<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0"><channel><title>IRIN - Conflict</title><link>http://www.irinnews.org/</link><description>Updated everyday</description><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 18:30:53 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>How To: Get medical aid kits to Aleppo, Syria</title><pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305201430490338t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Getting humanitarian supplies into conflict zones like Syria is no mean feat, often requiring negotiations with warring parties, braving insecurity and facing repeated delays and logistical challenges.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Getting humanitarian supplies into conflict zones like Syria is no mean feat, often requiring negotiations with warring parties, braving insecurity and facing repeated delays and logistical challenges.

But aid workers can make it happen. In one of the latest examples, 54 tons of much-needed medical supplies arrived in Syria last month, destined for people living close to the frontlines of the conflict in the biggest city Aleppo.

“More than 60 percent of the hospitals [in Aleppo] are out of service. Many are at the frontline and used by armed personnel,” said Fares Kady, medical coordinator for the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and the focal point for the World Health Organization (WHO) in Aleppo.

IRIN tracked the shipment, from the first phone call from a WHO official in Switzerland, all the way to the doctors in battle-scarred Syria on 13 April.

Switzerland

Olexander Babanin is a supply officer with the WHO Crises Support team in Geneva. In October last year he made a call to a medical supplies company in The Netherlands to order medical kits to restock the standby supplies at the UN Humanitarian Response Depot in Dubai.

“When the logistic supply chain starts, it is often not known where the medical assistance will in the end exactly go,” Babanin told IRIN.

“[It] all depends on requirement and availability. My job is to make sure that warehouses are full, but of course never too full.” 

The international humanitarian logistical network means emergency stocks can be pre-positioned in key parts of the world for rapid mobilization.

Medical kits like the ones that ended up in Aleppo are standardized packages of drugs and medical equipment, designed to be useful in a variety of regions and situations.

The Interagency Emergency Health Kit (IEHK) is composed of some 90 different types of drugs and 90 medical consumables and equipment packed in 44 boxes.

A single medical kit weighs just over a ton and its content meets the needs of 10,000 persons for three months.

WHO is the coordinating authority for international health within the UN system, and every five years an inter-agency committee consisting of pharmacists and technical staff from different relief organizations decides what essential drugs and medical supplies will be included in the medical kit.

The aim is to meet priority health care needs of a displaced population without medical facilities or a population with disrupted medical facilities.

The Netherlands

At the end of 2012 in the town of Gorinchem in the western Netherlands employees of the Medical Export Group (MEG), a commercial firm, pack the medications, spinal needles, surgical equipment, and other items into labelled boxes.

Like Babanin from WHO, the MEG packers are not aware of the final destination for the aid. The company specializes in providing medical packs internationally for humanitarian organizations.

The IEH Kits are loaded onto a ship at the port of Rotterdam, 40km away, and shipped to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.

United Arab Emirates

By January the latest emergency shipment is in Dubai, home to the Middle East UN Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) run by the World Food Programme (WFP), which as well as delivering food aid, provides logistical support to much of the UN.

Nevien Attalla is the pharmacist with UNHRD in Dubai, and helped the WHO medical aid along the next part of the journey.

“The request comes in through the UNHRD customer service mailbox. To support any emergency response we manage assets so they are readily available for deployment within a 24/48 hour time frame,” Attala told IRIN.

For this outbound shipment, she has to seek approvals from the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health and the Narcotic & Precursor Chemical Unit in the capital Abu Dhabi. 

She also arranges WFP supporting letters for each border crossing. As soon as the shipment is cleared the aid items are packed up for transportation by truck to Syria.

The medical aid is stocked at UNHRD’s 22,500 square metre covered storage space in a desert area far from Dubai’s skyscrapers.

The warehouses, part of Dubai’s International Humanitarian City [ http://www.ihc.ae ] are close to Jebel Ali port, the world’s largest man-made harbour, and also Dubai World Central-Al Maktoum airport.

The heat in this place is often unbearable. However, inside the warehouses it is mostly fresh and cool.

“We have 5,000 square metres which are temperature-controlled between 18 and 25 degrees Celsius. There is also a cold room to guarantee the storage for cold chain pharmaceutical goods,” Doris Mauron Klopfenstein, who works in logistics for UNHRD, told IRIN.

Syria

The hardest and final section of the journey begins on half a dozen trucks - driven by Syrian truck drivers, a requirement set by the Syrian government.

The two-year conflict in Syria has caused widespread disruption of the health care system; the 54 tons (52 kits) provide enough lifesaving medicines and supplies to cover emergency health needs for three months for an estimated population of half a million, potentially a tempting target for armed groups [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97011/SYRIA-Healthcare-system-crumbling ].

Since the beginning of the conflict WFP has reported more than 20 attacks on warehouses, trucks and cars in Syria.

The truck drivers hired by a WFP subcontractor set off from Dubai and take a route through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and then into Syria.

“The convoy remained several days at the Jordanian-Syrian border because of heavy fighting between Damascus and Dera’a Governorate,” said Elizabeth Hoff, head of the WHO office in Damascus.

Heading to the capital they cross through ever-changing government and rebel zones, and are frequently held up at checkpoints. But regular closures at the airport in Damascus and the length of the sea route mean trucks are the best option.

On 27 March the trucks finally arrive at the WFP warehouse in Alkisweh, rural Damascus. WHO and SARC carry out an assessment of the supplies, and then the aid is dispatched to Aleppo, 360km to the north.

WHO distributes 70 percent of such supplies through the Syrian Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Higher Education, and 30 percent through NGOs.

“Needs in Aleppo are increasing constantly. The health system is reeling due to the lack of medicine and medical instruments, especially for chronic diseases, and poor accessibility [geographical, social, economic and security], raising more challenges to the Syrian dilemma,” said Kady.

About six million people live in Aleppo Governorate, but since the conflict started an additional 1.5 million internally displaced persons have sought refuge in the city.

“This journey [Damascus-Aleppo] usually takes about four hours. Nowadays this road is very important for all parties of the war. The shipment passed almost 60 checkpoints and it took 11 hours,” said Kady.

On 13 April the goods are then distributed to their final destinations - two main hospitals in Aleppo and 10 health centres.

Syrian doctor Kady hopes for more supplies: “Opening new offices for humanitarian assistance and installing a safe road like a humanitarian corridor to Aleppo would be so important to decrease the suffering of people.”

But the possibility of further deliveries from Dubai is slight at the moment given the growing insecurity.

While UN officials continuously urge all parties to respect humanitarian principles and ensure safe access for relief supplies, “for the moment no further shipment of medications is planned from Dubai due to the continuing bad security situation in the entire southern part of Syria,” said Hoff.

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]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98087/How-To-Get-medical-aid-kits-to-Aleppo-Syria</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305201430490338t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Getting humanitarian supplies into conflict zones like Syria is no mean feat, often requiring negotiations with warring parties, braving insecurity and facing repeated delays and logistical challenges.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Demining on hold in Senegal’s Casamance Region</title><pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100850270000t.jpg" />]]>ZIGUINCHOR 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Demining has been halted in southern Senegal’s Casamance Region after 12 deminers were taken hostage by fighters with the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) on 3 May.</description><body><![CDATA[ZIGUINCHOR 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Demining has been halted in southern Senegal’s Casamance Region after 12 deminers were taken hostage by fighters with the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) on 3 May.

The hostages - all Senegalese members of private South African demining company Mechem - were seized in the village of Kaïlou, 20km west of the regional capital Ziguinchor, near the Guinea-Bissau border.

According to Seyni Diop, head of a division that helps mine victims at the government’s Anti-Mine Action Centre (CNAMS), demining has been temporarily suspended in Casamance. This comes just weeks after officials said Senegal was on track [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97907/Demining-speeds-up-in-Senegal-s-Casamance-region ] to meet the Ottawa convention with its commitment to ban anti-personnel landmines by 2015.

Mechem would not comment on the incident.

The rebels belong to the faction of César Atoute Badiaté, head of one of the three principal MFDC branches. The International Committee of the Red Cross has visited the hostages and, along with other agencies, including the UN Development Programme, local NGO Apran/SDP and the government of Senegal, is involved in trying to negotiate their release.

Fred Weyers, head of Mechem in Ziguinchor, said they were leaving the negotiations to the state of Senegal.

A meeting had been held two months ago in San Domingos, northern Guinea-Bissau, between rebels and the head of CNAMS, which leads the demining process in Casamance, to enable demining to proceed.

At the meeting, the rebels said they could not guarantee the security of deminers.

“The MFDC considers that CNAMS has reached a red line beyond which the security of deminers cannot be guaranteed. MFDC considers demining in Casmance to be dependent on the peace process.”

Meanwhile, over 1,000 people participated in a silent march through the streets of Ziguinchor on 22 May, organized by the Women’s Peace Platform, to push for the hostages to be freed. The group released a communiqué, stating: “We once again appeal to MFDC fighters and to César Atoute Badiate in person, for the well-being of the population of Casamance, for their mothers, aunts and sisters, who we are. We implore you to liberate these 12 people.”

CNAMS has been leading humanitarian demining in Senegal since 2008. For many years, NGO Handicap International led demining but late last year, two new operators came on board, Mechem and a Norwegian operator, NPA, to reinforce the effort.

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 ]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98094/Demining-on-hold-in-Senegal-s-Casamance-Region</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201110100850270000t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">ZIGUINCHOR 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Demining has been halted in southern Senegal’s Casamance Region after 12 deminers were taken hostage by fighters with the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) on 3 May.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Concern for Syrians stuck at Jordanian border</title><pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301100948400951t.jpg" />]]>AMMAN/DUBAI 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people are gathering in villages in southern Syria, unable to seek refuge in Jordan either because of insecurity along the border or, according to some, new Jordanian security measures. In the meantime, some of them are living “between the mosques and the streets” without enough food and water, amid daily violence. </description><body><![CDATA[AMMAN/DUBAI 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people are gathering in villages in southern Syria, unable to seek refuge in Jordan because of insecurity along the border or, according to some, new Jordanian security measures.

In Nasib village, just 2km from one of four border crossings between Jordan and Syria, there are 10,000 displaced people waiting to leave Syria, according to village imam Abu Omar. He said government security forces abandoned the village “long ago”.

The area surrounding the village is very tense, with the sound of heavy artillery “louder than ever”, [ http://jordantimes.com/article/syria-shelling-noises-louder-than-ever-to-residents-of-border-villages ] according to a local Jordanian newspaper. On several occasions in recent months, the surroundings of the village have been shelled or hit by gunfire. Just yesterday, Abu Omar said, a rocket fell in the village, causing minor injuries.

Despite the insecurity, he said, for the last seven days, Syrians attempting to cross the border have been turned back, told by border officials that the Jordanian intelligence services are currently refusing any entry, except emergency medical cases.

But Jordanian authorities deny closing the border.

"Jordan's policy towards helping Syrians has not changed," Anmar Alhmoud, Jordan's spokesperson on Syrian refugees affairs, told IRIN. Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh said the same at a press conference on 22 May, the official news agency Petra reported.

However, the number of Syrians fleeing to Jordan without documentation has dropped dramatically in the last week, from up to 2,500 per day to “all but zero”, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). (100-150 Syrians have, however, entered daily at official crossing points with passports, according to Alhmoud.)

A village under strain

Before the Syrian conflict began two years ago, Nasib was a small border crossing, home to 10,800 people, Abu Omar said. Some 5,000 of them left during the course of the conflict, only to have their homes filled by double the number of people, displaced by violence in other areas of the country.

In the last week, Abu Omar said, an additional 10,000 arrivals - coming from as far as Idlib and Aleppo provinces in the north - have put a strain on village resources.

“Displaced people used to stay in the collective shelters for one or two days and then continue on to the crossing,” he told IRIN over a scratchy phone line from Syria. “But since the border was closed, they are staying and waiting… Some families are living between the mosques and the streets.”

Over the past two years, Syrians have become accustomed to making do with less; and the residents of Nasib have long been sharing what they have with newcomers in need. But the few commodities that used to come across the Jordanian border have all but stopped in the last week, leading to food and water shortages in the village, Abu Omar said.

Today was the first day in more than two weeks, he said, that the village had flour with which to make bread: “The necessities of life are non-existent.” International humanitarian assistance does not reach these parts, he added.

Government and rebel forces have been battling for control of areas south of Dera’a for the past few months, but in recent weeks, the government has reportedly launched an offensive to retake areas previously “liberated” by the rebels.

One Syrian family that arrived in Jordan 10 days ago told IRIN the border was open but that the rebel Free Syrian Army had lost control of the area. People were scared to move inside Syria because of violence and because the government was back in control, the family said. Abu Omar said freedom of movement, even between villages, was very limited.

Aid agencies told IRIN insecurity in the border area could be deterring people from trying to get into Jordan.

Few options for Palestinians

In addition to the Syrians stuck in border villages, hundreds of Palestinians cannot leave Syria because of Jordanian regulations prohibiting them entry into Jordan. [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96202/Analysis-Palestinian-refugees-from-Syria-feel-abandoned ]

In Jamleh village, for example, just east of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, some 300 Palestinian refugees who attempted to leave Syria are stuck in difficult conditions. Most are now staying with host families, though some have managed to reach other villages where they are renting homes; others have no shelter at all.

Humanitarian assistance to them is limited because of the dangers accessing the area.

According to the UN, 4.25 million people are displaced internally within Syria. Another 1.5 million have registered as refugees in neighbouring countries and in North Africa.

At a press conference in Amman on 22 May, Syria’s ambassador to Jordan, Bahjat Sulieman, told reporters the Syrian refugee crisis has been “exaggerated” to put pressure on the Syrian government, saying that Syrians were not leaving the country for “real humanitarian reasons”, but rather for political ends.

He declined to comment on reports of Syrians stuck on the Syrian side of the border.

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]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98096/Concern-for-Syrians-stuck-at-Jordanian-border</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201301100948400951t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">AMMAN/DUBAI 24 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of people are gathering in villages in southern Syria, unable to seek refuge in Jordan either because of insecurity along the border or, according to some, new Jordanian security measures. In the meantime, some of them are living “between the mosques and the streets” without enough food and water, amid daily violence. </td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Helping displaced children in rebel-held parts of Kachin</title><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305200656420349t.jpg" />]]>KACHIN STATE 23 May 2013 (IRIN) - Children&apos;s laughter rings out from bamboo huts along the perimeter of the Lana Zup Ja camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a part of Myanmar’s Kachin State controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA): A group of pre-schoolers are playing in a plywood hut, seemingly oblivious to the squalid conditions surrounding them.</description><body><![CDATA[KACHIN STATE 23 May 2013 (IRIN) - Children's laughter rings out from bamboo huts along the perimeter of the Lana Zup Ja camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a part of Myanmar’s Kachin State controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA): A group of pre-schoolers are playing in a plywood hut, seemingly oblivious to the squalid conditions surrounding them. 

The playground-cum-learning centre is one of six new “child-friendly spaces” that local NGO Wing Pawng Ningthoi (WPN) has built in IDP camps in Kachin State. 

“Most of the children come from conflict zones, but when we ask them about their experiences, many of them don’t know how to answer and just stare in silence,” WPN’s Mary Tawm, who oversees food and shelter assistance for about 10,000 IDPs in six camps controlled by the KIA, told IRIN. 

But these children are also the lucky ones. 

"Thousands of children have been affected by the conflict in Kachin State,” said James Gray, a child protection specialist for the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 

While the agency had been able to provide support and assistance to separated and unaccompanied children and those in need of psychosocial support over the past 18 months in government-controlled areas, he said, “UNICEF is concerned about the situation of children in the non-government controlled areas, where access is difficult, and children are without child protection interventions.” 

“The children’s [psychological] needs are not being met because these are the kind of things that are secondary to food and shelter,” said Oddney Gumaer, international advocacy director of Partners Relief and Development [ http://www.partnersworld.org/ ], one of the few international NGOs to gain access to KIA-controlled territory. 

“In the Western world when there is a crisis or disaster there are psychologists and crisis teams at the location almost immediately and we get all the needed follow-up right away. But for these people there is no support like that,” she explained. 

Protracted displacement 

The children were displaced, like thousands of others, after a ceasefire between the Burmese government and the KIA collapsed in June 2011. Many are traumatized, having witnessed acts of violence. 

According to the UN, over 83,000 residents are displaced in Kachin State, including 47,000 (56 percent) in KIA-controlled areas. This number, however, does not include those living with host families or the many who fled to neighbouring Shan State. 

Many of the IDPs have been displaced for a long time, some for over 20 months, triggering renewed and additional needs for basic services and protection, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said in its most recent humanitarian update [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ref_Doc_UNOCHA_Myanmar_Humanitarian_Bulletin_March_2013.pdf ].

To help provide support for children in KIA-controlled areas, WPN is working with local workers from Save the Children in the six centres, and hopes to follow up with more assistance in future.

“Providing a protected environment where children can engage and participate in activities and interact in a more normal situation where they are protected from physical harm is key,” said Kelly Stevenson, Save the Children's Myanmar country manager. 

The pre-school set-up provides more of a group learning environment - similar to a classroom - to help many of the children build up their self-esteem and confidence, Stevenson explained. 

To help bring more awareness of children's basic rights, WPN has also organized several workshops for staff and volunteers, as well as camp residents. But for now, giving children the opportunity of interacting and playing together in a safe environment is proving helpful. 

According to the Laiza-based Relief Action Network for IDPs and Refugees (RANIR) [ http://www.ranirkachin.net/ ], an umbrella group of 11 NGOs and community-based organizations working in KIA-controlled areas, the quality of the humanitarian response in areas outside government control is well below international standards due to a lack of funding and limited access. 

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]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98083/Helping-displaced-children-in-rebel-held-parts-of-Kachin</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305200656420349t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KACHIN STATE 23 May 2013 (IRIN) - Children&apos;s laughter rings out from bamboo huts along the perimeter of the Lana Zup Ja camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a part of Myanmar’s Kachin State controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA): A group of pre-schoolers are playing in a plywood hut, seemingly oblivious to the squalid conditions surrounding them.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Syrians seeking refuge in Libya</title><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305230831020195t.jpg" />]]>MISRATA 23 May 2013 (IRIN) - Two years ago Syrians in the relative security of their own country watched the unfolding crisis in Libya descend into a devastating civil war.</description><body><![CDATA[MISRATA 23 May 2013 (IRIN) - Two years ago Syrians in the relative security of their own country watched the unfolding crisis in Libya descend into a devastating civil war.

Since then the tables have turned, and many of those same families find themselves in Libya after fleeing the Syrian conflict, which has left an estimated 6.8 million people (around a third of the population) in need of urgent humanitarian assistance [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Syria%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20-%20Issue%20%2324.pdf ].

Most of the Syrian community in Libya, estimated at around 110,000 by government officials, are believed to have arrived over the past 18 months after having fled the Syrian conflict.

Shavan, a Syrian ethnic Kurd, arrived in Libya in January. "Alone, I left Syria at the end of 2011 leaving my wife and my daughter. I was looking for a place to live far away from the hell of conflict," Shevan said.

After what he says was a difficult year in Lebanon, where he struggled to pay his living costs, he went back into Syria to pick up his family and then left for Libya.

The flow of Syrians to Libya, while far lower than the numbers seen arriving in Syria's neighbours, started almost as soon as the Libyan revolution ended in October 2011.

Some come by air from Lebanon or Turkey, but most have arrived by road, heading through Jordan and then across the Sinai to the Libyan-Egyptian border town of El Salloum (in Egypt).

In the initial stages, Syrians with a passport could enter without a visa, but the rules have been tightened since the attack on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi in September 2012, after which only families, not single men, were allowed in.

Visa-less travel

From January this year, the coastal border crossing from El-Salloum to Musaid (Libya) has been closed to all non-Libyans without a visa, according to information from the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

Alongside this measure, the Libyan minister of interior invited his "Syrian brothers" who had previously entered the country without a visa, to register at any passport office to get a government letter confirming their asylum seeker status.

But it is still possible to get across the border without a visa. One Syrian who had recently entered Libya near El Salloum, and asked not to be named, told IRIN: "Smugglers charge US$500 to take Syrians across the border to Libya. I also saw some Syrian women who were using sex work to pay for their transit."

Local NGOs in Libya run by Syrians were the first to provide relief, but many Syrian refugees have been reluctant to receive such aid.

"Suspicions about Syrian secret service infiltrations led the majority away from the operational centres managed by Syrian charities," the head of the UNHCR in Libya, Emmanuel Gignac, told IRIN.

UNHCR registration

After an initial delay, UNHCR started formally registering Syrian asylum seekers and refugees in September 2012.

By the end of April 2013, around 8,000 Syrians were registered with UNHCR as asylum seekers, though because of UNHCR's lack of a formal legal agreement with the government, the asylum seekers cannot advance to the agency's refugee status determination (RSD) process.

The majority of Syrian asylum seekers in Libya are in the second city, Benghazi, due to its proximity to the Egyptian border.

Large Syrian communities are also in Tripoli, mainly in the Suq Al Jumua, Janzoor and Hasham areas, while ethnic Kurdish Syrians in the capital have established a base on the outskirts in Ben Ghashir.

Syrian charities provide support and some aid. "You can ask their help to register your kids in the local schools or to get medical assistance," Bilal*, originally from the Syrian town of Hama, told IRIN.

The delivery of items such as blankets, mattresses and kitchen cooking sets is carried out regularly by Syrian organizations along with the Libyan organization Al Wafa and international agencies like UNHCR, the Danish Refugee Council and the Italian NGO CESVI.

Visiting UNHCR teams also assist the Syrians in Tripoli and Benghazi. The agency has opened a Centre for Community Development for vulnerable cases, and set up a hotline for Syrian asylum seekers.

The call centre receives around 40 phone calls a day - often appeals for medical or cash assistance, according to UNHCR associate RSD officer Valda Kelly.

The presence of Syrians in Benghazi has created some tension, and recently the city's commission in charge of regulating foreign labour, immigrants and refugees called on the national government and congress to reduce the number of people coming into the country to avoid security, economic, political and social risks.

Why Libya?

Despite the distance from their home country, many Syrians cited a lower cost of living and greater job opportunities as the reason for travelling to Libya, rather than the more common Syrian refugee hubs like Jordan and Lebanon. Some also had spent time in Libya before the Arab Spring, when most foreign nationals were evacuated.

But living costs remain a challenge for many in the Syrian community: "I pay 600 dinars (US$465) a month for an apartment and I barely earn 900," Ali who had fled from Duma, on the outskirts of Damascus, told IRIN.

The poverty of many has given rise to practices seen elsewhere in the region: "Syrian women have been offering themselves as brides to the Libyans because they have no alternative for their survival," said Mohamed, a Syrian refugee living in the coastal town of Misrata.

Other Syrians in Misrata confirmed this was happening. "In Benghazi Syrian girls are called `sheep' for their low price. Even regular men already with one wife can afford a new young wife," another Syrian told IRIN.

Shiite fears

Many Syrians told IRIN the Libyans had been welcoming. Ahmad, a Libyan civil engineer working for an Italian company in Misrata, told IRIN: "They are our brothers as they still suffer what we have experienced. They have every right to remain in Misrata."

Local officials in Misrata told IRIN there are about 5,000 Syrian refugees in the town.

Misrata, known as a base for anti-Gaddafi militia activity, is awash with Gaddafi-era weapons, and locals say a blind eye is turned to Syrians buying the weapons for export.

Some local reports in Libya say former revolutionary fighters in Libya, particularly from Benghazi and Misrata, have been travelling in the opposite direction to join the anti-government forces in Syria.

Not everyone is welcoming though. "Because of my Kurdish name, I was threatened often at ordinary checkpoints because Libyans thought I was not a Sunni Syrian but a Shiite," said Shavan.

Syria's now two-year conflict began when people, largely of the Sunni majority, began protesting on masse against President Bashar al-Assad, of the minority Alawite sect (Shia), and has become increasingly sectarian as the violence has increased.

*not a real name

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]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98085/Syrians-seeking-refuge-in-Libya</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305230831020195t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MISRATA 23 May 2013 (IRIN) - Two years ago Syrians in the relative security of their own country watched the unfolding crisis in Libya descend into a devastating civil war.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram</title><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005241211400801t.jpg" />]]>KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.</description><body><![CDATA[KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.

The attacks on BH camps in northern parts of Borno close to the borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroon followed the 14 May declaration of a state of emergency by Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. 

Musa Karimbe fled his village of Bulabute near Marte, BH's major stronghold in the area, on 17 May to Kusiri, 100km inside Cameroon where he is staying with a friend. "We are afraid of a repeat of Baga attacks on our homes," Karimbe said, referring to fighting on 16 and 17 April between troops from the Chad-Niger-Nigeria Joint Multi-National Task Force and BH members in which 187 residents from Baga town on the shores of Lake Chad were killed, and 2,128 homes burnt, according to Human Rights Watch [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria ].

People from villages around Abadam District, including Malamfatori, fled to Bosso in Niger’s Diffa Region, while others have taken refuge in the Cameroonian towns of Fotokol, Amchide, Darak and Kusiri, according to interviews with displaced Nigerians. Officials say 2,000 people have fled across borders, though several of the displaced told IRIN they thought the number was higher.  

The number of casualties from the fighting is not yet clear, though Nigeria defence spokesman Brig-Gen Chris Olukolade said on 17 May that there had been BH casualties, and that 100 BH members had been arrested.

An official with the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in the capital, Abuja, said they had not yet been able to establish contact with their teams to find out the details of the humanitarian situation, because telephone networks in Borno and Yobe states have been shut down since 16 May. “The areas where military operations are ongoing, are not accessible,” he told IRIN.

Residents of Gamboru Ngala in Borno State said military forces screened them thoroughly before allowing them to cross the border; others passed through the network of unofficial trade routes that criss-cross the region.

The military has placed a “food blockade” on northern Borno, refusing to allow trucks laden with household commodities from leaving Maiduguri (the state capital) to the northern part of the state, in case they end up in BH hands. As a result, prices have shot up, said Bukar Zanna, head of the Traders’ Association in Gamboru Ngala.

Since January 2013 BH has taken control of Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala-Balge and Gamboru Ngala local government areas in northern Borno, chasing out local government officials, taking over control of government buildings and imposing Sharia law.

This prompted President Goodluck Jonathan to declare last week that he would “take all necessary action... to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists,” including the arrest and detention of suspects, taking over BH hideouts, the lockdown of suspected BH enclaves, raids, and arresting anyone possessing illegal weapons.

The military crackdown came after several attempts at dialogue [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/Analysis-Hurdles-to-Nigerian-government-Boko-Haram-dialogue ] - the most recent on 17 April, when the president set up a 26-member Amnesty Committee (headed by Nigerian Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu) with a three-month mandate to try to convince BH to lay down its arms in exchange for a state pardon and social reintegration.

Dialogue soon broke down, and BH stepped up bombing attacks and assassinations in April and May in apparent defiance of the proposed amnesty. BH has repeatedly rejected peace talks, citing insincerity on the part of the Nigerian government following a series of failed mediated negotiations. 

On 8 and 9 May the Amnesty Committee met Nigerian security chiefs in Abuja and then BH members in detention in Kuje prison near Abuja to gather information on how to reach out to the BH leadership for talks. But on 9 May around 200 BH gunmen, armed with rocket launchers and rifles, launched coordinated attacks on security forces in the town of Bama in northern Borno, including a military barracks, a prison and police buildings, killing 42 people including soldiers, policemen, prison guards and civilians and freeing 105 inmates. Some 13 BH gunmen were killed in the attacks, according to the military.

In a 13 May video, BH leader Abubakar Shekau rejected the government’s amnesty overtures and vowed not to stop his group’s violent campaigns to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. 

Flip-flopping

The government’s flip-flop approach is evidence of its frustration with the deteriorating security situation. But the next steps are not clear. “Deployment of troops and the declaration of war on BH by the president have put a huge stumbling block on the path of the Amnesty Committee,” said Mohammed Kyari, a political science professor at Modibo Adama University of Science and Technology in neighbouring Adamawa State capital Yola, which is also affected by the emergency decree.

“It will now be difficult to win the confidence of BH which is crucial in bringing them to the negotiating table because you can’t talk of peace on one hand and be deploying troops on the other.” A leading rights activist in the north, Shehu Sani, who has participated in past negotiations with BH, agrees. 

But many say the government had no choice. Yahaya Mahmud, a prominent constitutional lawyer in Nigeria, told IRIN: “No government anywhere will allow a group to usurp part of territorial sovereignty. The declaration of a state of emergency was necessitated by the constitutional obligation to restore a portion of Nigeria’s territory taken over by an armed group which involves the suspension of constitutional provisions relating to civic rights.”

The fear now is that the more violent the crackdown, the greater the chance of radicalizing angry young men to join the rebel cause. Babagoni Kachalla, a resident of Wuljo, one of the areas taken over by BH in northern Borno, said BH has been going village-to-village since January in all-terrain vehicles fitted with loudspeakers to gather recruits and preach their ideology. In the days leading up to the military response, BH fighters stepped up their recruitment drive, said Borno State residents.

Political scientist Kyari worries, in response to the crackdown, that BH will just shift their bases. “BH can’t face Nigerian troops in conventional war; the troop deployment to northern Borno means they will move out to other towns and cities with less military presence and launch guerrilla war, which is deadlier.”

The deployment of troops to Maiduguri in June 2011 and military crackdowns pushed some BH members northwards within Borno, and others to northern Mali, which they fled during the French, Chadian and Malian intervention in the north.

Trust

Many analysts and politicians are pushing for dialogue as the only way out of the impasse, but trust between the government and BH is very low.

Conspiracy theories in the north abound, including that prominent politicians, including the president, are fanning some of the violence in the north since they would benefit from chaos continuing there in the run-up to 2015 presidential elections. 

While not endorsing the theories, Abdulkarim Mohammed, author of Paradox of Boko Haram, said they should be investigated if the government is serious about understanding the roots of BH’s insurgency. 

The Amnesty Committee stated yesterday it would meet BH leaders anywhere they chose, to negotiate a way out of the violence. 

If the government does not win the confidence of BH soon, to at least bring them to the negotiating table, we are going to be in this much longer than we thought,” said Kyari, adding: “and if it is not managed well, it will engulf neighbouring countries.”

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98076/Analysis-Nigerians-on-the-run-as-military-combat-Boko-Haram</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201005241211400801t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KANO 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes - thousands of them into neighbouring Niger and Cameroon - following airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram (BH) camps from 15 May.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Somalia, beyond the famine</title><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108160838010687t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Over one million people in Somalia are currently food insecure, according to a May report by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET). This number is a significant drop from the 3.7 million considered food insecure in mid-2011.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Over one million people in Somalia are currently food insecure, according to a May report [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/somalia_fsou_05_2013.pdf ] by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET). This number is a significant drop from the 3.7 million [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/astern%20Africa%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20%2323%20OCHA%20EA.pdf ] considered food insecure in mid-2011.

The improvement has been attributed to good ongoing ‘gu’, the March-to-June rains, and the 2012 October-November ‘deyr’ rains.

Successive droughts and poor rains had culminated in a famine in Somalia in 2011. The famine [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93280/SOMALIA-Time-for-immediate-action-on-famine-UN ] led to an estimated 258,000 excess deaths, meaning deaths above normal mortality numbers, according to a 2 May study [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia_Mortality_Estimates_Final_Report_1May2013.pdf ] commissioned by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and FEWSNET.

Most of these deaths were in the Banadir, Bay and Lower Shabelle regions, where 4.6 percent of the overall population is estimated to have died. In the Lower Shabelle region, a death rate of at least 9 percent was recorded among all ages, with 17.6 percent of under-fives there dying between October 2010 and April 2012, the study notes.

“There is consensus that the humanitarian response to the famine was mostly late and insufficient, and that limited access to most of the affected population, resulting from widespread insecurity and operating restrictions imposed on several relief agencies, was a major constraint,” said the study.

Humanitarian workers are keen to avoid a repeat of the famine, which has been described by many as a mainly “manmade” disaster. In this report, IRIN asks Somalia experts and analysts whether the conditions that led to the famine are still in place, and whether another famine could occur in Somalia.

The experts interviewed were: Abdihakim Ainte, a Somali analyst; Abdirahman Hosh Jibril, a member of the Somalia parliamentary committee for human rights and humanitarian affairs; Abdullahi Jimale, chairman of Somalia’s national disaster management agency; Olivia Maehler, operations liaison manager for Save the Children’s Somalia/Somaliland programme; Alun McDonald, Oxfam’s media and communications adviser for the Horn, East and Central Africa; and Daniel Molla, FSNAU’s chief technical advisor.

What have been the key lessons learned from the famine in Somalia?

Daniel Molla: There [was] sufficient and actionable early warning information and analysis provided by FSNAU and FEWSNET [ http://www.fews.net/Pages/default.aspx ] in the lead-up to the declaration of famine in July 2011. However, as widely documented, this did not translate into [a] timely and adequate response on the part of the humanitarian community and donors... Nutrition and mortality surveys should be undertaken outside of the regular calendar when early warning information indicates a deteriorating food security situation, in order to assess the situation and recommend appropriate interventions in a timely manner.

Olivia Maehler: I would think that lessons learned [include]… the need to keep in place a rigorous programme responding to humanitarian needs in normal times so that this can be scaled up [in emergencies]. We were able to scale up quickest in places where we already had a large humanitarian input. Also, the fact that cash transfer programmes proved very successful and stimulated rather than overwhelmed markets, and the need for humanitarian funding to move toward multi-year funding to allow for building resilience.

In the long term, the focus for avoiding hunger crises like this one lies in enhancing the resilience of communities themselves, and national governments have a central role to play. More than aid, government policy, practice and - crucially - investment, are vital to build people’s resilience by reducing disaster risk and protecting, developing and diversifying livelihoods.

Alun McDonald: The biggest lesson is that timeliness of the response is key, and early action saves lives. The humanitarian response saved many lives and helped millions of people by providing them with food, water, medicine and other aid - not only for saving lives but also helping farmers and pastoralists rebuild their livelihoods and support their families. However, the response ultimately came too late for many people.

Abdihakim Ainte: Keys lessons are that [the] absence of coordination from the international relief [community] worsen[ed] the enormity of the famine. Also, lack of preparedness on the part of the Somali government and local organizations [was a] key takeaway from the famine. We’ve also learned that the role of [the] Somalia diaspora in alleviating the famine was critical.

Could the famine have been avoided?

Molla: It is difficult to say famine could have been avoided altogether, but the scale and severity of it could have definitely been curtailed through [a] timely and robust response to the early warning information...

Ainte: [The famine] came at [a] critical time when most of the affected regions [were] run by Al-Shabab, [an insurgent group that] ban[ned] aid agencies… That hostility profoundly worsened the magnitude of the drought. From this point of view, it could have being averted, and it’s safe to say it was [a] man-made disaster.

What went wrong?

Molla: The 2011 [famine was] precipitated by a combination of a severe drought and consequent harvest failures for two seasons, low purchasing power of the poor, high food prices, and reduced humanitarian assistance hampered by insecurity and inadequate funding - all taking place in the context of an already weakened population whose resilience has been eroded by repeated exposure to frequent shocks and persistently high levels of acute malnutrition. The result was widespread excess mortality.

McDonald: There was a collective failure by governments, aid agencies and donors to act early… There was a reluctance to act and commit resources until there was certainty about the scale of the crisis - by which time [it was] already too late. Many governments don't step up their response until the crisis is in the news - but it's not in the news until people are already dying… Somalia was also an incredibly difficult place for aid agencies to respond effectively. After years of conflict, it was one of the most difficult and dangerous places in the world to work… There are lots of lessons to learn about how best to work and provide aid in such an environment. All our work in Somalia is done with local partners, who can often get better access than international agencies.

Ainte: The belated respon[se] from the international community, together with Al-Shabab’s blockade [of] aid organizations is what went wrong. If Al-Shabab is wiped out of Somalia, and the international community continues to build an early warning system to enable the Somalia government and local organization to forecast drought, chances of [famine] happening again [are] very slim.

Could a famine occur again in Somalia?

Molla: A majority of the rural poor and displaced population of Somalia remains extremely fragile, with its resilience weakened as a result of frequent and repeated exposure to shocks. Under such conditions, the risk of future famines can’t be ruled out unless sustained short-term humanitarian assistance as well as long-term development assistance are provided… [Even so,] the conditions that led to the famine are not there at present. While insecurity continues to pose challenges for humanitarian access, food prices have come down substantially and terms of trade and the purchasing power of the population [are] more stable now. The 2012 ‘deyr’ rains have been good and the current ‘gu’ rainy season is proceeding normally and is expected to yield average to above-average harvest[s] and good pasture and water conditions for livestock.

Maehler: Given how vulnerable communities continue to be to seasonal shocks, future deterioration in their situation could occur unless we continue to respond and build communities’ resilience. We are making progress, but humanitarian funding is dwindling… This could have a potentially devastating impact on the… chances for thousands of families across Somalia.

McDonald: Droughts, food crises and poor rains will definitely continue to happen in Somalia and the wider region. But droughts are natural events, whereas famines are ultimately manmade... [For example,] there was a severe drought in Kenya at the same time, but without the massive loss of life. The tragedy in Somalia happened because of a combination of drought, conflict, poor humanitarian access, a slow response, high food prices and a lack of effective government. If these issues are not addressed, then famine could occur again. Somalia was the first famine of the 21st century, and we need to make sure that it is also the last.

What is the way forward?

Molla: Resolution of the ongoing conflict in Somalia is ultimately a prerequisite to address food insecurity and avert famine in Somalia in [a] meaningful and sustainable manner. In the lead-up to the 2011 famine, insecurity ha[d] adversely impacted both assessment and monitoring of the food security and nutrition situation in several parts of Somalia, as well as humanitarian response. At present, there are several areas in south and central Somalia that remain inaccessible due to insecurity.

McDonald: We need to explore more innovative ways of delivering aid and using new technology - for example one of our partners used SMS and mobile phones to transmit cholera-prevention messages to people in insecure areas. In some areas, there was food available but prices were high and people couldn't afford to buy it - so we need to look at alternative aid such as providing people with cash rather than with food aid… We also need to ensure better links between our short-term humanitarian work and longer-term development work.

Ainte: Three initiatives should be put in place: First of all, building an [early] warning system is very critical. Secondly, strengthening local capacity, including civil society organization[s], is very important. Thirdly, continued engagement and partnership with [the] Somali government and local organization[s] is very crucial.

Is Somalia ready for another food security emergency?

Ainte: [The] government has [laid] down core priorities, and security is at the top of everything. In some respects, despite its international focus and support, the current government is better situated and equip[ped] to address future disasters.

Jimale: I think Somalia will be able to respond to a drought like the one in 2011 if government capacity to provide services is consolidated and [the] international community acts in a timely manner.

Jibril: The government is yet to provide services in liberated towns [where Al-Shabab has been driven out], and many areas are still in Al-Shabab hands, so it is hard to react if drought erupts.

aw-amd/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98082/Somalia-beyond-the-famine</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108160838010687t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 22 May 2013 (IRIN) - Over one million people in Somalia are currently food insecure, according to a May report by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET). This number is a significant drop from the 3.7 million considered food insecure in mid-2011.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Filipino Muslim rebels take tentative steps towards governance</title><pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305210454530433t.jpg" />]]>MANILA 21 May 2013 (IRIN) - The oppressive summer heat bore down on this impoverished southern Philippine town on Mindanao Island as thousands gathered to hear a &quot;proxy candidate&quot; of the country&apos;s largest Muslim rebel force address the crowd on the eve of recently concluded mid-term elections.</description><body><![CDATA[MANILA 21 May 2013 (IRIN) - The oppressive summer heat bore down on this impoverished southern Philippine town on Mindanao Island as thousands gathered to hear a "proxy candidate" of the country's largest Muslim rebel force address the crowd on the eve of recently concluded mid-term elections.

In the crowd were members of the 12,000-strong Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) - this time unarmed in keeping with a promise to the government to help keep peace and order during the 13 May polls. 

The candidate backed by MILF- the group’s first time to openly support a candidate - Tucao Mastura, 66, was a last-minute challenger to Esmael Mangudadatu, who has been governor of the Muslim-dominated Maguindanao, one of five provinces in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), since 2010. Mastura lost, but he said the election was a “fruitful” exercise that gave the rebels and the `Bangsamoro’ (local Muslims) a lesson in democracy. 

MILF has shunned past local elections, so as to not appear as if it were abandoning its struggle. 

"You could say I was a proxy candidate for the MILF," said Mastura, whose older brother is a member of MILF's decision-making central committee. "I did not want to run for governor of Maguindanao, but due to circumstances, the Bangsamoro people decided to push me in order to partake in this political exercise." 

He said had he won, it would have given MILF its first taste of governance ahead of signing a final peace agreement with the government, under negotiation since last October, and hopefully ending four decades of bloodshed that have left tens of thousands dead and the southern region mired in deep poverty. 

Mastura, a grizzled veteran who had fought in the jungles at the peak of the insurgency in the 1970s before deciding to drop his guns for a degree in accountancy, said he believed real peace could only be achieved by empowering local Muslims and giving them a chance to run their own affairs. 

The governorship of Maguindanao would have given the MILF a toehold in local politics traditionally ruled by moneyed and powerful clans, Mastura said, though he claimed the loss had not left him embittered. 

"We will get another chance in the new political entity," he said. 

MILF signed a "framework" agreement with Manila in October 2012, in which the government agreed to create a new autonomous political entity to be governed by MILF by 2016, when the six-year term of reformist President Benigno Aquino ends. 

A transition commission has until next year to draft a basic law to be passed in parliament, which will then carry out a referendum on whether proposed areas for the new autonomous region want to join. The new region will replace the current ARMM, created in 1990, which the government has called a “failed experiment” that has yet to improve life for the region’s 4.5 million Muslims. 

Both sides are still discussing how to share resources in the proposed area and how to fully reintegrate combatants into society while disarming them. 

"I hope by 2016 the Bangsamoro would be able to fully govern ourselves and engage the public," Mastura said. "We will continue to work with the government towards achieving this goal." 

Chief negotiator hopeful 

The government's chief negotiator with MILF, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, told IRIN recently that a final peace deal could be signed before Congress resumes in July. She said that apart from helping monitor peace and order, MILF had also been helping the government arrest illegal loggers and apprehend suspected “terrorists” and criminals in areas it controls, many of which lie within ARMM. 

She said MILF has given in to the "primacy of the peace process" and even allowed President Aquino to visit rebel areas in February, a first for a sitting president. 

Aid agencies are safely escorted into areas with development programmes under way. 

The rebels signed a pact with government in January this year to support a ban on firearms during election day, as well as allowing unhindered movement of election personnel into “security-sensitive areas”, including remote villages and towns claimed by MILF as part of its ancestral domain. 

"My MILF counterpart has repeatedly said failure is not an option. I agree completely," Coronel-Ferrer said. 

aag/pt/cb 

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98072/Filipino-Muslim-rebels-take-tentative-steps-towards-governance</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305210454530433t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MANILA 21 May 2013 (IRIN) - The oppressive summer heat bore down on this impoverished southern Philippine town on Mindanao Island as thousands gathered to hear a &quot;proxy candidate&quot; of the country&apos;s largest Muslim rebel force address the crowd on the eve of recently concluded mid-term elections.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The changing face of land disputes in Liberia</title><pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305171420580095t.jpg" />]]>MONROVIA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Liberia Land Commission, which was set up in 2009 to help settle land disputes between returning refugees and their neighbours, is making significant headway, say land experts, but non-conflict related land disputes are increasing, most of them as a result of weak land laws.</description><body><![CDATA[MONROVIA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Liberia Land Commission, which was set up in 2009 to help settle land disputes between returning refugees and their neighbours, is making significant headway, say land experts, but non-conflict related land disputes are increasing, most of them as a result of weak land laws.

Tens of thousands of Liberians were displaced during the 1999-2003 civil war. Many returned to their villages to find their land had been sold on or taken over by neighbours. Disputes over land occurred all over the country, but were mainly concentrated in Nimba, Lofa and Bong counties, which had high levels of displacement [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/89149/LIBERIA-Land-rights-tensions-not-abating ].

Since 2009 many of the neighbour-neighbour disputes have been resolved without too much difficulty, given that the conflicting parties already had an established relationship, and thus a shared interest in negotiating. said Gregory Kitt, project manager with NGO Norwegian Refugee Council, which has helped resolve hundreds of land disputes over the past decade.

In recent years, such disputes have reduced slightly, said Kitt. "This is an indication of the progress Liberia has made to become more stable."

Land reform was identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Report [ http://trcofliberia.org/reports/final-report ] as one of the priorities for boosting long-term stability.

"We've made a lot of progress over the past three years. We've sorted out at least five dozen cases," Cecil Brandy, chairman of the Land Commission, told IRIN. But dozens of cases continue to come in each month, he added - many of them related not to displacement but to weak land ownership laws that insufficiently respect people's property rights and can lead to corrupt practices. "On a daily basis we are intervening in land fights across the country. Our files are filled with too many cases. Families are at loggerheads. It is hectic."

Parallel laws

Land ownership in Liberia is based on Common Law which requires an owner to have a title deed. But a parallel system of traditional law, based on verbal agreement, is also prevalent, creating widesperead confusion over who owns what. Landowners as a result, often sell to multiple buyers, opening up room for conflict.

During the civil war, fraud was rife with many illegitimate land-related documents registered. "This criminal practice must stop. They make fraudulent transactions without the involvement of the real landowners. Because of this, now as Liberians return from Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea, they are facing major problems with their land," said Brandy.

The Commission is trying to set up a better land registry system so citizens can more easily access land ownership documents, and at least know what their legal ownership status is. And it has submitted a criminal conveyance bill to the Liberian legislature to deal with suspected criminals involved in multiple land sales. Brandy hopes the bill will soon become law.

The Liberia Land Commission is an autonomous government body, with a staff of 25 civil servants, set up to shape land reform policy in Liberia [ http://www.lc.gov.lr/index.php ].

Ciapha George, 45, is currently battling another family for ownership of his plot of land in the capital, Monrovia: unbeknown to him, the land had been sold to someone else before he bought it.

The case went to court and the judge recently ordered him to demolish his house and turn it over to the former owner. "The seller misled me. Right now I am the loser. All my efforts have been in vain," he told IRIN. George's family is currently living in an abandoned building in the capital.

But the governance bodies set up to protect these laws remain weak, said Kitt, and until they are strengthened, civil society groups will continue to have to step in to try to resolve disputes before they end up in court.

The Land Commission must be more proactive in tackling this problem of multiple ownership, said Monrovia resident Prince King. "I have seen lives and properties destroyed because of land disputes. Liberia is just from war and we need to put these things behind us."

Some vulnerable families have never been given formal access to their land, said Brandy, who pointed out that one of the Commission's priorities is to make ownership more equitable by re-examining how deeds are distributed.

Communities versus investors

According to environmental NGOs, including Friends of the Earth Liberia, the local authorities and landowners have sold more than 1.5 million acres (607,028 hectares) of land to palm oil companies in Liberia over recent years, seriously threatening some communities' property rights [
http://www.irinnews.org/report/94882/LIBERIA-Land-grab-or-development-opportunity ].

"Over the past year and a half we've seen an increase in land conflicts between communities and investors trying to develop natural resources. It is clear that challenges are emerging," said Kitt.

pc/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98070/The-changing-face-of-land-disputes-in-Liberia</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305171420580095t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">MONROVIA 20 May 2013 (IRIN) - The Liberia Land Commission, which was set up in 2009 to help settle land disputes between returning refugees and their neighbours, is making significant headway, say land experts, but non-conflict related land disputes are increasing, most of them as a result of weak land laws.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Restive northern Kenya sees shifting power, risks</title><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011251201360592t.jpg" />]]>GARISSA-NAIROBI 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - The presence of foreign militias in parts of northeastern Kenya, and their collusion with security officials and business people there, may be to blame for a rise in insecurity in the region, where multiple gun and grenade attacks have been reported over the past two years.</description><body><![CDATA[GARISSA-NAIROBI 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - The presence of foreign militias in parts of northeastern Kenya, and their collusion with security officials and business people there, may be to blame for a rise in insecurity in the region, where multiple gun and grenade attacks have been reported over the past two years. 

But securing northern Kenya is increasingly vital to the government, with the badlands growing in economic viability, the new constitution shifting power to the counties, and mega development projects being planned in the region. 

In October 2011, Kenyan troops launched an intervention into Somalia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94018/KENYA-SOMALIA-A-risky-intervention ] in pursuit of the Somali insurgent Al-Shabab militia, which it blamed for incursions into Kenya. Since then, dozens of people, including security officers, have been killed in attacks, mainly in the northeastern town of Garissa and the mainly-Somali Dadaab refugee camp.  

To address this, a number of security operations have been launched, involving the deployment of hundreds of police and military officers, arrests and curfews, as well the cessation of the registration of new Somali refugees amid fears of Al-Shabab infiltration. 

The most recent security operation in Garissa led to hundreds of arrests. "Ten police officers, among them the head of crime investigations [and] six local [administration] chiefs, have been suspended,” Charles Mureithi, the northeastern regional police chief, told IRIN, adding, “More arrests are on the way, and, of course, convictions.” 

The police officers and chiefs were said to be operating in league with the criminals, a view shared by a Garissa political leader, who spoke with IRIN on the condition of anonymity. 

"The monster responsible for all the sufferings we have experienced is… a club of wealthy traders from the Far East, Somalia [and] Kenya [as well as] politicians, our security officers and at least two sects of Al-Shabab,” said the Garissa leader. 

Who is to blame for the rising insecurity? 

An Al-Shabab-linked militia group has been blamed for some of the attacks in Garissa. 

"They only strike with an objective [of] fight[ing] other religions,” said Maulid*, a Garissa resident. “In Garissa, they worship in two mosques, same [as] in Nairobi. They consider us as infidels.” 

Churches in Garissa have been among the buildings targeted by grenade attacks. 

An Islamic religious leader, who preferred anonymity, called for the arrest of Al-Shabab-linked leaders and the seizure of their properties. "We want to see traders who paid gangs of criminals to kill arrested,” he said. 

According to Ahmed Yasin, a political science graduate from Somalia, the Al-Shabab-linked militias are retaliating against some prominent Kenyan Somalis’ support for the creation of an autonomous region of Jubaland [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97860/Briefing-Somalia-federalism-and-Jubaland ] in southern Somalia - which could serve as a buffer zone between the two countries - and against their support for the Ras Kamboni militia. 

In September 2012, the Ras Kamboni militia, alongside Kenyan troops, forced Al-Shabab out of the lucrative port city of Kismayo, which is a key economic and strategic resource for militias in southern Somalia. On 15 May, Ras Kamboni leader Sheikh Ahmed Madobe was announced as Jubaland’s president. 

While Al-Shabab is bitter at losing Kismayo, Yasin said, it also opposes the creation of a buffer zone, which would protect Kenya from Al-Shabab incursions. 

"Political leaders, elders and clerics must abandon support for [the] Ras Kamboni militia group... They must be wise [and] restrain from Somalia politics… and let their people enjoy peace," warned Yasin. 

What has been the fallout of the insecurity? 

A security operation to pacify the region has led to dozens of arrests; those found without legal identification documents were netted. Rights groups, however, are critical of these sweeping operations. 

Some Kenyan youths in Garissa are wrongfully being arrested as they lack identity cards, said Abdiwelli Mohamed of the local organization Citizens Rights Watch. The process of acquiring identification documents is often fraught with challenges, including long delays in the often-neglected northern region. 

According to Khalif Abdi Farah of the Garissa Northern Forum for Democracy, a civil society organization, dozens of people have also been injured, with others being illegally arrested in the crackdown. 

The police denied claims of arbitrary arrests, a view shared by Haji*, a Garissa resident and retailer. "It’s true [that] the police conducted house-to-house searches [and] stopped people on the streets. They checked identity cards and counter-checked with a list they were carrying. It’s clear [that] they are looking for particular individuals," he said. 

Besides a rising death toll and a large number of people injured in attacks over the past two years, the insecurity has had adverse socio-economic effects. Garissa businesses have been hit hard. 

A night club and guest house owner in Garissa said his business has suffered due to the curfew. "I only have an hour to operate. [I] open the pub at 5pm and close by 6pm.” 

Fear has also affected his business: “My guest house clients, [who] were mainly travellers either heading to Wajir, Mandera or Nairobi, these days no longer spend a night in Garissa for fear of arrest or attack," he said. 

Proceeds from the once-booming Garissa livestock market are declining too, said a revenue officer, noting that livestock traders are afraid of arrest. Asset and property values have also dropped significantly since December 2012, with fewer people opting to live or invest in Garissa. 

Why is securing northern Kenya vital? 

Securing Garissa and other northern Kenya regions has become a priority for the government, particularly amid the country’s newly devolved governance structure, lucrative cross-border development plans and the north’s growing economic viability. 

Devolution [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97726/Briefing-Devolution-to-transform-Kenya ], a centrepiece of Kenya’s 2010 constitution, will allocate more resources to the county governments, a move that is expected to reduce the marginalization of outer areas like northern Kenya. 

Kenya is also seeking to develop closer ties with its neighbours in the north, mainly Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan, amid planned mega development projects, such as the Lamu Port and Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET [ http://www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/pillars/project/macro_enablers/181 ]), which will link the Horn of Africa region. 

“Previously peripheral areas to the north and east will assume a new economic, and so political, significance,” states a 2 May analysis by Oxford Analytica [ http://www.oxan.com/ ], a global analysis and advisory firm, which notes that development had previously been concentrated in the central belt stretching from Nairobi to the Ugandan border. 

Kenya also expects to get relief from its current electricity shortages by 2016 thorough the Eastern Electricity Highway Project [ http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P126579/regional-eastern-africa-power-pool-project-apl1?lang=en ], which will connect Kenya’s electrical grid to Ethiopia’s, adds the analysis. “Protecting this supply will require: greater security in border areas; more careful management of local conflicts between communities in border areas to prevent escalation into disputes between the two states; and continued friendly relations between Nairobi and Addis Ababa.” 

Recent oil discoveries [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95547/KENYA-Oil-hope-and-fear ] in northwest Kenya, and ongoing exploration in other regions, such as near Lamu [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96675/KENYA-Disquiet-over-Lamu-port-project ], “ further underline the importance of once-peripheral areas of the country to future economic development,” added the analysis. 

What challenges lie ahead? 

“Nairobi's incentive to extend state authority to historically neglected regions will grow, but not without facing significant challenges,” said a 14 May Oxford Analytica analysis. 

The northern Kenya regions are characterized by widespread insecurity [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/90505/KENYA-SOMALIA-Insecurity-without-borders ]. Inter-communal violence and the proliferation of small arms are common, the state is largely absent, and the borders are mostly porous. 

For example, there are currently inter-clan clashes in Mandera, which neighbours Garissa, with several people being reported dead and at least 6,600 displaced, according to the Kenya Red Cross Society [ https://www.kenyaredcross.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=476&Itemid=124 ]. 

In response, security in Mandera has been beefed up and residents have been urged to surrender illegal firearms. 

Forceful disarmament [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/89060/KENYA-Your-guns-or-your-freedom-please ] is likely there, as similar moves have occurred elsewhere in the north. But this only further alienates residents who blame insecurity on the inadequate state presence. 

“While such events appear familiar and of little wider significance, the new geography of Kenya's development plan - including energy, transportation, hydrocarbons - alters the political considerations of centre-periphery relations and increases the relevance of long-standing insecurity and distrust,” Oxford Analytica’s 14 May analysis said. 

“If an historical state reliance on coercion continues, rising insecurity in northern and coastal areas creates some risks for smoother longer-term economic development,” it noted. 

Kenya After the Elections [ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenya-after-the-elections.pdf ], a 15 May policy briefing by the International Crisis Group (ICG), warns that devolution may not “be a ‘magic bullet’ that will allow the country to correct historical patterns of neglect, and redress regional marginalization and inequitable development… There are concerns devolution could ultimately balkanize counties, creating ‘ethnic fiefdoms’.” 

The briefing urges county governments to be inclusive of minority interests to address inequality. 

“The new government has the opportunity to usher in a new era of peace and socioeconomic development that would benefit all communities and unite the country. The foundation has been laid with the overwhelming support the constitution received in 2010, a base that should be maintained and built upon for a peaceful and prosperous future.” 

*Name changed 

aw-na/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98059/Briefing-Restive-northern-Kenya-sees-shifting-power-risks</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011251201360592t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GARISSA-NAIROBI 17 May 2013 (IRIN) - The presence of foreign militias in parts of northeastern Kenya, and their collusion with security officials and business people there, may be to blame for a rise in insecurity in the region, where multiple gun and grenade attacks have been reported over the past two years.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Libyans in North Africa scared to return home</title><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305160746270426t.jpg" />]]>CAIRO 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Until government and revolutionary forces attacked the Libyan town of Bani Walid, about 170km southeast of the capital Tripoli in October last year, Abdullah Warfella had been determined never to leave.</description><body><![CDATA[CAIRO 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Until government and revolutionary forces attacked the Libyan town of Bani Walid, about 170km southeast of the capital Tripoli in October last year, Abdullah Warfella had been determined never to leave.

But after two weeks of imprisonment and torture, the 68-year-old former contractor fled.

“They accused me of supporting [former ruler Muammar] Gaddafi during the revolution, which is not true at all,” Warfella told IRIN in Cairo. “These people have turned life into hell for people, not just in Bani Walid, but everywhere in Libya.”

Warfella is one of tens of thousands of Libyans who have fled to Egypt. Many are accused, often falsely they say, of having fought in pro-Gaddafi forces in 2011, or having publicly expressed support for him.

Far from home, many struggle to find employment and affordable accommodation, and lack almost any formal support. But they fear revenge attacks should they return home.

“There is a persistent desire inside Libya now for taking revenge on whoever took sides with Gaddafi against the revolutionaries, even if these people who took sides with Gaddafi were not influential people or fighters themselves,” said Salah Al Turki, a senior executive from the Cairo-based NGO Libyan Foundation for Human Rights (LFHR).

“Some of Gaddafi's supporters who initially left Libya in the wake of the downfall of the Libyan dictator and then returned to their home towns faced problems. Gaddafi's supporters in other countries watch all this and are filled with fear to return, lest they should meet the same fate.”

The number of Libyans who have fled the country is not clear as very few register with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

A source in the Libyan Ministry of Social Affairs said there were 430,000-530,000 Libyans in Tunisia. LFHR estimates the number of Libyans who had come to Egypt after the demise of Gaddafi's regime at 750,000, although the Libyan Embassy in Cairo told IRIN the number is not more than 30,000. Algeria is also thought to shelter tens of thousands of Libyans.

Despite, its geographical size, the Libyan population is only around six million, and government officials say that having such large numbers of citizens outside Libyan borders is a humanitarian and security concern for the government.

Some Libyans in Egypt were formerly high-ranking figures, like Ahmed Gaddaf Al Dam, a cousin of Gaddafi and a close associate who is now at the centre of a legal tussle [ http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2010/17/The-price-of-extradition.aspx ] in Cairo, aimed at paving the way for his extradition to Libya. 

But most lacked senior roles in the Gaddafi administration, and say they feel under threat because of their previous public support for Gaddafi, or for simply belonging to a tribe or town judged “pro-Gaddafi”.

Safe haven?

Though many Libyans who have fled to Egypt told IRIN they thought it was not yet safe to return, life in Egypt is far from easy and they say they continue to live in fear.

“Most of these people, particularly those who had committed crimes in Libya before coming here, think that state institutions or even international organizations will spy on them for the sake of the new government in Libya,” Omar Mohamed Al Ogaly, a plenipotentiary minister at the Libyan Foreign Ministry, told IRIN.

“They have this general fear of state or official agencies and this is why they stay away from these agencies.”

Egypt is undergoing economic and political strife of its own after the Arab Spring, and Libyans abroad are struggling with rising food prices and a lack of work.

Mohamed Al Salak, a TV host from the Libyan channel Libya TV, describes meeting one Libyan family living in a cemetery west of Cairo.

“Despite this, the members of this family are afraid to approach the Libyan Embassy for help,” Al Salak said. “Some of them have medical problems, but they are even afraid to go to the hospital, lest their whereabouts are known to the government in Libya.” 

LFHR tries to find ways of reducing the suffering of Libyan refugees in Egypt. Organization staff meet these refugees, try to give some financial support and present their plight to the Libyan government.

Division 

The current debate [ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-05/world/39048298_1_islamists-militias-parliament ] within Libya about what sort of role ex-Gaddafi supporters should have in the new administration is a subject that also divides Libyans in Egypt. 

In Cairo, fights have taken place in public areas like shopping centres between Libyans who used to support Gaddafi and others who detested his rule and rose up against him.

“We all had to keep silent under Gaddafi even as we did not like the man or his rule,” said Fawzi Al Trapolsi (not his real name), who worked for years as plenipotentiary minister under Gaddafi.

“There must be some forgiveness. Libya will not move a step forward if this desire for revenge continues to control everything.” 

On the other side of the political debate are Libyans like Adel Abdel Kafi, an ex-Libyan fighter pilot who flew his military plane from Tripoli to Cairo in the early 1980s and applied for political asylum in protest against what he called “Gaddafi's despotism”.

“Forgiveness?” he said to IRIN. “How can we forgive the people who either participated in killing innocent Libyans or who kept silent while the Libyans were being humiliated for more than 40 years?” 

Building trust

The Libyan government is taking some steps towards reconciliation. In Tunisia, Naema M. Elhammi, the deputy head of the General National Congress, told IRIN she had met Libyans living in poverty but not yet willing to return.

“They are all afraid,” Elhammi told IRIN. “They think they will face many troubles when they go back. The fact is that some Libyans do nothing but settle old scores with their compatriots. This makes everybody afraid.” 

A group of parliament members, including Elhammi herself, are paying visits to neighbouring countries to talk to the Libyan refugees and convince them to go back. But they still have to build trust. 

In Cairo, the Libyan Embassy has opened a separate office in a different part of the city to the embassy to listen to the problems of the refugees and try to convince them to go back.

Mabrouk Raheel, an embassy official responsible for the office, says 5-7 Libyans visit the office every day to demand help either to continue living in Egypt or to go back to Libya.

“People who did not commit crimes during the revolution have no problem in going back,” Raheel said. “Those who committed crimes, however, must go to court.” 

Al Ogaly, the plenipotentiary minister, says if some Libyans are not able to go to Libya at present, at least Libya must go to them.

“We want these people back,” Al Ogaly said. “They must return to their country. Why should they stay abroad?” 

He says Libya's revolutionaries are now more receptive than ever before to the idea of the return of their compatriots who supported Gaddafi.

Warfella from Bani Walid, whose son is currently in jail in Libya accused of fighting the anti-Gaddafi revolutionaries, says he is not yet convinced.

“We need a justice system that guarantees that nobody will be put in jail unjustly,” Warfella said. “We need security and assurances that nobody will come out, of his own will, and attack us or accuse us of imaginary things. We want Libya to be for all Libyans.”

When asked, however, whether he thinks these conditions can be met in the near future so he can return and see his children and wife, he sighs wearily: “I have hope in God.”

ae/jj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98045/Libyans-in-North-Africa-scared-to-return-home</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305160746270426t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">CAIRO 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Until government and revolutionary forces attacked the Libyan town of Bani Walid, about 170km southeast of the capital Tripoli in October last year, Abdullah Warfella had been determined never to leave.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Pastoralism’s economic contributions are significant but overlooked</title><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108010808430012t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Pastoralism is often regarded as an antiquated practice ill-suited to the modern economy, yet trade between pastoral communities in Africa - much of it informal and illegal - generates an estimated US$1 billion each year, according to a new book published by the Futures Agriculture Consortium.</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Pastoralism is often regarded as an antiquated practice ill-suited to the modern economy, yet trade between pastoral communities in Africa - much of it informal and illegal - generates an estimated US$1 billion each year, according to a new book [ http://www.future-agricultures.org/pastoralism/7666-book-pastoralism-and-development-in-africa ] published by the Futures Agriculture Consortium. 

“If we shift our gaze from the capital cities, where the development and policy elite congregate, to the regional centers and their hinterlands where pastoralists live, then a very different perspective emerges. Here we see the growth of a booming livestock export trade, the flourishing of the private sector, the expansion of towns with the inflow of investment, and the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs commanding a profitable market, and generating employment and other business opportunities; and all of this driven without a reliance on external development aid,” said the authors of the study. 

Pastoralism contributes between 10 and 44 percent of the GDP of African countries. An estimated 1.3 billion people benefit from livestock value chain, according to the International Livestock Research Institute. 

“Pastoralism contributes to the livelihoods of millions of people across Africa, in some of the poorest and most deprived areas. It is a critical source of economic activity in dryland areas, where other forms of agriculture are impossible,” Ian Scoones, from the Institute of Development Studies [ http://www.ids.ac.uk/ ], told IRIN. 

Ced Hesse, a researcher at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), told IRIN that in East Africa alone, “pastoralism directly supports an estimated 20 million people” and produces “80 percent of the total annual milk supply in Ethiopia, provides 90 percent of the meat consumed in East Africa, and contributes 19 percent, 13 percent and 8 percent of GDP in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, respectively”. 

He continued, “This is an enormous contribution to the regional economy, but often is unrecognized.” 

Invisible 

IIED’s Hesse explains why little attention is paid to pastoralists’ contributions: “The benefits that pastoralism brings are invisible to most governments because the methodologies they use for assessing economic activity and growth, the most popular being GDP, are not adapted to pastoralism.” 

“A ‘total economic valuation’ framework is needed. When Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, used this methodology to calculate the contribution of livestock to the Kenyan economy, they found livestock’s contribution to agricultural GDP is about two and half times greater than official estimates,” Hesse said. 

“Kenya’s livestock were under appreciated and no attempt to enumerate it had been made for decades,” the IGAD report said. 

Experts like Scoones say the rapid urbanization in Africa will continue to provide increased market opportunities for pastoralists. Not all will benefit from the direct sale of livestock, but there are opportunities for diversification. 

“There are spin-off benefits from such trade, including opportunities for engaging in diversified activities, including processing animal products, providing transport, fodder and marketing support, and offering services in the growing small towns in pastoral areas,”  said Scoones. 

“Not all those in pastoralist areas can be involved directly in the growing, vibrant livestock trade that feeds the burgeoning cities across Africa,” Scoones added. 

Bad press 

Yet other than reports of pastoralists suffering from poverty and climate-related shocks, pastoralism receives little attention from national governments or the media. 

Of the reporting that does exist, much is negative, according to Media perceptions and portrayals of Pastoralists in Kenya, India and China [ http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/14623IIED.pdf ], an April 2013 IIED report. 

In Kenya for instance, 93 percent of news articles on pastoralist analyzed by the authors were about drought and conflict. Fifty-one percent of articles mentioning conflict presented pastoralist as the cause of the problems rather than the victims of conflict. 

In India, on the other hand, 60 percent of articles reviewed portrayed pastoralists as victims “who have lost access to grazing land because of the growth of industrial agriculture, the dominance of more powerful social groups, and limits to grazing in forested land, among others.” 

The bad press has generated calls for pastoralist communities to change their lifestyles. 

Media reports also fail to mention the environmental benefits of pastoralism, which can contribute to biodiversity conservation [ http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/pdf/2041-7136-2-14.pdf ], and the role it plays in making food systems resilient by, for example, preventing overreliance on drought- and flood-vulnerable crops. 

“The media tends to portray pastoralists as a source of problem or as lost causes, yet most media articles about pastoralists do not even quote the pastoralists themselves. The media portrayals paint a partial picture, one that rarely mentions the important economic and environmental benefits of pastoralism, or the way that herder mobility helps increase the resilience of food systems in a changing climate, so that even distant consumers in cities benefit,” Mike Shanahan, communication specialist and author of the study, told IRIN. 

Minorities Rights Group International observed in its 2012 State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples [ http://www.minorityrights.org/11374/state-of-the-worlds-minorities/state-of-the-worlds-minorities-and-indigenous-peoples-2012.html ] report that pastoralists are being forced to abandon their livelihoods by national governments. Experts see an increase in the phenomenon of land grabs, in which pastoralists and minority groups are driven out of their lands to pave the way for development projects considered more “viable”, such as large-scale irrigation projects [ http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2011.652620 ]. 

Some experts, like IIED’s Hesse, say there is a case for modernizing pastoralism - not in the “sense of settling them or turning them into ranchers”, but by focusing on the “logic of pastoralism’s production strategies that allow it to produce the benefits in arid and semi-arid environments characterized by rainfall variability.” 

ko/rz   

]]></body><pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98052/Pastoralism-s-economic-contributions-are-significant-but-overlooked</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201108010808430012t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 16 May 2013 (IRIN) - Pastoralism is often regarded as an antiquated practice ill-suited to the modern economy, yet trade between pastoral communities in Africa - much of it informal and illegal - generates an estimated US$1 billion each year, according to a new book published by the Futures Agriculture Consortium.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Landmine casualties rising in Kachin, Myanmar</title><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305150926290145t.jpg" />]]>LAIZA 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - Former rebel fighter Lahpai Hkam has been in pain every day since a landmine destroyed his lower right leg during a battle with government soldiers 18 months ago in Myanmar’s northern Kachin State.</description><body><![CDATA[LAIZA 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - Former rebel fighter Lahpai Hkam has been in pain every day since a landmine destroyed his lower right leg during a battle with government soldiers 18 months ago in Myanmar’s northern Kachin State. 

“The artificial leg that I was given last year doesn't fit properly and it rubs on my stump causing a lot of pain,” he said in a hospital in Laiza, the de facto capital of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the political wing of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which has been fighting for greater autonomy from the Burmese government for the past six decades. 

According to rebel Kachin surgeon Brang Sawng, such stories are common and the number of landmine injuries is on the rise. 

“More than 45 soldiers who have had amputations because of landmines over the last two years urgently need prosthetics and replacements,” said Sawng. “The number one injury is caused by landmines, with both Burmese troops and Kachin soldiers mistakenly stepping on their own mines.” 

While neither side has published any official figures on civilian landmine casualties, media reports and information from NGOs indicate there were at least 381 landmine casualties, including 84 deaths in 2011. However, international experts say the real number could be significantly higher. 

"No armed group - neither the army nor any ethnic armed group [in Myanmar] - provides any public information on casualties, especially civilian ones. This is not unusual,” Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, a researcher with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) [ http://www.icbl.org/intro.php ], told IRIN. 

Many observers fear a rise in civilian casualties - and prosthetics are not the only thing in short supply. 

“For many of the operations we need blood transfusions, but we have no emergency blood bank or reserve so we are forced to operate without blood replacement,” the doctor Brang Sawng explained outside the recovery room of Laiza’s main military hospital. 

According to a recent report [ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/03/20/untold-miseries ] by Human Rights Watch (HRW), both government troops and the KIA still use landmines. 

“These are weapons that will continue to maim and kill for years to come and I would be surprised if both sides are capable of mapping and following where they actually placed these mines,” said Phil Robertson, deputy director of HRW’s Asia division. “The answer is for both sides to cease using anti-personal landmines.” 

Off limits 

The collapse of a 17-year-old ceasefire between the Burmese government and the KIA in June 2011 [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95616/MYANMAR-Kachin-conflict-continues-one-year-on ], has left more than 80,000 displaced. 

For Kachin farmers like Naw Tarong, who fled his home more than a year ago with his wife and three children, leaving behind crops and cattle, the chances of returning home soon look remote. 

“We cannot return home because KIA soldiers have planted landmines around our village to keep the Burmese out, and they have warned us not to go back yet,” Naw Tarong said, adding that some of his cattle had stepped on them and been killed. 

ICBL’s Moser-Puangsuwan said many civilians (mainly subsistence farmers) set off the mines while returning to their fields or foraging in the forest. “Combatants in Myanmar/Burma do not generally mark their mined areas… A deadly hazard exists.” 

Currently, Myanmar has no specific policy to support landmine victims during treatment and rehabilitation, and emergency services in conflict areas are “extremely limited”, according to a 2012 Landmine Monitor report [ http://www.the-monitor.org/custom/index.php/region_profiles/print_theme/2027 ].

As of 1 October 2012, 160 countries (over 80 percent of the world’s governments) have ratified or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, and 111 have signed or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Myanmar [ http://www.the-monitor.org/custom/index.php/region_profiles/print_profile/536 ] has signed up to neither. 

ss/ds/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98040/Landmine-casualties-rising-in-Kachin-Myanmar</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305150926290145t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">LAIZA 15 May 2013 (IRIN) - Former rebel fighter Lahpai Hkam has been in pain every day since a landmine destroyed his lower right leg during a battle with government soldiers 18 months ago in Myanmar’s northern Kachin State.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Boko Haram attacks hit school attendance in Borno State</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg" />]]>KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</description><body><![CDATA[KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.

Most of the children are primary school students, according to the official. Thus far Boko Haram (BH) has burned or destroyed 50 of the state's 175 schools, he said. Teachers in the state confirmed the estimate.

Students are staying at home for fear of attack, or are being transferred to private Islamic schools, known in the north as Islamiyya. On 6 May state schools officially reopened following a six-week break, but many have stayed closed, as officials and teachers fear attack.

BH gunmen had initially targeted schools - most of them primary - at night, detonating grenades and home-made explosives or dousing classrooms with gasoline and setting them alight, according to military and education officials.

But on 18 March BH shifted tactics, attacking four schools in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State (population 4.17 million, according to the 2006 census), in broad daylight, killing four teachers and seriously injuring four students.

On 9 April suspected BH members killed two school teachers in their homes, and four officials of the Borno State Feeding Committee, which runs a primary and secondary school feeding programme, while they were on an inspection tour of schools in Dikwa town, Borno State.

The shift to direct attacks on educators and students has rattled teachers, leaving many too frightened to go to work.

"We have been asked to resume classes but we are too afraid to return to school despite the stationing of a military post outside the school,” said Hajara Modu, a school teacher at Customs primary school in Maiduguri.

Secondary school enrolment is only 28 percent in Borno State - the lowest in the country, according to a 2010 Nigeria Education Data Survey.

On 10 April BH leader Abubakar Shekau claimed ordering the attacks on schools in an Internet video post, citing Nigerian military raids on Islamic schools in Maiduguri as the impetus.

Adama Zannah, a father of four students attending Sanda Kyarimi secondary school, one of the four schools affected in the 18 March attacks, told IRIN: "I want my children to attend school but they can only do that if they are alive... I can't allow them to go to school in this atmosphere of fear when schools are burnt and gunmen open fire during classes."

Islamic school attendance up

Many parents see the safest option as Islamic schools, which have seen a sharp rise in enrolment rates over recent months. These are private religious schools which teach an Islamic education, though some include English and maths in the curriculum.

Given the demand, fees at some Islamic schools have also increased - by 300 percent since the beginning of the year in some cases, according to parent Muhammad Kolo. He used to pay US$1.90 per month to educate his two children but the fee is now $7.60.

Borno State information commissioner Inuwa Bwala said the state government will try to strengthen Islamic schools with more money and more materials, and standardize their curriculum to teach children the Koran alongside Western education. (BH literally means “Western education is a sin” in Hausa).

Militarized schools

The school districts worst-affected by the arson attacks include old Maiduguri city and four local government areas - Marte, Kala-Balge, Gamboru Ngala and Mabar - in the northern part of Borno on the border with Cameroon and Chad, where BH has a strong presence [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria ].

Many students from these areas have been taken to neighbouring Dikwa District to take their May and June exams, protected by a heavy military detail.

The government has deployed soldiers in at-risk schools across the state but some parents fear this puts their children in yet more danger.

"The presence of soldiers makes them more prone to attack by BH which considers the military as their main enemy," said Ahmad Kyari, a resident of Gwange Quarters in Maiduguri city where all the schools in the area have been burnt; his three children are at home.

Attacks on schools violate children's right to education, as well as a number of human rights. In situations of conflict, they may also violate international humanitarian law and criminal law, and may constitute war crimes [ http://www.protectingeducation.org/what-international-laws-are-violated ].

"I'm really afraid to go to school. The thought of gunmen storming the school and opening fire or throwing explosives gives me the shivers and this is a thought that fills the minds of many students like me," said Nura Babani, a student of Sanda Kyarimi secondary school which was attacked on18 March.

"It is too dangerous to go to school now, especially with the attacks on some schools in broad daylight during classes,” student Maryam Habib, told IRIN.

In some areas where the government was trying to renovate schools, BH had set them ablaze again. Gwange II primary school in the Gwange area of Maiduguri city, considered a major BH stronghold, was burnt four times by BH, each time after undergoing renovation.

The school-burnings "sabotage government's effort at improving on education in Borno State", Borno State information commissioner Bwala told IRIN.

"It is not possible to learn in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. How do you expect a teacher to put in his best and a child to learn effectively when they are always on edge, in anticipation of gun and bomb attacks. This is killing education here," said the Ministry of Education official.

The federal government is exploring ways to forge a dialogue with BH [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/Analysis-Hurdles-to-Nigerian-government-Boko-Haram-dialogue ] but thus far, there has been little progress, and in recent weeks the militants have been staging a fierce comeback in the northeast. Over 3,600 people have been killed in BH-related violence since 2009, including extrajudicial killings by Nigerian security forces, according to Human Rights Watch.

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98032/Boko-Haram-attacks-hit-school-attendance-in-Borno-State</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305141119440092t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KANO, NIGERIA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - Around 15,000 children in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, have stopped attending classes since February 2013, according to a Borno State Ministry of Education official who preferred anonymity, as Boko Haram extremists continue a wave of attacks on state schools.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Briefing: Towards internal solutions to the DRC crisis</title><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg" />]]>KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</description><body><![CDATA[KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97999/Is-more-force-in-the-DRC-more-of-the-same ] will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there. 

The over-3,000-strong military force will work alongside the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) to carry out targeted offensives against militia groups, which have caused numerous civilian deaths and massive population displacements. 

While some welcome the forthcoming military intervention, many analysts are advocating for Kinshasa-led initiatives - such as reforming key institutions - as necessary, if not alternative, solutions. 

In this briefing, IRIN highlights some of the key issues that the DRC government needs to address to secure its restive east.  

How can the security sector be reformed? 

An effective security sector is key to resolving most of DRC’s problems, according to analysts. 

“The Congolese government’s inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else,” according to The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, a 2012 report by a group of Congolese and international civil society organizations [ http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/drc-ssr-report-20120416-1.pdf ]. 

“An effective security sector - organized, resourced, trained and vetted - is essential to solving problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals,” the report says. 

But little money is being directly spent on security sector reform (SSR), it notes.  For example, while official development assistance to DRC post-2006 has amounted to at least US$14 billion, just over one percent, or about $84.79 million, has gone to SSR. 

The report blamed the international community for being “politically incoherent and poorly coordinated” with regard to SSR. It also blamed the DRC government’s lack of political will to take on SSR, attributed to its endemic corruption.  

According to Naomi Kok, a research consultant with the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), “SSR is a long-term project for the DRC, and Kinshasa should take most of the responsibility for completing this successfully.” 

But DRC’s government needs to take charge first. “The problem of the DRC is a weak, and some may argue an illegitimate, government, unable to take full control and charge of its vast territory,” Nicholas Opiyo, a Kampala-based lawyer with the Akijul consultancy [ http://www.akijul.org/index.php ], told IRIN. 

He added:  “The weakness or division in the Congolese army is only... a manifestation of the broader breakdown in the governance infrastructure of the country. As a result, everyone finds resort in a patchy solution, taking control of the instruments of violence.” 

How can the army be reined in? 

Acts of violence against civilians in eastern DRC are rampant, with the DRC army (FARDC) and dozens of militia groups culpable. 

FARDC troops are accused of violating human rights around the town of Minova, in South Kivu Province, last year while retreating from North Kivu Province  after the city of Goma fell to the M23 militia [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96833/DRC-Fall-of-Goma-puts-200-000-children-at-risk ], according to  a  May UN Joint Human Rights Office report [ http://monusco.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Pj7jOWjAxWo%3d&tabid=10662&language=en-US ]. 

“In this context, at least 102 women and 33 girls were victims of rape or other acts of sexual violence perpetrated by FARDC soldiers,” says the report, which noted the soldiers had arbitrarily executed at least two people, used forced labour and looted from villages. 

FARDC is often regarded as weak, with poorly organized, unmotivated troops. The M23 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] mutiny in eastern DRC in 2012 by ethnic Tutsi FARDC officers, for example, was in part fuelled by grievances over pay and living conditions. 

Training alone will not address FARDC’s problems, which are structural, say experts. 

“There is an overestimation about what training can achieve. Foreign partners (Belgium, USA, France, Angola, South African and China) have now been training the Congolese army since 2006, and the results are very poor,” Thierry Vircoulon, an International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst, told IRIN in an e-mail. 

“Training is only good when it can be applied but, given the state of the Congolese army, the trained soldiers are sent back to a dysfunctional organization without decent pay and working conditions. Training will not solve the structural problems of the Congolese army.” 

FARDC has also been plagued by ethnic divisions, with some troops still loyal to militia groups. 

“The so-called Congolese army is a patchwork of fighters with various backgrounds - former Mobutu military personnel, militiamen from the MLC [Mouvement de liberation du Congo] of Jean-Pierre Bemba, Mai Mai, AFDL [Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo] fighters, etc. And there was not a process to unite these groups, and some of them managed to stay in their territories of origin - CNDP [Congrès national pour la défense du people]/M23 in North Kivu,” noted Vircoulon. 

“Therefore, ethnic and past affiliations remain and are stronger than the military discipline and command. The Congolese army is not an institution; it is a patchwork of undisciplined and untrained groups of fighters.” 

What about demobilization? 

The process of integrating ex-combatants into the Congolese army, part of the government’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, is also mired in challenges. 

“Currently, the national military is in a shambles, and there are various armed groups that are in various stages of DDR. This situation is aggravated by domestic and regional political manipulation,” ISS’s Kok told IRIN.  

Another challenge is the failure to address the causes of armed rebellion, making disarmament often short-lived.  In 2009, for example, the DRC government signed a deal with members of the CNDP, but failure to fully implement the deal led to the 2012 mutiny that gave rise to M23. 

“[When] the M23 were integrated into the FARDC in 2009… their command and control structures [were] more or less intact. Thus, when the time came for them to defect and form a new rebellion, they were ready to do so,” explained Kok.   

The absence of a vetting process for ex-combatants is also a problem. 

“A strategy of integrating abusive warlords and their fighters into the Congolese army - in often short-lived deals with little or no vetting or training before former combatants are redeployed as Congolese army soldiers - have fuelled the cycles of violence and horrific human rights abuses in eastern Congo,” Ida Sawyer, a researcher and advocate with Human Rights Watch (HRW), told IRIN.  

Reforming the judiciary   

Inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms further enable impunity for abuses. 

Between 15 November and 2 December 2012, at least 58 cases of rape were reported during M23’s occupation of Goma, according to the May UN Joint Human Rights Office report. M23 also executed 11 civilians, recruited and used child soldiers, and engaged in forced labour and looting. 

Only a few DRC militia leaders have been arrested and convicted, among them Thomas Lubanga , who in, March 2012 was found guilty [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95073/DRC-Lubanga-verdict-a-first-step ] of conscripting child soldiers in the northeastern  Ituri  region by the International Criminal Court (ICC).  In March, former M23 commander Bosco Ntaganda surrendered to the ICC.   

Experts are calling for the establishment of specialized courts within DRC to try human rights crimes outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. 

“Together with Congolese civil society organizations, we have also called for the establishment of specialized mixed chambers or a specialized mixed court within the Congolese justice system, with the involvement of international prosecutors, judges and other personnel to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Congo since 1990,” said HRW’s Sawyer.  

“The need to hold to account those responsible for perpetuating grave crimes (government troops, rebels and militia) must not be short-changed for any short-term gains,” added  analyst Opiyo. 

According to ICG’s Vircoulon, “The blocking of justice reform is the reason why impunity is rife in the DRC.” 

What about negotiating local solutions? 

Peace talks  between M23 and the DRC government are ongoing in Kampala, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), an approach favoured by analysts sceptical of the military intervention force [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44523&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo ].   

“It all depends on the effectiveness of the UN intervention brigade, but from the point of the organization [ICGLR], we don’t believe the intervention brigade is the final solution to the conflict,” Stephen Mwachofi Singo, an ICGLR programme officer, told IRIN. 

“Already, through [the] ICGLR process, there is a political process ongoing in Kampala. Such a process should be supported to its logical conclusion,” added Singo. 

Tackling ethnic tensions is key to pacifying conflict areas. 

“DRC is a vast, multi-ethnic country, with some of the ethnic groups spanning the borders of neighbouring countries such as Angola and Rwanda. Unfortunately, past and the current DRC government[s] have used this multiplicity of ethnic groups against each other and for political connivance. This has brewed a sense of favour and disfavour,” said analyst Opiyo. 

“In order for the ethnic-based tensions to ease, there is need for not just a nationalistic army but a representative government. A centralized rather than devolved administration would provide a platform for a national, rather than an ethnic, outlook among the Congolese people.” 

According to Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, a political scientist at Makerere University, “Lasting peace in the DRC cannot come out of the deployment of aggressive foreign forces.” 

“The causes of violence in that country [DRC] are internal. The solution therefore lies in resolving the internal problems that fuel the fighting. Only [the] Congolese can solve their problems in a sustainable way. Foreigners will not do it for them.” 

so/aw/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98036/Briefing-Towards-internal-solutions-to-the-DRC-crisis</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2009/200904210609150343t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">KAMPALA 14 May 2013 (IRIN) - A UN intervention brigade will soon be deployed to the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to neutralize militia groups operating there.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>&quot;Sometimes you cannot apply the rules&quot; - Syrian rebels and IHL</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091143410929t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - In recent months, Syrian rebels have faced increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. For guidance on the laws of war, they turn to a combination of Islamic law, IHL and their own sense of righteousness or, as one expert put it, “revolutionary justice” - with mixed results.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Syrian rebels facing increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law turn for guidance on the laws of war to a combination of Islamic law, IHL - where they are aware of it - and their own sense of righteousness, according to analysts and IRIN interviews with fighters [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words ].

A report [ http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Syria_Public_Brief_Dec_2012.pdf ] late last year by the Center for Civilians in Conflict pointed to the opposition’s lack of coherent control and command structures as a roadblock to the rebels’ ability to mitigate civilian harm and enforce IHL and human rights principles throughout their ranks. As a result, with hundreds of different militias and battalions operating on the ground, each group seems to be following its own set of rules.

As Aron Lund, an expert on Syrian opposition groups, put it: “Some groups go by Shariah law, and some groups go by rule of the gun - revolutionary justice.”

Sources of guidance

Faris al Bayoush, a former colonel now commanding a unit of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in the northwestern governorate of Idlib, said he sees the regime’s blatant disregard for human rights as all the more reason to commit himself to international norms.

“The abuses were one of the main reasons the revolution started, so of course we should respect humanitarian laws.”

He told IRIN he was well-informed of the content of all relevant international agreements because the Syrian army used to hold training courses on IHL for its officers. “They don’t respect IHL, but they teach it,” he said. He tries to ensure all his men also follow the rules by briefing them before each operation. His unit’s behaviour is, however, not only regulated by IHL but also by Islamic law, or Shariah. He views the two as complementary sources.

“[Shariah] gives us more detailed instructions,” he said. “For example, the Prophet said that you are not allowed to kill an old man, harm a child or cut down a tree.”

In contrast, an increasing number of fighters within the FSA view Islamic teachings alone as providing adequate guidance, though in many cases, they do indeed overlap, especially in the treatment of women and children.

“As Muslims, we regard Shariah law as our essential source,” said Raed al Aliwi, an engineer turned FSA commander in Hama Governorate. “We don’t have to study international laws because respecting human rights comes naturally with our religion.”

He claimed that breaches are rare, but conceded that it is sometimes difficult to make all lower-level fighters respect the rules. Many of them lack even basic knowledge of international norms, codified in the four Geneva Conventions on the laws of war and their associated protocols, which add up to more than 500 articles.

“We can do anything to topple [Syrian President Bashar al-]Assad,” said Abu Bakr, an FSA fighter in the central city of Homs. He argued that there is no need for regulations because he sees the rebels’ own judgment as sufficient: In his view, since the rebels are battling a dictatorship, they necessarily have higher ethical standards.

“We can see what is true and false,” he said, “and we are on the right side.”

Al-Ansar Brigades, a jihadist group affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra (The Front for the Support of the people of Syria), which is considered a terrorist organization by the USA, relies on a religious scholar among its commanders who provides guidelines that all the members adhere to.

“I have no idea of what the Geneva Conventions or any other treaties say,” said Abu Mousab, one of the group’s commanders, “but I’m sure Islamic law is much better because it is the most just law in the world.”

Even among the FSA fighters who stressed their commitment to IHL, there is a growing frustration with the international community and its principles.

“We are living in the days of the fighters,” said an FSA-member who goes by the name Manhal Abu Bakr in Hama. “Sometimes you cannot apply the rules when no one else does. We lost faith in international laws and policies.”

Proclamation of principles

Rebel crimes have persisted despite codes signed by FSA leaders to address misconduct and lawlessness within the opposition ranks. For example, the FSA’s high command issued a “Proclamation of Principles” [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/FSA_Proclimation_of_Principles.pdf ] in July, committing to human rights, pluralism and democracy, and pledging to do their “utmost to uphold international humanitarian law and norms, including by treating prisoners humanely, even as the Assad regime engages in crimes against humanity”.

For observers like Michael Shaikh, director of country operations at the Center for Civilians in Conflict and author of the Center’s report examining how the Syrian opposition views the principles of IHL, this shows a certain desire to engage with these principles.

“The codes of conduct are initially often more for public perception than about actual battlefield behaviour, but there is a clear opening here.”  

Some groups are making an effort to establish disciplinary systems.

“Many rank and file said they were reprimanded when they blew something up or fired their weapons without necessity; that weapons were taken away when there were incidents of civilian harm,” said Shaikh, who conducted interviews with rebel fighters between June and October 2012. “There was an inherent perception that they had to distinguish themselves from the Assad regime.”

Some groups have been trying to encourage rebels to follow the laws of war. According to a Westerner working with makeshift hospitals near Aleppo, one activist group tried distributing pamphlets on the laws of war, supported by verses from the Koran and the Bible, and quotes from Martin Luther King as well as Mahatma Gandhi. But it was chased away by an extremist group.

The International Committee of the Red Cross recently began arranging workshops on IHL for armed opposition groups, and is in dialogue with them with the aim of visiting places of detention under their control. It also distributes pamphlets on IHL obligations to both armed opposition groups and Syrian government soldiers it meets while in the field.

The UK is also funding [ https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-to-parliament-on-syria ] a programme by two consultancy firms to train rebels using an Arabic curriculum about international humanitarian law. And the Syrian Support Group [ http://syriansupportgroup.org/about/ ], a US-based group with a license to fundraise for the FSA in the US, says it only finances military councils that have adopted the FSA’s Proclamation of Principles.

Protecting their reputation

Efforts to limit rebel abuses have also been hampered by the escalation of chaos and violence.

“The big problem in Syria is not so much extremism but lawlessness and a lack of joint leaderships and structures that can deal with these kinds of things,” said Lund, who has authored several reports on Islamist groups in Syria for the Swedish Institute for International Affairs.

As such, criminality is a bigger threat to minorities than even the most extreme Islamist groups, like the Syrian Islamic Front, which has gone out of its way to reach out to Christians (though most extremist groups take a harder line on those belonging to Assad’s Allawite sect, who are often considered apostates from Islam).

“They [extremist groups] want to protect their reputation,” Lund said. “They want to do this work for the larger purpose of defeating Assad. They realize atrocities would undermine that... Random killing is not even part of al-Qaeda’s doctrine.”

Civilian protection

All rebels interviewed claimed they protect local residents during their operations by not targeting areas inhabited by civilians, or by telling people to vacate the area before they strike.

“We’ve even aborted operations when we realized we might hurt civilians,” said Abu Mousab of the jihadist al-Ansar Brigades.

The Center for Civilians in Conflict refers to other strategies to protect civilians, such as sending out scouts before their advance, or launching ambushes at night when people are less likely to be outside.

Nevertheless, civilians have often borne the brunt of the conflict due to a lack of consideration by the rebels. For example, rebels frequently endanger the population by positioning military objectives inside residential areas. In September 2012, 10 civilians were killed when the regime forces shelled a rebel position right next to an apartment building, according to the Center.

To make matters worse, rebel groups have been increasingly employing guerrilla tactics such as suicide bombings, often resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In September, for example, a twin suicide bombing in Damascus reportedly carried out by Jabhat al-Nusra killed dozens of people.

Who is a civilian?

One of the main causes for concern is, according to experts, the absence of a clear definition of who is to be considered a civilian.

“Many rebels I spoke with see themselves as civilians who picked up arms - they don’t think the rules apply to them,” Shaikh said. At the same time, when looking at their opponents, “they had a very loosy-goosy understanding of civilians as someone without a gun,” but did not apply the term to Alawis or people they perceived to be members of the Shabiha militias supporting government forces.

Others do not think in terms of “civilian” and “combatant”, which in Shariah law are not the only determinants of whether someone is a legitimate target.

In a TV interview [ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yexixuNzuaY ] posted on the internet, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, traditionally considered a more moderate voice among Muslim scholars, said all collaborators working with the “unjust” Syrian government, whether civilian or combatant, should be killed, an opinion echoed by some of the fighters.

Businessmen who help fund pro-government militias “are considered like fighters” and are usually sentenced to death if found guilty of supporting the regime in one of the group’s judicial courts, said Hamza Abdulrahman, a member of the Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib.

He, like others, admitted his brigade interrogates prisoners, using beatings - “but we don’t torture like Assad does”. Afterwards, prisoners are transferred to one of the group’s courts. Anyone found guilty of murder, kidnapping or even theft might be executed, he said. Captured soldiers from the regime’s army are also routinely killed, unless they were caught when defecting.

In spite of their growing influence, extremist groups are acting with more restraint in Syria than they did in Iraq, Lund said, “probably because they learned that when they let things go out of hand, they lose popular support and because they know the minority issue is so explosive in Syria, so they have to tread carefully.”

He warned, however, that “with time, this will probably change.”

For the full interviews with rebel fighters, click here [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words ].

gk/ha/cb

 

How Syrian rebels view aid access

Under international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of aid, subject to their right of control. So where do Syria’s rebels stand on this? 

In spite of the differences between the various groups, all fighters interviewed said they would never attack an aid convoy, with even the most extreme groups saying they would be prepared to facilitate access for aid workers and protect them - on certain conditions.

“No one would mind aid workers, unless they are coming to spy on us,” said Manhal Abu Bakr. “We’d need to know exactly who they are. Otherwise it wouldn’t go well. There would be suspicion.”

“We have no objection to anyone coming to help, but only in coordination with us,” added Osama Hadba, a member of the FSA’s Liwaa al Fateh brigade in Aleppo.

According to one aid worker, some organizations have been careful not to brand their distributions with USAID logos, and the Washington Post [ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-14/world/38537333_1_aid-workers-syrians-obama-administration ] reported recently that the US “feeds Syrians, but secretly”.

In addition, many rebel groups are doing their own aid distributions. “It’s a big part of their propaganda,” Lund said. “They want to come off as concerned with civilian affairs and not just fighting.” Jabhat al-Nusra, for example, has put a lot of effort into organizing bread distributions and restarting bus traffic.

Hadba, like other fighters IRIN spoke to, insisted that all civilians are equally deserving of aid, regardless of religion or political affiliation.

“If we distribute food supplies, we go from house to house and check who is in need,” said Raed al Aliwi, the FSA commander in Hama. “We don’t ask about people’s religion or political opinion.”

However, fighters conceded they mainly hand out supplies in areas where residents support their side because they do not have access to areas dominated by regime supporters.

“The real test,” one international aid worker said, will come when aid workers try to access neighbourhoods that support the government but are encircled by opposition groups. “So far, it has generally been the other way around and they've had no reason to make life difficult for us.”

Some rebel groups have, however, stopped aid trucks at gunpoint, looted their belongings, and re-distributed them to their constituents whom they believe to be in more need.

gk/ha/cb


For more on violations of IHL in Syria, see documentation by Amnesty International [ http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/summary_killings_by_armed_opposition_groups.pdf ], Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/17/syria-end-opposition-use-torture-executions#torture ], and the UN Commission of Inquiry for Syria [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf ], as well as the report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict [ http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Syria_Public_Brief_Dec_2012.pdf ].

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98021/quot-Sometimes-you-cannot-apply-the-rules-quot-Syrian-rebels-and-IHL</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091143410929t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - In recent months, Syrian rebels have faced increasing criticism for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. For guidance on the laws of war, they turn to a combination of Islamic law, IHL and their own sense of righteousness or, as one expert put it, “revolutionary justice” - with mixed results.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Syrian rebels on IHL: In their own words</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091208460593t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the UN Commission of Inquiry accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, including UN peacekeepers, and possibly using chemical weapons. So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International [ http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/summary_killings_by_armed_opposition_groups.pdf ] and Human Rights Watch [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/17/syria-end-opposition-use-torture-executions#torture ] to the UN Commission of Inquiry [ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf ] accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, and possibly using chemical weapons [ http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uns-carla-del-ponte-says-there-is-evidence-rebels-may-have-used-sarin-in-syria-8604920.html ]. The capture and detention of 21 UN peacekeepers in March and another four last week also constituted a violation of IHL.

So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?

IRIN interviewed rebel fighters of various leanings and levels of authority to better understand their mindset.

(See our analysis on this issue here [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98021/Analysis-Sometimes-you-cannot-apply-the-rules-Syrian-rebels-and-IHL ]) 

Faris al Bayoush, former Colonel in the army, now commanding a unit of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Idlib Governorate:

“I’ve read all about IHL during the training courses that were organized for the officers in the Syrian army, so I know all the rules. The majority of Syrians are civilians, good people. We naturally wouldn’t want to do anything to hurt them. Of course we respect IHL because violating human rights is what the regime stands for. The FSA has been formed to protect people from their crimes... We’re also guided by Islamic law. There is no contradiction between both because their content is similar: Both sources tell us not to harm civilians, particularly not weaker elements, but the Koran gives us more precise instructions... Before each battle, I give a speech to everybody to make sure everybody has the same idea of what is permissible and what isn’t. Then we talk and discuss the issue…

“Any foreign aid worker would be treated like our guest because the civilians here are really in need of assistance… A civilian is someone who doesn’t carry a gun, no matter what sect he belongs to... Do we take precautions so that we don’t harm civilians? Frankly, I find that question weird. Everybody is in God’s hands. But of course we don’t usually launch attacks if there are civilians around…

“We try to take good care of our prisoners. We’ve taken 53 lately, and we let them go home because we had nothing to charge them with.”

Manhal Abu Bakr, FSA member, Hama Governorate:

“We’ve lost faith in international laws and policies. This is why Islamist groups are gaining ground. At first they were weak, but then people realized it doesn’t help them if they adhere to Western standards, so they grew stronger... Some say this is hypocrisy. The international community expects us to comply with IHL, but nobody cares if our rights are being violated. For example, if you catch a Syrian air force pilot who is responsible for killing hundreds of people, of course you’d kill him…

“Foreign aid workers would have to be careful. There are bad groups, thieves and criminals; they might steal their supplies or kidnap them. No one of us would mind them unless they’re coming to spy on us. We’d need to know exactly who they are before we let them near us. Otherwise there would be suspicion. We cannot afford to make mistakes because the [one mistake could be our undoing].

“We try to distribute all aid supplies coming in from Turkey evenly. Usually we give it to people who support the revolution. We wouldn’t give anything to people who support the government because as rebels, we cannot enter their neighbourhoods. But we don’t differentiate between different sects. When you see all the need, you forget about religion... We always try to take measures not to harm civilians during out operations. This is the first thing we look into when planning an attack. We alert them and tell them to vacate the area. If they feel we don’t protect them, we’d lose their support.”

Raed al Aliwi, engineer, FSA commander, Hama Governorate:

“International humanitarian law is our be-all and end-all. It’s natural for us to comply with these standards because the FSA’s main purpose is to defend the people. This is why the FSA only launches attacks on very specific places where there are armed regime supporters. In many cases, we had to stop operations because there were civilians in the vicinity... It’s easy to differentiate between Shabiha [militias who support the government] and civilians because Shabiha always carry weapons, at least a small pistol; and they only show up in places where regime troops are close by. We also know them by their dialect… Alawis in general are not a problem for us. We’re not opposed to any sect as such…

“We wouldn’t object to any aid team coming to our area, no matter where they’re from, even if they’re Israeli…

“As Muslims, we regard Sharia law as our essential source from which we derive our rules. The problem is that there are groups who draw false conclusions from it, and then they turn extremist and do terrible things...

I’m commanding 60 men, and sometimes it’s difficult to make everybody follow the rules. If anyone violates our standards, he’d be punished. The important thing is that the leader behaves well because he is the role model that all the other men follow in their actions.”

Osama Hadba, member of the FSA’s religiously conservative Liwaa al Fateh brigade in Aleppo Governorate:

“We rely on the Koran as the key source of our rules, but we also take all international agreements into account. We know about IHL because everyone can see the violations committed by the regime with their own eyes... We are humans that have been forced to take up weapons. Of course we don’t violate any human rights, unlike the criminal regime we are opposing…


“In our office, we register all human rights breaches that occur. When we arrest somebody who is charged with any of those crimes, he’ll be transferred to one of the military courts that have been established to deal with such cases. A lot of lawyers and judges have defected and started working for the revolutionary courts.

“We stop only aid convoys that supply the regime army, not the ones heading towards civilian areas… We have no objection to any foreign aid workers coming to help, but only in coordination with us. I’d be happy to accompany them…

“We protect the civilian population as much as possible. Before launching an attack, we declare the area in question as a military zone, and civilians are requested to stay away.  It’s difficult to prevent harm from the population in neighbourhoods [that support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad] because the regime troops put their tanks inside the residential areas and use the civilians as shields.”

Abu Mousab, a commander of the al-Ansar Brigades (a jihadist group affiliated with US-designated terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nusra), Deir-ez-Zor Governorate:

“One of our commanders is a religious scholar, and he is responsible for setting our rules and principles. We’re fighting for religious reasons, so following the Koran and the Sunnah [teachings of the Prophet] is paramount for us. We’re not interested in IHL because Islamic law is much fairer than any secular law…

“I have no clue what the Geneva Conventions or any other international laws say because I’m a believer, and I’m sure that the Shariah is the best law in the world. All other laws are no solution…

“We announce our attacks beforehand if it’s possible. We’ve even aborted operations when we realized we might hurt civilians… We also consider regime supporters as civilians as long as they don’t carry weapons - except informers since they are causing huge damage. If we have proof that someone is an informer, we execute them. Sometimes people are stubborn, so sometimes you have to torture them to get the information you need. If we have a prisoner who has killed people, we’ll kill him...

“Everyone responsible for crimes committed against the Syrian people deserves to be killed…

“But we’re not killing randomly, even if people aren’t Sunni. If we arrest someone, it’s forbidden to kill him unless he has committed crimes. If he has, however, he deserves to be executed…

“Any aid group wanting to help people would be welcome here. We’d be prepared to give them protection. If we have supplies to hand out, we give it out to everyone equally, also to Christian families.”

Hamza Abdulrahman, member of Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham, Idlib Governorate:

“We don’t care about IHL because the Shariah is our law. For instance, if we arrest a prisoner, we’d take him to a court. We have our own Shariah courts in every area now. We don’t execute anyone unless they are killers, or guilty of theft or kidnapping. Anyone who helps the regime in any way will also be killed, for instance businessmen who support the regime financially. They are considered as fighters, not civilians. We also execute regime soldiers if we catch them, except if they were about to defect…

“Before they are taken to court, we interrogate them, and if they don’t say what they know, we beat or punish them - but we don’t torture like Assad does. According to Shariah law, it’s forbidden to hurt anyone’s head or face. There are laws, and we follow them. We also have our own charities which distribute aid supplies. The only criterion is people’s need; their political opinion or sect is irrelevant…

“If we plant a bomb, we don’t detonate it if there are civilians around. We only launch missiles on areas held by regime forces so that civilians don’t get hurt… We wouldn’t obstruct any foreign aid team, as long as they are unarmed. Other Islamist groups might have a different view on that, for example Jabhat al Nusra. They haven’t commented on this issue, so I’m not sure. But they think like al-Qaeda. They don’t think a European or American could contribute anything good to our revolution.”

gk/ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98022/Syrian-rebels-on-IHL-In-their-own-words</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305091208460593t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - Like Syrian regime forces, Syria’s multitude of rebel fighters have faced growing criticism in recent months over violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, with groups from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the UN Commission of Inquiry accusing them of killing opponents execution-style, torturing detainees, taking hostages, including UN peacekeepers, and possibly using chemical weapons. So how do the rebels view IHL principles? What guides their action? Who do they consider a civilian? And what do they think of aid workers?</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Somali security sector reform</title><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305131455010122t.jpg" />]]>NAIROBI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - At Gashandiga barracks in Mogadishu, Somalia, Pvt Mohamed Sheikh Issak pulled back his military fatigues to show his scarred right shoulder. “I was shot by Al-Shabab when they still controlled half of Mogadishu,” he told IRIN. “I was at home, but they knew I was a soldier.”</description><body><![CDATA[NAIROBI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - At Gashandiga barracks in Mogadishu, Somalia, Pvt Mohamed Sheikh Issak pulled back his military fatigues to show his scarred right shoulder. “I was shot by Al-Shabab when they still controlled half of Mogadishu,” he told IRIN. “I was at home, but they knew I was a soldier.” 

Issak joined the army over two years ago; he proudly recalled his role in the battles for Afgoye and Jowhar. With him were new recruits - young, inexperienced and ill-equipped, but determined to fight Al-Shabab; the militant group was ousted from the capital in 2011, but still controls large swaths of the country. 

“I want to defend my country,” 20-year-old Efrah Ibrahim told IRIN. She joined the army as a frontline paramedic after hearing a recruitment appeal on the radio. “Mogadishu was like another country before. It was very dangerous.” 

At the Somalia Conference held in London last week, British Prime Minister David Cameron pledged over US$50 million to help rebuild Somalia’s armed forces, police and judiciary. Other nations also committed funding, including nearly $60 million from the European Union. The hope is that young recruits like Issak and Ibrahim will soon take the lead in maintaining peace in Mogadishu, and one day throughout all of Somalia. 

Ambitious plans 

Many recent security gains in south-central Somalia have been the result of gruelling efforts by a 17,700-strong African Union force (AMISOM) supported by their Somali counterparts. More recently, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces have pushed back Al-Shabab in southern and western Somalia, respectively. 

But Somalia’s government has stressed that it wants to take control of the country’s security. An ambitious National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), adopted last August, outlines plans to rebuild Somalia’s armed forces and national security programme, reform the police and judiciary, and roll out a modern coastguard. Leaders hope to build a professional army of 28,000 within three years, at a cost of some $160 million, while also doubling police numbers to 12,000. 

“It is very important to rebuild the Somali forces and defeat the terrorist organizations and pirates that are threatening the security in our country,” Brig-Gen Mohamed Abdi Mammow, Somali National Army liaison officer, told IRIN. 

After two decades of war and the near-complete collapse of state institutions, Somalia faces profound challenges reforming its security sector. Issues include an underdeveloped national command and control system, competing clan-based loyalties, limited equipment and resources, and discipline concerns. 

Additionally, the Somali security forces, alongside their AMISOM counterparts, are fighting a violent insurgency. Recent attacks on the capital - including a suicide car bomb that left 11 dead just two days before the London conference - have underscored the significant demands on the security sector. 

“There is a real tension trying to train these forces when they are at war,” said Col Anthony Howie, senior military advisor to the UN Political Office for Somalia. “No one has the luxury of pulling them out; they are essential in the fight against Al-Shabab.” 

Analysts also point out that the security forces’ success depends on the government’s reach. “The security forces can only operate effectively where the government has earned local legitimacy,” said Matt Bryden, director of Horn of Africa think tank Sahan Research. 

From militias to military 

Somalia’s armed forces comprise some 20,000 soldiers, defined as those fighting Al-Shabab, including militias not formally integrated into the military. But only around 13,000 soldiers receive regular financial payments, most of which are paid by the international community. Pay is critical - soldiers who get paid receive a $100 monthly stipend - and resentment over salaries threatens loyalties to a national command structure. 

“Outside Mogadishu, in the near-term, the government has little choice but to negotiate command and control arrangements with local forces, providing them with logistical support, financial support and legitimacy in exchange for a degree of loyalty. Paying salaries will ultimately be much more important in building a professional force than obtaining new weapons and equipment,” said Bryden. 

Al-Shabab deserters and defectors are also being integrated [ http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/giving-extremists-a-second-chance/ ] into the security forces, but the process is not straightforward. The threat of infiltration by Al-Shabab underscores the need for improved counter-intelligence by the Somali government. Meanwhile, some pro-government militias are resisting joining the national command, and concerns remain about the loyalties of fighters in clan-based units. 

“Loyalty challenges are surmountable with better training - not only physical, but rigorous training on nationalism, human rights and rule of law,” said Abdi Aynte, director of Somalia’s first think tank, the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. 

The Somali military now follows an annual training programme. The Uganda-based EU Training Mission has trained over 3,000 soldiers, with much of the training expected to move to Somali soil this year. AMISOM has also supplied a training team, while Turkey is expected to play a significant role in both military and police training. 

But training alone is not enough. “They are also woefully underequipped and under-resourced to fight a violent insurgency,” said Col Howie. 

This was evident at the Gashandiga barracks. Despite enthusiastic weapons drills by the young soldiers, Col Kassim Ahmed Roble revealed the base has just 100 AK-47s for 600 soldiers. 

“The army needs some more time,” he told IRIN. “We need more weapons as well as financial support from the international community.” 

The UN Security Council relaxed a two-decade arms embargo against the country in March, permitting the Somali government to buy light weapons for its forces. But Defence Minister Abdihakim Fiqi said last week in London that not “a single bullet” or gun had been received since the lifting of the embargo due to a “lack of resources”. 

From the streets to the courts 

Somali’s police force was also incapacitated by the conflict. Funding pledges in London included money earmarked to help double police numbers and to rebuild Mogadishu’s central prison. But the police face challenges similar to those confronting the military: recruits cite low pay and significant risk to themselves and their families. 

“We cannot increase police numbers without knowing exactly what budget we have to pay them,” Gen Mohamed Hassan Ismael, Somali Police Force liaison officer, told IRIN. “We also need professional judges. As police, we are in the hands of the judiciary. There are high levels of corruption in the judiciary - sometimes criminals pay their way out. There needs to be scrutiny from top to bottom.” 

The majority of Somaila’s 6,000 police officers are based in Mogadishu. Some served pre-1991 and were vetted before being allowed to rejoin the force; around 3,500 have been recruited since 2005. Their stipends are paid by the international community, on the condition that officers have completed basic training. 

“After 20 years of war, people don't always understand policing,” Cpl Ahmadu Sule Singer, a Nigerian police trainer with AMISOM, told IRIN. “Some people here have grown up using a weapon, but I teach them basic police work with civilians. I find it so difficult to control them at the beginning of the course.” 

On a joint night patrol, Somali police officers man a checkpoint in Hodan District, searching cars as their Nigerian counterparts secure the area. “I correct them if they do something that isn’t good - I tell them to talk gently rather than cock their rifle,” added Singer. 

Local residents selling khat and cigarettes at a busy junction are relaxed about the police’s presence. “I don’t mind the police. They are doing a good job,” taxi driver Abdirahman Aden Hussein said as his car was being searched. “Before, you couldn’t stand out here at night.” 

Discipline and human rights 

Punishing security forces who commit offences is also a major concern. 

“The Somali security forces and their allied militias have committed serious abuses. I have spoken to displaced women raped by the security forces and individuals fleeing fighting who have had all their possessions looted along the way by government militia,” Laetitia Bader, a Human Rights Watch researcher, told IRIN. 

Earlier this year, a woman who alleged she had been raped by security forces and a journalist who interviewed her were arrested and charged with insulting national institutions, prompting international outrage. Although the verdicts were eventually overturned, the Somali government faced difficult questions about its commitment to cracking down on rape committed by security forces. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has since acknowledged that some security forces have committed rape and said that they must be “defeated just like Shabab”. 

The president also stressed that crimes by members of the army would not be tolerated. Mobile military courts, which follow troops to the frontline, are used to try suspected offenders. According to Col Howie, these are some of the most active courts in Somalia: “They have wide-ranging powers to administer discipline, and they take that very seriously.” 

While the military and police are trained in human rights and civilian protection, Human Rights Watch stresses that proper vetting is also critical. “There has to be a concerted effort to sideline abusers - both from within existing forces and during any integration process of militias,” said Bader. 

Somalia’s security forces have a long road to travel before they can take charge of the country’s security, but with the commitment to change and the significant funding pledged, they may be marching in the right direction.  

zf/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98028/Analysis-Somali-security-sector-reform</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305131455010122t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NAIROBI 13 May 2013 (IRIN) - At Gashandiga barracks in Mogadishu, Somalia, Pvt Mohamed Sheikh Issak pulled back his military fatigues to show his scarred right shoulder. “I was shot by Al-Shabab when they still controlled half of Mogadishu,” he told IRIN. “I was at home, but they knew I was a soldier.”</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Analysis: Towards increased services for Syrian survivors of sexual violence</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304250551050096t.jpg" />]]>NIZIP 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Turkey&apos;s camps for Syrian refugees are, by many measures, a model of humanitarian assistance. But one important detail appears to have been overlooked: According to aid workers, nowhere in Turkey&apos;s 17 refugee camps can survivors of sexual violence find the level of specialized psychosocial support experts say they so desperately need.</description><body><![CDATA[NIZIP 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - More has to be done to ensure the health and wellbeing of women and children affected by the Syrian conflict, said Babatunde Osotimehin, executive director of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), on a recent visit to Turkey’s Nizip refugee camp, about 40km east of the southern city of Gaziantep.

One of Turkey’s newest camps, Nizip houses some 10,000 refugees, or “guests” as the government prefers to call them, in white canvas tents and containers arrayed in neat numbered rows along the rocky, sun-bleached banks of the Euphrates. 

It is, by many measures, a model of humanitarian assistance.

Amenities include a laundry facility, a mosque, a health clinic, hot water and hot meals, schools and playgrounds, teahouses, hairdressers and a supermarket where refugees can shop for extras using electronic voucher cards. Kids can play organized football and compete in chess tournaments, watch TV and weave rugs. There is gas and electricity, sanitation and tight security.

But Turkish authorities seem to have overlooked one important detail. According to aid workers, nowhere at Nizip, or at any of Turkey’s 16 other camps, can refugee survivors of sexual violence find the level of specialized psychosocial support experts say they so desperately need.

“I am impressed by what I have seen here,” Osotimehin, a former Nigerian health minister, told a group of reporters gathered outside the camp’s school. “It’s remarkable what Turkey has done at its own expense.” But he had also come, he said, to highlight the urgent needs of pregnant and lactating women as well as victims of the sexual violence said to be on the rise across conflict-battered Syria. 

Sexual violence in Syria

Indeed, as a January report  by the International Rescue Committee put it, “rape is a significant and disturbing feature of the Syrian/civil war” - an assertion supported by surveys of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon who consistently cited sexual violence “as a primary reason their families fled the country” [ http://www.rescue.org/press-releases/syria-displacement-crisis-worsens-protracted-humanitarian-emergency-looms-15091 ].

Weeks later, Erika Feller, assistant UN High Commissioner for Refugees, echoed, those concerns, warning of reports that “the conflict in Syria is increasingly marked by rape and sexual violence employed as a weapon of war.” [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44230#.UWQlm_Vfo3G ]

And writing in the Atlantic last month, Lauren Wolfe, director of the Women Under Siege Project, which documents the incidence of rape in conflict zones, described how Syria’s “massive rape crisis” is “creating a nation of traumatized survivors” [ http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/syria-has-a-massive-rape-crisis/274583/ ].

To date, Turkey has taken in around 193,000 refugees in 17 camps, and six new camps are currently under construction. Stretched to capacity, the country has been lauded for its open-door policy and generous aid. But at least one gap remains [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97851/Is-Turkey-s-approach-to-Syrian-refugees-sustainable ].

“From what we have been able to learn, there is virtually no trained psychosocial support [specific to survivors of sexual violence] currently available in the camps,” said Leyla Welkin, a clinical psychologist and gender-based violence consultant working with UNFPA.

Specific services for survivors of SGBV are rarely at the top of the priority list in emergency settings, said Meltem Agduk, a gender programme officer with UNFPA. Like others have done elsewhere, Turkish officials first focused on providing adequate food and shelter to a spiralling number of refugees.   

“You can see that our camps are in better condition compared to Jordanian camps,” said a senior Turkish official. “The people are very happy.”

The government has informed the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) that specialized staff are available to the Syrian refugees, who can be treated inside the camp or referred to hospitals outside the camp where necessary, UNHCR's office in Ankara said. 

But as Welkin told IRIN after a meeting with women `mukhtars’, or village leaders, who teared up when asked about sexual violence, “there is a significant need for professional support.” 

Psychosocial services, more generally, are available to both women and children in the camps, but a lack of private space makes it difficult for women to talk about their experiences of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), perpetuating a culture of silence that severely impedes efforts to address it.

Building capacity

That dearth of psychosocial support for survivors of sexual violence in Turkey’s refugee camps is a function of its scarcity in the country at large, said Welkin, who is based in UNFPA’s office in the Turkish capital Ankara. “When it comes to SGBV, Turkey is very underserved.” 

Lack of personnel is a challenge for the Ministry of Family and Social Policy more widely, Agduk added. In some cities, there is just one psychologist and one social worker to deal with both the normal Turkish caseload, as well as the influx of Syrian refugees (an additional 130,000 have been registered outside the camps). 

In recent years, Turkey has focused on increasing its ability to respond to domestic cases of SGBV, opening one-stop centres where survivors of SGBV can access counselling, legal advice, and other kinds of support all in one place. But Turkey has less experience in treating SGBV in the context of disasters, in which trauma is multiplied, Agduk said. 

The Turkish government has been keen to address the issue of disaster-related SGBV, she added, and has turned to UNFPA for technical expertise.

Together with the Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Policy, UNFPA has designed a pilot programme to prepare and train 24 health care workers to conduct preliminary psychological assessment and treatment in the camps. The programme will also provide general public education on SGBV, said Welkin, including an intervention specifically targeting men, “some of whom will be perpetrators”.

UNHCR has also given Turkish officials its guidelines, or standard operating procedures, for the prevention of and response to SGBV "to be shared among their staff working with Syrian refugees in the camps."

UNFPA has already trained Turkish health care workers in the clinical management of rape, including emergency contraception, prevention of sexually transmitted infections, and collection of forensic evidence. But in the absence of access to counselling, said Welkin, victims are unlikely to present for medical treatment, largely because of the stigma surrounding the issue. Cultural differences and language barriers have also posed challenges, Agduk said.

The new training will begin within a couple weeks, with services likely to be up and running within two months, she said. This first phase of the programme targets health care workers, psychologists and social workers at the municipality and governorate level, with the aim of building capacity inside institutions that can be carried forward. 

“My hope is that this catastrophe can serve as an opportunity for Turkey to take a step forward in SGBV prevention and intervention - that the professionals we train will be able to take these skills from the camps to their own communities,” Welkin said. 

Indeed, government officials see this programme as “opening a door” through which they can establish new services that will be available not only for Syrian refugees, but in case of future disasters.

“It is important that they are now taking it seriously,” Agduk said.

New legislation, passed last year, has significantly improved the laws governing SGBV, for example by expanding the definition to include non-married victims of domestic violence or divorced women who are assaulted by their ex-husbands.

Understanding the needs

Still, the task ahead is not easy, and not least for the fact that the UN now faces a major funding shortfall. Of the US$1.5 billion pledged by international donors to cover Syrian refugee needs for the first half of 2013, just over half has been committed. UNFPA requirements for the Syrian crisis, across the region, for the same period were $20.7 million, but so far, say representatives, the agency has received less than half of that [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97877/Promised-aid-funding-for-Syria-reaches-half-way-point ].

Another challenge is that the scale and range of SGBV-related needs among Syrian refugees are not fully clear. 

“Our concern is not about the number of psychologists trained, but the lack of information about the reality on the ground,” said Ayman Abulaban, Turkey representative of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). He said UNICEF does not currently have information about this, but hopes to in the near future when project activities begin. 

Abulaban said there was a need to assess the gaps, to increase comprehensive prevention and response services, and to create a standardized referral system. He said he hoped a new UNICEF project to increase resilience among children and youth in the camps would help support the government in addressing the needs. (According to a recent Save the Children report, sexual violence in conflict disproportionately affects children and teenagers) [ http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0-df91d2eba74a%7D/UNSPEAKABLE_CRIMES_AGAINST_CHILDREN.PDF ].

“It is of utmost importance that Syrian refugees can access SGBV services,” he said in a written statement.

In the lead-up to its training, UNFPA, the Ministry of Family and Social Policy and AFAD, the government’s disaster and emergency management unit, will conduct a large assessment of the needs, Agduk said.

Meanwhile, as the fighting in Syria rages on, refugees continue to pour over the border, with some 7,000 new arrivals registering each day across the region. By the end of the year, warned UNHCR’s regional coordinator for Syrian refugees, the number of Syrian refugees in the region could surpass four million [ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44602&Cr=syria&Cr1=#.UXjrJiuPgjU ].

The Ministry of Family and Social Policy did not answer IRIN's request for comment. 

pa/ha/cb

*This article provides additional information to an original version published on 2 May 2013. 

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97953/Analysis-Towards-increased-services-for-Syrian-survivors-of-sexual-violence</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201304250551050096t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">NIZIP 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Turkey&apos;s camps for Syrian refugees are, by many measures, a model of humanitarian assistance. But one important detail appears to have been overlooked: According to aid workers, nowhere in Turkey&apos;s 17 refugee camps can survivors of sexual violence find the level of specialized psychosocial support experts say they so desperately need.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Coffee and patience: a day in the life of a family hosting Syrian refugees</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081000090696t.jpg" />]]>SAADNAYEL, BEKAA VALLEY 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The experiences of 1.4 million Syrian refugees are increasingly well-documented, but little is known about the people who open up their homes to host them. How do you organize your house to accommodate people you may only barely know? What are the stresses and strains? Do politics get in the way? IRIN spent a day in the life of a host family to bring you this portrait.</description><body><![CDATA[SAADNAYEL, BEKAA VALLEY 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Two years ago, as Syrian refugees began streaming across borders, Lebanese families opened up their homes. Unlike in Jordan, Turkey and Iraq, where hundreds of thousands of refugees are being housed in camps, at the beginning of the influx into Lebanon, the majority of refugees were hosted by families. Some Lebanese households took in as many as six refugee families.

But as the conflict next-door has dragged on and the number of refugees in Lebanon has grown, so too has the burden on their Lebanese hosts.

Today, most of the 425,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon are renting homes or apartments; with only 6 percent hosted by families, according to a survey by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

IRIN spent a day with some Lebanese hosts, bringing you this portrait of a family trying to balance obligation and sacrifice.

It was a series of twists of fate that brought together two families - one Lebanese, one Syrian - that did not know one another.

They met 15 years ago in a shared cab on the way to Syria, where the Lebanese family often shopped for cheaper products. Becoming friends, they met once or twice a year in Syria after that.

When Israel began bombing Lebanon in 2006, as part of a war with the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, the Lebanese family fled to Syria, where their new acquaintances hosted them for one month.

Six years later, the tables were turned.

On a sunny Thursday morning, Hannan is preparing a simple Lebanese breakfast of bread and vegetables for guests in the small Sunni village of Saadanayel, in Lebanon’s eastern Beka’a Valley.

Houda, 7, Bassima, 14, and their grandparents Sadika and Mohammad are seated on the floor of the living room, preparing to eat.

Hannan has been hosting the family of seven Syrian refugees in her humble two-bedroom house for the last five months. The children’s parents, Fadia and Houssam, have been out since early morning, like every day, searching for jobs in the surrounding cities of the Beka’a Valley. Their third child, 10-year-old Kamal, is out fetching water.

When their neighbourhood near the Syrian capital Damascus was bombed in December 2012, Fadia and Houssam called the only people they knew in Lebanon, and Hannan immediately responded.

“It's a pity. They had nowhere to go,” she said. “I couldn't say no. It would have been an offence against God not to help them.”

Hannan’s husband has a second wife, and only sleeps at the house every other day. Their five grown children do not live at home any more. So Hannan gave up her bedroom for the young Syrian couple, and is now sharing the second room with the grandparents and three children.

She spends her morning with the grandparents, interrupting their chit-chat every five minutes to take laundry off the clothesline, prepare coffee, garden, and watch over the refugee children playing in the field next door (They arrived in Lebanon too late in the year to enrol in school).

Everyone helps out with the household tasks, even Sadika, who has arthritis and leg pains. Fadia helps with the cooking and cleaning when she gets home from the job search. But as far as Hannan is concerned, that’s the easy part.

“I am used to cooking a lot of food for my visitors, so I don't mind cooking for 10 people. It is not the logistical side which is difficult. It is the financial side,” she whispers. “We are struggling to get enough food for everyone.”

The Syrian family has run out of money, so she, her husband and her seven guests live off the little money her husband gets from his pension, from their rented out horse pen, and from the garlic they grow in the backyard, which they trade for other vegetables.

They have cut back on meat almost completely and Hannan and her husband no longer buy new clothes or things for the house.

“I don't want to tell them that it's difficult, because I fear God,” Hannan says. “In 2006 when I stayed at their place it was different. I was staying with the grandparents, and it was only for a month.”

Around midday, the visitors begin stopping by. First it is the neighbours; then shisha-smoking friends of Hannan’s son, some of them Lebanese soldiers; then her own friends. They pass the time under the shadows of trees in the garden. The coffee is always flowing. The visits do not stop until late afternoon.

They chat about everything and nothing, and when the discussion turns towards the situation in Syria, Hannan springs out of her seat, and disappears into the house, finding a new task to keep busy. She doesn’t say so, but the discussions appear to make her uncomfortable. At the very least, she’s tired of it. “They spend all day talking about Syria,” she says.

At 2pm, the school bus drops off the neighbours’ children, who join the Syrian children chasing each other around the field. Shortly after their arrival, Fadia returns from hours of job-hunting. She cannot afford to take the bus every day, so sometimes she walks for kilometres.

She checks on her children, then immediately turns to helping Hannan with the daily tasks. She doesn’t get very far before a new visitor arrives.

A local representative from the Sunni political party Future Movement has stopped by. (He sometimes distributes food vouchers to the Syrian refugees, but he does not have any with him this time).

“They're lucky to have found a host family,” Anouar Choubasse says. “A lot of Syrian refugees have nothing, not even a roof.”

Fadia is a little surprised by his arrival and keeps her distance. She has tried to keep her family’s presence as discrete as possible - potentially for fear of the growing resentment [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/97354/UN-To-avoid-tensions-with-refugees-Lebanese-hosts-need-support ] towards the refugees in Lebanon. She never shares her opinions about politics.

“Saadnayel has always been a [hospitable] community,” says Choubasse. “But now, I can feel the racism growing. A lot of Lebanese people are in a difficult situation and don't get any help. It's not as bad [here] as in certain villages, where they imposed curfews on the Syrians. But people are losing patience.”

This Lebanese host family appears to be no exception.

His wife may fear God, but Hannan’s husband Ali does not hesitate to speak openly when he comes home later in the afternoon.

“When I sleep here, I have to sleep on the couch in the living room. I want to sleep in the same bed as my wife again. If the situation lasts for more than two more months, I will set up the family in a tent in the garden. If they will be staying for the long term, I will build a permanent structure for them.”

He pauses to consider.

“Of course we need to help them,” he goes on. “As the Arabic saying goes: ‘If someone is good to you, be twice as good to them’. But we need our intimacy at some point.”

By 4.30pm, the visitors begin trickling out. The Syrian father, Houssam, is still not home. His wife hopes his delay means he has found a job.

While Mohammad, the grandfather, takes a nap in the living room, Fadia and Hannan have lunch together. To accommodate the constant stream of visitors, they have to eat in two shifts. Today, the women eat first. They usually mix with the men, but this change of circumstances makes them laugh. “In the old Damascene tradition, the men ate before the women,” Fadia says. “Now it's the opposite.”

Whereas both Fadia and Hannan seemed uncomfortable with some of the visitors talking politics, the atmosphere during lunch is much more relaxed.

Houssam eventually returns, still jobless. He is frustrated, but does not show it.

“I have been looking for a job for five months now and haven't found anything,” he says. “There is too much unemployment in the area and they hire the Lebanese before hiring Syrians… I could take any job, as long as it's not too physical because I have heart problems,” he adds.

They chit-chat together on the front porch until the sun sets.

At night, they watch a drama series - careful to turn on the TV only after the news is over. Hannan tries to distract them with happier thoughts.

“We don't want to follow what is happening in Syria,” she explains. “It is too emotional for the Syrian family to talk about it. When you host a Syrian family, you have to be careful and subtle about the topics you talk about. You also have to be really patient.” And apparently, you also have to have a lot of coffee.

ar/ha/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97997/Coffee-and-patience-a-day-in-the-life-of-a-family-hosting-Syrian-refugees</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081000090696t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">SAADNAYEL, BEKAA VALLEY 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The experiences of 1.4 million Syrian refugees are increasingly well-documented, but little is known about the people who open up their homes to host them. How do you organize your house to accommodate people you may only barely know? What are the stresses and strains? Do politics get in the way? IRIN spent a day in the life of a host family to bring you this portrait.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Trading conflict for coffee in DRC</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081446130806t.jpg" />]]>GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.</description><body><![CDATA[GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.

"You should tell the population to grow coffee, as it's the best way for them to make money," he told a militia member during a recent visit to the town of Kalonge, where he and his fellow cooperative members have planted a nursery for coffee seedlings.

The Kivu Cooperative of Coffee Planters and Traders (CPNCK), which Makelele founded five years ago, has planted six of these nurseries in the Kalonge-Pinga-Mweso triangle, a hotbed of militia activity.

"If the young men in this area knew how much they could earn with coffee, they would not be interested in joining militias," Makelele told IRIN.

“A paradise for coffee”

Coffee, a traditional export crop, was virtually abandoned across much of North Kivu in the past 30 years. DRC’s production shrank from 110,000 metric tons in the late 1980s to about 50,000 metric tons in 2009, according to the DRC’s national coffee office.

CPNCK says it is giving away half a million arabica seedlings to help relaunch coffee’s cultivation.

Many people in the Kalonge area, including members of armed groups, appear to be interested in planting coffee. The militiaman told IRIN he would like to plant the crop on his ancestral land of more than 100 hectares, but that he would first have to raise US$1,000 to pay the land registry for title deeds.

Uncertainty about land titles and the involvement of Congolese and foreign armed groups are just some of the problems local farmers will face if they decide to take Makelele’s advice.  Planting coffee is a long-term investment, prices have been volatile and the market is not as reliable as that for food crops.

Nevertheless, the crop has paid off for neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda, which have increased their production in recent years. The crop is Uganda’s single most important export, and coffee and tea together account for nearly half of Rwanda’s exports.

The recent history of coffee prices could also deter would-be planters: The New York market price for mild arabica, currently slightly above the inflation-adjusted average for the past decade, has fluctuated by more than 300 percent since 2003, and has trended downwards since the late 1970s.

But coffee’s promoters argue that increasing demand in middle-income countries, plus the possibility that climate change could lead to the spread of diseases in coffee plants, point to higher prices in future - and bright prospects for Kivu coffee.

Additionally, the temperate climate in the Kivu region’s hills is thought to be protection against coffee rust, the most devastating disease affecting arabica. Partly for this reason, World Coffee Research describes the area as “a paradise for coffee”.

This optimism has helped to persuade several NGOs - including Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Oxfam, the Eastern Congo Initiative and the Fairtrade organization Twin - to launch coffee projects in the Kivu provinces.

Twin has helped a South Kivu co-operative, Sopacdi, replant coffee and improve yields, quality and post-harvest processing, enabling its 3,500 members to become the first producers in Kivu to achieve organic and Fairtrade certification.

Income potential

Sopacdi has publicized the job opportunities it has provided to ex-combatants. A number of them work at a mechanized washing centre - paid for by Twin and employing 161 people - where the coffee berries are depulped and dried.

One of the staff at the washing centre, former rebel Habamungu Engavashapa, told IRIN he was happy with civilian life because he was able to spend nights in a house rather than in the forest.

Another ex-combatant, Abdul Mahagi, said Sopacdi had trained him as a machinist and given him a contract; he said he was beginning to see a way to organize his life.

Other workers at the washing centre, however, complained that their salaries, about $60 a month, were barely enough to live on.

The main opportunities that coffee co-operatives are likely to provide for ex-combatants in the short term would be to clear land and plant seedlings.

CPNCK has been employing 50 ex-combatants on these tasks at a rate of $1 a day, much less than they would earn in artisanal mining, but not insignificant in most of the villages, says Jean-Baptiste Musbyimana, an agricultural journalist based in Goma.

The returns could be more enticing for ex-combatants and smallholder farmers who are able to grow coffee for themselves.

For information on the profitability of coffee versus that of alternative crops, IRIN consulted Franck Muke, an agronomist who has studied coffee production in DRC and in Brazil; Xavier Phemba, CRS’s agricultural project co-ordinator in Goma; and Sandra Kavira, an agronomist working for the International Fertilizer Development Centre.

Their data suggest returns from a hectare of 2,500 coffee trees could be two to three times as high as the returns from a hectare of maize or beans, assuming an absence of mineral fertilizers and only limited use of organic fertilizers.

Jean-Baptiste Musabyimana, of the Federation of Agricultural Producer Organizations of Congo (FOPAC), which does not promote coffee, said coffee is regarded as having several advantages over other crops, including the potential for intercropping with bananas, beans or legumes, which provide organic waste and additional profits from the same acreage.

Once the trees have been planted, coffee also requires less labour than annual crops and is less likely to be stolen.

"Armed groups won't cut off the berries and eat them," coffee plantation owner Eric Kulage told IRIN. "And the workers don't want the berries either, whereas when they are harvesting maize they always solicit some bags."

Coffee’s major disadvantage is the cost of planting and the fact that the trees cannot be harvested for the first three years and do not reach their full potential for five to eight years. Muke estimated costs of planting 2,500 trees per hectare, and pruning for three non-productive years, at $850 to $950. These costs, and the risks involved, limit the acreage farmers will be willing to devote to the crop.

Helping DRC compete

A significant limitation to DRC’s coffee industry is the lack of mechanized washing stations, which cut down on waste and help maintain product consistency. Washing stations are the norm in Uganda and Rwanda, but there are hardly any in Kivu, where producers depulp the berries by hand or sell the wet berries to merchants from Uganda and Rwanda.

Aid agencies are planning to install several washing stations at sites close to large population centres and to Lake Kivu. But Muke says this could be a mistake, as the lakeside areas have higher humidity, which is thought to promote coffee rust.

There could be social advantages to promoting a perennial crop in areas further from Lake Kivu, like Kalonge Pinga and Mweso, where many young men see joining an armed group as their most viable livelihood option.

“If they have a perennial crop to look after, they will want to settle down,” suggested CPNCK’s Makelele.

But a major obstacle to promoting agriculture in areas where militias recruit is, of course, insecurity. Although armed groups are unlikely to steal coffee berries, they might try to steal bulk loads of dried coffee from washing stations.

Plantation owner Kulage commented that, in his experience, armed groups had not succeeded in stealing and marketing large coffee harvests in recent years. He suggested that security forces might be deployed to protect washing stations during the limited periods when bulk loads of dried coffee are left there.

Oxfam’s co-ordinator for North Kivu, Tariq Riebl, doubted whether any donor would accept the risk of building a washing station in a place like Kalonge. He noted that 90,000 seedlings had recently been stolen from a CPNCK nursery near Kalonge.

“If you mention that to donors, they won’t want to hear anything more,” he said.

But Makelele argues that the theft was not a problem because the co-op was going to give the seedlings away anyway.

“I am very happy about it,” he told IRIN. “It shows that people want to plant coffee.”

nl/rz

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97998/Trading-conflict-for-coffee-in-DRC</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081446130806t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">GOMA 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - Entrepreneur Gilbert Makelele wants armed groups in his part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to wake up and smell the coffee.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Is more force in the DRC more of the same?</title><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081532470009t.jpg" />]]>JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters.</description><body><![CDATA[JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters. 

The deployment of this “international brigade” made up of troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania will complement the existing UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and is designed to help quell M23 [ http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23 ] and other rebel militias. 

When an intervention force was first mooted by the African Union (AU) last year, Sivuyile Bam, AU head of Peace and Support Operations Division (PSOD), told IRIN the plan was to “deal specifically with M23, and when M23 go away, they [the intervention force] go away”. That has since evolved into preventing the expansion of all armed groups, and neutralizing and disarming them by deploying an “offensive” military force, said a UN Security Council resolution [ http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10964.doc.htm ].

Pretoria-based think tank the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) [ http://issafrica.org/ ] estimates there are more than 33 armed groups currently operating in eastern DRC. They are variously involved in mineral extraction and self-defence through to acting as proxies for the strategic interests of neighbouring states. 

The intervention force, known as SADCBrig (Southern African Development Community Brigade), will “carry out targeted offensive operations… either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC [DRC national army], in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law,” says UN resolution 2098 [ http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098%282013%29 ].

It will consist “inter alia of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company with headquarters in Goma,” the UN resolution adds. 

Since the first deployment of “blue helmets” to the DRC in 1999, first as the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and then as MONUSCO, troop numbers have increased more than three-fold from the original 5,000-odd uniformed soldiers. There have been supplementary ad hoc military missions, such as the 2003 European Union (EU) military intervention in Bunia during the Ituri ethnic-based conflict dubbed Operation Artemis [ http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/book1/book%20vol1_part2_chapter12_operation%20artemis%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo_kees%20homan.pdf ], and the 2009 operations Umoja Wetu (Our Unity) and Kimia II, a joint military offensive of DRC and Rwandan security forces against the armed group Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération de Rwanda (FDLR). 

A military analyst serving with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), who declined to be identified, said the Security Council resolution was “a massive expansion of the task” first envisaged by the AU, but the mandate had to be “wider than M23” if the ambition was to protect civilians. 

Zuma doctrine 

The analyst told IRIN the intervention force was expected “to have initial capability by end of May and operational capability by end of June [2013]”. 

The deployment of South African troops in CAR and their participation in SADCBrig is being viewed by analysts as a departure from South Africa’s previous military ventures, with a more aggressive stance towards resolving the continent’s conflicts. It has been dubbed the [President Jacob] Zuma doctrine by analysts. 

South African Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane told a media briefing on 29 April 2013 her country was in favour of “preventative diplomacy, intervening when there are situations of strife. When we are called upon to do that, we will always be there, we will never say no.” 

In a statement adjoining the UN resolution, Rwanda’s Eugene-Richard Gasana hoped the force would tackle the “FDLR, which had sparked the 1994 [Rwandan] genocide”. Rwanda, which is suspected of supporting M23, sees it as a bulwark against the FDLR. 

The military analyst said MONUSCO had been “hesitant” to use force beyond self-defence - something for which the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation was roundly condemned when M23 walked into Goma unopposed, despite the presence of more than 1,500 armed peacekeepers in the town and nearly 6,000 in North Kivu Province. 

Ahead of the deployment of SADCBrig, and in the wake of 13 South African soldiers having been killed recently in the Central African Republic trying to prevent the rebel coup by the Séléka alliance, M23 taunted SANDF on social media saying it was “corrupt” and “old” [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94597/Analysis-South-Africa-paper-tiger-of-African-peacekeeping-operations ].

Critiques 

Meanwhile, some doubt the new force can achieve its objective. 

“Armed (DRC) groups are seen as a military threat but most of them are not. The military option against the armed groups has failed repeatedly and some [armed groups] deserve a small dose of military pressure but [also] a lot of police work in order to be neutralized. The intervention brigade in particular and the UN [MONUSCO] in general are not equipped for this,” International Crisis Group (ICG) [ http://www.crisisgroup.org/ ] analyst Thierry Vircoulon told IRIN. 

He said SADCBrig deployment was “security by substitution”, and would delay reforms of the DRC national army (FARDC), which has been accused of being a serial human rights abuser by rights organizations. SADCBrig’s more offensive posture would lead to “retaliations against civilians [by armed groups] and worsening of the humanitarian situation”, unless stringent measures were put in place to protect civilians in the areas of operation. 

Liam Mahony, author of a recent report commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) entitled Non-military strategies for civilian protection in the DRC [ http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/fv-publications/Non-military_protection_in_the_DRC.pdf ], said: “The international community continues to believe that military protection of civilians in the DRC may succeed, if there are only enough soldiers or a sufficiently strong mandate. 

“However, there is little if any empirical evidence for this. Faith in military solutions is exaggerated by the mistaken belief that violence can only be met with more violence… 

“The humanitarian service machinery has become a virtually permanent fixture in the region, serving victims of multiple displacements and repeating cycles of violence for two decades, while efforts to change the underlying dynamics of conflict have been insufficient and ineffective.” 

He told IRIN the approach by policymakers to armed groups in the DRC was “one size fits all… People tend to oversimplify or choose extreme interpretations of armed groups… People assume they are unreasonable and not open to negotiation and communication… This is not specific to DRC. It is true everywhere.” 

“I would not categorically dismiss the possibility that there may be armed groups with whom such approaches would fail, and there may be armed groups who would be more deterred from human rights abuse by an effective military counter-force. It is conceivable, but it must be the result of a very specific detailed analysis, not a generic knee-jerk approach.” 

Operational difficulties 

Andre Roux, author of a recent ISS briefing [ http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1605 ] on SADCBrig’s deployment, said: “The realities of conducting operations in this remote and complex environment have been underestimated in the rush to put solutions on the table.” 

Roux said the capabilities of SADCBrig “to effectively conduct `war fighting’ operations in an integrated manner, are questionable. With different operational doctrines, a variety of tactical deployment techniques and military equipment that is often not interoperable, the battalions can fight as individual units, but questions arise about whether they can or must fight as a cohesive brigade.” 

SANDF is expected to transfer its troops serving with MONUSCO to SADCBrig, which is supposed to operate in conjunction with FARDC, though past experiences of cooperation between SANDF and FARDC appear to have been problematical. “Members of the local army [FARDC] did not share information and they would steal anything without blinking an eye,” said a June 2012 ISS report on relations between the two [ http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=31642 ].

Roux noted that apart from the challenges of integrating military “tactics and doctrines”, there was also the risk of “a protracted counter-insurgency-type scenario characterized by atrocities in which entire villages are wiped out by rebel forces in order to divert the attention of the brigade into a defensive mind-set focused on the difficult task of protecting civilians rather than neutralizing illegal armed groups… 

“Is this again a peacekeeping band-aid that will struggle to meet the high expectations that do not consider the difficult realities of the situation?” he asks. 

go/cb 

]]></body><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97999/Is-more-force-in-the-DRC-more-of-the-same</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305081532470009t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">JOHANNESBURG 08 May 2013 (IRIN) - The imminent deployment of a UN-backed 3,000-strong international force mandated to “neutralize… and disarm” all armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marks a switch to a more belligerent international stance towards rebel militia, but has met with scepticism in some quarters.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Displaced still homeless after clashes in Baga, Nigeria</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061639020892t.jpg" />]]>BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.

An estimated 2,275 homes were destroyed in fires, and a further 125 severely damaged, according to satellite images released by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in a 1 May statement [ http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-destruction-deaths-military-raid ].

“Our major worry now is finding where to stay and rebuild our homes before rain sets in. Many of us are now squatting with relations and friends here in Baga and in neighbouring towns and villages,” Ibrahim Buba told IRIN in the courtyard of his gutted four-bedroom mud house in the Pampon Gaja-Gaja neigbourhood.

Heavy fighting broke out in Baga, on the shores of Lake Chad, between MNJTF and Boko Haram (BH) on 16 April, causing fire to break out and sweep through the neighbourhoods of Pampon Gaja-Gaja, Fulatari and Budumari. The Nigerian Red Cross estimated 187 people died in the fire and fighting, but the military dispute these figures, insisting only 37 people, including 30 Islamists, six civilians and a soldier, were killed.

Many residents accused soldiers of burning their homes, while military forces disputed the accusations, blaming BH.

The area is a BH stronghold and military officials have accused Borno State residents of harbouring BH members. According to HRW, BH has killed numerous Borno State residents, creating a climate of fear in the area.

“I lost my all that I worked for in life including my house, two cars, two motorcycles, and a grinding machine which is my major source of income,” said 62-year-old Adamu Ciroma. “What preoccupies me is how to rebuild my house to shelter my family of 18.”

Maina Maaji Lawan, a Borno State senator, told IRIN there is not enough emergency shelter to house all the displaced. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has set up temporary shelter for just over 600 of the displaced, according to a recent statement.

Borno State governor Kashim Shettima has ordered that the destroyed houses be rebuilt, according to spokesperson Isa Umar Gusau.

Many still in hiding

Most Baga residents rely on fishing and farming for their income. “We don’t even have seeds to plant because the seeds we saved have been gobbled by fire,” local smallholder Ba’ana Sharif told IRIN, as he stood in the midst of his burnt granary. The rainy season begins in May and extends into September in Nigeria’s semi-arid northeastern region.

NEMA and the Red Cross arrived in Baga eight days after the fire because they had to wait for security clearance from the military which claimed the area was too dangerous for aid workers to enter, according to Nigerian Red Cross national coordinator Umar Mairiga.

Many residents are still in the bush having fled their burning homes: They fear a resumption of violence between BH and the military, residents and aid officials said.

"Many people are still in hiding. Part of our work there is to build confidence. We need to show people that what we have now in Baga is assistance, not any more attacks," said NEMA spokesman Manzo Ezekiel.

Resident Abdullahi Gumel told IRIN on 30 April that he found two residents in the bush suffering from burns and thirst. They both died within 24 hours.

Brig-Gen Austin Edokpayi, head of MNJTF, blamed the mass exodus of residents on “warnings from BH Islamists to leave the town, as the terrorists were planning reprisals against the military for the casualties they suffered at the hands of the multi-national troops.”

HRW called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to probe the events in Baga as part of a preliminary investigation the court launched in 2010 on the situation in Nigeria. The ICC has indicated that crimes committed by BH may constitute crimes against humanity.  
On 23 April, President Goodluck Jonathan ordered a full-scale investigation into the events in Baga.

aa/aj/cb

]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2013/201305061639020892t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGA,NIGERIA 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Thousands of residents of Baga in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, remain displaced for fear of further clashes breaking out between radical Islamist group Boko Haram and troops from the Nigeria-Niger-Chad Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). A reported 187 people died in the clashes on 16 and 17 April.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Less dependent on food rations</title><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011150703500206t.jpg" />]]>BAGHDAD/DUBAI 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - The number of Iraqis without secure access to food dropped by more than a quarter of a million people between 2007 and 2011, part of a generally positive trend of increasing food security in Iraq over the last decade.</description><body><![CDATA[BAGHDAD/DUBAI 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - Food security in Iraq has improved in the last decade, as the American-led invasion brought an end to sanctions and a resumption of open relations between Iraq and the rest of the world.

Historically, Iraq’s vulnerability to food insecurity has been largely due to barriers to international trade - caused by two decades of wars and sanctions - which hindered the export of oil and import of food commodities. These barriers also affected Iraq’s ability to modernize the agricultural sector and employ new technologies; local production could not meet the country’s growing food needs.

As such, even during the worst years of sectarian violence in the last decade, access to food improved on average, compared to the years under sanctions.

Recent history

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in 1980, just four percent of Iraqis were undernourished or “food deprived”, meaning they consumed less than the minimum energy requirement, which in Iraq is currently estimated at 1,726 kilocalories per person per day. Despite years of war with Iran in the 1980s, agricultural subsidies and food imports from the US and Europe helped keep the level of food deprivation low [ http://www.fao.org/NEWS/1999/img/SOFI99-E.PDF ].

But when the UN leveled sanctions against Iraq in August 1990, and US government credits for agricultural exports to Iraq ceased, Iraq - almost completely dependent on imports for its food needs - saw food deprivation rise to 15 percent by 1996, according to FAO. Throughout the 1990s, food deprivation continued to climb, reaching a peak of close to one-third of the population in the late 90s, by some counts.

Humanitarian food supplies delivered through the UN’s Oil-for-Food Programme, initiated in 1995, helped ease the strain, but during the early to mid-2000s, the Public Distribution System (PDS) - the government’s subsidy scheme created in 1991 - remained “by far the single most important food source in the diet” for the poor and food insecure population, according to a 2006 report by the government and the World Food Programme (WFP) [ http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp193132.pdf ].

Post-2003

Food deprivation levels began to fall just before the turn of the century, and the decline increased with the toppling of former president Saddam Hussein, which saw Iraq regain the ability to import freely. In the last decade, the country has experienced a “huge transformation”, as one observer put it.

In 2003, months after the invasion, a WFP survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/122/wfp086624.pdf ] found that 11 percent of the population lacked secure access to food, a large drop from the high of the 1990s.

While food insecurity was found to have risen slightly, to 15.4 percent, in a 2005 WFP-government survey [ http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp193132.pdf ], it fell right back down shortly afterwards.

Joint government-UN analysis [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1110/Food%20Deprivation%20in%20Iraq.pdf ] of 2007 survey data [ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRAQEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22032522~menuPK:313111~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:313105,00.html ] found that 7.1 percent of the population was food deprived; this dropped to 5.7 percent in 2011, according to the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1685/IKN_S8_FoodSecurity_en.pdf ].

The government credits an improvement in security, economic growth and increased humanitarian aid.

PDS

Whereas aid workers estimated 60 percent of the population was food aid-reliant during Hussein’s reign, the PDS is now essential only to the poor [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/24110/IRAQ-Food-security-still-problematic-WFP ].

Sa’ad al-Shimary, a government employee from Baghdad, said his family used to be dependent on the PDS. “I don’t even need the food supplies we get from the ration card now,” he said. “I can buy good quality food from the markets, as everything is available now.”

But while the value of the PDS basket has diminished for most Iraqis (it now represents only 8 percent of the total cash value of food expenditures), it remains a major source of wheat and rice for 72 percent and 64 percent of households respectively, according to the 2011 IKN survey. (Iraq’s PDS is the largest in the world, according to the US Agency for International Development, providing virtually free basic food rations to any Iraqi; as such, it is not only utilized by the poor.) [ https://www.inma-iraq.com/sites/default/files/11_transforming_the_iraqi_public_distribution_system_2011jan00.pdf ]

The PDS is the source of more than one-third of Iraqis’ calorie consumption, and more than half of the poor’s consumption.

And at 35 percent, food continues to comprise the highest proportion of Iraqi household expenditures. Nearly one-quarter of IKN respondents said they used coping strategies to eat enough in 2011. In addition to the 5.7 percent of Iraqis now considered to be undernourished, an additional 14 percent would become undernourished if the PDS did not exist, according to the IKN.

Malnutrition

Malnutrition indicators paint a blurrier picture.

While the percentage of children under five who are underweight nearly halved from 15.9 percent in 2000 to 8.5 percent in 2011, according to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), conducted by the government and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), chronic and acute malnutrition indicators look less positive.

The percentage of children under five who are moderately or severely stunted (too short for their age) or wasted (underweight for their height) both increased - if only slightly - over the same period, a “worrying” trend, aid workers said, given the long-term impacts of malnutrition on mental development.

According to UNICEF, one out of every four Iraqi children suffers from stunted growth. High levels of chronic and acute malnutrition are a sign that mothers and children do not have access to quality food. While access to food has improved, stunting and wasting are difficult trends to reverse in a short period of time. As such, it may take years before improved access to food reflects in malnutrition rates across the board.

Impact of violence

Although the last decade has seen overall gains in food security, the sectarian violence of 2006-2007 [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97905/The-forgotten-displacement-crisis ] did have a negative impact. For example, a WFP report based on 2007 data found that levels of food deprivation differed by area: in Diyala Governorate, one of the most volatile during the conflict, 51 percent of the population was deprived of food, while in the northern autonomous Kurdistan region, largely spared the consequences of the invasion, just one percent of the population suffered from food deprivation [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1110/Food%20Deprivation%20in%20Iraq.pdf ].

Here, too, there has been change. While in 2007, insecurity had a huge bearing on food security, the food insecure today are traditionally vulnerable groups - the illiterate, the unemployed, the displaced and female-headed households.

Iraq also faces new challenges to its food security, according to Edward Kallon, WFP’s director in Iraq, including rising global food prices, poverty, climate change, desertification and drought.

For more, check out this UN fact-sheet on food security [ http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1824/ExecutiveSummer.pdf ] and this presentation by UNICEF comparing the child indicators in Iraq over the last three to five decades [ http://www.unicef.org/equity/files/PMACEquitypresentation.pdf ]. The bulk of statistics come from WFP/government surveys in 2003 [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/122/wfp086624.pdf ], 2005 [ http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp193132.pdf ] and 2007 [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/227/WFP_VAMSurvey_2007_CFSVA%20final.pdf ]; and UNICEF/government surveys in 2000 [ http://www.childinfo.org/files/iraq1.pdf ], 2006 [ http://www.childinfo.org/files/MICS3_Iraq_FinalReport_2006_eng.pdf ] and 2011 [ https://www.yousendit.com/download/UVJneFlUY1M1bmo1SE1UQw ]. This 2010 report [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1110/Food%20Deprivation%20in%20Iraq.pdf ] on food deprivation analyzes 2007 data collected in a survey by the government and the World Bank [ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRAQEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22032522~menuPK:313111~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:313105,00.html ], just as this 2012 report [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1824/WFP-final-view.pdf ] analyzes food security data from the 2011 IKN survey [ http://www.japuiraq.org/ikn ]. The FAO has its own figures on food deprivation [ http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf ]. The government has also tracked statistics [ http://cosit.gov.iq/english/AAS2012/section_19/2.htm ] on underweight children from 1991 through 2009.

For other development indicators, visit IRIN's series: Iraq 10 years on [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-ten-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact ].

af/da/ha/rz

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A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
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]]></body><pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97991/Less-dependent-on-food-rations</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2010/201011150703500206t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">BAGHDAD/DUBAI 07 May 2013 (IRIN) - The number of Iraqis without secure access to food dropped by more than a quarter of a million people between 2007 and 2011, part of a generally positive trend of increasing food security in Iraq over the last decade.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Women yet to regain their place</title><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><description><![CDATA[<img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041258200194t.jpg" />]]>DUBAI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - In the 1980s, Iraqi women enjoyed more basic rights than their counterparts in the region; today, despite steps taken after decades of conflict and sanctions, Iraqi women do not have equal educational or employment opportunities, and many are subjected to gender-based violence.</description><body><![CDATA[DUBAI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - In the 1980s, the UN says, Iraqi women enjoyed more basic rights than other women in the region. But years of dictatorship, sanctions and conflict, including the US-led invasion one decade ago, led to deterioration in women’s status. 

“Across the board, women are suffering more [than they used to],” said Sudipto Mukerjee, deputy head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq. 

Despite steps taken towards gender equality since 1990, Iraqi women today do not have equal educational or employment opportunities, and too many are subjected to gender-based violence 

Due to years of war and political instability, 10 percent of households are headed by women, most of them widowed, but many of them divorced, separated or caring for sick spouses. 

“They represent one of the most vulnerable segments of the population and are generally more exposed to poverty and food insecurity as a result of lower overall income levels,” the UN said in a March 2013 fact-sheet [ http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=xqx9gxy7Isk%3D&tabid=2790&language=en-US ].

Education 

According to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) conducted by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the government, the ratio of girls to boys in primary school rose from 0.88 in 2006 to 0.94 in 2011; in secondary school, the ratio rose from 0.75 in 2006 to 0.85 in 2011. According to IRIN calculations, the enrolment of girls is growing at a faster rate than that of boys.

However, had Iraq progressed at the same rate as other countries in the region, according to UNICEF, it would have already reached 100 percent enrolment for both boys and girls in primary schools - achieving the third Millennium Development Goal of eliminating gender disparity in education [ http://www.unicef.org/equity/files/PMACEquitypresentation.pdf ]. 

According to Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey of 2011, 28.2 percent of women 12 years or older are illiterate, more than double the male rate of 13 percent. Young women - those aged 15 to 24 - living in rural areas are even less educated; one-third of them are illiterate. 

Employment 

Similar inequality can be seen in the labour force. 

According to the IKN survey, only 14 percent of women are working or actively seeking work, compared to 73 percent of men [ http://www.japuiraq.org/documents/1681/IKN_S4_LaborForce_en.pdf ]. Those who are employed are mostly working in the agricultural sector, and women with a diploma have a harder time finding jobs: 68 percent of women with a bachelor’s degree are unemployed. 

The representation of women in parliament increased from 13 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 2006, meeting the one-quarter female representation quota imposed in 2005, but this is still far below the national target of half. 

Physical safety 

Women’s health concerns have seen some gains. The percentage of births attended by skilled personnel has risen significantly in the last decade [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97964/War-leaves-lasting-impact-on-healthcare ]. And the maternal mortality rate - which at 84 per 100,000 births in 2006 was the highest in the region - appears to have dropped significantly, to 24 per 100,000 in 2011, according to the World Health Organization [ http://rho.emro.who.int/rhodata/ ].

Still, domestic violence, honour killings, female genital mutilation (FGM) and human trafficking remain threats to many Iraqi women and girls. In the northern autonomous Kurdistan region, 42.8 percent of women have experienced FGM, according to the 2011 MICS [ https://www.yousendit.com/download/UVJneFlUY1M1bmo1SE1UQwv ].

In 2011, nearly half of girls aged 10 to 14 were exposed to violence at least once by a family member, and nearly half of married women were exposed to at least one form of spousal violence, mostly emotional, but also physical and sexual, according to a survey by the government and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) [ http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/I-WISH_Report_English.pdf ].

For more, check out this UN fact-sheet on women in Iraq [ http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=xqx9gxy7Isk%3D&tabid=2790&language=en-US ].

For other development indicators, visit IRIN's series: Iraq 10 years on [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97897/Iraq-ten-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact ].

ha/rz

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A decade after US-led forced toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, IRIN examines the progress in basic living standards.
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]]></body><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><link>http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97976/Women-yet-to-regain-their-place</link><content:encoded><![CDATA[<table cellpadding="3"><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://www.irinnews.org/images/2012/201209041258200194t.jpg"/></td><td valign="top">DUBAI 06 May 2013 (IRIN) - In the 1980s, Iraqi women enjoyed more basic rights than their counterparts in the region; today, despite steps taken after decades of conflict and sanctions, Iraqi women do not have equal educational or employment opportunities, and many are subjected to gender-based violence.</td></tr></table>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>