<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Governance</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 18:30:53 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>Careless food storage sidelines Swaziland’s hungry</title><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301081314390787t.jpg" />]]>MBABANE 23 May 2013 (IRIN) - Mounds of food aid intended for Swaziland’s food insecure were recently found rotting in the government’s main storage warehouses at the Matsapha Industrial Estate, about 25km east of the capital, Mbabane.</description><body><![CDATA[MBABANE 23 May 2013 (IRIN) - Mounds of food aid intended for Swaziland’s food insecure were recently found rotting in the government’s main storage warehouses at the Matsapha Industrial Estate, about 25km east of the capital, Mbabane. 

According to a March 2013 briefing by the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) [ http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SWZ ], “Approximately 116,000 persons are currently estimated to be food insecure, up 31 percent from the previous year.” 

The spoiled food was discovered earlier this month by parliamentarian Eric Matsebula after his constituents in rural Mayiwane, in the Hhohho Region, some 60km north of Mbabane, complained they were going hungry 

According to the Times of Swaziland [ http://www.times.co.sz/index.php/news/87133-food-meant-for-the-needy-left-to-rot.html ], Matsebula told parliament: “I went to the warehouse, and the food is rotting, and even the fertilizer has been spoilt.” 

The spoiled food included 15,000kg of the staple maize meal, 25,000kg of beans and 600 cartons of vegetable oil. 

The revelations come several months after it was discovered the cash-strapped administration of King Mswati III, sub-Saharan Africa’s last absolute monarch, sold maize donated by the Japanese government for US$3 million and deposited the money in the Central Bank of Swaziland [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97684/Swazi-government-sells-food-aid ]. The proceeds from the sale were then used by government officials for other expenditures. 

Food-aid dependent 

Swaziland has been dependent on food assistance, to varying degrees, for the past two decades. In 2007, more than half of the country’s 1.1 million people required food aid. The reliance on rain-fed agriculture, archaic farming methods [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94481/SWAZILAND-Bleak-outlook-for-food-security ], as well as an absence of land reform [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96742/SWAZILAND-IMF-recommends-land-reforms ], the impact of HIV and AIDS and rising input and fuel costs, have all contributed to the country’s persistent food insecurity. 

The March GIEWS briefing said, “The import requirement for maize in the current 2012/13 marketing year (May/April) is estimated at 75,000 tons, moderately higher than the previous year, to compensate for the reduced 2012 domestic output.” 

The UN World Food Programme (WFP) [ http://www.wfp.org/countries/swaziland ] in Swaziland provides food assistance at over 1,500 neighbourhood care points, more than 200 secondary schools and 12 health facilities. In 2012, the WFP supply chain reached 327,000 people. 

Francis Dube, director of World Vision Swaziland’s [ http://www.wvi.org/ ] integrated programmes, told IRIN the organization would commence a food-for-work programme in June of this year, following the receipt of 1,080 tons of rice from Taiwan, Province of China. 

The programme would target 3,000 vulnerable households, or about 18,000 people. “Each household will provide a single member, between the ages of 18 to 65, to work in the community-selected projects and earn a family monthly food package for the next six months,” said Dube. 

Food aid delivered by these agencies is closely monitored to avoid spoilage. 

“WFP’s monitoring systems require that our staff regularly visits food distribution points to ensure food is kept securely and being used for intended purposes. In addition to following internal security procedures, WFP Swaziland requests external inspections from [the] UN Department of Safety and Security,” said a WFP statement provided to IRIN. 

World Vision uses a “carefully selected” waterproof and rodent-free commercial warehouse with 24-hour security in the Matsapha and Sidwashini areas of Mbabane, and does not use government warehouses, Dube said. “Warehousing standards include food-receiving procedures; food dispatch; stock control; use and distribution of pallets to avoid food contamination from the floor; control of loading and movement of trucks; morning procedures; and day-end procedures.” 

Politics to blame? 

It is not known if the food aid found rotting in Matsapha is an isolated incident or if it is indicative of the situation at other government storage facilities. The incident is being blamed on bad blood between members of parliament (MPs) and Mswati III’s cabinet, after a no-confidence vote in October 2012 against Prime Minister Sibusiso Dlamini, who is both a relative and appointee of the king. The no-confidence vote was later reversed. 

Although the country has institutions resembling those in democracies, Swaziland’s parliamentarians do not enact legislation; rather, they approve policies of the king’s appointed cabinet. But MPs are still responsible to their constituents - voter registration began a few days ago for this year’s scheduled elections, although a poll date has yet to be announced. Political parties remain banned. 

Some observers believe the disruption of food supplies was meant as a lesson for the MPs. 

Aaron Simelane, a Swaziland-based political commentator, told IRIN, “MPs are considered community development agents by the people who vote… Swazis want their MPs to bring roads, jobs and aid to their communities, but MPs have no power to do any of these things. [The] cabinet has this power. 

“The people do not know this, and when things aren’t done they blame MPs, who promise to deliver this and that to get elected. By withholding food aid, [the] cabinet is teaching MPs a lesson about power.” 

Deputy Prime Minister Themba Masuku, whose office is responsible for the government’s food aid distribution, told MPs that he had been in hospital for the past two months and was not “privy to what has been going on down there” in Matsapha, the Times of Swaziland reported. 

tg/go/rz 

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98086/Careless-food-storage-sidelines-Swaziland-s-hungry</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301081314390787t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MBABANE 23 May 2013 (IRIN) - Mounds of food aid intended for Swaziland’s food insecure were recently found rotting in the government’s main storage warehouses at the Matsapha Industrial Estate, about 25km east of the capital, Mbabane.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram</title><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005241211400801t.jpg" />]]>KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.</description><body><![CDATA[KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.

The attacks on BH camps in northern parts of Borno close to the borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroon followed the 14 May declaration of a state of emergency by Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. 

Musa Karimbe fled his village of Bulabute near Marte, BH's major stronghold in the area, on 17 May to Kusiri, 100km inside Cameroon where he is staying with a friend. "We are afraid of a repeat of Baga attacks on our homes," Karimbe said, referring to fighting on 16 and 17 April between troops from the Chad-Niger-Nigeria Joint Multi-National Task Force and BH members in which 187 residents from Baga town on the shores of Lake Chad were killed, and 2,128 homes burnt, according to Human Rights Watch [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria ].

People from villages around Abadam District, including Malamfatori, fled to Bosso in Niger’s Diffa Region, while others have taken refuge in the Cameroonian towns of Fotokol, Amchide, Darak and Kusiri, according to interviews with displaced Nigerians. Officials say 2,000 people have fled across borders, though several of the displaced told IRIN they thought the number was higher.  

The number of casualties from the fighting is not yet clear, though Nigeria defence spokesman Brig-Gen Chris Olukolade said on 17 May that there had been BH casualties, and that 100 BH members had been arrested.

An official with the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in the capital, Abuja, said they had not yet been able to establish contact with their teams to find out the details of the humanitarian situation, because telephone networks in Borno and Yobe states have been shut down since 16 May. “The areas where military operations are ongoing, are not accessible,” he told IRIN.

Residents of Gamboru Ngala in Borno State said military forces screened them thoroughly before allowing them to cross the border; others passed through the network of unofficial trade routes that criss-cross the region.

The military has placed a “food blockade” on northern Borno, refusing to allow trucks laden with household commodities from leaving Maiduguri (the state capital) to the northern part of the state, in case they end up in BH hands. As a result, prices have shot up, said Bukar Zanna, head of the Traders’ Association in Gamboru Ngala.

Since January 2013 BH has taken control of Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala-Balge and Gamboru Ngala local government areas in northern Borno, chasing out local government officials, taking over control of government buildings and imposing Sharia law.

This prompted President Goodluck Jonathan to declare last week that he would “take all necessary action... to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists,” including the arrest and detention of suspects, taking over BH hideouts, the lockdown of suspected BH enclaves, raids, and arresting anyone possessing illegal weapons.

The military crackdown came after several attempts at dialogue [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/Analysis-Hurdles-to-Nigerian-government-Boko-Haram-dialogue ] - the most recent on 17 April, when the president set up a 26-member Amnesty Committee (headed by Nigerian Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu) with a three-month mandate to try to convince BH to lay down its arms in exchange for a state pardon and social reintegration.

Dialogue soon broke down, and BH stepped up bombing attacks and assassinations in April and May in apparent defiance of the proposed amnesty. BH has repeatedly rejected peace talks, citing insincerity on the part of the Nigerian government following a series of failed mediated negotiations. 

On 8 and 9 May the Amnesty Committee met Nigerian security chiefs in Abuja and then BH members in detention in Kuje prison near Abuja to gather information on how to reach out to the BH leadership for talks. But on 9 May around 200 BH gunmen, armed with rocket launchers and rifles, launched coordinated attacks on security forces in the town of Bama in northern Borno, including a military barracks, a prison and police buildings, killing 42 people including soldiers, policemen, prison guards and civilians and freeing 105 inmates. Some 13 BH gunmen were killed in the attacks, according to the military.

In a 13 May video, BH leader Abubakar Shekau rejected the government’s amnesty overtures and vowed not to stop his group’s violent campaigns to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. 

Flip-flopping

The government’s flip-flop approach is evidence of its frustration with the deteriorating security situation. But the next steps are not clear. “Deployment of troops and the declaration of war on BH by the president have put a huge stumbling block on the path of the Amnesty Committee,” said Mohammed Kyari, a political science professor at Modibo Adama University of Science and Technology in neighbouring Adamawa State capital Yola, which is also affected by the emergency decree.

“It will now be difficult to win the confidence of BH which is crucial in bringing them to the negotiating table because you can’t talk of peace on one hand and be deploying troops on the other.” A leading rights activist in the north, Shehu Sani, who has participated in past negotiations with BH, agrees. 

But many say the government had no choice. Yahaya Mahmud, a prominent constitutional lawyer in Nigeria, told IRIN: “No government anywhere will allow a group to usurp part of territorial sovereignty. The declaration of a state of emergency was necessitated by the constitutional obligation to restore a portion of Nigeria’s territory taken over by an armed group which involves the suspension of constitutional provisions relating to civic rights.”

The fear now is that the more violent the crackdown, the greater the chance of radicalizing angry young men to join the rebel cause. Babagoni Kachalla, a resident of Wuljo, one of the areas taken over by BH in northern Borno, said BH has been going village-to-village since January in all-terrain vehicles fitted with loudspeakers to gather recruits and preach their ideology. In the days leading up to the military response, BH fighters stepped up their recruitment drive, said Borno State residents.

Political scientist Kyari worries, in response to the crackdown, that BH will just shift their bases. “BH can’t face Nigerian troops in conventional war; the troop deployment to northern Borno means they will move out to other towns and cities with less military presence and launch guerrilla war, which is deadlier.”

The deployment of troops to Maiduguri in June 2011 and military crackdowns pushed some BH members northwards within Borno, and others to northern Mali, which they fled during the French, Chadian and Malian intervention in the north.

Trust

Many analysts and politicians are pushing for dialogue as the only way out of the impasse, but trust between the government and BH is very low.

Conspiracy theories in the north abound, including that prominent politicians, including the president, are fanning some of the violence in the north since they would benefit from chaos continuing there in the run-up to 2015 presidential elections. 

While not endorsing the theories, Abdulkarim Mohammed, author of Paradox of Boko Haram, said they should be investigated if the government is serious about understanding the roots of BH’s insurgency. 

The Amnesty Committee stated yesterday it would meet BH leaders anywhere they chose, to negotiate a way out of the violence. 

If the government does not win the confidence of BH soon, to at least bring them to the negotiating table, we are going to be in this much longer than we thought,” said Kyari, adding: “and if it is not managed well, it will engulf neighbouring countries.”

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98076/Analysis-Nigerians-on-the-run-as-military-combat-Boko-Haram</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005241211400801t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The anatomy of a Mozambique land deal</title><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305221408030773t.jpg" />]]>NIASSA 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - A multi-million dollar “ethical” plantation development in northwestern Mozambique - the initiative of a clutch of Scandinavian faith-based organizations - has faced alleged acts of sabotage by the very people it was designed to assist, illustrating the divisions between foreign benefactors and local communities.</description><body><![CDATA[NIASSA 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - A multi-million dollar “ethical” plantation development in northwestern Mozambique - the initiative of a clutch of Scandinavian faith-based organizations - has faced alleged acts of sabotage by the very people it was designed to assist, illustrating the divisions between foreign benefactors and local communities.

The company Chikweti Forest conceded in a recent environmental impact assessment that the land dispute was rooted in the initial, failed, consultation process, which did not involve either an entire community or neglected to consult others that were to be affected.

Local authorities, NGOs and Chikweti Forests are now engaged in a conflict resolution process with those affected by the project.

Chikweti Forests is owned by the Global Solidarity Forest Fund (GSFF) [ http://gsff.se/en/ ], a Swedish-based investment fund founded in 2006 by Sweden’s Diocese of Västerås, the Opplysningsvesenets fond (OVF, a national Norwegian church endowment) and the Norwegian Lutheran Church, with the goal of community development and poverty alleviation. The GSFF has several investors, the largest being the Dutch public-sector pension fund Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP.

The fund aims to create a 100,000-hectare pine and eucalyptus plantation in the Lichinga Plateau, near Lake Malawi, which is seen as a large-scale, sustainable investment in the country’s largest and least populated province. The initiative intends to provide a return for investors while also improving community livelihoods.

About 15,000 hectares of the plantation have so far been planted.

Sabotage

But about a year after Chikweti’s launch, reports of arson and uprooted saplings began to emerge. Chikweti estimates that between 2007 and 2012, the company lost US$1 million to fires - 60 percent of these fires are thought to have been criminal and the remainder accidental. The highest number of fires to date occurred in 2012.

A September 2012 report by the human rights group FIAN [ http://www.fian.org/fileadmin/media/publications/PR_-_2012.10.16_-_Tree_plantations_Niassa_Mozambique.pdf ] said, “In April 2011, peasants from Licole and Lipende uprooted and cut down some 60,000 pine trees on an area of 12 hectares with machetes and hoes, and destroyed some [company] equipment.” Several people from the local community were subsequently arrested.

According to Mozambique’s land tenure system, all land is owned by the state, although local communities have customary rights to it if they can prove usage for the past 10 years.

The FIAN report, citing research by the World Bank [ http://www.worldbank.org/ ] and the US-based think tank the Oakland Institute [ http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/ ], said between 2004 and 2009, Mozambique transferred 2.7 million hectares of land to investors. Foreign investors were granted one million hectares of these transfers, “73 per cent of which are for the forestry sector, and 13 per cent for agrofuels and sugar.”

The report noted that, in the absence of a public land registry, “most contracts between investors and government are kept secret”.

Origins of dispute

The origins of the Chikweti land dispute can be traced to numerous causes, from locals’ high expectations for development projects and employment opportunities to local leaders agreeing to the concessions without understanding how large an area 1,000-2,000 hectares was or that it would take decades before the land would be again available for communities to cultivate.

According to community members, the plantation took land that had been left fallow or that was being saved for the next generation.

Chikweti’s negotiations with the top traditional leaders also made lower leadership members feel they had been overlooked in the consultation process, several local leaders complained to IRIN.

Cucena Namalha, from the local NGO Estamos, which is assisting in the conflict resolution, told IRIN, “When we first came to the communities here, there were many complaints, for example about bridges and schools that Chikweti had promised to build. We ask the communities, ‘Have you signed any papers? Is it written anywhere what they have promised?’ The answer is no. The only thing we can do is make sure that the same thing doesn’t happen again.”

Efforts are now underway to conduct delimitations to help determine land access. This is usually the responsibility of the local authority’s land surveyors, but because of limited capacity, NGOs are assisting in the process.

At a recent meeting hosted by Estamos in Bandeze, one of the affected communities, an NGO representative explained the goal: “We are here to protect you and your children from future investors that want to use your land. If your land is formally delimited, it will be easier for you to defend yourself and to decide what parts could be used for investments and what part you need to keep.”

However, such guarantees from Estamos were met with scepticism. Local leader Victorino Rajabo said at the gathering, “You must understand, they [the community] are afraid. When Chikweti came, we lost a lot of land. Now they don’t know how to react. They don’t know what to hold on to.”

Rajabo told IRIN after the meeting that dialogue with Chikweti had improved, but that the community remains affected. “We still have land, but it is far away from the village,” he said, pointing to the mountains on the horizon.

Chikweti has provided employment opportunities to locals, but this, too, has proved problematic. Employment levels at the plantation have fluctuated from a high of 6,000 people to the current 1,300 permanent jobs plus 800 seasonal workers.

Chikweti’s CEO, Chris Bekker, said when he assumed his post in 2011 that the company was performing poorly because only about 24 percent of employees routinely arrived on the job. He attributed this to many people never having experiencing the responsibilities of formal work.

Meanwhile, many who had not benefited from employment opportunities were angry. “Only the ones who are employed by Chikweti really gained something, but they are eating at other peoples’ expense,” Rajabo told IRIN.

Mending fences

Bekker attributed the land dispute to a variety of issues, including poor communications and high expectation about role the company would play developing local communities. He has spent his first two years on the job slowing the company’s expansion plans while working to engage with the locals.

The company has employed trained conflict resolution experts from Lichinga to provide regular dialogue with affected communities in their mother tongues. It has also established community a fund; the first of the fund’s disbursements were used to build basic mosques, maternity facilities, health posts, schools and bridges.

The community outreach projects have had a calming effect. In the village of Ussumane, tensions appeared to have dissipated.

“We have built two schools with the money from Chikweti, and the relationship with the company is good today. We have an understanding,” Jafar Binal, a local leader and fund administrator, told IRIN.

As part of the fund’s terms, the community receives $5 for each hectare that is not burned or vandalized.

“The fires are not always started by people in the communities where we work; it can be done by neighbouring communities in order to harm people they are upset with or because of jealousy,” Bekker said.

The company has adopted a rotation system for the seasonal employees, with the objective of distributing income among different community members, with one team working one week and another working the following week. More permanent jobs are envisaged once the company begins its expansion plans.

Since 2011, the local government has not accepted any new applications for using communal land for plantations, and it will not do so until existing conflicts are resolved.

“We are more careful now, especially concerning the forestry industry,” Silva Joao, director of geography and state land delimitations at the agricultural department in Lichinga, told IRIN. “We will use the best methods we can find to secure a massive participation. We don’t want any more reports about land conflicts because of poorly done consultation processes,” he said.

al/go/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98077/The-anatomy-of-a-Mozambique-land-deal</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305221408030773t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NIASSA 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - A multi-million dollar “ethical” plantation development in northwestern Mozambique - the initiative of a clutch of Scandinavian faith-based organizations - has faced alleged acts of sabotage by the very people it was designed to assist, illustrating the divisions between foreign benefactors and local communities.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Filipino Muslim rebels take tentative steps towards governance</title><pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305210454530433t.jpg" />]]>MANILA 21 May 2013 (IRIN) - The oppressive summer heat bore down on this impoverished southern Philippine town on Mindanao Island as thousands gathered to hear a &quot;proxy candidate&quot; of the country&apos;s largest Muslim rebel force address the crowd on the eve of recently concluded mid-term elections.</description><body><![CDATA[MANILA 21 May 2013 (IRIN) - The oppressive summer heat bore down on this impoverished southern Philippine town on Mindanao Island as thousands gathered to hear a "proxy candidate" of the country's largest Muslim rebel force address the crowd on the eve of recently concluded mid-term elections.

In the crowd were members of the 12,000-strong Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) - this time unarmed in keeping with a promise to the government to help keep peace and order during the 13 May polls. 

The candidate backed by MILF- the group’s first time to openly support a candidate - Tucao Mastura, 66, was a last-minute challenger to Esmael Mangudadatu, who has been governor of the Muslim-dominated Maguindanao, one of five provinces in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), since 2010. Mastura lost, but he said the election was a “fruitful” exercise that gave the rebels and the `Bangsamoro’ (local Muslims) a lesson in democracy. 

MILF has shunned past local elections, so as to not appear as if it were abandoning its struggle. 

"You could say I was a proxy candidate for the MILF," said Mastura, whose older brother is a member of MILF's decision-making central committee. "I did not want to run for governor of Maguindanao, but due to circumstances, the Bangsamoro people decided to push me in order to partake in this political exercise." 

He said had he won, it would have given MILF its first taste of governance ahead of signing a final peace agreement with the government, under negotiation since last October, and hopefully ending four decades of bloodshed that have left tens of thousands dead and the southern region mired in deep poverty. 

Mastura, a grizzled veteran who had fought in the jungles at the peak of the insurgency in the 1970s before deciding to drop his guns for a degree in accountancy, said he believed real peace could only be achieved by empowering local Muslims and giving them a chance to run their own affairs. 

The governorship of Maguindanao would have given the MILF a toehold in local politics traditionally ruled by moneyed and powerful clans, Mastura said, though he claimed the loss had not left him embittered. 

"We will get another chance in the new political entity," he said. 

MILF signed a "framework" agreement with Manila in October 2012, in which the government agreed to create a new autonomous political entity to be governed by MILF by 2016, when the six-year term of reformist President Benigno Aquino ends. 

A transition commission has until next year to draft a basic law to be passed in parliament, which will then carry out a referendum on whether proposed areas for the new autonomous region want to join. The new region will replace the current ARMM, created in 1990, which the government has called a “failed experiment” that has yet to improve life for the region’s 4.5 million Muslims. 

Both sides are still discussing how to share resources in the proposed area and how to fully reintegrate combatants into society while disarming them. 

"I hope by 2016 the Bangsamoro would be able to fully govern ourselves and engage the public," Mastura said. "We will continue to work with the government towards achieving this goal." 

Chief negotiator hopeful 

The government's chief negotiator with MILF, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, told IRIN recently that a final peace deal could be signed before Congress resumes in July. She said that apart from helping monitor peace and order, MILF had also been helping the government arrest illegal loggers and apprehend suspected “terrorists” and criminals in areas it controls, many of which lie within ARMM. 

She said MILF has given in to the "primacy of the peace process" and even allowed President Aquino to visit rebel areas in February, a first for a sitting president. 

Aid agencies are safely escorted into areas with development programmes under way. 

The rebels signed a pact with government in January this year to support a ban on firearms during election day, as well as allowing unhindered movement of election personnel into “security-sensitive areas”, including remote villages and towns claimed by MILF as part of its ancestral domain. 

"My MILF counterpart has repeatedly said failure is not an option. I agree completely," Coronel-Ferrer said. 

aag/pt/cb 

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98072/Filipino-Muslim-rebels-take-tentative-steps-towards-governance</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305210454530433t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MANILA 21 May 2013 (IRIN) - The oppressive summer heat bore down on this impoverished southern Philippine town on Mindanao Island as thousands gathered to hear a &quot;proxy candidate&quot; of the country&apos;s largest Muslim rebel force address the crowd on the eve of recently concluded mid-term elections.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Seeking safety in the city</title><pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201105181441170873t.jpg" />]]>LONDON 21 May 2013 (IRIN) - Every year, hundreds of thousands of people are forced from their homes by violence or natural disasters. But the face of displacement is changing: While the popular view of displacement is one of sprawling rural camps, displaced people are now just as likely to be living in urban areas, often hidden from view.</description><body><![CDATA[LONDON 21 May 2013 (IRIN) - Every year, hundreds of thousands of people are forced from their homes by violence or natural disasters. But the face of displacement is changing: While the popular view of displacement is one of sprawling rural camps, displaced people are now just as likely to be living in urban areas, often hidden from view.

The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), based at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), has explored this phenomenon in a series of studies called “Sanctuary in the City?” [ http://www.odi.org.uk/projects/2437-sanctuary-city-urban-displacement-vulnerability#details ], which examines displacement conditions and policies in eight urban centres around the world.

HPG’s Simone Haysom told IRIN, “Urban displacement is the future of what displacement is going to look like. Many of the displaced come from cities and are not going to put up with camp conditions. Already more than half are in urban areas, and that percentage is only going to grow, except where governments enforce strict encampment policies. And humanitarians are not equipped with the right tools and resources to deal with urban displacement.”

Camps versus cities

Keeping displaced populations in refugee camps or internally displaced persons (IDP) camps simplifies administration for relief agencies. “Humanitarian operations in urban areas can be more costly and time-consuming,” according to the UN Refugee Agency’s 2012 State of the World’s Refugees report [ http://www.unhcr.org/publications/22-chapter-6-displacement-and-urbanization.html#more-22 ].

“In contrast to refugee camps, humanitarian actors in towns and cities often know little about the food security and nutritional status of urban refugees and IDPs,” the report states.

But as the world grows increasingly urbanized, displaced populations are increasingly gravitating to cities. “Unlike a closed camp, cities present obvious opportunities to stay anonymous, make money, and build a better future,” says UNHCR’s website [ http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html ].

Still, encampment policies are attractive to governments struggling to keep up with the service demands in urban areas, where the added presence of displaced populations could overextend resources and cause resentment among local residents.

Katy Long of the London School of Economics, who works on issues arising from protracted displacements, said, “Eighty percent of displaced people are hosted in developing countries, and they compete for resources. The politics of nationalism play into it too, and the encampment process and the aid which goes with it provide opportunities to pass the costs on [to aid agencies]. Camps may not address the root problems and may leave refugees and IDPs extremely vulnerable, but they make sense in terms of political economy.”

In denial

HPG’s research found that government officials often assert, against all evidence, that displacement is temporary problem.

This was the case in Syria, where the government seemed to be in denial about farmers and herders who had been driven into Damascus by drought and land loss. The HPG study (conducted in 2011, before current conflict reached the capital) found that the government consistently stressed the temporary nature of this displacement, and tried to limit assistance to the squalid displacement camps on the edge of Damascus “to avoid creating a culture of dependency.”

The study’s authors wrote, “Even if the government and the international community appear to portray the displacement… as temporary… the scale of losses in northeast Syria is huge, and return does not seem to be possible without… a long-term strategy aimed at restoring the viability of rural livelihood systems in these areas.”

Similarly, authorities in Afghanistan are reluctant to accept that new arrivals flocking into the capital, Kabul, are there to stay. The HPG Kabul study observed that, “The de facto policy of the government at all levels is that displacement is a temporary phenomenon, and that in time people will return to their rural areas of origin.”

Such assumptions can limit assistance. According to the study, “One senior… official… explained why he had refused an international agency… permission to build temporary toilets and wells in one settlement, on the grounds that ‘IDPs are here for a short time and they don’t need a bathroom and a well in this situation... When we provide them with these services they will never move back to their areas.’”

Long told IRIN that in reality more than two-thirds of the world’s IDPs have been displaced for more than five years, but authorities are often unwilling to face this fact, partly because it reflects badly on them.

“In Afghanistan, for instance, if they admit that they still have a displacement problem, they are admitting that the peace is still fragile and imperfect. But rather than only looking for permanent solutions, we have to learn to live with people being displaced at this moment and focus on making their displacement better, because policies often make displacement a far worse experience than it needs to be,” Long said.

Opportunities for settlement

The HPG researchers in Kabul found that an overwhelming majority of the displaced said they intended to settle permanently in the city. Evidence from elsewhere suggests that, if allowed to do so, they could eventually integrate and make new lives for themselves.

Even 60 years after their arrival, the Palestinians in Damascus are still officially considered refugees, but many have moved out of areas designated as refugee camps and into better housing. The “camps” are now home to a mixed population including migrant workers, IDPs and poor Syrians.

Integration may be easier now because many developing-world conurbations are cities of newcomers. One HPG study showed that virtually everyone living in Yei, a town in South Sudan, had come from somewhere else. New arrivals are also prevalent in more established urban areas like Nairobi, Kenya; one study estimates only 20 percent of those under 35 were born in the city.

In Yei, Nairobi and Kabul, HPG found that the displaced were in circumstances similar to other newcomers: they were relegated to informal settlements with few or no facilities, struggling to find decent housing and earn a living. Long, of the London School of Economics, says experts now wonder whether these situations should be tackled as a general development challenge, rather than differentiating between IDPs and other urban poor.

“There are some places where we need to focus,” she told IRIN, “such as the legal status of refugees, who often don’t have the correct paperwork to be in the city. But rather than pulling out displacement and putting it in a separate box, a lot of solutions work best if they are community-based, not least because then we are not privileging one group over another and building resentment against the displaced.”

eb/rz 

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98074/Seeking-safety-in-the-city</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201105181441170873t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">LONDON 21 May 2013 (IRIN) - Every year, hundreds of thousands of people are forced from their homes by violence or natural disasters. But the face of displacement is changing: While the popular view of displacement is one of sprawling rural camps, displaced people are now just as likely to be living in urban areas, often hidden from view.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The changing face of land disputes in Liberia</title><pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305171420580095t.jpg" />]]>MONROVIA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Liberia Land Commission, which was set up in 2009 to help settle land disputes between returning refugees and their neighbours, is making significant headway, say land experts, but non-conflict related land disputes are increasing, most of them as a result of weak land laws.</description><body><![CDATA[MONROVIA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Liberia Land Commission, which was set up in 2009 to help settle land disputes between returning refugees and their neighbours, is making significant headway, say land experts, but non-conflict related land disputes are increasing, most of them as a result of weak land laws.

Tens of thousands of Liberians were displaced during the 1999-2003 civil war. Many returned to their villages to find their land had been sold on or taken over by neighbours. Disputes over land occurred all over the country, but were mainly concentrated in Nimba, Lofa and Bong counties, which had high levels of displacement [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/89149/LIBERIA-Land-rights-tensions-not-abating ].

Since 2009 many of the neighbour-neighbour disputes have been resolved without too much difficulty, given that the conflicting parties already had an established relationship, and thus a shared interest in negotiating. said Gregory Kitt, project manager with NGO Norwegian Refugee Council, which has helped resolve hundreds of land disputes over the past decade.

In recent years, such disputes have reduced slightly, said Kitt. "This is an indication of the progress Liberia has made to become more stable."

Land reform was identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Report [ http://trcofliberia.org/reports/final-report ] as one of the priorities for boosting long-term stability.

"We've made a lot of progress over the past three years. We've sorted out at least five dozen cases," Cecil Brandy, chairman of the Land Commission, told IRIN. But dozens of cases continue to come in each month, he added - many of them related not to displacement but to weak land ownership laws that insufficiently respect people's property rights and can lead to corrupt practices. "On a daily basis we are intervening in land fights across the country. Our files are filled with too many cases. Families are at loggerheads. It is hectic."

Parallel laws

Land ownership in Liberia is based on Common Law which requires an owner to have a title deed. But a parallel system of traditional law, based on verbal agreement, is also prevalent, creating widesperead confusion over who owns what. Landowners as a result, often sell to multiple buyers, opening up room for conflict.

During the civil war, fraud was rife with many illegitimate land-related documents registered. "This criminal practice must stop. They make fraudulent transactions without the involvement of the real landowners. Because of this, now as Liberians return from Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea, they are facing major problems with their land," said Brandy.

The Commission is trying to set up a better land registry system so citizens can more easily access land ownership documents, and at least know what their legal ownership status is. And it has submitted a criminal conveyance bill to the Liberian legislature to deal with suspected criminals involved in multiple land sales. Brandy hopes the bill will soon become law.

The Liberia Land Commission is an autonomous government body, with a staff of 25 civil servants, set up to shape land reform policy in Liberia [ http://www.lc.gov.lr/index.php ].

Ciapha George, 45, is currently battling another family for ownership of his plot of land in the capital, Monrovia: unbeknown to him, the land had been sold to someone else before he bought it.

The case went to court and the judge recently ordered him to demolish his house and turn it over to the former owner. "The seller misled me. Right now I am the loser. All my efforts have been in vain," he told IRIN. George's family is currently living in an abandoned building in the capital.

But the governance bodies set up to protect these laws remain weak, said Kitt, and until they are strengthened, civil society groups will continue to have to step in to try to resolve disputes before they end up in court.

The Land Commission must be more proactive in tackling this problem of multiple ownership, said Monrovia resident Prince King. "I have seen lives and properties destroyed because of land disputes. Liberia is just from war and we need to put these things behind us."

Some vulnerable families have never been given formal access to their land, said Brandy, who pointed out that one of the Commission's priorities is to make ownership more equitable by re-examining how deeds are distributed.

Communities versus investors

According to environmental NGOs, including Friends of the Earth Liberia, the local authorities and landowners have sold more than 1.5 million acres (607,028 hectares) of land to palm oil companies in Liberia over recent years, seriously threatening some communities' property rights [
http://www.irinnews.org/report/94882/LIBERIA-Land-grab-or-development-opportunity ].

"Over the past year and a half we've seen an increase in land conflicts between communities and investors trying to develop natural resources. It is clear that challenges are emerging," said Kitt.

pc/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98070/The-changing-face-of-land-disputes-in-Liberia</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305171420580095t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MONROVIA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Liberia Land Commission, which was set up in 2009 to help settle land disputes between returning refugees and their neighbours, is making significant headway, say land experts, but non-conflict related land disputes are increasing, most of them as a result of weak land laws.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Making WASH work in Burkina Faso’s cities</title><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305161656290386t.jpg" />]]>OUAGADOUGOU 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - Earlier this year Denis Ouedraogo, a tailor living in the Tampouy neighbourhood just north of Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou, connected his mud-walled home to the water network for the first time. “Even without electricity, having enough water can make you happy,” he said.</description><body><![CDATA[OUAGADOUGOU 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - Earlier this year Denis Ouedraogo, a tailor living in the Tampouy neighbourhood just north of Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou, connected his mud-walled home to the water network for the first time. “Even without electricity, having enough water can make you happy,” he said.

He is among 1.9 million people to have connected to the government water grid since 2001, thanks to major changes in how the National Office for Water and Sanitation (ONEA) delivers water to urban Burkinabés.

In 2001 just 73,000 Burkinabés could access clean water, according to research [ http://www.developmentprogress.org/sites/developmentprogress.org/files/burkina_water_progress.pdf ] by Peter Newborne at the Overseas Development Institute, which is trying to track and communicate examples of progress on development [ http://www.developmentprogress.org/ ].

In 2002 just half of Burkina Faso residents had access to clean water. In 2008 (the latest statistics available) this had risen to 76 percent - 95 percent in urban areas. The plan was to reach the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to double the number of those with access to clean water, in this case to 87 percent, by 2015. Those tracking water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) progress in Burkina Faso, say the goal will be surpassed [ http://www.unicef.org/sowc2012/pdfs/SOWC-2012-TABLE-3-HEALTH.pdf ].

How?

A number of factors made this possible: ONEA was nationalized and restructured in 1994 following a period in which it had become unprofitable and poorly functioning. The new national company ran along commercial lines, instilling a culture of performance and efficiency, said Newborne.

The second priority was to find a bulk water supply, in this case by building the Ziga dam 45km from the capital.

A mixture of government grant funds (from France and other European donors) and concessionary loans at low interest rates (predominantly from the World Bank), provided the required finances. This helped them bring costs down: for instance, connecting to the grid now costs a household US$61, down from on average $400 in the 1990s, according to ONEA’s chief operating officer, Moumouni Sawadogo.

Next came the work: building a network of pipes throughout Ouagadougou, including in the city’s unzoned [unplanned]  suburbs, which house one third of the capital’s residents and had hitherto been overlooked in terms of household water supply.

“Even in non-zoned areas, people can pay their water bills,'' said Halidou Kouanda, head of NGO Wateraid in Burkina Faso, citing a 2011 ONEA study noting that financial recovery rates in unzoned neighbourhoods were 95 percent.

Now, with a steady income and an 18 percent leakage rate, ONEA is one of the best-performing water utility companies in sub-Saharan Africa, according to the World Bank.

Targeting the poor

While targeting unzoned areas upped the percentage of urban dwellers who could access clean water (thus helping to meet the MDG), it did not ensure that water was affordable.

Now ONEA needs to try to target the poor, as it pledged to do in an initial equity strategy agreed with the Ministry of Water and Sanitation.

As part of its strategy, ONEA built 17,290 wells and standpipes for some areas without household-level connections. Water from a standpipe costs 60 CFA (11 US cents) for a 220 litre barrel (transported on wheels). But the very poor cannot afford such barrels, turning instead to water vendors who sell the same amount for 200-500 CFA (40-98 cents) depending on the season.

Thus paradoxically, the poorest families pay up to eight times more than others for their water.

ODI is discussing different pro-poor targeting methods that might work, including: subsidizing part of the water supply for certain households; targeting poor areas; allocation by housing type; means-testing; community-based targeting; or self-targeting.

At the moment, all households are charged the same connection tariff. “Is this equitable? We think not,” said Newborne. “You could means-test it; you could waive the connection charge for some; or charge the first X cubic metres at a different rate,” he suggested, adding that lower-income households could pay bills weekly or on a pay-as-you-go basis, to keep track of costs. “Think of how mobile phone companies have fixed their pricing plans to be accessible,” he said.

The concern is that households who experience running water for the first time may use more than they can afford, then falling behind  and drop off the grid, said WaterAid’s Kouanda. This happened to 6.8 percent of Ouagadougou’s ONEA customers in 2009.

Families must be made aware of this risk, said Kouanda. But many customers are so nervous of this happening, that they practice their own careful monitoring.

Ami Sidibé, who lives in Somgandé neighbourhood, which was connected to the water mains three months ago, said she continues to fill jerry cans - using tap water - to monitor her household’s use. “I’ll do anything to avoid returning to the situation before,” she told IRIN.

Reduced disease risk?

No studies have yet been published linking the spread of the water network with the incidence of disease, but some Somgandé residents who were recently connected to the grid said their children were falling sick less frequently. Water-borne illnesses are among the top five reasons for children’ health visits, according to the Health Ministry.

Future challenges will include how to extend such networks to rural areas, which are currently under-serviced in terms of clean water: 72 percent of rural Burkinabés access clean water, versus 95 percent of city residents.

The local authorities are responsible for rural water supply under Burkina Faso’s decentralized governance system.

According to a just-published report Progress on Sanitation and Drinking Water 2013 Update [ http://www.unicef.org/media/media_69091.html ] by UNICEF and the World Health Organization, striking disparities remain between rural and urban water access, with rural communities making up 83 percent of the global population without access to an improved water source.

bo/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98054/Making-WASH-work-in-Burkina-Faso-s-cities</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305161656290386t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">OUAGADOUGOU 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - Earlier this year Denis Ouedraogo, a tailor living in the Tampouy neighbourhood just north of Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou, connected his mud-walled home to the water network for the first time. “Even without electricity, having enough water can make you happy,” he said.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Challenges to improving health care in Pakistan</title><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281135270775t.jpg" />]]>LAHORE/DUBAI 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - Hamza Mazhar, a 35-year-old teacher from Pakistan’s eastern city of Lahore, says he never wants to see the inside of a government hospital again.</description><body><![CDATA[LAHORE/DUBAI 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - Hamza Mazhar, a 35-year-old teacher from Pakistan’s eastern city of Lahore, says he never wants to see the inside of a government hospital again.

“My mother was taken to the hospital with an upper respiratory tract infection in February this year and doctors said she needed care in the hospital’s Intensive Care Unit (ICU),” he told IRIN.

But the doctors in charge wanted the family to pay a bribe to get into the ICU, which had plenty of spare beds. They could not afford to pay. His mother was unable to get the treatment she needed and in March she died.

Health care in Pakistan is identified as one of the country’s most corrupt sectors, according to surveys by Transparency International [ http://www.transparency.org.pk/documents/NCPS%202009/NCPS%202009%20%20Report.pdf ]; general surveys suggest the majority of Pakistanis are unhappy with the health services they are offered. 

This is just one of the many challenges facing Pakistan’s health system, as identified in the first ever comprehensive assessment [ http://www.thelancet.com/themed/pakistan ] of the sector, published in the medical journal The Lancet and launched today in Islamabad. 

Entitled Health Transitions in Pakistan, the series of articles says Pakistan’s health sector lags behind 12 countries in the region with cultural, economic and geographic similarities.

Pakistan has no national health insurance system and 78 percent of the population pay health care expenses themselves. It is the only country in the world without a National Health Ministry.

The report authors say the recently elected government has a unique opportunity to push through reforms and take advantage of recent constitutional changes that devolve health care to the provinces.

The findings are not entirely negative. Progress has been made on all health indicators in the past 20 years. The rates of child deaths and maternal mortality have fallen, and the community-based Lady Health Workers programme is singled out for praise.

But improvements have been much slower coming than in other similar countries. IRIN picked out four major challenges from the health assessment.

1. Avoidably high child and maternal mortality

The assessment’s authors describe Pakistan’s progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals for reducing child and material mortality (4&5) as “unsatisfactory”. 

Pakistan, with its population of 180 million, has more child, foetal and maternal deaths than all but two of the world’s nations.

The report calls child survival “the most devastating and large-scale public health and humanitarian crisis Pakistan faces”.

An estimated 423,000 children under-five die each year, almost half of them new-born babies. Family planning options are also limited and nearly a million women attempt unsafe abortions each year.

Simple measures like training more nurses and midwives (currently outnumbered by doctors 2:1) could save more than 200,000 women and child lives in 2015, the report’s authors say.

2. Nutrition

A lack of adequate nutrition for children contributes to the high number of child and maternal deaths. Nearly 40 percent of children under-five are underweight [ http://www.fao.org/ag/agn/nutrition/pak_en.stm ] and more than half are affected by stunting. 

Poor nutrition weakens the body’s natural defence mechanisms.

But the report also says that malnutrition affects the Pakistani economy, with estimates that it costs the country 3 percent of GDP every year, particularly through reduced productivity in young adults.

3. “Lifestyle diseases”

In Pakistan, as more widely throughout south Asia, non-communicable diseases like cancer, diabetes and heart problems have replaced communicable diseases like malaria and diarrhoea in the past two decades as the leading causes of death and morbidity.

This general trend has not been matched by an adaptation in the Pakistani health system or government policy. Poor road safety, cheap cigarettes and high-levels of obesity (one in four adults) all lead to preventable deaths.

So-called “lifestyle diseases” could cost the country nearly US$300 million in 2025, according to the report’s authors.

They say the right government action, including higher excise taxes on cigarettes, new legislation, and information campaigns could cut the premature mortality rate from cardiovascular diseases, cancers, and respiratory diseases by 20 percent by 2025.

4. Low public spending

Humanitarian crises provoked by earthquakes, flooding and conflict over the past decade have mobilized large sums of money both internationally and within the country.

But corresponding sums have not been spent on underlying health services, which have the potential to save many more lives.

Public health spending has declined from 1.5 percent of GDP in the late 1980s to less than 1 percent, according to the report - equivalent to less than 4 percent of the government budget.

That has left Pakistanis with little support for medical costs, which are responsible for more than two-thirds of major economic shocks for poor families, according to the Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education.

Rapid population growth [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96969/Analysis-Tackling-Pakistan-s-population-time-bomb ] only makes what resources are spent on health care produce ever smaller results. 

kh/jj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98055/Challenges-to-improving-health-care-in-Pakistan</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281135270775t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">LAHORE/DUBAI 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - Hamza Mazhar, a 35-year-old teacher from Pakistan’s eastern city of Lahore, says he never wants to see the inside of a government hospital again.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Restive northern Kenya sees shifting power, risks</title><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011251201360592t.jpg" />]]>GARISSA-NAIROBI 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - The presence of foreign militias in parts of northeastern Kenya, and their collusion with security officials and business people there, may be to blame for a rise in insecurity in the region, where multiple gun and grenade attacks have been reported over the past two years.</description><body><![CDATA[GARISSA-NAIROBI 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - The presence of foreign militias in parts of northeastern Kenya, and their collusion with security officials and business people there, may be to blame for a rise in insecurity in the region, where multiple gun and grenade attacks have been reported over the past two years. 

But securing northern Kenya is increasingly vital to the government, with the badlands growing in economic viability, the new constitution shifting power to the counties, and mega development projects being planned in the region. 

In October 2011, Kenyan troops launched an intervention into Somalia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94018/KENYA-SOMALIA-A-risky-intervention ] in pursuit of the Somali insurgent Al-Shabab militia, which it blamed for incursions into Kenya. Since then, dozens of people, including security officers, have been killed in attacks, mainly in the northeastern town of Garissa and the mainly-Somali Dadaab refugee camp.  

To address this, a number of security operations have been launched, involving the deployment of hundreds of police and military officers, arrests and curfews, as well the cessation of the registration of new Somali refugees amid fears of Al-Shabab infiltration. 

The most recent security operation in Garissa led to hundreds of arrests. "Ten police officers, among them the head of crime investigations [and] six local [administration] chiefs, have been suspended,” Charles Mureithi, the northeastern regional police chief, told IRIN, adding, “More arrests are on the way, and, of course, convictions.” 

The police officers and chiefs were said to be operating in league with the criminals, a view shared by a Garissa political leader, who spoke with IRIN on the condition of anonymity. 

"The monster responsible for all the sufferings we have experienced is… a club of wealthy traders from the Far East, Somalia [and] Kenya [as well as] politicians, our security officers and at least two sects of Al-Shabab,” said the Garissa leader. 

Who is to blame for the rising insecurity? 

An Al-Shabab-linked militia group has been blamed for some of the attacks in Garissa. 

"They only strike with an objective [of] fight[ing] other religions,” said Maulid*, a Garissa resident. “In Garissa, they worship in two mosques, same [as] in Nairobi. They consider us as infidels.” 

Churches in Garissa have been among the buildings targeted by grenade attacks. 

An Islamic religious leader, who preferred anonymity, called for the arrest of Al-Shabab-linked leaders and the seizure of their properties. "We want to see traders who paid gangs of criminals to kill arrested,” he said. 

According to Ahmed Yasin, a political science graduate from Somalia, the Al-Shabab-linked militias are retaliating against some prominent Kenyan Somalis’ support for the creation of an autonomous region of Jubaland [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97860/Briefing-Somalia-federalism-and-Jubaland ] in southern Somalia - which could serve as a buffer zone between the two countries - and against their support for the Ras Kamboni militia. 

In September 2012, the Ras Kamboni militia, alongside Kenyan troops, forced Al-Shabab out of the lucrative port city of Kismayo, which is a key economic and strategic resource for militias in southern Somalia. On 15 May, Ras Kamboni leader Sheikh Ahmed Madobe was announced as Jubaland’s president. 

While Al-Shabab is bitter at losing Kismayo, Yasin said, it also opposes the creation of a buffer zone, which would protect Kenya from Al-Shabab incursions. 

"Political leaders, elders and clerics must abandon support for [the] Ras Kamboni militia group... They must be wise [and] restrain from Somalia politics… and let their people enjoy peace," warned Yasin. 

What has been the fallout of the insecurity? 

A security operation to pacify the region has led to dozens of arrests; those found without legal identification documents were netted. Rights groups, however, are critical of these sweeping operations. 

Some Kenyan youths in Garissa are wrongfully being arrested as they lack identity cards, said Abdiwelli Mohamed of the local organization Citizens Rights Watch. The process of acquiring identification documents is often fraught with challenges, including long delays in the often-neglected northern region. 

According to Khalif Abdi Farah of the Garissa Northern Forum for Democracy, a civil society organization, dozens of people have also been injured, with others being illegally arrested in the crackdown. 

The police denied claims of arbitrary arrests, a view shared by Haji*, a Garissa resident and retailer. "It’s true [that] the police conducted house-to-house searches [and] stopped people on the streets. They checked identity cards and counter-checked with a list they were carrying. It’s clear [that] they are looking for particular individuals," he said. 

Besides a rising death toll and a large number of people injured in attacks over the past two years, the insecurity has had adverse socio-economic effects. Garissa businesses have been hit hard. 

A night club and guest house owner in Garissa said his business has suffered due to the curfew. "I only have an hour to operate. [I] open the pub at 5pm and close by 6pm.” 

Fear has also affected his business: “My guest house clients, [who] were mainly travellers either heading to Wajir, Mandera or Nairobi, these days no longer spend a night in Garissa for fear of arrest or attack," he said. 

Proceeds from the once-booming Garissa livestock market are declining too, said a revenue officer, noting that livestock traders are afraid of arrest. Asset and property values have also dropped significantly since December 2012, with fewer people opting to live or invest in Garissa. 

Why is securing northern Kenya vital? 

Securing Garissa and other northern Kenya regions has become a priority for the government, particularly amid the country’s newly devolved governance structure, lucrative cross-border development plans and the north’s growing economic viability. 

Devolution [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97726/Briefing-Devolution-to-transform-Kenya ], a centrepiece of Kenya’s 2010 constitution, will allocate more resources to the county governments, a move that is expected to reduce the marginalization of outer areas like northern Kenya. 

Kenya is also seeking to develop closer ties with its neighbours in the north, mainly Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan, amid planned mega development projects, such as the Lamu Port and Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET [ http://www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/pillars/project/macro_enablers/181 ]), which will link the Horn of Africa region. 

“Previously peripheral areas to the north and east will assume a new economic, and so political, significance,” states a 2 May analysis by Oxford Analytica [ http://www.oxan.com/ ], a global analysis and advisory firm, which notes that development had previously been concentrated in the central belt stretching from Nairobi to the Ugandan border. 

Kenya also expects to get relief from its current electricity shortages by 2016 thorough the Eastern Electricity Highway Project [ http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P126579/regional-eastern-africa-power-pool-project-apl1?lang=en ], which will connect Kenya’s electrical grid to Ethiopia’s, adds the analysis. “Protecting this supply will require: greater security in border areas; more careful management of local conflicts between communities in border areas to prevent escalation into disputes between the two states; and continued friendly relations between Nairobi and Addis Ababa.” 

Recent oil discoveries [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95547/KENYA-Oil-hope-and-fear ] in northwest Kenya, and ongoing exploration in other regions, such as near Lamu [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96675/KENYA-Disquiet-over-Lamu-port-project ], “ further underline the importance of once-peripheral areas of the country to future economic development,” added the analysis. 

What challenges lie ahead? 

“Nairobi's incentive to extend state authority to historically neglected regions will grow, but not without facing significant challenges,” said a 14 May Oxford Analytica analysis. 

The northern Kenya regions are characterized by widespread insecurity [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/90505/KENYA-SOMALIA-Insecurity-without-borders ]. Inter-communal violence and the proliferation of small arms are common, the state is largely absent, and the borders are mostly porous. 

For example, there are currently inter-clan clashes in Mandera, which neighbours Garissa, with several people being reported dead and at least 6,600 displaced, according to the Kenya Red Cross Society [ https://www.kenyaredcross.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=476&Itemid=124 ]. 

In response, security in Mandera has been beefed up and residents have been urged to surrender illegal firearms. 

Forceful disarmament [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/89060/KENYA-Your-guns-or-your-freedom-please ] is likely there, as similar moves have occurred elsewhere in the north. But this only further alienates residents who blame insecurity on the inadequate state presence. 

“While such events appear familiar and of little wider significance, the new geography of Kenya's development plan - including energy, transportation, hydrocarbons - alters the political considerations of centre-periphery relations and increases the relevance of long-standing insecurity and distrust,” Oxford Analytica’s 14 May analysis said. 

“If an historical state reliance on coercion continues, rising insecurity in northern and coastal areas creates some risks for smoother longer-term economic development,” it noted. 

Kenya After the Elections [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenya-after-the-elections.pdf ], a 15 May policy briefing by the International Crisis Group (ICG), warns that devolution may not “be a ‘magic bullet’ that will allow the country to correct historical patterns of neglect, and redress regional marginalization and inequitable development… There are concerns devolution could ultimately balkanize counties, creating ‘ethnic fiefdoms’.” 

The briefing urges county governments to be inclusive of minority interests to address inequality. 

“The new government has the opportunity to usher in a new era of peace and socioeconomic development that would benefit all communities and unite the country. The foundation has been laid with the overwhelming support the constitution received in 2010, a base that should be maintained and built upon for a peaceful and prosperous future.” 

*Name changed 

aw-na/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98059/Briefing-Restive-northern-Kenya-sees-shifting-power-risks</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011251201360592t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GARISSA-NAIROBI 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - The presence of foreign militias in parts of northeastern Kenya, and their collusion with security officials and business people there, may be to blame for a rise in insecurity in the region, where multiple gun and grenade attacks have been reported over the past two years.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Cape Town&apos;s asylum seekers struggle to get documented</title><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305151132020076t.jpg" />]]>CAPE TOWN 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - When Jean Baptiste*, a medical student from Lubumbashi, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), arrived in South Africa in September 2012, he headed straight for Cape Town, where he knew he would be able to stay with his brother. No one at the border told him that it was no longer possible to apply for asylum in Cape Town.</description><body><![CDATA[CAPE TOWN 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - When Jean Baptiste*, a medical student from Lubumbashi, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), arrived in South Africa in September 2012, he headed straight for Cape Town, where he knew he would be able to stay with his brother. No one at the border told him that it was no longer possible to apply for asylum in Cape Town. 

He has since approached the city’s Refugee Reception Office (RRO) 18 times to try to secure an asylum seeker permit and become documented, but he has never made it past the security guards outside. 

Without documentation, finding even casual work in Cape Town has proved impossible, and without work, he lacks the funds to travel to the cities of Durban, Pretoria or Musina, the three remaining places in South Africa where RROs are still issuing permits to newly arrived asylum seekers. The distance between Cape Town and Pretoria, the nearest RRO where he could apply for asylum, is nearly 1,500km. 

“At the moment, I don’t have money to go to Pretoria or elsewhere,” said Jean Baptiste, whose involvement in a student group opposed to the Congolese government put his life in danger and forced him to flee the country. 

Catch-22 

“For newcomers, it’s a Catch-22 situation,” said Anthony Muteti, a community liaison officer with People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP). Together with the Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town, PASSOP has registered over 1,800 asylum seekers in situations like Jean Baptiste’s since Cape Town’s RRO moved locations in July 2012 and stopped accepting new asylum seeker applications. It seems likely there are many more who have not been counted. 

Last July, soon after the RRO stopped assisting new arrivals, a high court judgement ruled in favour of the Scalabrini Centre’s urgent application to force the Department of Home Affairs to resume these services in Cape Town [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95951/SOUTH-AFRICA-Court-orders-Cape-Town-to-process-asylum-applications ], pending a full review of the case. 

In March of this year, another high court judgement found that the Department’s decision to close the Cape Town RRO to newcomers had been unlawful due to a lack of consultation with the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs or with affected groups. The Department is appealing both the interim court order and the March judgement, which requires it to resume full services to asylum seekers and refugees, including new asylum applicants, by 1 July 2013. 

The Scalabrini Centre has not opposed the Department’s leave to appeal on the condition that it be heard as soon as possible and that the Cape Town office assist asylum seekers with permits issued at other RROs around the country. 

Marlize Ackermann, an advocacy officer with Scalabrini, told IRIN that in recent months, most such individuals have been told they cannot renew their permits in Cape Town, but must return to the office where they originally applied for asylum. Scalabrini has registered over 400 such individuals since January. 

“Officially, they’re supposed to be assisted, but in reality permit holders are often refused further extensions of permits, and if it is extended, it’ll just be a 30 day permit to allow them time to get to Musina or wherever,” she said. 

For many asylum seekers, especially those with large families or health problems, travelling a minimum of 1,500km every three to six months in order to extend their permits is simply not possible. They have no option but to allow their permits to expire, making them undocumented and liable to arrest and deportation. 

Deborah Mbela Momba, a mother of six from DRC, who was separated from her husband when fighting broke out in Goma last November, is facing this predicament as the six-month asylum seeker permits she obtained for herself and her children from the RRO in Musina are about to expire. 

With assistance from the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Momba travelled from Musina to Cape Town, where she had lived during a previous period of instability in DRC. Now, she and her children are staying with a friend in Mitchell’s Plain, and Momba is earning a small income from braiding hair. 

“I barely get enough [money] to eat,” she told IRIN, speaking tearfully through a translator. “I don’t know how I’ll find enough to go to Musina.” 

Fear of arrest 

According to Ackerman, the police in Cape Town are aware of the situation and rarely arrest asylum seekers without permits. However, Muteti of PASSOP said Home Affairs officials regularly raid places where foreign nationals are known to live and work, arresting those without documents. 

“They’re taken to Pollsmoor Prison and kept with violent criminals for up to 30 days,” he told IRIN. 

Those who avoid arrest, struggle to access healthcare and education for their children, let alone jobs. 

“Whenever I try to get piece work, they won’t take me cause I don’t have documents,” said Daniel Munyoro*, 23, from Zimbabwe. He arrived in Cape Town in March and has not been able to apply for asylum there. “It’s not even safe to walk around because the police might stop and ask me for papers. My buddy is giving me food and a place to sleep, but he keeps asking me when I’m going to start paying.” 

Even for those asylum seekers registered in Cape Town, renewing their permits is not a simple matter, said Muteti. “The RRO is scaling down its services, and treatment of foreigners there is appalling. Sometimes you wait all day and don’t get served.” 

He added that asylum seekers are often told to come to the RRO only on the day that their permits are due to expire. If they do not make it to the front of the queue on that day, they become liable for a R2,500 (US$266) fine. “If you can’t afford to pay, you become undocumented, which means you’ll probably lose your job, the banks will freeze your account and you can be arrested,” he said. 

RROs to relocate 

Asylum seekers in Cape Town are not the only ones struggling to get documented. The Department of Home Affairs has also closed RROs in Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape Province in the last two years, ostensibly because of complaints from local business owners. In both cases, courts have ruled that the closures were unlawful [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94692/SOUTH-AFRICA-Red-tape-ensnares-asylum-seekers ]. The Eastern Cape High Court ordered the Department to re-open the Port Elizabeth RRO to newcomers last February, but so far it has not done so. 

On several occasions in the past year, department officials have stated that the closure of RROs in metropolitan areas is in line with a strategy to eventually relocate all RROs to the country’s borders. Details have been sketchy, but a December 2012 statement by Home Affairs Director-General Mkuseli Apleni said the first of these RROs was under construction at the border with Mozambique, in Lebombo, although he did not give a timeframe for when it would be completed. 

Refugee rights organizations, such as Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), have been critical of the Department’s plan to move RROs to the borders, particularly without having first introduced it as a policy that would have required inputs at the Parliamentary and Cabinet levels as well as extensive public consultation [ http://www.lhr.org.za/publications/policy-shifts-south-african-asylum-system-evidence-and-implications ]. 

Head of LHR’s Strategic Litigation Unit, David Cote, said there were fears that the move to the borders would have negative implications for asylum seekers. “We’re really concerned that it would create de-facto refugee camps [at the borders],” he told IRIN. 

Muteti of PASSOP is among many in South Africa’s refugee rights sector who have registered a major shift in the South African government’s approach to asylum seeker and refugee protection in recent years. “Being a refugee myself, I’ve been through the mill,” he said. “But there are serious problems affected asylum seekers now.” 

*Not their real names 

ks/rz 

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98051/Cape-Town-apos-s-asylum-seekers-struggle-to-get-documented</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305151132020076t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">CAPE TOWN 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - When Jean Baptiste*, a medical student from Lubumbashi, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), arrived in South Africa in September 2012, he headed straight for Cape Town, where he knew he would be able to stay with his brother. No one at the border told him that it was no longer possible to apply for asylum in Cape Town.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Pastoralism’s economic contributions are significant but overlooked</title><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108010808430012t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Pastoralism is often regarded as an antiquated practice ill-suited to the modern economy, yet trade between pastoral communities in Africa - much of it informal and illegal - generates an estimated US$1 billion each year, according to a new book published by the Futures Agriculture Consortium.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Pastoralism is often regarded as an antiquated practice ill-suited to the modern economy, yet trade between pastoral communities in Africa - much of it informal and illegal - generates an estimated US$1 billion each year, according to a new book [ http://www.future-agricultures.org/pastoralism/7666-book-pastoralism-and-development-in-africa ] published by the Futures Agriculture Consortium. 

“If we shift our gaze from the capital cities, where the development and policy elite congregate, to the regional centers and their hinterlands where pastoralists live, then a very different perspective emerges. Here we see the growth of a booming livestock export trade, the flourishing of the private sector, the expansion of towns with the inflow of investment, and the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs commanding a profitable market, and generating employment and other business opportunities; and all of this driven without a reliance on external development aid,” said the authors of the study. 

Pastoralism contributes between 10 and 44 percent of the GDP of African countries. An estimated 1.3 billion people benefit from livestock value chain, according to the International Livestock Research Institute. 

“Pastoralism contributes to the livelihoods of millions of people across Africa, in some of the poorest and most deprived areas. It is a critical source of economic activity in dryland areas, where other forms of agriculture are impossible,” Ian Scoones, from the Institute of Development Studies [ http://www.ids.ac.uk/ ], told IRIN. 

Ced Hesse, a researcher at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), told IRIN that in East Africa alone, “pastoralism directly supports an estimated 20 million people” and produces “80 percent of the total annual milk supply in Ethiopia, provides 90 percent of the meat consumed in East Africa, and contributes 19 percent, 13 percent and 8 percent of GDP in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, respectively”. 

He continued, “This is an enormous contribution to the regional economy, but often is unrecognized.” 

Invisible 

IIED’s Hesse explains why little attention is paid to pastoralists’ contributions: “The benefits that pastoralism brings are invisible to most governments because the methodologies they use for assessing economic activity and growth, the most popular being GDP, are not adapted to pastoralism.” 

“A ‘total economic valuation’ framework is needed. When Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, used this methodology to calculate the contribution of livestock to the Kenyan economy, they found livestock’s contribution to agricultural GDP is about two and half times greater than official estimates,” Hesse said. 

“Kenya’s livestock were under appreciated and no attempt to enumerate it had been made for decades,” the IGAD report said. 

Experts like Scoones say the rapid urbanization in Africa will continue to provide increased market opportunities for pastoralists. Not all will benefit from the direct sale of livestock, but there are opportunities for diversification. 

“There are spin-off benefits from such trade, including opportunities for engaging in diversified activities, including processing animal products, providing transport, fodder and marketing support, and offering services in the growing small towns in pastoral areas,”  said Scoones. 

“Not all those in pastoralist areas can be involved directly in the growing, vibrant livestock trade that feeds the burgeoning cities across Africa,” Scoones added. 

Bad press 

Yet other than reports of pastoralists suffering from poverty and climate-related shocks, pastoralism receives little attention from national governments or the media. 

Of the reporting that does exist, much is negative, according to Media perceptions and portrayals of Pastoralists in Kenya, India and China [ http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/14623IIED.pdf ], an April 2013 IIED report. 

In Kenya for instance, 93 percent of news articles on pastoralist analyzed by the authors were about drought and conflict. Fifty-one percent of articles mentioning conflict presented pastoralist as the cause of the problems rather than the victims of conflict. 

In India, on the other hand, 60 percent of articles reviewed portrayed pastoralists as victims “who have lost access to grazing land because of the growth of industrial agriculture, the dominance of more powerful social groups, and limits to grazing in forested land, among others.” 

The bad press has generated calls for pastoralist communities to change their lifestyles. 

Media reports also fail to mention the environmental benefits of pastoralism, which can contribute to biodiversity conservation [ http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/pdf/2041-7136-2-14.pdf ], and the role it plays in making food systems resilient by, for example, preventing overreliance on drought- and flood-vulnerable crops. 

“The media tends to portray pastoralists as a source of problem or as lost causes, yet most media articles about pastoralists do not even quote the pastoralists themselves. The media portrayals paint a partial picture, one that rarely mentions the important economic and environmental benefits of pastoralism, or the way that herder mobility helps increase the resilience of food systems in a changing climate, so that even distant consumers in cities benefit,” Mike Shanahan, communication specialist and author of the study, told IRIN. 

Minorities Rights Group International observed in its 2012 State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples [ http://www.minorityrights.org/11374/state-of-the-worlds-minorities/state-of-the-worlds-minorities-and-indigenous-peoples-2012.html ] report that pastoralists are being forced to abandon their livelihoods by national governments. Experts see an increase in the phenomenon of land grabs, in which pastoralists and minority groups are driven out of their lands to pave the way for development projects considered more “viable”, such as large-scale irrigation projects [ http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2011.652620 ]. 

Some experts, like IIED’s Hesse, say there is a case for modernizing pastoralism - not in the “sense of settling them or turning them into ranchers”, but by focusing on the “logic of pastoralism’s production strategies that allow it to produce the benefits in arid and semi-arid environments characterized by rainfall variability.” 

ko/rz   

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98052/Pastoralism-s-economic-contributions-are-significant-but-overlooked</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108010808430012t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Pastoralism is often regarded as an antiquated practice ill-suited to the modern economy, yet trade between pastoral communities in Africa - much of it informal and illegal - generates an estimated US$1 billion each year, according to a new book published by the Futures Agriculture Consortium.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Call for oil revenues to improve living standards in Congo</title><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203071330530657t.jpg" />]]>BRAZZAVILLE 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - Congo, which is heavily dependent on revenue from the oil industry, has been declared as “conforming to” a global standard that aims to ensure transparency of payments for natural resources; NGOs hope the announcement will improve the lives of the poor.</description><body><![CDATA[BRAZZAVILLE 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - Congo, which is heavily dependent on revenue from the oil industry, has been declared as “conforming to” a global standard that aims to ensure transparency of payments for natural resources; NGOs hope the announcement will improve the lives of the poor. 

More than half the country’s 3.6 million people live below the poverty line. 

The Initiative for Transparency in the Extractive Industries (EITI) [ http://eiti.org/ ], adopted by G8 countries in 2003, aims to improve the transparency of the management of mineral resources. It brings together, in a single structure, governments, oil companies, international financial institutions and NGOs. 

"Being validated and found to comply with the EITI means Congo ticked 21 boxes, including membership of EITI, implying a commitment to publish all necessary information relating to the management of our industries, especially oil, our primary export resource," Florent Michel Okoko, coordinator of EITI in Congo, told IRIN. 

Oil accounts for 80 to 90 percent of Congo’s exports and budget revenues. 

EITI covers both solid and liquid mines. However "at this stage, we are focusing on the oil industry because, in terms of solid mines [iron ore mining in the southwest], we are still at the stage of prospecting. In the relatively near future, we will also integrate solid mines," said Okoko. 

Congo’s achievement of compliance has not come overnight: The country became associated with EITI in 2004, but oil has remained a sticking point. 

“However, since 2011 the government seems to have made an effort because from then on, there is an 80 to 90 percent overlap between revenues that were reported by oil companies and those said to have been seen by the Treasury,” Christian Mounzéo, of the Congolese organization Publish What You Pay (PWYP), told IRIN. 

Much-needed revenues 

Congolese civil society groups insist that such revenue should benefit the lives of all Congolese citizens. 

"Being consistent with EITI is not an end in itself. Instead, the government should mandate the equitable distribution of [revenue from] petroleum, mining and gas products. The Congolese want to touch and taste the income of its oil daily,” Brice Mackosso, secretary-general of the Diocesan Commission for Justice and Peace (CJP), told IRIN. 

Officially, annual income from oil exports is around US$6 billion. 

"These oil revenues are currently very, very important, so it is time for the average Congolese to feel them in terms of better access to education, water, electricity and health," said Mackosso. 

According to the most recent Demographic Health Survey (2007), 47 percent of the population had access to water in urban areas, and 11 percent in rural areas. The figures for electricity were 45 and 6 percent respectively. 

Literacy rates, which used to be around 100 percent in the 1980s, dropped to 80 percent in 2010 due to the civil war, according to the UN Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP’s Human Development Index says life expectancy is 55. 

Officially 24 to 30 percent of the population under 30 is unemployed, according to 2011 World Bank estimates. 

Between February and April 2013, at least 9,500 state school teachers went on strike to demand a 60 percent pay increase. "Teachers have expressed aloud what all Congolese think to themselves. In any case the oil money is not kept in Congo, but in tax havens," Elo Dacy, a member of the opposition Patriotic Union for National Renewal (UPRN), told IRIN. 

lmm/cb/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98044/Call-for-oil-revenues-to-improve-living-standards-in-Congo</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201203071330530657t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BRAZZAVILLE 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - Congo, which is heavily dependent on revenue from the oil industry, has been declared as “conforming to” a global standard that aims to ensure transparency of payments for natural resources; NGOs hope the announcement will improve the lives of the poor.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Tracking vaccine scares</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304020549030977t.jpg" />]]>LONDON 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Vaccine scares have emerged as a major challenge to global efforts to eliminate preventable diseases, with rumours and conspiracy theories proliferating faster than health authorities can respond to them. Now researchers, led by Heidi Larson of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, are developing a tool to identify the first signs of these negative reports.</description><body><![CDATA[LONDON 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Vaccine scares have emerged as a major challenge to global efforts to eliminate preventable diseases, with rumours and conspiracy theories proliferating faster than health authorities can respond to them. Now researchers, led by Heidi Larson of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, are developing a tool to identify the first signs of these negative reports.

Vaccine scares have popped up in both the richest parts of the world and the poorest. Over a decade ago, suggestions in the UK that the combined MMR (measles, mumps and rubella) vaccine could trigger autism led to a dramatic drop in the number of parents having their children vaccinated. Wales, which had one of the lowest vaccination rates, is now in the grip of a major measles outbreak, with young teenagers - the generation that was not protected - particularly affected.

Northern Nigeria saw rumours that the polio vaccine was part of a Western conspiracy to sterilize Muslims [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97781/Analysis-Roots-of-polio-vaccine-suspicion ], preventing polio’s eradication in the country and leading to the disease’s reappearance in surrounding countries where it had already been eliminated.

“Bad news stories damage vaccination programmes as much as biological hazards, and these stories evolve over minutes or hours, needing immediate action,” said University of Toronto public health specialists Natasha Crowcroft and Kwame McKenzie, in a comment [ http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(13)70131-2/fulltext ] published this week alongside Larson’s paper [ http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(13)70108-7/abstract?rss=yes ] in the medical journal The Lancet. “By the time a detailed scientific analysis of a vaccine safety issue is completed, the story is no longer newsworthy.”

Crowcroft and McKenzie point out that modern communications, especially the internet, can exacerbate vaccine scares. But Larson’s Vaccine Confidence Project set out to establish whether the internet could also provide the tools to fight misinformation.

Rumour surveillance

Larson’s team set up a media surveillance system covering 144 countries, looking at online articles, blogs and reports about vaccines and vaccine-preventable diseases.

The first stage of the process was automated, using the HealthMap data collection system, which searched for terms such as “vaccine”, “rotavirus” or “measles”. The accumulated material was inspected by real people, who assessed whether it positively or negatively portrayed vaccination, and whether it should be flagged as a cause for concern.

When one report appeared on multiple websites, all copies were counted, “recognizing the fact that replicated reports show the spread of information,” Larson’s paper says.

Although it was a worldwide survey, the researchers paid particular attention to five countries - China, Finland, France, Nigeria and Pakistan - that had seen issues over public confidence in vaccines. They also mapped reports about the human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine in India, where trial HPV vaccination projects had been suspended in two states.

The Vaccine Confidence Project initially ran from April 2010 to April 2011. At the end of the year, they could see that the system had worked - clusters of reports expressing concern about vaccination correlated with real-world events. Of the reports analysed, 69 percent were assessed as favourable to vaccination and 31 percent as hostile.

“We picked up concerns we already knew were there, but more than that,” Larson told IRIN. “For instance, we saw activity around a narcolepsy/H1N1 vaccine link, and we were picking up early discussions suggesting this might be an issue before the final confirmation (in Finland) that there was indeed a link.

“And in Pakistan, where we were following issues around polio acceptance, we started picking up political tensions and concerns among lady health workers. We certainly didn’t predict the killing of polio workers, but we had seen the tensions growing.”

Waves of information

There are questions about whether internet surveillance, using search terms in English, can spot emerging concerns in rural societies where internet penetration is low and public debate occurs in local languages. Could this kind of surveillance, for instance, have picked up the early signs of polio vaccine rejection in Hausa-speaking northern Nigeria?

Larson, who has worked in that area on behalf of the UN Children’s Fund, says she thinks it would have.

“It was emerging in the local media a bit, and then reports started to circulate on the BBC Hausa service. And since Nigeria has English as an official language, they were soon circulating in English as well. A former Nigerian minister of health, Nike Grange, is on our advisory board, and she says that if they had had a system like this at the time, and had understood the full impact of the rumours they heard, they would have acted much sooner,” Larson said.

“And the world has changed a lot in the last decade. What we are seeing is that you don’t have to have a computer in every household. People hear something on the radio, they tell their neighbour, they tweet it, and there are waves of information. We hadn’t anticipated how ubiquitous cellphones and smartphones were going to be, and that makes this work even more relevant.”

eb/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98030/Tracking-vaccine-scares</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304020549030977t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">LONDON 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Vaccine scares have emerged as a major challenge to global efforts to eliminate preventable diseases, with rumours and conspiracy theories proliferating faster than health authorities can respond to them. Now researchers, led by Heidi Larson of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, are developing a tool to identify the first signs of these negative reports.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Egypt rethinks its subsidy system for the poor</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141109580576t.jpg" />]]>CAIRO 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Egyptian government has taken tentative steps towards reducing the roughly US$20 billion subsidy system that supporters say provides vital aid to the one-in-four Egyptians in poverty, and critics say is unsustainable and enriches the corrupt.</description><body><![CDATA[CAIRO 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Egyptian government has taken tentative steps towards reducing the roughly US$20 billion subsidy system that supporters say provides vital aid to the one-in-four Egyptians [ http://www.capmas.gov.eg/pdf/studies/pdf/enf1.pdf ] in poverty, and critics say is unsustainable and enriches the corrupt.

“Most of the subsidies do not go to the people who really need them,” said Osama Kamal, who until the 7 May cabinet reshuffle was petroleum minister.

The government plans a series of piecemeal reforms to revolutionize its decades-old subsidy system in a bid to rein in a runaway budget deficit, and adapt to the conditions of a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.

But as Minister of Supply and Internal Trade Bassem Auda said recently, the subsidy system protects at least eight million Egyptians against poverty, and any changes are highly sensitive.

The government wants to reduce the budget deficit to 5.5 percent in the 2016-2017 budget from 10.7 percent in the 2012-2013 budget, according to the Finance Ministry [ http://www.brecorder.com/world/africa/118022-egypt-eyes-55pc-budget-deficit-in-2016-17.html ].

A high priority in the subsidy reform scheme is energy subsidies, which are estimated at 115 billion pounds ($16.8 billion), and bread subsidies [ http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1398046 ] (Arabic), which are estimated at 21 billion pounds ($3.1 billion).

Manal Metwaly, an economics professor from Cairo University, says cuts will have a devastating effect on the poor: “The government says the subsidy system opens the way for corruption, but it doesn’t have to slash subsidies in order to fight corruption.

“The subsidies keep millions of people afloat, while commodity prices keep rising. This means that any change in the system can affect the lives of millions of people.”

What’s the plan to reduce bread subsidy corruption?

Subsidized bread is a permanent item on almost all Egyptian tables; it is a lifeline for the poor, but the system is also frequently abused.

Egyptians consume as many as 210 million loaves of subsidized flat bread every day, helping to make it the world's largest wheat importer.

The government sells a subsidized loaf of bread at the nation's more than 25,000 bakeries for five piasters (less than one US cent) whereas the production cost of the same loaf is more than 40 piasters (six US cents).

“Bread subsidies are a real headache for the government because, like most other subsidies, they open the way for massive corruption and profiteering by a group of dishonest traders,” Hamdy Allam, a senior official at the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, told IRIN.

In order to reduce corruption resulting from the selling by bakery owners of subsidized flour on the black market, the government introduced a new system in April, which has been implemented in several governorates and accepted by 15,000 bakeries.

Instead of selling subsidized flour to the bakeries, the bakers buy the flour at the market rate, but are then reimbursed 35 piasters by the government per loaf, to make sure the sales price remains 5 piasters.

The system is expected to be implemented across Egypt in the next two months after all the nation's bakeries sign up to the reforms.

The government’s aim here is to reduce corruption rather than financial support for poor consumers.

What’s the plan for ration cards?

Egypt's ration cards date back to 1964 when the population was less than 30 million. Back then, the government earmarked two million pounds ($301,204) to give citizens rice, sugar, lentils, cooking oil, and tea at subsidized rates.

Now, the government spends as much as nine billion pounds (US$1.3 billion) every year on the food subsidies, which go to around 17.6 million families (around 68 million people).

In July, the government plans to start limiting ration cards to citizens whose monthly income is below 1,500 Egyptian pounds (US$216), but at the same time is planning to allow children born after 2005 in low-income households to be registered for the cards, reversing a suspension of registrations introduced under President Hosni Mubarak.

The minister of supply also announced last week that it would be working to improve the quality of ration card goods, which have a poor reputation.

…and for energy subsidies?

Energy is by far the largest recipient of subsidies.

The Petroleum Ministry produces oil to the value of 165 billion pounds (US$23.8 billion) every year, but then sells these products for 50 billion pounds [ http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Policy.aspx?Serial=1239531 ] (Arabic).

Most energy subsidies go on factories and industrial projects, which get their energy needs at less than market prices. But private vehicle owners also benefit.

The government has already started reducing subsidies on car fuel, and targeting 95-octane gasoline was the first step in this regard [ http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/58834/Business/Economy/Egypt-announces-cut-of-octane-gasoline-subsidies.aspx ].

The government says that from July it plans to cut subsidies on car fuel by 10 percent in the first stage of the reforms, but this will rise to 50 percent within five years. If applied in July, the government says, the plan will bring overall fuel subsidies down to 99 billion pounds (US$14.5 billion).

To do this, it plans to give coupons or smart cards to car owners allowing them to purchase limited amounts of subsidized fuel.

…and gas cylinders?

Gas cylinder subsidies are enjoyed by almost every Egyptian household.

The government says gas cylinder subsidies amounted to 60 billion Egyptian pounds (almost US$8.9 billion) in the 2012-2013 budget [ http://www.mss.gov.eg/mss/ar-eg/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9.aspx?udt_517_param_detail=14 ] (Arabic).

Although the production of one cylinder costs 78 pounds ($11.2), until recently the government sold the same cylinder to the public for five pounds (72 US cents).

Now, the government plans to link subsidized gas cylinders to ration cards.

Ration card holding families made up of three people will be allowed to get one gas cylinder every month at the subsidized rate of five pounds. Families of more than three people will get 1.5 gas cylinders at the same subsidized rate every month.

The government started implementing the first stage [ http://dostor.org/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1/172028-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%82%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2 ] (Arabic) of the gas cylinder subsidy reform plan in April by raising the price of the cylinders to eight pounds ($1.15) for homes and 16 pounds for restaurants and shops ($2.30).

The government says it will start distributing gas cylinder coupons in July in all governorates.

The price of a cylinder without the coupons is expected to rise to 30 pounds ($4.3). The government says the coupon system will save three billion pounds a year.

Egyptians consume as many as 360 million gas cylinders every year.

What might the consequences be?

Egypt has long discussed subsidy reforms [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/77691/EGYPT-Can-bread-subsidies-continue-in-their-present-form ], but has struggled to change a system seen as both unsustainable but too sensitive to reorganize.

A senior Muslim Brotherhood official, who asked not to be named, told IRIN the government was determined to push through reforms.

“We will not buy votes at the expense of the national economy. This subsidy system must be reformulated in ways that allow the subsidies to reach the people who really need them.”

Given the continued street protests and the upcoming parliamentary elections, analysts say the government will need to argue that reforms are about reducing corruption rather than hitting the poor.

“Some of the measures we take are unpopular. They will make people hate us. But this is not what we care about. We only care about putting the economy of this country back on track,” said the official.

Politicians have always feared social unrest from the inevitable price rises that will result.

“The price of one ton of concrete iron [iron bars used in the construction industry] jumped 30 percent as soon as the government slashed the subsidies on energy for concrete iron factories,” Rashad Abdo, head of local think tank Egyptian Economic Forum, told IRIN. “The same will happen with all other commodities. Ordinary citizens will foot the bill at the end of the day.”

ae/jj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98031/Briefing-Egypt-rethinks-its-subsidy-system-for-the-poor</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141109580576t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">CAIRO 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Egyptian government has taken tentative steps towards reducing the roughly US$20 billion subsidy system that supporters say provides vital aid to the one-in-four Egyptians in poverty, and critics say is unsustainable and enriches the corrupt.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boko Haram attacks hit school attendance in Borno State</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg" />]]>KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</description><body><![CDATA[KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.

Most of the children are primary school students, according to the official. Thus far Boko Haram (BH) has burned or destroyed 50 of the state's 175 schools, he said. Teachers in the state confirmed the estimate.

Students are staying at home for fear of attack, or are being transferred to private Islamic schools, known in the north as Islamiyya. On 6 May state schools officially reopened following a six-week break, but many have stayed closed, as officials and teachers fear attack.

BH gunmen had initially targeted schools - most of them primary - at night, detonating grenades and home-made explosives or dousing classrooms with gasoline and setting them alight, according to military and education officials.

But on 18 March BH shifted tactics, attacking four schools in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State (population 4.17 million, according to the 2006 census), in broad daylight, killing four teachers and seriously injuring four students.

On 9 April suspected BH members killed two school teachers in their homes, and four officials of the Borno State Feeding Committee, which runs a primary and secondary school feeding programme, while they were on an inspection tour of schools in Dikwa town, Borno State.

The shift to direct attacks on educators and students has rattled teachers, leaving many too frightened to go to work.

"We have been asked to resume classes but we are too afraid to return to school despite the stationing of a military post outside the school,” said Hajara Modu, a school teacher at Customs primary school in Maiduguri.

Secondary school enrolment is only 28 percent in Borno State - the lowest in the country, according to a 2010 Nigeria Education Data Survey.

On 10 April BH leader Abubakar Shekau claimed ordering the attacks on schools in an Internet video post, citing Nigerian military raids on Islamic schools in Maiduguri as the impetus.

Adama Zannah, a father of four students attending Sanda Kyarimi secondary school, one of the four schools affected in the 18 March attacks, told IRIN: "I want my children to attend school but they can only do that if they are alive... I can't allow them to go to school in this atmosphere of fear when schools are burnt and gunmen open fire during classes."

Islamic school attendance up

Many parents see the safest option as Islamic schools, which have seen a sharp rise in enrolment rates over recent months. These are private religious schools which teach an Islamic education, though some include English and maths in the curriculum.

Given the demand, fees at some Islamic schools have also increased - by 300 percent since the beginning of the year in some cases, according to parent Muhammad Kolo. He used to pay US$1.90 per month to educate his two children but the fee is now $7.60.

Borno State information commissioner Inuwa Bwala said the state government will try to strengthen Islamic schools with more money and more materials, and standardize their curriculum to teach children the Koran alongside Western education. (BH literally means “Western education is a sin” in Hausa).

Militarized schools

The school districts worst-affected by the arson attacks include old Maiduguri city and four local government areas - Marte, Kala-Balge, Gamboru Ngala and Mabar - in the northern part of Borno on the border with Cameroon and Chad, where BH has a strong presence [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria ].

Many students from these areas have been taken to neighbouring Dikwa District to take their May and June exams, protected by a heavy military detail.

The government has deployed soldiers in at-risk schools across the state but some parents fear this puts their children in yet more danger.

"The presence of soldiers makes them more prone to attack by BH which considers the military as their main enemy," said Ahmad Kyari, a resident of Gwange Quarters in Maiduguri city where all the schools in the area have been burnt; his three children are at home.

Attacks on schools violate children's right to education, as well as a number of human rights. In situations of conflict, they may also violate international humanitarian law and criminal law, and may constitute war crimes [ http://www.protectingeducation.org/what-international-laws-are-violated ].

"I'm really afraid to go to school. The thought of gunmen storming the school and opening fire or throwing explosives gives me the shivers and this is a thought that fills the minds of many students like me," said Nura Babani, a student of Sanda Kyarimi secondary school which was attacked on18 March.

"It is too dangerous to go to school now, especially with the attacks on some schools in broad daylight during classes,” student Maryam Habib, told IRIN.

In some areas where the government was trying to renovate schools, BH had set them ablaze again. Gwange II primary school in the Gwange area of Maiduguri city, considered a major BH stronghold, was burnt four times by BH, each time after undergoing renovation.

The school-burnings "sabotage government's effort at improving on education in Borno State", Borno State information commissioner Bwala told IRIN.

"It is not possible to learn in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. How do you expect a teacher to put in his best and a child to learn effectively when they are always on edge, in anticipation of gun and bomb attacks. This is killing education here," said the Ministry of Education official.

The federal government is exploring ways to forge a dialogue with BH [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/Analysis-Hurdles-to-Nigerian-government-Boko-Haram-dialogue ] but thus far, there has been little progress, and in recent weeks the militants have been staging a fierce comeback in the northeast. Over 3,600 people have been killed in BH-related violence since 2009, including extrajudicial killings by Nigerian security forces, according to Human Rights Watch.

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98032/Boko-Haram-attacks-hit-school-attendance-in-Borno-State</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Towards internal solutions to the DRC crisis</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97999/Is-more-force-in-the-DRC-more-of-the-same ] will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there. 

The over-3,000-strong military force will work alongside the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) to carry out targeted offensives against militia groups, which have caused numerous civilian deaths and massive population displacements. 

While some welcome the forthcoming military intervention, many analysts are advocating for Kinshasa-led initiatives - such as reforming key institutions - as necessary, if not alternative, solutions. 

In this briefing, IRIN highlights some of the key issues that the DRC government needs to address to secure its restive east.  

How can the security sector be reformed? 

An effective security sector is key to resolving most of DRC’s problems, according to analysts. 

“The Congolese government’s inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else,” according to The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, a 2012 report by a group of Congolese and international civil society organizations [ http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/drc-ssr-report-20120416-1.pdf ]. 

“An effective security sector - organized, resourced, trained and vetted - is essential to solving problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals,” the report says. 

But little money is being directly spent on security sector reform (SSR), it notes.  For example, while official development assistance to DRC post-2006 has amounted to at least US$14 billion, just over one percent, or about $84.79 million, has gone to SSR. 

The report blamed the international community for being “politically incoherent and poorly coordinated” with regard to SSR. It also blamed the DRC government’s lack of political will to take on SSR, attributed to its endemic corruption.  

According to Naomi Kok, a research consultant with the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), “SSR is a long-term project for the DRC, and Kinshasa should take most of the responsibility for completing this successfully.” 

But DRC’s government needs to take charge first. “The problem of the DRC is a weak, and some may argue an illegitimate, government, unable to take full control and charge of its vast territory,” Nicholas Opiyo, a Kampala-based lawyer with the Akijul consultancy [ http://www.akijul.org/index.php ], told IRIN. 

He added:  “The weakness or division in the Congolese army is only... a manifestation of the broader breakdown in the governance infrastructure of the country. As a result, everyone finds resort in a patchy solution, taking control of the instruments of violence.” 

How can the army be reined in? 

Acts of violence against civilians in eastern DRC are rampant, with the DRC army (FARDC) and dozens of militia groups culpable. 

FARDC troops are accused of violating human rights around the town of Minova, in South Kivu Province, last year while retreating from North Kivu Province  after the city of Goma fell to the M23 militia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96833/DRC-Fall-of-Goma-puts-200-000-children-at-risk ], according to  a  May UN Joint Human Rights Office report [ http://monusco.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Pj7jOWjAxWo%3d&tabid=10662&language=en-US ]. 

“In this context, at least 102 women and 33 girls were victims of rape or other acts of sexual violence perpetrated by FARDC soldiers,” says the report, which noted the soldiers had arbitrarily executed at least two people, used forced labour and looted from villages. 

FARDC is often regarded as weak, with poorly organized, unmotivated troops. The M23 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] mutiny in eastern DRC in 2012 by ethnic Tutsi FARDC officers, for example, was in part fuelled by grievances over pay and living conditions. 

Training alone will not address FARDC’s problems, which are structural, say experts. 

“There is an overestimation about what training can achieve. Foreign partners (Belgium, USA, France, Angola, South African and China) have now been training the Congolese army since 2006, and the results are very poor,” Thierry Vircoulon, an International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst, told IRIN in an e-mail. 

“Training is only good when it can be applied but, given the state of the Congolese army, the trained soldiers are sent back to a dysfunctional organization without decent pay and working conditions. Training will not solve the structural problems of the Congolese army.” 

FARDC has also been plagued by ethnic divisions, with some troops still loyal to militia groups. 

“The so-called Congolese army is a patchwork of fighters with various backgrounds - former Mobutu military personnel, militiamen from the MLC [Mouvement de liberation du Congo] of Jean-Pierre Bemba, Mai Mai, AFDL [Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo] fighters, etc. And there was not a process to unite these groups, and some of them managed to stay in their territories of origin - CNDP [Congrès national pour la défense du people]/M23 in North Kivu,” noted Vircoulon. 

“Therefore, ethnic and past affiliations remain and are stronger than the military discipline and command. The Congolese army is not an institution; it is a patchwork of undisciplined and untrained groups of fighters.” 

What about demobilization? 

The process of integrating ex-combatants into the Congolese army, part of the government’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, is also mired in challenges. 

“Currently, the national military is in a shambles, and there are various armed groups that are in various stages of DDR. This situation is aggravated by domestic and regional political manipulation,” ISS’s Kok told IRIN.  

Another challenge is the failure to address the causes of armed rebellion, making disarmament often short-lived.  In 2009, for example, the DRC government signed a deal with members of the CNDP, but failure to fully implement the deal led to the 2012 mutiny that gave rise to M23. 

“[When] the M23 were integrated into the FARDC in 2009… their command and control structures [were] more or less intact. Thus, when the time came for them to defect and form a new rebellion, they were ready to do so,” explained Kok.   

The absence of a vetting process for ex-combatants is also a problem. 

“A strategy of integrating abusive warlords and their fighters into the Congolese army - in often short-lived deals with little or no vetting or training before former combatants are redeployed as Congolese army soldiers - have fuelled the cycles of violence and horrific human rights abuses in eastern Congo,” Ida Sawyer, a researcher and advocate with Human Rights Watch (HRW), told IRIN.  

Reforming the judiciary   

Inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms further enable impunity for abuses. 

Between 15 November and 2 December 2012, at least 58 cases of rape were reported during M23’s occupation of Goma, according to the May UN Joint Human Rights Office report. M23 also executed 11 civilians, recruited and used child soldiers, and engaged in forced labour and looting. 

Only a few DRC militia leaders have been arrested and convicted, among them Thomas Lubanga , who in, March 2012 was found guilty [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95073/DRC-Lubanga-verdict-a-first-step ] of conscripting child soldiers in the northeastern  Ituri  region by the International Criminal Court (ICC).  In March, former M23 commander Bosco Ntaganda surrendered to the ICC.   

Experts are calling for the establishment of specialized courts within DRC to try human rights crimes outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. 

“Together with Congolese civil society organizations, we have also called for the establishment of specialized mixed chambers or a specialized mixed court within the Congolese justice system, with the involvement of international prosecutors, judges and other personnel to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Congo since 1990,” said HRW’s Sawyer.  

“The need to hold to account those responsible for perpetuating grave crimes (government troops, rebels and militia) must not be short-changed for any short-term gains,” added  analyst Opiyo. 

According to ICG’s Vircoulon, “The blocking of justice reform is the reason why impunity is rife in the DRC.” 

What about negotiating local solutions? 

Peace talks  between M23 and the DRC government are ongoing in Kampala, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), an approach favoured by analysts sceptical of the military intervention force [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44523&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo ].   

“It all depends on the effectiveness of the UN intervention brigade, but from the point of the organization [ICGLR], we don’t believe the intervention brigade is the final solution to the conflict,” Stephen Mwachofi Singo, an ICGLR programme officer, told IRIN. 

“Already, through [the] ICGLR process, there is a political process ongoing in Kampala. Such a process should be supported to its logical conclusion,” added Singo. 

Tackling ethnic tensions is key to pacifying conflict areas. 

“DRC is a vast, multi-ethnic country, with some of the ethnic groups spanning the borders of neighbouring countries such as Angola and Rwanda. Unfortunately, past and the current DRC government[s] have used this multiplicity of ethnic groups against each other and for political connivance. This has brewed a sense of favour and disfavour,” said analyst Opiyo. 

“In order for the ethnic-based tensions to ease, there is need for not just a nationalistic army but a representative government. A centralized rather than devolved administration would provide a platform for a national, rather than an ethnic, outlook among the Congolese people.” 

According to Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, a political scientist at Makerere University, “Lasting peace in the DRC cannot come out of the deployment of aggressive foreign forces.” 

“The causes of violence in that country [DRC] are internal. The solution therefore lies in resolving the internal problems that fuel the fighting. Only [the] Congolese can solve their problems in a sustainable way. Foreigners will not do it for them.” 

so/aw/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98036/Briefing-Towards-internal-solutions-to-the-DRC-crisis</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>&quot;Sometimes you cannot apply the rules&quot; - Syrian rebels and IHL</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091143410929t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - In recent months, Syrian rebels have faced increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. For guidance on the laws of war, they turn to a combination of Islamic law, IHL and their own sense of righteousness or, as one expert put it, “revolutionary justice” - with mixed results.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Syrian rebels facing increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law turn for guidance on the laws of war to a combination of Islamic law, IHL - where they are aware of it - and their own sense of righteousness, according to analysts and IRIN interviews with fighters [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words ].

A report [ http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Syria_Public_Brief_Dec_2012.pdf ] late last year by the Center for Civilians in Conflict pointed to the opposition’s lack of coherent control and command structures as a roadblock to the rebels’ ability to mitigate civilian harm and enforce IHL and human rights principles throughout their ranks. As a result, with hundreds of different militias and battalions operating on the ground, each group seems to be following its own set of rules.

As Aron Lund, an expert on Syrian opposition groups, put it: “Some groups go by Shariah law, and some groups go by rule of the gun - revolutionary justice.”

Sources of guidance

Faris al Bayoush, a former colonel now commanding a unit of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in the northwestern governorate of Idlib, said he sees the regime’s blatant disregard for human rights as all the more reason to commit himself to international norms.

“The abuses were one of the main reasons the revolution started, so of course we should respect humanitarian laws.”

He told IRIN he was well-informed of the content of all relevant international agreements because the Syrian army used to hold training courses on IHL for its officers. “They don’t respect IHL, but they teach it,” he said. He tries to ensure all his men also follow the rules by briefing them before each operation. His unit’s behaviour is, however, not only regulated by IHL but also by Islamic law, or Shariah. He views the two as complementary sources.

“[Shariah] gives us more detailed instructions,” he said. “For example, the Prophet said that you are not allowed to kill an old man, harm a child or cut down a tree.”

In contrast, an increasing number of fighters within the FSA view Islamic teachings alone as providing adequate guidance, though in many cases, they do indeed overlap, especially in the treatment of women and children.

“As Muslims, we regard Shariah law as our essential source,” said Raed al Aliwi, an engineer turned FSA commander in Hama Governorate. “We don’t have to study international laws because respecting human rights comes naturally with our religion.”

He claimed that breaches are rare, but conceded that it is sometimes difficult to make all lower-level fighters respect the rules. Many of them lack even basic knowledge of international norms, codified in the four Geneva Conventions on the laws of war and their associated protocols, which add up to more than 500 articles.

“We can do anything to topple [Syrian President Bashar al-]Assad,” said Abu Bakr, an FSA fighter in the central city of Homs. He argued that there is no need for regulations because he sees the rebels’ own judgment as sufficient: In his view, since the rebels are battling a dictatorship, they necessarily have higher ethical standards.

“We can see what is true and false,” he said, “and we are on the right side.”

Al-Ansar Brigades, a jihadist group affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra (The Front for the Support of the people of Syria), which is considered a terrorist organization by the USA, relies on a religious scholar among its commanders who provides guidelines that all the members adhere to.

“I have no idea of what the Geneva Conventions or any other treaties say,” said Abu Mousab, one of the group’s commanders, “but I’m sure Islamic law is much better because it is the most just law in the world.”

Even among the FSA fighters who stressed their commitment to IHL, there is a growing frustration with the international community and its principles.

“We are living in the days of the fighters,” said an FSA-member who goes by the name Manhal Abu Bakr in Hama. “Sometimes you cannot apply the rules when no one else does. We lost faith in international laws and policies.”

Proclamation of principles

Rebel crimes have persisted despite codes signed by FSA leaders to address misconduct and lawlessness within the opposition ranks. For example, the FSA’s high command issued a “Proclamation of Principles” [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/FSA_Proclimation_of_Principles.pdf ] in July, committing to human rights, pluralism and democracy, and pledging to do their “utmost to uphold international humanitarian law and norms, including by treating prisoners humanely, even as the Assad regime engages in crimes against humanity”.

For observers like Michael Shaikh, director of country operations at the Center for Civilians in Conflict and author of the Center’s report examining how the Syrian opposition views the principles of IHL, this shows a certain desire to engage with these principles.

“The codes of conduct are initially often more for public perception than about actual battlefield behaviour, but there is a clear opening here.”  

Some groups are making an effort to establish disciplinary systems.

“Many rank and file said they were reprimanded when they blew something up or fired their weapons without necessity; that weapons were taken away when there were incidents of civilian harm,” said Shaikh, who conducted interviews with rebel fighters between June and October 2012. “There was an inherent perception that they had to distinguish themselves from the Assad regime.”

Some groups have been trying to encourage rebels to follow the laws of war. According to a Westerner working with makeshift hospitals near Aleppo, one activist group tried distributing pamphlets on the laws of war, supported by verses from the Koran and the Bible, and quotes from Martin Luther King as well as Mahatma Gandhi. But it was chased away by an extremist group.

The International Committee of the Red Cross recently began arranging workshops on IHL for armed opposition groups, and is in dialogue with them with the aim of visiting places of detention under their control. It also distributes pamphlets on IHL obligations to both armed opposition groups and Syrian government soldiers it meets while in the field.

The UK is also funding [ https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-to-parliament-on-syria ] a programme by two consultancy firms to train rebels using an Arabic curriculum about international humanitarian law. And the Syrian Support Group [ http://syriansupportgroup.org/about/ ], a US-based group with a license to fundraise for the FSA in the US, says it only finances military councils that have adopted the FSA’s Proclamation of Principles.

Protecting their reputation

Efforts to limit rebel abuses have also been hampered by the escalation of chaos and violence.

“The big problem in Syria is not so much extremism but lawlessness and a lack of joint leaderships and structures that can deal with these kinds of things,” said Lund, who has authored several reports on Islamist groups in Syria for the Swedish Institute for International Affairs.

As such, criminality is a bigger threat to minorities than even the most extreme Islamist groups, like the Syrian Islamic Front, which has gone out of its way to reach out to Christians (though most extremist groups take a harder line on those belonging to Assad’s Allawite sect, who are often considered apostates from Islam).

“They [extremist groups] want to protect their reputation,” Lund said. “They want to do this work for the larger purpose of defeating Assad. They realize atrocities would undermine that... Random killing is not even part of al-Qaeda’s doctrine.”

Civilian protection

All rebels interviewed claimed they protect local residents during their operations by not targeting areas inhabited by civilians, or by telling people to vacate the area before they strike.

“We’ve even aborted operations when we realized we might hurt civilians,” said Abu Mousab of the jihadist al-Ansar Brigades.

The Center for Civilians in Conflict refers to other strategies to protect civilians, such as sending out scouts before their advance, or launching ambushes at night when people are less likely to be outside.

Nevertheless, civilians have often borne the brunt of the conflict due to a lack of consideration by the rebels. For example, rebels frequently endanger the population by positioning military objectives inside residential areas. In September 2012, 10 civilians were killed when the regime forces shelled a rebel position right next to an apartment building, according to the Center.

To make matters worse, rebel groups have been increasingly employing guerrilla tactics such as suicide bombings, often resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In September, for example, a twin suicide bombing in Damascus reportedly carried out by Jabhat al-Nusra killed dozens of people.

Who is a civilian?

One of the main causes for concern is, according to experts, the absence of a clear definition of who is to be considered a civilian.

“Many rebels I spoke with see themselves as civilians who picked up arms - they don’t think the rules apply to them,” Shaikh said. At the same time, when looking at their opponents, “they had a very loosy-goosy understanding of civilians as someone without a gun,” but did not apply the term to Alawis or people they perceived to be members of the Shabiha militias supporting government forces.

Others do not think in terms of “civilian” and “combatant”, which in Shariah law are not the only determinants of whether someone is a legitimate target.

In a TV interview [ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yexixuNzuaY ] posted on the internet, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, traditionally considered a more moderate voice among Muslim scholars, said all collaborators working with the “unjust” Syrian government, whether civilian or combatant, should be killed, an opinion echoed by some of the fighters.

Businessmen who help fund pro-government militias “are considered like fighters” and are usually sentenced to death if found guilty of supporting the regime in one of the group’s judicial courts, said Hamza Abdulrahman, a member of the Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib.

He, like others, admitted his brigade interrogates prisoners, using beatings - “but we don’t torture like Assad does”. Afterwards, prisoners are transferred to one of the group’s courts. Anyone found guilty of murder, kidnapping or even theft might be executed, he said. Captured soldiers from the regime’s army are also routinely killed, unless they were caught when defecting.

In spite of their growing influence, extremist groups are acting with more restraint in Syria than they did in Iraq, Lund said, “probably because they learned that when they let things go out of hand, they lose popular support and because they know the minority issue is so explosive in Syria, so they have to tread carefully.”

He warned, however, that “with time, this will probably change.”

For the full interviews with rebel fighters, click here [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words ].

gk/ha/cb

 

How Syrian rebels view aid access

Under international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of aid, subject to their right of control. So where do Syria’s rebels stand on this? 

In spite of the differences between the various groups, all fighters interviewed said they would never attack an aid convoy, with even the most extreme groups saying they would be prepared to facilitate access for aid workers and protect them - on certain conditions.

“No one would mind aid workers, unless they are coming to spy on us,” said Manhal Abu Bakr. “We’d need to know exactly who they are. Otherwise it wouldn’t go well. There would be suspicion.”

“We have no objection to anyone coming to help, but only in coordination with us,” added Osama Hadba, a member of the FSA’s Liwaa al Fateh brigade in Aleppo.

According to one aid worker, some organizations have been careful not to brand their distributions with USAID logos, and the Washington Post [ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-14/world/38537333_1_aid-workers-syrians-obama-administration ] reported recently that the US “feeds Syrians, but secretly”.

In addition, many rebel groups are doing their own aid distributions. “It’s a big part of their propaganda,” Lund said. “They want to come off as concerned with civilian affairs and not just fighting.” Jabhat al-Nusra, for example, has put a lot of effort into organizing bread distributions and restarting bus traffic.

Hadba, like other fighters IRIN spoke to, insisted that all civilians are equally deserving of aid, regardless of religion or political affiliation.

“If we distribute food supplies, we go from house to house and check who is in need,” said Raed al Aliwi, the FSA commander in Hama. “We don’t ask about people’s religion or political opinion.”

However, fighters conceded they mainly hand out supplies in areas where residents support their side because they do not have access to areas dominated by regime supporters.

“The real test,” one international aid worker said, will come when aid workers try to access neighbourhoods that support the government but are encircled by opposition groups. “So far, it has generally been the other way around and they've had no reason to make life difficult for us.”

Some rebel groups have, however, stopped aid trucks at gunpoint, looted their belongings, and re-distributed them to their constituents whom they believe to be in more need.

gk/ha/cb


For more on violations of IHL in Syria, see documentation by Amnesty International [ http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/summary_killings_by_armed_opposition_groups.pdf ], Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/17/syria-end-opposition-use-torture-executions#torture ], and the UN Commission of Inquiry for Syria [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf ], as well as the report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict [ http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Syria_Public_Brief_Dec_2012.pdf ].

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98021/quot-Sometimes-you-cannot-apply-the-rules-quot-Syrian-rebels-and-IHL</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091143410929t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - In recent months, Syrian rebels have faced increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. For guidance on the laws of war, they turn to a combination of Islamic law, IHL and their own sense of righteousness or, as one expert put it, “revolutionary justice” - with mixed results.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Syrian rebels on IHL: In their own words</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091208460593t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the UN Commission of Inquiry accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, including UN peacekeepers, and possibly using chemical weapons. So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International [ http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/summary_killings_by_armed_opposition_groups.pdf ] and Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/17/syria-end-opposition-use-torture-executions#torture ] to the UN Commission of Inquiry [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf ] accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, and possibly using chemical weapons [ http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uns-carla-del-ponte-says-there-is-evidence-rebels-may-have-used-sarin-in-syria-8604920.html ]. The capture and detention of 21 UN peacekeepers in March and another four last week also constituted a violation of IHL.

So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?

IRIN interviewed rebel fighters of various leanings and levels of authority to better understand their mindset.

(See our analysis on this issue here [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98021/Analysis-Sometimes-you-cannot-apply-the-rules-Syrian-rebels-and-IHL ]) 

Faris al Bayoush, former Colonel in the army, now commanding a unit of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Idlib Governorate:

“I’ve read all about IHL during the training courses that were organized for the officers in the Syrian army, so I know all the rules. The majority of Syrians are civilians, good people. We naturally wouldn’t want to do anything to hurt them. Of course we respect IHL because violating human rights is what the regime stands for. The FSA has been formed to protect people from their crimes... We’re also guided by Islamic law. There is no contradiction between both because their content is similar: Both sources tell us not to harm civilians, particularly not weaker elements, but the Koran gives us more precise instructions... Before each battle, I give a speech to everybody to make sure everybody has the same idea of what is permissible and what isn’t. Then we talk and discuss the issue…

“Any foreign aid worker would be treated like our guest because the civilians here are really in need of assistance… A civilian is someone who doesn’t carry a gun, no matter what sect he belongs to... Do we take precautions so that we don’t harm civilians? Frankly, I find that question weird. Everybody is in God’s hands. But of course we don’t usually launch attacks if there are civilians around…

“We try to take good care of our prisoners. We’ve taken 53 lately, and we let them go home because we had nothing to charge them with.”

Manhal Abu Bakr, FSA member, Hama Governorate:

“We’ve lost faith in international laws and policies. This is why Islamist groups are gaining ground. At first they were weak, but then people realized it doesn’t help them if they adhere to Western standards, so they grew stronger... Some say this is hypocrisy. The international community expects us to comply with IHL, but nobody cares if our rights are being violated. For example, if you catch a Syrian air force pilot who is responsible for killing hundreds of people, of course you’d kill him…

“Foreign aid workers would have to be careful. There are bad groups, thieves and criminals; they might steal their supplies or kidnap them. No one of us would mind them unless they’re coming to spy on us. We’d need to know exactly who they are before we let them near us. Otherwise there would be suspicion. We cannot afford to make mistakes because the [one mistake could be our undoing].

“We try to distribute all aid supplies coming in from Turkey evenly. Usually we give it to people who support the revolution. We wouldn’t give anything to people who support the government because as rebels, we cannot enter their neighbourhoods. But we don’t differentiate between different sects. When you see all the need, you forget about religion... We always try to take measures not to harm civilians during out operations. This is the first thing we look into when planning an attack. We alert them and tell them to vacate the area. If they feel we don’t protect them, we’d lose their support.”

Raed al Aliwi, engineer, FSA commander, Hama Governorate:

“International humanitarian law is our be-all and end-all. It’s natural for us to comply with these standards because the FSA’s main purpose is to defend the people. This is why the FSA only launches attacks on very specific places where there are armed regime supporters. In many cases, we had to stop operations because there were civilians in the vicinity... It’s easy to differentiate between Shabiha [militias who support the government] and civilians because Shabiha always carry weapons, at least a small pistol; and they only show up in places where regime troops are close by. We also know them by their dialect… Alawis in general are not a problem for us. We’re not opposed to any sect as such…

“We wouldn’t object to any aid team coming to our area, no matter where they’re from, even if they’re Israeli…

“As Muslims, we regard Sharia law as our essential source from which we derive our rules. The problem is that there are groups who draw false conclusions from it, and then they turn extremist and do terrible things...

I’m commanding 60 men, and sometimes it’s difficult to make everybody follow the rules. If anyone violates our standards, he’d be punished. The important thing is that the leader behaves well because he is the role model that all the other men follow in their actions.”

Osama Hadba, member of the FSA’s religiously conservative Liwaa al Fateh brigade in Aleppo Governorate:

“We rely on the Koran as the key source of our rules, but we also take all international agreements into account. We know about IHL because everyone can see the violations committed by the regime with their own eyes... We are humans that have been forced to take up weapons. Of course we don’t violate any human rights, unlike the criminal regime we are opposing…


“In our office, we register all human rights breaches that occur. When we arrest somebody who is charged with any of those crimes, he’ll be transferred to one of the military courts that have been established to deal with such cases. A lot of lawyers and judges have defected and started working for the revolutionary courts.

“We stop only aid convoys that supply the regime army, not the ones heading towards civilian areas… We have no objection to any foreign aid workers coming to help, but only in coordination with us. I’d be happy to accompany them…

“We protect the civilian population as much as possible. Before launching an attack, we declare the area in question as a military zone, and civilians are requested to stay away.  It’s difficult to prevent harm from the population in neighbourhoods [that support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad] because the regime troops put their tanks inside the residential areas and use the civilians as shields.”

Abu Mousab, a commander of the al-Ansar Brigades (a jihadist group affiliated with US-designated terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nusra), Deir-ez-Zor Governorate:

“One of our commanders is a religious scholar, and he is responsible for setting our rules and principles. We’re fighting for religious reasons, so following the Koran and the Sunnah [teachings of the Prophet] is paramount for us. We’re not interested in IHL because Islamic law is much fairer than any secular law…

“I have no clue what the Geneva Conventions or any other international laws say because I’m a believer, and I’m sure that the Shariah is the best law in the world. All other laws are no solution…

“We announce our attacks beforehand if it’s possible. We’ve even aborted operations when we realized we might hurt civilians… We also consider regime supporters as civilians as long as they don’t carry weapons - except informers since they are causing huge damage. If we have proof that someone is an informer, we execute them. Sometimes people are stubborn, so sometimes you have to torture them to get the information you need. If we have a prisoner who has killed people, we’ll kill him...

“Everyone responsible for crimes committed against the Syrian people deserves to be killed…

“But we’re not killing randomly, even if people aren’t Sunni. If we arrest someone, it’s forbidden to kill him unless he has committed crimes. If he has, however, he deserves to be executed…

“Any aid group wanting to help people would be welcome here. We’d be prepared to give them protection. If we have supplies to hand out, we give it out to everyone equally, also to Christian families.”

Hamza Abdulrahman, member of Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham, Idlib Governorate:

“We don’t care about IHL because the Shariah is our law. For instance, if we arrest a prisoner, we’d take him to a court. We have our own Shariah courts in every area now. We don’t execute anyone unless they are killers, or guilty of theft or kidnapping. Anyone who helps the regime in any way will also be killed, for instance businessmen who support the regime financially. They are considered as fighters, not civilians. We also execute regime soldiers if we catch them, except if they were about to defect…

“Before they are taken to court, we interrogate them, and if they don’t say what they know, we beat or punish them - but we don’t torture like Assad does. According to Shariah law, it’s forbidden to hurt anyone’s head or face. There are laws, and we follow them. We also have our own charities which distribute aid supplies. The only criterion is people’s need; their political opinion or sect is irrelevant…

“If we plant a bomb, we don’t detonate it if there are civilians around. We only launch missiles on areas held by regime forces so that civilians don’t get hurt… We wouldn’t obstruct any foreign aid team, as long as they are unarmed. Other Islamist groups might have a different view on that, for example Jabhat al Nusra. They haven’t commented on this issue, so I’m not sure. But they think like al-Qaeda. They don’t think a European or American could contribute anything good to our revolution.”

gk/ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091208460593t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the UN Commission of Inquiry accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, including UN peacekeepers, and possibly using chemical weapons. So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Somali security sector reform</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305131455010122t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - At Gashandiga barracks in Mogadishu, Somalia, Pvt Mohamed Sheikh Issak pulled back his military fatigues to show his scarred right shoulder. “I was shot by Al-Shabab when they still controlled half of Mogadishu,” he told IRIN. “I was at home, but they knew I was a soldier.”</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - At Gashandiga barracks in Mogadishu, Somalia, Pvt Mohamed Sheikh Issak pulled back his military fatigues to show his scarred right shoulder. “I was shot by Al-Shabab when they still controlled half of Mogadishu,” he told IRIN. “I was at home, but they knew I was a soldier.” 

Issak joined the army over two years ago; he proudly recalled his role in the battles for Afgoye and Jowhar. With him were new recruits - young, inexperienced and ill-equipped, but determined to fight Al-Shabab; the militant group was ousted from the capital in 2011, but still controls large swaths of the country. 

“I want to defend my country,” 20-year-old Efrah Ibrahim told IRIN. She joined the army as a frontline paramedic after hearing a recruitment appeal on the radio. “Mogadishu was like another country before. It was very dangerous.” 

At the Somalia Conference held in London last week, British Prime Minister David Cameron pledged over US$50 million to help rebuild Somalia’s armed forces, police and judiciary. Other nations also committed funding, including nearly $60 million from the European Union. The hope is that young recruits like Issak and Ibrahim will soon take the lead in maintaining peace in Mogadishu, and one day throughout all of Somalia. 

Ambitious plans 

Many recent security gains in south-central Somalia have been the result of gruelling efforts by a 17,700-strong African Union force (AMISOM) supported by their Somali counterparts. More recently, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces have pushed back Al-Shabab in southern and western Somalia, respectively. 

But Somalia’s government has stressed that it wants to take control of the country’s security. An ambitious National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), adopted last August, outlines plans to rebuild Somalia’s armed forces and national security programme, reform the police and judiciary, and roll out a modern coastguard. Leaders hope to build a professional army of 28,000 within three years, at a cost of some $160 million, while also doubling police numbers to 12,000. 

“It is very important to rebuild the Somali forces and defeat the terrorist organizations and pirates that are threatening the security in our country,” Brig-Gen Mohamed Abdi Mammow, Somali National Army liaison officer, told IRIN. 

After two decades of war and the near-complete collapse of state institutions, Somalia faces profound challenges reforming its security sector. Issues include an underdeveloped national command and control system, competing clan-based loyalties, limited equipment and resources, and discipline concerns. 

Additionally, the Somali security forces, alongside their AMISOM counterparts, are fighting a violent insurgency. Recent attacks on the capital - including a suicide car bomb that left 11 dead just two days before the London conference - have underscored the significant demands on the security sector. 

“There is a real tension trying to train these forces when they are at war,” said Col Anthony Howie, senior military advisor to the UN Political Office for Somalia. “No one has the luxury of pulling them out; they are essential in the fight against Al-Shabab.” 

Analysts also point out that the security forces’ success depends on the government’s reach. “The security forces can only operate effectively where the government has earned local legitimacy,” said Matt Bryden, director of Horn of Africa think tank Sahan Research. 

From militias to military 

Somalia’s armed forces comprise some 20,000 soldiers, defined as those fighting Al-Shabab, including militias not formally integrated into the military. But only around 13,000 soldiers receive regular financial payments, most of which are paid by the international community. Pay is critical - soldiers who get paid receive a $100 monthly stipend - and resentment over salaries threatens loyalties to a national command structure. 

“Outside Mogadishu, in the near-term, the government has little choice but to negotiate command and control arrangements with local forces, providing them with logistical support, financial support and legitimacy in exchange for a degree of loyalty. Paying salaries will ultimately be much more important in building a professional force than obtaining new weapons and equipment,” said Bryden. 

Al-Shabab deserters and defectors are also being integrated [ http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/giving-extremists-a-second-chance/ ] into the security forces, but the process is not straightforward. The threat of infiltration by Al-Shabab underscores the need for improved counter-intelligence by the Somali government. Meanwhile, some pro-government militias are resisting joining the national command, and concerns remain about the loyalties of fighters in clan-based units. 

“Loyalty challenges are surmountable with better training - not only physical, but rigorous training on nationalism, human rights and rule of law,” said Abdi Aynte, director of Somalia’s first think tank, the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. 

The Somali military now follows an annual training programme. The Uganda-based EU Training Mission has trained over 3,000 soldiers, with much of the training expected to move to Somali soil this year. AMISOM has also supplied a training team, while Turkey is expected to play a significant role in both military and police training. 

But training alone is not enough. “They are also woefully underequipped and under-resourced to fight a violent insurgency,” said Col Howie. 

This was evident at the Gashandiga barracks. Despite enthusiastic weapons drills by the young soldiers, Col Kassim Ahmed Roble revealed the base has just 100 AK-47s for 600 soldiers. 

“The army needs some more time,” he told IRIN. “We need more weapons as well as financial support from the international community.” 

The UN Security Council relaxed a two-decade arms embargo against the country in March, permitting the Somali government to buy light weapons for its forces. But Defence Minister Abdihakim Fiqi said last week in London that not “a single bullet” or gun had been received since the lifting of the embargo due to a “lack of resources”. 

From the streets to the courts 

Somali’s police force was also incapacitated by the conflict. Funding pledges in London included money earmarked to help double police numbers and to rebuild Mogadishu’s central prison. But the police face challenges similar to those confronting the military: recruits cite low pay and significant risk to themselves and their families. 

“We cannot increase police numbers without knowing exactly what budget we have to pay them,” Gen Mohamed Hassan Ismael, Somali Police Force liaison officer, told IRIN. “We also need professional judges. As police, we are in the hands of the judiciary. There are high levels of corruption in the judiciary - sometimes criminals pay their way out. There needs to be scrutiny from top to bottom.” 

The majority of Somaila’s 6,000 police officers are based in Mogadishu. Some served pre-1991 and were vetted before being allowed to rejoin the force; around 3,500 have been recruited since 2005. Their stipends are paid by the international community, on the condition that officers have completed basic training. 

“After 20 years of war, people don't always understand policing,” Cpl Ahmadu Sule Singer, a Nigerian police trainer with AMISOM, told IRIN. “Some people here have grown up using a weapon, but I teach them basic police work with civilians. I find it so difficult to control them at the beginning of the course.” 

On a joint night patrol, Somali police officers man a checkpoint in Hodan District, searching cars as their Nigerian counterparts secure the area. “I correct them if they do something that isn’t good - I tell them to talk gently rather than cock their rifle,” added Singer. 

Local residents selling khat and cigarettes at a busy junction are relaxed about the police’s presence. “I don’t mind the police. They are doing a good job,” taxi driver Abdirahman Aden Hussein said as his car was being searched. “Before, you couldn’t stand out here at night.” 

Discipline and human rights 

Punishing security forces who commit offences is also a major concern. 

“The Somali security forces and their allied militias have committed serious abuses. I have spoken to displaced women raped by the security forces and individuals fleeing fighting who have had all their possessions looted along the way by government militia,” Laetitia Bader, a Human Rights Watch researcher, told IRIN. 

Earlier this year, a woman who alleged she had been raped by security forces and a journalist who interviewed her were arrested and charged with insulting national institutions, prompting international outrage. Although the verdicts were eventually overturned, the Somali government faced difficult questions about its commitment to cracking down on rape committed by security forces. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has since acknowledged that some security forces have committed rape and said that they must be “defeated just like Shabab”. 

The president also stressed that crimes by members of the army would not be tolerated. Mobile military courts, which follow troops to the frontline, are used to try suspected offenders. According to Col Howie, these are some of the most active courts in Somalia: “They have wide-ranging powers to administer discipline, and they take that very seriously.” 

While the military and police are trained in human rights and civilian protection, Human Rights Watch stresses that proper vetting is also critical. “There has to be a concerted effort to sideline abusers - both from within existing forces and during any integration process of militias,” said Bader. 

Somalia’s security forces have a long road to travel before they can take charge of the country’s security, but with the commitment to change and the significant funding pledged, they may be marching in the right direction.  

zf/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98028/Analysis-Somali-security-sector-reform</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305131455010122t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - At Gashandiga barracks in Mogadishu, Somalia, Pvt Mohamed Sheikh Issak pulled back his military fatigues to show his scarred right shoulder. “I was shot by Al-Shabab when they still controlled half of Mogadishu,” he told IRIN. “I was at home, but they knew I was a soldier.”</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Understanding the causes of violent extremism in West Africa</title><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281140270935t.jpg" />]]>DAKAR 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Academics and government, military and civil society representatives gathered for a conference in the Senegalese capital this week to assess the interplay between development and violent extremism in West Africa, with some participants suggesting that underdevelopment, marginalization and weak governance create a breeding ground for militancy.</description><body><![CDATA[DAKAR 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Academics and government, military and civil society representatives gathered for a conference in the Senegalese capital this week to assess the interplay between development and violent extremism in West Africa, with some participants suggesting that underdevelopment, marginalization and weak governance create a breeding ground for militancy. 

While local factors in West African and Sahel countries have contributed to extremist violence, the rise of global jihad in the wake of the US-led "war on terror" since 9/11 has also played a part in spreading radical militancy in the region. 

"In the Sahel, there is a combination of bad governance, poverty, insecurity as well as several internal and external factors [that contribute to extremist violence]," said Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, head of the Centre for Security Strategy in the Sahel and the Sahara, at the opening of the 6-10 May Dakar conference. 

"The Sahel has provided an ideal ground for extremist violence to take root and spread beyond national borders," he said. 

The region has a history of instability. Since the first post-independence coup in West Africa that toppled Togo's founding president in 1963, it has seen a string of coups, some of which have sparked civil wars. 

West Africa is also one of the world's most impoverished regions despite its natural resources. Seven West African countries occupy the bottom 10 places in the UN Human Development Index [ http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ ].

Poor political and resource governance have often led to explosions of violence by disgruntled segments of society, and a number of studies [ http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/west_africa.pdf ] have linked bad governance to insecurity in West Africa. 

For example, Mali's Tuareg have been fighting perceived marginalization by the central government and demanded an autonomous homeland in the country's north. Following the March 2012 coup in the capital Bamako, the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad seized towns from government troops in the north, but was soon driven out by militant Islamist groups. 

Nigeria's increasingly violent Boko Haram militia, which wants an Islamic state, should be seen as a reaction the government's entrenched corruption, abusive security forces, strife between the disaffected Muslim north and Christian south, and widening regional economic disparity, according to the Council on Foreign Relations [ http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739 ].

Some observers stress the local aspect. Militant Islam in Africa, while linked to broader ideological currents, is mainly driven by the local context, with Islamist groups emerging, evolving and reacting to immediate local concerns, University of Florida's Terje Ostebo, argued in a November 2012 paper [ http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AfricaBriefFinal_23.pdf ] published by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS). 

"The Malian government's failure to consistently invest [in] and maintain a strong state presence in the north. created an enabling environment for the expansion of Islamic militancy and the escalation of violence in this region," said Ostebo, an assistant professor at the university's Centre for African Studies (ACSS) and the Department of Religion. 

Marginalization 

"Poverty and underdevelopment and a sense of marginalization and exclusion that comes from lack of governance, particularly at the local level, are seen as drivers associated with violent extremism," Benjamin Nickels, an assistant professor with the ACSS, told IRIN. 

"Supporting development is a long-term approach to undermining drivers associated with violent extremism," he added. 

"You do have a number of underlying factors that make certain regions particularly vulnerable to violent extremism and extremist ideologies, and then you have a number of factors that trigger violence. Amongst these factors there is an underlying economic dimension that often gets missed," said Raymond Gilpin, the ACSS academic dean. 

Poverty, unemployment and socioeconomic deprivation partly explain the rise of Islamist movements - violent and non-violent - argued Ostebo.

"There are other factors of extremist violence. However, it is easier for militant groups to recruit unemployed youth who see no future for themselves, than those who are in employment. The more young people are able to be employed the less chances there are that they can be recruited by militant groups," said Gilles Yabi of the International Crisis Group.

"Development is part of the measures against extremist violence. But we are already in a situation [in West Africa] where underdevelopment is so deep that reversing it is very difficult," he told IRIN. 

Ould-Abdallah cited other factors such as West Africa's wide geographical area, weak public institutions and people's and governments' loyalty to tribe and clan rather than the nation state as also contributing to crime and extremist violence in the region. 

In a bid to end insurgencies, Nigeria and Mali have attempted negotiated settlements, but they have also resorted to the use of force, which is limited in resolving the fundamental causes of rebellion. Repression by governments or external forces can cause Islamist militants to fight for their very existence and at the same time deepen perceptions of state illegitimacy, Ostebo warned. 

Spillover 

The French-led intervention in Mali has dislodged the Islamist rebels from their strongholds, but triggered fears that the fleeing militants could destabilize [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97494/The-regional-threat-posed-by-Mali-s-militants ] countries in the region from where they hail, target foreign nationals in neighbouring countries and even win the sympathy of other extremist militia. 

The January attack on an Algerian gas plant is believed to have been in retaliation for the French military drive in Mali. Nigerian troops heading for Mali as part of an African intervention force came under attack by Boko Haram-linked militants in January. 

On 7 May, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb posted a video message calling for attacks on all French interests across the world for its intervention in Mali. 

Nigeria has teamed up with its neighbours to form a multi-national force to counter Boko Haram. 

"The priority for Sahel right now is to help resolve the Mali crisis. After Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, West Africa does not need another protracted crisis," said Ould-Abdallah. 

ob/cb 

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98012/Understanding-the-causes-of-violent-extremism-in-West-Africa</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201303281140270935t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DAKAR 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Academics and government, military and civil society representatives gathered for a conference in the Senegalese capital this week to assess the interplay between development and violent extremism in West Africa, with some participants suggesting that underdevelopment, marginalization and weak governance create a breeding ground for militancy.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: The UN’s integrated mission in Somalia</title><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208151439550143t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Following the unanimous adoption of a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution setting up an integrated mission in Somalia, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) will be set up for an initial one-year period beginning on 3 June; it will be based in the capital Mogadishu.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Following the unanimous adoption of a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution setting up an integrated mission in Somalia [ http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10944.doc.htm ], the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) will be set up for an initial one-year period beginning on 3 June; it will be based in the capital Mogadishu. 

The UN defines an integrated mission as one in which there is a shared vision among all the UN actors at country level.

“This strategic objective is the result of a deliberate effort by all elements of the UN system to achieve a shared understanding of the mandates and functions of the various elements of the UN presence at country level and to use this understanding to maximize UN effectiveness, efficiency, and impact in all aspects of its work,” say the Integrated Mission Planning Guidelines [ http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/Multidimensional%20and%20Integrated/06_DPKO_IMPP_final_.pdf ] endorsed in 2006 by the Secretary-General.

According to the resolution, the mission is intended to help Somalia build on the political gains made over the past year; assist the country to develop a federal system of government; review its constitution and hold a constitutional referendum; and facilitate preparations for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2016.

In addition, UNSOM will “promote respect for human rights and women's empowerment, promote child protection, prevent conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice institutions.” 

UN agencies working in Somalia are expected to move there. Many are currently based in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. 

In this briefing, IRIN looks at what an integrated approach means for Somalia.

What is the political, humanitarian situation in Somalia?

Somalia has recently made progress towards stability. In 2012, the country set up a functioning federal government under the leadership of President Sheikh Hassan Mohamud, the first such administration since 1990.

However, there continue to be huge political and humanitarian challenges. Insurgents, who still control parts of the country, continue to launch deadly attacks regularly, while more than one million Somalis are displaced due to conflict and drought. One million more have crossed into neighbouring countries, mainly Kenya and Ethiopia.

A 2013 report [ http://www.fsnau.org/in-focus/technical-release-study-suggests-258000-somalis-died-due-severe-food-insecurity-and-famine ] published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) revealed that over 250,000 Somalis, many of them children under five, died as a result of famine between October 2010 and April 2012. They were unable to receive any humanitarian assistance, in part, due to insecurity.

What is UNSOM’s role?

On 6 March 2013 the Security Council had, while partially lifting a 20-year-old arms embargo [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97703/Briefing-The-risks-and-rewards-of-easing-Somalia-s-arms-embargo ] on Somalia and extending the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), for another year, agreed with the UN Secretary-General that the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) had “fulfilled its obligation” and needed to be replaced by an integrated mission to give the Somali administration “a single door to knock on”.

The new mission, to be headed by a special representative of the Secretary-General would include, “the provision of policy advice to the Federal Government and AMISOM on peace-building and state-building in the areas of governance, security sector reform and rule of law (including the disengagement of combatants); development of a federal system (including preparations for elections in 2016); and coordination of international donor support.”

All the UN country teams, both political and humanitarian in Somalia, would be expected, with immediate effect, to coordinate all their activities with the head of the newly established mission. 

The office of the UN humanitarian coordinator for Somalia is expected to fall under the office of the special representative from the beginning January 2014.

What now for UNPOS and AMISOM?

With the creation of an integrated mission, UNPOS ceases to exist. Established in 1995 and headed by a special representative of the Secretary-General, UNPOS’s role was mainly political, facilitating political dialogue and peace-building activities. In his letter [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/239 ] to the UNSC seeking the establishment of an integrated mission in Somalia, the Secretary-General said UNPOS had fulfilled its mandate and should “be dissolved and replaced by a new expanded special political mission as soon as possible”.

The Somalia Federal Government is largely propped up by the 18,000-strong AMISOM force.

A technical assistance mission to Somalia by the Secretary-General recommended in its report [ http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_239.pdf ] “use of local UN-contracted and trained security guards, the impending deployment of an AMISOM guard force in Mogadishu, and reliance on Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). If these are deemed insufficient, UN Guard Units or international private security companies could be utilized.”

AMISOM has always been involved in limited humanitarian assistance [ http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/humanitarian-work/ ] but it is not clear if this will continue with UNSOM.

The UNSC in its resolution, urges the newly appointed special representative to align closely with other stakeholders in Somalia, including UN country teams, the federal government, AMISOM, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the European Union and “other regional, bilateral and multilateral partners”.

Experts, say the success of UNSOM will depend on whether it aligns its operations with the different actors in Somalia, some of whom may have qualms about sharing their areas of expertise and/or influence.

“The number of pivotal actors dealing with Somalia has increased as of late, not least as new donors have come in and stepped up their support. Hence, if the international community is serious about UNSOM and would like to see it fulfil its mandate, actors need to be aligned behind UNSOM,” Dominik Balthasar, an expert on Somalia at Chatham House, told IRIN. “Yet, this might possibly be a hard bullet to bite for other actors such as AMISOM or IGAD, as the participation of UNSOM is likely to restrict the roles they have played thus far.”

Abdi Aynte, executive director of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) [ http://heritageinstitute.org ], a Mogadishu-based think tank, said: “With respect to its relations with AMISOM, the hope is that they become mutually reinforcing [and] not mutually exclusive [since] AMISOM is widely viewed positively.”

What are the merits of UNSOM? 

UNSOM will merge the UN’s humanitarian and political operations in Somalia, providing an opportunity to harness the operational capacities of the many agencies into a single mission. 

“It looks like an ambitious plan and is probably the most significant engagement in Somalia by the UN in decades,” Cedric Barnes, director, Horn of Africa programmes at the International Crisis Group, told IRIN.

HIPS’s Aynte said the integrated mission will provide a single international community narrative on Somalia, something he says the Somalis have wanted for a long time.

A unification of the development and humanitarian pillars in Somalia, others have argued, would help marshal the much-needed international funding to remedy the situation in Somalia while also “creating coherence and unifying strategies”.

Elmi Ahmed Duale, Somalia’s ambassador to the UN, described the resolution as important and said it had ensured “there was only “one door” to knock on, “as opposed to fragmented approaches in coordinating assistance”. 

According to ICG’s Barnes, this will be dependent on how much the government is willing to cede in the new engagement.

“It would be interesting to see how this will play out with a government that might want to assert authority while at the same time fronting the issue of sovereignty,” Barnes added.

The fact that Al Shabab is listed as a terrorist group has made it difficult for many humanitarian agencies to have an engagement with it, at least for the purposes of offering humanitarian assistance in areas still under the group’s control.

Why the dissenting voices against UNSOM?

Humanitarians have voiced their concerns against merging humanitarian operations with political and military activities, arguing it would make their work in Somalia difficult as it runs the risk of delegitimizing humanitarian actors.

“As many Somalis continue to struggle to obtain the basic necessities for survival, such as food, health care, and protection from violence, humanitarian assistance must remain a priority and it must remain completely independent of any political agenda,” Jerome Oberreit, secretary-general of Médecins Sans Frontières, said in a statement [ http://www.msf.org.uk/article/somalia-humanitarian-aid-must-not-be-co-opted ].

“The humanitarian aid system must not be co-opted as an implementing partner of counter-insurgency or stabilization efforts in Somalia,” he added. 

In March, InterAction, The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), said in a joint statement [ http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/131669840?access_key=key-axjqq1wp5tlwu7r4viw ] that the decision risked jeopardizing the delivery of impartial humanitarian assistance in the country: “By requiring UN humanitarian coordination to fall under the political mandate of the new UN peace-building mission in Somalia, the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action will be compromised.” 

Russel Geekie, public information officer at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Somalia office, said: “The integration should not hamper the delivery of aid. In its most recent resolution on Somalia (SC resolution 2102, which follows up on 2093), the Security Council reiterated that impartial, neutral and independent humanitarian assistance must be ensured, wherever those in need are.” 

According Chatham House’s Balthasar, integrating humanitarian operations into the broader politico-military stabilization plans “runs the risk of constraining humanitarian space, but that this does not necessarily need to be the case. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that humanitarian aid has always been political and that it has frequently been instrumentalized by a wide variety of actors - not least by those who oppose the government.” With an eye towards the dynamics surrounding humanitarian space in Somalia, he added that ever since Al Shabab had been put on the back foot, humanitarian actors who had become accustomed to negotiating with the insurgents to deliver humanitarian aid lacked clarity over who was in control and how to safely deliver aid. 

“Basically, the political situation on the ground appears to have become more, rather than less, complicated. In this situation, devising an integrated mission might not be the worst of all options for the sake of prioritizing stability and the establishment of functioning structures of governance,” he added. 

ko/kr/oa/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98015/Briefing-The-UN-s-integrated-mission-in-Somalia</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208151439550143t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Following the unanimous adoption of a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution setting up an integrated mission in Somalia, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) will be set up for an initial one-year period beginning on 3 June; it will be based in the capital Mogadishu.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Getting governments to cough up for DRR</title><pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301091116460112t.jpg" />]]>AQABA 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - Investing in preparation for potential disasters is a “no brainer”, Elizabeth Longworth, director of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), told a recent disaster risk reduction (DRR) conference in Aqaba, Jordan.</description><body><![CDATA[AQABA 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - Investing in preparation for potential disasters is a “no brainer”, Elizabeth Longworth, director of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), told a recent disaster risk reduction (DRR) conference in Aqaba, Jordan.

And yet a report [ https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/WEB%20Humanitarianism%20in%20the%20Network%20Age%20vF%20single.pdf ] published last month by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said DRR funding accounts for only 3 percent of humanitarian aid and just 1 percent of all other development assistance.

Last year (seen as a relatively quiet year by natural disaster experts), the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) [ http://cred01.epid.ucl.ac.be/f/CredCrunch31.pdf ] recorded 310 natural disasters, leading to 9,930 deaths affecting 106 million people.

In total in the last three years, disasters have caused more than US$300 billion of recorded damage [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97655/Tallying-natural-disaster-related-losses ].

So, if the scale of the damage is not in dispute, why is DRR not better resourced? Has the funding argument not yet been won?

Improving funding

“Funding is a challenge,” said Jordan Ryan, director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery at the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

“DRR doesn’t always get sufficient funding. Sometimes the donors don’t put a priority on disaster risk. They don’t always come through. So, I think we need even more attention.”

But natural disaster experts are emphatic that DRR funding is fundamentally a good investment. Estimates vary about how much can be saved, but the most conservative figures say that every $1 spent on DRR is worth $4 later on.

One example of the difference preparation can make is in what is now Bangladesh where in 1970 the Bhola cyclone killed up to 500,000 people. Nearly four decades later when another destructive storm hit (Cyclone Aila, 2009), early warning systems, hundreds of cyclone shelters, and disaster volunteer networks helped keep the country’s death toll below 200.

When natural hazards meet unprepared communities, populations are left extremely vulnerable, as seen when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008, a country without early warning systems or storm shelters.

Perceptions of the importance of disaster preparedness vary from country to country.

“In Japan people understand this is money well spent,” Kimio Takeya, visiting senior adviser for the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), told IRIN, saying the country had been buffeted by earthquakes, typhoons and floods in the last 50 years: “Everything hit Japan.”

This follows a clear pattern. Governments find it difficult to appreciate risk and the need for risk reduction, until disaster strikes.

Changing perceptions

“I suppose that if we had won the argument [about DRR funding], we wouldn’t be making the case for increased donor commitment anymore as much as we do, so I guess the simple answer is no, we haven’t won it yet. But I do also believe that it is changing,” said Jo Scheuer, team leader for DRR and recovery at UNDP.

“The recent events, including in Japan and US, have shown clearly that they disasters affect everybody. It is an increasing risk that we are facing, particularly in terms of climate change, and if you look at the global discussions around also humanitarian aid and the resilience debate, there is a clear movement - I would say a political will - to move away from just responding to humanitarian crises or disasters, to actually building resilience.”

For donors, agencies like UNDP make the argument that DRR spending can be a means of reducing the long-term emergency humanitarian aid needed annually to deal with each new natural disaster.

“Donors are now increasingly putting money into preparedness and resilience, so that there aren’t only these millions of dollars that are for response, but that you can actually prepare countries beforehand for building their resilience, particularly in urban cities, where there’s growing infrastructure and the risk of massive potential economic damage,” Aditi Banerjee, disaster risk management specialist in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region at the World Bank, told IRIN.

But beyond donors, experts say there needs to be a change of attitude in governments, which find it difficult to reallocate funds from areas like health and education to DRR.

“Of course it is very difficult to convince the political leaders or the people to spend money before the disaster. This needs something like far-sightedness,” said Takeya.

He has been looking at the impact of DRR spending on GDP growth. “We are modelling and trying to calculate and analyse for each country. There’s a definite positive pattern - we can show the evidence that… your GDP growth will go down without DRR investment,” he said.

Convincing governments that they are not yet spending what they should on DRR is crucial, said Longworth.

“The sustainability of DRR is when budget-holders, whether they be governments, local governments, or other entities actually start re-orientating their budget allocations to DRR, and that’s why we’re putting so much attention on the economic case. It is absolutely well established now that the scale of economic losses from disasters justifies significantly more investment in reducing risks.”

More data, a growing awareness of the link between the scale of a disaster and preparedness, and international initiatives like the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), agreed in January 2005 just after the Indian Ocean tsunami, have helped change perceptions about DRR.

For Banerjee at the World Bank, even in the MENA region, which has been less affected by natural disasters than others, thinking is clearly changing.

“To me this shift has been the most intense in MENA, because MENA is not typically a region that is like Asia or Latin America that is hit by a disaster every few months. It’s hit by big disasters but over time, which is why sometimes the institutional memory is forgotten. But in the five years that I’ve been here there’s been so much more dialogue on this.”

Using climate funds

One potential source of funding for DRR projects that garnered a lot of interest from delegates at March’s first DRR conference in the Arab world [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97941/Arab-cities-aim-to-build-resilience-to-natural-disasters ] is climate change resource streams.

“This is already happening. If you look at some of the projects, programmes, entities that have been funded from the various existing financial instruments related to climate change adaptation, many of those activities are actually classic DRR activities - from early warning systems to agricultural livelihood measures and so on,” said Scheuer.

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is in charge of three climate funds: the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Special Climate Change Fund, set up under the Kyoto Protocol to offset the negative effects of climate change in the developed world.

The first two projects [ http://irinnews.org/Report/90571/CLIMATE-CHANGE-Adaptation-Fund-starts-delivering ] under the Adaptation Fund were to help handle rising sea levels in Senegal, and water management in Honduras.

Another recent US$7.6 million project in northern Pakistan funded by the Adaptation Fund is to help communities better prepare for sudden glacial lake flooding.

“If it’s rising sea levels, or depleted water table, when you address it, you are reducing the risk, you’re also anticipating what’s coming in terms of global warming,” said Longworth.

Several Pacific countries are drawing up joint strategies at a national level to tackle DRR and climate change adaptation together.

“The issue here is not that you get a transfer from the climate pots into the disaster pots of money. The issue is that programmatically and substantively speaking, we make sure that we have the synergies between those two funding streams,” said Scheuer.

“It doesn’t matter where the money comes from; it matters that we address the issue of risk and build resilience,” he said.

But preparedness is not all about big money - much DRR work, experts stress, can be relatively cheap things like training volunteers, teaching basic first aid techniques, and making better use of tools like mobile phones that many people already have.

Sometimes it can even just be a question of remembering former ways of living that were more resilient in terms of natural hazards.

In Japan, flood prone areas in traditional communities normally had an elevated building somewhere in the area that people could escape to, with second floors commonly storing a boat to help residents escape.

Build back better

In reality, it is very difficult for governments to grasp the value of DRR until they have been the victim of a major disaster.

In the case of Algeria, it was only after the Boumerdès earthquake of 2003 and the deaths of around 3,500 people that the government beefed up regulations for the construction of schools and hospitals, according to Hichem Imouche from the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The same thing happened after the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, which levelled most of Tokyo. Building regulations were strengthened again in Japan after the Great Hanshin earthquake near the city of Kobe in 1995; rubber blocks were placed under bridges and earthquake proof shelters constructed.

“Once disaster happens it is of course a bad situation but it is a chance to revise the way of thinking,” said Takeya.

No doubt the debate will move forward when DRR experts and officials meet on 19-23 May for the Fourth Session of the Global Platform for DRR [ http://www.preventionweb.net/globalplatform/2013/ ] in Geneva, Switzerland.

jj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98003/Analysis-Getting-governments-to-cough-up-for-DRR</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301091116460112t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">AQABA 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - Investing in preparation for potential disasters is a “no brainer”, Elizabeth Longworth, director of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), told a recent disaster risk reduction (DRR) conference in Aqaba, Jordan.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Hunger projects stalled in Guinea-Bissau</title><pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208141544380935t.jpg" />]]>BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.</description><body><![CDATA[BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.

The organization needs US$7 million immediately to cover its food security and nutrition programme targeting 278,000 people for 2013; and a further $8 million to extend the project through 2014. The project involves school-feeding, preventing moderate and acute malnutrition, and boosting rice production, and was supposed to start in February this year.

WFP head of programmes Fatimata Sow-Sidibé told IRIN the money is lacking because traditional donors suspended all development cooperation following the April 2012 coup.

“We have some promises [from donors],” said Sow-Sidibé, “but the programme was supposed to start in February and we have no resources to buy the food we need.”

Traditional donors more or less stopped all development funding in Guinea-Bissau following the 12 April 2012 coup d’état, leaving infrastructure projects and basic services at a standstill across the country, but humanitarian funding was supposedly untouched. LINK The problem for WFP is that their project spans development and emergency activities and thus is not just eligible for humanitarian funding.

The African Development Bank also suspended its funding for rural agricultural development projects, following the coup. The cuts “are having a direct impact on food security in Guinea-Bissau, where we already have severe cereal deficits due to inadequate local production,” said a civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture who preferred anonymity.

Food insecurity in Guinea-Bissau is driven mainly by an inability of people to access food because prices are beyond their reach. Most Bissau Guineans rely on imported rice as they grow mainly cash crops (cashews) and not grains.

Food prices have risen year on year since 2008 (imported rice is currently U$1.20 per kg), and the most recent countryside hunger assessment (2011) cited high prices as the biggest barrier for vulnerable households to access food.

The coup put off a planned countrywide food security assessment in 2012 but a rapid assessment in the regions of Biombo, Oio and Quinara in June 2012 revealed one in five people were food insecure (regions in the east were not included in the survey). Some 65 percent of households at the time had under one month’s supply of food stocks and more people were resigned to further indebtedness, selling animals and producing wine from the cashew fruit, to get by.

Cashew crisis

People’s ability to buy food has been severely hampered by a crisis in the cashew industry: 80-95 percent of Bissau-Guineans depend on cashew sales to purchase food as well as meet other household expenses. Terms of trade for cashews have been deteriorating since 2011: In a good year 1kg of rice can be roughly exchanged for 1kg of cashews; this shifted to 1.5kg of cashews to buy 1kg of rice in 2012, and to 2kgs of cashews for 1kg of rice in 2013, according to Ministry of Agriculture and WFP research. “Everything here is linked to cashews,” said Sow-Sidibé.

The poor terms of trade are linked to a poor 2012 cashew crop, and plummeting cashew prices following the coup (from 80 US cents per kg in May 2012 to 50 US cents one month later), and also linked to low fixed prices on international markets.

Cashew farmers are further stymied by exorbitant petrol prices (US$1.50 per litre) which makes it increasingly expensive for them to get their crop to market.

Ongoing projects

WFP continues to run food assistance programmes where it can. In two districts in Gabu, eastern Guinea-Bissau (Mancadndje Dara, Madina Madinga), and in two districts of Bafata (Djabicunda and Sare Biro), the organization helps villagers improve their farming techniques to boost rice production, including giving them improved seeds and helping them rent animals to get their crops to market. It also helps villagers grow market gardens to improve their food diversity and boost household income.

Mutaro Indjai, head of the village committee of rice producers in Saucunda village in Gabu, told IRIN: “This project helped us improve our production to last through four months, whereas before we only produced enough for one month.”

If the project comes to an end, they will continue to use improved techniques of production, but they would lack the seeds needed to plant next year. “We won’t have access to improved seeds, nor to the animals we need to speed up planting and to help us transport our harvest to nearby villages,” he told IRIN.

Nutrition

Nutrition programmes have also been affected. WFP pushes food diversity, given that feeding practices are a key component of high chronic malnutrition levels in Guinea-Bissau.

The organization tries to push a more varied diet (than the starch-dominated fare given to most infants) including fish soup, peas, carrots, tomatoes, and millet-based cereal. They also support local NGOs to make regular visits to health centres and villages on vaccination days to talk about how to prepare nutrient-rich meals for infants made out of corn flour, peanut powder, bean powder, oil and sugar, among others. Programmes target children in their first 1,000 days of life.

Some 17 percent of children under-five are underweight, and 27 percent are stunted due to inadequate nutrition, according to a December 2012 UNICEF-Ministry of Health nutrition survey.

Hunger specialists fear chronic malnutrition levels will rise if prevention is not stepped up.

UNICEF supports the Ministry of Health to set up nutrition treatment centres; provides therapeutic food for severely malnourished children; and helped update the government’s strategy to manage acute malnutrition, in February 2013. “Lack of funding, very few partners in nutrition, and limited human resources trained in nutrition” are the major challenges facing UNICEF, said Victor Suhfube Ngongalah, head of child survival there. UNICEF needs US$750,000 to implement its projects in 2013 and 2014.

Guinea Bissau is ranked 176 out of 187 countries assessed in the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report. Political instability has also marred development. Since 1994 no elected president in Guinea-Bissau has finished his mandate.

aj/dab/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98004/Hunger-projects-stalled-in-Guinea-Bissau</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201208141544380935t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BISSAU/DAKAR 09 May 2013 (IRIN) - The World Food Programme (WFP) has not received the money it needs to run basic nutrition and food security schemes in Guinea-Bissau, leaving projects in jeopardy or at a standstill.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>“Super-fly” threatens “Rambo” cassava, food security</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/2008030531t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - A tiny, rapidly breeding cyanide-munching insect, dubbed a “super-fly” by scientists, is threatening the food security of millions of Africans.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - A tiny, rapidly breeding cyanide-munching insect, dubbed a "super-fly" by scientists, is threatening the food security of millions of Africans.

The Bemisia tabaci - one of several whitefly species - carries lethal viruses that cause cassava brown streak disease (CBSD) and cassava mosaic disease (CMD), which have decimated the hardy cassava plant.

Cassava, a tropical root crop, is the third most important source of calories in the tropics, after rice and maize. According to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), it is the staple food for nearly a billion people in 105 countries, where it comprises as much as a third of daily calories consumed. The cheapest known source of starch, cassava is grown by poor farmers - many of them women - often on marginal land; for these people, the crop is vital for both food security and income generation.

The threat to cassava is particularly alarming as the plant is often called the "Rambo" root for its ability to withstand high temperatures and drought. With climate change expected to take a major toll on maize in the coming decades, many hope cassava will offer an alternative route to food security in Africa. Cassava may also prove to be an important source of biofuel [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95694/CLIMATE-CHANGE-Cassava-key-to-food-security-say-scientists ].

Experts plan to take aim at the whitefly this week, at a conference of the Global Cassava Partnership for the 21st Century (GCP21), at the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center in Italy. The conference is dedicated to "declaring war on cassava viruses in Africa."

Pandemics

From the 1980s to the mid-2000s, CMD ravaged more than 4 million square km in Africa's cassava-growing heartland, stretching from Kenya and Tanzania in the East to Cameroon and the Central African Republic in the West. But in recent years, the scientific community developed cassava varieties resistant to CMD.

James Legg, a leading cassava expert at the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), who works out of Tanzania, told IRIN, "The premature celebrations for this apparent victory were very soon squashed, however, as sinister new reports were received of the occurrence and apparent spread of CBSD in southern Uganda."

Until then, scientists had assumed that the viruses causing CBSD could not spread at medium-to-high altitudes; the disease had previously only been reported in coastal areas of East Africa and the low-altitude areas around Lake Malawi. "The spread recorded from Uganda instantly cast doubt of the validity of that earlier theory," said Legg. "Worse still, the disease spread out from Uganda over following years, and into the neighbouring countries of Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda."

CBSD is now a pandemic, threatening Nigeria, the world's largest producer and consumer of cassava. The cassava starch industry in Nigeria generates US$5 billion per year and employs millions of smallholder farmers and numerous small-scale processors.

Only in 2005 were scientists able to confirm that the whitefly responsible for spreading CMD was also responsible for spreading CBSD.

"With this realization, it became clear that the spread of these two disease pandemics was really only a consequence of the fact that East and Central Africa was experiencing a devastating outbreak of the whitefly that  transmits both of them," explained Legg.

He told IRIN that in the 1980s, researchers recorded an average of less than  one fly per plant, but by the mid-1990s, the number of whiteflies had  increased a hundredfold.

Arms race

It seems Bemisia tabaci has been assisted by climate change: The warmer temperatures occurring in higher altitudes have created optimal conditions for the insect to breed rapidly, speeding its adaptation and evolution. More  importantly, said Legg, is the fact that these flies seem to have worked out how to do better on cassava plants, whose cyanide production deters all but  a very small group of insects. As the whitefly population has exploded, rapid spread of the viral diseases - CMD and CBSD - was an inevitable consequence.

What makes a bad situation even worse, however, is that these diseases, in  turn, may promote the whitefly. "These insects also seem to have a close  relationship with the viruses that they transmit, and some evidence has  shown that the insects do better on virus-diseased plants, leading to an 'I  scratch your back, you scratch my back' type of mutually beneficial relationship," Legg said.

Scientists are working towards solutions. A member of Legg's team is examining the impact of climate change on the whitefly in search of ways to  deal with the pest. Other planned projects are working to control whiteflies  directly, either through introducing other beneficial insects that kill  whiteflies, or through producing varieties that combine whitefly and disease resistance.

Efforts to breed high-yielding, disease-resistant plants suitable for  Africa's various growing regions will involve going to South America, where cassava originated, and working with scientists at the cassava gene bank of  the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), IITA's sister  organization, in Colombia. CIAT is the biggest repository of cassava cultivars in the world.

Experts at the conference in Italy will also discuss a more ambitious plan to eradicate cassava viruses altogether. The aim will be to develop a regional strategy that gradually replaces farmers' infested cassava plants with virus-free planting material of the best and most disease-resistant cultivars. Approaches to developing these cultivars will include new molecular breeding and genetic engineering technologies to speed up selection. The hope of the team is that by joining forces, and employing the whole range of technologies available, a lasting impact will be made in tackling a crop crisis that poses the single greatest challenge to the future of Africa's cassava crop.

jk /rz

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97986/Super-fly-threatens-Rambo-cassava-food-security</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2008/2008030531t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - A tiny, rapidly breeding cyanide-munching insect, dubbed a “super-fly” by scientists, is threatening the food security of millions of Africans.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Countering the radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth</title><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031222150686t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya's youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.

Youth unemployment is extremely high, as are levels of political disenchantment. An estimated 75 percent of out-of-school youths are unemployed, according to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) [ http://kenya.usaid.gov/programs/education-and-youth/51 ]. 

"The unemployment crisis is a ticking bomb. Over 60 percent of the population is under 25. You cannot ignore that," said Yusuf Hassan, the Member of Parliament for Nairobi’s Kamukunji Constituency, which has a large Muslim population. "A huge and significant population is restless. And the gap between the rich and poor is getting wider."

"When access to resources is based on ethnic, cultural or religious characteristics or there is a growing divide between the 'haves' and 'have nots' in countries and communities, economic conditions further contribute to instability," says a new report by the Institute for Security Studies in Africa (ISS) [ http://www.issafrica.org/assessing-the-vulnerability-of-kenyan-youths-to-radicalisation-and-extremism ]. "Countries confronted by large differences between 'haves' and 'have nots' are additionally vulnerable to conflict, which may include resorting to acts of terrorism."

Marginalized and radicalized

A string of grenade attacks - some allegedly by Somali Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabab or their sympathizers - have occurred in the Kenyan towns of Garissa, Mombasa and the capital, Nairobi, since Kenya began its military incursion in Somalia in October 2011 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94018/KENYA-SOMALIA-A-risky-intervention ].

But Islamic radicalization is not new to Kenya. Kenyans were involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and the Tanzania city of Dar es Salaam; the coordinated attacks, which killed more than 220 people, were Africa's first suicide bombings by Al-Qaeda's East Africa cell. In a 2002 dual car-bomb and suicide attack on a hotel and plane in Mombasa, at least one of the suspects was Kenyan.

Muslims make up an estimated 11 percent [ http://www.knbs.or.ke/docs/PresentationbyMinisterforPlanningrevised.pdf ] of Kenya’s population; large Muslim communities can be found in the country’s northeast and in the coastal region. Traditionally, Kenya’s Muslims are moderate, with the community peacefully seeking participation in politics. But ISS pointed to the historical political marginalization of Muslims - right from negotiations for Kenya’s independence, in which ethnic Somalis, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, were not represented - as a contributor to the radicalization of young people. 

“Although Kenya is a secular state, it is essentially a Christian country because of the dominant Christian population… There is the perception that Islam is ‘alien’, despite the fact that it came to Kenya before Christianity,” the report notes.

The report also found that some young Kenyan Muslims have been influenced by radical preaching, which leads them to believe that wars being fought against Muslims abroad - for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq - are part of “a global campaign against Islam”.

According to a 2011 report [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 ] by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, non-Somali Kenyan nationals constituted the largest and most organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabab.

Taking advantage of vulnerable youth 

"We've already seen the rumblings of 'Pwani si Kenya' [Coast is not Kenya, the slogan of a separatist group in Kenya’s Coast Province] [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrs ] - radicalized, marginalized, poverty-stricken young people are saying, ‘we don't belong to Kenya’," said Hassan, who was seriously injured in a 2012 grenade attack in his constituency. 

The ISS report found that Islamist militants were exploiting sub-standard socioeconomic conditions, and the government's inability to provide basic services, by positioning themselves as providers of assistance. "Creating or infiltrating bona fide charity organizations... is a sure way to win the general support of ordinary people," the report said. 

The report points to the growing influence of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), a Kenyan group whose objectives include promoting community health and social welfare, but which also advocates "an extreme interpretation of Islam and prepares members to travel to Somalia for 'jihad' [holy war], thus attracting the attention of security agencies in Kenya and abroad." According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544 ], Al-Shabab announced a merger with MYC in 2012.

Hassan Sheikh, a cleric in the northeastern town of Garissa, said extremist groups have taken control of many mosques and Islamic schools, setup orphanages, and employed teachers and imams.

"North Kenya is a hub for mercenaries. You can easily get [attract] them - it’s out of poverty,” said Khalif Aabdulla, a civil rights activist from Wajir, also northeastern Kenya.
NGOs and government officials in Kenya acknowledge an urgent need to develop a counter-radicalization policy to prevent young people from turning to violent groups, and some say Kenya’s newly elected government may be an opportunity to tackle the issue. NGOs say the government must do more than promote economic empowerment among marginalized communities; it must also foster a sense of belonging.

"There are some efforts to use the Council of Imams or Islamic Preachers' Association to talk to the youths," said Mwalimu Mati, CEO of governance watchdog Mars Group Kenya. "The moderates are trying to assist the government, but I can't say it's a complete success." 

Counter-productive counter-terrorism

"The problem is exacerbated by counter-terrorism programmes by the Kenya police who carry out mass raids rather than targeted arrests. It keeps the youths feeling repressed generally. They then identify that as oppression based on religion," Mati said. He says the problem is primarily in North Eastern District, Eastleigh and Coast Province. 

The ISS report describes the current approach as "collective punishment based on perceptions".

"Most perceptions are completely wrong, especially that Somali nationals are responsible for attacks in Kenya or that Kenya is an innocent bystander when acts of terrorism are committed on its soil," it stated. 

Following attacks in Nairobi, ethnic Somalis - both Kenyan and foreign nationals - said they experienced xenophobia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94090/KENYA-Xenophobia-fear-follow-Nairobi-blasts ] and lived in constant fear of arrest.

Under the government of former president Mwai Kibaki, both the Ministry for Peace-building and Conflict Management and the Ministry for Education told IRIN that they had no programmes to address radicalization.

The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport said they ran "empowerment programmes" in conjunction with the formal education system. But as Leah Rotitch, a director in the education ministry, said, "The people Al-Shabab target are normally young people who are out of school."

The persecution felt by ethnic Somalis and other Muslim communities has only increased [ http://www.kenya-today.com/news/kenyan-muslims-fear-the-worst-over-proposals-to-boost-police-powers ] in recent years, with police allegedly engaging in extrajudicial use of force and even killings of terror suspects; the police deny these claims.

"Since the passing of the new anti-terror bill, we have seen a huge spike in extrajudicial killings. And terrorism has become an easy label," said Horn of Africa analyst Abdullahi Halakhe. "Such efforts only succeed in alienating the local population, who usually have critical human intelligence. They are turning the Islamic radicalization of young people into a matter of national security, making those young people their enemies, thus making it worse."

The ISS report calls for "introspection on the part of the police officer stopping and searching a person because he looks Somali".

Reaching the young

Tom Mboya, who established the Inuka Kenya Trust in response to the role young people played in perpetrating the post-election violence of 2007-2008, says now is an opportunity to engage the youth. "They're what should be the engine of this country," he told IRIN.

"Devolution is positive," he says, referring to the process of decentralizing power from Nairobi [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97726/Briefing-Devolution-to-transform-Kenya ], which was set in motion by Kenya's new constitution. Mboya believes this process will create opportunities for young people. But, he says, "in parts of the country more prone to violent extremism, there needs to be policy in place. The leadership will have to be more alive to that problem".

A focus on young people formed a key part of new President Uhuru Kenyatta's election campaign - his government will now have to work out an acceptable and effective approach in tackling the issue of violent extremism. 

Mars Group's Mati says using moderate imams to neutralize potentially radical youths does not work because young people no longer regard them as credible. "It's a generation gap - control over youths has somehow become difficult. In the old days, what an imam said went. The radical preachers are young," he said.

Hadley Muchela, programmes manager for Kenyan rights group Independent Medico-legal Unit, says targeting violent extremism will require sensitivity because, thanks to the way the issue has been handled in the past, it is often seen as an indictment against all of Islam. "You find very few Kenyans willing to go into it," he said. 

Abdikadir Sheikh, who works with the Sustainable Support and Advocacy Programme, a local NGO, said the group has set up a pilot project to dissuade youth in the northeastern towns of Dadaab and Garissa from joining extremist groups. 

"We are very careful or [we could] lose our lives; you can’t confront radicalization directly - you need different approaches," he told IRIN. "We have established a strong team of more than 600 youths… some have so far joined colleges. We plan to work with the county governments.” 
The ISS report warns that "there is no quick fix for the level of radicalization seen in Kenya".

"The biggest threat to stability in Kenya will be if extremists succeed in dividing Kenya between Muslim and non-Muslim," the report said. 

jh/na/kr/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97982/Countering-the-radicalization-of-Kenya-apos-s-youth</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305031222150686t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the Islamic radicalization of Kenya&apos;s youth, a situation experts say must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>