vacancies in the judiciary so that, nationally, justice is expedited," he said. "While justice processes improved on our side can help communities - both Ugandan and foreign - live better governed lives, the ultimate investment would be in improving governance across the border."

"There is need for a holistic approach to look at the refugee issues in Uganda. We have to look at policy, immigration and defence lawyers for fair trials. Will the suspects have access to defence lawyers, or will they be accorded with lawyers to defend them in court?" asked Nicholas Opiyo, a constitutional and human rights lawyer in Kampala, Uganda’s capital. "Sustainability is a very crucial element in this court... If they don't put good and proper systems to support this court, it will be a waste of time and money."

so/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97903/Uganda-pilots-mobile-courts-for-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203281125310596t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 23 April 2013 (IRIN) - Uganda&apos;s government and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have launched a pilot mobile court system to improve access to justice for victims of crimes in Nakivale, the country&apos;s oldest and largest refugee settlement.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Uneven progress on child stunting in East and Central Africa</title><pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202150719060014t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Improvements in nutrition and stronger government policies have led to a decline in childhood stunting, according to a new report on child nutrition. However, the condition continues to affect some 165 million children under the age of five globally.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Improvements in nutrition and stronger government policies have led to a decline in childhood stunting, according to a new report on child nutrition [ http://www.unicef.org/media/files/nutrition_report_2013.pdf ] by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). However, the condition continues to affect some 165 million children under the age of five globally.

Stunting can lead to irreversible brain and body damage in children, making them more susceptible to illness and more likely to fall behind in school. Based on UNICEF’s report, IRIN has put together a round-up of the nutrition situations in six East and Central African countries that are among 24 countries with the largest burden and highest prevalence of stunting.

Burundi: Under-five mortality in this small central African country dropped from 183 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 139 per 1,000 live births in 2012. This is far short of the 63 deaths per 1,000 live births necessary for the country to achieve UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) [ http://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/child_mortality/en/ ] 4, which aims to reduce child mortality by two-thirds by 2015. An estimated 58 percent of children under age five are stunted, compared with 56 percent in 1987, according to demographic and health surveys from those years.

According to the UNICEF report, Burundi has made “no progress” on MDG 1 [ http://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/hunger/en/ ], which aims to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.

Central African Republic (CAR): An estimated 28 percent of under-five deaths in CAR occur within the first month of a child’s life; the biggest killers of children under five are malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia. The percentage of children under age five who are stunted has changed little since 1995, standing at 41 percent in 2010, as has the percentage of children who are underweight, which has remained at about 24 percent for the last 18 years.

There has, however, been significant progress in the number of mothers exclusively breastfeeding their infants. In 2010, 34 percent of infants under six months old were breastfed, compared to just 3 percent in 1995. According to UNICEF, infants who are not breastfed in the first six months of life are “more than 14 times more likely to die from all causes than an exclusively breastfed infant”.

Democratic Republic of Congo: Africa’s second-largest country bears 3 percent of the global stunting burden, with 43 percent of children under age five suffering from stunting and 24 percent being underweight. Stunting is significantly higher (47 percent) in rural areas than it is in urban areas (34 percent).

The percentage of children who are underweight dropped from 34 percent in 2001 to 24 percent in 2010. DRC’s progress towards MDG 1 is described as “insufficient”.

Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa nation, which bears 3 percent of the global stunting burden, has seen a steep drop in stunting levels, from an estimated 57 percent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2011. The percentage of underweight under-fives has also dropped significantly, from 42 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2011. Between 2000 and 2011, under-five mortality was cut from 139 deaths per 1,000 live births to 77 per 1,000 live births - within striking distance of its MDG 4 target of 66 per 1,000.

A national nutrition programme launched in 2008 has been key to reducing national food insecurity, a major cause of stunting. The country’s health service extension programme [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/72371/ETHIOPIA-New-programme-boosts-village-health-service-delivery ] has also played a role in bringing nutritional interventions to villages.

Rwanda: Community interventions - such as kitchen gardens and increasing the availability of livestock, as well as measures to boost healthy infant feeding practices like exclusive breastfeeding and the provision of nutritional supplements - saw the percentage of underweight under-fives in Rwanda drop from 20 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2010. Enhanced data collection and analysis has also enabled the government to improve its planning and monitoring of child malnutrition.

The report describes the country as “on track” to meet MDG 1.

Tanzania: Bearing 2 percent of the world’s stunting burden, Tanzania has made significant strides in improving child nutrition. An estimated 50 percent of infants under six months old were breastfed in 2010, compared to 23 percent in 1992. The country has also brought under-five stunting levels down from 50 percent in 1992 to 42 percent in 2010, but continues to suffer significantly higher stunting in rural children (45 percent) compared to urban children (39 percent).

Tanzania’s under-five mortality rate dropped from 158 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 68 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010, putting it close to its MDG 4 target of 53 deaths per 1,000 live births. UNICEF’s report says the country is “on track” to meet its MDG 1 targets.

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97853/Uneven-progress-on-child-stunting-in-East-and-Central-Africa</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201202150719060014t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 16 April 2013 (IRIN) - Improvements in nutrition and stronger government policies have led to a decline in childhood stunting, according to a new report on child nutrition. However, the condition continues to affect some 165 million children under the age of five globally.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Regional insecurity adding to Chad&apos;s humanitarian needs</title><pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121513560373t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Chad is grappling with an influx of refugees and returnees into its south-eastern regions, mainly from neighbouring Sudan, and others from the Central African Republic (CAR) following a series of inter-ethnic clashes in Darfur and a recent coup in the CAR, respectively.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Chad is grappling with an influx of refugees and returnees into its south-eastern regions, mainly from neighbouring Sudan, and others from the Central African Republic (CAR) following a series of inter-ethnic clashes [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97434/Call-for-humanitarian-access-after-clashes-in-North-Darfur ] in Darfur and a recent coup [ http://www.irinnews.orgwww.irinnews.org/Report/97721/CAR-coup-amid-humanitarian-crisis ] in the CAR, respectively.

At least 74,000 people have fled into Chad from Darfur in the past two months, 50,000 of them in the past week alone, sparking the largest influx of refugees from Sudan into Chad since 2005, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) [ http://www.unhcr.org/5167e1366.html ].

Waves of refugees

In March, the first wave of 24,000 people fled from Darfur and arrived in Tissi, a remote area in Chad’s southeastern Sila Region; 8,000 were Sudanese and 16,000 Chadians. Most of them are women and children.

"Under every tree, there are women and children who are trying to protect themselves from sunshine," Abdellahi Ould El Bah, a UNHCR programme officer on mission in Tissi, told IRIN.

UNHCR staff on the ground say they “found women and children very scared, exhausted with haggard eyes”.

In Tissi, basic amenities are lacking.

“People lack everything and are living in very dire conditions. They need food, water and shelter. People are obliged to drink water from the river,” Aminata Gueye, the UNHCR representative in Chad, told IRIN. “Those who are wounded need healthcare, while health centres or clinics in Tissi [are] not functional.”

Access to Tissi by air is impossible, meaning aid workers have to spend eight hours by road, and they have to cross 21 wadis (seasonal rivers).

With insecurity rife, more refugees are expected. "We fear a new wave of refugees in the next few days, as there are reports of continuing violence on the side of Darfur," said Gueye.

Most recently, clashes have been recorded between the Misseriya and Salamat ethnic groups in Um Dukhum, Darfur, with dozens of deaths reported.

On 12 April, UNHCR started the relocation of at least 8,000 Sudanese refugees from Tissi, to the Goz Amir and Djabal refugee camps in Sila Region. The relocation is expected to help in the provision of assistance to the new arrivals and to improve their security.

Local authorities have provided some 100 ton of food for the new arrivals, with UNHCR and partners coordinating efforts to provide emergency assistance in Tissi.

Refugee population already large

The new refugee influx constitutes a huge challenge for UNHCR, which was already facing limited resources as it provided protection and assistance to the large numbers of refugees in Chad. Months earlier, UNHCR and the governments of Chad and Sudan had started discussions on the return of Sudanese refugees to Darfur.

Eastern Chad is already home to about 300,000 refugees from Darfur [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95863/SUDAN-CHAD-The-strains-of-long-term-displacement ] and thousands of others from CAR. Chad has, since December 2012, received at least 4,000 new refugees from CAR, in addition to some 65,000 already there, according to a 6 April update [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Central%20African%20Republic%20Humanitarian%20snapshot.pdf ] by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Besides the new refugees, Chad is also grappling with the returns of hundreds of Chadian migrants released from detention centres in Libya [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97617/Chadian-migrants-rue-Libyan-detention-ill-treatment-deportation ].

“It is with great concern that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is monitoring the multiple migration crises currently developing along the Chadian borders. IOM is already responding to the influx of 1,200 extremely vulnerable Chadian migrants returning to Chad after having been released from detention centres in Libya.

“At the same [time], IOM is in the process of providing life-saving assistance, including homeward transportation, to over 17,000 Chadian migrants, [that] are fleeing the intercommunity violence in Sudan, that are arriving in remote border towns in Chad without means to support themselves,” Qasim Sufi, IOM chief of mission in Chad, told IRIN.

Measles outbreak

Medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is treating the wounded in Tissi, with serious cases being referred to the towns of Goz Beida or Abéché.

At the same time, teams are trying to contend with an outbreak of measles in a nearby area: “In Saraf Bourgou only, our team has confirmed 35 cases of measles, which represents 25 percent of consultations,” said Alexandre Morhain, MSF’s head of mission in Chad [ http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=6719&cat=field-news ]. “The disease has already killed seven children, five of whom were under five years old.”

An emergency measles vaccination campaign is expected to be launched in Tissi, with severe acute malnutrition cases and paediatric emergencies also being treated.

According to MSF, the situation of the refugees there is precarious as the rains approach. “We need to act now, because within two months it will be impossible to access this area by road.”

aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97840/Regional-insecurity-adding-to-Chad-apos-s-humanitarian-needs</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304121513560373t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Chad is grappling with an influx of refugees and returnees into its south-eastern regions, mainly from neighbouring Sudan, and others from the Central African Republic (CAR) following a series of inter-ethnic clashes in Darfur and a recent coup in the CAR, respectively.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In East Africa, heavy rains test emergency preparedness</title><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304040922550914t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - Unusually heavy rains have caused havoc across much of east Africa, displacing thousands of people and damaging important infrastructure.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - Unusually heavy rains have caused havoc across much of east Africa, displacing thousands of people and damaging important infrastructure.

“Above-normal rains have occurred in several areas, including northern and western Tanzania; Rwanda; Burundi; the Lake Victoria Basin; western, southern and northeastern Kenya; southern and central Somalia; and eastern and south-eastern Ethiopia,” states an update by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/East%20Africa%20Seasonal%20Monitor%20April%208%202013.pdf ].

Even normal rains can cause flooding and damage in areas with poor drainage; this year’s heavy rains are already beginning to test the emergency responses in many flood and disaster-prone areas.

The rains, which have “caused significant flooding in the Lake Victoria basin in Uganda and Kenya, the southern Maasai rangelands in Kenya, and along the Wabi Shabelle in Ethiopia in late March and early April”, according to the update, started between mid-March and early April and are likely to continue through May.

Kenya 

In Kenya, at least 18,633 people have been displaced by flooding since the onset of the rains, according to the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) [ https://www.kenyaredcross.org/PDF/REPORTED%20sitrep%202013%20FLOODS%209th%20April%202013-1.pdf ]. Some 32 deaths have also been recorded, with others being injured.

The number of people displaced could rise to about 30,000 before the rainy season ends, said Nelly Muluka, the KRCS communications manager. 

“We are also working on searching for the unaccounted people and sensitizing communities on the need to move to safer areas,” said Muluka. KRCS is distributing food and non-food items to affected families, but there is a need for medical care and additional food and shelter.

Ahead of the rains, Kenya’s meteorological department had warned of generally enhanced rainfall over the western highlands, Lake Basin, central Rift Valley and the central highlands, including Nairobi, in March and April. 

“We expected floods in areas like Nairobi, Central, Coastal and Western Kenya, and have already put aside food and non-food items for potential victims,” Andrew Mondoh, the permanent secretary in the Special Programmes Ministry, told IRIN. 

In the coastal area of Tana River, hundreds of families marooned by floods have been rescued by helicopter and moved to safer areas, added Mondo. 

The rains have also destroyed roads in the Rift Valley areas of Kajiado and Narok and in the western area of Kisumu. 

In northeastern Kenya’s Dadaab refugee complex, home to about 463,000 mainly Somali refugees, the rains have displaced some families and affected commodity prices. 

Parts of a 90km road, linking the main region of Garissa to the Dadaab refugee complex, have been rendered impassable, affecting transport and commerce. 

Movement within the Ifo-1 and Ifo-2 camps becomes especially difficult during the rainy season due to flooding, which makes aid delivery difficult.

“It is a mixture of sad[ness] and happiness during the rainy season in Dadaab; we really need the rain because it is always very hot and we get more milk from the neighbouring locations, but we have no proper shelter and the prices of some foodstuffs become higher,” said Muhubo Aden Kusow, who runs a grocery store at one of the Ifo camps. 

The heavy rains are expected to continue over the next two weeks, according to Ayub Shaka, the deputy director of Kenya’s Department of Meteorological Services. “It is difficult to say where floods will occur in the next two weeks for example, but the best we can do is to ask people living in flood-prone areas to stay alert and safe,” said Shaka.

Somalia 

In neighbouring Somalia, heavy rains were recorded in the first week of April.

“Robust precipitation accumulations (>75mm) were again observed over central and southern Somalia,” states an Africa Hazards Outlook report for 11-17 April [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afr_Apr11_2013.pdf ]. 

“Many local areas have already experienced more than three times their normal rainfall accumulation since the beginning of April, sustaining the risk for localized flash flooding and downstream river inundation over the Jubba and Shabelle River basins in eastern Ethiopia and southern Somalia.”

The Shabelle has already burst its banks in some places, according to a 10 April Shabelle River flood update by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization [ http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/flood-update-shabelle-river-10042013 ]. 

“SWALIM [Somalia Water and Land Information Management] field reports in the last two days indicate river breakages at Hurway (about 8m wide), Eji (about 6m wide) and Maadheere (about 14m wide) villages all in Middle Shabelle Region. This has led to inundation of large areas, causing destruction of cropped area[s] of unconfirmed acreage, and displacement of several families.”

Ethiopia 

The southern and eastern regions of Ethiopia have also received “heavy and well-distributed precipitation totals”, according to the Africa Hazards Outlook, “with lesser amounts observed in the west and higher elevations of the country.” 

“This has already negatively affected cropping activities, with a reduction of planting over many local Belg [February-May rains]-producing areas of Ethiopia,” it says.

With the rains expected to continue, efforts are underway to mitigate their adverse effects.

Uganda 

According to Uganda’s chief weather forecaster, Deus Bamanya, there is an increased likelihood of near-normal to above-normal rainfall over most parts of Uganda, with the rains peaking between mid-April and early-May. Flash flooding could also occur in areas expected to receive below-normal rainfall due to sporadic heavy downpours.

“The expected impacts include increased lightning, hailstorms, floods and landslides,” Bamanya told IRIN.

The government plans to relocate vulnerable populations living in the eastern Mount Elgon region, which is prone to flooding and landslides [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88283/UGANDA-300-feared-dead-as-landslides-bury-villages-in-the-east ]. 

“We are worried [about] landslides, mudslides and flooding. There are already signs in the low-lying and hilly and mountainous areas,” Musa Ecweru, Uganda’s state minister for relief, disaster preparedness and refugees, told IRIN.

“The effects of the heavy rains last year were very devastating. We don’t want [a]repeat. We are going to relocate people in these vulnerable areas. We are only waiting for resources from our development partners to start the relocation exercise,” said Ecweru. The Ugandan government requires some 35 billion shillings (about US$13.5 million) for the exercise.

“We are going to de-gazette some government land to relocate these vulnerable populations. We are negotiating with [the] Uganda Wildlife Authority to have this done immediately. We must [re]settle these people as quick[ly] as possible,” he added. 

The districts of Mbale, Tororo, Kalangala, Bundibugyo and Masaka are among those most affected by hailstorms, according to Catherine Ntabadde-Makumbi, the Uganda Red Cross Society assistant communications director, who added that at least 8,362 people remain without assistance, with 5,681 of them displaced. The displaced are in urgent need of shelter kits, household items and water purifying tablets. 

Burundi 

In Burundi, flood-affected areas include the northwestern region of Bubanza, Bujumbura City and the plains of Imbo along the shores of Lake Tanganyika. 

"We have a problem with rain in the town of Gihanga [in Bubanza]. Houses and plantations were destroyed, causing the displacement of people and stopping work in the fields," Anselme Wakana, governor of Bubanza Province, told IRIN. 

At least 1,000 hectares of rice has been damaged there, raising food security fears. "We are harvesting rice that was not yet mature due to fear of flooding," said farmer Olive Ngayimpenda. 

Several homes have been destroyed in the areas of Gihanga.

According to Mbonerane Albert, the president of the local NGO Green Belt Action, the situation could worsen due to environmental degradation: deforestation in Bubanza has increased surface runoff, increasing the risk of flooding. 

Rwanda 

In neighbouring Rwanda, authorities have issued disaster warnings to those living in risk-prone areas.

"High-risk-zone dwellers have [been] given [a] new eviction ultimatum to relocate since we noticed that expected heavy rainfall could affect the vulnerable populations," Antoine Ruvebana, the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Refugees Affairs and Disaster Management, told IRIN. 

Rwanda, due its hilly terrain, is susceptible to erosion, flooding and landslides. 

According to the Rwandan meteorological services department, several western parts of the country could get ''above-normal rainfall'' during the mid-April to May 2013 period. 

rk-mh-dn-at-so/aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97830/In-East-Africa-heavy-rains-test-emergency-preparedness</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304040922550914t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 11 April 2013 (IRIN) - Unusually heavy rains have caused havoc across much of east Africa, displacing thousands of people and damaging important infrastructure.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Urgent humanitarian needs in post-coup Central African Republic</title><pubDate>Thu, 04 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303271308490061t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 04 April 2013 (IRIN) - Less than two weeks after the overthrow of Central African Republic (CAR) President François Bozizé in a rebel coup, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated, leaving civilians in the capital, Bangui, in critical need of aid, said a senior humanitarian official.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 04 April 2013 (IRIN) - Less than two weeks after the overthrow of Central African Republic (CAR) President François Bozizé in a rebel coup, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated, leaving civilians in the capital, Bangui, in critical need of aid, said a senior humanitarian official.

“The main humanitarian needs in Bangui are access to health and nutrition and clean water [and] security and protection of civilians,” Amy Martin, who heads the Bangui branch of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), told IRIN. 

Bozizé was ousted on 24 March after the rebel Séléka coalition overran Bangui, exacerbating the country’s already precarious humanitarian situation [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97721/CAR-coup-comes-amid-deepening-humanitarian-crisis ]. Insecurity had already been rife before the coup, especially in the northeast, and access to basic services was inadequate.

Now, only two hospitals are functioning in Bangui, schools are closed nationwide and civil servants are not yet back to work. Water and electricity services have been interrupted, and insecurity has worsened.

Insecurity

“Insecurity is persistent, with the circulation of arms and poor discipline by the Séléka elements,” said Martin. 

Following the coup, there were reports of widespread looting and violence in Bangui. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported [ http://www.unicef.org/media/media_68508.html ] that 10 metric tons of emergency supplies were stolen from its main warehouse. 

“The looting continues in Bangui as well as in towns where Séléka are expanding their presence, notably to the west and northwest of Bangui,” Martin continued.

Regarding the number of people affected by the crisis, she said: “We are using the population figure of the entire country, 4.5 million people, [as the number of people] affected. The most vulnerable people - women, children, elderly, [people living with HIV/AIDS] - are most at risk.”

The insecurity has led to population movements.

“In the northwest, people are fleeing to the bush; in Bangui, a few thousand crossed the River [Oubangui] to Zongo [in DRC], but as the situation calms down they are returning,” said Martin.

Insecurity could also worsen in southeastern CAR, an area affected by activities of the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Following the Séléka takeover, Ugandan troops and US military advisers in CAR suspended their search for LRA leader Joseph Kony.

“It is unclear whether the Ugandans and the Americans will leave, but if they do, there will be no security forces left in the southeast of CAR to offer any sort of civilian protection,” Ledio Cakaj, an independent researcher focusing on the LRA, told IRIN.

“It is unlikely that the new CAR regime has the capacity to provide security for an area close to 1,000km away from Bangui, same as was the case under the previous government.”

Cakaj added: “It is not clear yet how Kony will respond to the recent developments, but given the history of attacks in CAR it is likely that LRA attacks against civilians will intensify given the lack of protection of civilians [should the Ugandan and American forces depart].”

Food insecurity 

The insecurity, which has intensified since December, has affected farming and commercial activities raising food security fears [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97524/Looming-food-crisis-in-the-Central-African-Republic ]. 

“In the interior of the country, people need seeds and agricultural inputs for this agricultural season… Commerce needs to restart to allow people to access goods in markets,” said OCHA’s Martin.

According to a 28 March OCHA update [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CAR%20Situation%20Report%20No%209%2028%20March%202013.pdf ], “The border with all neighbouring countries is closed, which directly affects movement of commercial [goods] and fuel from Douala, which is Bangui’s main commercial and supply line from Cameroon.” 

“Land preparation, which should have started in January, is behind schedule in parts,” stated a UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) March update [ http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=CAF ].

“The food security situation, which was already alarming… has deteriorated from December 2012 onwards, when the civil conflict escalated,” added the update, warning that the “situation is projected to further deteriorate until the next harvest, in July 2013, especially in the north of Nana-Grebizi, in Ouham and Vakaga regions.”

“It is worth noting that before the crisis erupted, floods in Nana-Gribizi, Ouham and Vakaga prefectures had already affected agricultural activities,” Alessandro Costantino, an economist with FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System on Food, told IRIN.

And more flooding could become a problem:  “Every year, flooding occurs in CAR in the middle and towards the end of the rainy season, which spans from April until October in the South, from July to October in the rest of the country,” he said.

Rebels from the northeast 

The Séléka rebels mainly come from the restive northeast of CAR, a region that is “geographically isolated, historically marginalized and almost stateless,” according to the International Crisis Group (ICG).

Circumstances leading to the coup included the “absence of [a] solution to the problem of the armed groups of northeastern CAR; the lack of a programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for these fighters; and a crippled security system,” said a 27 March ICG blog post [ http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/2013/03/27/failure-has-many-fathers-the-coup-in-central-african-republic/ ].

“The disarmament of the fighters has been planned since the agreements of Libreville in 2008, but it has never taken place due to the lack of political will of the Bozizé regime,” it said.

Séléka leader Michel Djotodjia named himself president after the coup, and “if he remains in power, he will be the first CAR president from the remote, neglected and largely Muslim northeast”, said a blog post in African Arguments [ http://africanarguments.org/2013/04/02/central-african-republic-president-michel-djotodia-and-the-good-little-putchist%e2%80%99s-tool-box-by-louisa-lombard/ ].

Djotodjia was the leader of the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR) rebels, who merged with rebels from the Convention Patriotique pour le Salut Wa Kodro (CSPK) and Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP) to form the Séléka coalition. 

Djotodjia’s government plans to hand over power to an elected president after a three-year transition period. But challenges are already emerging, with opposition critical of the composition of the new cabinet named by Séléka on 31 March, days after the suspension of the constitution and the dissolution of CAR’s National Assembly.

Access problems 

At present, hundreds of thousands of people remain cut off from aid and essential services.

According to UNICEF, children are among the worst affected, with some two million lacking access to basic social services and exposed to violence.

“Children in the Central African Republic were some of the most vulnerable in Africa even before the recent upsurge in fighting,” said Manuel Fontaine, UNICEF's regional director for West and Central Africa, in a 29 March statement.

“It is imperative to have full and secure access to communities affected by the conflict. With every lost day, every thwarted delivery and every stolen supply, more children may die.”

Fontaine added, “The time has come for the Séléka coalition, which took power last weekend, to really demonstrate how committed it is to humanitarian principles and human rights for all Central Africans.” 

aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97780/Urgent-humanitarian-needs-in-post-coup-Central-African-Republic</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303271308490061t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 04 April 2013 (IRIN) - Less than two weeks after the overthrow of Central African Republic (CAR) President François Bozizé in a rebel coup, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated, leaving civilians in the capital, Bangui, in critical need of aid, said a senior humanitarian official.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: M23, one year on</title><pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303271154440060t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 03 April 2013 (IRIN) - The M23 rebellion, the latest of a string of armed insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province, has been active for one year now, during which hundreds of thousands have fled their homes and many have lost their lives.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 03 April 2013 (IRIN) - The M23 rebellion, the latest of a string of armed insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province, has been active for one year now, during which hundreds of thousands have fled their homes and many have lost their lives. 

The Mouvement du 23-Mars, or March 23 Movement [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ], came into existence in April 2012, when hundreds of mainly ethnic Tutsi soldiers of FARDC, the national army, mutinied over poor living conditions and poor pay. Most of the mutineers had been members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/76275/DRC-Nkunda-s-rebel-group-spells-out-demands ], another armed group that in 2009 signed a deal with the government, which the dissidents felt Kinshasa had not fully implemented. M23 is named after the date the agreement was signed.

In November 2012, M23 captured Goma, the provincial capital, but withdrew and subsequently entered into peace talks with the government. Neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda were accused of backing M23 by a UN Security Council Group of Experts report [ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/17/us-congo-democratic-rwanda-uganda-idUSBRE89F1RQ20121017 ], charges both countries strongly deny.

In this briefing, IRIN outlines the group’s impact on the province over the past year, its current position and avenues for peace in eastern DRC.

What is the humanitarian situation in North Kivu?

Although clashes between M23 and FARDC have subsided, “North Kivu remains highly insecure due to the proliferation of weapons, sporadic fighting between armed groups and the army, and inter-community tensions,” according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20-%20GOMA%20RESPONSE%20PLAN%20%28ENGLISH%29.pdf ] (OCHA).

OCHA notes that since the beginning of the M23 rebellion, more than half a million people have been driven from their homes in North Kivu. The figure accounts for more than half of the 914,000 displaced people in the province. Tens of thousands more fled to refugee camps [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97742/Congolese-refugee-camps-in-Rwanda-full ] in Rwanda and Uganda.

According to Amnesty International [ http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/drc-bosco-ntaganda-must-be-surrendered-icc-2013-03-19 ], M23 has been responsible for human rights abuses “including violations of the duty to care for the civilian population when launching attacks, forced recruitment of children who were either trained to take part in hostilities or forced to work to build military positions, unlawful killings, and acts of sexual violence”. The organization also blamed FARDC for widespread abuses against civilians. 

Where are M23’s leaders?

The movement’s leadership now looks significantly different than it did in April 2012. 

In February 2013, a rift was reported in M23’s leadership, with one of the founders, Bosco Ntaganda, and M23’s political leader, Jean-Marie Runiga, on one side and M23’s military chief, Sultani Makenga [ http://www.congoforum.be/upldocs/RVI%20Briefing%20-%20Usalama%20-%20Makenga%20Profile%20%E2%80%93%203%20December%202012.pdf ], on the other. The two factions clashed in North Kivu, and Makenga sacked Runiga, who was the group’s representative at the peace talks taking place with the DRC government in the Ugandan capital, Kampala. Following more fighting in March, Ntaganda’s faction surrendered. Both he and Runiga, along with several senior commanders and close to 700 fighters, fled to Rwanda.

On 18 March, Ntaganda surrendered himself to the US Embassy in the Rwandan capital, Kigali, and asked to be transferred to the International Criminal Court for trial over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. He made his first appearance in court on 26 March. According to a paper [ http://riftvalley.net/resources/file/RVI%20Usalama%20Project%20-%20Briefing%20-%20Ntaganda%20Profile.pdf ] by the Rift Valley Institute, Ntaganda had fallen out with fellow commanders early in the rebellion and had been effectively relegated to the sidelines. 

Experts have lauded Ntaganda’s arrest as a positive step in the fight against impunity in DRC, but warn that it does not mean an end to violence in the region.

Runiga has been placed under house arrest [ http://bigstory.ap.org/article/congo-m23-faction-leader-arrested-rwanda ] in Rwanda; the Rwandan government has disarmed [ http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-rebels-rwanda-moved-away-border?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ReliefwebUpdates+(ReliefWeb+-+Latest+Updates) ] the M23 troops who surrendered and moved them to a refugee camp more than 50km from the DRC-Rwanda border.

Various reports [ http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/27/democratic-republic-congo-sultani-makenga ] indicate that Makenga is now consolidating his fighters, thought to number about 1,500, and M23-held territory in North Kivu, but he may also be preparing for further negotiations with President Joseph Kabila’s government. According to Congo expert Jason Stearns [ http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2013/03/m23-split-and-join.html ], “The internal M23 split may have provided the break they [DRC representatives] needed to make the deal acceptable for the rebels.” 

Any deal is likely to involve the integration of Makenga’s fighters into FARDC, with lower cadre fighters automatically integrated and higher ranking officers considered for integration on a case-by-case basis. However, analysts say the re-integration method has not worked in the past and must be rethought.

“M23 integration in FARDC is feasible but is not suitable. The policy of repeated integration of armed groups in FARDC is [contributing] to the fragmentation and militarization of FARDC,” Marc-Andre Lagrange, DRC senior analyst for the International Crisis Group, told IRIN via email. “Since that approach has proven, with M23, to be a failure, the DRC government with MONUSCO and UNSC should look for another option.” 

According to a recent article in the newsletter Africa Confidential: “Experts broadly agree that some kind of agreement between Kinshasa and M23 is in the offing and will be signed soon, but reliable sources in North Kivu diverge on what the outcome will be. Some feel that Makenga will reintegrate his troops into the FARDC, while others suggest that Makenga and [new] M23 political leader Bertrand Bisimwa can stay independent of the army while not being seen as a ‘negative force’.” 

What is the fate of the peace talks?

The Kampala peace talks between M23 and the DRC government began in December 2012 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97075/Analysis-Seeking-civilian-and-military-solutions-in-the-DRC ], under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The talks have made little progress and have been put on hold due to the rebel group’s internal problems. Bisimwa has urged Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to revive the talks [ http://allafrica.com/stories/201304021191.html ].

On 24 February, a UN-brokered peace agreement [ http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/scanned-on-24022013-125543.pdf ] aimed at ending conflict in eastern DRC was signed in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, by 11 African countries - Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Dubbed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC, the deal’s goals include the reformation of the DRC’s army and an end to regional interference in the country. Among the decisions reached was the formation of a neutral intervention force aimed at fighting “negative forces” in eastern DRC - referring not only to M23 but other armed groups as well.

While the deal was lauded as a breakthrough by African countries, analysts are more sceptical, criticizing the agreement as being long on rhetoric and short on detail and solid action plans. A Foreign Policy Association blog post [ http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/28/regional-peace-to-settle-violence-in-the-drc-shows-progress-not-so-fast/ ] noted that since the 1990s, a number of similar regional agreements had failed to bring peace to DRC. It pointed out that the some key players were not mentioned or involved - including armed groups like Raia Mutomboki [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96899/DRC-Civilian-population-in-Masisi-at-risk ] (Swahili for “angry citizens”), Mai Mai Cheka and the Hutu-dominated FDLR, whose presence in eastern DRC is perceived as a threat by Rwanda.

“The primary aggressors present in the country for the last 10 years, the militia groups that patrol the eastern provinces, were not even included in the discussion,” said the author, Daniel Donovan. “By excluding these groups, they hold no commitment to such an agreement, which begs the question: How does this move signify a guarantee for peace?”

What is next for the region?

On 28 March, the UN Security Council authorized [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44523&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo ] an offensive “intervention brigade” to “address imminent threats to peace and security” as part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).

“The objectives of the new force - which will be based in North Kivu Province in eastern DRC and total 3,069 peacekeepers - are to neutralize armed groups, reduce the threat they posed to State authority and civilian security, and make space for stabilization activities,” according to the UN News Centre. It also aims to support the Addis accord.

Following the announcement, the DRC government said it supported the intervention brigade and warned M23 rebels to disband. M23’s Bisimwa has rejected [ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21993655 ] the UN’s decision to send the force, but said [ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YAzl8128kE ] the group would neither fight nor flee the UN forces. 

The International Federation of Human Rights [ http://www.fidh.org/DRC-An-intervention-brigade-within-MONUSCO-would-require-further-human-13106 ] has warned of a potential “escalation in military confrontations and increased risk of retaliatory attacks by armed groups against civilians” as a result of the force’s entry into the fray, and urged MONUSCO to “mitigate against the increased risks that communities will face”. 

Experts say reforms in eastern DRC must go beyond military solutions. “The intervention brigade… should not be seen as the only solution but one element of a comprehensive solution,” said ICG’s Lagrange.

“After last year’s fall of Goma and rise of the Mai Mai [rebel] threat, there is a serious need for a new approach against the armed groups. Such an approach should include the use of military force; a targeted policy of arrest on armed groups' leaders; a DDR [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] offer focusing on civilian reintegration; the investigation and neutralization of the logistical networks of the armed groups; and development work in the communities that generate armed groups,” he told IRIN. 

“Groups like M23 are not a cause but a symptom of what's going wrong in the DRC,” he added. “The Congolese government must commit to implement the security sector reforms, especially the reforms concerning the FARDC. It must also abandon its policy of peace prevailing over justice.” 

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97779/Briefing-M23-one-year-on</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303271154440060t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 03 April 2013 (IRIN) - The M23 rebellion, the latest of a string of armed insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province, has been active for one year now, during which hundreds of thousands have fled their homes and many have lost their lives.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boost for healthcare in DRC</title><pubDate>Sun, 31 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304020549030977t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 31 March 2013 (IRIN) - The British government has announced a major new programme aimed at providing essential healthcare to six million people in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The five-year, US$270.7 million project will focus on rebuilding health facilities, training health workers, and supplying drugs and equipment.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 31 March 2013 (IRIN) - The British government has announced a major new programme [ https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-british-boost-for-healthcare-in-drc ] aimed at providing essential healthcare to six million people in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The five-year, US$270.7 million project will focus on rebuilding health facilities, training health workers, and supplying drugs and equipment.

Civil war has destroyed much of the country’s health infrastructure, as well as the road networks and vital services such as electricity, meaning patients often have to travel long distances to health centres that may not be equipped to handle their complications.

IRIN has put together a list of five health issues in DRC that require urgent attention:

Maternal and Child Health - DRC’s maternal mortality ratio [ http://www.unfpa.org/sowmy/resources/docs/country_info/profile/en_DRC_SoWMy_Profile.pdf ] is 670 deaths per 100,000 live births, with an estimated 19,000 maternal deaths annually. The country has a severe shortage of health workers - less than one health professional is available per 1,000 people.

With 170 out of every 1,000 children dying before they reach the age of five and 10 percent of infants underweight, DRC has one of the worst child health indicators [ http://www.unicef.org/sowc2012/pdfs/SOWC%202012-Main%20Report_EN_13Mar2012.pdf ] in the world. It is one of five countries in the world in which about half of under-five deaths occur. Some of the biggest killers of children are diarrhoea, malaria, malnutrition and pneumonia.

Sexual violence - Several studies report high levels of sexual violence perpetrated against women, children and men in DRC, both by armed groups and within the home; one study [ http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=186342 ], conducted in the North and South Kivu and Ituri in 2010, found that 40 percent of women and 24 percent of men had experienced sexual violence.

Between the stigma of rape and the dearth of decent health services in DRC, sexual violence often leaves survivors injured, infected with sexually transmitted illnesses and severely traumatized. Some of the main requirements are first aid and trauma services, counselling, diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted infections, HIV post-exposure prophylaxis and access to contraception.

During a recent visit to eastern DRC, UK Foreign Secretary William Hague announced $312,110 in new funding [ http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/news/uk-announces-funds-to-help-survivors-of-rape-democratic-republic-of-congo.html ] to support the NGO Physicians for Human Rights, which works at Panzi Hospital in South Kivu Province, “to help efforts to develop local and national capacity to document and collect evidence of sexual violence”.

Diarrhoeal diseases - The consumption of unsafe water is one of the main causes of the diarrhoeal diseases - such as cholera - that infect and kill children and adults in DRC. A cholera epidemic that started in June 2011 has infected tens of thousands and killed more than 200 people. In the capital, Kinshasa [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95384/DRC-Poor-sanitation-systems-hinder-fight-against-cholera ], which has been hit by the epidemic, less than 40 percent of people have no access to piped water. According to the UN Children’s Fund, UNICEF [ http://www.unicef.org/media/media_68359.html ], 36 million people in DRC live without improved drinking water, and 50 million without improved sanitation.

Some of the measures to boost access to safe water and sanitation include hygiene awareness campaigns, rehabilitation of water supply and of sanitation facilities, disinfection of contaminated environments, chlorination of water, and distribution of soap.

Immunization - Despite the existence of an effective vaccine for measles at a cost of roughly $1 per vaccine, the disease is one of the leading killers of children in DRC. According to the Global Alliance for Vaccines [ http://www.gavialliance.org/library/news/gavi-features/2012/seth-berkley-visits-dr-congo-to-view-progress-on-immunisation/ ], 20-30 percent of children in DRC do not have access to immunization. Some challenges to universal vaccine coverage include the poor road network, the size of the country (DRC is Africa’s second largest country), unreliable electricity for vaccines that require refrigeration, and low awareness within the population.

HIV - More than one million people in DRC are living with HIV; 350,000 of these qualify for life-prolonging antiretroviral drugs, but only 44,000 - or 15 percent - are actually on treatment. Just 9 percent of the population knows of their HIV status, largely because of low awareness, but also because of a shortage of facilities - for instance, only one laboratory in the country is equipped to carry out polymerase chain reaction tests for early infant diagnosis.

Just 5.6 percent of HIV-positive pregnant Congolese women receive ARVs to prevent transmission of HIV to their babies; according to government figures, the mother-to-child transmission [ http://www.plusnews.org/Report/95346/DRC-End-of-mother-to-child-HIV-transmission-still-a-long-way-off ] rate is about 37 percent.

Humanitarian agencies have called on the government and donors to urgently boost funding [ http://www.plusnews.org/Report/95412/DRC-HIV-effort-needs-government-donor-commitment-to-succeed ] for HIV prevention, treatment and care.

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97761/Boost-for-healthcare-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304020549030977t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 31 March 2013 (IRIN) - The British government has announced a major new programme aimed at providing essential healthcare to six million people in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The five-year, US$270.7 million project will focus on rebuilding health facilities, training health workers, and supplying drugs and equipment.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In Congo, thousands still homeless one year after munitions blasts</title><pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203230906150052t.jpg" />]]>BRAZZAVILLE 28 March 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people remain homeless in the Republic of Congo (ROC) one year after being displaced following a deadly munitions blast at an army barracks in the capital, Brazzaville. The 4 March 2012 blast, in the area of Mpila, east of the capital, left some 282 people dead and 2,300 others injured, according to officials.</description><body><![CDATA[BRAZZAVILLE 28 March 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people remain homeless in the Republic of Congo (ROC) one year after being displaced following a deadly munitions blast [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95143/CONGO-Thousands-still-homeless-after-munitions-blast ] at an army barracks in the capital, Brazzaville. The 4 March 2012 blast, in the area of Mpila, east of the capital, left some 282 people dead and 2,300 others injured, according to officials. 

“We have not relocated all those affected to date. We are relocating them gradually, as we are building houses on selected sites,” Emilienne Raoul, the ROC minister for humanitarian action, told IRIN. 

“For a long time, the disaster-affected have remained traumatized, especially the children. It’s difficult to forget this disaster,” Raoul continued. 

Thousands of people who were left homeless after the March 2012 blast - which was actually a series of explosions - sought refuge in several sites around the capital. 

Still waiting

At present, at least 1,400 people are still living in tents at site number 17, west of Brazzaville. 

In the surburb of Kintélé, 25km north of Brazzaville, the ROC government has built houses on 10 hectares of land. About 300 affected families have already been settled there. 

“Here, we have the bare minimum: water, electricity, modern toilets and sanitation,” Ago Ngoulou, 43, told IRIN. Ngoulou is living in Kintélé after losing all his property in the explosions. “But transport is a headache. The site is far from the city centre.”

Most of those affected by the blasts have returned to the area of Mpila, where 2,000 families have received tents for shelter. Conditions there are difficult. 

“We set up the tents between the sides of the walls of our destroyed hoses. We are at the mercy of the elements, insects and dangerous animals such as snakes,” complained army Sgt Jules Engambé.
In the vicinity, vegetation grown over the shells of burnt up military tanks and vehicles.

The ROC government has set aside some 60 billion CFA (US$120 million) to assist the affected households - about 50 people crippled in the blast will receive a monthly allowance of 140,000 francs ($280).

In September 2012, the ROC government and China signed a number of financial agreements totalling 970 million euros (about $1.2 billion), most of which will go towards reconstructing Mpila. Reconstruction work will start in 2013, in consultation with the land owners, according to the planning minister, Jean-Jacques Bouya.

The process of decontaminating the explosion site, which started days after the early 2012 blasts, is expected to end on 31 March, the proposed date for the start of the reconstruction work. 

“The munitions that were exploded were scattered over a 3km radius,” said Cpt Cyr Andsi, the mine clearance head, adding that quality controls had been carried out to ensure the safety of people in Mpila.

Inquest 

Members of an inquest into the cause of the 4 March 2012 explosions in Mpila initially suspected that the blasts had been due to an electric fault. But according to the ROC prosecutor Essamy Ngatsé, “This theory no longer holds.”

At least 30 people have so far been arrested and charged, among them 23 military officers who were said to have breached state security and committed arson. But their case files have, for a long time, been circulating between various offices of the judiciary, including the court of appeals and the supreme court.

“If the trial proceeds based on this cacophony that we have observed, it’s hard to believe that it will be a just and fair trial,” said Roche Euloge Nzobo of the Congolese Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH).

lmm/aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97751/In-Congo-thousands-still-homeless-one-year-after-munitions-blasts</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203230906150052t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BRAZZAVILLE 28 March 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people remain homeless in the Republic of Congo (ROC) one year after being displaced following a deadly munitions blast at an army barracks in the capital, Brazzaville. The 4 March 2012 blast, in the area of Mpila, east of the capital, left some 282 people dead and 2,300 others injured, according to officials.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda “full”</title><pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303271206540692t.jpg" />]]>KIGALI 27 March 2013 (IRIN) - Camps in Rwanda hosting thousands of refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are running out of space following an influx of people fleeing insecurity in eastern DRC, says a senior government official.</description><body><![CDATA[KIGALI 27 March 2013 (IRIN) - Camps in Rwanda hosting thousands of refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are running out of space following an influx of people fleeing insecurity in eastern DRC [ http://www.irinnews.org/Country/CD/DRC ], says a senior government official.

“Since we have an obligation to accommodate new arrivals, there is a need to find alternative solutions since the existing camps have been declared full,” Séraphine Mukantabana, the Rwandan Minister of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs, told IRIN.

“As [the] government, we have an obligation to ensure that they [Congolese refugees] are in safe places, but the only challenge is the means that will be involved in relocating local residents living in these neighbouring areas as a way to expand these new camps,” she said.

Rwanda is hosting thousands of Congolese refugees in five sites in Gihembe, Kigeme, Kiziba, Nkamira and Nyabiheke. 

At least 25,000 Congolese entered Rwanda from eastern DRC in 2012, according to the Rwandan government. The influx added to the approximately 43,000 refugees - mainly Congolese - already in the country.

The ministry noted that there are some refugees willing to be relocated to other places in Rwanda due to security concerns. 

“However, the majority among them ha[ve] opted to remain in a transit camp [in] Nkamira, located near the border with DR Congo, exploring the opportunity to return home as the security situation in their home villages is gradually returning to normal,” Mukantabana said.

The Nkamira camp, in northwestern Rwanda, close to the DRC border, is hosting around 8,300 Congolese refugees, among them combatants who fled recent fighting between two factions of the M23 militia [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] in eastern DRC. On 15 March, the Rwandan government reported a new influx of Congolese refugees [ http://www.gov.rw/New-influx-of-Congolese-refugees-enter-Rwanda ].

There have been challenges meeting the food needs of [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97408/Congolese-refugees-in-Rwanda-complain-of-insufficient-food-water ] the Congolese refugees in Rwanda. 

On 5 March, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) launched an appeal for an extra US$69.6 million “to help hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced Congolese civilians in the volatile Great Lakes region this year”. Part of the extra funds - some $17.7 million - is intended for Rwanda.

"Our plans for Rwanda centre on the Kigeme refugee camp, which was reopened and expanded last year and will soon reach its capacity of 25,000. Facilities need to be developed and homes repaired, and we aim to strengthen the local and health services to cater for the refugee population," said [ http://www.unhcr.org/5135cdef6.html ] UNHCR spokesman Adrian Edwards.

According to UNHCR, the security situation in DRC limits the refugees' prospects for return.

at/aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97742/Congolese-refugee-camps-in-Rwanda-full</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303271206540692t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KIGALI 27 March 2013 (IRIN) - Camps in Rwanda hosting thousands of refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are running out of space following an influx of people fleeing insecurity in eastern DRC, says a senior government official.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Kony hunt still on after CAR coup</title><pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011051154390753t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 26 March 2013 (IRIN) - The search for the Ugandan rebel group the Lord&apos;s Resistance Army (LRA) in the rainforests of the Central African Republic (CAR) will continue despite the ouster of President François Bozizé by rebel group Séléka, officials say.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 26 March 2013 (IRIN) - The search for the Ugandan rebel group the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the rainforests of the Central African Republic (CAR) will continue despite the ouster of President François Bozizé by rebel group Séléka, officials say.

Séléka overran the capital, Bangui, on 24 March, putting Bozizé to flight. The rebels named their leader, Michel Djotodjia, the new head of state.

“I don’t think the overthrow of President Bozizé by Séléka will change our mission and position in the hunt down of LRA rebels. We are in CAR with the mandate from [the] AU [African Union] and UN [United Nations],” Uganda’s state minister for international relations, Henry Okello Oryem, told IRIN, adding that his country is committed to capturing LRA leader Joseph Kony.

Uganda has some 2,500 soldiers deployed around the border areas of CAR, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, where Kony and his fighters are thought to spend most of their time. The Ugandan troops are joined by 500 Congolese fighters, 500 South Sudanese and 350 CAR troops, all operating under the auspices of the AU. In late 2011, the US deployed 100 special forces to the region as military advisers to the effort.

Ploughing on

According to Thierry Vircoulon, Central Africa project director for the think tank International Crisis Group (ICG), “the fall of Bozizé will not change much the situation on the ground, except if the Séléka leaders insist on the departure of the foreign troops as stipulated in the Libreville agreement [a peace agreement brokered in January and breached by the latest fighting? but never successfully implemented].”

Potential problems

Some analysts say, however, that the AU’s decision to suspend CAR from the organization following the coup could have negative consequences for the hunt for the LRA.

“The AU’s suspension of CAR poses a great challenge and will slow down the hunt for Kony and his rebels. Uganda has to re-negotiate with Séléka rebels… in order for its troops to have the mandate to operate in their territory,” Ronald Ssekandi, a regional political analyst based in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, told IRIN.

Angelo Izama, a political affairs analyst at the US-based Open Society Foundation, said the hunt for Kony and the LRA would largely depend on Séléka’s control of the country.

“The deterioration of government in CAR is a significant complication for the hunt against Joseph Kony. The LRA's asymmetrical, low-tech survival strategy thrives in conditions of lawlessness and violence, especially in the hinterland,” he told IRIN.

“Already the geographical terrain, as well as the size of CAR, has been a practical constraint against the forces hunting Kony. If Séléka is unable to consolidate control, it would further the physical and tactical net within which LRA can seek opportunities to rebuild weapons caches,” he added. “The Séléka rebels do not have the capacity [to limit LRA activities]… In addition, Kony is not their problem; there are much more important emergencies to deal with.”

According to Lt Gen Edward Katumba Wamala, commander of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces’ (UPDF) Land Forces, Kony’s fighters currently number about 400, and they continue to roam around CAR, DRC, Sudan and South Sudan. He said some LRA defectors recently reported that Kony was in Sudan’s western region of Darfur, while his senior commanders, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo, are thought to be in CAR.

Kony, Odhiambo and Ongwen are wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) [ http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/Pages/situation%20index.aspx ] for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Uganda.

LRA still a threat

“The LRA no longer pose a big threat, but there are still [a] few pockets of LRA rebels operating in CAR under Odhiambo and Ongwen. They are a nuisance. They have continued to abduct, maim and kill unarmed people,” Katumba told IRIN.

“It is important to recall that, despite [the] relatively small number of remaining elements, the LRA continues to pose a serious threat to civilians, with dire humanitarian consequences, in the affected areas in CAR, DRC and South Sudan,” Abou Moussa, head of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), told IRIN via email.

In February, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported [ http://www.hdptcar.net/sites/www.hdptcar.net/files/Bulletin%20humanitaire%2001%20eng-1.pdf ] that in the country’s southeast, “there has been an increase in the LRA attacks against communities and hostages being taken.”

According to LRA Crisis Tracker [ http://www.lracrisistracker.com ], the LRA was responsible for 13 civilian deaths and 17 abductions in CAR February 2013. UNOCA says an estimated 443,000 people are currently displaced in LRA-affected areas, many of them depending on international assistance for food, shelter, health care, water and sanitation. This includes an estimated 347,000 people in Province Orientale’s Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé districts in DRC.

Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s chief prosecutor, recently sent a message [ http://www.icc-cpi.int/fr_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/statement-OTP-18-03-2013.aspx ] to the LRA, assuring them that, should they be arrested, they would not be “tortured or killed” and would receive a fair trial.

Commitment to the cause

Analysts say if the LRA threat is to be laid to rest once and for all, countries in the region must show more commitment to finding Kony.

“It requires committed governments to arrest Kony. The ICC can only base its optimism in this practical possibility. There is no government in CAR, soft states in South Sudan and Chad, and support for LRA from Sudan. It’s plausible that the situation above favours the LRA and not the ICC,” said Open Society Foundation’s Izama.

“Kony's continued existence, and that of his entire group, is part of a much larger problem in the Great Lakes region: failure by governments to resolve internal political problems and to work together in a concerted way to bring to an end cross-border insurgencies in the region,” said Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, a political scientist and senior research fellow at Makerere University’s Institute of Social Research. “Their proliferation points to the existence of problems or grievances that ought to be addressed - questions to do with citizenship and nationality, land ownership, access to services and opportunity.”

so/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97737/Kony-hunt-still-on-after-CAR-coup</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011051154390753t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 26 March 2013 (IRIN) - The search for the Ugandan rebel group the Lord&apos;s Resistance Army (LRA) in the rainforests of the Central African Republic (CAR) will continue despite the ouster of President François Bozizé by rebel group Séléka, officials say.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>CAR coup comes amid deepening humanitarian crisis</title><pubDate>Mon, 25 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303251111520356t.jpg" />]]>BANGUI 25 March 2013 (IRIN) - The humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is worsening as the security and political conditions there rapidly deteriorate, with the Séléka rebel coalition taking the capital, Bangui, in the latest offensive.</description><body><![CDATA[BANGUI 25 March 2013 (IRIN) - A rebel-led weekend coup in the Central African Republic (CAR) took place against a backdrop of worsening humanitarian conditions in many parts of the country, with access to affected populations severely restricted.

The Séléka rebel group overran the capital, Bangui, on 24 March, putting President François Bozizé to flight and naming Michel Djotodjia as the new head of state.

"With all offices and most stores looted  it will be difficult to evaluate needs. Bangui has no electricity or water.  We need to have security and for the population to stop looting," Amy Martin, who heads the Bangui branch of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), told IRIN on 25 March.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned the "unconstitutional seizure" and called "for the swift restoration of constitutional order."

"UN and NGO staff are concentrated in the UN compound. We are expected to evacuate staff, non-essential [staff], as the security is not in place and looting continues, with sporadic gunfire in the streets," said Martin.

A few days before the coup, Martin told IRIN: "In general, the political and security environment is deteriorating as the Libreville Agreements [a peace accord signed on 11 January] are not gaining any traction."

"The agreed conditions are not being respected by either side: release [by the government] of prisoners, the quartering of armed forces by Séléka. There are more rumours of additional former rebel groups to join the Séléka coalition. All remain very uncertain and unpredictable," she said.

On 20 March, the UN Security Council condemned Séléka attacks [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44443&Cr=central+african+republic&Cr1=#.UUxNkxyLCFV ] in the area of Bangassou and the surrounding region, "and the threat of a resumption of hostilities."

"Séléka now controls three-quarters of the country," said Margaret Vogt, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for CAR, several days before the capture of Bangui. She added that rebel members of the government of national unity - which parties agreed to form in the January peace deal - had decided to withdraw from the government and had gone "back into the bush".

The rebels had issued an ultimatum, threatening to resume fighting if their conditions - including the release of political prisoners and the withdrawal of foreign soldiers - were not met.

Humanitarian access limited

The rebels' taking of the town of Bangassou on 12 March, in breach of the January peace agreement, had led to a reduction in humanitarian access to populations in need of assistance.

"The current advancement of the Séléka to the southern town of Bangassou has effectively cut off a major hub for humanitarian actors' access to the southeast, affecting 300,000 people already suffering from six years of LRA [Lord's Resistant Army, a Ugandan rebel group] attacks. Since the beginning of the crisis in December, humanitarian access has been limited to about 33 percent of the areas under Séléka control," stated OCHA in a 12 March press release, adding that Séléka now controls a large part of the country, home to over 1.5 million people or 34 percent of the total population.

On 15 March, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) warned [ http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/unhcr-warns-risks-civilians-central-african-republic-refugee-numbers ] that "renewed fighting in Central African Republic was threatening the civilian population in the southeast of the country and compromising UNHCR's access to refugees and internally displaced people."

"As is always the case in these kinds of situations, as long as there isn't a total cessation of hostilities, the humanitarian crisis will continue and worsen," Pazougou Fulgence, a sociologist at the University of Bangui, told IRIN.

According to OCHA's Martin, humanitarian access has been a constant challenge: "Insecurity prevents free circulation of people, and limits movement between major towns. Looting of organizations' offices, equipment and stealing of vehicles has hindered operations in the field for humanitarians. Lack of protection for civilians limits their freedom of movement, with harassment and other exactions of violence," she said.

"With the rainy season fast approaching and very poor road infrastructure, [access] will reduce even more, especially to the more remote regions of the southeast and northeast of the country."

Latest in series of crises

The Séléka offensive [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97085/CENTRAL-AFRICAN-REPUBLIC-Hundreds-flee-as-rebels-advance ], which began on 10 December 2012, is the latest in a series of crises in CAR, leading to an increase in civilian protection needs and heightening the risk of food insecurity [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97524/Looming-food-crisis-in-the-Central-African-Republic ].

Tens of thousands of people in CAR were already in humanitarian need due to past crises, especially in the east. The crises have resulted from a number of factors, according to Kaarina Immonen, the UN Deputy Special Representative for CAR, including "recent conflict, attacks by unknown or uncontrolled armed groups, violent acts by Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army, and continued banditry in parts of the country".

The crises have increased the number of people in need, their level of need and the cost of supplementary interventions, according to CAR's Prime Minister Nicolas Thiangaye. "Civilians have become victims of serious human rights violations: murders, rapes, looting and robberies," he said.

As of 12 March, the Séléka offensive had, according to OCHA, left some 175,000 people internally displaced, with at least 29,000 others seeking refuge in neighbouring Chad and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. An estimated 166,000 children were also out of school. These numbers could increase following the taking of Bangui.

Commenting on the impact of the current crises in CAR, Special Representative Vogt said, "At the best of times, the record in CAR was not good, but it is exponentially worse."

cd-k-aw/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97721/CAR-coup-comes-amid-deepening-humanitarian-crisis</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303251111520356t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BANGUI 25 March 2013 (IRIN) - The humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is worsening as the security and political conditions there rapidly deteriorate, with the Séléka rebel coalition taking the capital, Bangui, in the latest offensive.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boosting support for IDPs outside DRC’s formal camps</title><pubDate>Thu, 21 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207101215300298t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 21 March 2013 (IRIN) - Humanitarian agencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province are working to increase their support for hundreds of thousands of displaced people living outside formal camps with little humanitarian support, often relying on the kindness of sometimes equally vulnerable host communities.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 21 March 2013 (IRIN) - Humanitarian agencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province are working to increase their support for hundreds of thousands of displaced people living outside formal camps with little humanitarian support, often relying on the kindness of sometimes equally vulnerable host communities.

Fighting in North Kivu in 2012 displaced some 590,000 people, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In total, some 914,000 people are displaced in the province. According to the NGO Refugees International (RI), some 802,000 of these are living outside formal camp settings.

“Only 112,000 North Kivu IDPs live in UNHCR-operated camps, while 230,000 are in spontaneous settlements, and the rest are living with host communities,” RI advocate Caelin Briggs [ http://refugeesinternational.org/content/back-field-drc ] told IRIN following a mission to the province.

“Across the board, we found extremely harsh conditions, particularly in the non-official camps - spontaneous settlements and people living with host families,” she added. “Food is the number one need mentioned. For instance, between July and December 2012, there was no food distribution in Masisi [territory]. They try to get day labour on nearby farms, but there is just not enough work to go around.”

Briggs noted that protection was another issue of concern. “In Goma, there is a big threat to women fetching firewood, especially as they now have to go deeper into the forest for it,” she said. “They are advised to go in groups, but this is not really helpful against a group of armed men.”

The DRC government has not yet ratified the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 2009 - also known as the Kampala Convention [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96984/IDPs-African-IDP-Convention-comes-into-force ] - the world’s first legally binding instrument aimed specifically at aiding people displaced within their own countries.

Harmonizing programmes

“Until recently, there was very little assistance and coordination of activities in spontaneous sites and for IDPs living in host families and other displacement situations,” Simplice Kpandji, the UN Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) public information officer in DRC, told IRIN. “Over the last few months, the humanitarian community has sought to create a new, more holistic coordination/assistance system which includes not only CCCM [camp coordination/camp management] camps but also other displacement situations.”

“Approaches to distribution, registration, security… etc. are being harmonized to ensure that all IDPs in various situations of displacement are treated equally,” he added.

RI is making the case for the “the activation of a national-level CCCM cluster to jointly address the needs of displaced persons living in CCCM camps as well as those living in spontaneous settlements and with host families” [ http://refugeesinternational.org/policy/letter/letter-deputy-special-representative-monusco ]. In some countries, humanitarian actors working within a particular field, such as shelter or health, coordinate their activities through “clusters” [ http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination ]. CCCM activities in the DRC are handled by a “working group” under the larger protection cluster.

Kpandji said that although the CCCM working group has been working “very much like a cluster”, it lacks access to funding mechanisms available to clusters, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund [ http://www.unocha.org/cerf/ ] and pooled funds.

In January, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) joined UNHCR in coordinating spontaneous sites in North Kivu.

“Little is done for IDPs outside the formal camps, which is why IOM has developed a strategy to care for IDPs in spontaneous sites and those living with host communities,” said Laurent de Boeck, chief of IOM’s mission in the DRC.

“IOM has a three-tier approach to IDPs outside the camps: understanding and registering the people displaced using a displacement tracking matrix; analyzing the pull-push factors leading to displacement, and assessing the ability of host families to cope with crisis; and, based on the needs, deliver the immediate needs of the IDPs [including] food and non-food items, and encourage other humanitarian actors to help as well.

“Finally, we aim to build the resilience of the IDPs, both where they are and in their places of origin - when and if return is safe. We aim to create durable solutions, whether this means insertion into host communities, return back to their places of origin or… formal re-localization,” he added.

Addressing the risks

De Boeck noted that displacement from one community to another could create tensions and make host communities vulnerable to possible insecurity.

He said access and identification of host families was particularly difficult. “Often both the displaced and the host families are vulnerable so there is a dilemma on who to focus on,” he said.

“One risk for UNHCR and partners is encouraging the creation of collective sites in areas with insufficient/inadequate conditions to provide effective protection and assistance,” said Kpandji.

“Contingency plans in the province should be updated regularly to ensure that suitable reception areas are identified in advance, and that the humanitarian community is prepared,” he added. “Close cooperation with authorities - who should identify land for displacement sites in advance - should be maintained.”

According to De Boeck, there is also a need for better harmonization between national humanitarian policy and regional implementation.

“In the overall approach, there is a misunderstanding between Kinshasa and the provincial level. Efforts are focused very much on North Kivu, with no systematic approach in other provinces,” he said. “There are good initiatives by the government, i.e., the ministerial and national policy on development as well as a new governmental decree giving the Ministry of Humanitarian Action a coordination role. This needs to be reflected at the provincial level.”

He added, “There is a need to dialogue with the population to better understand their needs and how to meet them.”

Kpandji also pointed out the need to develop the agencies’ ability to rapidly evaluate and respond to displacement, “in particular with regards to child protection and support to community-based protection mechanisms”.

Funding

“Funding is a major challenge. We are really advocating for increased funding for IOM and UNHCR, as well as for OCHA’s US$30.5 million [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA_Humanitarian%20Action%20in%20the%20DRC%2018%20January%202013%20_%20FINAL.pdf ] request to cover the basic needs of IDPs in North Kivu,” said Briggs.

“Our needs are $13 million over 12 months, and we will have $4 million before the end of the month, allowing us to work for six months… This is all for our work in North Kivu,” said de Boeck. “We will also be appealing for funds for our operations in Province Orientale and South Kivu.”

“Funding remains an issue. Sure, it is important, but equally as important - and arguably more important - is the end of fighting, an end to these sporadic bouts that prevent access and [hinder] aid organizations’ work,” said one aid worker, who preferred anonymity. “Money without access does not get us anywhere.”

kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97702/Boosting-support-for-IDPs-outside-DRC-s-formal-camps</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201207101215300298t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 21 March 2013 (IRIN) - Humanitarian agencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province are working to increase their support for hundreds of thousands of displaced people living outside formal camps with little humanitarian support, often relying on the kindness of sometimes equally vulnerable host communities.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Cholera outbreak in Congo</title><pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209131307590968t.jpg" />]]>BRAZZAVILLE 15 March 2013 (IRIN) - An influx of migrants from the countryside into the Republic of Congo&apos;s second largest city, Pointe-Noire, is exacerbating a cholera outbreak that began in November 2012. The outbreak infected at least 389 and killed 10, according to the health ministry and local authorities.</description><body><![CDATA[BRAZZAVILLE 15 March 2013 (IRIN) - An influx of migrants from the countryside into the Republic of Congo's second largest city, Pointe-Noire, is exacerbating a cholera outbreak that began in November 2012. The outbreak infected at least 389 and killed 10, according to the health ministry and local authorities.

"Heavy rain in the port city in recent weeks and sanitation problems triggered the cholera outbreak," said Health Minister François Ibovi.

According to the mayor of Pointe-Noire, Roland Bouiti Viaudo, the booming city has seen a large influx of migrants from rural areas.

"People build and settle in prohibited areas, including [around] sewers, blocking the free flow of wastewater, which explains the repeated outbreaks of cholera,” he told IRIN. "To stop the disease… everyone - the authorities, NGOs and communities - should mobilize and become aware of this danger."

In early March, during a council of ministers' meeting, the government announced that emergency aid had been released to combat the outbreak, but it did not specify the amount.

Health authorities in Pointe-Noire, a city of more than 800,000, have set up an intensive cholera treatment centre on the grounds of the 200-bed Loandjili Hospital.

"This centre is run by six specialists in infectious diseases and the gastrointestinal tract. It also has a team of 28 nurses with disposable gowns, gloves, masks and shoes to avoid contamination," said the country’s director-general of health, Alexis Elira Dokekias.

"So far... of all cases reported by the Pointe-Noire health services, 347 have already returned home, 10 have died, and 32 are still hospitalized," he said.

lmm/cb/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97661/Cholera-outbreak-in-Congo</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209131307590968t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BRAZZAVILLE 15 March 2013 (IRIN) - An influx of migrants from the countryside into the Republic of Congo&apos;s second largest city, Pointe-Noire, is exacerbating a cholera outbreak that began in November 2012. The outbreak infected at least 389 and killed 10, according to the health ministry and local authorities.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Aid for Trade - does it help the poor?</title><pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/200705162t.jpg" />]]>LONDON 12 March 2013 (IRIN) - Since the World Trade Organization launched its Aid for Trade initiative in 2005, an estimated US$200 billion dollars of development funding has been mobilized for the programme. But some NGOs are asking whether Aid for Trade really helps reduce poverty.</description><body><![CDATA[LONDON 12 March 2013 (IRIN) - Since the World Trade Organization launched its Aid for Trade initiative in 2005, an estimated US$200 billion dollars of development funding [ http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl262_e.htm ] has been mobilized for the programme. But some NGOs are asking whether Aid for Trade really helps reduce poverty.

Two of those NGOs, Traidcraft and the Catholic Agency For Overseas Development, commissioned a study of British and European Aid for Trade assistance, looking at whether the donors have assessed the impacts of these projects on the poor. 

The study, carried out by Saana Consulting [ http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/Resources/Traidcraft/Documents/PDF/tx/Aid%20for%20Trade%20Report%202012.pdf.pdf ], points out that the majority of funding goes to middle-income countries rather than low-income countries, and finds little evidence to demonstrate what impact the programmes have had on poverty.

The study reveals most reviews are completed within the lifetime of a project or at the end - too soon to see any real impact. It adds that “by and large, causal linkages between what a project delivers and the impact on poverty are based on a series of assumptions, and in some cases a leap of faith.”

Little known about poverty effects

The assumption underlying Aid for Trade is that “a rising tide floats all boats,” that more trade brings greater national wealth, and that everyone - including the poor - will benefit. 

Liz Turner, one of the study’s authors, does not dispute this notion. She says that, generally speaking, trade is good. But, she says, “looking at the effects of Aid for Trade in the long term, we end up defaulting back to macro-economic analysis and this issue around the winners and losers from growth. Even if you know that the net effects of a project are going to be positive, wouldn’t it be wiser to find out if there are going to be any losers?” 

Aid for Trade supports all kinds of projects: road building and port upgrading, providing technical support for trade negotiations and regulatory frameworks, designing better border posts, and teaching Ugandan farmers how to produce dried fruit for the lucrative European breakfast cereal market. But only the latter kinds of projects are likely to get evaluated for their effects on poverty reduction.

Kerry Hamilton manages the UK’s Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund, which supports such projects. She told IRIN, “The whole idea is that by doing this, there will be a developmental impact on the farmers and workers involved in that trade. All our projects have a monitoring and evaluation framework, and we ask for baseline data and a set of indicators against which we can measure its success. 

“The difficulty is in the time scales. Projects included in our fourth round of funding have to be completed within 18 months, and by the end of that period, the impact on poverty is going to be minimal. Ideally we should go back in two years’ or five years’ time, but because of the way the funding works, once the project has finished we probably won’t.” 

Hidden losers

Asked by IRIN for an example in which trade support was shown to have an impact on poverty, the head of Aid for Trade at the UK Department for International Development (DFID), Adaeze Igboemeka, cited a project to speed border and customs procedures in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

“What it focused on was gender and the informal traders,” Igboemeka said. “We used methods like changing the actual structure of the border offices, adding glass panels. Officials working at the border were less likely to ask for bribes, and some of the sexual violence that affects women traders - we saw a very important decrease there. And just having clear procedures made it easier for poor, informal traders to trade.” 

But at a meeting to discuss the study at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London, ODI researcher Yurendra Basnett used border post projects as an example of aid that produces losers as well as winners, notably in the communities that spring up to provide services to people waiting at congested borders.

“I was involved in designing a project in South Sudan aimed at improving customs administration,” said Basnett. “Now, from improving customs capacity, how do you go to saying this will have a poverty impact? In the long term it may, and you can make these assumptions, but it is a massive leap of faith, and there are tensions… Now if, for example, you are working on a border post and reduce the transit time from three days to three hours, then a lot of informal traders lose their livelihoods.” 

The University of Manchester also found both winners and losers emerging from trade programmes [ http://www.capturingthegains.org/ ]. After trade sanctions on South Africa were lifted in the early 1990s, its fruit growers became major exporters and a lot of work was done to meet the standards demanded by European supermarkets. Growers were under pressure meet social standards, which had some positive effects for workers, including higher wages and the provision of clinics.

But the demand for cheaper produce also led growers to cut staff and use more temporary workers, often migrants from Zimbabwe or Mozambique, who are paid less and enjoy fewer benefits.

Not enough information

Donors admit that poverty impacts are very hard to track, especially for broader attempts to support trade.

William Hynes, of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), says most smaller donors don’t even attempt to evaluate these impacts. They only monitor that the money was spent on what it was intended for.

“Impact evaluations are costly. They are burdensome, lengthy, and not necessarily aligned with the project managers’ incentives. They do help get across this idea that we should prioritize learning over accountability. But getting at the poverty impacts of a project would probably involve a household survey. A baseline and final survey for 500 households would cost around $300,000, so for most activities that is simply off the table straight away.”

And Igboemeka concedes that, in most cases, the effects of Aid for Trade on the poor are difficult to nail down. “The poverty impact is indirect, and we are very clear about that. The assumption is - and there is a lot of evidence to support it - that if a country is able to trade more, it will grow, and that will create jobs and increase incomes and lead to poverty reduction. That’s a very long results chain, so we don’t try to make a direct attribution of the direct poverty reduction impact. We don’t have enough information to do that robustly.”

All this uncertainty worries campaigners like Gareth Siddorn of Traidcraft. “I know Aid for Trade is just one part of an aid portfolio,” he told IRIN, “but I was struck by the recognition, by colleagues from both DFID and OECD, that it might not be the most effective way of directly benefitting poor people. And from an NGO perspective, that isn’t just one indicator among many - it’s the primary purpose of aid and development policies.” 

eb/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97630/Aid-for-Trade-does-it-help-the-poor</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2007/200705162t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">LONDON 12 March 2013 (IRIN) - Since the World Trade Organization launched its Aid for Trade initiative in 2005, an estimated US$200 billion dollars of development funding has been mobilized for the programme. But some NGOs are asking whether Aid for Trade really helps reduce poverty.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Militias in Masisi</title><pubDate>Wed, 06 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303061047170615t.jpg" />]]>MASISI 06 March 2013 (IRIN) - The process of integrating armed groups into the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) army, FARDC, has stalled again amid heavy fighting at a base where hundreds of combatants had assembled.</description><body><![CDATA[MASISI 06 March 2013 (IRIN) - The process of integrating armed groups into the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) army, FARDC, has stalled again amid heavy fighting at a base where hundreds of combatants had assembled.

The clashes, which started in Kitchanga, North Kivu Province, could jeopardize community reconciliation across much of the province's Masisi territory, which saw outbreaks of ethnic violence in 2012.

In this briefing, IRIN looks at armed group integration and community pacification in eastern DRC and asks how these processes might develop in Masisi and elsewhere in the region.

What has happened in Kitchanga?

Heavy fighting broke out on 24 February between FARDC and the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) militia, and continued until 27 February. It broke out again on March 3; as of 5 March, at least 70 people had been killed and thousands displaced from their homes.

Between 500 and 700 APCLS combatants are believed to have been in Kitchanga, alongside a regiment of about 1,000 FARDC soldiers. The combatants had been sent by their commander, Janvier Bwingo Karairi, who was negotiating with the army over the possible integration of his forces.

UN Radio says discussions broke down over the murder of an APCLS officer and attempts by the APCLS to attack ethnic Tutsi living in a displacement camp, who they alleged were hiding weapons. A witness to the fighting, Samson Ndako, said many houses in Kitchanga were burned as the fighters targeted each other's communities. The APCLS are largely ethnic Hunde, and many soldiers in the town are Hutu or Tutsi.

Most of the town’s estimated 120,000 inhabitants have fled towards Tongo in the northwest.

Why are these latest clashes significant?

There is fighting between the FARDC and armed groups in many parts of DRC, but Masisi is a key area for political and strategic reasons. Tensions within this densely populated territory have repeatedly sparked or fuelled wars.

The area straddles an ethnic fault line between Banyarwanda people, who have Rwandan ancestry and include the Hutu and Tutsi, and other so-called “indigenous” communities, such as the Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo and Nande.

In 2012, the violence [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96392/DRC-Army-commander-seeks-solution-to-Masisi-crisis ] in Masisi was worse than at any time since the 1990s, contributing to the displacement of up to half a million people in North Kivu.

That violence died down in December, when Hutu, Hunde and other armed groups agreed to a ceasefire. There was even a plan for APCLS’s Janvier to take command of other armed groups and shepherd them into a mass integration into the army. That idea may now be shelved or abandoned.

Masisi is also at the frontline of the stand-off with the M23 rebels, who control most the neighbouring territory of Rutshuru.

What is the risk of a return to ethnic violence in Masisi?

The fighting in Kitchanga is not simply Hunde versus Hutu and Tutsi. Oxfam worker Eddy Mbuyi told IRIN that elements of the Rwandan, Hutu-dominated rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda(FDLR) have been siding with the APCLS, and other local Hutu militias appear to be neutral. Still, he said, there is virtually an ethnic war in Kitchanga, and it threatens to spread.

Yet progress towards reconciling Hutu, Hunde and other communities has been made in recent months. Since December 2012, at least three large pacification meetings have been held in the territory. The Jesuit Refugee Service described a meeting on 5 February at Masisi Centre as "historic" - it was the first time hundreds of Hunde and Hutu combatants had met at such a gathering.

The leaders of the APCLS and of the Hutu Force for the Defence of Human Rights (FDDH) militias were present at that meeting, and in an apparently strong gesture of solidarity, FDDH coordinator Emmanuel Munyariba said the FDDH would take orders from APCLS's Janvier.

However, that solidarity may have been conditional on good relations with the army (Munyamariba is also a local police chief), and the FDDH is not the only Hutu militia, nor is it united - three groups call themselves FDDH. In a recent Rift Valley Institute report [ http://rvi.asilialtd.com/download/file/fid/1121 ], Congo expert Jason Stearns [ http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/ ] referred to 15 mostly Hutu splinter militias in the neighbouring territory of Kalehe.

Reconciliation has a long way to go in the villages. The NGO Concern found some villages in Masisi still empty, and many formerly ethnically mixed villages are now inhabited by only one ethnic group. Forty-five percent of the villagers Concern interviewed said they had only just returned after fleeing the recent violence, and many remain displaced.

Notably absent from pacification meetings were representatives of the Tutsi community. The research head for the North Kivu Civil Society Association, Djento Maundu, said this was a major reason some community chiefs have not attended the meetings.

There is a serious risk of armed groups banding together against the Tutsi, who are widely blamed for the M23 rebellion [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] although many Tutsi have died fighting alongside the rebels. Most of the M23's senior officers are Tutsi, as are many generals in FARDC who were integrated into the army after fighting for Rwandan-backed rebel movements.

Some complain that past peace agreements have given the Tutsi too much power, and that they are using it to defend their large land holdings and dominant role in the economy.

Hunde elder and APCLS spokesman Kingi Mbayo told IRIN on March 4 that the APCLS is not against the Tutsi, and has some Tutsi in its ranks, including “Colonel” Philemon. He also said Tutsi ranches have not come under attack in the past year, which appears to be true.

But he added that many Tutsi who claim to be Congolese refugees, whose return to their land is one of the M23’s demands, are not genuine Congolese, and called for more pressure on the Congolese and Rwandan governments to address this issue.

APCLS spokesman Jannot Makale Kale told IRIN on 4 March that the group would not leave Kitchanga but was willing to coexist there with FARDC, which it still regards as its ally.

Where has this left the army integration process?

In 2012, the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) reported that there were at least 31 armed groups in eastern DRC. The only large militia to integrate into the army since 2009 was the Hutu Nyatura, a group of around 1,000 fighters, now known as the Tango Four regiment. MONUSCO has a list of 12 groups in North Kivu that have been in integration talks.

MONUSCO lists nine of the armed groups in North Kivu as pro-FARDC and only four as pro-M23. But the list considers APCLS a pro-FARDC group, so it may need updating. Even so, the APCLS's hostility to the Tutsi means an alliance with the M23 is unlikely.

The M23 is believed to include some 3,000 fighters, while the Congolese army may have deployed some 20,000 against them. The other armed groups in North Kivu cumulatively have several thousand fighters.

Without significant armed support, the M23 will have difficulty advancing far from the Rwandan border. The proposed deployment of drones [ http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/01/20131941818393957.html ] to monitor the border will put them under further pressure.

The M23 also has serious internal divisions. Two M23 factions, one led by Bosco Ntaganda and the other by Sultani Makenga, were fighting at the end of last month, allowing FARDC and allies to move into the M23 zone before withdrawing again on March 3.

The armed groups that MONUSCO lists as pro-M23 are generally smaller than the pro-FARDC groups, so the odds seemed to be stacked against the movement. By June, it could also be facing a possible reinforcement of MONUSCO – which has some 17,000 peacekeepers - by a South African Development Community-led neutral international force of up to 4,000 soldiers with a more robust mandate.

Where next for integration and pacification?

Spokesmen for armed groups like the APCLS, FDDH and Movement of Action for Change (MAC) have told IRIN that the reason they have not yet joined the army is because it has been infiltrated by the M23. There is widespread suspicion that Tutsi officers within FARDC are M23 sympathizers, and militia members will be reluctant to join the army if they think the senior ranks are dominated by a hostile community.

Meanwhile, government negotiations with the M23 have been ongoing since December. The government is trying to avoid reintegrating senior M23 officers; it has offered to reintegrate all ranks up to major and to treat colonels and above on a case-by-case basis, offering some of them “retirement packages”. MONUSCO supports this position.

If a deal is reached with the M23, the army might try to deal with the region’s other armed groups by force, with the help of MONUSCO. A military source said the SADC-led troops would probably conduct some operations against the FDLR, some of whose core leadership was involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

In a letter published on 12 February, 19 mostly international NGOs called for "non-military solutions to [the] conflict… based on the failure so far of military action to fully address the presence of non-state armed groups and the negative impact of such action on the civilian population".

But militia commanders' ambitions may not be limited to integration in the army. For instance, the territory of APCLS's Janvier's is rich in high-grade cassiterite, which has been largely unexploited.

Researcher Maundu suggests that a key to peace could be establishing which people are the real stakeholders in the mines, and then encouraging the mines’ exploitation by demobilized militias.

nl/kr/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97602/Briefing-Militias-in-Masisi</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303061047170615t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MASISI 06 March 2013 (IRIN) - The process of integrating armed groups into the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) army, FARDC, has stalled again amid heavy fighting at a base where hundreds of combatants had assembled.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In Congo, few pygmy women have access to reproductive health services</title><pubDate>Fri, 01 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2112045t.jpg" />]]>BRAZZAVILLE 01 March 2013 (IRIN) - Indigenous women in the Republic of Congo, better known as pygmies - a minority group threatened with extinction - are virtually excluded from reproductive health services. They mostly give birth at home and are exposed to related health risks, according to a 2012 study conducted by the Ministry of Health with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA).</description><body><![CDATA[BRAZZAVILLE 01 March 2013 (IRIN) - Indigenous women in the Republic of Congo, better known as pygmies - a minority group threatened with extinction - are virtually excluded from reproductive health services. They mostly give birth at home and are exposed to related health risks, according to a 2012 study conducted by the Ministry of Health with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA).

The study, Determinants of the Use of Reproductive Health Services by Indigenous Peoples, was conducted in four regions of Congo - Likouala, Sangha, Plateaux and Lekoumou - where most of the 43,500 indigenous people live.

In terms of reproductive health, "the numbers are not encouraging" for indigenous women, UNFPA representative David Lawson told IRIN. 

"While 94 percent of the general population gets antenatal care, only 37 percent of pregnant aboriginal women receive such services; and while 93 percent of Congolese women usually give birth in a health centre, only 4 percent of indigenous women do so,'' said Lawson, citing the study.

"The risks are enormous for indigenous women because they do not receive emergency care at birth," he added.

According to the same study, at least 45 percent of Congolese women use contraceptive methods, while only 25 percent of indigenous people do so, "because of a lack of access to family planning".

Also, 50 percent of indigenous people said they were not getting any information on HIV/AIDS (the country has an HIV prevalence rate of 3.2 percent), while studies show that 99 percent of Congolese are getting information on the epidemic and prevention methods.

Why the gap?

There are several reasons for this gap.

"Pygmy women, like men, move around and often live in the bush far from health centres, in the provinces,” said the country’s director-general of health, Alexis Elira Dokekias.

"In order not to disrupt their way of life, we send health services to these populations. In Lekoumou, where their concentration is very high, we decided that health care is free," he said.

The indigenous people’s customs, extreme poverty, low education levels and traditional beliefs help explain why they are on the fringes of the health system.

"Generally, indigenous women give birth in the forest without the assistance of a midwife. They consider their traditional medicine there to be the best in the world," ethnologist Sorel Eta told IRIN.

"Their medicine has no adverse consequences, contrary to what one might think. You must accept the pygmies as they are and respect their expertise," said Eta.

"Instead, there should be a comprehensive approach that allows indigenous peoples to preserve traditional medicine in reproductive health, but also to enjoy the benefits of modern medicine," David Lawson advised.

Aboriginal people make up 2 percent of the population, as opposed to 10 percent a few years ago. In 2011 the country enacted a law on the “promotion and protection of their rights”. But NGOs are demanding better implementation of the law to counter - however slightly - the discrimination they face.

lmm/cb/rz 

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97574/In-Congo-few-pygmy-women-have-access-to-reproductive-health-services</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2112045t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BRAZZAVILLE 01 March 2013 (IRIN) - Indigenous women in the Republic of Congo, better known as pygmies - a minority group threatened with extinction - are virtually excluded from reproductive health services. They mostly give birth at home and are exposed to related health risks, according to a 2012 study conducted by the Ministry of Health with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA).</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>African migrants pay high prices to send money home</title><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data [ http://sendmoneyafrica.worldbank.org/ ] from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world. 

While South Asians pay an average of US$6 for every $100 they send home, Africans often pay more than twice that - and in South Africa, which has the highest remittance costs on the continent, nearly 21 percent of money set aside for family members back home is spent on getting it there.

With an estimated 120 million Africans depending on remittances from family members abroad for their survival, health and education, the World Bank argues that high transaction costs are cutting into the impact remittances can have on poverty levels. 

To address this, the Bank is partnering with the African Union Commission and member states to establish the African Institute for Remittances [ http://sendmoneyafrica.worldbank.org/african-institute-remittances-air-project ], which will work towards lowering the transaction costs of remittances to and within Africa. It will also leverage the potential of remittances to influence economic and social development. 

“The World Bank’s approach supports regulatory and policy reforms that promote transparency and market competition and the creation of an enabling environment that promotes innovative payment and remittance products,” said Marco Nicoli, a finance analyst at the Bank who specializes in remittances.

Costly and difficult

Owen Maromo, a 33-year-old farmworker who lives in De Doorns, a grape-growing region in South Africa’s Western Cape Province, told IRIN that his family in Zimbabwe relies on the money he sends home every month. 

“I’ve got a house there and I need to pay rent. I’m also taking care of my youngest brother - since my mum died four years ago - and my wife’s family.

“Almost every Zimbabwean here is budgeting to send money back home,” he added. “If they could, they would send money home on a weekly basis.”

In a 2012 report by the Cape Town-based NGO People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP), interviews with 350 Zimbabwean migrants revealed some of the reasons sending money home from South Africa is both costly and difficult [ http://www.passop.co.za/news/featured/press-statement ].

A key impediment is the stringent regulatory framework that governs cross-border transfers from South Africa. Exchange control legislation, for example, requires money transfer operators (MTOs) to partner with a bank. According to PASSOP, this has had the effect of stifling competition that would likely reduce transaction costs.  

Legislation intending to counter money laundering and terrorist financing requires that customers provide proof of residence and proof of the source of their funds before they can access financial services. This effectively excludes the many migrants living in informal settlements and those who are paid in cash. 

PASSOP found that even among migrants who do have access to banks and MTOs like Western Union and MoneyGram, many lack the financial literacy to make use of them. 

“Some have just come from rural areas in Zimbabwe, so it takes time for them to know about such things,” said Maromo, adding that lack of documentation was another major obstacle. “If you’re undocumented, you can’t go through the banks.”

Three-quarters of the Zimbabwean migrants interviewed by PASSOP relied instead on “informal” remittance channels, such as giving money or goods to bus drivers, friends or agents to send home. This is often not much cheaper than using banks or MTOs, and it is significantly riskier. Of the respondents who used such methods, 84 percent reported negative experiences, including theft of their money, loss or destruction of their goods and long delays in remittances reaching intended recipients. 

Maromo relayed his own experience sending money home through an agent who charged a 15 percent commission to channel the money through his South African bank account before handing it over to Maromo’s relatives in Zimbabwe. “Some time ago, I nearly lost 2,000 rand ($225) because I deposited it in [the agent’s] account and he was saying he didn’t have it and giving excuses. In the end, we got the money, but it cost us nearly 1,000 rand ($113) in airtime calling Zimbabwe,” he said.

“Some are using bus drivers or those people who are going home, and you have to trust them because you’re desperate, but there can be a lot of problems,” he added. “There are a lot of people whose money just disappears. Almost on a daily basis, you hear those stories.”

Lowering transaction fees

Now, Maromo uses a UK-based online transfer service called Mukuru.com, which is popular with many Zimbabweans living overseas. The proof of residence and source of funds requirements are the same as for traditional MTOs, but the site charges 10 percent on transfers from South Africa to Zimbabwe - less than most banks. 

The South African Reserve Bank and the treasury have committed to bringing the cost of remittances down to 5 percent by relaxing regulations for smaller money transfers, negotiating with regulators in the Southern African Development Community on exchange control regulations, and removing the requirement that MTOs partner with banks.

However, at the time of writing, the Reserve Bank has not yet responded to questions from IRIN about how these changes will be implemented and within what timeframe.

Rob Burrell, director of Mukuru.com, said achieving the 5 percent target would be tough considering the numerous costs that MTOs have to cover, including fees paid to the companies that collect and pay out the money, the cost of supporting transactions through a call centre, and licensing and reporting requirements. “We would need everyone pulling together,” he said.

Burrell noted that less stringent laws governing MTOs in the UK mean more competition but much weaker anti-money laundering controls. To operate in South Africa, Mukuru.com has to comply with the regulation that they partner with a local banking license holder.

“In the UK, it’s easier to obtain your license. There are 4,000 [MTOs operating in the UK] compared to 12 in South Africa, but the downside is that it’s very difficult to police them all,” he told IRIN. “My last audit in the UK was four years ago because they can’t handle the volume of licenses.”

ks/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97557/African-migrants-pay-high-prices-to-send-money-home</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200909291220100610t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - New data from the World Bank has revealed that African migrants pay more to send money home to their families than any other migrant group in the world.</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>In Brief: Measles epidemic affects thousands in DRC</title><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201112211013110936t.jpg" />]]>KINSHASA 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - A measles epidemic has affected tens of thousands of children in northern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), overwhelming health facilities, says medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).</description><body><![CDATA[KINSHASA 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - A measles epidemic has affected tens of thousands of children in northern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), overwhelming health facilities, says medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

“Most health centres are either not functional, out of medical stocks or inaccessible for the majority of the population. Many children die in their villages because the health facilities cannot provide adequate care,” Anja De Weggheleire, MSF Medical Coordinator in DRC, told IRIN via email.

“The disease is extremely contagious and can spread quickly in countries like DRC, which have large gaps in their healthcare system,” MSF said in a statement.

Measles mostly affects children and can cause complications including pneumonia, malnutrition, severe dehydration, ear infections and eye infections that can lead to blindness. Despite the availability of a vaccine for the disease, measles remains one of the biggest killers of children.

According to MSF, measles can kill between one and 15 percent of unvaccinated children who contract the disease and up to 25 percent of malnourished or vulnerable groups with limited access to healthcare.

Since March 2012, MSF says it has treated more than 18,000 patients and vaccinated 440,000 children in DRC’s Equateur and Orientale provinces.

“This situation is only the latest development in an ongoing epidemic that has affected the entire country since 2010,” said Amaury Grégoire, MSF deputy head of mission.

MSF officials said they counted 35 dead children in one of the villages they visited. 

ko/rz

]]></body><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97559/In-Brief-Measles-epidemic-affects-thousands-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201112211013110936t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KINSHASA 27 February 2013 (IRIN) - A measles epidemic has affected tens of thousands of children in northern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), overwhelming health facilities, says medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).</td></tr></table>>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>